THE PLACE OF NAVAL OFFICERS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
By Lieut. Commander G. B. Vroom, U. S. Navy
From the establishment of the United States of America as a sovereign power to the present day, naval officers have played parts of the utmost importance in international affairs. England from the days of the Tudor Navy, especially in the Mediterranean and in the Far East, has been ably represented by her seamen. The rise of England's power on the ocean, is due no less to her defeat of the Spanish Armada, and the subsequent maritime activity that followed that epoch-marking event, than to the efforts of her naval commanders in the realm of diplomacy. Naval officers first recognized the importance of the Mediterranean to England's greatness; the foundations of her power in those waters were laid in the times of the Commonwealth and the restoration in spite of the greatest difficulties encountered both at home and abroad. The achievements of Lord Nelson, diplomatic as well as warlike, closed a period of almost two centuries in which England's greatest men appear, leading her on to empire and to the absolute command of the sea.
The Century Dictionary defines diplomacy as: 1. The science of the forms, ceremonies and methods to be observed in conducting the actual intercourse of one state with another, through authorized agents, on the basis of international law; the art of conducting such intercourse, as in negotiating and drafting treaties; representing the interests of a state or of its subjects at a foreign court, etc. 2. The art or practice of negotiation or official intercourse, as between independent powers; diplomatic procedure in general; the transaction of international business. Hence. 3. Dexterity or skill in managing negotiations of any kind; artful management with the view of securing advantages; diplomatic tact.
The greatest natural gift necessary for the successful prosecution of public affairs may be summed up in what is known in the Far East as "face-pidgin." This may be said to include a knowledge of the fitness of things; courtesy, dignity, a willingness to respect the customs and prejudices of the person with whom one is dealing; the instinctive knowledge of how to do the proper thing at the proper time. The nearest English word is tact; but "tact" does not quite cover the meaning.
The essence of the naval profession is the ability to judge men. In addition, there is required of every successful naval officer personal magnetism and leadership.
A recognized aptitude for public affairs, a thorough knowledge of the forms of procedure and methods of international intercourse, would naturally be required of any man appointed to a diplomatic post or to a responsible command at sea, on a foreign station.
Add to these judgment, firmness and decision, and we have the qualifications necessary to a successful diplomat or naval commander; all of which were possessed in the greatest degree by the brilliant men of the past.
In the modern world, with the ease and rapidity of communication, the spheres of independent action of diplomatic representatives as well as naval commanders, have narrowed tremendously. This is more especially true as regards the routine despatch of business between friendly powers through their respective foreign offices and the various diplomatic agents accredited to them. Rare indeed would be the occasion, in these days, when the question of peace and war, the negotiation of a treaty, or even the settlement of a comparatively minor question, would depend upon the initiative and decision of a diplomat or naval officer, without reference to his government. It may be said that ordinarily a diplomat is merely the mouth-piece of his government, with the additional duty of collecting and transmitting such information concerning the government to which he is accredited, as he might think of value. His usefulness would therefore depend almost entirely upon the ability to make friends, through or from whom he might acquire information.
There are occasions, however, when upon him would devolve vast responsibility, as in the old days. The question of war might depend upon the firmness with which he dealt with delicate questions; his attitude might be interpreted as the attitude of his government. No less are the possibilities that might befall a naval commander to-day, especially in Latin America, and the Far East, where communication is more uncertain, and where events are apt to move more swiftly.
History is replete with the names of men of genius in the military and naval professions, who were no less skilled as diplomatists. To go no farther back than the latter years of the eighteenth century, we find Nelson, at that time a rear admiral of the blue, given diplomatic powers that would under no circumstances be accorded to-day; powers that left to his sole discretion what amounted to a declaration of war upon neutral states. These powers were delegated by the commander-in-chief on the station whose orders from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty were to appoint "a discreet officer" to carry out their plans.
