PROFESSIONAL NOTES
Prepared by Lieut. Commander H. W. Underwood, U. S. Navy
FRANCE
Naval Needs of France.—Paris Senators have been just as emphatic as Messieur les deputes were in their affirmation of the need of a strong navy, worthy of France's glorious traditions on the sea and of her worldwide colonial empire. Under stress of financial pressure, the 1921 Budget de la Marine, which the Chamber had reduced by 300 million francs, has been further shorn of 130 million francs, coming down to barely 800 million francs, partly wasted on the upkeep of 35,000 Bolshevist arsenal workmen employed in non-naval work. At first sight, this might appear to be a move in the wrong direction: "Pas d'argent, pas de marine"; but it was more than made up for by a fine display of good intentions and of naval eloquence. Since the war, owing mostly to the financial ruin (national debt of 300 milliard francs), brought about by the systematic devastations of the infamous Boche (who will turn out to be the true winner of the war) and by the failure of the Paris politicians of verbiage to enforce the long-overdue reparations, French naval construction has been at a standstill (for the armed cargo vessels of the Tahure class are not bona-fide warships). Even the pre-war 900-ton Enseigne Gabolde has not yet been completed, in marked contrast with the activity prevailing in other navies; and so, naval eloquence and ever-changing programs of grand things to be done to-morrow have been the main productions of the Rue Royale Admiralty, under the patriotic, but powerless, Ministers Leygues and Landry. Indeed, if verbal and literary energy were an asset of naval worth, the Marine Reptihlicaine would be greater than the Marine Royale ever was under the silent Colbert and the hard-working Sartines and Castries. No wonder Senator Berenger, Rapporteur du Budget de la Marine, waxed somewhat sarcastic about the prevailing habit of showering ''couronnes de fleurs et encens" on French naval men, and proclaimed it was time to pass from empty words to manly action that alone counts in the balance. Considering the present plight of the Gallic Navy, and the deep discouragement among officers, he asked for a "programme de renaissance et de resurrection," not to change with the whims of every new minister, but to be first discussed by Parliament and then to be carried out with the utmost speed.
The debate on the naval policy is to take place very shortly. After six years of stagnation, and in the light of the strides being made in rival navies, both parliamentary and naval men are agreed as to the need of an immediate effort with a view to restoring the fast-declining naval prestige of the Republic. The security of the coasts of France against landing and bombardment, and the safety of the maritime routes between France and North Africa, have been again and again mentioned as being the limit, for the present, of France's naval ambitions. Modest enough in appearance, extremely costly in practice, since aerial and ballistic superiority, together with a high degree of submarine and mining efficiency, are nowadays required to ensure the complete protection of coasts. The day is past of short-range warfare when coast defence could be organized on economical lines. To efficiently defend the coasts means that the whole problem of sea warfare must be satisfactorily solved; otherwise only make-believe results can be arrived at. Similarly, the securing of safe communications in the Mediterranean means that French naval and aerial supremacy in those waters must be so great as to discourage aggression. It must be uncontested. Such is not the case at present. Italy officially claims the supremacy, and with some reason; the cruiser fleet and the flotillas of the Peninsula have a distinct advantage in the matter of quality, and her aeronautical branch is well to the fore. Having suffered less from the war than France, she has been able to devote more attention to her naval armaments and to forge ahead. When is remembered the detrimental influence two isolated Boche cruisers without base near at hand exercised over the movements of the Lapeyrere armee navale and of Algerian troopships, it requires no great imagination to guess what would happen in the case of a war with a power enjoying the use of the many offensive bases of Sicily, Sardinia, and of Northern Italy. It is here that bold tactics of offence appear as the only practical safe and paying course, and ability to inflict greatest damage in the least time is the best insurance against war. No wonder Admiralty experts are giving special attention to the revolutionary changes in Mediterranean strategy brought about by war developments.
The recent move of the British Admiralty in the matter of new construction is considered here an object lesson to France, whilst the decision of Bocheland to start anew making her future on the sea, and without any ado, at the moment when she is proclaiming herself too poor to comply with the clauses of the Treaty she has signed, is justly held to be an insult to France and a challenge to Great Britain.
The Guisthau program, that is certain to be approved by Parliament, marks a considerable advance over previous projects of construction as regards both quality and number, and it will have the effect of vastly improving the naval position of France a few months hence. It will comprise six cruisers of 8000 tons and 34 knots, that will closely resemble the British Hawkins, excel the U. S. Omaha class, and totally outmatch Mediterranean scouts; 12 super-destroyers of 2200 tons, 36 knots, and 5.5-inch armament, to excel most, if not all, destroyers afloat; 12 torpilleurs d'escadre of 1000 tons and 35 knots of the improved Gaholde type; 36 submersibles of 600 and 1300 tons, very carefully studied with a view to robustness and reliability, and to be constructed at a rapid rate by state arsenals and private yards, an arrangement calculated to promote emulation and good work.
Preparations are being made to commence, this year, 3 cruisers, 6 super-destroyers, 12 torpilleurs, and 12 submersibles of the most powerful type. Moreover, the 190-meter ex-battleship Beam is to be completed as a porteavions, despite the criticisms Admiral Guopratte made in the Chamber as to her lack of speed. When launched at La Seyne in 1918 she was built up to the main armor deck, and only weighed 5000 tons. Since then her sides have been partly completed, and she received a temporary superstructure for the purpose of aviation experiments that were conducted under the supervision of Admiral Violette, and proved satisfactory. She is to be ready by 1923, and her transformation, with a speed of at least 23 knots and a very strong anti-submarine defence, is to entail an expenditure of some 60 million francs, whereas four years and over 100 million francs would be necessary to construct a 35-knot seaplane carrier on American lines. The Guisthau program will cost over one milliard francs, for it is probable that the cruiser and destroyer units to be laid down in 1922-3 will be larger than the 1921 type, superior quality over all comers being the desideratum of French naval men.
The coast defence organization is to be revised on up-to-date lines. British war exploits against Boche bases on the Belgian coast have shown it would be a mistake to entirely rely on aerial and submarine "defensive offensive." Seaplane flotillas are extremely fragile and vulnerable, as recent experiments in the Channel and Mediterranean have shown; and there is a limit to the number of submarines. Well-sheltered and posted gun batteries, thoroughly trained from peace time on realistic lines, afford the most reliable protection for naval bases and important strategic points. The comprehensive tests now proceeding at Gavres with new explosives and new types of shells have made it clear that (for special reasons) 13.4 and even 12-inch guns on commanding positions on shore can be relied upon to outrange the most powerful super-dreadnoughts afloat, whilst quick-firing 5.5-, 6.5-, and 7.6-inch weapons can render quite a wide zone unhealthy for destroyers and submarines, especially with the strides being made towards a solution of the night-firing problem.
Senator Tissier, who acted as the "bras droit" of ex-Minister Pelletan, criticized the presence in Paris " notre plus grand port de guerre " of too many officers de vaisseau, paperasserie making instead of actively preparing for war, which is their sole raison d’être. Some time since an old admiral denounced in La Revue Hebdomadaire the land-lubber inclinations of too many young gentlemen in blue, and, of course, the reduced number of ships in commission tends to turn too many of our 2300 officiers de marine into bureaucrats. A good weeding out will strengthen the fighting spirit of the service. Happily, the great bulk of the Marine Francaise is composed of true seamen, who are never more happy than when at sea. Senator Tissier urged the adoption of an official "doctrine navale" framed in accordance with the lessons of the war, and he meant on la jeune Ecole lines. It is doubtful if this is at all desirable; it is a mere catch-word, seeing that the naval science is ceaselessly changing, and even now is being changed as the result of post-war ballistic and aerial developments.
Great satisfaction has been caused by the appointment as chief constructor (in place of M. Maurice) of Ingenieur-General Doyere, the creator of the Normandie quadruple-turret type of battleship, who is the most original and talented battleship designer the Marine Franqaise has seen since the days of M. de Bussy (1889-91), creator of the Dupuy de Lome and Baudin types. In the matter of scientific education and of theoretical attainments French ingenieurs have probably no rivals, but the strong point of M. Doyere, who at one time acted as chief constructor of the Chinese Navy, is a wide and solid practical experience, together with a go-ahead and inventive turn of mind. He thus possesses the qualities of those grands ingenieurs au passe who made French naval architecture first in the world. The able Hubac, who designed the fleet of Colbert, had previously studied in England and Holland; Forfait (1752-1807), rival of Sane had done likewise. Chief Constructors Boucher (1825-1830), creator of the famous Surveillante frigate type; Dupuy de Lome, who revolutionized naval architecture, and his worthy disciple, de Bussy, all proceeded on practical experimental lines with the avowed ambition of excelling tor quality France's then only rival, the great British Navy.—The Naval and Military Record, Apr. 20, 1921.
GREAT BRITAIN
The Navy Estimates and the Capital Ship.—The outstanding feature of the navy estimates, presented to Parliament during March, is the decision of the British Government to continue the building of large capital ships. The wisdom of such a policy has been much criticized in certain quarters; but in view of the considered opinion of the British naval staff as expressed a year ago that the necessity for the capital ship had survived the test of the war and still formed the unit on which sea power was built up—an opinion since endorsed and acted upon by the United States and Japan—it cannot, we think, be gainsaid that the British Government has come to a wise decision in the matter, especially as such a decision was not made until the matter had again been examined by a special committee set up for that purpose. As we have already stated, the question is one which only experts with a full knowledge of the facts of the war can decide, and must in the nature of things involve a compromise of conflicting factors based upon the probabilities of the case. Undoubtedly there has been a tendency by some to overstate the dangers of attack by aircraft and submarines.
In introducing the Navy Estimates in the House of Commons, Sir James Craig, Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, stated that it was intended to build four new vessels to replace the four oldest capital ships now on the effective list. The new ships would be an improvement on the Hood class embodying the lessons of the war. The keels would all be laid during the next twelve months, but it had not yet been decided where the ships were to be built, and it would be impossible to make much, if any, progress with the new ships until late in the autumn. A sum of two and one-half millions has been included in the Estimates as a first installment for these vessels.
As regards other new construction, it is proposed to build a submarine and a mine-layer, both of which will embody the latest developments in these types of craft, and will also include a number of experimental features.
The object of the government's naval policy, as mentioned by the First Lord of the Admiralty in a statement explanatory of the Estimates, is to maintain a "One-Power Standard," i. e., that the British Navy should not be inferior in strength to that of any other power, and, in his own words:
"The Government neither commits itself to, nor contemplates, any building 'programmes' in answer to those of any other Power. Indeed, it trusts that it may be possible, as a result of frank and friendly discussion with the principal naval powers, to avoid anything approaching to competitive building, either now or in the future."—The Shipbuilder, April, 1921.
Flotilla Leaders.—A description, with photographs, is given in this article, of the various types of flotilla leader built for the British Navy from their inception in the Marksman and Lightfoot, 1913-14 program, to the Shakespeare and Scott classes, completed 1917-19. Details of armament, speed, power, machinery, etc., are given in the article. In passing, it is mentioned that for all-round fighting and sea-going qualities, the later boats are probably the finest boats extant. Their armament consists of five 4.7-inch and one 3-inch A. A. guns, and two sets triple 21-inch torpedo tubes. The nominal speed is 36 knots at light load on 40,000 s. h. p., but on trial speeds of 37.7 to 38.7 knots were attained. (Marine Engineer and Naval Architect, Feb., 1921.)—The Technical Review, Apr. 26, 1921.
New Submarines.—So much attention was created by the announcement that the Government had decided to begin the construction of four new capital ships, to replace four vessels which had become obsolescent, that hardly anyone seems to have noticed the fact that it is also intended to build two other vessels of fighting types, a submarine and a minelayer. It is true that no indication of this was given in the First Lord's explanatory statement, but in introducing the Estimates in the House of Commons Sir James Craig said: "We also propose to build a submarine and a minelayer, both of which will embody the latest developments in these craft, and will also include a number of experimental features." There is likely to be an even greater interest shown later on in the design and progress of these two vessels than in that of the capital ships. The latter, we know, will be improvements on the Hood; they will not be very much bigger, since it has been indicated, that any dock which will take the Hood will take them also; and they are to embody the lessons, especially in regard to armament and protection, learned during the late war. But no similar hints have been given about the two smaller craft, particulars of which will thus be the more keenly awaited.
The outcome of the war was to confirm British naval designers in their plans, so far as big ships were concerned. The Hood thus affords a sound basis on which to prepare the designs of the new vessels, modified, of course, by battle experience and the studies of the past two years. But when the end of the war came, submarine construction was in no such settled state. We had in hand some small vessels of the 12-knot H type; others of the huge steam-driven K class, built for ocean-going work in company with the Grand Fleet, and still the largest and fastest submarines in the world; others, again, of the L type, designed for 17 ½ knots, and embodying the best results of earlier oil-engined vessels; and, lastly, a series of three submarine monitors of the M class, mounting a 12-inch gun apiece. It seems evident that the installation of steam machinery in the K type was a war time expedient which will not be repeated, but it will be no easy task to obtain from internal-combustion machinery a speed approaching the 24 knots which this remarkable though complicated type attained on the surface. The Admiralty Engineering Laboratory at West Drayton, for which increased financial provision is made this year, is largely concerned with researches and experiments in heavy fast-running marine oil engines, and it may be hoped that as a result of the work here it will be possible to install in the new submarine engines of greater power than any yet adopted. To the submarine cruiser which Rear-Admiral S. S. Hall has advocated, of about 3000 tons with a sea endurance of 50,000 miles and six months, is probably a far cry. It will be interesting to see how near the new vessel approaches to it.
If there is no clear indication of the design of the new submarine to be gathered from past practice, still less is there any hint in regard to the minelayer. It appears that no ship has ever been built specially for this duty. We began the war by using obsolete cruisers for the purpose, and when these were found too slow, various kinds of other craft, such as destroyers, were utilized. Later on it was found desirable to equip submarines to lay mines, and the advantages of under-water craft in this connection would seem to be so great that there are many people who will expect to see the new minelayer with submersible powers. The only minelayer now on the active list, the Princess Margaret, has been very costly Originally a 5000-ton liner, chartered and converted during the war, she was purchased in 1919, and in the coming year is to have £76,000 spent upon her for repairs and alterations. Though not exceptionally fast, she can carry a much larger supply of mines than regular war types can without interfering with their ordinary duties.— The Army and Navy Gazette, Apr. 16, 1921.
The Navy and the Crisis.—Without touching upon the outcome of the negotiations between the coal owners and miners which, at the moment of going to press, are in progress, it is only right that a word of congratulation should be given to the Admiralty for the completeness and efficiency of their preparations to aid the civil power in case of an extension of the strike The nation instinctively looks to the sailor in a time of trouble, and once again its faith in him has been justified. There was a ready response to the order for the mobilization of the Royal Fleet Reserve, but long before the men of this force had begun to assemble at their ports the ships of the Atlantic Fleet had left for their emergency stations all round the coast. The presence of the battleship Valiant in the Mersey must by now be considered a hardy annual. She was there, we believe, during the railroad strike of 1919 and the coal strike of 1920, and so it was again to Liverpool that she was sent from Devonport last week. Similarly, the Warspite went to the Clyde, the Delhi to Cardiff, the Dunedin to the Humber, the Dauntless to Avonmouth, and other vessels were distributed accordingly. The offers of service from officers were so numerous that the Admiralty on Saturday night found it necessary to acknowledge them publicly; since they could not all be replied to. As regards the men, the presence of blue uniforms at Chelsea Barracks, turning this artistic quarter of London into a miniature dockyard, came as a plain indication that the Admiralty were ready with skilled men to send to the power stations or other centers where they might be needed to help in keeping going the life of the community. Happily, by Saturday night the situation had become easier, and everyone who has any regard at all for the welfare of his country will be glad if the elaborate machinery prepared for the emergency, and of the existence of which such a good indication has been given, will have no need to function.—The Army and Navy Gazette, Apr. 16, 1921.
