DISCUSSION
Promotion in the Navy
(See Page 7, Whole No. 215)
Commander R. A. Koch, U. S. Navy.—Lieut. Commander Vossler has outlined briefly the three systems of promotion which have been tried in the navy and recommends a fourth as a combination system. Commander Foote states there are only three distinct methods and agrees with Lieut. Commander Vossler. (It is true that any method may be classed in one of these three methods, but there are many methods of application.) Commander Barker states the simple fact that in any scheme a large number of useful officers will be transferred to the retired list or a hump will result and that Lieut. Commander Vossler accepts the hump. (The prevention of the hump has been the reason back of all proposed systems.)
The three systems which have been tried are condemned. The system suggested by Lieut. Commander Vossler is by far the worst system that has yet been suggested as it does not relieve the hump and puts the mass of officers in a position where promotion to higher grades is out of the question, it would tend to kill initiative, energy, mutual confidence, team work, esprit de corps and would lower the general average ability.
The Navy Requirements for maximum efficiency are:
(1) High average ability.
(2) Promotion to the various grades at a suitable age to get all out of an officer there is in him.
(3) Selection to duty and assignment in accordance with special qualifications.
(4) Esprit de corps, team work, initiative, mutual confidence.
The navy now has the first requirement. In order to have the second requirement, there must be elimination, which will aid progressively the attainment of the first requirement. The third requirement is now within the power of the navy and is used to a greater or less extent; however, the navy being under-officered, availability must be given too much weight in assignments to duty. The fourth requirement is the most important and can never be obtained by any process of hurdling or rehurdling, where jealousies must enter and where officers will be tempted, in order to reach higher grades quickly or to prevent themselves from being hurdled by juniors, to use such methods as self-advertisement or to assume all credit for success obtained in any activity, although this success may be obtained in great part by the initiative and efficient work of subordinates. In order for the navy to keep both the second and fourth requirements, it is necessary that officers go up or out. Those who go up will have at least slightly higher average ability than those who do not and will contain the stars required in the various activities, who will by the operation of (3) be in positions such as Chief of Staff or positions without title where their ability is felt, or in minor commands, but they will not function as stars of the first magnitude until they reach the proper age; this preliminary work will only test and increase their powers, give them increasing responsibility and prepare them for their final role.
The plan to carry out the above is in no sense original and is no doubt now in the files of the Navy Department worked out in detail by the late Admiral John Hood, who was a captain on duty in the General Board in 1912 when he had the task of preparing a plan for promotion. He had available all data and suggestions and had the necessary assistance. Promotion by lot to various grades to eliminate the hump had even been suggested. His plan was given little consideration due to the fact that a plan was required that would increase efficiency with no increase in cost. Captain Hood, however, made use of retired officers as will be briefly outlined, and he also pointed out that officers with 14 years' service would be the best nucleus of a reserve force that could be obtained. The additional expense of this limited number of retired officers would be a small item of the expense of a Naval Reserve Force now generally recognized as a necessity.
Brief Outline of Captain Hood's Method of Promotion
A certain number of officers graduate from the Naval Academy. The number of graduates to be commissioned may later be reduced when the navy has its authorized officer complement. Warrant officers commissioned with a class will for promotion purposes be considered as a part of that class. Three years after graduation this class is due for promotion to lieutenant (j. g.) and six years after graduation to lieutenant. Fourteen years after graduation this class comes up for lieut. commander.
Selection here enters after 14 years' service, in which time all officers have had an opportunity to develop. The average loss up to this time resulting from death, court-martial, resignation, and failure to pass examinations was given in the original plan. Of those remaining in the class, a certain number or percentage are selected to fill the lieut. commander grade (there was, I believe, some slight elasticity in the number of this grade), the remainder will automatically retire on three-quarters pay. The term selection is used instead of elimination as the attitude of the board should be that of selection. Officers might be selected for initiative shown, work accomplished, and responsibility assumed, whereas, if ordered to pluck, a board might be on the defensive in its actions and these same officers might be plucked; letters of censure or failures recorded serving as a reason or excuse. It was not claimed that the best would always be selected up any more than it can be claimed that class standing indicates accurately the true knowledge obtained at the Naval Academy but it approaches service standing as Naval Academy standing approaches academic standing.
This process is continued in each grade after a definite number of years' service in grade. This one class can be followed through to the rear admiral grade where probably only about two are selected. The average age of reaching the grade of rear admiral was, I believe, 55. There was no penalty for entering the Naval Academy a year or two above the average age except that if selected to rear admiral it would be at an age of 56 or 57, instead of 55. This is a survival of the fittest with a vengeance but there is no hurdling or re-hurdling and no stigma or hardship attached, but as an asset a wonderful reserve nucleus is created.