In pursuance of instructions I have received from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, to employ a squadron of His Majesty's ships within the Mediterranean, under the command of a discreet officer I do hereby authorize you, on being joined by the Culloden, etc., to take them and their captains under your command, in addition to those already with you, and to proceed with them in quest of the armament preparing by the enemy at Toulon and Genoa On the subject of supplies, I enclose also a copy of their lordships' order to me, and do require you strictly to comply with the spirit of it, by considering and treating as hostile any ports within the Mediterranean (those of Sardinia excepted), where provisions or other articles you may be in want of, and which they are enabled to furnish, shall be refused; and you are to treat in like manner, and capture the ships and vessels of powers or states adhering to His Majesty's enemies, or under other circumstances enumerated in the said order, determining to the best of your judgment upon the several cases under this head, that may occur during your command.
Throughout the campaign in the Mediterranean, Nelson was constantly employed in diplomatic negotiations, sometimes under the orders of the commander-in-chief, but more often upon his own initiative. We find frequent reference in his letters, both official and personal, to his diplomatic activities. Thus, writing from the Bay of Naples to Lord Keith, in June, 1799, he says:
…I arrived in the Bay of Naples on the twenty-fourth, when I saw a flag of truce flying on board His Majesty's ship Seahorse, Captain Foote. and also on the castles of Uovo and Nuovo. Having on the passage received letters informing me that an infamous armistice was entered into with the rebels in those castles, to which Captain Foote had put his name, I instantly made the signal to annul the truce, being determined never to give my approbation to any terms with rebels, but that of unconditional submission I sent Captains Troubridge and Ball instantly to the cardinal vicar-general, to represent to His Eminence my opinion of the infamous terms entered into with the rebels His Eminence said he would send no papers, that if I pleased I might break the armistice, for that he was tired of his situation. Captain Troubridge then asked His Eminence this plain question: "If Lord Nelson breaks the armistice, will your Eminence assist him in his attack on the castles?" His answer was clear, "I will assist him neither with men or guns." After much communication, His Eminence desired to come on board to speak with me on his situation. I used every argument in my power to convince him that the treaty and armistice was at an end by the arrival of the fleet; but an admiral is no match in talking with a cardinal. I, therefore, gave him my opinion in writing—viz. Rear-Admiral Lord Nelson, who arrived in the Bay of Naples on 24 June with the British fleet, found a treaty entered into with the rebels, which he is of opinion ought not to be carried into execution without the approbation of His Sicilian Majesty, Earl St. Vincent, Lord Keith
As the reduction of the Island of Malta is of the greatest consequence to the interests of the allied powers at war with France, and the withdrawing of the squadron of His Most Faithful Majesty under your command, at this time, from the blockade of that island, will be of the most ruinous consequences to their interests, particularly when an enemy's fleet of thirteen sail of the line are daily expected in those seas, and two sail of the line and several other ships with provisions and stores, for the relief of Malta, are now lading at Toulon; you are hereby required and directed, in consideration of the above circumstances, and notwithstanding the orders you have received from your court to return to Lisbon, not on any consideration whatsoever to withdraw one man from that island, which may have been landed from the squadron from under your Excellency's command, or detach one ship down the Mediterranean, until further orders from me for that purpose.
The order quoted in the foregoing paragraph was accompanied by a private letter to the same effect. Writing to Sir J. St. C. Erskine, on October 11, he says: "I have with great difficulty induced his Sicilian Majesty to permit Sir John Acton to write to Colonel Graham, that he might take five hundred men from the citadel of Messina, for the important service of Malta; and Sir John has wrote (sic) in the same strong manner to the Russian admiral at Naples, for seven hundred troops…"
Throughout the period of Nelson's service in the Mediterranean, he was constantly engaged, not only in strictly naval duties, but in public affairs of far-reaching consequence. No officer of to-day would have the hardihood to give orders to the commander of an Allied force, in spite of contrary orders that the latter might have received from his government; nor is it likely that there would be a necessity to do so. Of course it must be borne in mind that the times of Nelson cannot be compared with modern days ; the activities of naval officers in the past in purely diplomatic affairs are not introduced for the purpose of showing what a naval officer might be called upon to do, but to show that the genius for naval affairs and administration; the ability to command the respect and loyalty of subordinates, such as Nelson possessed in a marked degree; often go hand in hand with the genius for public affairs, and the courage and firmness necessary for their successful prosecution.
