NAVAL CORPS, SPECIALIZATION AND EFFICIENCY
By Lieutenant Commander T. C. Kincaid, U. S. Navy
Much has been written in the past few months in connection with the special functions of the various naval corps, shore duty only, amalgamation and other kindred subjects having to do with the organization, duties and education of the officer personnel of the navy.
Promotion by selection and other methods of promotion have been analyzed and discussed and a board of officers of high rank has been appointed to consider recommendations on this subject. The method of promotion has, and always will have, a direct bearing on the duties, training and education of officers. Under one system specialists may thrive, while under another the jack-of-all-trades-master-of-none may have an advantage; and still another system may develop a good all-around naval officer who is particularly well informed in one line of endeavor.
Many of the articles written on these subjects have been inspired by arguments in which glittering generalities formed the basis of the discussion, bringing forth false conclusions, which are not borne out by careful analysis. The old corps jealousies and after-war hysteria are not entirely lacking in what we read.
That specialization of some sort is necessary can not be doubted and the number of pro-specialists in the service has noticeably increased in the past few years, as a result of observations afloat as well as ashore. This faction should not be entirely discouraged for their ideas are based upon fundamentally sound arguments, but their ideas should be carefully sifted and weighed against each other in order that the kind of specialization that will do most good, and least harm, will be obtained.
Corps specialization is decidedly unpopular, the feeling being general that special corps are both unnecessary and undesirable. The service would be far better served by specialists within the line who go to sea and operate the material of which they supervise the construction when ashore. The naval constructor and the permanent engineer are not the actual designers of material. They are supervising designers and the run-of-the-line naval officer can be trained to do just the work that these specialists do. In fact, the line officer has the advantage of practical experience afloat and is able to consider recommendations and criticisms from a broader point of view than the corps specialist who has remained on shore duty for several years.
The fact that line officers, after a special course of instruction, can successfully supervise the design of complicated mechanism has been demonstrated by the Bureau of Ordnance. There is no more complicated design work than that of a gun and its appliances. During the past few years enormous strides have been made in the development of ordnance material and all of the design work has been supervised by seagoing line officers. The development in fire control mechanism could not have taken place without the direct contact of seagoing officers who had a thorough, practical knowledge of the problems to be solved. The design of new material may be divided into two general functions; first, a clear-cut statement of what the mechanism is to accomplish, giving its general characteristics, followed by a critical inspection of the actual designs; and second, the actual calculation and arrangement of parts. The first of these functions can best be done by a line officer specialist who is familiar with practical considerations connected with operation and who knows what part this particular mechanism is to play in the operation of the ship as a whole. The second can be accomplished only by a designing engineer of whom there are plenty available in the drafting rooms of various naval establishments and outside contractors.
Specialists are required at sea as well as ashore. It is obviously impracticable and impossible for any individual to be expert in all the varied subjects of which an efficient naval officer is required to have a working knowledge. The officer who works up in the Gunnery Department through all the stages required to give him a thorough knowledge of operation, procedure and doctrine, should be an expert gunnery officer, but the efficiency of the ship as a whole would suffer if he were detailed as navigator or chief engineer. In the same way, the trained engineer could not be expected to make an expert gunnery officer. The officer who flits from one department to another can not be an expert in any one line of endeavor, and certainly not in all lines. This does not mean that the average naval officer can not "get away" with a tour of duty in any department on board ship. The untrained gunnery officer or chief engineer may finish a cruise without court-martial and the ship may even stand fairly well in competition, but it is certain that maximum efficiency will not be attained and very little development can be hoped for if the heads of department on board ship are not specially trained men.
It is only natural that officers who specialize in the production of a certain type of material ashore should specialize in the operation of that material afloat. By such a system complete co-operation between the designers and operators of material should be obtained and maximum efficiency afloat should be the result. Continuous and progressive advancement of the multiplicity of arts, industries, and sciences connected with a naval officer's career can be obtained only in this way.
The establishment of seagoing corps would not accomplish our object. We would then have the old corps jealousies and narrow points of view. But that is not all. Teamwork would be extremely difficult, due to lack of understanding and sympathy between the officers in charge of the various stations in the ship. This was demonstrated years ago and was one of the causes of the abolition of the Engineer Corps. Each department on board ship, and each subdivision of each department, is merely a unit in an organization which must function as a whole. Each unit must not only perform its own function but must do so at the proper time and in such manner as will fit in with the other units for the efficiency of the whole organization. It is necessary that the commander of a unit have a working knowledge of the functions of other units and of the general scheme of operations of the whole ship's organization.