Use Made of Retired Officers Other Than in the Reserve Force
Captain Hood outlined certain shore duties that might be assigned to retired officers upon their request. This included recruiting stations, hydrographic offices, navy yards, and many important duties; supervision over all activities was, however, left in the hands of active officers. By this method, the number of officers could be increased at under officered stations and many active officers could be released for other duty. A retired officer would perform active duty on shore only and only at his own request, the incentive for a retired officer to ask for this duty would be his interest in the duty and its permanency, he could have a regular home of his own which would greatly decrease expenses and he would be allowed to take short cruises to keep in touch with the navy afloat. At the end of about 20 years it was estimated that all duty to which retired officers might be ordered would be filled by them, and the question of shore duty for active officers would present itself. Captain Hood approved of definite tours of shore duty for active officers and pointed out that there were many billets on shore open only to active officers and further pointed out that there is no limit to postgraduate courses for junior officers or war college courses for senior officers and that it would be practically impossible to give officers sufficient postgraduate and war college work unless a large per cent of shore billets were taken by retired officers.
I have not gone into details but as near as I can remember the above was Captain Hood's plan which was worked out in minute detail and is no doubt available and is as applicable now as when written. This plan was probably the most carefully worked out of any plan ever suggested. Its only criticism being that it would cost more money than some other plans but as previously stated this excess of retired officers would form a small part of the present reserve force which of necessity must be expensive, but is recognized now as essential.
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Naval Aviation and a United Air Service
(See Page 307, Whole No. 217)
Captain Ralph Earle, U. S. Navy.—The placing of all aviation under the misleading and catch word title of a united air service has been for some time and still is a very seriously discussed measure. Such a proposed organization would actually instead of uniting anything rob the army and navy of a very vital part of their power by adding a new and independent force to our fighting arms with all the multitudinous interferences and complexities involved thereby. Such procedure is akin to robbing a person of the use of one arm by having its movements controlled by a brain over which he had no authority. Instead of unity of action there would result in every conceivable operation dual control. A military or naval undertaking cannot succeed save only under one commander.
I wish that all those who may have the responsibility for deciding finally whether or not the United States should have a united air force would place themselves, prior to making such a weighty decision as an orientation point from which to consider the various arguments pro and con, in the dark days of late March, 1918, when the great offensive of the German Army began on the 50 mile front from Arras to La Fere. Can they believe that divided control of the Allied forces would ever have beaten that host? Not until some time after Marshal Foch was chosen as the Allied Commander-in-Chief under date of April 3d did the checking of the German onrush become a fact, and the counter offensive begin that October 1st caused German leaders to make frantic efforts for an armistice; and who believes to-day, but what that, if it had not been for the unity of command so fortunately decided upon, the result of the war' would have been far less satisfactory to us. This unity of command included control of all the air forces operating with the armies.
A united—What a clever way of spelling divided!—air force? By all means. No, never. Remember the lessons of those dark days. Unity of military command, and in that command, unity of action are clearly indicated and must be conserved. An air force that cannot operate with, or in other words is not an integral part of either an army or a navy is not worth while possessing. Before a force can be a unit, the members thereof all must be truly a part of it in doctrine, training, and understanding. The captain of a battleship must know his gunnery officers and their capabilities as developed by association with him if he would shoot accurately, similarly he needs to have his aviators be they scouts or spotters or torpedo plane pilots or what not speaking his language and so each carrying out his mission to the full. It must be apparent to all that the pilot of a seaplane or plane scouting for the navy who is not a seaman, and thus understanding naval tactics and the uses of types of sea forces, is of little real value to the commander at sea.
I do not believe that one can truthfully say that the formation in Great Britain of a united—i.e., the Royal—air force has been a success, or that it ever was a success even though all of us will cheerfully admit that Sir William Weir, its first head, was an exceptionally capable man. The formation of this force led to many promotions in rank but hardly to advancement in efficiency of the air services. In fact progress seemed to stop then and there. We recollect that almost immediately after formation of the Royal Air Force in 1918 the British Navy was compelled to organize a separate navy air force in order to be enabled to carry out operations in the Dunkirk area. Then again did not their navy have to operate lighter-than-air craft at that period and independently of this main organization? Surely these facts indicate something amiss with united control of air forces.