A Naval Exchange.—During the war, when British and American warships were working together in many seas, and the comradeship between the two navies was intensified by the perils and hardships of active service jointly performed, someone suggested that this naval entente ought to be perpetuated when peace returned by a system of exchanging squadrons. The idea was that at certain periods a force of British battleships or cruisers should be attached to the American fleet for cruising or maneuver purposes, taking its orders from the American Commander-in-Chief; while an American squadron should be similarly incorporated in one of the British commands. We believe we are correct in stating that an informal proposal to this effect was made to Admiral Rodman by the King when His Majesty was visiting the American admiral on board his flagship, the New York. At that time a force of American dreadnoughts actually formed part of the Grand Fleet, under the orders of Admiral Beatty, and it must have seemed the most natural thing in the world that the cooperation which had been brought about by stress of war should be continued in after days for the purpose of preserving peace. Since that time the idea has been revived by various American organs, but nothing has been done officially to give it effect. That the fraternal spirit which prevailed in the war is still very much alive is evident from the reception accorded to Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly on his recent visit to the United States. There is no doubt that the British Admiralty would cordially respond to an invitation to send a cruiser squadron to sail for a time with the U. S. Atlantic or Pacific fleet, and if an American force could simultaneously join up with our Atlantic fleet it would be welcomed with enthusiasm. We recognize, however, that the initiative must come from the Cabinet, not from the navy, and Cabinets are notoriously reluctant to take any step, that savors of the unconventional. Meetings between heads of governments are difficult to arrange when three thousand miles of ocean separate them, but they can keep in touch with each other through accredited intermediaries, and if it be true that President Harding intends to send a diplomatic mission to this country to discuss the limitation of armaments and other subjects, our government should take the opportunity to submit a formal proposal for the exchange of naval squadrons. Such an arrangement would constitute an effective guarantee of peace on the great waters.—The Naval and Military Record, Apr. 6, 1921.
An Anglo-American Naval Agreement.—We do not know what steps, if any, have been taken by the government to give effect to the desire of an overwhelming majority of the British people to come to an understanding with the United States on the question of naval armaments. It takes two to make an agreement, and it is impossible as yet to say whether American public opinion as a whole desires such a compact as would rule out the danger of competitive naval shipbuilding between the two great English-speaking nations. There has unquestionably been a reaction from the Wilsonian policy of co-operation with European Powers in the settlement of European problems, and at the present moment American statesmanship seems to be guided by the principle of abstention from those "entangling alliances" against which Washington, in his valedictory address, solemnly warned his countrymen. No sensible person will blame the United States for wishing to keep out of the Serbonian bog of European politics. Down to the end of the 19th century we in this country did our best to keep politically aloof from the continent, and even to-day there are many here who would fervently welcome a return to the "splendid isolation" from which circumstances compelled us reluctantly to depart. Barely 20 miles of water separate England from the continent, yet that "silver streak" had been for hundreds of years the determining factor in our foreign policy. It is therefore easy to realize why the Americans should be loth to involve themselves in the affairs of a continent from which they are separated by 3000 miles of ocean.
The inspired statements issued at Washington last week in regard to the visit of M. Viviani have served to clear the atmosphere. President Harding has made it plain that his administration cannot contemplate anything in the nature of an alliance with France or any other power. It remains to be seen whether he considers a naval agreement with this country as coming within the category of those foreign commitments which he and—as we believe—the mass of the American people are determined to avoid. If negotiations to this end are to be undertaken at all, they will demand the utmost tact and delicacy. For, as we are learning to our cost, the problem of working out a standard of relative naval strength satisfactory to both parties is by no means so simple as it looks at first sight. The first point on which enlightenment is needed is whether the American government would be content with a navy of approximately the same strength as our own. If so, then the main obstacle to an agreement disappears at once, for the British government has already expressed, though the First Lord of the Admiralty, its readiness to accept naval equality vis-a-vis the United States. It appears, however, that the Washington authorities are disinclined to make a pronouncement on this point until they have satisfied themselves that the Anglo-Japanese alliance is entirely without naval significance so far as the United States is concerned. The anti-British elements have been playing this card for all it is worth, and their persistent propaganda has succeeded to the extent of creating doubt in the American mind as to the wisdom of accepting naval equality with Great Britain whilst the latter remains the ally of Japan.
We must not blame the American people for regarding as a possibility that which every Briton knows to be a chimera, namely, an Anglo-Japanese armed league against the United States. It has been dinned into their ears by the Hearst newspapers that the alliance contains "secret clauses" which are susceptible of such an interpretation. This he ought to be nailed to the counter once and for all. In Japan the foreign minister has repudiated it in the most explicit terms, but our own government has so far contented itself with a semi-official dementi which does not and cannot carry the weight that would attach to a definite and unequivocal statement by the Prime Minister or Lord Curzon. Niceties of diplomatic etiquette are perhaps responsible for our government's silence, but in a matter of tins vital importance punctilio might safely be disregarded for once. The Japanese alliance may still have its uses, but no rational person can doubt that an Anglo-American naval agreement would be infinitely more desirable on all grounds. As we have said before, it would involve none of the difficulties which inevitably shipwrecked every pre-war attempt to bring about a pari passu reduction of Anglo-German sea armaments. To put the matter quite bluntly, we could not trust Germany, and it goes without saying that common trust is the only foundation for an agreement of this kind. In the case of the United States, however, we could depend upon her scrupulously to observe any standard which she might have accepted, and we think our own pledge would be honored with as little hesitation by her. There need be no splitting of hairs as to the exact fighting value of individual ships. A mutual assurance that neither country would seek to out-build the other would suffice. We believe such an arrangement to be eminently practicable. It seems to us—as it seemed to Mr. Balfour five years ago, when the Great War was at its height—"that the lesson to be drawn from history by those who love peace, freedom, and security is not that Britain and America should be deprived, or should deprive themselves, of the maritime powers they now possess, but that, if possible, those powers should be organized in the interests of an ideal common to the two states, an ideal upon whose progressive realization the happiness and peace of the world must largely depend."—The Naval and Military Record, Apr. 13, 1921.
German and British Chemical Industries and the War.—The intimate connection between German dye works and munition and poison gas has been so strongly urged during and after the war, in the chemical journals as well as in the general press, that it hardly required the publication of a White Book to draw renewed attention to the subject. The introduction to the report of the British mission appointed to visit chemical works, issued as an army paper this week, will, however, help to make the official standpoint clear, and it will also serve to reduce the problem to its actual dimensions.
The British mission, appointed to visit chemical factories in the German territory on the Rhine now occupied by the Allies, consisted of seven experts under the leadership of Brigadier-General H. Hartley; they were accompanied by delegates from America, Belgium, France and Italy, and spent two weeks in February, 1919, in the chief chemical works of the district. Some years before the war three of the largest chemical concerns, the Bayer Company of Elberfeld and Leverkusen, the Badische Anilinund Soda-Fabrik, and the Aktien-Gesellschaft fur Anilin, had combined in a group. A second group was then formed, comprising the firms of Meister, Lucius und Bruning, Casella, and Kalle. During the war the two groups amalagamated, and their Interessen-Gesellschaft I.G. was joined by the firms of Griesheim-Elektron, Weiler-ter-Meer, and others. Not all these chemical works were visited, as they were not all situated in the occupied zone; but the inspection was extended to some of the larger explosive works of the district, such as the Rheinisch-Westfalische Sprengstoff A.G. of Troisdorf, the Carbonit A.G. of Schlebusch, the Rheinische Dynamit fabrik, of Upladen. The procedure adopted was to study, in the first instance, the lay-out and pre-war capacity of the works and their utilization, especially as regards explosives and poison gases, and extension for war purposes, and then to inquire into the processes of manufacture. Valuable information was obtained, although most of the special departments were no longer in operation, and enquiries were not readily answered.
The factories inspected can hardly be considered, it is pointed out, as representative of the explosive industry of Germany, and arrangements for utilizing the dye works for war purposes do not appear to have been made before the war; the chemists had later to be recalled from the front. Only a very small proportion of the propellant explosives used came from the dye factories, and very little before 1916. Of the explosives, trinitrotoluene was the most important, picric acid and dinitro benzene coming next; as over here, ammonium nitrate (about 40 per cent) was mixed with the high explosives. The German and British methods of manufacture were found to be very similar taken generally, but the blockade restricted the Germans heavily as to raw materials. The nitric acid was, in Great Britain, practically all made from saltpetre; over there ammonia had to be oxidized into nitric acid, and paper crepe and glycol took the place of cotton and of glycerin. Glycol is ethylen alcohol; before the war it had served as a substitute for glycerin, which it resembles, being also a sweetish, rather sticky fluid, but only for certain pharmaceutical preparations. The use of these new raw materials and of plant originally designed for the other purposes necessitated various modifications, some of considerable difficulties, in the processes. On the whole the commissioners consider that the German methods were not superior, and in some respects inferior to the British practice, and that the high-level efficiencies of British factories were hardly reached.
The poison-gas manufacture was concentrated in the occupied zone, and the bulk of the poison-gas factories had previously been producing dyes and pharmaceutical products. Different stages of manufacture were allocated to different works, in many, but not in all, cases to the advantages of rapidity and efficiency. Thus, for instance, the famous mustard gas was made by the old three-stage process of Viktor Meyer, partly in Ludwigshafen and partly in Leverkusen, many miles further down the Rhine, whilst a rapid and more efficient one-stage process was quickly worked out at Cambridge when the nature of the gas had been recognized. The German output figures are certainly impressive; but they have been equaled over here. The key of the whole chemical war industry was the synthetic ammonia manufacture by the Haber process. That was started at Oppau in 1912, chiefly to obtain ammonia salts for fertilization. The daily ammonia production there was raised from 25 metric tons in 1914 to 250 tons in 1918; the Leuna works in the Merseburg Government district brought that production up to 650 tons in 1918. The daily production of nitric acid was increased threefold, to 719 tons, during the war; the chlorine manufacture rose from 37 tons to 63 tons per day. (Chlorine and phosgene were first the chief poison gases; later the I.G. works supplied varied organic compounds, and for their manufacture the dye works certainly offered facilities which did not exist in this country.
As regards the military importance of the German chemical industry the report states: "Although no arrangements had been made to utilize the chemical works at the outbreak of hostilities, the works were rapidly converted to war purposes, thanks to their highly-trained personnel and the great technical resources of their peace organization. In the future every chemical factory must be regarded as a potential arsenal, and other nations cannot, therefore, submit to the domination of certain sections of chemical industry which Germany exercised before the war…As it is clear that the military strength of a country depends to a large extent on the development of its chemical industries, it is necessary to review the present condition of these industries in Great Britain and Germany." The linking-up of the heavy chemical trade (acids and alkalis) in which England had always been leading, with the production of dyes and fine chemicals was one of the strong German features; another was scientific organization, in the office as well as in the laboratory and factory. English chemical industry had her triumphs, too, during the war, also under heavy difficulties, though of different kinds. If there are no synthetic ammonia works yet in this country, Claude claims to obtain much higher yields than Haber by working at very high pressures, and research is being pushed everywhere "The rapid growth of British chemical industry during the war proves that it can successfully compete with Germany provided that reconstruction is undertaken on a sufficiently large scale." We do not wish, on this occasion, to add anything to these concluding words of the report. The problems affect the general national policy.—Engineering, Apr. 22. 1921.
The Conduct of a Naval Battle.—A lecture delivered at the Royal Artillery Institution, by Commander R. F. Seymour, C.M.G., D.S.O., R. N.—Of all the more important events in war a decisive naval battle is perhaps the most rare, but when it does occur I think it has a more profound effect upon the future course of events than almost any other incident. By "decisive" I mean a battle which is fought right out and brought to completion on the spot by the destruction of the larger portion of the enemy's fleet. Such battles were the defeat of the Spanish Armada and Trafalgar, but they are very rare; they occur perhaps not once in one hundred years. The more usual battle when fleets meet at sea are victories of the type of Lord Howe's victory of the 1st June and the Battle of Jutland. In those battles history eventually assigns the victory to one side, but at the time probably both belligerents claim the victory, and it is rather difficult for them to see at the moment exactly what the effect of the battle is going to be. Those are the types of battles which everybody ought to expect in naval warfare because they are the ones which most usually occur. I am afraid they are usually hailed by a chorus of attacks from the public of the day on the Commander-in-Chief—attacks made by people who may have only heard of such battles as the defeat of the Armada and Trafalgar and expect them to occur on every occasion. The reason for this I think is that few people outside our own service really understand the problems with which the admiral is confronted, or the main characteristics of a sea battle.
A battle at sea is I think what you term in military parlance an encounter battle, and under modern conditions is fought at extremely high speed with the fleets engaged over a very wide area; for instance the slowest vessels in these days would approach at any speed up to 40 knots and the fastest destroyers when they are counter-attacking, at a speed of anything up to 70 knots.
Surprise is a very difficult thing to effect at sea. It is almost impossible to conceal the movements and the intentions of the various units. Perhaps the two most important factors in a sea battle may be said to be time and weather. I think one of the most striking things from naval history is how often the greatest sea commanders have exercised the most extraordinary patience under various circumstances and then suddenly, they have appeared to have thrown prudence to the winds and have proceeded with almost feverish energy to attack without the further loss of a moment. I think that is to be explained by the fact that in a sea battle the psychological effect of the attack—the exactly right timing of the attack is almost of more importance than the actual material gain or loss resulting from it. If this was so in the old days of sailing ships how much more so must it be in these days of high speed and when the inventions of aircraft and submarines have been brought to the stage at which they are. An attack made a moment too soon may be a stroke in the air, and an attack made a moment too late may miss an opportunity which will probably not occur again for many months.
The weather, in spite of modern conditions, may be said to play an enormous part in the fortunes of a sea battle and it is almost as much a cause for thought and trouble to an admiral as the actions of the enemy himself. One is continually fighting against the elements whereas the enemy appears at very infrequent intervals. A change in the weather conditions makes an immense change in the problem with which the admiral is confronted, and although admittedly this change is the same for both sides, the speed with which the admiral grasps or anticipates it makes a very great deal of difference to the immediate situation.
Again, although in battle too much reliance should not be placed upon signals, for they are at any moment liable to be interfered with by the enemy, yet the Commander-in-Chief can, by his own personal movements—the movements of his flagship—by his own personal effort and will, very largely dominate or retrieve a situation in battle.
Another point, which perhaps is not always realized in connection with our problem, is that we are entirely free from anything to do with supply transport and movements of troops, so that really our staff problem is extremely simple compared to yours. This allows the admiral to exercise a great deal of personal control over his fleet.
The problem presented to the Commander-in-Chief has been most lucidly stated by Nelson who said, "The business of an English Commander-in-Chief is first to bring the enemy's fleet to battle on the most advantageous terms to himself, and secondly to continue them there without separating, until the business is decided." He goes on in this particular memorandum I am talking about which was issued shortly before Trafalgar, to explain that he first of all will try to get the initiative (and in those days it was done by getting the weather gauge), and then he will throw the whole of his force on an inferior portion of the enemy leaving the remainder in a position where they can take no immediate part in the battle; and thirdly, he will endeavor to pass through their line and engage them from the lee side so that they cannot get away when the battle is beginning to go against them.
In the following October, however, just before the battle he issued an addendum to his memorandum in which he says: "Thinking it almost impossible to bring a fleet of 40 sail of the line into a line of battle in variable winds, thick weather and other circumstances which must occur without such loss of time that the opportunity would probably be lost of bringing the enemy to battle in such a manner as to make the business decisive I have made up my mind," and here follows a modification of his .previous instructions which I think might be summed up by saying that he makes up his mind that he will expose his ships during the initial contact to greater risk of damage from the enemy in order to defeat these two factors, time and weather, upon which he lays particular stress.
Of course there is a limit to the risks to which ships can be exposed on initial contact in order that a decisive advantage may be gained later on, and the enemy engaged and defeated in the time available. The fixing of this limit must always be the supreme test in the judgment of the admiral commanding-in-chief. Nelson had behind him the whole of the experience of the sailing ship period, and we have behind us the very short amount of experience since the advent of steam, and the introduction of the torpedo.
I think the above characteristics of a sea battle should be kept in the forefront of one's mind, if the problem is to be understood rightly. I think that the reason why the tactics of a naval battle are very frequently controversial and misunderstood is that these characteristics are not fully grasped. To sum them up: a naval battle is an encounter battle fought at high speed over a large area, the element of surprise is small, time and weather are enormously important and a very large degree of control can be exercised by the commander-in-chief, who does not require a staff or anything like the scale required for a land battle.
I will now sketch our system of fighting instructions and they may be divided into two, those issued by the Admiralty, and those issued by individual commanders-in-chief. The Admiralty issues instructions dealing with the general principles on which a battle is fought and the commander-in-chief issues his standing instructions as to the different tactics he will pursue under different circumstances in the different dispositions of his fleet according to what force is placed under his command. The Admiralty system was one which was evolved over 100 years ago by Howe and Kempenfeldt whose fighting instructions, tactical movements, and all the signals ordering these movements and conveying the admiral's possible intentions, were compressed into one volume, the "Signal Book," and this signal book formed the basis of tactical training for the whole navy.