One line of endeavor in which specialization is greatly needed is that of administration. A flag officer generally selects his staff from among the younger officers of his acquaintance in whom he has confidence, but these officers, until they have served on a staff, are entirely untrained for the special type of duty they are called upon to perform. There is no school of instruction for prospective members of a flag officer's staff and the officers selected are, in many cases, too young to have had the experience necessary to perform their duties efficiently. The details of administration can not be followed personally by the flag officer and important work, of a widely varied nature, is delegated to officers who have had neither the experience nor the training to properly perform such work. The result can only be inefficiency in administration.
For a number of years there has been a demand in the service for a greater number of school days for officers. The advance in technical subjects has been so rapid in the immediate past that the Naval Academy is no longer able to complete the education required for an officer.
The course at the Naval Academy lays a foundation upon which to build. It is excellent preparation for inferior subordinate duties. After about five years at sea, all officers should return to the Naval Academy for a period of one year for a postgraduate course in general line duties. At this period in his career, the officer has had an opportunity to test the theories learned at the Naval Academy; has had the responsibility of a watch, either on deck or in the engine room, or both; has occupied a position of more or less importance in the battle organization of a man-of-war; has profited by contact with older and more experienced officers; has developed a sense of responsibility and pride in the service; and usually has a definite preference for one line of work. His age and experience make his powers of learning vastly greater than during the initial instruction period at the Naval Academy.
The function of the general line' course is the confirmation of initial instruction and the progressive and advanced instruction in preparation for duties of a higher order, laying emphasis on the subjects in which all line officers must be expert. Every line officer in the service should be an expert navigator and an expert seaman; should have a thorough knowledge of the laws governing the navy and the U.S. Navy Regulations; should have a thorough understanding of the organization and relative functions of ships, shore stations and the Navy Department. A detailed outline of a proposed general line course was submitted to the Bureau of Navigation by a board appointed to consider the instruction and training of line officers and the report of this board was published in the Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, for August, 1920.
Immediately following the general line course, specialization should begin. If practicable every line officer should specialize and become highly expert in one branch of work. The specialist's course should correspond to the present postgraduate courses for line officers in ordnance and engineering and there should be added courses in naval construction, aviation, and administration. The length and nature of these courses would be determined in accordance with the requirements in each case.
After completion of this course, the line-officer-specialist would go to sea and be assigned to duty in connection with his specialty, and subsequent shore duty should follow the same line of work. This should not be an ironclad rule, as all line officers should be available for assignment to any line duty, but it should be the general rule followed in ordinary practice. When an officer had attained the proper rank for superior subordinate duties, he would become head of a department in which he had been brought up and his previous training and experience would insure not only proper performance of duty in a routine way, but aggressive performance of duty tending toward advance and development.
The next step in the education of the line officer is the Junior War College course which should be taken by all line officers after about twenty years' service. All specialists are again placed on a common footing, studying the principles of command and many important phases of tactics and strategy in preparation for duty as second in command of capital ships and commanding officer of smaller fleet units. All line officers would then have a common conception of war and would be uniformly indoctrinated. The senior members of a flag officer's staff would be competent to do strategic planning and to formulate doctrines.
Graduates of this course should be assigned to duty in accordance with their relative rank. Graduates who have not rank enough to be second in command of capital ships or to command cruisers or gunboats, should be assigned to command destroyers or to superior subordinate duties in connection with their specialties on capital ships until such time as the necessary rank has been attained. Shore duty at this period should be of an administrative nature and may or may not be in connection with a specialty.
After completion of a tour of duty in command of a capital ship or group of smaller ships, officers who will attain flag rank should be detailed to take the Senior War College course. All captains should, if practicable, take this course, but, if the number is limited, only those officers who it is expected will be selected for promotion should be allowed to take the course. If promotion by selection remains in effect, the Selection Board should designate the officers to be detailed for this course if there is to be a limited number.
The Senior War College course should teach the higher elements of the profession which concern chiefly those principles that govern in the administration, operation and functions of forces and fleets. Without such a course, a flag officer can not hope to function at maximum efficiency. If a flag officer is promoted without having taken the senior War College course his first assignment to duty in his new rank should be at the War College. With the above system of instruction in effect flag officers would not be properly trained themselves but would be able to surround themselves by specially trained, competent staff officers to whom important duties could safely be entrusted. The president of the Naval War College should be required to furnish all graduates of the Senior War College course with a semi-annual letter, or pamphlet, setting forth all developments in the preceding six months in order to insure flag officers of several years' standing keeping up to date.
Many of the after-war difficulties which the service has experienced during the past three years are of a temporary nature, and will cease to give trouble as time goes on and the service settles down to a routine scheme of training a definite organization of men and ships. These difficulties, however, have served to strengthen the arguments of the pro-specialists and have convinced many officers, who did not believe it before, that specialists are essential to efficiency in the operation of our ships.