The fallacy of the argument so often used that it would be economical and for the best of military and naval interests to combine the production of machines under one organization is exceedingly well brought out by Captain Craven. Seaplanes and land planes are certainly dissimilar and becoming more so as time goes on. So different are they that one cannot conceive of one organization producing all types efficiently. A big organization is too unwieldy. All such are hard to start, and at the same time, once started are difficult to stop even though headed straight towards dire disaster, such is their momentum. Overhead costs then become enormous, conferences and counter conferences, orders and disorders become the rule of the day. No sailor knows all about the soldier's job and the converse is true. Entire amalgation is beyond the realms of possibility.
There is a tendency to misread certain arguments or statements usually critical of the lack of progress made along certain lines by attributing such to navy—or army—conservatism. Difficulties are encountered in all development, but to attempt to overcome them in a manner akin to that of increasing the number of inexperienced cooks engaged in making a broth which all admit doesn't help the broth at all, is most illogical. A united air service will multiply the men, civilian office holders and others, necessary to get results by hundreds, and, as they will try to cooperate by conferring with sailors or soldiers, the number of the latter also must be increased to permit such procedure. No economy in such methods!
An unbiased thinker surely must agree with Rear Admiral Adair when he remarks in his strictures on the operations of the Royal Air Force in the House of Commons, December 10, 1919, after reciting its many shortcomings—"I would go so far as to say this, that, had the progress of the Naval Air Service been left to the hands of the Navy, the German Fleet might have been destroyed in Wilhelmshaven long before the armistice. That is rather a severe charge to make, but I think it is one that is justifiable." In other words a third arm, that can never appreciate the conditions peculiar to the other two, is and must always be an obstacle to progress. The navy must control the surface of the sea, all the waters below and the skies above. This conception of course is not new, it is what I believe the navy has always stood for, and should continue to insist upon. Possibly a sailor should not speak of the army and its aircraft as he cannot be supposed to be as competent to manage such, as are army officers, nor does he have to; as, fortunately both General Pershing and Field Marshal Haig have given views upon the undesirability of a united air service in language and positiveness that leave nothing to be desired. Their views are made available to us in Captain Craven's article and merit all consideration.
We now have no cabinet post for the commissioner of automobiles to take care of those machines operated by civilians, nor do we need a cabinet officer to care for such aircraft as may be privately owned and operated. Their proper control will come coincidently with their use.
Statements as to lack of progress are usually too vague and so unfair as to hardly merit answering in detail. Despite all critics there has been great progress in all branches of aviation; far greater than advocates of a united air service are willing to admit and which the services themselves cannot in reason disclose or give publicity.
The last paragraph of Captain Craven's article is indeed expressive and sums up the situation tersely and should be read by those who may eventually decide the great question at issue. By observance of its precepts and by the emphatic rejection of a united air service great saving in expenditures and real progress and actual leadership in the air will be our country's portion.
Lieut. Commander W. A. Edwards, U. S. Navy.—Captain Craven, in his admirable article, "Naval Aviation and a United Air Service," hits the nail squarely on the head when, in conclusion, he states that:
"In view of the definite opinions publicly expressed by leaders in the great struggle of the recent past, it is obvious that advocates of the United Air Service, if acquainted with actual conditions and requirements, are basing their arguments in favor of such an organization on other than military grounds."
If these advocates of a United Air Service are not acquainted with "actual conditions and requirements," then their testimony is of no value, and they should be disqualified and eliminated forthwith as incompetent witnesses.
If, however, they are familiar with "actual conditions and requirements," it is perfectly obvious, as Captain Craven tritely remarks, that they are basing their arguments on other than military grounds.
Can it be possible that the dazzling rays from the "brass hats" contemplated in the proposal to create a United Air Service, consisting of a secretary, an assistant secretary, 1 major general, 15 brigadier generals, 165 colonels, 300 lieutenant colonels, 605 majors and 3850 officers of the lower grades, have so blinded these advocates of a separate service that they cannot see the unsoundness of their arguments from the point of view of the efficiency of the battle fleet?
We are constantly reminded by those who favor amalgamation of the fact that Great Britain amalgamated her two air services during the war with unqualified success and that, therefore, we would be well advised to do likewise. It is, of course, quite true that Great Britain did amalgamate, but with what measure of success still remains to be seen. Captain Craven remarks in this connection: "Rumor has it that all is not plain sailing," etc. We are not concerned for the moment, however, with the success or the failure of the British problem, for the fact remains that Great Britain was fully justified in taking this step when she did for a great many very excellent reasons, none of which, however, apply in the remotest degree to us. In the first place, the fusion of the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps into the Royal Air Force was not effected until April, 1918; or, in other words, and this is the meat of the argument, not until after the German High Seas Fleet had been contained, and not until after the submarine menace was overcome to such an extent that the world's output of shipping exceeded the destruction occasioned by the submarine menace. The production and destruction curves crossed in March, 1918. In other words, the situation at sea was well in hand by the time this fusion took place, and, although the naval war had not been won, the navy had already accomplished its primary mission and the freedom of the seas was assured to the Allied cause.