For the navy of the 19th century was one of peace, and as always happens in periods of prolonged peace administrative and technical details crept in until the tactical and fighting part became almost submerged in a mass of administration and in the minds of many officers no doubt it was relegated to second place. However, for the last ten years before the war a tremendous effort was made and the fighting instructions were separated and taken out of the signal books. The books themselves were revised but, unfortunately, when war broke out those new books were never actually brought into force, and during the war the instructions on which we acted and on which we fought, on the few occasions when we did fight, were the Grand Fleet battle instructions which were tactical orders built up by the commander-in-chief of the Grand Fleet and which really combined the general principles which used to be issued by the Admiralty and the commander-in-chief's own detailed plans and instructions. They were separated from the signal book and the disadvantage was that the signal book issued by the Admiralty and the instructions issued by the commander-in-chief were not perfectly coordinated.
With the dispersion of the fleet at the close of the war we have now reverted to a system of Admiralty instructions dealing with general principles which will form a basis for tactical training of the fleet throughout the service and the commanders-in-chief issue their own particular fighting instructions and plans for the forces under their command. These are separate to the signal books but better staff organization ensures better co-ordination of signals and instructions.
I will now endeavor to give a short outline of how a modern sea battle might be, or probably would be conducted, and for convenience I will divide it into three portions, first the approach, which covers the time from when the advanced forces make contact until the main fleets sight one another. This is the period of reconnaissance when the advance forces have to discover and report the dispositions of the whole of the enemy's fleet and prevent the enemy's advance forces from discovering and reporting the dispositions of our own fleet. The second period is the main fleet action and the third period, is "after action" when the result has been achieved.
The fleet when at sea cruises in what is termed a cruising disposition, and these cruising dispositions are diagrams which are made out under various circumstances of cruising. This particular one here is a diagram showing the whole of the Grand Fleet concentrated and in cruising disposition. We have the advanced line of light cruisers disposed about five miles apart and about 35 miles ahead of the battle fleet. This is disposed in units of two or three ships. They are shown in this diagram as in line ahead, but in actual practice they are in a much looser formation; they really are spread almost in one continuous line as a look-out screen for the battle fleet. Positions 10 miles further ahead are provided for airships or aircraft, and for an air screen at visibility distance ahead of the light cruiser screen. Immediately astern of the centre of the screen at the point "U" we have the aircraft carriers. These carried the reconnaissance air screen; they kept an air screen out head of the light cruiser screen and on the enemy being reported it was the function of those aircraft carriers to despatch further aircraft to look out for and discover the enemy. These positions O. M. J. are the positions of the cruiser supports; two very fast specially built cruisers at O and M whilst J was the place where the battle cruisers were stationed with their accompanying destroyers. The function of the supports was to move up to repel any of the enemy's cruisers who pierced our screen, and the function of the light cruisers was to go on and to endeavor to outflank the enemy's screen and to locate and report the enemy's battle fleet. The advanced light cruiser line, their supports, and attendant aircraft carriers comprised the battle cruiser force. They were not always in station with the Grand fleet as shown; they were very often employed scouting at considerable distances. Astern of the battle cruisers is the reserve screen; any vessel of the enemy which succeeded in piercing or evading the battle cruiser force still has to meet this reserve screen of light cruisers. Two submarine flotillas usually accompanied the fleet; they were vessels of the K class (of which one has just been sunk) and they had a surface speed which enabled them to keep with the fleet. Their function was, as soon as the enemy's fleet was discovered, to endeavor to get into a position between the enemy's fleet and his base. They acted independently from the time the enemy's main battle fleet were reported. Astern of the reserve screen is the fast battle squadron which acted as supports to this reserve light-cruiser line. Next astern are the linking ships; they pass out visional signals and finally there is the battle fleet, consisting of about 36 battleships and about 100 attendant destroyers.
The method of reporting the enemy as soon as contact is obtained is very rigidly laid down. The report consists of the class of vessels sighted, the numbers, the bearing and distance of the enemy, the course of the enemy, the position of the reporting ship and the time at which the report is sent off. That is a very short signal; it consists of one six-letter group, one position group, which is partly figures and partly letters and a time group. These enemy reports, when sent off by wireless by these ships are received by all commanders of units and individual ships, the wireless organization providing for this, and they are plotted on a board. This plot is not only a matter of placing on the board the position of all enemy craft reported. The plot to be of value has to show the relative position as regards the opposing fleets at any moment. To achieve this the track of both fleets must be plotted continuously, our own fleet according to the reckoning and the enemy from all available data obtainable from, all cruisers and from aircraft or from shore directional stations, or any other source. Shore wireless stations listened for any wireless signal made by the enemy and took bearings of it and passed out the result. Also certain ships in the fleet were fitted with directional wireless and they could get a fairly accurate fix of the position of the enemy.
One of the factors governing the cruising disposition used to be that every unit had to be within sight of its next outer ship or unit because when we went to the sea it was of the utmost importance that we should not touch a wireless key or send any wireless signal before the enemy were encountered. The whole of the maneuvering of the fleet when cruising had to be done by visual signaling and it was a fairly large order to turn the fleet in a short space of time.
An accurate and continuous knowledge of the relative positions of the two opposing forces of course was of the utmost importance to the commander-in-chief, for on it depended the disposition of his fleet so that he could maneuver to a position of advantage just before the main fleets sighted one another. This moment was perhaps the most important of all because any error in the reports might lead the admiral to make a wrong disposition which might make him meet the enemy at a tactical disadvantage.
The moment of making contact between the main fleets is the moment when the work of the advance force's tactical reconnaissance ceases and ends that first part of the problem stated by Nelson to be "To bring the enemy fleet to action on terms as advantageous as possible." The Grand Fleet Battle Instructions laid down that to achieve this first part of the problem it would be the endeavor of the commander-in-chief first to place his fleet between the enemy and his base and secondly to dispose the guides of the battle fleet at right angles to the bearing of the center of the enemy.
At the end of the tactical reconnaissance or approach it was to be the endeavor of all ships to deploy as shown in this deployment diagram. The broad thick arrows show the divisions of battleships deployed with their guides at right angles to the bearing of the center of the enemy. The various units, which were the advance force, endeavored to take up their stations as arranged, always keeping contact with the enemy as they come in and ready to join in the fleet action at the moment when the two main fleets come into contact with one another. The battle cruisers in battle were to engage the enemy's battle cruisers and to prevent them from interfering in any manner with the attack of our torpedo craft. The function of the light cruiser squadron is first of all to prevent the enemy's destroyers, which are not shown on the diagram, from interfering with, or making their attack on our own battle fleet and also to clear the way for our destroyers to make their torpedo attack on the enemy. Directly the main fleets made contact those destroyers moved out in succession preceded by these light cruiser squadrons which you will see stationed right ahead of them. The unit of attack for destroyer flotillas is that they move out by flotillas but their actual handling is by half flotillas. The first half flotilla's function is to deal with any of the enemy's destroyers with which the light cruiser squadrons have failed to deal, while the second half makes its attack with torpedoes. At the same time if they do not meet with opposition both the light cruisers and the first half flotilla fire their torpedoes at the enemy as soon as they get in a position to do so.
The ideal position for everybody to attain is of course in the van. That is the position from which they can most conveniently attack the enemy's battle fleet but we have to station a certain proportion of vessels astern of the fleet because the enemy may at any moment reverse his course and endeavor to escape, and if we reversed our course to meet his movement we should then find ourselves in a position of inferiority in the van. The Germans as a matter of fact stationed most of their destroyers on the disengaged side of their battle fleet and used to attack through the line, but I think on the whole our system of placing our destroyers at each end of the line had a greater advantage because it considerably hampers the movements of their fleet to have flotillas trying to pass through comparatively small gaps. The method which the admiral adopts to control this number of vessels in battle is one of considerable difficulty. I think it may be said that the methods of fighting adopted in various ages have alternated between the rigid system and the go-as-you-please system. The Elizabethans used to fight practically without any ordered system at all and everybody used to go for the enemy as he could. When the Dutch came along we had a more rigid system which gradually became a stereotyped single line in which we practically never got a decisive victory. It is obvious that the disadvantage of the rigid system is that subordinates tend to attach greater importance to preserving their station and to receiving the commander-in-chief's signals than they do to inflicting damage on the enemy, and ultimately failure may result from lack of initiative and the inability to secure a favorable opportunity when it arises. Of course the disadvantage of too much freedom is lack of co-operation. So we had to devise some system between the two and the system adopted in the Grand fleet in the war was that each unit was handled separately by its flag officer. Units were a division of battleships consisting of from four to five battleships, a squadron of light cruisers of anything between four and eight—there are generally about six—a flotilla of destroyers numbering about 20 and a flotilla of submarines about six to eight. The system adopted was that units were handled independently as occasion dictated and commanders had full power to initiate the movement of their units, conforming generally to the movements of the commander-in-chief. The commander-in-chief who was stationed in the center of the battle fleet controlled simply the division in which his flagship was stationed, but notwithstanding that decentralization of command he retained the power to order the movement of the whole fleet by executive signal, should he consider that it was necessary to ensure decisive results; for instance, supposing he had been successful in placing his fleet between the enemy and his base, and the enemy endeavored to escape by putting down a smoke screen, reversing his course and escaping under the stern of our fleet, it would then be necessary, for the commander-in-chief to reverse the course of his fleet to prevent him doing so.
The distribution of gun fire of the fleet was a matter in which considerable difficulty was experienced. It was found in the war that even if the commander-in-chief managed to maneuver so as to get into a position of tactical advantage it was extremely difficult for the gunnery people to reap the benefits of that tactical advantage because they were unable to select the right target and to concentrate their fire effectively. So a system was evolved whereby the commander-in-chief signaled the bearing of his flagship's target, and according to pre-arranged principles and the situation of the enemy which the commanders of each unit visualized from the plot, each unit could calculate the sector in which their targets lay and this provided them with the necessary information to obtain the desired concentration.
We are now able effectively to concentrate four ships on one, whereas at the beginning of the war it is very doubtful whether the fire of two ships on one was very much more effective than single ship to single ship. Now I think you can say that the fire of two ships is certainly twice as effective as one, and probably the fire of four ships is very nearly four times as effective as the fire of one ship.
With regard to torpedo attack, each unit of the fleet endeavors to effect a torpedo concentration on that portion of the enemy which is most suitably placed to receive torpedo attack. Of course the difficulty of effecting a concentration of torpedo fire is the very long time of flight; whereas the projectile from a gun at a given range is perhaps a matter of 15 seconds, the time of flight of a torpedo is as many minutes—they take a quarter of an hour to 20 minutes to reach the enemy's battle line so that anything in the nature of concentration is very much more difficult with torpedoes.
We now come to the second portion of Nelson's statement of the problem, namely that of keeping the enemy engaged without separating until the business is decided. In the sailing ship era, which lasted hundreds of years, a solution was only found towards the end of it, and then more or less by accident, by Rodney breaking the line. Nelson always completed the business and once he got hold of the enemy he never let them go. The era of steam has not yet produced a solution which has been tested in battle. Of course there are a great number which have been produced on paper but all of them expose the fleet to an initial tactical disadvantage. Of course how much your ships should be exposed to this initial tactical disadvantage is the test of the judgment of the admiral. It was decided in the Grand Fleet after Jutland that in the event of the enemy trying to escape the torpedo disadvantage must be accepted and he must be kept under gun fire. We put our money on the gun; the enemy put his money on the torpedo.
Another possible solution is to divide your fleet and place one-half of your fleet on this side of the enemy and the other half on the other side but, of course, the difficulties of that are very great. One part of your force may be overwhelmed before the other force comes into action. Another possible solution is to get to such close range that it does not matter which way the enemy turns, but, of course, the difficulty is to get there when the enemy can easily keep you at long range by putting his helm over, and sheering off. It is extremely difficult to close with the enemy if he does this as each time he turns away time is lost in turning to follow him.
After the main fleet action has taken place there is very little more except that we had an organization for reorganizing all ships which still retained their tactical speed and had sufficient ammunition and torpedoes to take up the pursuit relentlessly. As soon as the enemy's order was broken and he was defeated it was the organization for ships to re-form, and without loss of time to pursue and, in the words of the instructions, it was the duty of all ships to "locate and report" and to "attack and destroy" the disorganized fleet.—The Journal of the Royal Artillery, April, 1921.
JAPAN
Turco-Japanese Relations.—a new departure for Japan is the appointment of a high commissioner at Constantinople m the person of Mr. Sadatsuchi Uchida, formerly Japan's minister at Stockholm, and the fact that his mission is not a temporary one decides the semi-official Paris Temps to infer that it is Japan's intention to fix an embassy at Constantinople as soon as peace is officially established between Turkey and the Allies. Then the high commissioner will become ambassador, and this well-informed Paris daily avers that those who know the prudence and the tenacity of Japanese diplomacy do not for an instant think that he will be a mere figurehead. He will be not only an observer in this capital of the Near East, where Japan has never before had any diplomatic representative, but he will be a pioneer, because Japan desires to conclude a commercial treaty with Turkey, and we read:
"He will pursue a certain policy, of course, because Japan is interested in the independence of Turkey and naturally has no pretensions to Turkish territory. Altho we do not know the circumstances m which the Japanese government decided to send a representative to follow the course we have outlined, we may well consider that Japan did not take action without having notified her ally, England. Moreover, Japan wishes to keep an eye on Russia, where the Soviet government is taking up the tradition of the czars, and looking longingly toward Constantinople.
"By installing a diplomatic envoy in the capital of the Sultan, and by appearing to the Turks as the defender of their independence, Japan reminds everybody that with its 77,000,000 of population, with its army intact and its constantly growing fleet, it is the greatest power of Asia. Unless we are in error, it is pursuing the policy that has already led it to conclude an agreement with the Emir of Afghanistan. What is more, the Treaty of Sevres provided that Japan would have .a delegate on the Straits Commission, empowered with two votes, even as England, France, and Italy. It will be recalled also that the United States was to have two votes on this commission 'from the time it wished to participate, in case it should wish to participate'; and that the same treatment was promised Russia 'if it became, and on the day it became, a member of the League of Nations.' Turkey, like Greece, Roumania, and Bulgaria, was to have only one vote."
The arrival of the Japanese High Commissioner may prove to be a real advantage for Turkey, in the view of Le Temps, which admits that the independence and the future frontiers of the Sultan's state depend not so much on diplomatic conversations at Constantinople as on the shot and shell exchanged between the Nationalist Army of Angora and the army of King Constantine. But if the Greeks are finally vanquished, it is predicted that diplomatic arrangements will be helpful to the Turks toward a complete exploitation of their victory.—The Literary Digest, May 7, 1921.
Disarmament Impetus in Japan.—The cry for disarmament is beginning to penetrate "even Japan," it is noted by those who are impressed with the continuous reference to the subject in various Japanese newspapers of importance. Even some politicians have taken it up, although at the loss of a certain amount of their popularity, we are told. The Japan Magazine (Tokyo) is sufficiently moved by the views of Marquis Shigenobu Okuma, as set down in the Japanese Taikwan, to condense them for the benefit of readers of English, and it emphasizes the fact that this distinguished elder statesman is "not prepared to favor unconditional disarmament so heartily as other advocates seem to do, but bases his hope that Japan will adopt this policy upon the supposition that England and America will lead the way, as the two nations most vitally concerned." Before the war there were eight great powers, the Marquis Okuma reminds us, and three of them were naval powers—England, Germany, and America. Germany, Austria, and Russia are now in "a desperate or at least struggling position," and the two great naval nations are England and America. If the world sincerely desires peace let the strongest nations make the first move, the Marquis suggests, for if the weaker nations were to initiate such a movement it would be "tantamount to unconditional surrender," and he continues:
"To be sure the weaker nation can use its armaments only as a threat, but being so weak it can not disregard armaments altogether. The nation which has greater defences cannot demand that the weaker nation disarm first. If the strong have no aggressive designs, they do not need so powerful a fleet for defence merely. That Japan and Italy have no aggressive designs is proved by the weakness of their respective fleets. To be sure, Japan's 8-8 program may sound big, but compared with England and America, it is not even one-half as large. Hence, Japan has only the minimum, and can not begin to reduce. By all means let England and America begin. That will be the one short method of securing world-peace, and Japan will delightedly welcome such an arrangement.