Within a few months after this country entered the war practically every gunnery officer in the fleet had been detached and their places were filled by much younger officers. These officers, however, were essentially gunnery specialists having been thoroughly indoctrinated in the gunnery departments of the various ships in the fleet. This made possible the era of advance and development in gunnery which took place in our fleet during the war period. Within a few months after the signing of the armistice, practically all of these officers had been detached and, in order to have commanders as heads of department, older officers were ordered in their places. Many of these officers had been out of touch with gunnery for years and had great difficulty in catching up with the war developments. Expert submarine officers, destroyer commanders, and officers who had been serving on the staff of a flag officer found themselves woefully lacking in the knowledge and training necessary to drill and operate a ship's battery. Advance and development in gunnery were almost negligible and many of the lessons learned during the war have been lost.
Much difficulty has been experienced in the operation and upkeep of the engineering departments on board ship during the past few years because of the lack of specially trained engineers. New destroyers, just built and commissioned, have been found after a few months to be in very poor condition due to inefficiency in operation and upkeep. Conditions afloat have been a matter of grave concern to the Bureau of Engineering, so much so, that compulsory instruction in engineering for a certain number of hours a week for all officers on board ship below the grade of lieutenant commander was recently considered. This condition will correct itself in time but it indicates clearly the need of specially trained officers—specialists. The immediate remedy for such a situation lies within the fleet itself. Within a few months vast improvement can be made by systematic instruction and indoctrination through the medium of fleet meetings and lectures, similar to the system employed in the Atlantic Fleet in connection with gunnery during the war.
Part of the difficulties in engineering are due to the permanent engineer. When the assignment of officers to duty in engineering, only, with perpetual shore duty after reaching the grade of commander, was being considered, there was doubt in the minds of many officers as to the advisability of applying for this assignment. Those who did apply may be divided into two general classes: those whose interests are wholly in engineering and who are more or less averse to the duties of a line officer; and those who had performed so much engineering duty in the past that they felt that their chances for being selected for promotion would be jeopardized if they did not stick to engineering. A few may have applied because of the permanent shore duty feature.
One of the results of the assignment of officers to engineering duty, only, was the great difficulty in getting officers to apply for engineering duty. Young officers who would have been greatly benefited by a tour of duty in the engine room began to be shy of engineering. They did not want to be identified with a branch of work which led to permanent engineering and shore duty only. Engineering in their minds became a subject separate from the subjects connected with a line officer's duties. The law prevents officers of the grade of commander and above, who have been assigned to engineering duty only, from performing duty afloat, except in certain specified capacities, and the services of these officers are lost to the forces afloat just at the time when their special knowledge and experience would be most useful. The permanent engineer is unwelcome as chief engineer of a battleship because of the restrictions on the duty he may perform, and the fact that he can not succeed to command leads to embarrassing situations. Line officers who perform engineering duty afloat have a restricted choice of shore stations, as many of the desirable berths are occupied by permanent engineers.
The accompanying diagram shows the outline of the career proposed for line officers. After about five years' experience at sea the general line course is taken, followed immediately by a specialization course. Each individual then follows his own particular specialty until, at the end of about twenty years' service, all officers take the Junior War College course. The periods of command are followed by the Senior War College course before flag rank is reached. To the time scale at the left of the diagram have been added the rank and pay periods in the proposed pay bill to indicate the approximate rank at different periods in the career. Base pay allowed in the proposed bill has been shown merely as a matter of interest.
The above scheme of education and training of line officers would give the service the specialists that are needed, doing away entirely with the old corps jealousies and lack of sympathy, and would correct many present evils. The officers of the Construction Corps and those designated for engineering, only, should be amalgamated with the line as was the old Engineer Corps. The same procedure could be made to apply to the Supply Corps and Civil Engineer Corps but it is not so important in these two corps. With such a system in effect there would be very little chance of being skipped by the Selection Board for having performed too much duty of one kind, and such a danger does exist today. This is borne out by advice given individuals by members of former Selection Boards.
This article is not an indictment of the personnel of the Construction Corps nor of the officers who have been designated for engineering duty, only, but is intended to be a constructive criticism of a system which has many evils. The most important thing to be corrected, even before amalgamation of these two groups of officers, is the present inadequate system of education and training of line officers. Amalgamation with the line of these two groups of officers would add to the line many valuable officers in the lower grades. The officers of higher rank who elect to continue construction or engineering duties, only, should be allowed to do so, as was done when the old Engineer Corps was amalgamated with the line. When the old Engineer Corps was taken into the line, no immediate steps were taken to produce engineering specialists and, with the retirement of the old engineers, there was no one available to supervise the design and construction of engineering equipment. The need of specialists was not realized at that time as it is today. It was for this reason principally that designation of officers for engineering only was put into effect. With the system of specialization described above no such difficulty would be encountered.