Now, what was the strategical situation on land at that time—April 1, 1918?
Admittedly, it was far from being satisfactory, and I do not think that it is any exaggeration to say that it was critical. What, therefore, could have been more natural, more imperatively logical, than the action taken by Great Britain in reinforcing her hard-pressed armies on the various fronts, with the supernumeraries of her naval strength—the Royal Naval Air Service? The situation was critical. The immediate mission was to win the war at all costs and with a disregard of post-war or any other consequences; and the most expedient way was by amalgamating the two services.
This international emergency situation is paralleled on a minor scale by that of our own Northern Bombing Group with reference to which the Commander of the U. S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters estimated as follows, in the early fall of 1918:
"Enemy have evacuated naval bases in Flanders; the mission for which the U.S. Naval Northern Bombing Group was organized is therefore accomplished.
"The proposition of employing this unit in Italy has been actively under way for some time, but several months must elapse before operations there can begin.
"Consideration has also been given to the project of continuously bombing enemy naval bases in the Heligoland Bight, but for this purpose planes of greater radius and greater carrying capacity than are at present available must be built and equipped. A considerable interval of time must be allowed before this can be effected.
"The personnel necessary for the above-mentioned undertakings has after six months of unremitting labor, been obtained and organized into an operating unit, which, if disbanded at this time, would be most exceedingly difficult to reconstruct. In the present emergency, therefore, which is felt by everyone to mark the crisis of the war, it is most urgently represented that it is the duty of the Navy Department, in consideration of the foregoing, to depart from the principle laid down that navy personnel should only be used against purely naval objectives and that the services of the U S. Naval Northern Bombing Group be offered to the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces, to assist in hastening the victory which is impending.
"It is moreover definitely determined in the event of the above change of objective being agreed to by the department that preparations shall continue unremittingly, (a) to prepare an offensive operation against enemy naval bases in the Adriatic; (b) to prepare an offensive against the German North Sea coast, either with more powerful machines, or, in the event of a military situation, allowing of a nearer approach to Germany with the present types of machines. As soon as the preparations for either of the above objectives permit, the U. S. Naval Northern Bombing Group shall at once be withdrawn from army work and returned to naval work."
If this constitutes a sound argument for the permanent amalgamation of our air forces, then there exists an equally sound argument for the amalgamation of the army and the navy into a United Defense Service.
The fundamentally basic principle of warfare is that unity of command is essential to success; conversely, divided control spells disaster.
There can be absolutely no doubt that, in the next war, the Fleet Air Force will be just as much an integral part of the fleet as the submarine force or the destroyer force, if not, indeed, more so. As such, it must remain under the control of the commander-in-chief not only during battle, but during the pre-war period of preparation for hostilities.
In commenting upon the Royal Air Force in "The Crisis of the Naval War," Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Jellicoe, asks these questions:
"With the air service under separate control, financially as well as in an executive and administrative sense, is it certain that the Admiralty will be able to obtain machines and the personnel in the necessary numbers to carry out all the experimental and training work that is essential for efficiency in action? Is it also beyond doubt that unity of command at sea, which is essential to victory, will be preserved?"
Let us apply these exceedingly pertinent questions to our own situation and look at the problem from this point of view.
What is the answer?
The answer is no.
Chief Constructor D. W. Taylor.—The question of a United Air Service, or as I think it should preferably be called, an Independent Air Service, has been a good deal discussed in the last year or so, and apparently the discussion is going to continue. The matter is one of primary importance, affecting the national safety, and an incorrect decision in the next year or so will do harm which will take years to overcome.
Questions of material in this connection are, it seems to me, though serious, of minor importance compared with some fundamental questions involved.
I have heard a good deal about the alleged excessive overhead due to separate services; but the advocates of an Independent Air Service make no mention of the obvious fact that the expense of the necessary liaison between an Independent Air Service and the army and navy would be much greater than any possible reduction of overhead by amalgamation. The mere fact that army and navy machines both fly does not mean that they should be identical. Captain Craven makes this very clear. The fact is that the general situation as regards material is very fairly comparable to the ordnance situation in the army and navy.
