THE RESULTS AND EFFECTS OF THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
By Lieut. Commander Holloway H. Frost, U. S. Navy
I. The Military Situation Before the Battle
In order to determine what the results of the battle of Jutland were, it is necessary to establish the salient features of the military and naval situations in Europe before the battle.
At the beginning of June, 1916, the general military situation was very favorable for the Allied Nations. The year of 1915 had been an extremely successful one for the Central Powers. On the eastern front the Russians had been pushed back with heavy losses and crushing defeats; Bulgaria had entered the war and Serbia had been overrun, while the British and French were being decisively repulsed at the Dardanelles. On the western front and in Italy the various allied offensives, although gaining a little ground and some prisoners, were generally favorable to the Central Powers.
At the beginning of 1916 the Central Powers, as the result of their successes of 1915, had sufficient reserves to attempt other offensives. The Germans prepared a powerful drive on Verdun; the Austrians made ready for an attack in the Trentino; the Turks pushed the siege of Kut-el-Amara and prepared defensive positions to hold off relieving armies.
It is somewhat of a remarkable coincidence that each of these three offensives ran the same course; each commenced with striking successes; each ended in virtual failure.
At Verdun very important successes were gained on the first days; gradual progress was made for several months. By May it had become a great battle of attrition. Its final results were decidedly unfavorable for the Germans.
At the middle of May the Austrian offensive commenced. After important initial successes, it also v/as checked, and ultimately the Italians regained a considerable portion of the ground lost.
In April the Turks succeeded in taking Kut-el-Amara, but were unable to make any further advance, due probably to the death of Field Marshal von der Goltz, and the arrival of important British reinforcements.
The Central Powers had meanwhile been able to maintain the Russian front despite very heavy attacks on the German part of the front during March. The Macedonian front was stationary. The Russians had broken through the Armenian front, but this was a local success only and could have little effect on the more vital campaigns.
Thus, the three great offensives of the Central Powers had failed, and in failing had practically consumed the entire strategical reserves of their armies. The Allied Nations, with a great superiority of numbers and equipment, seized the initiative on all fronts and prepared for a simultaneous concentric attack, which all supposed would soon bring about a decision.
In France elaborate preparations were made for a great attack astride the Somme River; the Italians made ready for a new Isonzo battle; the Russians were concentrating enormous forces, well equipped with fresh stores of material, for a powerful drive at many points along a wide front; the Saloniki front was being built up in preparation for an advance into Serbia; in Mesopotamia the British were getting ready on a large scale for a campaign toward Bagdad; finally, Roumania had about decided to enter the war on the side of- the Allied Nations, thus greatly lengthening the eastern front and throwing a fresh and well-equipped army into the heart of Hungary for the coup-de-grace.
The mere beginning of these numerous campaigns brought the removal of the chief of the general staff of the German field army and the appointment to that position of supreme importance of Field Marshal von Hindenburg. Upon taking up his position of first quartermaster general, Ludendorff described the situation as follows:
The circumstances under which the Field Marshal and I had been summoned to take supreme command were extremely critical. Whereas we had hitherto been able to conduct our great war of defense by that best means of waging war—the offense—we were now reduced to a policy of pure defense.
II. The Naval Situation Before the Battle
In 1915, while the Germans were taking the offensive on the eastern front, they were also taking the offensive on the high seas by means of the submarines operated from bases in Germany, Belgium, Austria and Turkey. This offensive, as admitted by von Tirpitz, was somewhat premature, as the Germans were really not ready in February, 191 5, for its execution. Therefore, the damage caused to Allied and neutral shipping in the first months of the campaign was comparatively small. As the output of submarines increased and their crews became more skilled, the shipping sunk by them increased, as the figures for the third quarter of 1915 show. However, the damage to shipping was kept at about a constant figure for the last two quarters of 1915 and the first two quarters of 1916, due to the restrictions placed upon the submarine commanders by the German Government as a result of the strong protests of neutral nations, which culminated in the promise of the Germans to carry out cruiser warfare with their submarines, after the Sussex incident in March, 1916. The submarines, therefore, did not have an important effect upon the course of the war before the battle of Jutland. The following table, taken from the official report of the British Admiralty, March 21, 1918, shows the total loss of British and foreign shipping by enemy action and marine risk:
Year | Quarter | Gross |
1915 | First | 320,447 |
Second | 380,419 | |
Third | 529,181 | |
Fourth | 494,373 | |
1916 | First | 524,195 |
Second | 522,289 |
The High Sea Fleet during the year 1915 had limited its operations to controlling the Baltic, the Cattegat, a part of the Skagerrack and a small sea area off Helgoland, which permitted the submarines to gain deep water before being subject to enemy attack. The command of the Baltic permitted trade with Norway and Sweden, which was, however, subject to occasional attack by British submarines. In May the German army captured Libau, which the German naval units used as an advanced base. The supplies for the German army in Courland were transported from German Baltic ports to Libau. Ludendorff states that this line of supply was of the "utmost importance." In August, 1915, a German naval advance into the Gulf of Riga and a landing attack at Pernau were defeated by the Russians. The retention of the Gulf of Riga by the Russian fleet had an important effect in the halting of the advance of the German army in the Riga sector. The Russians also held the Gulf of Finland, where Reval and Kronstadt were used as naval bases.
The British Navy, having in 1914 swept the German cruisers from the high seas, consolidated its position in the North Sea during 1915 for the purpose of maintaining its command over it, and of preventing German merchant shipping and naval units from making passage between the high seas and German ports. The British government gradually commenced to exert decisive pressure upon Germany by adding to the contraband list and placing the most severe restrictions on the trade of the neutral nations adjacent to Germany.
The British also were forced to commence the building up of a great anti-submarine organization to meet the German submarine offensive. As soon as it was demonstrated that the German submarine campaign would be checked by the protests of the neutral powers, British construction of merchant vessels was allowed to decrease to about one-third of peace-time figures. During 1915 Lord Fisher had commenced a large emergency naval building program, including vessels specially designed for use in the Baltic and against the Belgian coast.
In the early part of 1916 Admiral Scheer, who became commander-in-chief of the High Sea Fleet, decided upon an active offensive-defensive campaign with the fleet as a substitute for the submarine campaign; as the submarines could not operate very favorably against trade at that time, due to the restrictions placed on their methods of operation, a number of them were assigned to operate in conjunction with the fleet whenever it put to sea.