From John Paul Jones, receiving at Brest the first salute to the flag, down to Admiral Dewey and his diplomatic triumph at Manila, when he obtained the moral support of England as opposed to the hostile intentions of the German admiral there present, the history of the United States Navy contains the names of many men no less successful as diplomatists than in their profession. Of them all, John Paul Jones was perhaps the most indefatigable, because he was under the necessity of obtaining for himself from the French court what his own government was unable or unwilling to supply. His activities extended over a long period, from 1778 to 1792, and he used every means to further his ends known to diplomatic practice of his day. While in command of the Ranger, he set about to persuade the French Government to provide him with a suitable command. "He wrote to Sartine, the French Minister of Marine, to the King of France, to various influential persons in or about the French court, to French naval officers, to French ladies of influence, to Dr. Franklin, and to others whom he thought to be in a position to help him." (Paullin.) Writing to the king, on October 19, 1778, he says:
After my return to Brest in the American ship of war, the Ranger, from the Irish Channel, His Excellency Dr. Franklin informed me by letter, dated June 1st, that M. de Sartine, having a good opinion of my conduct and bravery, had determined, with your Majesty's consent and approbation, to give me the command of the ship of war the Indien which was built at Amsterdam for America, but afterwards for political reasons made the property of France. I was to act with unlimited orders under the commission and flag of America. And the Prince de Nassau proposed to accompany me on the ocean.
I was deeply penetrated with a sense of the honor done me by this proposition, as well as of the favor which your Majesty intended thereby to confer on America, and I accepted the offer with the greater pleasure as the Congress had sent me to Europe in the Ranger to command the Indien, before the ownership of that vessel was changed.
The minister desired to see me at Versailles to settle future plans of operations, and I attended him for that purpose. I was told that the Indien was at the Texel, completely armed and fitted for sea, but the Prince de Nassau was sent express to Holland, and returned with a very different account—the ship was at Amsterdam, and could not be got afloat or armed before the September equinox.
The American plenipotentiaries proposed that I should return to America; and as I had been appointed repeatedly to the chief command of an American squadron to execute secret enterprises, it was not doubted but that Congress would again show me a preference. M. de Sartine, however, thought proper to prevent my departure by writing to the plenipotentiaries (without my knowledge), requesting that I might be permitted to remain in Europe, and that the Ranger might be sent back to America under another commander, he having special services which he wished me to execute. The request they readily granted, and I was flattered by the prospect of being enabled to testify by my services my gratitude to your Majesty as the first prince who has so generously acknowledged our independence.
There was an interval of more than three months before the Indien could be got afloat. To employ that period usefully, when your Majesty's fleet was ordered to sail from Brest, I proposed to the minister to embark in it as a volunteer, in pursuit of marine knowledge. He objected to this, but at the same time approved of a variety of hints for private enterprises, which I had drawn up for his consideration.
Two gentlemen were appointed to settle with me, the plans that were to be adopted—who gave me assurance that three of the best frigates in France, with two tenders, and a number of boats, should be immediately put under my command, and to pursue such of my own projects as I thought proper; but this fell to nothing, when I believed that your Majesty's signature only was wanting.
Another armament, composed of cutters and small vessels at L'Orient, was proposed to be put under my command, to alarm the coasts of England, and check the Jersey privateers; but happily for me this also failed, and I was saved from ruin and dishonor; for, as I now find, all the vessels sailed slow, and their united force was very insignificant.
