(See Whole No. 228, Page 189.)
Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, U. S. N. (Retired).—My much admired friend, Admiral Wainwright, does an unintentional injustice, it seems to me, to suggestors of new schemes. I allude mainly to the sentences:
Admiral Fiske, writing on the defense of the Philippines, states that he had recommended that reliance for their defense be placed on airplanes. This was made at a time when the efficiency of the plane, even as a scout, was all to be developed in the future. One is reminded of Admiral Sir Percy Scott, the great prophet of the submarines. Both admirals have rendered important services to their respective countries; both have large imaginations and arc gifted with a prophetic flair, but their advice for present everyday work has not always been the best. Prophecies of the future are not always the best foundation for the present needs. Had this character of advice been followed, our destroyers would have been without torpedoes while the ten thousand yard torpedo was being developed, and the shore of the Philippine Islands littered with the wrecks of imperfect airplanes. To prophesy for the future the head may be in the clouds, but to provide for the present, the feet must be firm on the ground.
This paragraph indicates the estimate of the inventor of new schemes that used to be held, but that is held by only a few at the present day. Most people realize now that it is possible to propose a new scheme and yet keep one’s feet on the ground. Most people also have learned from the progress of the last half century that the mere fact that a certain apparatus is unreliable is no reason for refusing to try to develop it and make it reliable.
As a matter of fact, I did not “recommend that reliance for their defense (the Philippines) be placed on airplanes," I simply suggested that a certain scheme be tried, to redeem a situation that was admitted to be hopeless.
At the time (1910-1911) I had been inventing for thirty years, had made a few successes and more failures (as every inventor does), and knew from bitter experience what a wide chasm separates an attractive idea from an actually produced invention. 1 knew that airplanes, at that time, were wholly undeveloped and wholly unreliable; but I felt absolutely sure that they could be developed in instruments of war that could prevent any troops from landing in open boats. Events have proved that I was right. I merely suggested a line to work in. Subsequent events have proved that it was a good line; perhaps the only good lute.
Of course, Admiral Wainwright is correct in believing that there is danger in pursuing new schemes and neglecting schemes that have been tried and proved to he good. Hut every navy officer knows that; even if he invents new schemes. Like every sensible manufacturer, no matter how enterprising he may he in developing new apparatus, lie must be very careful to make experimental work take a place subordinate to regular work. Like every good sailor, he must not let go of one rope until he has got hold of another.
I am sorry that Admiral Wainwright thinks that the change from the Aid System to the present one was a ‘‘step backward.” As Aid for Operations, I found when the Great War broke out in Europe, that I was wholly powerless to do anything except routine work: largely for the reason that the office was not legalized, and could he abolished at any moment by the Secretary. The Aid for Operations, and the whole Aid System, could not continue to exist save by his consent.
So I concocted a few paragraphs which Hobson got put into the Appropriation Bill in January, 1915, by the unanimous vote of the House Naval Committee. This provision created the office of Chief of Naval Operations; an office which no Secretary could abolish. Secretary Daniels succeeded in striking out some of the most important clauses; hut I got some of them put hack the following year, notably the clause directing the detailing of "at least fifteen officers” for making war plans.
The Aid System was an admirable step toward a General staff. But it was a short step, and it constituted a wholly inadequate organization for war or preparation for war. I think it is the consensus of officers who have had experience with both organizations that the office of Chief of Naval Operations is better than the Aid System.