"No one can deny the fact that the world is spending immense sums on armaments and is feeling severe financial embarrassment on account of this enormous expenditure. At a time when the nations are suffering serious financial depression after a war extending through nearly five consecutive years, and when provision for the national defence can hardly be made even with the utmost effort, how does Japan feel about this matter? We are, indeed, not strong either financially or economically yet we cannot neglect our national defences even for a day, since we are as dependent upon these for existence as a bird upon beak and spurs or an animal upon teeth and claws…
"If the great powers could mutually agree to reduce their armies and navies it would, indeed, be a blessed thing for Japan as well as for this war-weary world. Merely from the financial relief alone, Japan would sing for joy. And, in closing I would repeat once more that, as the usual order of procedure is for aggression to come from the stronger upon the weaker, we are looking for America and England to set our hearts at ease by taking the initiative in disarmament and giving a good example to the world in this regard. As the first gleam of light I look to see England and America negotiate this question successfully, after which I trust France, Japan, and Italy will follow suit."—The Literary Digest, May 7, 1921.
Is the Anglo-Japanese Pact Dead?—If it is not dead, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is moribund, say some sharp Japanese critics, and ought to be allowed to die in peace. But altho the former reasons for it have ceased to exist, we hear from some British sources, new ones have come up that make a Far-East understanding between Britain and Japan of high importance, especially because of certain pro-American possibilities in China. Among the Japanese press the Tokyo Kokumin says that "if the object is to preserve the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as a historic monument or something like an object of art in view of the services it has rendered in the past, we have no objection," and it adds:
"Under the Alliance Great Britain fulfilled her obligation in the Russo-Japanese War, while Japan's obligation was discharged in the world war. Unless Japan assumes the duty of protecting India and Great Britain undertakes the task of guaranteeing the Pacific, there is no value in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance."
In the view of The Herald of Asia the first obvious inconvenience ensuing from the renewal of the Alliance would be the suspicion created among Americans that it is "ultimately directed against them." The relations between Great Britain and the United States, we are told, are no longer as cordial as a few years ago. This journal does not believe that Anglo-American rivalry, however sharp it may become, and "it will undoubtedly become dangerously bitter," will ever precipitate an armed conflict between the two nations. In any case, however loudly the British Government may shout its friendship for America, the renewal of the Alliance with Japan is "bound to excite an unfortunate suspicion in America as to the real intentions of the signatory powers."
The Round Table (London), a quarterly review of the politics of the British Commonwealth, believes that the fundamental interests of the British Empire in the Far East to-day are the same as they were ten years ago, namely, peace and security for British territory, good relations with all Far-Eastern Powers, the open door for trade with China, and the establishment of a capable and progressive government in China itself. On the latter point The Round Table observes:
"In the first place, there must be a clear understanding between the British Empire and Japan that Japan really wishes to establish a stable and independent government in China and is willing to live up to the principle of the ‘open door’ for the trade and commerce of all nations within it. That Japan will always have a predominant position in China is certain. Her geographical position insures this, provided that her policy toward China is benevolent and not rapacious. Nobody grudges her a position of exceptional authority and influence in China, but other nations could not acquiesce in her claiming for herself any exclusive privileges, and still less in her attempting to establish any direct or indirect authority over Chinese affairs."
The second condition necessary to the renewal of the Alliance, according to The Round Table, is that it should not lead to misunderstandings with other powers, and it is pointed out that:
"The real danger of renewal is that it may lead to a counter-balancing combination between China and the United States. Nothing could be worse for the future of the British Empire or Japan than that they should drift into a position in which they were placed in opposition to the United States and China. So long as both Great Britain and Japan loyally live up to the principles which originally underlay the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and the Government of Japan sets its face resolutely against the policy represented by the twenty-one demands, there is nothing in the Alliance which is hostile either to the interests of the United States or of China. But the negotiation of an alliance between two powers which cannot fail to affect the interests and the future of its neighbors is bound to arouse suspicion, and possibly hostility, unless it is done with their knowledge and consent."—The Literary Digest Apr. 16, 1921.
Our Yap Protest as Seen in Japan.—A conciliatory attitude toward the American protest about Japan's mandate for the island of Yap is observed in some sections of the Japanese press, but in others the fear is expressed that "whether Japan yields an inch America takes a yard," and a rallying-cry is heard that Japan "stand fast," especially as America has no right to protest about anything covered by the Versailles Treaty, since she has failed to ratify it. Meanwhile, it is understood, say Tokyo dispatches, that Japan is consulting with Great Britain and France on the subject; and France, we learn from Washington dispatches, favors the American principle of equality of rights in mandatory territories advanced in the Hughes note to the four great powers associated with the United States in the war. In Premier Briand's reply to the Hughes note he points out that since it was sent simultaneously to the governments of Great Britain, Italy, and Japan, "it cannot be answered until after an understanding has been reached between the governments of the four interested powers at the time of the next meeting of the Supreme Council of the Allies." Mr. Briand adds, however, that he would "inform Your Excellency at once that when this question comes before the Supreme Council the representatives of France will broach the examination thereof with the greatest desire to find a solution which will give every satisfaction to the United States." The Tokyo Chugai Shogyo declares sharply that "if America insists on the internationalization of Yap, she will lay herself open to the charge that her intention is to snatch the island from another country in order to possess herself of it," and it asks:
"Is such an attitude consistent with the idea of justice and humanity which has been so loudly preached by America? The mandates for the South Pacific islands were decided upon on May 7, 1919, at a conference of Great Britain, America, France, and Italy. At that time the decision was entirely approved by Mr. Wilson. Yet America now objects to Japan's occupation of the island in question. Not only is this attitude of America improper, but it is difficult to understand her real intentions."
This Japanese paper is subject to correction on this point, it is noted by some, as may be gathered from a statement in Premier Briand's communication to Secretary of State Hughes, in which we read:
"By a note dated February 18, after having noted that the decision of May 7, 1919, made no reservation concerning the mandate attributed to Japan over the islands of the northern Pacific, my department pointed out to your embassy that nevertheless President Wilson and Mr. Lansing had formulated in the course of a former meeting in the presence of the representative of Japan categorical reservations concerning the island of Yap, that Baron Makino had not objected, that the question raised by the representatives of the United States should be placed in discussion, and that consequently the Japanese Government was cognizant of the American reservations. The note concluded that thus there were elements for a resumption of conversations between the United States and Japan which the Government of the [French] Republic would be happy to see result in a satisfactory conclusion."
The Tokyo Yorodzu says, bluntly that America's "threat," that if Japan does not agree to American claims regarding Yap, America will not recognize the Japanese mandatory rule of the island, is "insolent," and it asserts that as America has not ratified the Versailles Treaty "she has consequently no right of veto over its stipulations." The Tokyo Hochi charges that America "aims at the internationalization of Yap," and with that objective protests against Japan having the mandate, and therefore tries to prevent the cables from being monopolized by Japan. As the will of America is "uncompromising, there should be no optimism regarding the future of the problem," yet:
"If the question involved is only one of the disposal of the cables, the settlement will be comparatively easy, as is the case with the Atlantic cables, but the fundamental object of America is to internationalize Yap. If this American claim should be entertained, there would be no use in Japan's acquiring a few cables. We cannot but hope that the government will go to the root of the matter and see to it that an adequate settlement is made."
In contrast to the foregoing, other journals such as the Tokyo Jiji-shimpo, the Asahi, and the Yomiuri counsel moderation and cable concessions within bounds, and the Yomiuri considers that the United States is justified "at least in protesting concerning the mandate, which is in the interest of harmony with Japan," but "should Japan abandon the mandates, she should ask the United States to abandon the fortifying of Guam."—The Literary Digest, Apr. 30, 1921.
Shipbuilding in Japan.—Some remarkable facts relating to the expansion of the Japanese shipbuilding industry since 1914 have recently been published. Seven years ago the number of yards in Japan which were able to build ships of more than 1000 tons was limited to four. By 1918 this number had risen to 45. From 1916 onward the output of tonnage rose by leaps and bounds in response to the demand created by the war. The total output for 1916 came to 185,000 tons as compared with a maximum of 40,000 tons before the war. In 1917 vessels aggregating 486,000 tons were put afloat, and in the following year no less than 721,000 tons were launched. Following the armistice a decline set in, but in spite of this the Japanese yards produced 675,000 tons in 1919. The slump made itself felt more severely last year, the total for which was only 456,000 tons. Owing to the world-wide depression in the shipping industry many Japanese establishments are finding it difficult to carry on, and unless conditions improve it is expected that the number of yards will have been reduced to 17 or 18 by the end of the year. Some relief has been afforded by the large naval program introduced last year. As the Japanese Naval Attaché pointed out to one of our representatives not long since, with so many of the native yards clamoring for work it is most unlikely that the government will consider the placing of naval contracts abroad, and the prospect of foreign shipbuilders enjoying any share of the work is therefore remote. Furthermore it is understood that during the debates on the new navy budget the government virtually pledged itself not to go outside Japan for any material which could be fabricated by native industry. As Japan already possesses the distinction of spending a higher percentage of her revenue on armaments than any other nation, it is only natural that her people should desire to keep the money in their own country. According to Mr. Ozaki, a prominent member of the Diet, the current naval and military budgets will absorb no less than 32 per cent of the total revenue.—The Naval and Military Record, Mar. 30, 1921.
UNITED STATES
Navy Department—Bureau of Construction and Repair
Vessels Under Construction, United States Navy—Degree of Completion, As Reported April 30, 1921
Type, number and name | Contractor | Per cent of completion | |||
May 1, 1921 | Apr. 1, 1921 | ||||
Total | On ship | Total | On ship | ||
Battleships (BB) | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? |
44 California | Mare Island Navy Yard | 96.5 | 96.3 | 96.1 | 95.7 |
45 Colorado | New York S.B. Cpn. | 71.3 | 69.4 | 69.3 | 66.2 |
46 Maryland | Newport News S.B. & D.D. Co. | 98.3 | 97.8 | 96.8 | 96.2 |
47 Washington | New York S.B. Cpn. | 63.1 | 56.3 | 61.2 | 54.3 |
48 West Virginia | Newport News S.B. & D.D. Co. | 52.1 | 42.4 | 49.5 | 39.3 |
49 South Dakota | New York Navy Yard | 29.1 | 21.1 | 26.7 | 18.1 |
50 Indiana | New York Navy Yard | 25.8 | 17.8 | 23.1 | 14.8 |
51 Montana | Mare Island Navy Yard | 22.1 | 13.2 | 18 | 11.9 |
52 North Carolina | Norfolk Navy Yard | 29.4 | 21 | 27.4 | 19.8 |
53 Iowa | Newport News S.B. & D.D. Co. | 19.3 | 15.4 | 16.1 | 12.6 |
*54 Massachusetts | Beth. S.B Cpn. (Fore River) | 3 | 0.5 | 2.5 | … |
Battle Cruisers (CC) | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? |
1 Lexington | Beth. S.B Cpn. (Fore River) | 16.6 | 6.5 | 13.8 | 4 |
2 Constellation | Newport News S.B. & D.D. Co. | 9.3 | 6.3 | 7.9 | 4.8 |
3 Saratoga | New York S.B. Cpn. | 20.4 | 11.8 | 18.1 | 9.5 |
4 Ranger | Newport News S.B. & D.D. Co. | 1.6 | 0.7 | 1.2 | 0.6 |
5 Constitution | Philadelphia Navy Yard | 6 | 2.9 | 4.3 | 2 |
6 United States | Philadelphia Navy Yard | 6 | 2.9 | 4.3 | 2 |
Scout Cruisers (Light Cruisers CL) | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? |
4 Omaha | Todd D.D. & Const. Cpn. | 91.4 | 82.7 | 90 | 81.8 |
5 Milwaukee | Todd D.D. & Const. Cpn. | 88.3 | 79.7 | 84.7 | 78.9 |
6 Cincinnati | Todd D.D. & Const. Cpn. | 80.6 | 68.9 | 80.6 | 65.4 |
7 Raleigh | Beth. S.B Cpn. (Fore River) | 53.8 | 35.2 | 51.4 | 33.3 |
8 Detroit | Beth. S.B Cpn. (Fore River) | 53.6 | 35 | 51.2 | 33.1 |
9 Richmond | Wm. Cramp & Sons Co. | 64 | 38 | 62 | … |
10 Concord | Wm. Cramp & Sons Co. | 62 | 36 | 60 | … |
11 Trenton | Wm. Cramp & Sons Co. | 44 | 22 | 41 | … |
12 Marblehead | Wm. Cramp & Sons Co. | 42 | 20 | 39 | … |
13 Memphis | Wm. Cramp & Sons Co. | 35 | 14 | 32 | … |
Auxiliaries | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? |
Fuel Ship No. 18 Pecos | Boston Navy Yard (Oiler AO6) | 82.5 | 81.6 | 75.5 | 73.8 |
Ammunition Ship No. 2 Nitro (AE2) | Puget Sound Navy Yard | Comm. 4/1/21 | 99.9 | 99.8 | |
Repair Ship No. 1 Medusa (AR1) | Puget Sound Navy Yard | 60.6 | 44.5 | 58 | 40.3 |
Dest. Tender No. 3 Dobbin (AD3) | Philadelphia Navy Yard | 57.3 | 57 | 52.3 | 52 |
Dest. Tender No. 4 Whitney (AD4) | Boston Navy Yard | 21 | 12.5 | 19.5 | 7.6 |
Sub. Tender No. 3 Holland (AS3) | Puget Sound Navy Yard | 16.8 | 1.4 | 14 | … |
Aircraft Tender, Wright (AZ1) | Tietjen & Lang | 70 | 57 | … | … |
Patrol Vessels | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? |
Gunboat No. 22 Tulsa (PG22) | Charleston Navy Yard | 64.6 | 44.7 | 59.8 | 41.8 |
*Battleship No. 54—Keel laid 4/4/21. | |||||
In addition there are under construction 8 destroyers and 37 submarines. | |||||
There were delivered during April, 1921, 7 destroyers. | |||||
Authorized but not under construction or contract 12 destroyers, 1 transport and 7 submarines. |
The Battleship and the Junk Heap.—Our British cousins are between the devil and the deep blue sea over the question of scrapping their great battleships and preparing for future wars in the air or under the sea. Its lines of communication are so vital to the British Empire that the discussion of the merits and demerits of the battleship have naturally aroused much interest in England.
The heat of the discussion has been felt in America. Our Navy Department has become so much interested that high ranking naval officers have been called upon to testify before the Naval Committees of Congress, and the Naval General Board have made a report on the subject.
The meat of the argument seems to be this: Friends of the all-big-gunship maintain that it is still the backbone of the fleet, and that, while the battle line needs numerous auxiliaries to protect it—such as battle-cruisers, light cruisers, destroyers and aircraft—the gun is still the principal weapon in sea warfare. The enemies of the big ship claim that the battleship is doomed—that with the same amount of money spent on submarines, torpedo-planes and bombers, the inordinately expensive dreadnought will be driven from the seas.
In the discussion on the other side of the Atlantic ail hands, including even the opponents of the battleship, are agreed that the capital ships of the Grand Fleet, notwithstanding the fact that they were many miles from Dover Straits, made possible an uninterrupted line of men and supplies to war-stricken France, in default of which there is no doubt that Germany would have won the war.
Ordinarily the armed forces of progressive powers profit by the lessons learned in past wars, and the main lessons from the Great World War seem to indicate plainly the gun as still the controlling factor as far as capital ships are concerned.
Thus, British capital ships destroyed, or badly damaged during the war were as follows:
- By gunfire in fleet action 3
- By torpedoes in fleet action 1
- By mine 5
- By submarines 5
- By internal explosion 2
- By torpedoes or bombs from aircraft 0
Now of the five ships that were victims of mines, two were lost at the Dardanelles where they were sent over the protest of the ranking naval officer at the British Admiralty, who knew it was contrary to a well recognized principle of naval warfare that ships cannot be used against shore fortifications, nor can they be used in confined spaces where mine laying submarines have an opportunity to "lay their eggs." The other three were lost early in the war, before the paravane was perfected. It therefore, the lessons of the last war are taken to heart, the mine should play a smaller part against the big ships in the future.
Of the five capital ships sunk by submarines two were at the Dardanelles, confined in a sense, to a small area, thus offering the slow submerged craft an opportunity to attack them. The other three battleships were torpedoed near Malta, in the English Channel, and near Gibraltar, respectively it is not known whether they were screened by anti-submarine craft when torpedoed, but it is known that no capital ships, cruising in fleet with a proper fleet screen, were lost.
No remarks need be made concerning the two ships lost by internal explosion-the answer to that is a more stable, more careful y made powder.
Taking out the five battleships lost by mines, the five lost by submarines and the two by internal explosion, on the ground that a more expert knowledge of naval warfare should prevent these losses in the future, it can be easily seen that the war lessons point to the gun as the main factor of sea power.