Apart from material matters, there are at least two fundamental objections to an Independent Air Service based upon human nature—a thing which changes very slightly if at all from generation to generation. Suppose we had an Independent Air Service handling all aviation. That air service, being manned by humans, would naturally and inevitably concentrate upon the offensive side. It would deceive itself and deceive the country as to its offensive capabilities. Only by exaggeration in this respect could it get money from Congress in competition with the army and navy. From the naval point of view, while the offensive is of major importance, adequate defense in the air against the enemy's offensive is also essential. Until human nature has changed, the navy would have no such defense at its service with an Independent Air Service and would be at a most serious disadvantage in dealing with a navy which had a properly balanced air service branch.
Another fundamental objection of the same kind to an Independent Air Service is touched on by the author. History has shown that combined operations of the army and navy have always been carried on with greater difficulty and less efficiency than independent operations of either arm. Of course it is easy to say that this should not be so, but it has been so in the past, and will continue to be so until human nature manifests itself differently from its manifestations in the past. Now with an Independent Air Service, every operation of the army and navy in war will be a combined operation so far as we can estimate at present. At least this will necessarily be the case if aviation develops as we all believe. The resulting inefficiency inevitable in combined operations would be a most serious handicap upon both the army and the navy. Almost certainly the result of an Independent Air Service would be in time that we would consolidate army, navy and air service under one head—a Minister of Defense. We should then be exactly where we were in 1789, when the Secretary of War (not Secretary of the Army) controlled both army and navy. This arrangement lasted nine years, and during this period there was much criticism of the administration of naval affairs. Early in 1798 an investigating committee of Congress reported that apparently enormous expenses and unaccountable delays had attended the naval administration of the War Department. So the Act of April 30, 1798, established the Navy Department.
If we establish an Independent Air Service, the next step will be a Minister of Defense. Then, after the same troubles as from 1789 to 1798, we will again divide into the army and navy. In my opinion the ultimate result of an Independent Air Service would be that in from 3 to 15 years after its establishment we would have again the same organization as to-day.
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The Fate of the Dreadnought
(See Page 191, Whole No. 216)
Lieutenant F. S. Low, U. S. Navy.—In the article, "The Fate of the Dreadnought," published in the February Proceedings, it seems indeed very fortunate that the authors did not permit their assumptions concerning the characteristics of various types of ships to lead to any definite conclusion as to the course that will be followed by naval architects. This statement is made because it appears that many of their suppositions and statements of fact are not only at variance with accepted practice but also with every theory we have derived from research and experience. The discussion is based upon such faulty premises that were not these errors pointed out, many readers not only might, but undoubtedly would, receive an extremely misleading conception of fundamentals which have to do with the construction and operation of submarines.
The distinction drawn by the authors between a submarine and a submersible is no longer acceptable. To quote Monsieur Laubeuf the originator of the submersible. (Le Yacht, Janvier, 1910.)
"The difference consists in the form, the method of construction and the buoyancy. The pure submarine has circular cross-sections and a hull in the form of a cigar; the ballast tanks in the interior of this hull and reserve buoyancy is small.
"On the other hand, the submersible has a form which approaches that of an ordinary ship and the cross sections are not circular; it possesses a double hull in whole or in part, the ballast tanks being formed by the space between the two hulls. The reserve buoyancy is great."
As a matter of fact, due to the great strides made in submarine construction in recent years and to the application to one type of ship of so many qualities which formerly were thought of as a distinct feature either of the submarine or submersible, the time has arrived when all vessels that are capable of travelling beneath the water are classed generically as submarines.
In the article under discussion it is stated that the contemplated submersible battle cruiser would have little or no armor, "because, while on the surface she would lie awash, or nearly so, and would not need it." How, by any stretch of the imagination, can cause and effect be so related? If we construct such a battle cruiser and equip her with heavy guns, we presumably except her to fight them, and our estimate must be very low indeed, both of the destructive effect of a heavy caliber shell on the unarmored deck of a submarine and of the fire control efficiency of any probable adversary, if we are to assume the untenable premise that a submarine cannot be hit and the equally fallacious corollary that if a hit is made, only minor damage will result therefrom. The life of a submarine is generally, and quite properly, reckoned as one hit from any caliber gun. The most enthusiastic advocate of the submarine will hardly deny that at least one good, solid, major caliber hit can be inflicted by capital ships on a submarine at battle ranges; this, in spite of the inherent advantages possessed by the submarine in her low visibility and the small area of her exposed, above water surface. In other words, if we are to construct a submarine capable of joining in a gun duel with a capital ship, we cannot rightfully assume that the submarine will be impervious to shell fire. It may be difficult to hit her, but she will be hit and while one shot may not result in sinking; it is very probable that diving ability will either be seriously interfered with or entirely destroyed. Then she will be at the mercy of the enemy.
