A TACTICAL AWAKENING
By Commander John Stapler, U. S. Navy
The question is, is the navy awake to the importance of complete tactical knowledge and co-ordination in every form of battle effort?
The decisive fleet action of to-day bears so directly on national destiny that failure to properly combine every type of weapon should be securely guarded against.
The World War has contributed a remarkable advance in all classes of ships, both sea and air. The gun, torpedo and mine have laid down new restrictions on battle movements. Modern sea action with its high speed and increasing number of distinct types of ships and weapons has become a complicated problem. The relatively simple requirements of battle in the sea actions prior to the present period, stand out in comparison. Then, an understanding of the capabilities of the main fighting strength, the ship of the line, in accordance with the general battle plan, was sufficient. The need of dove-tailing in the striking power of half a dozen different weapons so that their blows might be delivered in the proper sequence, was not a subject of study. Communication had not reached its present vital importance; nor had the bearing of an efficient service of information both air and under sea been borne home.
Modern battle is dependent upon so many elements that must be harmonized to gain complete success, that it becomes a subject for constant study and experiment. The danger is, that the daily humdrum of routine, and the ever-lasting demands of material upkeep, and individual unit training, so occupies the attention of officers in command, that the need of battle co-ordination between commands is lost sight of. One class of work is ever present pressing at the elbow in its procession of reports and papers. The other is less tangible and demanding in attention. It is accepted as important; but the ever insistent details of individual operation tend to keep it, more or less, just over the horizon of accomplishment. This makes it, however, none the less vital in the ultimate day of battle.
Present sea action unrolls in rapidly moving phases in all of which the various weapons have definite tasks. Not only must the general battle plan be understood by force and individual commanders, with a thoroughly grasped force doctrine of action to meet the varying battle stages, but there must be the appreciation of what the other task groups or forces are thinking and propose to do in meeting any one of a number of particular situations.
This can only be accomplished by a system of battle training which holds those deciding hours of the future ever before the eyes, and makes their meeting a matter of paramount daily importance. All else should be secondary in interest to the commander. The preparation of the weapon is essential, but of what use is the weapon if it cannot be used in full effectiveness after it is prepared? A number of officers can assist in the preparation of the weapon, both material and personnel, under the general supervision of the head; but there is but one officer in each unit to make the tactical decision in battle, and that is the leader. Seconds then mean much to a nation, and the responsibility is great.
Tactical Steps
The ship ready to fight is a requisite step to its tactical employment. Ship handling, whatever its form, and the use of its weapons are the foundation of tactics.
The next step is the combining of the tactical efforts of a number of units of the same class. Various forces of similar type appear in tactical training.
These two steps are, in general, fairly well reached by the navies of the world. But it is the third and final step, the combining of all the forces that go to make the modern fleet in action, to which the searchlight of attention should be turned. The previous steps are of but little value, if this, the last and all important, is not thoroughly explored. In view of the rush of recent naval development, and the requirements of modern fleet action, has the service adapted itself to meet the increased demands of preparation for tactical leadership?
Jutland
Some points in this battle are briefly touched, to emphasize the importance of the tactical co-ordination of the fleet in action.
Service of Information.—Throughout the battle attention is called to the fact that a more successful service of information, before and during the action, would have meant much to both the British and the Germans. Neither fleet realized the proximity of the other, until a chance contact between the light forces developed. There was but little time then for any change in the general dispositions.
Weather conditions had been such that the German Zeppelins attached to the High Sea Fleet had entirely missed the Grand Fleet. This applied in part to the submarine patrols. On the other side the British, apparently, had failed to receive word of the sailing of the German fleet.
Communications.—The failure of communications at critical points during the progress of the battle, points to the need of the utmost attention to this extremely important subject. Had the British commander-in-chief more complete information of the enemy dispositions just prior to the contact between the main battleship forces, it is certain, that the British battle deployment would have been completed before the enemy was sighted by the main body.
With close gun action in a superiority of nearly two to one from a position ahead of the German advance and with the British battle cruisers and destroyers massed on the German head of column, the few remaining minutes of daylight would have been sufficient for the British. The delay that resulted from the deployment of the British battleships after sight contact gave the Germans their chance.