In any study of the question as to whether the big-gun ship is obsolete, attack on it from three planes must be considered: i.e., surface attack, underwater attack and attack from the air.
1. Surface Attack.—Students of naval affairs will remember that with the advent of the modern torpedo boat in the nineties, the disappearance of the battleship was predicted. Progress answered, however, with the destroyer to drive off the torpedo-boat, and this was followed in turn by the fast cruiser to take care of the destroyer, and by the battle-cruiser to protect the van and the rear of the battle line from, the cruiser. The normal fleet then settled down to battleships, battle-cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers, and the fleet that could throw the most metal and hit with it, was the one that could win.
2. Underwater Attack.—Next came the submarine which some prophets say will play the main role in control of the sea in the future. Now, looking again to the lessons learned in the war, not one capital ship in a properly screened fleet was damaged by a torpedo from a submarine during the whole course of the war. One attack was made on the British fleet by Wedigen, universally admitted to the best man the Germans had at the time, but the submarine was rammed and sunk and the capital ships suffered no damage.
The submarine is merely a weapon of opportunity. If it happens to be ahead of a fleet, on its track, and is commanded by an iron-nerved skipper like Wedigen, then it may come within range and take its toll. If the sub is off the track of the fleet, however, its slow submerged speed, while running silently, will not permit it to gain attacking position. If the submarine speeds up, the listening devices in the fleet screen will hear and warn the fleet, and all that the big ships need to do is to avoid that locality. Meanwhile the probabilities are that the fleet screen will get the submarine.
3. Attack from the Air.—The other plane from which the dreadnought is to be destroyed is above water. Here the form of attack is to be by torpedoes or bombs launched from airplanes. This was never tried in the World War. It is reported that, recently, in England, a torpedo attack from airplane was made on a squadron of battleships. Five out of eight of the ships were hit with collapsible-head torpedoes. The fleet was at anchor and there was no battleship screen of destroyers firing at the planes which launched the torpedoes. The fleet was not underway so that individual ships would have a chance, by a touch of the helm, to avoid the torpedoes seen in the water, as was done at Jutland.
We must bear in mind that in an airplane attack on a fleet with torpedoes, there are several difficult conditions to be met: (1) The plane must be only a short distance from the water; if too high the tail of the torpedo, carrying the delicate Obry gear, will be smashed and the torpedo will not run true; (2) the plane must be pointed in the right direction to hit the target; (3) the plane must be at a certain definite angle to the water or the torpedo will go to the bottom; (4) the fighting planes from the fleet will be attacking the torpedo planes, and (5) most important of all, the secondary batteries of the fleet and improved destroyer anti-aircraft guns will be firing at the attacking airplanes all the time during which they are attempting to fulfill the exacting conditions noted above.
It may well be that progress in aircraft and submarine design will keep an enemy battle fleet further from one's own coast but, after all, in any except a European war, the sea power—which I hold to be the guns of the fleet—must be sent to the vital strategic area in order to bring its influence to bear in ending the war.
Now if the Briton is to control from the air, he must be able to send his airplane torpedoes to the vital sea area. In the present stage of development he must send them in ships, and all an enemy sea power needs to do is to find some means to destroy the airplane-carrying ships. That should be easy.
In the rapid development of all kinds of weapons of war the world has done wonders in the past half century. In this development every nation has been forced to meet type with type. If England is to be considered America's most probable enemy (which God forbid); if she goes heavily into construction of airplane carriers and relies solely on war in the air, then we must meet her, not only by some weapon to destroy her airplane carriers, but by war in the air. If some other nation holds fast to the battleship we must meet her by power on the surface. Again, if any nation, whose policies clash with ours, lays great stress on the submarine. Uncle Sam must be fully prepared to combat the submarine. This has been proved in the past when the torpedo-boat brought forth the design of the destroyer, and the armored cruiser was met by the faster, heavier gunned battle-cruiser.
One of the questions that form the main theme of the writing of the capital ship's principal enemy—Sir Percy Scott—is "What can the battleship do?" The answer comes from one of the underlying principles of sea power. The big gun ship places gun power, the controlling factor of naval strength, in the sea areas where needed. Big-gun superiority forms a point of support for cruisers and other warships and enables them to patrol and control the area in question.—The Scientific American, Apr. 16, 1921.
Merchant Marine
Seaman Go On Strike.—Owing to the refusal of the representatives of the marine labor organizations to permit any downward readjustment of wages at this time, union seamen on American ships were called out on strike at the beginning of this week when the agreements heretofore in force regarding working hours and rates of pay expired. At the time of this writing, it is impossible to judge how widely the strike order will be obeyed nor to what extent shipping under our flag will be tied up. Negotiations for a settlement are also still in progress which may lead to a speedy and satisfactory adjustment of the present differences.
This insistence of the seamen upon their former scale of wages is largely due to the attitude of the engineers, who have been the chief beneficiaries under the old overtime clause which enabled the seamen to draw considerable extra compensation. According to Admiral Benson, out of the $72,000,000 paid to seamen during the past thirteen months no less than $6,000,000 was due for overtime. Many engineers are reported to have swelled their earnings as much as one-third under this overtime provision, which has tempted them to postpone doing necessary work until such a time as they were no longer on regular watch. With the abolition of overtime, they face a reduction under the new scale of perhaps thirty per cent in their gross income. As the overtime clause has been abused in the past, ship operators are united in endorsing Admiral Benson's stand that payment for overtime services at sea should be for the most part eliminated.
As pointed out by our Washington correspondent, the Shipping Board only determined upon a 15 per cent cut in wages after its experts had ascertained that there had been a fall recently of from 18 to 30 per cent in the cost of living. The wage reduction which the men have been asked to accept cannot, therefore, be deemed unwarranted. In resisting a fair offer and in attempting to delay the inevitable readjustment of wages from war time levels the marine unions have forfeited public sympathy and are engaged in a losing contest. With the exception of the railways, wages m all the great industries of the country have been reduced in accordance with the lowered cost of living. It is no hardship for the laboring classes to accept less pay so long as their purchasing power undergoes no impairment. Workers in shipbuilding and ship repair plants have realized that wages could be reduced without their suffering hardships, and our seamen ought to come to a similar conclusion.—The Nautical Gazette, May 7, 1921.
AERONAUTICS
President Harding and Aeronautics.—Aviation is inseparable from either the army or the navy, and the government must, in the interests of national defense, encourage its development for military and civil purposes.
The encouragement of the civil development of aeronautics is especially desirable as relieving the government largely of the expense of development, and of maintenance of an industry, now almost entirely borne by the government through appropriations for the military, naval and postal air services. The air mail service is an important initial step in the direction of commercial aviation.
It has become a pressing duty of the Federal Government to provide for the regulation of air navigation; otherwise independent and conflicting legislation will be enacted by the various states which will hamper the development of aviation. The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, in a special report on this subject has recommended the establishment of a Bureau of Aeronautics in the Department of Commerce for the Federal regulation of air navigation, which recommendation ought to have legislative approval.
I recommend the enactment of legislation establishing a Bureau of Aeronautics in the Navy Department to centralize the control of naval activities in aeronautics, and removing the restrictions on the personnel detailed to aviation in the navy.
The army air service should be continued as a coordinate combatant branch of the army, and its existing organization utilized in cooperation with other agencies of the government in the establishment of national trans-continental airways and in cooperation with the states in the establishment of local airdromes and landing fields.—Flying, May, 1921.
The Navy Should Have a Bureau of Aeronautics.—The activities of the Navy Department are carried on under a system of separate bureaus, each of which is confined to certain specific work. Thus, the Bureau of Construction and Repair designs the hulls of the ships; the Bureau of Steam Engineering designs the motive power; the Bureau of Ordnance designs the guns, and so forth; and each of these is in charge of a director, or chief, who directs and is responsible for the work done in his own particular bureau. This segregation of the multiplied activities of the navy has not been an arbitrary matter; rather, it represents a natural growth in which the institution of separate bureaus has been rendered necessary by the multiplication of inventions and discovery and the ever-increasing complexity of the modern warship. In fact, the bureau system finds its counterpart in that specialization which is such a marked feature of our modern industrial activity, where the growth of each particular branch of industry has been so rapid and has so greatly widened the field of knowledge, that it is all that one man can do to get a thorough mastery of one particular field.
The birth and rapid development of the new art of aeronautics and the important part which it is bound to play in future naval warfare have brought the Navy Department face to face with the question as to whether it must not now create another bureau to deal with what is already a highly specialized branch of naval activity. Even to-day, when we stand merely on the threshold of aeronautical development, the art is sufficiently developed to call for the services of a highly specialized class of men in the designing room, in the work shop, and in actual flying service with the fleet at sea. What we already possess in the way of machines, men and knowledge is merely a beginning, and it is certain that the call for a special bureau will become more insistent as the years pass by.
Three is a powerful movement at work in favor of the institution of a United Air Service, in which the design and construction of machines and the training of officers will be done under a single central body, and the machines and the men allocated to the army or the navy in response to the demand. Personally, we believe that the army service on land and naval service at sea are so widely different, both in the character of the machines required and in the training of the personnel, that no greater mistake could be made than to include the two branches in one central service.
In the first place a machine that is suitable for land service is not suitable for the sea. The conditions are widely different. Given a fairly level and smooth field, the army plane can take off and land upon it no matter in what part of the world the landing field be situated; but for sea service you must have a plane which can take off from or land upon the sea itself or upon the unstable platform of a ship which has been built especially for that purpose. Furthermore, not only must the naval aircraft be designed for these special conditions, but the flying man, to be thoroughly efficient, must have been bred to the sea. He must have acquired the sea instinct and initiative which is the mark of your efficient naval man and is every whit as essential to the officers and men who navigate in the air as to those who navigate upon the surface of the sea. The air squadrons of a great fleet must be trained to operate with that fleet and find their proper position in it just as completely as a battle-cruiser squadron, a cruiser squadron, or a flotilla of destroyers and submarines. They must know their commander-in-chief, be familiar with his tactics, and be on their toes all the time, ready almost to anticipate the orders which long familiarity and training have taught them to expect.
To put the flying activities of the navy under a separate outside organization such as the army or a United Air Service, would be as efficient as to have a United Bureau of Ordnance and have the navy constructor send the sketch plan of the proposed armament of the ships to such a body, with the request that they design the suitable guns, gun mounts, projectiles, ammunition hoists, and what not. Such a course would make for errors, misunderstandings and inefficiency.
Hitherto the development of naval aircraft has been everybody's task and the task of no one in particular. The immediate need of the navy is a responsible directing bureau in the navy which can care for naval aviation and foster its growth and development. Unless we have such a bureau, aviation will continue to stagger along and we shall be faced with a repetition of the failures which have been all too frequent in our submarine development.
The idea of coordination, as expressed in a United Air Service, is attractive as an abstract proposition. Great Britain thought so—tried it out—and has abandoned the idea as impracticable.—The Scientific American, Apr. 16, 1921.
Secretary Denby Opposed to Unified Air Control.—Washington.—Secretary of the Navy Denby told the House Committee on Naval Affairs April 25 that he is absolutely opposed to a separate air service with unified control over army, navy, other governmental aviation and civilian
The view of Mr. Denby was sought whiles he was urging the passage of legislation creating a Bureau of Aeronautics in the Navy Department, which President Harding recently recommended.
"A Bureau of Aeronautics in the Navy Department is necessary in the interest of aviation development," he said. "At present aviation activities are scattered through perhaps a dozen bureaus. The plan is to bring all activities into one bureau."
The creation of such a bureau was recommended to President Harding by the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, which likewise urged the necessity for establishing a bureau of aeronautics in the Department of Commerce to take care of civil aviation, and went on record in opposition to separating aviation from the army or navy.
Secretary Denby urged the committee to be as liberal as possible in providing funds for the development of aviation m the navy.
"The people do not realize that our navy is lacking in one arm," he said. "Aviation has become a vital part of our naval forces. If our fleet should ever engage another force it should be just as fully equipped with planes and carriers as its opponent in order to be on an equal footing." He said a Bureau of Aeronautics would decrease expenses.—The Aerial Age Weekly, May 9, 1921.
American Aviation Policy.—President Harding has submitted to Congress, with his approval, a report of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, in which are recommended a naval air service, an army air service, and a bureau of aeronautics in the Department of Commerce to regulate air navigation and to encourage civil and commercial aviation. The President agrees with the army and navy officers who controlled the subcommittee making the report that a single air department for military, government and commercial purposes should not be created. On April 11 Chairman Kahn of the Military Affairs Committee introduced in the House of Representatives a bill providing for a single Bureau of Air "to make more effectual provision for the aerial defense of the United States and to provide for the concentration of national air strength." On the same day he introduced a bill "to regulate air navigation." The issue, then, of a single air department is before Congress.
In the report whose recommendations President Harding approves it is declared that "aviation is inseparable from the national defense," and that "it is of vital importance in time of peace to make the greatest possible progress in the science itself." And thereupon the committee proposes something that will impede "the greatest possible progress" in aviation; that is to say, it recommends a distribution of authority, initiative and responsibility among at least three agencies—the army, the navy and the Department of Commerce. "Neither the army nor the navy, nor both combined," says Brigadier General William Mitchell of the Army Air Service in his book, "Our Air Force, the Keystone of National Defense," "can be expected to develop, organize and perfect a flying corps and its employment to the greatest possible limit of which that weapon (the aeroplane) is capable." In his recent message to Congress President Harding said that "the civil development of aeronautics" must be encouraged to relieve the government "largely of the expense of development and of the maintenance of an industry now almost entirely borne by the government through appropriations for the military, naval and postal air services." The President might have added, what is of the first importance, that if progress in aeronautical invention is to be promoted, the government must have the co-operation and aid of the civilian or independent manufacturers. The prospect must be opened to them of selling their machines to companies engaged in freight and passenger traffic as well as to the government for the army, navy, and the Post Office and other departments.
How can the government encourage the civilian manufacturers aside from giving them contracts? By developing air routes and building aerodromes in all parts of the country, for use by commercial aviators as well as by the army, the navy and the post office. The committee headed by General C. T. Menoher and Admiral D. W. Taylor recognizes the necessity of this in its report when it recommends that the Army Air Service take up the work, with as much co-operation as it can get from other government agencies and from, the states and municipalities. Indeed, the report to which President Harding gives his endorsement outlines a scheme of such magnitude that to submit it to several bodies for execution would be to court failure and to waste money. Concentration, and not distribution, is the key to success. Chairman Kahn's bills may need amendment, perhaps redrafting, but they point in the right direction. A nation that takes the lead in commercial aviation should have the best aerial offense and defense. (Editorial in New York Times.)—The Aerial Age Weekly, May 2, 1921.
New Fight Looms Over Air Policy.—The fight for an independent air service, waged for the past two years, has broken out afresh and with increased vigor since submittal of the report of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics on a Federal air program. In the controversy fanned by the report innuendoes are made that a report of a minority of the committee was withheld and President Harding deprived of part of the information he asked for.
All three civilian members of the National Advisory Committee, it Is stated, signed the minority report. They are F. H. Russell, Glenn L. Martin and Sidney Waldon. Major W. G. Kilner is also stated to have signed the minority report.
This quartet in its minority report urged the President to direct the National Advisory Committee to consider and report on whether it is better to divide aeronautics among four departments, as is recommended in the majority report, or to establish a Department of the Air, a Unified Air Service or an Independent Air Force. They asked Dr. Charles D. Walcott, Chairman of the National Advisory Committee, to incorporate this suggestion with the majority report.
This was not done, and its omission is the ground for the charge that the President has been favored with only one side of the question. The majority report favors an Army Air Service, a Naval Air Service and an Air Mail Service conducted separately and independently as now, and a Bureau of Aeronautics in the Department of Commerce for regulation of air navigation. The National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics should be continued, the committee suggests, for scientific research in an advisory capacity for coordinating all federal aeronautical activities.
While the four constituting the minority of the committee are advocates of an independent air service, in which all air activities shall center, Dr. Walcott says they signed the majority report Mr. Waldon says that the minority report, after omission from the account of the committee's findings delivered to the President, was sent to Mr. Harding. The showdown of strength between the advocates of the different policies will come in Congress, to which the majority report has been transmitted by the White House.—The Aerial Age Weekly, May 2, 1921.