On February 11, 1916, Scheer commenced the execution of his campaign with the High Sea Fleet by sending the light cruiser Rostock with the destroyer flotillas II, VI, and IX on a raid off the Dogger Bank. This force succeeded in sinking the British sloop. Arabis.
On March 5 three dirigibles bombed the Humber area and the High Sea Fleet advanced into the approaches to the Channel and returned without making contact with any important British force.
On April 24 six Zeppelins bombed the coastal towns and the German scouting force bombarded Lowestoft and Yarmouth, supported by the whole High Sea Fleet. Contact was made with the Harwich force, which kept out of effective gun range. The Seydlits was mined during this cruise.
Finally, on May 31, Admiral Scheer commenced an advance into the Skagerrack, which developed into the battle of Jutland.
The British forces were well disposed along the eastern coast of Scotland and England to meet the offensive of the High Sea Fleet.
The battle fleet, with its accompanying cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers, was at Scapa. The battle cruiser fleet, with light cruisers and destroyers, was at Rosyth. The mission of these two forces was to scout for and bring to action the German battle fleet whenever it put to sea. Thus, on April 25 they very nearly were able to intercept the High Sea Fleet, and on May 31 they were able to bring it to action.
In addition to these main forces the following less important forces were stationed along the eastern coast of Scotland and England for the purpose of enforcing the blockade, preventing bombardment of coastal cities and, in general, of controlling the sea area along the coast against the attacks of enemy light cruisers, destroyers and submarines:
- The tenth cruiser squadron, based on the Shetland Islands.
- Light forces based at Scapa, Moray Firth and Firth of Forth.
- The third battle squadron and third cruiser squadron, based at the Thames.
- The Harwich force.
- The Dover patrol.
The Grand Fleet at Jutland had a superiority over the High Sea Fleet of approximately 1.75 to 1, or of 7 to 4.
In addition to the ships actually present the Germans had one battleship, first line, in commission—the Konig Albert—as against four battleships, first line and one battle cruiser for the British—the Royal Sovereign, Queen Elisabeth, Empress of India, Dreadnaught and Australia.
As a final reserve, the opposing navies had the following large ships, which had been laid down since 1900:
Class of ship | Great Britain | Germany |
Battleship, second line | 16 | 11 |
Cruiser, second line | 23 | 1 |
The following ships were building and nearing completion:
Class of ship | Great Britain | Germany |
Battleship | 2 | 2 |
Battle cruiser | 2 | 1 |
Cruiser | 3 | 0 |
The British cruisers each carried four 15-inch guns and had speeds of 35 knots. Their armor was very light.
Therefore, the British had a reserve of 12 large modern ships as against 4 for the Germans. Back of these there was a further reserve of 39 large second line ships as against 12 for the Germans.
In addition, the other Allied Nations had powerful navies which were largely available as reserves for the Grand Fleet.
The French had 7 battleships, first line, and 10 very good battleships, second line; Italy had 5 battleships, first line, and 4 of the second line. Russia had 4 battleships, first line. On the other hand, Germany's allies had weak naval forces. Austria had 2 battleships, first line, and 6 of the second line. Turkey had 1 battle cruiser.
The total naval strength of Great Britain's allies therefore amounted to 16 ships of the first line and 14 of the second, while Germany's allies had a total of 3 ships of the first line and 6 of the second. This omits all cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers; in all of these classes the Allied Nations were greatly superior.
Let us now see what the probable result of an action between the two fleets would be. In order to give the benefit of doubt to the Germans, we will assume that they were slightly more efficient, ship for ship, and that their fleet would be handled somewhat better than the Grand Fleet. Nevertheless, admitting these advantages, it still seems evident that they had only a remote chance of coming out of a fleet action with losses as small as those of the British. It would require a most extraordinary combination of skill and luck if the Germans were to inflict losses in the ratio of 7 British units to 4 of their own. Nevertheless, the British could well afford to receive losses in this ratio, even to the total destruction of both forces engaged, unless they were influenced by considerations of future difficulties with the United States or one of their allies. This was the maximum success the Germans could have won in a battle fought to a decision.
In this extreme case, even, the British had such reserve strength as to assure them the continued control of the North Sea.
This control might have been somewhat less effective than before, because the Germans might gain the following advantages:
- A better exit of their submarines from German ports.
- Better opportunities for raids on the trade between England and Norway.
- Better chances for successful raids on the English coast.
- An easier passage for raiders between Scotland and Norway.
- A lessening of the British anti-submarine effort, due to the necessity to reinforce the Grand Fleet with vessels previously engaged in this duty.
It will be at once seen that these possible advantages would give the Germans no decisive benefit, and, in fact, the situation would soon reduce to that which obtained before the battle; probably it would be even more favorable to the British.
It has been generally recognized at the Naval War College that in a naval battle the damage inflicted is not merely in proportion to the numbers engaged, but in proportion to the square of these numbers. Having this in mind, it would seem that the British could expect to inflict two or three times the losses they received and had almost a certainty of coming out of the battle with less losses than the enemy. This meant that, if they could come to close action, they could expect to wipe the German fleet from the board.
The destruction of the German fleet would have had the following results:
- The German submarines would have been mined in, and the great submarine campaign would have been greatly decreased in effectiveness.
- A great part of the British Navy could have been demobilized and the building of naval units and merchant shipping stopped, thus releasing personnel and material for the armies.
- The British Navy could have penetrated into the Baltic and controlled that sea area.
- The German Baltic coast could be attacked, thus drawing troops from the land fronts.
- The British Navy, working with the Russians, would probably have held together the Entente Alliance.
- England could have supplied Russia through the Baltic.
- These measures, together with the other successful allied offensives on land would, in all probability, have decided the World War in 1916.
III. The Material and Personnel Losses of the Battle
It has been definitely and finally determined that the following vessels were sunk in the battle, or as a result of damage received in it:
British | |
Ships | Displacement |
Queen Mary | 26,350 |
Indefatigable | 18,800 |
Invincible | 17,250 |
Defense | 14,600 |
Warrior | 13,550 |
Black Prince | 13,350 |
Tipperary | 1,430 |
Turbulent | 1,100 |
Fortune | 965 |
Ardent | 935 |
Shark | 935 |
Sparrowhawk | 935 |
Nestor | 890 |
Nomad | 890 |
Total | 111,980 |
German | |
Ships | Displacement |
Lutzow | 26,700 |
Pommern | 13,200 |
Wiesbaden | ? |
Elbing | ? |
Rostock | ? |
Frauenlob | 17,150 |
V-4 | ? |
V-27 | ? |
V-29 | ? |
S-35 | ? |
V-48 | 3,680 |
Total | 60,730 |
The British total losses in vessels sunk were greater than the German in the ratio of 1.84 to 1. If we were to exclude the second line ships from the total, the British losses would be 70,480 and the German losses 44,815; then the British losses would be greater in the ratio of 1.59 to 1.