The minister then thought fit that I should return to Brest to command the Lively, and join some frigates on an expedition from St. Malo to the North Sea. I returned in haste for that purpose, and found that the Lively had been bestowed at Brest, before the minister had mentioned that ship to me at Versailles. This was, however, another fortunate disappointment, as the Lively proves, both in sailing and equipment, much inferior to the Ranger, but more especially if it be true, as I have since understood, that the minister intended to give the chief command of the expedition to a lieutenant, which would have occasioned a very disagreeable misunderstanding; for, as an officer of the first rank in the merchant marine, who has ever been honored with the favor and friendship of Congress, I can receive orders from no inferior officer whatsoever. My plan was the destruction of the English Baltic fleet, of great consequence to the enemy's marine, and then only protected by a single frigate. I would have held myself responsible for its success had I commanded the expedition.
M. de Sartine afterwards sent orders to Count D'Orvilliers to receive me on board the fleet, agreeable to my former proposal, but the order did not arrive until after the departure of the fleet the last time from Brest, nor was I made acquainted with the circumstance before the fleet returned here.
Thus have I been chained down to shameful inactivity for nearly five months. I have lost the best season of the year, and such opportunities of serving my country and acquiring honor as I cannot again expect this war; and, to my infinite mortification, having no command, I am considered everywhere an officer cast off, and in disgrace for secret reasons.
At the close of the war, Jones was appointed by Congress as an agent to solicit, in France, the payment of all prize money arising from the sale of prizes that he had captured. His appointment was made upon his own solicitation to Congress for the post.
Resolved, That Captain John Paul Jones be, and he hereby is recommended to the Minister plenipotentiary of the United States, at the court of Versailles, as agent to solicit under the direction of the said minister for payment and satisfaction to the officers and crews, for all prizes taken in Europe under his command and to which they are in anywise entitled. And that the said Captain J. P. Jones shall receive the commission usually allowed in such cases out of the money which he shall recover as agent for the said prizes, in full compensation for his services and expenses; provided always that the said Captain J. P. Jones, previous to his entering upon the execution of the said trust shall give to the superintendent of finance, for the benefit of all concerned, sufficient bonds with good security, for the faithful discharge thereof, and for the just payment of the same to the said superintendent of finance, to be by him distributed to those persons who may be entitled thereto.
In accordance with the resolution, Jones was empowered by Franklin to act as agent. His negotiations covered a period of two and a half years, before they were successfully terminated by the payment of the prize money claims. In the course of his work, he treated with the French Foreign Minister and with the Danish Foreign Minister. Jones' last diplomatic mission was to the dey of Algiers, to treat concerning peace and the ransoming of American prisoners, for which he was chosen by Thomas Jefferson. He died, however, before entering upon the work.
After the close of the Revolution, and the establishment of the American Republic, we find naval officers of the United States actively engaged in Europe in diplomatic affairs. It was, indeed, due directly to their negotiations, in conjunction with their naval duties, that the United States first received serious attention from European statesmen. The work of Preble, in Tripoli and Tunis in the years of 1804 and 1805, convinced not only the pirate states of northern Africa, but the European nations as well, that the United States was a sovereign power amply able and determined to protect its interests and its citizens abroad.
Upon the withdrawal of United States vessels from the Mediterranean, 1807, the United States had no vessels there until 1815. In that year, war was declared upon Algiers, and two American squadrons were sent to the Mediterranean. These were commanded by Commodores Bainbridge and Decatur. Having been authorized by the President to capture Algerine vessels, Decatur, whose squadron arrived first in European waters, and whose flagship carried William Shaler, consul general to the Barbary states, as a passenger, captured a brig and a frigate, the latter the flagship of the Algerine forces. With the two prizes, Decatur appeared off Algiers. With Bainbridge and Shaler he had been authorized to negotiate a treaty with the Dey. The Swedish consul acting as mediary, the captain of the port asked the conditions upon which peace would be made, and they replied by handing him a note from the President and a note signed by themselves (Paullin), The President's note gave the Dey the choice of peace or war: The commissioners informed the Dey that they were prepared to conduct the negotiations. "The Shaler-Decatur treaty was the most liberal treaty that Algiers had ever made with a Christian nation, and marks the beginning of a new era in the relations of that country with the civilized powers." (Paullin.)
