NAVY YARDS AS INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS
By Commander G.A. Bisset, (CC), U.S. Navy
It will appear later on in this article that the above title is in the nature of a screen. The real subject of the article is the maintaining of materiel.
General Order No. 53, which provides for industrial managers at all navy yards, under the commandants, effective July 1, 1921, brings up again the question of organization of navy yards. In this connection, it may be that the following conclusions resulting from fourteen years' navy yard experience under fourteen commandants may interest the readers of the Institute.
Who is so wise as to be able fully to know all things?
Five hundred years ago one of the world's deepest thinkers, Thomas a Kempis, in the above words expressed his virtual agreement with the consensus of modern opinion that "no one man knows it all."
In spite of this belief that goes back to antiquity, there is prevalent, to an astonishing degree, a feeling in the line of the navy that all naval activities should be under the control of the line. While conceding to the line the leading role in the navy, it is manifest that the best results cannot be obtained by subordinating the activities of the other corps to the line. The best line officer in the service would make a very poor surgeon, unless he has had training that he does not get as a part of his regular duties. Similarly this Ai line officer would make a poor naval constructor, although his regular duties do make him more or less familiar with the finished product manufactured by the naval constructors. Knowing how to operate the engines, navigate the ship, and handle the guns is an entirely different profession from building the ship—just as fabricating the plates in building the ship is an entirely different proposition from converting iron ore into the steel plates from which the ship is to be built. Placing a naval hospital under the command of a line officer would be on a par with placing an industrial plant at a navy yard under such command. It would be just as reasonable to make a paymaster gunnery officer of a ship, or a marine officer, supply officer of a navy yard. While each might succeed in the unusual job, success would certainly cause comment—a sure proof that it was unexpected. While General Order No. 53 institutes a very great improvement over previous conditions, it doesn't go quite far enough. It is necessary to face the issue squarely. In mounting a stair one must raise one's foot the height of the step to get ahead. If one raises it only halfway one lands where one started. It is believed to be dodging the issue to make line officer commandants of navy yards heads of the industrial activities of the yards.
Good results should be obtained by a naval constructor manager under a capable line officer commandant who has a proper appreciation of his position and doesn't undertake to do the manager's work for him. If, however, there is a line officer manager the condition is changed. He is just so much "insulation" between the commandant and the yard—just so much insulation, also, against efficiency. While the commandant has as his "cabinet" the captain of the yard to look out for military matters, the supply officer for stores, and the yard surgeon for health—all specialists—he is practically without help in connection with industrial activities, the most important of all, as the manager is no more of a specialist in these matters than the commandant himself. While, therefore, in order to be assured of a successful administration, the commandant should have a manager with vast experience in all the thousand and one problems of an industrial yard—employment of labor, civil service rules, planning systems, drafting rooms, shop organization, yard equipment, plant maintenance, transportation system, care of loose and hand tools, operation of power houses, etc.—he must, in the case under discussion, get along without this expert adviser. A man with a navy yard experience of fifteen years or so is familiar with navy yard "history" and will not make nearly so many mistakes as the less experienced man and will know the answer to many a problem that the other will have to work out himself with a strong probability that the answer he gets is not the correct one but had been tried before and discarded. A line officer may be rewarded for some specially meritorious work at sea by being made industrial manager at a navy yard. If he understood the requirements of the position and the probability of his losing such reputation as he had acquired he would scarcely think of accepting. Even if seagoing should some day become popular, it is impossible to conceive of a naval constructor's accepting a position as executive officer of a battleship as a reward for his having done good work in connection with its construction. No one would realize better than the naval constructor that the last fifteen years' experience that had made him a capable naval constructor had removed him that much further from fitness for line duties. At that, the chances are in his favor, as he once performed line duties while the line officer manager never performed construction corps duties.