A Proposed American Transport Aeroplane.—The machine illustrated and briefly described is to carry forty passengers with all their baggage, and contains several interesting constructional features that are not as radical as they may seem at first sight. The use of metal construction, variable pitch propellers and supercharging, are admitted to be the next steps in development. The problem of supplying sufficient power to drive a large aeroplane has brought out several different solutions. Owing to the limited power available in one unit, the majority of the giant aeroplanes built have been powered by a multiplicity of engines; in several machines as many as six have been used successfully. The two general types of construction are, a central power group and a distribution between the wings. The solution proposed here is the employment of very large power units placed very close together, but driving the propellers directly.
This new transport machine is a biplane, and is planned to carry forty passengers a crew of four and about 2400 pounds of freight. It is constructed of steel and aluminum, thus reducing fire risk. It is equipped with two 1200-horsepower dual V-engines, designed especially for the purpose, driving 12-foot, 4-bladed variable pitch propellers, which are patented by the designer.
The principal dimensions are as follows:
Span 125 ft.
Chord 16.5 ft.
Gap 14 ft.
Height overall 19 ft.
Length overall 75 ft.
Total area 3864 sq. ft.
Petrol tank capacity 1200 gal.
Endurance 12 hr. at 100 m. p. h.
Maximum speed 130 m. p. h.
Power loading 15.4 lb. per h. p.
Wing loading 9.6 lb. per sq. ft.
Total weight 18.5 tons.
—(Flight, Jan. 20, 1921.)—The Technical Review, Apr. 26, 1921.
Alcogas Aviation Fuel.—An account of test made with a fuel mixture consisting of 40 per cent alcohol, 35 per cent petrol, 17 per cent benzol and 8 per cent other ingredients, in comparison with aviation petrol. The fuel tests were made on a Liberty engine, in respect to the maximum power attainable, and the fuel consumption with the weakest mixture giving maximum power; the speed range was from 1400 to 1800 r. p. m., and the altitude range (as simulated in the altitude laboratory) was from to 25,000 ft. Compression ratios of 5.6 and 7.2 were employed. A description of the fuels, and their physical properties is given, with the distillation temperatures; the initial boiling points were practically the same at 60 degrees C, whilst the 90 per cent values for the alcogas and petrol were I45 degrees C. and 127 degrees C respectively. A description of the test plant used and the manner of conducting the tests is included. The results of the tests which are described at some length and are illustrated by a large number of graphs may be summarized as follows:
- At 5.6 compression, the same maximum power production at ground level and a general average of 4 per cent more power at altitude was obtained for the alcogas; the maximum difference of power was 6 per cent at 6400 ft. and 1800 r. p. m. in favor of the alcogas.
- At 7.2 compression, an average, and fairly uniform increase of 4 per cent in power at altitude was obtained in favor of the alcogas, no comparative figure being obtained for the petrol at ground level.
- The alcogas showed a fuel consumption per b. h. p. from 10 to 15 per cent greater than the petrol for this maximum power at any altitude, speed or compression ratio. Owing to the 12 per cent higher density of alcogas the fuel consumption in terms of volume per b. h. p. was practically the same in the two cases.
- The thermal efficiency of the alcogas was superior by about 15 per cent. A pound of alcogas contains about 22 per cent less heat units than a pound of petrol, so that in securing more power with 15 per cent greater fuel weight it is evident that the available energy of alcogas is more fully realized than in the case of petrol.
- With the 7.2 compression ratio, the alcogas develops about 15 per cent greater power for the same fuel weight per unit power.
- The radiator capacity required per brake horse-power is the same in the two cases.
The alcogas was observed to give smoother running than when the same engine was run upon aviation petrol, but no information was obtained relating to the effect of the fuel on the continued operation of the engine. (V. R. Gage, S. W. Sparrow and D. R. Harper, Report No. 89 U. S. Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 1920. 9 pp., 27 figs.)—The Technical Review, Apr. 12, 1921.
Trial Flights and Acceptance Tests for New Types of Aeroplanes.—A. G. Fokker.—The ideal test pilot is, or should be, the designer of the machine. Unfortunately, this combination is very rare, and the designer has usually to rely on reports of others as to the properties of his machine. Until reliable recording instruments are in our possession, the "personal element" will predominate in the tests and "scientific" pilots are not always available.
The following are the main characteristics which an aeroplane should possess, and on which the test pilot should concentrate his attention:
Getting Off.—The machine should possess sufficient directional stability while running along the ground. As soon as the flying speed is reached it should be able to get off without the use of the elevator.
In Flight.—There should be no hunting, either in the horizontal or the vertical direction. The changing over from "power-flight altitude" to "gliding-flight altitude" should be automatic and quick. Even at the lowest flying speeds wing-flap controls should be possible. When executing curves there must be no tendency to go into a nose dive or spin. When side-slipping the machine should still be controllable. All rudder organs should be properly balanced.
Landing.—Smooth landing depends very much on the type of landing wheels and their position. By proper construction, any tendency to leave the ground again can be checked. (Het Vliegveld, Jan. 1, 1921.)—Mechanical Engineering, May, 1921.
ENGINEERING
Tendencies in Marine Oil Engine Practice.—During the winter session now drawing to a close, there have been a number of notable technical papers read before the learned societies dealing with all branches of engineering, and where marine engineering is concerned perhaps the two most important have been "The Present Position of the Marine Diesel Oil Engine," by Mr. James Richardson, B. Sc, read before the Institution of Engineers and Shipbuilders in Scotland; and that on "Mechanical Gears of Double Reduction for Merchant Ships," by Mr. R. J. Walker, C. B. E. and Mr. S. S. Cook, B. A., before the Institution of Naval Architects. Selection of these papers is made for the reasons, firstly, that they deal with the two most modern developments in marine propulsive machinery, and, secondly, because we desire to draw attention to the trend of the discussions that ensued in both cases.
First to deal with the oil engine question, as was perhaps inevitable, considerable attention was focused on the relative merits of engines working on the four-stroke and the two-stroke cycles. Very definite statements were made in the paper on this subject, to the effect that most of the published data referring to power output obtained with two-cycle engines were incorrect, and these engines were credited with a power capacity that could not be sustained continuously at sea. This view was supported by reference to the submarine engine practice adopted in several important navies. Conditions m such service make imperative the reduction to a minimum of the space and weight of the main machinery and it was noted in the paper that the four-cycle engine held a predominant position for satisfying these conditions.
On the theoretical side the author maintained that the limiting factor in respect of the power obtainable from any given size of combustion cylinder is the quantity of heat that can be passed through unit thickness of cast iron per unit of time for a given maximum temperature at the inner surface of the metal. The limit on this basis is largely independent of the piston speed. For instance, with a high mean effective pressure a low speed of revolution may give a reasonable figure of heat transfer through the metal surrounding the combustion zone, and conversely, a low mean effective pressure will permit safely on a high speed of revolution. In support of this contention, it may be noted that two-cycle engines, which have a higher mean effective pressure than is general with four-cycle, are mostly designed to run at a lower speed of revolution. Naturally in making comparisons on a mean pressure basis the mean effective pressure is that for the whole cycle. In the case of the four-cycle engine the cycle extends over two revolutions or four strokes, whilst with the two-cycle engine there is an explosion every revolution, or every two strokes.
The limiting rate of heat transfer is, of course, dependent on the material in use. Certainly for convenience of machine work and for general reliability, it is reasonable to assume, for the present at any rate, that an ordinary grade of good hard grey cast iron will be adopted and the limiting temperature of the inner face of the casting must not be such as to cause serious disintegration of the metal through the graphite plates and consequent liability to cracks, etc. Practice, at any rate with large four-cycle engines, has now reached such a stage that standardization has almost set in, and practice at sea has served definitely to give a safe figure for this question of heat transfer. Assuming that the proportion of the heat of the fuel that has to be abstracted from the burning gases is more or less constant, and that the stroke-bore ratio can be assumed as fixed, so that the area of the piston is practically an exact fraction of the total area of the combustion chamber, then the limiting condition can be expressed as pounds of fuel per hour consumed per square inch of piston area.
Taking the total amount of fuel per hour consumed in any cylinder and dividing it by the piston area in square inches the quotient should not greatly exceed 0.2 pounds per square inch per hour. This is certainly, a conservative rating, referring primarily to large engines and it could no doubt be safely exceeded for small cylinders. Large marine four-cycle practice over a number of years of continuous operation at sea, however, amply confirms the desirability of being conservative in this respect, indeed it was noted in Mr. Richardson's paper that even with the progress in design made within the last few years there has been generally a measurable increase in the weight and the space occupied by the slow-speed marine Diesel engine per horsepower developed continuously. This is due largely to the reduction in the rate of heat transfer.
The mean effective pressure for two-cycle engines on a brake horsepower basis appears from the table of mercantile engines given by Mr. Richardson to average about 66 pounds per square inch. The highest figure quoted is 73.5 pounds and the lowest 55, but the author held that it was very doubtful if a mean pressure higher than 55 pounds per square inch on a brake horsepower basis could be continuously sustained at sea. Three examples of two-cycle marine engines cited gave mean effective pressures of 73, 66 and 73 pounds per square inch on a brake horsepower basis, and the rate of heat transfer was equivalent to a fuel consumption of 0.39, 0.315, 0.345 pounds per hour per square inch of piston area.
Corresponding to these figures certain stresses are developed in the material. On certain assumptions, it was concluded that the stresses arising from unequal expansion may in the three cases quoted amount respectively to 24,000, 14,900, and 15,000 pounds per square inch, the highest stress occurring in the largest engine. 'It is quite obvious that fractures in cast iron cannot be a matter of surprise when such stresses are imposed. As already mentioned the safe rate of heat transfer corresponds to a fuel consumption of 0.2 pound per square inch of piston area per hour. Hence, if the two-cycle engines be reduced in power output to the same basis the mean effective pressure will fall to a very moderate one of less than 55 pounds, and there will be, Mr. Richardson maintains, little, if any, gain in space or reduction in weight, as compared with the four-cycle engine.
To examine a little further this all important question which is raised in this paper, and so fully pursued in the discussion, it cannot, owing to lack of published definite data, be said to be conclusively proved that the rate of heat transfer equivalent to the combustion of 0.2 pounds per hour per square inch of piston area is altogether established as the limit apart from the question of the quality of the fuel and the maintenance of the exhaust valves, matters which are not exactly common to engines of both cycles.
With a low grade of fuel oil, exhaust valve maintenance may be so onerous as to demand a reduction in power output with the four-cycled engine, apart from the heat transfer question proper. On the other hand, two-cycle cylinders with exhaust ports on one side and scavenging air inlet ports opposite, where cool air enters to clear out the hot gases, are certainly highly stressed, during full power running at a high rating, in this particular part of the cylinder, as it must be borne in mind that the necessarily high velocity of the issuing exhaust gases involves a high rate of transfer of heat to the cooled exhaust bars, and adjacent parts.
No doubt the quality of the metal surrounding the hot gases will be gradually improved. Much research to this end is now in progress, and in due course the results so obtained will be translated into foundry practice. To such metallurgical improvements, engine design and performance will quickly respond. The special point we wish to urge is the fact that no data giving definite information regarding the two-cycle engine were given in the paper or discussion although there was ample testimony to the satisfactory performance of four-cycle engines. If there are two-cycle ships operating at sea with good results and working at high mean effective pressures and heat transfer figures, it would be greatly to the benefit of progress in marine engineering that the facts should we widely known.
Coming to the second paper it is probable that no marine engineering paper of recent times can have been so eagerly looked forward to as that of Messrs. Walker and Cook on "Mechanical Gears of Double Reduction for Merchant Ships," as there have been so many rumors of failures of mechanical double reduction gearing. Little enlightenment on a number of factors, however, was given by this paper, other than a certain amount of very interesting information on the one subject of torsional shaft vibration. It is, however, cheering to have the statement given by Engineer-Admiral Sir George Goodwin that failure was much less frequent than it had been 12 months ago, but whether a lessening of the tooth pressure or the exercise of greater care in workmanship, or both are responsible was not elicited. In this paper the authors quoted that in Great Britain and other countries (excluding America) the number of ships with double reduction gears built and under construction is about 220 representing a total of 1,150,000 horsepower. As successful examples only three designs—five ships—are quoted having constants in the equation for pinions over 10-inch diameter, viz., constant = P/√d varying from 195 to 238. The statement that a constant between 180 and 220 is good practice. is made, although the authors hold that there is nothing to show that considerably higher loads than represented by the constants, could not he adopted. It is a well-known fact that a number of ships with double reduction gear are operating at sea at a fraction of pull power, and so with a very much smaller tooth pressure than that designed, as was well pointed out in the discussion by Captain Onyon, M. V. O., R.N. Are there any double reduction gears running at sea continuously with constants of 220 or higher. Again, the questions involved are of such importance as to demand a solution which can only be obtained by the recording and publishing of actual details of performance. If a high standard of workmanship materials and lubricants are the critical factors, then it is necessary that standards of such accuracy should be formulated, and definite means for securing these be made general. We do not desire at present to deal n detail with this question. It is evident, however, from the two discourses which are the subject of this article that nothing but gain can accrue from a close co-operation between the engineer and the ship-owner. What is desirable is a free expression of experience and a complete recording and publication of full facts of performance. Along this path, and only by such means can these absorbing and highly important questions be raised from the present level of uncertainty and doubt to the realm of established experience.—Engineering, Apr. 8, 1921.
Simplex Detector Shows Presence of Salt in Boiler Feed Water.—The presence of salt in boilers is universally admitted to be highly objectional because of the reduced steaming capacity which results from salt being deposited on the heating surfaces, and also because of the danger of overheating which is always present when there is salt on these surfaces. In the case of water-tube boilers, which are now being used more extensively than in previous years, and where even a small deposit of salt may have serious consequences, greater precautions are generally taken to keep the feed fresh than when the ordinary type of boiler is installed.
In this connection mention may be made of a most remarkable instrument manufactured by the McNab Company of Bridgeport, which has been named the Simplex Salt Detector. It is so designed as to indicate at all times the grains of salt in each gallon of feed water, thus revealing the presence of salt before the water enters the boiler, even though the quantity be as little as one grain per gallon. Furthermore, should the quantity of salt suddenly increase as the result of a split condenser tube, or of the evaporator priming, the apparatus gives immediate warning of the fact by ringing a bell, and by causing the electric lamp contained within the instrument to burn with increased intensity. This permits of the defect being remedied before the density of the water in the boiler has increased perceptibly.
The presence of salt in the feed water of marine boilers is ordinarily due to leaking condenser tubes and to evaporators priming. In the usual course the water is tested by a salinometer, but this test is dependent upon the human element, as it is taken as and when the engineer sees fit or finds it convenient to do so. The salinometer does not detect the amount of salt entering the boiler through the feed line, but merely determines the quantity of salt in the boiler. The Simplex Salt Detector, however, detects and gives warning of the presence of salt in the feed water before it enters the boiler.
The working of this instrument is based on the well-known fact that pure water has a high electrical resistance, which, however, falls very quickly if certain compounds—of which ordinary salt is one—are added to the water. The essential part of the apparatus is a glass vessel fitted with two electrodes by which a current is passed through a sample of the feed water, the necessary current being taken from any convenient direct current power or lighting circuit. The electrodes are made of a special grade of platinum iridio and are so arranged that no metal part of the connections is in contact with the water. This is important as it avoids the excessive corrosion which would otherwise take place. The electrodes are adjustable so that the sensitiveness of the instrument can be varied.
As mentioned above, the instrument gives a continuous indication of the saltiness of the feed, and this is done by having a small supply of feed water flowing through the glass vessel, entering at one end and flowing out at the opposite end. The resistance of water falls very rapidly for a small increase in the amount of salt present, and this tends to make the simplest arrangement too sensitive. To obviate this, in the Simplex system, a resistance is introduced which is in the form of an incandescent 105 volt carbon lamp contained within a brass dome on top of the instrument. The lamp shows no light when the water is fresh, but as soon as salt is present, will begin to glow a dull red, which gradually increases to full brightness as the salt increases. This enables the officer on watch to see at a glance whether there is salt in the feed, and if so, whether it is in sufficient quantity to require immediate attention.
A meter attached gives a quantitative indication of the amount of sail present in grams per gallon at 100 degrees Fahrenheit. A definite warning is given immediately the salt exceeds a fixed percentage, and is operated by a relay connected in series with the instrument. The relay is very easily adjusted.—The Nautical Gazette. Apr. 30, 1921.
Aluminum and Its Alloys.—A report of three Cantor lectures delivered before the Royal Society of Arts, describing the properties of aluminum and its alloys and the lines of investigation leading to the production of alloys with varying properties particularly suited to diverse industrial uses. Aluminum is chiefly valued on account of its low specific gravity, but the strength of the pure metal is insufficient for many applications, and it is essential to alloy it with other metals to attain the necessary tenacity, this involving some sacrifice of the low specific gravity, except when magnesium is employed in combination, when the alloys are very easily corrodible. Another metal which may eventually prove to be a serious rival to aluminum is beryllium, otherwise known as glucinum, but this has not yet been developed commercially and its properties have not been fully investigated.