Diplomatic successes in the western Mediterranean were followed by negotiations for a treaty with Turkey. Five naval officers were concerned: Commodores William Bainbridge, John Rodgers, William M. Crane, James Biddle and David Porter. The period of negotiations was from 1784 to 1832. It was not until 1800, however that a naval officer appears in connection with the relations between the United States and Turkey. In that year, Commodore Bainbridge, whose vessel had been impressed into the service of Algiers and sent on a mission to the Turkish capital, discussed with the Capudan Pacha the subject of a treaty between the United States and Turkey. The conversation was:
He expressed a very great desire that a minister should be sent from the United States to effect it. I informed him that there was one already named, who, at present, was in Lisbon, and probably would be here in six months. He said he would write to the ambassador, which letter would be a protection for him while in the Turkish empire, and gave me liberty to recommend any merchant vessel to his protection, which might wish to come here previously to the arrival of the ambassador. I thanked him in the name of the United States for the protection he had been pleased to give the frigate under my command, and for his friendly attentions to myself and officers. I conceive it to be a very fortunate moment to negotiate an advantageous treaty with this government.
Nothing came of Bainbridge's visit to the Sublime Porte, however. William Smith, of Charleston, South Carolina, was the ambassador who had been accredited to Turkey, and although Bainbridge received and transmitted a letter from the Pacha to Smith, the latter made no use of it, because the mission was abandoned. The next visit of an American naval officer to Turkey was not until 26 years later, when Commodore John Rodgers was sent, being then in command of the Mediterranean squadron, to seek an interview with the admiral of the Turkish fleet, which took place at Tenedos, on July 6, 1826. The result was a note, two years later, from, the Turkish Government stating that "the delay, until now, must be attributable to destiny," and that "the present period is favorable for such a convention." Rodgers, however, had left the Mediterranean the year before, and his successor, Commodore William Crane, was appointed joint commissioner with David Offley, consul, to conclude a treaty. The negotiations lasted through the winter 1828-29, and ended in failure. Crane's successor. Commodore James Biddle, was therefore appointed by the President, together with Offley and a New York merchant, Charles Rhind, to continue the negotiations, jointly or severally. Nothing was done, however, until the arrival of Rhind, in 1830, when negotiations were commenced that lasted through three months. The terms proposed by the Turks were unfavorable to the United States, and it was only with much difficulty, and finally upon the direct order of the Sultan, that the treaty was drawn in accordance with the wishes of Rhind. The treaty was ratified in the following year, and Commodore David Porter, recently resigned from the navy, was appointed minister and empowered to exchange ratifications. The treaty was proclaimed on February 4, 1832.
We will now consider the relations of the United States in the Pacific, and more especially with the Oriental nations, as carried on by American naval officers. These have been of the most far-reaching importance.
The earliest of these relations were with China, and were brought about directly by the spread of American commerce to the Far East. The first American war vessel to visit China was the Congress, commanded by Captain John Dandridge Henley. At that time, the Chinese Government looked with great disfavor upon the arrival of any foreign man-o'-war, and left no stone unturned to hasten its departure. Henley encountered the usual reception at the hands of the Chinese officials, but paid no attention to the urging of the port authorities that they were unable to furnish him with supplies of which he stood in great need. It appears that the Chinese anticipated that the arrival of foreign man-o'-war would cause disturbance, since the British frigate Alceste, in 1816, having been denied the privilege of anchoring at Whampoa, proceeded up the river, firing upon the forts and junks that opposed her progress. Henley, however, succeeded in obtaining his supplies, and proceeded to Manila, where he was hospitably received. In his report to the Secretary of the Navy he says in part:
I have met with a very hospitable reception at Manila, one indeed which has far exceeded my most sanguine expectations. The governor himself (Mariano Fernandez de Folgueras) professes the greatest friendship for us, and has tendered his services to render any assistance which I might stand in need of. Under these circumstances I deemed it a fit season to effect the repairs of my mizzenmast, which I informed you in my last had been found to be very defective…
Henley returned to Lintin after refitting at Manila, and, having again been denied the services of a comprador, demanded from the government the same privileges accorded to British men of war, but received no reply from the Viceroy. He then weighed anchor! and proceeded up the bay to Chuenpe. The demonstration had the desired effect, and he promptly received his stores.