Commander Bellairs gives the personnel losses as follows:
? | British | German |
Officers killed | 343 | 172 |
Officers wounded | 51 | 41 |
Men killed | 6104 | 2414 |
Men wounded | 513 | 449 |
Total | 7011 | 3086 |
The British personnel losses were greater than the German losses in the ratio of 2.27 to 1. These losses were even more disadvantageous to the British because they lost two rear admirals with their entire staffs and six captains as against the three captains lost by the Germans.
The damage to ships which did not sink may be indicated by the hits received and the personnel losses caused by the hits. In the case of battleships, battle cruisers and cruisers only heavy caliber hits are counted, all small caliber hits and shell splinters being omitted. In the case of light cruisers all hits of every caliber are counted.
Damage to Battleships, Battle Cruisers and Cruisers | |||||
British | German | ||||
Name | Heavy hits | Casualties | Name | Heavy hits | Casualties |
Lion | 12 | 44 | Derffinger | 19 | 179 |
Princess Royal | 9 | 70 | Seydlitz | 21 | 149 |
Tiger | 4 | 62 | Moltke | 4 | 38 |
New Zealand | 1 | None | Von der Tann | 4 | 47 |
Indomitable | 1 | None | Markgraf | 5 | 17 |
Barkham | 6 | 59 | Grosser Kurfurst | 8 | 33 |
Mayala | 7 | 96 | Konig | 10 | 65 |
Warspite | 27 | Unknown | Kaiser | 2 | None |
Colossus | 2 | 5 | Helgoland | 1 | None |
Total | 69 | ? | Holstein | 1 | 10 |
? | ? | ? | Total | 73 | ? |
The number of heavy hits received by the Germans was therefore greater than those received by the British in the ratio of 1.14 to 1. In addition, the British had the Marlborough torpedoed, while on the German side the Seydlits was hit by a torpedo and the Ostfriesland mined.
Damage to Light Cruisers | |||||
British | German | ||||
Name | All hits | Casualties | Name | All hits | Casualties |
Southampton | 20 | 89 | Frankfurt | 4 | 21 |
Dublin | 13 | Unknown | Pillau | 1 | 26 |
Chester | 20 | 81 | Stettin | 2 | 35 |
Castor | 10 | 35 | Munchen | 5 | 25 |
Calliope | 1 | 21 | Hamburg | 4 | 38 |
Canterbury | 1 | None | Total | 17 | ? |
Galatea | 1 | None | ? | ? | ? |
Falmouth | 1 | None | ? | ? | ? |
Total | 67 | ? | ? | ? | ? |
The British therefore suffered greater damage to their light cruisers than did the Germans. The British also had more destroyers damaged.
In a final consideration of the losses it must be borne in mind that a ship sunk represents a damage many times more serious than one which is so badly damaged that it is just able to get into port before sinking. None of the ships sunk were replaced during the whole war by vessels of their type commenced after the battle; on the other hand, the Derffinger and Seydlits, which were damaged far more than any other ships, were ready after six months of repairs, while all the other ships, both British and German, were ready within two and one-half months from the date of the battle.
Furthermore, to build new ships requires a great amount of expensive material and the services of numerous skilled workmen: to repair ships but little new material is needed, and the personnel, while fairly numerous, is needed for a very much shorter period.
The personnel losses, particularly in officers, represent a very serious loss to a naval service.
Giving due weight to these considerations, it seems fair to estimate the British losses as approximately 1.75 times as great as the German. In other words, the losses were in proportion to the forces engaged. Thus, at the end of the battle the British still held the superiority over the Germans which they had before it was fought.
IV. The Moral Effects of the Battle
The moral effects of the battle must be considered under two headings:
- The effect upon the navies.
- The effect through the civil population, the armies and the population of the neutral nations.
Neither Jellicoe nor Beatty in their official reports claimed a success or victory, Jellicoe sent a message of congratulation to Beatty as follows:
Please accept my sincere congratulations on the action of the forces under your command under the difficult and disadvantageous conditions of light and weather which existed for you. The heavy losses, which I deeply deplore, appear to be largely due to these conditions, and your ships inflicted very severe damage to the enemy, although the great defensive strength of their ships saved more from becoming total losses. Words cannot express my deep sympathy with relatives and friends of the gallant officers and men who have gone under.
These are not the words of an admiral who has won a battle.
The message of the King to the fleet does no more than mention the "gallantry of the officers and men," and state his "confidence in the valor and efficiency of the fleets."
In his official report Admiral Jellicoe says:
The disturbing feature of the battle-cruiser action is the fact that five German battle cruisers engaging six vessels of this class, supported after the first 20 minutes, although at great range, by the fire of four battleships of the Queen Elisabeth class, were yet able to sink the Queen Mary and the Indefatigable.
Again the Admiral writes:
The experience and results of the action, particularly the knowledge we now have of the speed of the enemy's third squadron, must exercise considerable influence on our future dispositions and tactics. It will, for instance, not be advisable in future to place our fifth battle squadron in a position removed from support.
Finally this interesting statement is made:
The German organization at night is very good. Their system of recognition signals is excellent. Ours is practically nil. Their searchlights are superior to ours, and they use them with great effect. Finally, their method of firing at night gives excellent results. I am reluctantly compelled to the opinion that under night conditions we have a great deal to learn from them.
These statements demonstrate the following facts:
- The British battle cruisers were not capable of engaging the German battle cruisers under equal conditions. There is reason to believe that this was the opinion of those who served on the British battle cruisers.
- The fifth battle squadron, according to the opinion of the commander-in-chief, was capable of operating only with the fleet. This to a great extent threw away the advantages of its high speed and weakened the position of the battle cruisers still more.