The industrial application of the alloys of aluminum is chiefly considered from the engineering aspect. At the present time their comparatively high cost restricts their use to cases where lightness is of considerable importance. The war gave a great incentive to their production and use for many purposes, but during peace, when conditions are much more competitive on a price basis, the extensive use of aluminum alloys in general engineering will be largely dependent on a reduction in the cost of aluminum. The compositions and specifications of various alloys developed for war purposes are given and the improvement in the quality of these alloys by ageing is noted. Prolonged annealing also effects the improvement, but is hardly considered to be of commercial application. In connection with the use of aluminum pistons in internal combustion engines, many investigations were made to determine which alloys exhibit the best tenacity at comparatively high temperatures, and a remarkable alloy is that containing 14 per cent of copper and 1 per cent of manganese which shows an increasing tenacity with increasing temperature up to 250° C. The alloy containing 4 per cent of copper, 2 per cent of nickel and VA per cent of magnesium, previously referred to, shows the highest tenacity of the whole series for all temperatures up to 310° C. The adoption of this alloy, will, it is considered, eliminate the occasional trouble experienced from burnt pistons. The use of aluminum alloy pistons has resulted in an increase of power of the order of 20 per cent being obtained from engines as compared with the use of iron or steel pistons. Piston slap and the growth of pistons is discussed, the latter effect being comparatively small and being capable of elimination by annealing. The question of securing the gudgeon pin in aluminum pistons and the possibility of the employment of the metal for bearing surfaces is considered in some detail. The use of aluminum for cylinder castings has not resulted in as many advantages as was anticipated, but in the case of air-cooled engines, the freedom from distortion owing to the high conductivity of aluminum is a marked advance. Aluminum cylinder heads can also be advantageously employed The use of aluminum alloy connecting rods is a probable development. The construction of girder frameworks for rigid airships offered a wide field for aluminum alloys and it is considered that they will play an important part in the development of the all-metal aeroplane, the latest phases of this science being dealt with in detail. Considerable economy could be effected in railway work by the use of aluminum alloys in place of steel for the chassis of coaches, and in all applications where acceleration and retardation of masses is an important factor, while their use in bridge and roof construction would also effect great economies (W. Rosenhain, D. Sc, F. R. S., Journal of The Royal Society of Arts. Nov 5, 12 and 19, 1920.)—The Technical Review, Mar. 29, 1921.
ORDNANCE
Naval Gunnery and Construction.—The gunnery experiments which were carried out in the Channel early in February, and which resulted in the sinking of the ex-German battleship Baden, appear to have had a wider significance than was appreciated at the time. They were supposed to have been held mainly to determine the resistance of German armor and internal protection to the attack of heavy naval projectiles. No official account of the firing has been published, but we gather from unofficial reports that the bombardment was performed by the monitor Lord Clive, which had been temporarily armed with three heavy guns—of 15- inch or larger caliber—on a triple mounting, to which we shall revert later. The distance between firing ship and target was not great, but the guns were fired with reduced charges, which gave the projectiles a velocity equivalent to that which would remain to them at very long range. The fact that certain German ships of older design and less substantial protection had endured at the Battle of Jutland a tremendous amount of punishment without being sunk or absolutely disabled seemed to warrant the assumption that the Baden would survive a very severe hammering. This expectation was not fulfilled. So far as we are able to gather, her flotation, was destroyed long before the prescribed number of rounds had been fired, either because our projectiles were exceptionally destructive or because the armor and other defences of the ship were less robust than had been surmised. As originally planned, the tests, we believe, were to have included an attack by torpedo-carrying aircraft, though considering that the target was stationary, the practical value of the latter experiment cannot have been great. Even when allowance is made for the difficulty of obtaining a straight run from torpedoes which have been dropped into the sea from aircraft flying, perhaps, 50 feet above the surface at a speed of 70 to 90 miles an hour, it should not be hard to strike a motionless target with an overall length of nearly 590 feet. These torpedo attacks were duly delivered, but it is stated that the Baden had already been sunk by gunfire and was lying in shallow water, with a heavy list to starboard, when struck by the torpedoes. Our illustration shows the damaged ship lying partially submerged between Dean Tail and Dean Elbow buoys, between the mainland and the Isle of Wight. She has since been salved and patched up for further experiments.
In the absence of data as to the type of gun used in the attack, the number and character of the projectiles fired, their initial velocity, and the general conditions in which the firing took place, it .would be futile to attempt any definite inferences from this most interesting gunnery experiment. Sir E. T. d'Eyncourt has stated, however, that the Baden's thickest armor failed under an attack which British-made plates of the same thickness would have resisted. It is certainly gratifying to have this authoritative tribute to the excellence of British armor. Sir Eustace d'Eyncourt's statement corroborates the remarks made by Sir Robert Hadfield at Sheffield last month, which we reproduced in our issue of April 1st. His claim was that at Jutland our armor withstood the attacks which it was designed to defeat, and kept out the German projectiles wherever its thickness warranted that expectation. He attributed the failure of the Queen Mary's 9-inch turret armor to the concentrated effect of two and probably three armor-piercing shell, a blow approximating to 48,000 foot-tons. On the other hand, as the photographs published in The Engineer of February 20, 1920, clearly showed, the 11-inch and 12-inch belt and barbette armor of the German battle-cruisers was holed repeatedly by our projectiles. In the course of the tests made with the Baden last February her waterline belt, nearly 14 inches thick was penetrated time after time, although, as we have said, the velocity of the projectiles had been reduced to correspond with firing at considerable range.
To illustrate the formidable nature of the target attacked we may quote from Mr. S. V. Goodall's description of the Baden's armor and protective plating, given in his recent paper read before the Institution of Naval Architects. The main belt, he stated, is 13 ¾ inches thick, tapering to 6 11/16 inches at the lower edge; above this is a 9 7/8-inch belt extending to the upper deck. This citadel is enclosed by athwartship armor bulkheads, and beyond them thinner side armor is fitted which terminates at armor bulkheads. Above the upper deck and set in about 5 feet from the deck edge is the 6 11/16-inch armor of the secondary battery. The gap so formed is protected by 1 3/16-inch deck plating. The deck above this battery is from 1 3/16 inches to 1 9/16inches thick. The sloping protective deck—the middle deck amidships and aft—is 1 3/16 inches thick; abaft the citadel this deck is increased in thickness up to a maximum of 4 ¾ inches over the steering gear. Forward of the citadel the protective deck—the lower deck—is generally 2 3/8 inches thick. Barbette protection varies from 13 ¾-inch armor above the top decks to 1-inch plating at the bases of A and B turrets, and 4 ½-inch armor at the bases of X and Y turrets. Gunhouse armor is 13 ¾ inches thick at the front, 9 7/8 inches at the sides, horizontal roof 3 15/16 inches thick, and sloping roof 4 ¾-inch. The 5.9-inch casemates of the secondary battery are formed by transverse and longitudinal bulkheads of 7/8-inch plating. The fore conning tower has a maximum thickness of 13 ¾ inches with a 5 7/8-inch roof, the corresponding thicknesses for the after conning tower being 7 1/8 inches and 5 ¼ inches, respectively. Above the protective deck the coal bunkers extend practically from A to Y barbettes, and when filled with coal reinforce the protection afforded by belt and decks. A further addition to this protection is provided by the 1 3/16-inch splinter bulkhead, which is a continuation to the upper deck of the torpedo protection bulkhead. Armor gratings protecting the openings in the forecastle and protective decks are of the built-up type formed by ½-inch bars. In some of the protective deck openings a second tier of gratings with bars fore and aft is fitted immediately below the upper tier. As regards protection against torpedoes, a longitudinal bulkhead 2 inches thick, terminating on 1 3/16-inch transverse bulkheads, is fitted throughout the greater part of the length of the ship. Outside this are coal bunkers about 6 feet wide, and beyond these an air space 7 feet wide amidships and slightly less at the ends.
Whatever the shortcomings of our pre-Jutland armor-piercing projectiles may have been—and the defects attributed to them by Lord Jellicoe have been vigorously challenged by high authorities—there is not any doubt that the armor-piercing shells now used in the Royal Navy are of a most efficient type. The modifications introduced after Jutland concerned not merely the filling and the fuse, but a revision of the old proof requirements for armor-piercing shell bodies, which had become out of date. We have been assured by a leading artillery expert that the modified type of 13.5-inch armor-piercing shell now in use has great penetrating power at a given range than the 15-inch armor-piercing shell fired at Jutland, and is therefore the more destructive weapon of the two, notwithstanding that it weighs only 1400 pounds as against 1930 pounds. As the improvement extends to armor-piercing projectiles of all calibers, it goes without saying that the armament of our present-day battle fleet is incomparably more formidable than was the case a few years ago, though the ships remain the same. Before leaving this subject a word may be said about the German projectiles It had been assumed that Germany had adopted very long shell for her heavy naval guns, but this opinion turns out to be incorrect at least as regards the 15-inch gun. The pieces of this caliber in the Boden employed an armor-piercing shell 3.5 calibers long and a high-explosive shell 4.1 calibers long, the weight in both cases being 1653 pounds, of which the armor-piercing burster represented 519 pounds and the high-explosive burster 148 pounds. The German 15-inch projectile was thus nearly 300 pounds lighter than the British, and its length did not exceed that of the latter. On the other hand, the German 11-inch and 12-inch high-explosive shell had a length of approximately 4 ½ calibers. The principle of using very long projectiles is not by any means of recent date, for as far back as 1871 we find Sir Joseph Whitworth writing as follows: "I desire to make all guns capable of firing powerful shells six diameters long, using the regular charge of powder. When high velocity is required, and for long ranges, then projectiles should be from three to four diameters long." It does not appear that shell of six diameters in length have ever been fired in actual warfare though the 12-inch high-explosive "portmanteaux," loaded with "Shimose,'' with which the Japanese attacked the Russian ships Tsushima, are said to have been over 5 feet long. They tumbled badly in flight, but despite this a remarkably high percentage of hits was made, and the heavy burster caused great havoc.
Gunnery practice against ship targets has not hitherto been indulged in by the British Navy to the same extent as in foreign navies, nor when such tests were made have they invariably been rendered as instructive as they might have been. On such occasions it has been customary to select some obsolete ship and subject it to bombardment by modern ordnance without attempting to reproduce in the target the defensive qualities that would be encountered in modern armored ships. Generally, therefore, the result has been to convey an exaggerated impression of the destructive powers of the projectiles employed. This undoubtedly occurred in the cases of the Belleisle, Edinburgh, and Hero experiments. In Germany, France, and the United States a more practical value was often given to such tests by reconstructing the target to resemble in part a modern ship. Germany led the way in this direction, spending large sums yearly on the fitting out of target ships, whole squadrons of which were sometimes attacked simultaneously. The most fruitful American was that to which the San Marcos—ex Texas—was subjected in March, 1911, for the result brought about a revolution in American ideas of armor protection and led to the abandonment of armor on the topsides and its concentration on the water line, gun positions, and other vital parts. When all is said and done, however, peace experiments can never be as instructive as actual war experience. It is probable that our naval officers and constructors derived more useful information from Jutland and the Dogger Bank than they could have obtained from years of ceaseless peace experiment on a lavish scale. Whatever the object of attacking the Baden may have been, it was certainly not to stage a mere pyrotechnical display. The Admiralty may have desired to test the present type of armor-piercing shell against the thickest armor of a modern ship, to determine some unsolved question of protection, or, perhaps, to try a new piece of naval ordnance in contemplation for the battleships of the current program.
The fact that a triple mounting for heavy guns was used in the experiment is very suggestive, and while there is no definite evidence that this system of mounting is to be adopted in the new battleships, the indications certainly point that way. In common with many other innovations in naval design, we owe this system to the Italians, who first introduced it in the Dante Alighieri, laid down in 1909. By taking the bold step of disposing the main armament in triple turrets, the late Colonel Cuniberti was able to mount a battery of twelve 12-inch guns, associated with a powerful quick-firing armament, in a ship of only 19,500 tons, well protected over the vitals, with an adequate coal capacity, and possessing the remarkable speed of 23 knots. Had the conventional twin mounting been retained, it would not, he estimated, have been possible to arm the ship with more than ten 12-inch guns, and even then less weight and space would have been left over for protection, machinery, etc. So substantial a gain went far to offset the objections—real or imaginary—which had previously militated against the grouping of more than two heavy guns in one position. In the same year the triple turret was adopted by Russia for the four battleships of the Gangut class, in the designing of which Colonel Cuniberti had a large share; and in 1910 Austria followed suit by laying down the Viribus Unitis, whose twelve 12-inch guns were on triple mountings. Reports of the gunnery trials of the Dante Alighieri and Viribus Unitis were conflicting, some accounts stating that the complicated mechanism had proved fatal to rapid tire and that the deflection caused by the discharge of the side guns made accurate practice impossible. On the other hand, the Italian authorities professed themselves perfectly satisfied with the triple turret, which, they declared, was as simple to manipulate and as accurate in fire as the twin mounting. Meanwhile experiments were in progress across the Atlantic, and in 1912 it was announced that the two battleships to be laid down that year, the Oklahoma and Nevada, would have part of the main armament disposed in three-gun turrets. That these must have proved satisfactory is evident from the circumstance that all the American battleships built subsequently, excepting only the four Marylands, have their main armament mounted on the same principle. Both the deflection trouble and the tendency, when the three guns are tired simultaneously, of mutual "air wave" interference to prejudice the accurate flight of the projectiles, are said to have been overcome by discharging the right and left-hand guns together and the middle gun a fraction of a second later, the necessary interval being secured by a special device. In the earlier American mountings of this pattern the three guns are apparently mounted on a common slide and could not be elevated or depressed independently of one another; the installation, therefore, was to all intents a three-barreled gun. But in later ships this principle appears to have been discarded, for a photograph of the battleship Tennessee, published in The Engineer of May 21, 1920, distinctly showed the three 14-inch guns in each of the forward turrets at varying angles of elevation.
Turning to the question of weight, it would appear that while the Italians employed most of the weight saved by concentrating 12 guns on 4 mountings instead of 6 in increasing the power of the machinery, the Americans have preferred to utilize the margin in reinforcing the armor on the gun positions, with the result that the gross weight of two triple turrets is little, if at all, below that of three twin turrets less stoutly armored. We draw this conclusion from official American figures, according to which the weight of a 14-inch turret, containing three 14-inch 50-caliber guns, is "not far from 2500 tons, of which total, of course, the armor is the greater part." Since the weight of a British pattern turret, containing two 15-inch 45-caliber guns, with their ammunition and accessories, is understood not to exceed 1350 tons, it would seem that the weight of six American 14-inch 50-caliber guns, triple mounted, is greatly in excess of that of six British 15-inch 45-caliber guns mounted in pairs, the figures being 5000 and 4050 tons, respectively. The disparity is so great that we assume that some item or items of weight not included in the British total are contained in the American figure. Hitherto the triple mounting has been looked at askance by British naval opinion, but it may well be that the necessity of endowing our new ships with increased gun power without unduly magnifying dimensions has forced the Admiralty to accept a system which it does not view with entire favor, that case its attitude is on a par with that of Rear Admiral Twining, U. S. N.. Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, who in 1912 expressed a dislike for the triple turret, but nevertheless recommended it as the only method by which the weight needed for additional protection could be saved. Although the triple turret has yet been fitted in a British ship, 12-inch mountings of this description are believed to have been manufactured by Armstrong, Whitworth and Co. for the Italian government and a description of one such mounting, designed at Elswick was published in 1913 In this case the guns were independently elevated and depressed by hydraulic power, controlled by valves in the sighting position.