The monthly pay of officers attached to an average navy yard will probably be about $25,000, that is, $300,000 per year. Considered as an industrial plant it is evident that $300,000 is a terrific overhead, bearing in mind the output of an average yard. A private plant of the same capacity would probably have fewer than one- fourth the officials. Navy yard organizations show small return for the outlay, with many high ranking officers performing only nominal duties. At one of the smaller yards recently there were forty-four commissioned officers in the industrial department. When we go down the line in the navy yard organization, until we find the man that really does the work of an industrial manager, we are liable to find that besides all the problems he has to solve that legitimately belong to a manager (and there are plenty) he is burdened with many unnecessary troubles due to the nominal managers ahead of him to whom he must explain every contemplated move and persuade them of its necessity before he can go ahead. The nominal manager may get along all right if recommendations come to him approved by all concerned, but if his advisers disagree he is in a quandary. It is believed to be literally true that there is no such thing as an efficiently operated government-owned industrial plant. The causes of this condition are fairly numerous but the main causes are few and readily understood. While, perhaps, most people attribute unsatisfactory results to graft this is totally lacking in the navy, to which this article particularly refers. The worst charge that can be made against individuals is well-meaning incompetence.
In a democracy, where each person has an equal "say" in the government, it is clear that those people that know something about industrial management (or anything else) are vastly outnumbered by those that know nothing about it. The natural inertia of mankind makes this majority slow to make any changes.
It is purely accidental if the majority of the people of a democracy ever do anything well, such as elect the best men to high offices. The majority is always ignorant and uninformed and swayed by anything but reason. The intelligent and progressive always constitute a small minority—the greater the intelligence the smaller the minority.
In a large unwieldy democracy, correcting anything that is wrong is a long tedious process—it takes so long for the small minority that "knows" to instruct the vast majority until sufficient public sentiment is created to force the change. Moreover, of that small minority few have the public spirit or incentive to undertake the huge task of educating the masses. The large democracy is liable therefore to meet the fate of the great pachyderm that sinks further into the mire that is made more fluid through its own frantic efforts to emerge.
A man who has sufficient skill as a politician to become Chief Executive of the democracy could hardly, unless he is a superman, be also the man best qualified to be business manager of the country, nor is he apt to select the best department heads (looking at the matter mathematically).
Assuming that the chance of the best business manager's becoming Chief Executive is one in one thousand (very optimistic) and the chance that he will select the best department heads is one in one hundred, the chance that in November of every fourth year we shall get the best possible department heads is only one in one hundred thousand. In other words, it is practically a mathematical certainty that we shall not.
It would seem, then, that the moves for the betterment of the service must come from the service itself rather than from an executive. It behooves the service, therefore, to enlighten itself. Hence, everyone with a few meager candle-power should contribute his quota so that eventually the illumination will become general.
The work that is being done at the War College at Newport for the fighting branch of the service is of incalculable value. Surely this institution is not paralleled in any country in the world. Certainly the instruction there received can not otherwise result than in bringing our line officers to the very pinnacle of fighting efficiency. With these officers and suitable materiel, the country may rest secure behind the first line of defense, the navy.
Suitable materiel—there is the rub—materiel efficiently constructed and efficiently maintained. Materiel may win or lose a battle or a war. Defective powder in a shell that lodged near the sternpost of the Kearsarge, causing the shell to fail to explode, probably saved the Kearsarge from sinking rather than the Alabama—the difference between victory and defeat.
Or, to quote from more recent experience, the inferiority of English materiel, in defensive qualities, resulting in three battle cruisers being utterly destroyed by gunfire at the battle of Jutland while no German armored vessel was similarly destroyed, would, in the case of a foe of equal or nearly equal strength, have caused the loss of sea dominion to England.
Does our materiel compare with our personnel? Sadly—no!
Our materiel and our personnel should meet on that "pinnacle of efficiency."
While the construction of our materiel is fairly satisfactory and may compare favorably with that of foreign countries, it should outclass these countries to the same degree that our personnel does. After the construction of our materiel comes the perhaps more important consideration of maintaining it in the most efficient condition through repairs and alterations.
The excuse for this article is the subject of maintaining materiel in the most efficient condition. Maintaining materiel—that is the fatal weak spot in our service armor—that is the mortal disease from which we are suffering. There seems no hope of a cure; the doctors disagree, so the patient dies.