- The British would not risk a general engagement at night and probably would not even attack with destroyers. A striking example of this occurred on August 19, when Commodore Tyrwhitt gained contact with the High Sea Fleet at nightfall. "The conditions," writes Jellicoe, "for night attack proved to be unfavorable, and at 7.30 p. m. the commodore reported that he had abandoned the pursuit."
While these facts doubtless made certain of the British forces less eager for battle, it is certainly a fact that the entire Grand Fleet would have welcomed another fleet action under equal conditions in the open sea. It is also a fact that the battle exposed the many deficiencies of the British ships and material, which were made good with great energy. It is probable that the morale of the Grand Fleet, all things considered, was as good after the battle as before it, and particularly after the depressing effects of the losses had worn off.
Let us now examine the situation from the German point of view.
In his official report Scheer claimed a success. His very interesting summary reads as follows:
The success obtained is due to the fact that our squadron and flotilla leaders were filled with zeal for battle, and realized the object of the undertaking, and to the excellent work performed by the ships' companies, who were imbued with the greatest martial ardor.
Its achievement was only rendered possible by the quality of our ships and armament, the fact that the peace training of the units was conscious of its object, and by the conscientious training carried out by the individual ships.
The large amount of experience gained will be exploited with the greatest care.
The battle has proved that in building up our fleet, and the development of the individual types of our ships, we have been guided by correct and strategical views, and that we should, therefore, continue on the same lines.
All arms have borne their share in this result; the decisive factor was, however, the long range heavy armament of the larger vessels. It caused the greater part of the known losses inflicted on the enemy, and it enabled the flotillas to carry out a successful attack against the enemy's Main Fleet. The above observation in no way detracts from the merit of the flotillas, whose attack on the enemy battle-fleet was finally successful in enabling us to break away completely from the enemy.
The large war vessel, battleship and cruiser, is and remains, therefore, the foundation of sea power, and should be further developed by enlarging the caliber of the guns, increasing the speed and perfecting the armor above and below the water.
These paragraphs show that Scheer was completely satisfied with the personnel and material of his fleet. While Jellicoe expressed satisfaction with his personnel, he criticized very severely the material development of his fleet in many respects.
The Austrian Naval Attaché to Berlin visited the fleet immediately after it returned to port and made an official report to the Austrian Admiralty. This report has every evidence of accuracy, and has the advantage of not being a public statement written for propaganda purposes. His report confirms the opinions of Admiral Scheer. In addition he makes the following comment upon the morale of the High Sea Fleet:
The fleet is absolutely enthusiastic and intoxicated with victory; the terrible incubus, the dread which weighed on everybody, namely, that the war should end without a meeting of the two fleets, has vanished…The entire fleet down to the last sailor has faith in its strength and in the possible conflicts of the future.
Despite the satisfaction of the Germans with the result of the battle and the temporary enthusiasm of their personnel, they realized that the numerical superiority of the British and their advantages of position would prevent the High Sea Fleet from ever gaining the command of the sea. Admiral Scheer admitted this and therefore urged the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare. This not being approved at that time, he continued his campaign with the High Sea Fleet in the North Sea in a manner similar to its operations before the battle; in fact his operation against Sunderland on August 19 was the most ambitious of his sorties into the North Sea. There is no evidence that the morale of the German commander-in-chief or that of his fleet was lowered by the battle of Jutland.
It is true that the morale of the fleet became bad in the latter part of 1917. The reasons for this were as follows:
- After January, 1917, unrestricted submarine warfare was commenced. This drew the best officers to the submarines; picked men were also taken from the fleet for the submarines. The morale of the submarines was good to the very end.
- All the navy yard facilities were used for the building and repair of submarines, and the material condition of the fleet deteriorated.
- As all the submarines were used against trade, none could be assigned to the fleet for combined operations, as was the case in 1916.
- For these reasons, it was not considered advisable to operate the fleet as aggressively in 1917 and 1918 as in 1916. The enforced idleness, the lack of food, and the pernicious activities of the Independent Socialists then combined to undermine the morale of the German Navy. It is not considered that the results of the Battle of Jutland contributed to this condition.
It now remains to consider the moral effect of the battle upon the civil population and armies of the belligerents, and upon the neutral nations.
In the German army the effect of the battle was favorable. Before the action there was doubtless a feeling that, while the troops were suffering terrible losses in battle, the fleet was remaining safe in port. The battle dispelled this feeling and doubtless encouraged the army, which at this time was being tested to the very limit.
Throughout Germany there had doubtless been some dissatisfaction at the lack of action on the part of the fleet, which had cost such enormous taxes before the war. The battle brought home the uses and accomplishments of the fleet, and as the Germans worked their propaganda very skillfully, the effect through their country was certainly very favorable. "That it gave the German people," writes Commander von Hase, "new strength and confidence, and contributed greatly to their prestige, there can be no question."
It is considered that the German Admiralty made a mistake in concealing the loss of the Lutzow. Admiral Scheer states that this was not done at his request, saying: "Unfortunately the secrecy observed produced the impression that it was necessary to enlarge our success to that extent." The Germans had good reason to be proud of the accomplishments of their fleet, without concealing any of its losses.
In the Allied Nations and among the neutrals the effect was particularly disadvantageous. This was partly due to the very high reputation which the British Navy had maintained through hundreds of years of history, and the fact that the German Navy was a new development and had never been tried in a fleet action. These considerations led the neutral nations to expect a complete victory, or at least that the German losses would be much heavier than the British. Therefore, the first startling German accounts had a tremendous effect upon public opinion. These impressions were increased by the admission by the British of the greater part of the German claims.
Then, to counter the unfavorable situation, the British used two lines of propaganda. The first was to blame the results of the battle upon the unfavorable weather condition. This proved a most unfortunate line, for people familiar with naval history remembered what Hawke had said and done at Ouiberon Bay. Here this famous old admiral reported that he saw the necessity he "was under of running all risks to break the strong force of the enemy." Following the French fleet, he entered the bay in a gale just as darkness was coming on. Being warned by his sailing master, who protested strongly against his entering the bay, Hawke replied: ''You have done your duty in warning me; now lay us alongside the French commander-in-chief." Also it might have been recalled that mist prevented Calder from capturing more than two ships from Villeneuve in the battle off Cape Finisterre in 1805, and that Calder had been censured by a court-martial of his brother officers.