Provided that accuracy of fire and facility of working the guns are not unduly prejudiced thereby, the adoption of triple turrets for our new ships, if resolved upon, must be considered a wise step. Having decided to resume capital ship construction after a pause of five years, we find that other powers are completing and building ships which in armament and speed will far surpass the finest vessels we now possess. Our designers must therefore cast about for some expedient which will enable them to produce a new type, approximately equal in battle power to the best ships in other navies, without putting an intolerable strain on the national purse. It would be easy enough to recover our place at a bound by laying down ships of unheard-of dimensions and cost, but there are weighty reasons against such a policy. The solution must consequently be sought, not in mere size, but in technical modifications, such as a greater concentration of armament, new methods of protection, and weight-saving principles in the machinery department. If our designers and marine engineers are put upon their mettle they will, we feel confident, evolve a type of warship which need fear no comparison with foreign contemporaries of equal or greater displacement and cost The most powerful battleship now under construction is the United States Indiana type, which displaces 43,200 tons and is armed with twelve 16-inch so-caliber guns, the speed being 23 knots. It does not follow that the Admiralty will deem it prudent to put so many eggs into one basket, nor is it certain that 23-knot battleships would be the most suitable investment for the British Navy. By contenting ourselves with a battery of ten is-inch or 16-inch guns, in four turrets, with adequate but not exaggerated protection against gunfire and submerged attack, machinery and boilers designed to generate the maximum power for their weight, and—last but not least—by thoroughly reviewing the existing standards of stress to determine the feasibility of accepting lighter scantlings, we may arrive at a type of ship which, if inferior in displacement and cost to the heaviest vessels building elsewhere, will yet be admirably suited to the requirements of the naval defence of the Empire.—The Engineer, Apr. 22, 1921.
British Shell and Armor at the Battle of Jutland.—Excerpt from Speech by Sir Robert Hadfield, Bt.—It is very regrettable if the impression should have become prevalent, not only in England, but abroad also, that the British ships were inferior to those of the German Fleet.
After a careful study of the dispatches and other sources of information, one is now forced to the conclusion that the British vessels are second to none either in construction or material, as shown in the recent and very able paper, "Notes on some features of German Warship construction," by Sir Eustace T. d'Eyncourt, K. C. B., F. R. S., read before the recent session of the Institute of Naval Architects, and also a paper by Mr. S. V. Goodall, M. B. E., read at the same session, on "The Ex-German Battleship Baden."
So far as we here are concerned, the principal interest is centered in the materiel side, and Sheffield has every right to be proud of the great part it has taken in producing machinery, guns, armor, and projectiles required for the fleet, which have proved to be entirely adequate for their respective duties within the scope of their design.
The calamity, almost incredible in its swiftness and completeness, which overtook three of our armored cruisers appears to have led to a belief in the super-excellence of the German armor piercing shell, and the public has attributed the sinking of these three ships to the inferiority of their armor.
In considering the protection provided for our vessels, it is difficult to avoid entering the field of design, and, if this side is omitted, it is not possible to form a just appreciation of the value of the armor plates fitted in the British ships.
The distribution of the armor has a very marked influence upon its value, and for a given weight above the minimum necessary its increased value as "protection" is out of all proportion to the increase of the weight.
The German battleships of the Kaiser class built in 191 1 were armored to the extent of 35 per cent of the total displacement, while similar British ships, the Orion class, had but 29 per cent. The Seydlitz, built in 1912, carried 31 per cent, against the ships of the Lion and Queen Mary class of the same date, 23 per cent.
Thus, while there is an important difference between the percentage weights of armor worn by the opposing vessels, these figures give but an inadequate idea of its actual protectional value.
It is common knowledge that the German Fleet was never intended to seek its enemy in foreign waters, while our fleet sacrificed armor in order to carry fuel sufficient to fight an action wherever the enemy might be found, and in addition to this our designers were under the added and important restrictions imposed by the lack of capacity in the available dock accommodation.
It is, however, a fact that British armor withstood the attacks which it was designed to defeat, and kept out the German projectiles wherever its thickness warranted this expectation.
The 9-inch armor on the Queen Mary's turret failed under the concentrated effect of two, and probably three, armor-piercing shell fired by the Derfflinger, a blow approximating to 48,000 foot tons; the Indefatigable succumbing to two blows approximating to 32,400 foot tons from the 11-inch guns of the Von-der-Tann, delivered in quick succession, one taking effect in the vicinity of the after-turret, the second striking the 7-inch armor immediately under the fore-turret.
Later in the day a 7-inch turret in the Invincible was struck by a salvo of three or four shells from the 12-inch guns of the Derfflinger.
The Queen Mary was only in action 32 minutes; the Indefatigable 15 minutes, and the Invincible 12 minutes. In each case the ship sank due to the explosion of the magazine below.
The 11-inch and 12-inch belt armor of the German battle cruisers was perforated repeatedly, and it was due to their armored decks and to their very adequate sub-division into watertight compartments more than to their heavy belt armor that four of them managed to struggle back to port, there to remain under repair for some five or six months.
My firm are particularly interested in the matter of the performance of the armor-piercing shell of the fleet, and now that the imposition of silence has passed I feel one may be permitted to speak upon a matter which so nearly concerns ourselves.
The impression created by the statements in Lord Jellicoe's book was as fortunate as it was unintentional. A close examination of the actual phrases used discloses the fact that there was no imputation against the metallurgical properties and treatment of the shell body as an armor piercer, and, indeed, where the shell functioned properly as a whole, the turret, side, and deck armor of the German ships was repeatedly perforated; and this not with salvos, but by shell falling singly.
Photographs published in the Engineer, February 20, 1920, show the excellent effects obtained.
That Lord Jellicoe, on his appointment as First Sea Lord, assembled a committee to consider the whole subject of the performance of the British projectiles is a matter for congratulation.
As a result of their deliberations, it became immediately evident that not only the explosive, the method of filling, and fuse then in use, demanded improvement, but also that the old proof requirements for the armor-piercing shell bodies were out of date.
The Admiralty therefore presented to the armor-piercing shell manufacturers the problem of the attack of armor at an angle to its face, and Lord Jellicoe, in his later book, "The Crisis of the Naval War," records his appreciation of the work done in the following words:
"The greatest credit was due to the Ordnance Department and to our enterprising manufacturers for the feat which they achieved."
Fortunately, my firm, amongst others no doubt, had already travelled some distance along that path, but the conditions asked for were far more severe than any that had been hitherto seriously considered by the authorities and technical experts of any of the great naval powers.
It is impossible to convey in a few words the many technical difficulties met with in solving the problem, but it is sufficient to say that they involve a complete revolution in armor-piercing projectile manufacture, not only metallurgically, but in design also; and the whole problem had to be worked out with the least possible delay, and under war conditions of labor.
Although in the case of my own firm we had previously accomplished a great deal, as official records, if consulted, would show, the final solution of the problem occupied several months of research and experiments, but by then success at proof tests was more or less established, and, as stated by Lord Jellicoe, within twelve months the fleet was equipped with armor-piercing shell of this new type.
Since that time further improvements have been introduced, and the work of investigation and research still progresses. We may here remark that some wonderful results have been obtained.
It must not be supposed that the total expenditure of ammunition at Jutland consisted exclusively or armor-piercing projectiles. The choice lies largely in the hands of the Captain and gunnery officer of the ship, and is governed by the description of the target, the range, and the visibility.
The British fired rather less than 50 per cent of armor piercers, and when the diversity of the targets (enemy ships) is remembered, this is not surprising. It would be as wrong to fire armor-piercing shell at a destroyer or light cruiser as it would be to fire high-explosive shell at an armored battleship, and the lack of visibility no doubt militated against a larger proportion of armor piercers being used.
Commander Von Hase remarks that while he in the Derfflinger used only armor-piercing projectiles, the gunnery officer of the Lutzow used high-explosive exclusively against the Lion, and this explains the outbreak of fires which occurred in that ship during the early part of the action.
There is no official record of the number of hits obtained by heavy shell, but from other sources we may by selection arrive at a useful comparison of the relative efficiency of the British and German projectiles.
The Princess Royal was hit nine times, probably all 12-inch armor-piercing shell, and remained in action with one turret disabled.
The Derfflinger, hit by seven heavy shell of 13.5-inch or 15-inch caliber, probably all armor-piercing projectiles, remained in the line, but with her two after-turrets wrecked, a third partially disabled, and only one turret left in effective condition.
The Warspite received 27 hits by heavy German shell, and after the action steamed across the North Sea at full speed.
The Konig, having only 15 hits, arrived with difficulty at Hamburg with four of her forward compartments flooded, and her forecastle only six feet above water. The ship was so damaged as to be hors de combat.
It would be unfair to attribute the sinking of the three British battle cruisers to the armor-piercing qualities alone of the German projectiles. It should, too, be borne in mind that the armor on these particular ships was comparatively thin. That the turret armor of these three ships was perforated there is no doubt, but this result seems to have been attained by the weight of the combined blow of several shell striking more or less together, and not to the armor-piercing effect of single shell.
The immediate cause of their loss was the explosion of their magazines and this might equally well have been the fate of the Lion whose turret armor was perforated, and also the Derfflinger, whose two after-turrets were wrecked by British armor-piercing shell.
None of the British armored ships were sunk as the direct effect of gun attack, while two German ships, the Lutzow and Seydlitz, actually suffered this fate. The former ship was finished off with a German torpedo to hasten her end, while the latter was run ashore to prevent her sinking in deep water.
We thus arrive at the conclusion that any impression of German superiority in material is unwarranted.
Having had the exceptional opportunity of examining in a most exhaustive manner modern German (Krupp) armor-piercing shell, and also been in possession of comparative results of plate tests of contemporary German and British armor piercers, it can be confidently asserted that at the time of the Battle of Jutland the British ships were armed with a better projectile.
Shell of the improved type, now forming the armament of our ships, are not only far more efficient than the older type, but are well in advance of anything yet produced by other countries.
From the statements of our First Sea Lord, and also the Report of the United States Board of Admiralty (1920), it is clear that we must in no way relax our efforts of research and development in this direction. Both emphasize the fact that the battleship is still the main power of the fleet. The words of the United States Admiralty Report sums up the matter thus:
"Nothing that occurred during the World War has served to change the opinion of the General Board as to the vital importance in war of the battleship, the ship that can at once give and take heavy blows."
During history our fleet has progressed along strictly evolutionary lines, and it is only by following this precedent that we can maintain our supremacy.
With the lessons of Jutland before them, the Admiralty have stated their intention of continuing the development of the capital ship, and no one who has made a study of the true facts can question the correctness of their decision.
There is no reason why this policy should deprive the submarine and aircraft school of their right and proper opportunities for development.
The era of armor and armor-piercing shell has by no means passed, and there is no sign of relaxation in the world's effort towards the improvement of these essential factors.
The Operation of Heavy Armored Turrets.—After discussing the advantages of the several methods in use for manipulating armored turrets and their internal mechanism, whether hydraulically, electrically, or by compressed air, the author comes to the conclusion that the power supplied should be electric, and should be led in by movable pivoting leads. Training is best performed by electricity, while the elevating, loading and breech mechanism is best operated hydraulically, and he gives considerations which should govern the choice of the type of drive most suitable to the other operations.
The hydraulic power required in the turret should be generated in the moving turret itself, by using electric pumps, having standard parts which can be replaced and repaired on board the ship.
Whether any alterations will be required in the elevating gear in turrets adapted to director-work remains to be seen; for at present the use of hydraulic power developed in the turret by electric means has not been put to test (Oberregierunzsbaurat Methling. Schiffban, Oct. 20. 1920.)—The Technical Review, Mar. 29, 1921.
RADIO
Gunnery and Torpedo-Planing.—Sir: As an American of English descent, a former member of the Naval Consulting Board, and a man interested from boyhood in navies and in everything pertaining to the sea, I have always been an intense admirer of the British Navy. I have been especially an admirer of the work of the late Lord Fisher—whom we regard as one of the great figures of naval history—in mechanizing British sea power, and of the strides made by the British Navy, under the leadership of Admiral Sir Percy Scott, R. N., in speed and accuracy of gun fire, since the latter's first memorable performance in H. M. S. Scylla in 1899, both in using individual naval telescope sights on gun mounts and with the director system.
As one of the pioneers of the aeronautical movement, and a governor of the Aero Club of America for many years, I have been profoundly impressed by the British Navy's skilful development of the torpedo-plane since 1913; and I believe that great good will result from the controversy now going forward in your country and ours over the effect the torpedo will have on the capital ship.
But, while having the utmost respect for the superb performance of the British Navy, I cannot square with the spirit of fair play, for which the British officer is beloved the world over, the fact that British naval officers, in discussing their achievements in gunnery and torpedo-planing, have continually refrained from mentioning the truth that they owe the naval telescope sight, the director system, and the torpedo-plane to an American naval officer, the present Rear-Admiral Bradley A. Fiske.
Admiral Fiske—then Lieutenant Fiske—took out the basic patents for the naval telescope sight and the director system in 1890. Both were described on page 506 of London Engineering on April 24, 1891, and in La Revue d'Artillerie on March 12, 1892, as well as in such newspapers as the New York Times, and many naval and scientific periodicals on many occasions. Furthermore, the fact was later published broadcast, that on September 22, 1892, on board the U. S. S. Yorktown, in Behring Sea, Lieutenant Fiske, using his telescope sight, made a record at target practice with a six-inch gun that was wholly unprecedented. This subject was elucidated at great length by Lieutenant Fiske in an article that was published in the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings in June, 1896.
Moreover, it was perfectly well known by all the navies that the U. S. Navy adopted the telescope sight shortly after Lieutenant Fiske's demonstration in 1892, and that it was used in the U. S. S. Olympia at the battle of Manila Bay on May 1, 1898, and in all the American battleships at the battle of Santiago on July 3, 1898. Still, the British Navy date the improvement of modern naval gunnery from the performance of H. M. S. Scylla, in 1899, and attribute the invention of the naval telescope sight and the director system to Sir Percy Scott.
I cannot but find the British Navy similarly remiss in regard to the torpedo-plane, for the torpedo-plane was patented by Admiral Fiske on July 16, 1912; and the fact was widely published, and with full illustrations and description, during the remaining months of 1912 and the early part of 1913. The British and Italians began experiments with it in 1913. In 191 5 certain Turkish craft—I think four—were sunk by a British torpedo-plane in the Sea of Marmora, and in 1917, I believe, the Germans sank two British steamers in the North Sea. Since then all the great navies have been at work developing it; but so far as I have been able to ascertain, they have not only followed the general plan described in Fiske's original patent, but have adhered almost exactly to the mechanical apparatus described in his patent, even to its details. Nevertheless, Mr. Bywater, in your issue of February 16, 1921, refers to Fiske merely as the first to advocate air torpedo work in the United States.
All of the facts that I narrate can easily be verified by reference to the United States Patent-Office, and to leading newspapers and other periodicals printed in the English, French, German, Spanish, Russian, and Japanese languages, and to Fiske's autobiography, which has been on sale in England for more than a year.
Surely it cannot be the intention of the British Navy to claim credit it does not deserve, not to withhold from a distinguished officer in a sister navy the credit to which he is entitled for useful achievement.
In closing, please permit me to express my appreciation of the fairness and good feeling which you invariably display in treating American subjects. Your attitude has won you the confidence and respect of your American readers.—Respectfully,
Henry A. Wise Wood.
—The Naval and Military Record, Mar. 30, 1921.
Who Invented Torpedo-Planes?—We published in our issue of March 30 a letter from Mr. Henry A. Wise Wood, of New York, who entered a courteous protest against the presumption, general on this side, that the naval telescope sight, the director system, and the torpedo-plane were British inventions, when the fact is, he declared, that we owe all these things to an American naval officer, the present Rear-Admiral Bradley A. Fiske. We forwarded Mr. Wood's letter to Admiral Sir Percy Scott, and invited him to comment upon it, but, being at present away from his books of reference, he has been unable to favor us with a detailed reply. However, he informs us that when he was commander of the Edinburgh in (he thinks) 1897, telescope sights had been in use on turrets for some time, but "possibly Admiral Fiske was the inventor." We believe that Admiral Fiske was, in fact, first in the field with this device, which made accurate shooting possible at long range and certainly the evidence which Mr. Wood adduces on this head seems overwhelming.
We have also read that Admiral Fiske evolved an effective system of director firing many years ago, but we do not know whether this system was fundamentally the same as that which Sir Percy Scott perfected, or whether its introduction into the United States Navy ante-dated the adoption of the Scott director by the British Navy As regards torpedo-planing, we are aware that Admiral Fiske has been for some years a strong advocate of this weapon, and we accept Mr. Wood's statement that the Admiral was the pioneer of air torpedo tactics. So far as we are concerned, the last thing we desire is "to withhold from a distinguished officer in a sister navy the credit to which he is entitled for useful achievement.'' Admiral Fiske, we would add, is widely known and esteemed in British naval circles both as a sea officer of the very best type and as a man of brilliant inventive genius. We remember him, also, as having publicly defended the policy of the British Admiralty towards the U-boat menace at a time when that policy was being subjected to criticism by other American officers who were not conversant with the peculiar conditions of warfare in the North Sea.—The Naval and Military Record, Apr. 20, 1921.