The second American ship of war to visit China was the Vincennes, under the command of Master Commandant William B. Finch. He communicated with the merchants at Canton, and received a statement from them, which he transmitted to the government, respecting the state of trade between the United States and China, and the desirability of periodical visits by American ships of war.
The next noteworthy event was the arrival of Commodore Lawrence Kearney, with the Constellation and the Boston, sent out to protect American interests, which were considered by the government to be jeopardized by British operations in the vicinity of Canton. The perpetration of several outrages upon Americans caused Kearney to demand redress. He sent a note to Viceroy Ke, by the hand of Lieut. J. G. Reynolds, of the marine corps, dealing with the outrages. He received a conciliatory reply, and proceeded to Hong Kong, where he learned that the British had completed a treaty with the Chinese and obtained important commercial privileges. This led him to undertake to negotiate a similar treaty, by which American merchants might receive the same privileges. His correspondence was directly with the Viceroy.
The address of Commodore Kearney, commander-in-chief of a squadron of United States ships, respectfully represents that he learns with deep interest the high Imperial commissioners deputed to arrange commercial affairs with the British are expected in a short time to arrive in Canton, and that a commercial treaty is to be negotiated to operate in favor of "British merchants" exclusively.
The undersigned is desirous that the attention of the Imperial Government might be called with respect to the commercial interests of the United States, and he hopes the importance of their trade will receive consideration, and their citizens, in that matter, be placed upon the same footing as the merchants of the nation most favored.
The undersigned does not press this matter at present, but, trusting to the good and friendly understanding which exists, he submits the case, and has the honor to be, your Excellency's most obedient servant. (Paullin.)
At Canton he received the reply of the Viceroy:
Ke, guardian of the young prince, member of the Board of War, member of the Imperial Cabinet, and governor of the two Kwang provinces, states, in reply to the subject of the 10th of the 9th month (13th October), that I have received your polite communication relating to the English commerce. I, the governor, have ever hitherto treated the merchants of every nation with the same kindness. Moreover, the Americans who have come to Canton have had free commerce, month after month, and year after year. These merchants have been better satisfied with their trade than any other nation; and that they have been respectfully observant of the laws, is what the august Emperor has clearly recognized, and I, the governor, also well know. How, then, should I not rather, on the cessation of difficulties with the English, wish to show favor to them? Now, I have ordered the Hong merchants, with the said English nation's merchants, to devise beforehand, and to wait the arrival in Canton of the Imperial commissioners, great ministers of state. When I shall have received the newly devised regulations concerning the free trade of the English, then I, the governor, together with the lieutenant-governor and Tartar-general, will immediately deliberate upon the proper adjustment of the regulations, and will make a representation to the Emperor that he may hear and direct what shall be done.
Decidedly it shall not be permitted that the American merchants shall come to have merely a dry stick (that is, their interests shall be attended to). I, the governor, will not be otherwise disposed than to look up to the great heart of the Emperor in his compassionate regard toward men from afar, that Chinese and foreigners with faith and justice may be mutually united, and forever enjoy reciprocal tranquility, and that it may be granted to each of the resident merchants to obtain profit, and to the people to enjoy life and peace, and universally to participate the blessings of great prosperity, striving to have the same mind.
This is my reply.