The second course of action was to claim that the German losses were very much greater than they actually were. In addition to the true losses, the British claimed certain or probable losses of three battleships, one light cruiser, four destroyers, and one submarine. The German claims, although also exaggerated, were modest in contrast with these. Doubtless this line of propaganda had some effect, but the very necessity for using such methods had a bad effect upon those who could not be convinced that the British claims were true.
Taken all in all, the battle of Jutland had a favorable moral effect for the Germans and was a very heavy blow at British naval prestige.
V. The Effects of the Battle Upon the Course of the War
As it was known that many of the vessels of the High Sea Fleet were severely damaged, the Grand Fleet did not put to sea during the month of June. This period was utilized to effect important repairs and to carry out certain alterations proved necessary by the battle. Practically all the repairs were completed by the first week in July. The Chester rejoined on July 29 and the Marlborough on about August 5.
During the month of July the Grand Fleet put to sea but once, and this time for an exercise cruise of three days in the vicinity of the Shetlands. On the night of the 24th the Warspite and Valiant collided in Scapa Flow and had to be docked.
On August 18 the Grand Fleet started on a sweep into the southern part of the North Sea.
When the High Sea Fleet arrived in port on June 1, all damaged ships were sent to navy yards or private shipbuilding companies to repair their damages. By the middle of August all the ships were ready for service except the Derffinger and Seydlitz. The new battleship Bayem joined the fleet.
Admiral Scheer then put to sea with the intention of carrying out his original plan of a raid on Sunderland. During the 18th there were numerous contacts between the German submarines and the units of the Grand Fleet; the light cruiser Nottingham was sunk as the result of three torpedo hits; the Falmouth was hit by four torpedoes before sinking; on the other hand the battleship Westfalen was torpedoed by a British submarine, not, however, being seriously damaged. In the late afternoon the two fleets were nearly in contact, but Scheer refused action and succeeded in withdrawing just in time. In fact, the Harwich force did make contact with him and was in a position for a night destroyer attack. The British refused to attack, because, as Jellicoe reports, "the conditions for night attack proved to be unfavorable."
In this operation, the Germans declined a day action and the British one at night. Neither fleet was willing to engage, except under conditions which were favorable to it. The actual losses of the British were heavier than those of the Germans, and the success of the German submarines had a very decided moral effect upon the British. This is shown by the following statements of Admiral Jellicoe:
The experience of August 19th showed that light cruisers, proceeding at even the highest speed, unscreened by destroyers, ran considerable risk from enemy submarines. The enemy's submarine commanders were no doubt increasing in efficiency, and risks we could afford to run earlier in the war were now unjustifiable. Representations were made to the Admiralty to the effect that it was considered that in the future light cruisers should be screened by at least one destroyer per ship.
The ease with which the enemy could lay a submarine trap for the fleet had been demonstrated on the 19th of August; what had constantly puzzled me was that this had not been done very frequently at an earlier stage in the war. Since, however, it had been attempted and with some success, there seemed to be every reason to expect a repetition of the operation, and it was clear that it was unwise to take the fleet far into southern waters, unless an adequate destroyer force was present to act as a submarine screen for all ships. If the circumstances were exceptional and the need very pressing, it would be necessary to accept the risk. There was general agreement on this point between the flag officers of the fleet and the Admiralty.
This decision made the German control of the North Sea area off Helgoland considerably more secure, gave the German submarines a safer exit from their bases and made it practically impossible for the High Sea Fleet to be brought to action. In accordance with this principle none of the battle squadrons of the Grand Fleet ventured much to the southward of Scapa Flow while Admiral Jellicoe remained in command. The battle cruiser fleet made several cruises toward the Skagerrack, and the light cruisers made reconnaissance off the German minefields. The British submarines maintained a patrol off Florn Reef, and in the Skagerrack.
On the other hand, Admiral Scheer planned additional sorties into the North Sea. However, he apparently was not willing to risk a fleet action during these operations, for the one planned for September was cancelled because the weather was not suitable for dirigible scouting. In October an operation with the High Sea Fleet into the center of the North Sea was carried out, but the attempt to attack trade between England and Norway was without result, and no contact was made with the British forces.
Scheer's naval campaign with the High Sea Fleet had been practically checked, and the status at the end of 1916 was almost the same as at the beginning. His operations had a favorable moral effect throughout the world, and they had reflected great credit upon him and the High Sea Fleet. Nevertheless, nothing had been accomplished to break the British blockade; all that could be done was to maintain the present situation in the North Sea and the Baltic; the maintenance of this situation was of great importance for the Germans, and the offensive operations of the High Sea Fleet in 1916 had rendered the defensive position of Germany more secure.
After the results of the battle of Jutland had been carefully analysed, Scheer in his report of July 4, had stated the following opinion:
Should the future operations take a favorable course, it may be possible to inflict appreciable damage on the enemy; but there can be no doubt that even the most favorable issue of a battle on the high seas will not compel England to make peace in this war. The disadvantages of our geographical position compared with that of the Island Empire, and her great material superiority, cannot be compensated for by our fleet to a degree which will enable us to overcome the blockade instituted against us, or to overpower the Island Empire herself, even if all our submarines are available for military purposes.
A victorious termination of the war within reasonable time can only be attained by destroying the economical existence of Great Britain, namely, by the employment of submarines against British commerce.
This opinion had been constantly gaining ground in the German Navy and in the Government. It is shown by a statement made by Scheer in November, 1916:
The dangers which threaten our U-boats on these expeditions are so great that they are justified in demanding the utmost support that the fleet can give them in time of need. On no account must the feeling be engendered amongst the crews that they will be left to their fate if they get into difficulties. Fear of loss or damage must not lead us to curb the initiative in naval warfare, which so far has lain mostly in our hands. To us every U-boat is of such importance that it is worth risking the whole available fleet to give it assistance and support.
From now on the main mission of the High Sea Fleet became the support of the submarines; they, instead of the capital ship, became the chief weapon used in the German offensive on the High Seas. From now on the Germans made their attack directly on British trade and not on the Grand Fleet. In the last quarter of 1916, the shipping losses increased over 100 per cent.
Admiral Jellicoe was fully alive to the situation. He considered that the Germans would not risk a fleet action for some time, but he was greatly concerned with "the ever-growing danger of the submarine to our sea communications, and the necessity for the adoption of the most energetic measures to deal with this danger." To meet this danger he was called to the Admiralty to become First Sea Lord.