Otherwise reasonable people seem unable to see reason when the question of organization or management of navy yards is under discussion. Probably few seagoing officers give the matter serious thought, imagining perhaps that their ideas will not be asked for by those with power to make changes. My experience is that the run of ideas of seagoing officers relative to navy yards is chaotic, unfixed and unfriendly. They rarely miss an opportunity to make a dig at a navy yard, evidently being convinced that the naval constructors are responsible wholly and entirely for the situation they mention.
Naval constructors are human and therefore prone to err. They make their quota of errors. These errors become rarer and rarer, however, as they gain experience in navy yards, until after many years' experience and their becoming construction officers, their course is practically clear of such impediments.
At this stage in his career the naval constructor is liable to find himself confrere with an engineer officer doing his first, or, in rare instances, his second tour of duty in a navy yard. Seagoing is now such a grind that it is really imperative for an officer's shore duty to be something of a relaxation. On his first tour an officer realizes that a navy-yard job is anything but a relaxation and many seldom seek a second tour. This confrere will therefore be passing through the same error-making stage that the construction officer passed through some ten years previously. This engineer officer goes after two years or so, and another comes and passes through the same phase, etc., etc. As naval constructors may have twenty-five years' service as construction officers at navy yards (not to mention their experience as assistants in the hull division) it may be expected that their nerves will become shattered from such a long infliction of association with "maky learn" engineer officers. Many vexatious disputes are bound to arise, disputes refereed by a possibly "maky learn" commandant who too frequently sides with the engineer officer because "the line is the thing."
Usually the largest shop in the yard is the machine shop, a large percentage of the material used in the yard passing through this shop at some stage. This shop is in the machinery division. The shop superintendent machinery division is usually a young officer doing his first and only navy yard tour. Without any equipment whatever, he is injected into the position of boss of the largest shop in the yard. As the output of the yard as a whole depends very much upon the machine shop, one doesn't have to be one of the three wise men to know that the output of the yard is bound to suffer. The shop will merely turn out what the civilian supervisors with their limitations are able to turn out. They are practical men who need and are entitled to get from the shop superintendent technical guidance. The chances are, moreover, that the shop superintendent can get no help from his boss, the engineer officer, who in all probability never was shop superintendent himself. They are both in the position of having to make decisions without having the knowledge of how to decide. After two years when the shop superintendent is detached, he has learned enough about the shops, if he is diligent, to be of some little value. He is then replaced by another young officer who goes through the same instruction period. Thus the shop is a school. The officer doubtless benefits from the schooling; the machine shop certainly cannot, as it has been obliged to get along all the time without a real head. While this schooling has some value, obtained in this way its cost to the Government far exceeds its value. Moreover, the schooling would be far more beneficial to the young officer himself if, instead of serving as shop superintendent, he served as assistant shop superintendent under an experienced shop superintendent.
In the latter case he is learning from a teacher, in the former he merely learns what he can pick up by himself. In other words, not only does the officer benefit but the Government does also—an officer is given good training in shop work without expense to the Government instead of poor training at heavy expense.
The hull division has better shop superintendents than the machinery division. With at least equal initial intelligence and more experience they are bound to be better. Moreover, in the case of the hull shop superintendent, the shops may be his one great consuming interest in life. The knowledge he gets in this position will always be of vital use to him.
At one yard, under normal conditions just before we entered the war, patterns made for one ship by the machinery division cost twenty-seven hundred dollars ($2,700.00). Plans of these castings were sent to an outside concern for quotations. They quoted seven hundred dollars ($700.00)—practically only one quarter the cost in the yard. It is seldom possible to get direct comparisons of cost such as the above. It is believed, however, that in practically every yard work done in the machinery division will cost much more than it should. In other words, much of the appropriation for repairs expended by the machinery division is wasted. In still other words, much more repair work could be done with the same appropriation if the work were done efficiently.
Some years ago the old ordnance department of a navy yard desired to draw from Store No. 1 white pine sixteen inches wide and sixteen feet long—nothing else would do. Such wide lumber being particularly rare and expensive, inquiry was made as to the purpose for which it was desired. It was wanted to make transportable rifle racks which are eight inches wide and four feet long! These racks had been costing ten dollars ($10.00) each. The Portsmouth yard now makes them, thanks to the skill of naval constructors, for about one dollar and sixty cents ($1.60) each.