Some further correspondence ensued, and resulted in granting to all Western nations the privileges first given to the British. A member of the British commission in China wrote:
The Chinese Government promised, on the representation of the American commodore, Kearny, previous to the treaty of Nanking, that whatever concessions were made to the English should also be granted to the United States. The throwing open of the ports of China to Europe and America was not therefore the result of our policy, but had its origin in the anxious forethought of the Americans, lest we might stipulate for some exclusive privileges.
Thus by the foresight and initiative of a naval officer was the first step taken to open to the world the ports of China; the beginning of the "open-door policy." From that day to this, China has regarded the United States as her firm friend, and no one can doubt but that the swiftly moving events in the Far East will find the United States vitally interested in the problems to be solved.
The most important, and best known diplomatic undertaking in the Pacific, by an American naval officer, in the nineteenth century, is Commodore Perry's mission, which resulted in the opening of Japan, up to that time known only to the few traders and whalers who were permitted to land at certain selected ports.
Unlike the negotiations with China, which were upon the initiative of the officers on the station, Perry's undertaking was most carefully planned by both the Navy and State Departments. The commodore himself selected the officers who accompanied him, and before sailing, acquainted himself with all that was known in those days respecting the character and customs of the Japanese, their manufactures, and arms; and from the whalers of New Bedford he obtained information of the coasts and harbors. His first mission was to obtain from the Japanese assurance of protection and relief of shipwrecked mariners, and others who might be forced to land in Japan; the secondary mission was to negotiate a treaty, and to this end he was supplied with all necessary letters of credence; a letter from the President to the Emperor of Japan, and instructions from the State Department, together with the usual sailing orders. He proceeded by way of the Cape of Good Hope, maturing his plans and completing his preparations on the outward voyage.
On July 8, 1853, Perry arrived in Yedo Bay, with his ships cleared for action, and anchored off the town of Uraga in the afternoon.
Perry's proceedings are a brilliant example of the highest type of diplomacy. Throughout the negotiations he followed a course of action peculiarly fitted to the character of the people with whom he was dealing; and in considering this fact, it must be remembered that until his arrival in the far east his only knowledge of a people then little known was derived from a few books that had been furnished to him by the governor of New York, and from the whaling captains of New Bedford.
The proceedings, given in Perry's narrative, are too well known to require repetition here; it is sufficient to remark that they rank, in foresight, dignity, and firmness, as well as ingenuity, with these of Nelson in the Mediterranean.
Having briefly considered some of the most noteworthy examples of modern times, historically speaking, we turn to the opportunities of the present and the immediate future. All of the great men just considered, were products of the times in which they lived. They were men selected for the important commands, either by the officials of their governments or by their immediate superiors on the spot, and accomplished their diplomatic successes incidentally to their professional duties; or they were appointed, because they possessed peculiar qualifications, to accomplish certain diplomatic missions. That the occasion produces the man is a trite phrase; if the same conditions existed to-day in the conduct of international affairs, without a doubt we would have a Nelson, Jones or Perry ready for the occasion. But times have changed. No longer do we commission our naval officers to negotiate treaties with foreign powers, or leave weighty questions of war and peace, or the concluding of alliances, to the initiative and judgment of one man. War has become too costly and too serious a calamity to mankind; the swiftness of events, the vast problems of modern war, the highly scientific nature of its weapons, undreamed of almost yesterday, require the almost constant and exclusive concentration of those whose business it is to deal with them. Not only the scientific advances of recent years, but the attitude of the peoples of the earth toward warfare and international problems, have caused a complete change. It is only necessary to remember that in Nelson's day, even up to the accession of Queen Victoria, warfare was more or less a personal affair between rulers. The causes, viewed in the light of modern ideas, were trivial in the extreme. Personal ambition, revenge, and hereditary enmities were the most fruitful causes of war. The peoples themselves were concerned only in that they had the costs to pay, the press gangs to avoid. To a considerable extent, war was carried on by professional soldiers and mercenaries, who knew little and cared less of the rights and wrongs of the cause for which they fought.