On land the war had been a rapid succession of reverses for the Central Powers. In Galicia the Austrian army had completely collapsed before the Russian attacks; almost one-half million prisoners were taken, and it was only by throwing in all the German reserves that even a semblance of a front was maintained.
General Ludendorff paints the picture on the eastern front with most vivid colors:
Those were terribly anxious days. We gave up everything we had knowing full well that if the enemy were to attack us no one could help us. And that is just what happened. On July i6 the Russians, in enormous force, poured out from the Riga bridge-head west of the Dvina and gained ground at once. We went through a terrible time until the crisis was overcome, thanks to the valor of the troops and the careful handling of affairs by the Headquarters Staff of the Eighth Army, which was compelled to use single battalions and batteries as reserves. These battles were not over yet at the end of July, when there were sure indications that the attacks at Baranovici and along the whole course of the Stockod would be resumed. We awaited these with a sinking heart, for our troops were exhausted and had long fronts to defend. The Austro-Hungarian troops had lost all confidence in themselves, and needed German support everywhere.
On July 1 the Allied attack on the Somme commenced with initial successes and developed into a grinding battle of attrition. The Allies, having a great superiority in numbers and enormous advantages in artillery, could afford such a battle better than could the Germans. As the battle progres.sed through August and September, the German losses became heavier and heavier, the divisions more and more exhausted and it was really with the utmost difficulty that the front was maintained.
On August 1 the Italians broke through the Austrian positions, took Gorizia and captured a large number of prisoners.
On September 1, to cap the climax, Roumania entered the war and commenced the invasion of Hungary with a fresh and well-equipped army. On the 7th an Allied offensive on the Macedonian front commenced; this resulted in the ultimate capture of Monastir by the Serbians.
Professor George H. Allen thus describes the situation:
The central empires quivered under the terrific pressure both on the east and west and there was imminent danger that the Galician front would collapse. In the midst of the Battle of the Somme the Germans were compelled to transfer reinforcements from the west to restore the wavering Austro-Hungarian lines. From the beginning of the Russian offensive on June 4th until the middle of September as many as sixteen infantry divisions appear to have been shifted from the western to the eastern front; while seven Austro-Hungarian divisions were transferred from the hard pressed Italian front, and two divisions were contributed by Turkey. Time will probably reveal further evidence of the intensity of the crisis.
Can there be any doubt but that British naval forces controlling the Baltic and operating in combination with the Russian armies would have brought the war to an end during the last months of 1916?
As it was the Central Powers gradually consolidated their positions on all fronts, concentrated what slight reserves they could make available, and overran Roumania. Thus for the time, their defensive positions were secure. But war cannot be won without attacking. Where were the Germans to attack? On all the land fronts, the Allied Nations had a great superiority. The attack must be made on the sea. Here the Germans still had the submarine weapon. In desperation, like a gambler playing his last card, Germany announced the decision to make use of this last instrument of war which gave hopes of compelling their enemies to sue for peace—the submarine. "The strategic offensive," writes Scheer, "passed definitely to the navy on February 1, 1917. U-boats and the fleet supplemented each other to form one weapon which was to be used in an energetic attack on England's might. Our fleet became the hilt of the weapon, whose sharp blade was the U-boat."
Here we see the paradox of the nation with the greatest army standing on the defensive on land, and the country with the greatest navy forced to the defensive at sea.
The submarine offensive was the important event of 1917. Many authorities have told how near the submarine came to winning the war for Germany. "The danger which confronted the British peoples was never so great in any previous period as it was during the year 191 7 when the submarine menace was at its height." (Jellicoe.)
It is doubtful whether there is any case in history where a navy as weak in comparative fighting strength as was the German, and as poorly based as regards strategic position, has accomplished such important results, by means of methods, however, which the great majority of nations have considered as inhuman and contrary to the principles of international law.
The submarine accomplished the following results in 1917:
(a) Encouraged the armies and civil population of the Central Powers by giving them hopes of ultimate victory.
(b) Brought Great Britain to the verge of starvation and depleted the stocks of fuel oil to such an extent that the operations of the Grand Fleet were limited. "So many vessels were sunk," writes Admiral Jellicoe, "that our reserve of fuel oil became perilously low. Instead of a reserve of some five or six months we were gradually reduced to one of about eight weeks, and in order to economize expenditure of fuel it actually became necessary at one time to issue directions that the speed of oil burning warships was to be limited except in cases of the greatest urgency. Such an order in war time was a matter of much gravity."
(c) Caused a great material loss to the Allies by the sinking of merchant shipping and the loss of cargoes. The tonnage, according to British official reports, lost by Allied and neutral nations was as follows:
Year | Quarter | Gross tonnage |
1916 | Third | 592,039 |
Fourth | 1,159,343 | |
1917 | First | 1,619,373 |
Second | 2,236,934 | |
Third | 1,494,473 | |
Fourth | 1,272,843 |
(d) Compelled the Allies to dissipate their energies in building merchant shipping at the expense of their military efforts. The increase of British tonnage built is shown by the following table:
Year | Quarter | Gross tonnage |
1916 | Third | 124,961 |
Fourth | 213,332 | |
1917 | First | 246,239 |
Second | 249,331 | |
Third | 248,283 | |
Fourth | 419,621 |
(e) Forced the Allied Nations to build up great anti-submarine organizations, composed of numbers of ships and personnel many times those employed by the Germans in the submarine campaign. The British alone had 3395 auxiliary patrols in commission in British and Mediterranean waters.
(f) Operated very effectively against the lines of communications to the Allied forces on the Macedonian front and greatly limited their operations.
(g) Reduced Italy to a very precarious situation and strongly influenced the collapse of the Italian armies on the Isonzo front.
(h) Enabled the Germans to hold the western front. In a conference on July 13, 1917, General Ludendorff stated:
The superiority of our western opponents in war material, particularly in guns and ammunition, was so great last year that if it had gone on increasing—i.e., by the unrestricted import from America and the maintenance of the enemy's war industries at their highest level—we should have been faced with serious dangers on the western front in 1917. These dangers could only have been diminished by the unrestricted submarine campaign. If it had not begun no one could say whether we should now still be holding firm on the western front.
The decision of the Germans to use submarine warfare, on the other hand, brought the United States into the war; and this ultimately decided the war in the favor of the Allied Nations, after the submarine campaign had failed to gain the decision for Germany. There is no evidence to support the German claims that the United States would have entered the war merely to come to the assistance of the Allies, and without the provocation afforded by the submarine campaign.