The naval appropriations have recently been cut to the bone. Thousands of men are being discharged from navy yards. The navy seems to be driving on a "lee shore" without the wherewithal to "claw off." Such small funds as are available for upkeep of the fleet should be let out of the strongbox with grudging care only upon the strongest guarantees that each dollar -buys the maximum of repairs—not just twenty-five cents' worth, or fifty cents' worth. Is any naval officer so short-sighted or is his patriotism of such a brand that he prefers half a navy, so long as repairs are controlled by the line, to a full navy kept in repair by the constructors ? The case is similar to that refereed by King Solomon where the false mother preferred half a dead baby to surrendering the whole live one to its real mother. It is absurd to imagine that any naval officer prefers a half navy to a full navy. All merely want to be "shown." Would that the Lord repeat His creative act of the third (?) day of the creation when He said, "Let there be light."
Very recently a number of battleships were at a yard for repairs. Workmen and facilities were available to complete the repairs in record time. What happened? The appropriations, rigidly limited by Congress, were so low that after the clerks and draftsmen and other overhead expenses had been paid, very little was left to pay for labor. Consequently, instead of staying at the yard about two months these vessels had to stay nearly six months, waiting until the monthly allotments totaled enough to pay for the necessary repairs. During all this time there was being wasted, through inefficiency, Government funds that could have been used to advantage to effect earlier completion of these repairs. A little insignificant looking barometer indicates the approach of a ship-wrecking storm. Likewise, at the yard in question, one little item where a comparison was obtainable indicated where to look for leakages of real moment where comparisons were not readily obtainable. This little item was the cost of upkeep of air tools. The hull division for a considerable time had been oiling and making minor repairs to its own air tools, accurate records being maintained to ascertain the cost of the work in detail. Even the unit cost per tool was available, labor and material separately. "Proper authority" directed that the upkeep of hull division air tools be handled by the machinery division. Accurate records showed that after this event the labor cost of upkeep, per tool, reached as high as four times the previous cost, the total excess over the previous rates amounting to $5,000 in six months—practically $1,000 a month—enough to keep several destroyers in repair.
Of the two types of economists one says, "figures never lie," and the other, ironically, "you can prove anything by figures"—directly opposite viewpoints.
The above figures are the kind that do not lie and they prove a lot! Moreover, after expending so much on upkeep, the machinery division did not keep the tools in as satisfactory condition as formerly. Machinists couldn't be expected to know as much about when an air hammer is in satisfactory condition as a riveter or a chipper and caulker.
Just as on board' ship surgeons are selected from all the officers on board to do surgical work because their experience, education, and training make them most suitable for this work, so at shore stations should managers of the industrial plants be selected from the corps of naval constructors, for identical reasons.
Moreover, to carry the analogy further, just as at naval hospitals a surgeon is selected to do the operating work on account of special fitness for this particular work, so from the construction corps should be selected for industrial managers only those that are particularly fitted for such positions. Most members of the construction corps are distributed over three main classes of work; navy yard work; shipyard work, as superintending constructors ; bureau work. Each member of the corps is best fitted for one of these three positions. In fact, it may not be exaggerating to say that some are totally unsuited for one or two of these jobs. It is manifestly undesirable for a man to be given a job for which he is not suited. The man suffers and the job as well. Selection has a legitimate field when made use of as indicated above. There are some constructors that should never be assigned to navy yards jobs in charge of a large number of men and in contact with numerous others, including officers attached to naval vessels. They are temperamentally unsuited for such jobs. These same men may be incomparable on a shipyard or bureau job.
The corps of constructors is now large enough so that it also should have a "finishing school" like the War College where the special talents of the individuals may be ascertained and developed. They should be required to specialize. Once a man's specialty is determined, he should be given the opportunity to make a thorough study of it under competent instructors. Such a method would be far better than learning by mistakes, as at present. It is not intended to infer that the present method is the deliberate choice of those in authority. They have no alternative on account of the large amount of work to be done by a very limited personnel. To the writer, however, the situation appears now to have clarified to such an extent that the above suggestions are in order.