The field of diplomatic activity open to naval officers is, at present, limited to Latin America and to the Far East. It is impossible for many reasons to discuss affairs in the Pacific, except in a general way; chiefly because of the vastly important affairs in which the United States is deeply concerned, that are now pending. The commonest duty, and an important one, is the paying of visits of courtesy in foreign ports; the interchange of visits of ceremony with foreign officials, looking to the preservation of friendly relations and intercourse with foreign states. It need hardly be said that in such cases the success of a visit of courtesy ("showing the flag") rests no less upon the commissioned personnel than upon the conduct and appearance of liberty parties; every man who comes in contact with people ashore is, in fact, a representative of his country; and upon his actions; bearing, courtesy and dignity, rests the judgment that will be passed upon his country. This is especially true among the Oriental nations. It is in that part of the world that "face-pidgin" counts more than anywhere else; and it would seem, in the light of recent events, that it is in the Pacific that the United States, and her representatives of the navy, are to be most actively engaged in international affairs. The chief duty now devolving upon our representatives in the Far East is the collection and forwarding of information to the departments concerned, in conjunction with the diplomatic representatives on the spot. Probably the only case that would call for independent action on the part of a naval commander would be a move to protect persons and property, in an emergency.
The same state of affairs obtains in Central America and Mexico. Here we maintain naval forces, for the purpose of showing the flag, and for the protection of lives and property. In a lesser degree there would be a field of independent action for commanding officers than in the Far East, because of the relative nearness to the Navy Department, and because affairs are in a less acute state than in the Far East. The turbulence of local bands of banditti, and the various de facto governments frequently set up in the coastwise towns and cities render the presence of naval vessels of great importance to the interests of the United States. The frequent changes of political jurisdiction brought about by the several leaders in these times of revolution in Mexico bring up many questions for solution by the senior naval officer present: especially questions involving the right of asylum. Not the least interesting and important phase of such duty is the intelligence work involved. It is no unusual thing to leave a port, on the west coast of Mexico, and to find, upon returning a few days or weeks later, that the military control of the town has changed hands; that an entirely new set of officials has assumed office, and that a new issue of fiat currency has been printed and put m circulation. The writer has in mind one such case, when the commandante of a certain town issued an edict to the effect that all store and hotelkeepers should accept only the money issued by him. The scarcity of silver depreciated the paper money to the point where 100 dollars was worth about 30 cents silver; a dinner cost 50 dollars, or 15 cents silver. Thus the "army," plentifully supplied with the paper money, was subsisted without difficulty, since the merchants were forced to accept the paper. But the same edict provided that liquor could only be purchased with silver; as the rank and file had only paper money, the supply of beer and champagne was reserved for the great man and his staff.
One important diplomatic post open to naval officers has not been mentioned heretofore. It is that of naval attaché. This duty comes under the supervision of the office of Naval Intelligence, and the officers concerned report to that office. It is primarily for the purpose of gathering information relating to naval affairs, and officers so engaged are attached to embassies and legations, and are under the orders of the respective ambassadors and ministers. While the posts are of great importance, comparatively few naval officers are detailed to them; whereas there is every prospect that some time or another, all officers will find themselves in the position of representing their country abroad; if not in some vital matter, at least by giving a lasting favorable impression to those with whom they come in contact in the discharge of official business or interchange of social courtesies. Nor can any officer, whatever his rank, afford to lose sight of the fact that, when he is ashore in a foreign country for any purpose, his conduct and bearing are watched and commented upon. He is "always on duty" in that he is always under observation. He may find himself called upon to make a speech; and though he were the youngest graduate in the navy, yet his remarks will find listeners who will be ready to construe them as the opinions and convictions of the American people, and, if he be indiscreet, he may, even by a chance word, make difficulty for himself and cause embarrassment to his country.