The effectiveness of the submarine campaign was made possible by the failure of the British to win a decisive victory at the battle of Jutland. Such a victory and a subsequent move of the British into the Baltic would have decreased the results of the submarine campaign in the following ways:
(a) Closed the Cattegat to German submarines, thus shutting off one of their two lines of advance into the North Sea. Even as late as the Fall of 1917, Admiral Jellicoe stated that a British advance into the Baltic was "not impossible," notwithstanding the fact that the entire High Sea Fleet was then in being. Such an operation could not, of course, have been carried through under these conditions, as it would have left the Germans with a superiority in the North Sea.
(b) Prevented German trade with Sweden and thus decreased the supply of material for constructing submarines.
(c) Damaged by bombardment or aircraft attack shipyards on the Baltic coast engaged in the construction of submarines.
(d) The heavy personnel losses which the High Sea Fleet would have suffered would have prevented the submarines from obtaining picked personnel from this source.
(e) The passage of the submarines to and from the North Sea via Helgoland would have been more difficult, as minefields could have been laid comparatively close in to the German bases and would have been more effective than the barrages laid between the Orkneys and Norway. It is not considered that the German bases could have been completely blocked, for, as Commander von Hase points out, "the submarine warfare had been conducted from Flanders without the fleet under much more difficult conditions than those in the North Sea."
(f) A great part of the destroyers, light cruisers, sloops, minesweepers, trawlers, submarines and patrol vessels of various types, which had been operating with the Grand Fleet, could have been assigned to anti-submarine operations. As it happened, these forces were increased. Efforts to obtain destroyers for anti-submarine operations were vetoed by the commander-in-chief, Grand Fleet and the Admiralty. "Those who argued then," wrote Admiral Jellicoe, "or who have argued since, that we should have reduced the number of destroyers with the Grand Fleet will not, I think, meet with any support from those who served in that fleet, especially from the officers upon whom lay the responsibility for countering any move of the High Sea Fleet." Referring to a later date he says: "The Admiralty was pressed to weaken yet further the Grand Fleet destroyer force in order to extend the convoy system, but did not consider such a course justified in view of the general naval situation."
(g) A great part of the capital ships of the Grand Fleet could have been placed out of commission, and their personnel and the energy expended in their upkeep could have been used in antisubmarine operations. As an alternative, these ships could have been kept in commission and used directly against the enemy forces, in the same way the Federal naval forces in the Civil War, having no Confederate fleet to consider, were employed.
(h) The four great battle cruisers of the Hood class, whose construction was commenced just after the battle of Jutland, would not have been required, and merchant ships or anti-submarine craft could have been built in their place.
The second great event of the year 1917 was the collapse of Russia. This was caused by the following:
- The terrible losses suffered by the Russians in 1914, 1915 and 1916.
- The general inefficiency of the Russian Government, which practically broke down in 1917.
- The intrigues of the Bolshevists, assisted by German propaganda.
- The rout of the Russian Army in Galicia in July, 1917.
- The German Riga offensive in September, 1917.
- The operation of the High Sea Fleet in October, 1917, which resulted in the Germans gaining the command of the Gulf of Riga, and the capture of Oesel and Moon Islands at its mouth.
Many of these causes of the Russian collapse can be traced to the failure of the British to make the most of their opportunities at Jutland. Had the British been able to control the Baltic, they would probably have been able to have prevented this great disaster to the Allied arms, or, at least, to materially delayed it.
Direct communication would have enabled the Allies to bring diplomatic pressure upon Russia to much greater effect than was actually done. Supplies for the Russian Army would not have had to be sent through Archangel. Allied propaganda would have been more effective. Allied troops could have been sent in to reinforce the Russians at important points, such as at Riga. The presence of a British fleet in the Baltic would have greatly encouraged the Russians, and lowered German influence in Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland. It would have cut the German sea communications to Libau, have prevented the Riga operation, and rendered impossible the naval attack on Oesel Island. In addition, the German expedition to Finland in 1918 would have been prevented. All these advantages would almost certainly have kept up such Russian resistance as would have prevented the German concentration on the west front for their great 1918 offensive.
It has been shown how the Germans reached their high-water mark in the spring of 1916; then the tide had turned in favor of the Allies and they had come within an ace of winning the war in the fall; a naval victory had been all they needed to gain the decision.
In the winter of 1916-1917 the Germans had started to gain ground. In 1917 the Germans had continued to make progress, the effectiveness of the submarine campaign, the collapse of Russia, and terrible defeat of the Italians on the Isonzo marking the stages of their advance. In the fall of 1917, they regained the offensive role on the western front at the great counterattack at Cambrai. The submarine campaign having failed to win a decision, the German leaders concentrated all their forces on the western front for a final great campaign.
But while the year 1917 had certainly revived the fortunes of the Central Powers and had by outward successes greatly encouraged the civil population, two great and almost unseen influences were slowly but surely exerting their pressure, and building up forces to meet the great German offensive which was threatened.
The first was the steady and remorseless pressure of the British blockade of the Central Powers. As the internal resources of Germany became more and more exhausted, the pressure of the blockade became more and more heavy; it affected not only the military operations of the Germans, but ground down the morale of the civil population by privations and starvation. Germany could hold out only for a short period more, sufficient for one great attack to be made, and even this attack could not be made with its full effectiveness.
The second influence was the rapid and most effective preparation of the United States. In 1917 the United States had not been able to throw important military forces into the fighting lines. Naval forces had reinforced the Grand Fleet, and thus definitely prevented the Germans from ever again contesting the command of the North Sea with surface craft; other naval units had contributed to the gradual breaking up of the submarine offensive. But the principal contributions of the United States in this year were unlimited financial aid and indispensable morale encouragement. These were to play their part in meeting the first blows of the German 1918 offensive; the new American army, being rapidly formed and transported to Europe, was to contribute the force which finally turned the scales and, in combination with the British and French Armies, to win the final decision.
During 1918 the German Navy still continued the offensive with the submarine weapon, with, however, constantly decreasing effect. The High Sea Fleet made a few raids into the North Sea, but generally limited its operations to a successful support of the submarines. When Hindenburg and Ludendorff, with supreme courage, threw all their reserves against the western front, it is difficult to see why the Germans did not use their battle cruisers, at least, on a raid into the Atlantic at the same time. Had they been able to prevent the sailing of American transports for even two weeks in the spring of 1918, the German Army might have won the war. Nevertheless, the fact that the High Sea Fleet was in being compelled Great Britain to retain 300,000 troops at home to guard against a German landing attack in England. In this way the High Sea Fleet contributed to the success of the great German attack on March 21, 1918.