Eventually, therefore, there should be available in the construction corps, industrial manager specialists of whose qualifications even the most carping can have no real doubts. These specialists, trained in the same school, should have similar ideas as to organizations, systems, methods, etc. When, as at present, the seagoing officers find a different system at each navy yard they visit they may be pardoned for doubting the efficiency of any one of them. It is self-evident that one of the various systems must be better than all the others. The new scheme should provide the machinery for ascertaining the best "system" and making it universal.
With the Utopian arrangement indicated above, when necessary to fill a vacancy in the industrial manager position at a yard, an industrial manager specialist of known ability would be selected, as distinguished from the present system of filling vacancies approximately by seniority.
Although criticism is always necessary so that defects may be corrected wherever they are found, in order that perfection may be approached, no one should deny to navy yards their mead of glory. What they accomplished during the war in spite of inconceivable handicaps was most praiseworthy.
Perhaps the worst handicap under which they labored was the civil service commission. Let us hope that in our next war the enemy will not find as strong an ally in our civil service as he did in the last war. While this statement will surprise many, numerous co-sufferers will recognize the justice of it. This so-called "service" was, in my experience, of no service whatever. To discuss the civil service fully would require an article in itself. May it suffice here to express the hope that the civil service will be ejected from navy yards bag and baggage—until such time as an economy or efficiency commission has investigated thoroughly the civil service and obtained remedial legislation that will convert the civil service from an obstacle to a service. It is only fair to add, however, that with the laws as they are, even the best administered civil service would still be a nuisance.
In looking over the above paragraph I find I have made a charge without a specification. I cite one. In March, 1917, at the Puget Sound navy yard, it was found necessary to obtain ship draftsmen for the large amount of work in prospect. With numerous new shipyards all over the country it was impossible to obtain real ship draftsmen at the rate of pay provided at navy yards, particularly when in order to obtain a satisfactory rate of pay he must meet civil service requirements that had been prepared for peacetime use. It was necessary, therefore, to pick up the best men obtainable and give them temporary appointments subject to non-competitive examination. One draftsman so obtained in March or April, 1917, submitted his non-competitive papers to the civil service commission. In May, 1918, he received notice from the civil service commission that he had failed to pass his non-competitive examination and must be discharged at once.
In the meantime this draftsman had acquired a year's experience as a ship draftsman and was therefore much better qualified than almost any man we could find at that time for a position in the drafting- room. In fact, at that time men were being taken on every few days for drafting work that had nothing like the qualifications of the man in question. While it is difficult to conceive of anything more absurd than the above action, the civil service commission was guilty of many other things almost equally absurd.
Great savings are possible at navy yards. These possibilities are by no means confined to the machinery division. Although in hull divisions gradual improvement is being made in methods and processes, eliminating waste, a vast amount of further eliminations is possible. Any item of expense attacked with the idea of reducing the cost is sure to yield gratifying returns. It is essential that the burden of these attacks be borne by the officers, however, as the foremen and mechanics are too busy with routine matters for them to be of material assistance in this work. As examples of what can be done in this way by study, a few instances are cited, as follows:
The squilgee is an article familiar to all naval officers. In attempting to reduce the cost of manufacture of squilgees, and at the same time make them more suitable for the purpose for which they are used, the following was noted.
The type of squilgee in use at the time the study was started had a groove for the rubber blade with equal thicknesses of wood on each side of the groove. These wooden "legs" were also of equal length. The rubber blade was held in by screws. It was found that the forward edge of the groove was badly worn by contact with the deck when too much pressure was brought to bear upon the squilgee when operating it. For this same reason, that is, too much pressure, most squilgees failed by the splitting of the wood at the back of the groove, that is, the wood of the rear leg. The squilgee was strengthened by making the wood of the squilgee thicker, this increased thickness being taken by the rear leg, reinforcing it against splitting. The forward end was shortened by about one-quarter inch and chamfered so that it would not come in contact with the deck. Nearly four-fifths of the cost of the completed squilgee was the cost of the rubber blade, the highest grade rubber being used. Cheaper grades of rubber were tested, more "compound" being in the cheaper grades. It was found that a satisfactory blade could be obtained for sixteen cents instead of forty cents as formerly paid. In place of the screws, rivets were used, which, being hammered up, brought the wooden sides of the groove tightly against the rubber blade, giving a much stronger squilgee than obtainable when screws were used, screws not drawing the wooden legs against the rubber at all. The net result of the investigation was that a far better squilgee was obtained at about one-half the previous cost.