It must also be borne in mind that no matter what type of construction we apply to our submarine, she will always be more or less of a poor, low and wet, gun platform and will provide only limited fire control facilities; for once the compromise between surface craft and submarine is permitted to swing too far in favor of the many desirable surface qualities, the value of the submarine as such, is decreased in proportion as the surface efficiency is enhanced. We cannot have high surface and submerged efficiency in a submarine any more than we can have both the heaviest armor and armament in a dreadnought. The balance must be struck.
In one part of the article, speaking of the submarine battle cruiser, the statement is made that "it is easy to imagine such a vessel acting as a destroyer, making and repelling torpedo attacks and carrying out screening operation," and a few pages following, in speaking of the same type of ship, we read the remarkable and contradictory statement, "If it tried to operate on the surface as a destroyer, it would lack the destroyers' speed and flexibility." Pursuing this course of reasoning and accepting the latter statement, it appears that a severe strain might be placed upon the imagination and the success of the venture even put in jeopardy, if we are to acknowledge, without comment, the truth of the first assertion. In our entire consideration of the submarine battle cruiser it is well to remember that while the theorists' conception of a submarine may be a vessel capable of almost instantaneous transition from surface to submerged and submerged to surface capabilities, in practice, it will be found that it is not the gay proceeding of diving and surfacing like a porpoise but, in fact, that each maneuver requires the expenditure of altogether too many precious moments to get the vessel under proper control for gun or torpedo fire. The same reasoning holds true here. We cannot have a submarine possessing the same surface qualities as a destroyer.
We are all prone to accept with great enthusiasm and almost unbounded faith the advent of a new device, which, it may seem, will aid us in accomplishing the end we have in view. Such is the case with the antisubmarine devices developed during the war. The very secrecy m which all development and research work has been veiled and the popular ignorance of the true limitations of these devices, have given to them a potential power of detection, transcending the most enthusiastic da.ms of their inventor. We have training wires and eels, SC, MB, MV, K and Y tubes and, I presume, many other contrivances whose avowed purpose it is to seek out and destroy submarines and his name would be fool, who would deny the merits of these ingenious devices. But how, by any stretch of the imagination can we say, as do the authors, that the antisubmarine devices were fatal? To the reader who has had access to the records of anti-submarine experiments, it must appear so, but it will also be found that many of these experiments were carried out under perfect weather conditions, with certain elements of the artificial entering into the tests and that in a majority of the most successful tests, the listening was done by the inventor himself; a man whose broad knowledge of physics and acoustics and natural high proficiency in handling the invention of his own mind, puts him completely out of the class of ratings that we, in service, must depend upon. It will not be denied that anti-submarine devices helped materially in combating the submarine menace but it must be emphatically denied that they were fatal. They were a hindrance to submarine operations and a bothersome thorn in the sides of submarine commanding officers but, if we are to accept the statement that these devices sealed the fate of the submarine, so then, must we also accept every incorrect and unbased conclusion that flows from this source. If the fate of the submarine has already been sealed then why is every important naval power in the world continuing submarine construction? For our own protection, we cannot subscribe to such morbid delusions and transgressions of fact.
In the particular type of anti-submarine warfare in which the Allies were engaged against Germany, practically every condition of sea and land was favorable for this work. The German submarines were, for the most part, operating in restricted areas and comparatively shallow water. Both of these conditions made the anti-submarine devices more effective. It is hardly conceivable, and is not generally admitted, that submarines will ever again be employed under the same conditions and in the same role as were those of Germany. Hence, it will be found that our estimate of the capabilities of anti-submarine devices will have to be materially changed in drawing up plans for their use in possible future wars. Do we know, for instance, that their efficiency will be the same when operating in hundreds and thousands of fathoms of water as when employed in the comparatively shallow waters contiguous to the British Isles? Do we know that anti-submarine craft, equipped with all the most modern devices, can be employed to advantage against large fleet submarines in the open sea, when a large number of high powered ships, causing great sound interference, are present? Countless numbers of similar questions could be propounded and the answer to all of them, based not on theory, but upon lack of conviction in practice, would be the same. We not only do not know these things to be true but we have every reason to believe that these marvelous, delicate instruments will not obtain the results which their advocates claim for them. It may be well to state here that I speak not merely from the perusal of records but from experience both in the capacity of the pursuer and the pursued.