In the last days of the war, when the German Army was hopelessly beaten, the commander-in-chief of the High Sea Fleet planned a submarine trap in the North Sea, similar to the operation of August 19, 1916. There was no chance that this would have resulted in any important success for the Germans. The mutiny of the German bluejackets, which prevented its execution, therefore had no material effect upon the war, notwithstanding the terrible disgrace it brought to the German Navy.
VI. Summary of the Effects and Results of the Battle
Having passed in review the course of the war after the battle of Jutland, we are now in a position to estimate its results. At the time of the battle two salient points of the strategical situation could have been recognized by the British and German leaders. These were:
- The Germans had a very little chance of winning a fleet action and any fleet action they might be able to win would not materially improve their strategical position, or have an important effect upon the naval campaign.
- The British had very favorable chances of winning a fleet action, and such a victory would improve very materially their strategic position, and would have a decisive effect upon the naval campaign, if not upon the entire course of the war.
Therefore, it should be regarded as an extraordinary piece of good fortune for the British if a fleet action could be forced upon the Germans. This good fortune was further increased on the 31st of May by two factors which increased enormously the advantages of the British:
- The visibility conditions greatly favored the British, a fact which the British commander-in-chief states he knew at the time.
- The German fleet was on two separate occasions in the most extremely unfavorable tactical positions with reference to the British fleet.
A striking proof of these disadvantages of the Germans is demonstrated by the fact that the High Sea Fleet scored a total of two hits on the British Battle Fleet, inflicting five casualties.
Despite all the conditions in favor of the British, the Germans suffered far smaller material losses.
The moral results of the battle were favorable to the Germans throughout the world. The battle was a great blow at British naval prestige and tradition.
In judging the effects of the battle on the later course of the war, it is our opinion that the battle had no effect in favor of either the British or the Germans. It left the strategical situation as it found it.
After the action the pressure exerted by both the British and German Navies increased.
The blockade of the British Navy eventually helped to win the war in 1918, in conjunction with the Allied armies.
The German Navy came within an ace of winning the war with the submarine, assisted in the downfall of Russia, helped the defeat of Roumania, played its part in the rout of the Italian Army on the Isonzo, and gave the German Army a splendid chance to win on the western front.
We know the Allies won the war in 1918. But the present situation is only temporary. In ten years from now, who will be the real victor? Only the future can tell.
A victory in 1916 would have been a different victory than the victory in 1918.
VII. The Lesson of the Battle of Jutland for the United States Navy
It would not be suitable for us to endeavor to point out the lessons of this naval battle, when this was done one hundred and thirty years ago by our first great naval commander, Paul Jones. Every American naval officer could do nothing better than to learn by heart the following remarkable statement:
De Grasse had more ships, more men, and more guns than Graves had. His ships were better found and sailed faster, either ship for ship, or measuring the maneuvering power of the fleet by the slowest or dullest of all, than the ships of Graves. In my judgment, there has never been an occasion in all the naval wars between France and England when the opportunity was so distinctly and overwhelmingly on the side of France as in those few October days in 1781, off the Capes of the Chesapeake—when France actually had, for the moment, command of the sea. Now, my dear Kersaint, you know me too well to accuse me of self-vaunting. Vou will not consider me vain, in view of your knowledge of what happened in the past off Carrickfergus, off Flamboro Head, and off the Liman in the Black Sea, if I say that, had I stood—fortunately or unfortunately in the shoes of de Grasse, there would have been disaster to some one off the Capes of the Chesapeake; disaster more lasting than an orderly retreat of a beaten fleet to a safe port. To put it a little more strongly, there was a moment when the chance to destroy the enemy's fleet would have driven from me all thought of the conjoint strategy of the campaign as a whole.
APPENDIX.
New Information Concerning the Battle of Jutland
On 31 March the writer sent ten questions to the German Admiralty concerning the battle of Jutland. On 9 June, the answers were supplied by Commander Groos, writing for Vice Admiral v. Mantey of the Naval Archives Section of the German Admiralty:
1. Q. How many German torpedo boats took part in the battle?
A. Sixty-five German torpedo boats took part in the Skagerrack battle.
2. Q. How many were with Admiral Hipper?
A. Of these, 32 torpedo boats were with Admiral Hipper.
3. Q. What was the total displacement of all the torpedo boats?
A. Total displacement of torpedo boats—62,203 tons.
4. Q. What was the distance from Admiral Hipper's scouting line of light cruisers and torpedo boats to the Lutzow at 4.00 p. m., German time?
A. Twenty nautical miles.
5. Q. About how many hits did the German battle cruisers receive before Admiral Scheer arrived, at about 6.45 German time?
A. The German battle cruisers received 11 hits (shell) and 1 torpedo hit up to 6.45 German time.
6. Q. How many hits did the German battle cruisers and the first division of battleships receive while pursuing Admiral Beatty to the northward from about 6.45 p. m, to about 8.00 p. m., German time?
A. About 15 hits. These are subject to correction and it is difficult to determine what part of the total hits should be attributed to the different phases of the engagement.
7. Q. When was the Seydlitz torpedoed?
A. Seydlitz was torpedoed 6.57 German time.
8. Q. Are the number of hits received by German ships, as given in my table on page 1767 of the enclosed pamphlet (The High Sea Fleet at Jutland) correct? If not, please inform me of errors.
A. The actual number of hits received is as follows:
Derffinger, 28, of which 9 were of small caliber.
Seydlitz, 23, of which 2 were of small caliber
Moltke, 4, of which none were of small caliber.
Konig, 15, of which 5 were of small caliber.
Markgraf, 5.
Kaiser, 2.
Grosser Kurfurst, 9, of which i was of small caliber.
Munchen, 5, all of small caliber.
The others correspond to the table.
9. Q. What were the exact losses of killed and wounded in the High Sea Fleet?
A. Losses among German crews in the battle:
Killed and missing 2545
Wounded 494
10. Q. How many German torpedo boats, in addition to those sunk, were damaged by gunfire?
A. Losses of German destroyers in the battle:
Sunk by gunfire 3
Sunk by torpedoes 2
Damaged by gunfire 6