A much more sensational accomplishment was done in the manufacture of hammocks, the prime consideration being the manufacture of these hammocks as quickly as possible. Through improvements in the sewing machines, all these improvements being designed by the yard, a female employee was able to work the eyelets in ninety-seven hammocks in an eight-hour day when formerly first-class sail-makers had turned them out by hand at the rate of eight per day.
Referring to the question as to whether or not the existence of navy yards is warranted, it will be well to consider the expenditures for the navy during 1920 as taken from the annual report of the paymaster general.
Total expenditures during 1920 $1,078,000,000.00
Operating expenses of the fleet, 203,000,000.00
Repairs to ships and equipage and alterations, 39,000,000.00
Maintenance of navy yards, 172,000,000.00 (Of this amount only $78,000.00 was for maintenance of navy yards [industrial].)
Improvements to navy yards, 87,000,000.00
Cost of output of industrial yards, 303,000,000.00 (Includes new construction.)
Property investment of naval establishment, total, 2,911,000,000.00
Ships, 1,292,000,000.00
Stations, 534,000,000.00
Stores, 1,085,000,000.00
Upon analyzing the above figures it will be observed that the repairs and alterations to vessels constitute only 4 ½ per cent of the naval expenditures; that the maintenance of industrial yards amounted to 7.2 per cent of the total expenditures; that improvements to industrial yards amounted to 5 ½ per cent.
It is clear from the above that the claim sometimes advanced that all the money appropriated for the navy goes to pay high wages in navy yards is not justified.
As the value of shore stations is 41 per cent of the value of the ships, why not dispose of all the shore stations and put the money derived from them into ships, increasing the navy by 41 per cent? In order to answer this question it is necessary to demonstrate that navy yards are or are not indispensable. It is customary in a discussion of this kind for each of the participants to start with a theory of his own, effort being directed towards finding facts to prove his particular theory. This case is similar. One is not accustomed to preparing a defense for navy yards, as one has been accustomed to their existence as a regular institution. Upon looking around, however, it is not difficult to prepare a defense for them.
In the first instance, every nation that has a navy that amounts to anything also has navy yards. It would appear, therefore, that if navy yards are to be dispensed with, the onus of proving that they can be dispensed with is on those who desire to make a change.
However, waiving this point, with the fleet repairs scheduled as in the United States, so that the absence of vessels from their regular stations for repairs will be minimized and absolutely according to pre-arranged schedule, it must be apparent to anyone that to have these repairs done in a shipyard would be out of the question. Navy yards being under the same military authority as the ships, their operation is under the absolute control of the secretary. On the other hand, in dealing with private shipyards, all repairs and alterations would have to be covered by written contracts. If the contracts are prepared with the usual governmental care, the repair period would be over before the contract would be signed. Moreover, as repairs proceed, the necessity for additional repairs becomes evident. To cover this additional work, no end of complications arise. It is evident, in the first place, that in allotting the work it will be necessary to obtain bids from all responsible shipyards available. It is evident, moreover, that on account of the uncertainty of all repair work, the price bid will be ample to cover every contingency. That there is tremendous profit in repair work is evident from the fact that the most prosperous shipyard in the United States confines itself to repair work only. It will take no new construction work whatever. While, from new construction, direct comparisons can be obtained between the cost of the work at navy yards and at shipyards, the post probably being ordinarily in favor of the shipyards, if there is left out of consideration the military feature of keeping the navy yards in good condition for repair work by having new construction work done there, no such comparison is possible in repair work. Repair work in private plants would undoubtedly cost very much more than in navy yards. Moreover, as private plants could not be expected to keep on hand such a large quantity of stores as the navy does—over one billion dollars' worth—the time required for repairs would be increased by the time necessary to obtain material. To shorten the time of delivery, heavy bonuses would have to be paid. Besides, private firms cannot purchase so economically as the Government and they haven't the machinery for inspection that the Government has, this machinery insuring that the material purchased meets the specified requirements. In war, the Government would have to take its chances, along with private shipping companies, in obtaining the services of the shipyards.