It is perhaps well that the technical discussion as to the inability of the submersible to dive and go to great depths was dispensed with, for it is believed that proof of these statements would involve a laborious and circuitous process of reasoning not founded on fact. While it may he conceded that large submarines will, perhaps, take a longer time to dive then small submarines, there seems to be no good reason why this time element should be of such duration as to endanger the safety of the submarine. If such a reason does exist, then why build submarines? Neither is there anything to prevent the construction of large submarines capable of going to the same depths that are required by the specifications of our present day submarines.
That part of the paper which has to do with the motive power of submarines is so misleading as to require almost complete refutation. The gasoline engines formerly used for submarine propulsion were, of course, not only dangerous because of the inflammability of the fuel but also, because many men were permanently poisoned by the noxious fumes of combustion. While it cannot be stated that the Diesel engine is a perfectly reliable machine, the cruising performed by German submarines during the war, and the every day runs that are now being made by Diesel engine merchant vessels all over the world, are in themselves sufficient evidence to confute the statement, made by the authors, that excessive weight and general unreliability accompany all internal combustion engines. If steam were used for surface propulsion there might be no necessity for other means of surface power but if there were, it is difficult to understand why, as they contend, a ship of the size under discussion could not be equipped with any other type of motive power, in addition to her steam installation. Indeed, the very increase in size is the reason why more machinery could and would be installed.
While it is true that the lead-acid type of storage battery does, under certain conditions, generate chlorine and hydrogen gas, in our service the casualties resulting from such generation of gas have been so few as to warrant the statement that their prevention and diffusion involve nothing more than ordinary, routine care. It is a sad fact, known by many in our service, that the alkaline battery, stated by the authors to have replaced the lead-acid battery, is capable of copious generation of hydrogen gas. The foregoing is one of the main reasons why, several years ago, after an unfortunate explosion of the experimental alkaline battery installed in the E-2, this type of cell was condemned for all future construction. There is not now one single alkaline storage battery, installed as the main battery of a submarine in our navy.
With regard to the use of the torpedo, it can hardly be conceded that a torpedo hit is purely a question of luck, as the authors state is to be. To be sure, an isolated long range shot, fired in the expectation that it will hit a certain definite target, is an absurdity. If, however, we are to have fleet submarines, we will have enough of them and they will each have a sufficient number of tubes to fire "Browning shots," with the practical certainty that a percentage of torpedoes fired will cross the enemy line. Hits may or may not be made, but the enemy cannot but be greatly inconvenienced and hampered by such an attack. Jutland proves this.
This criticism has been written, not with the intention of discrediting views held by others, but rather, because of the general lack of knowledge on the part of the service at large concerning submarines, it is not deemed proper to allow to go unchallenged, statements which, owing to their wide variation from fact and practice, may only tend to more thoroughly confuse the submarine controversy. Such comments as have been made would be injurious rather than helpful, were not some consideration given to the ultimate development of the submarine.
There is, I believe, unanimity of opinion that submarines serving with fleets of capital ships must fulfill the following general requirements:
- Large cruising radius.
- Sufficient surface speed to accompany the fleet under all conditions.
- Good sea keeping qualities and habitability.
- Powerful torpedo armament of long range torpedoes.
- Good average diving and submerged qualities.
Some of the foregoing characteristics have already been attained and others are rapidly approaching a satisfactory solution. We know, from experience, that they are necessary; whereas the discussion of the submersible battle cruiser is still in the academic stage and all theories now held must travel the tortuous road of satisfactory demonstration. With our general requirements before us, the sphere of the fleet submarine is not difficult to determine. The submarine force will be just as much a part of the fleet as the destroyer force is now. By reason of the fleet submarines' ability to accompany the fleet under all conditions, the commander-in-chief may find it expedient, and particularly to his advantage, to use the submarine force.
- To attain a favorable position before they submerge for torpedo attack.
- To gain and hold a position that will force the enemy to accept an inferior tactical position.
In both of these cases we have the raison d’être of high surface speed. To obtain it, some other desirable quality, probably submerged speed, must be sacrificed and in order to deliver successful torpedo attacks against high speed surface craft, it is readily apparent that it will almost always be necessary to gain a fairly good surface position before submerging. It is noteworthy that the world wide tendency is to sacrifice submerged speed to surface speed.
Considering (b) above it is generally admitted, and has proven true in practice, that whereas surface craft that have the task set for them of turning an enemy column, may be driven off by a superior force, a group of submerged submarines is a real and a moral deterrent and may succeed when surface vessels fail.
After all, since the purpose of the battle is to destroy our adversary, it matters little as to what means and weapons are employed to effect this end. Even though the submarine force is unable to consummate a torpedo attack, the general plan is carried out, and if the enemy is forced to avoid the locality in which our submarines have been placed and thereby accept a tactically inferior gunnery position, the task of the submarines will have been well accomplished.
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The Soul of the Service
(See Page 351, Whole No. 217)
Captain W. T. Cluverius, U. S. Navy.—1. The anomalous condition of a shortage of more than 50 per cent in total authorized commissioned strength combined with an actual excess in the complements of the three lower grades of the line is enough to try the "Soul of the Service."
2. Captain Jessop's article is timely for it is necessary indeed, in this serious post-war period, to determine first, what professional attributes are missing in the quickly-promoted junior officer and then, what modifications in training must be made in order to re-equip him as nearly as may be for his life's work. The writer inquires into these points well and finds that all the losses are based in that inclusive one of experience. With it was lost training in that subordination which comes with training at sea, close supervision by older officers and the benefits of that association, and the crystallizing of ideals of duty which, because they must be deep rooted, are of slow growth.
3. Much in these elements was lost to the junior officer of the line long before the World War—lost with the passed midshipman and the two years probationary period at sea where, under continuous control, the aspirant for a commission was trained in the duties of a subordinate and drilled in the acceptance of responsibility. He learned the details of his profession from his division officer, and, day by day, military character was formed.
4. Annapolis has realized and shouldered these losses, especially those entailed by the rapid promotion in war, and is trying to bridge the arc as best it may in a systematic manner.
5. The Naval Academy is often criticized for this or that lack in professional equipment discovered when the graduate joins a ship. Professional demands, both practical and theoretical, are greater than ever before and growing. It is simply impossible to cover the field in four years. Vet at all times there are attempts from without to shorten the course of instruction when the need is to lengthen it. There are those, too, who say let them get this or that aboard ship. Some of the essentials of our profession can never be absorbed after graduation. The abandonment of the two years' cruise was a lesson in this matter: the ensign of to-day lacks much professionally that the ensign of yesterday acquired as a passed midshipman.
6. I agree with Captain Jessop that academic methods suffer restriction and must of necessity at certain points be artificial. Nothing can make up for experience. A midshipman must stand on his own foundation and a gradation by marks is imposed. This is the only criterion of academic achievement, but I cannot agree that it is "as true of discipline as it is of any other study." Moreover, it is my observation that in all professional departments at Annapolis to-day the "question of the usefulness of what he is being taught" is so continuously brought to a midshipman's attention that to some degree "it must enter his head." Unfortunately in many respects, the proper striving for marks is not prevalent now because a "two-five" means a commission. Too often this mark can be made without sufficient effort and scholarship suffers.
7. There is no one discipline department as such. There is an Executive Department of which, in addition to his other duties, the Commandant of Midshipmen is the head. Under him is a commissioned officer attached to each company of the Regiment of Midshipmen whose duty it is to teach his men the executive requirements of their profession; to instill in them the instincts of duty; and to formulate their military character, all the while maintaining discipline and causing them to maintain it.
8. Annapolis is the school of the line of the navy. Midshipmen officers and petty officers are given standardized duties and comprehensive authority in the exercise of command which is the function of the line. They are guided, advised, and backed, by the commissioned company officer. With the midshipmen's responsibility based on regimental ranking and rating come their privileges: not with longevity, that is, not with class.
9. Similarly in the professional departments, the commissioned personnel are held accountable for the maintenance of discipline and the determination of military character displayed by the midshipmen when engaged in those departments. Just as the gunnery officer, the engineer officer, and the navigating officer are responsible in our ships, so are all officers attached to the Naval Academy. The Commandant of Midshipmen corresponds with the Executive Officer in coordinating the whole.
10. The matters of leadership and command are constantly dwelt on by the Executive Department and service interest is enhanced by a succession of addresses made not only by the most distinguished officers of our fleet and service, but also by foreign flag officers and general officers whose names are world wide and who are frequent visitors to Annapolis. Without exception they remark on the spirit they find and in their contacts with midshipmen, dwell on our glorious traditions which are an inspiration to further effort.
11. Yes, Annapolis is striving to the utmost to fill the gaps. But training in the full sense of duty when it comes and the assimilation of the spirit which Annapolis enjoins is a post-graduate course for the fleet, and the fleet must see to it that no "naval holiday" in these essentials is permitted. On the contrary it is the bounden duty of every officer in the fleet to show in himself that the newcomer's vision of service is unimpaired.