It is clear from the above that navy yards are indispensable, that they cannot be disposed of in order to buy ships with the proceeds.
There are many good reasons why there should be navy yards—there are equally good reasons why they should be operated at maximum efficiency; to save the taxpayer or to give us more navy for the same expenditure. Red tape will always handicap navy yards, very much in the way that parliament used to handicap kings and the law still handicaps crime.
"Red tape" is that system in which a man is prevented from doing a thing in the most direct manner through the necessity for conforming to various rules and regulations of higher authority or to the law. Many of these rules, regulations, or laws are thoroughly justified, others are out of date. It would be absurd, for instance, to use steel for naval construction that had not been inspected—that is justifiable red tape. It is equally absurd to be governed by an old law that states that in making repairs to vessels, if the estimated cost exceeds $3,000, no work shall be done until after it has been recommended by a board of survey composed of various officials, totaling about ten. At the time the law was enacted, $3,000 was probably 1 per cent of the cost of the largest vessels known. Against this figure today would have to be set over $300,000. While much out-of-date or unnecessary red tape could and should be dispensed with, a red tape check is absolutely necessary in any governmental institution.
The last annual report of the paymaster general is about five inches thick. While it contains much information of undoubted interest, it seems hardly possible that its value can compare with its cost. What would be of greater interest would be figures making possible a comparison of the efficiencies of the different yards. Practically the only figures available for comparison now are percentages of general expense and indirect expense. These figures not only mean nothing but are liable to create a wrong impression in the lay mind. What counts, of course, is the total cost of the work regardless of how this total is divided between labor and indirect expense, material costs being practically unaffected by management.
Included in the industrial costs that should be available for purposes of comparing the different yards are:
Electricity per kilowatt hour; total amount consumed per year; total cost; percentage of the total cost to total of the payroll for the year of the yard employees.
Steam per pound ; total produced per year; total cost; percentage of payroll.
Air per 1,000 cubic feet of free air; total produced per year; total cost; percentage of payroll.
Heat per pound of steam; total produced per year; total cost; percentage of payroll.
Hydraulic power.
Total power-house costs per pound of steam produced; quantity and cost of fuel used per pound of steam produced; ratio of total payroll of power-house employees to number of pounds of steam produced during the year; percentages of total steam produced used: to generate electricity; for heat; to compress air; for blacksmith shop; for other power purposes.
If air is used for steam hammers give cost in suitable unit for comparison with cost of operating steam hammer in yards using steam.
Foundry costs per pound for brass, iron, and steel castings and total weight manufactured during the year.
Costs per pound for galvanizing iron and steel; total costs for year and total weight of zinc consumed and total weight of metal galvanized.
Cost per pound or cubic foot of oxygen manufactured at yard during year; total amount and total cost for year and comparison of total cost with total yard payroll. Same for acetylene gas.
Total cost of oxyacetylene welding; total weight of welding metal consumed; percentage of second to first.
Total cost of riveting for year; total direct labor only, total value of output on piecework basis (same piecework schedule being used for all yards for comparative purposes); total riveting hours for year; ratio total riveting hours to total value on piecework basis; total maintenance cost of tools; average maintenance cost per tool.
The above items give an idea of comparisons that should be obtainable among the different yards. The list should be extended to include transportation, cranes, locomotives, etc., as well as practically every activity where a basis for comparison may be found.
In order that the comparisons may be of value "out of pocket" costs only should be used. It is unreasonable for one yard, say, to be charged with depreciation on a plant ten times as large as it may be using for current work—the nine-tenths unused is a military feature—provision for war.
It is hoped that the candor of this article will give no offense as none is intended. I am merely acting upon my theory that to obtain the right solution of any question in dispute, the proper procedure is to keep nothing in reserve but to state the entire case as it seems to the disputant. Nothing would be gained by minimizing the points at issue, agreeing on these and leaving the major items unmentioned to fight about in the future.
In General Order No. 55 the secretary of the navy has stated the necessity for economy and placed the situation up to the officers of the navy. He has made the first move—it is now our move. Shall we fail the secretary and the navy?