Tactical Co-ordination.—In excellent example of tactical coordination is presented by the German retirement at 6.30 p. m. from an extremely critical position. It was accomplished by a simultaneous ships right about from a bent column formation in which the head of the column was being forced around to the southward. In conjunction with this maneuver, a properly timed German destroyer attack was thrown against the Grand Fleet, and smoke screens were laid to cover the German withdrawal. The Germans only lacked the presence of fleet submarines to make the attack of the delaying screen complete.
This maneuver was successfully executed; and in illustration that it was not a matter of chance, it was repeated under almost similar conditions at about 7.20 p. m. It was full tactical appreciation and study by the German command that had prepared this maneuver for the situation that actually developed.
The night phases of the battle were examples principally of the need of reliable information and communication. The two main bodies were in proximity to each other, and yet were out of touch. It was unfortunate that the British were unable to so concentrate their light forces as to deliver a simultaneous destroyer attack on either bow of the German advance during darkness. This to be followed at daylight by renewed attacks, supported by the guns of the Grand Fleet from an intercepting position off the Horn Reef minefields.
The Germans likewise seemed to have completely lost touch with the Grand Fleet after 9 p. m. Their night destroyer attacks failed, due to their inability to find the British. Yet the two opposing main bodies were relatively close to each other. The importance of holding contact with the enemy main strength, once it is established, and of maintaining efficient communications, is seen. There was failure on both sides to mass submarines on the line of action.
At Jutland the Germans steamed into a superior British concentration. They escaped through their tactical skill.
Tactical Preparation
Leadership in battle is the distinct and privileged duty of the line officer. The demands on command to meet the tactical requirements of future fleet action are so great, that a full realization of this utterly important subject is necessary.
How then can this tactical preparation be best secured? A study of the tactical progress especially in its relation to the organization for tactical work recently employed by the principal sea powers, will furnish a certain amount of suggestion.
With this should be combined the particular requirements of our service. It is evident that the modern unit of naval command has reached a point of considerable administrative complexity. There is need of additional officer personnel with a somewhat altered routine of daily duties. This to meet the new demands of fighting efficiency and tactical preparation.
To further the examination of the subject and to present some constructive suggestions the following phases are discussed:
Tactical Opportunity for the Leader
The captain of a ship should be relieved so far as possible of the minor details and routine of ship or force administration. He should be largely free from time consuming reports and paper work. Details of duty assignment, general policy and inspection are logically for his attention. With the time thus saved from small matters, he will be able to study his command from the battle preparation and tactical handling point of view. In addition, he will have the opportunity to gain the knowledge of what the capabilities are, and what action may be expected during the varying stages of battle, of all fleet types. Only so, can absolute fleet co-ordination be obtained. Not only must he know what his own command is to do to meet a given situation, but he should know of what the other fellow is thinking and what he will probably be doing five minutes hence.
There is need of a tactical aide for the leader. In the case of a captain of a ship, this aide may well be the navigator. The navigator's duties should be adjusted accordingly. A War College course, and tactical instruction, should be part of the requirements of both of these officers before assuming their duties afloat.
The executive of a ship might well take over many of the details of administration and routine, which now occupy the captain's attention; and in turn, an executive aide, an officer of rank and experience should be assigned to each first rate ship to assist the executive in covering the increased field of his activities. The first lieutenant to continue his duties as at present. The modern battleship has reached a point in development, where sufficient officers should be provided, if there is to be an adequate planning and efficient tactical preparation at the head.
For a commander of a division of ships it would be well to have an officer of experience detailed as tactical aide; and in the case of a squadron commander, this officer should be of captain's rank. On the staff of the commander-in-chief, the tactical aide should be an officer of flag rank, and should be in addition to the chief of staff.
Besides the above, all fleet and force staffs should have representatives of the various fleet types as liaison officers. These officers to be connecting links with the particular element of the fleet which they represent. An appreciation of type capability would be one result of their presence on the staff. They could aid materially in war games, and in tactical war preparation, and in the dissemination of general information. Thus a destroyer aide, a submarine aide and an aircraft aide would be found on the staff of the commander-in-chief.
The Germans early realized the importance of adequate officer assignment to ships, and of installing a system whereby there was a natural flow of tactical information. The demands of the future will be much greater in this respect than has been the case in the past.
The Game Board.—Wherever possible, tactical game boards to be installed afloat and used for study and test purposes. All sea tactical maneuvers can be played to advantage at the game board, as a preliminary to the actual getting underway. The maneuvering of the fleet with all its component parts present, is necessary for a proper appreciation of the effect on time and space of battle speed. But the game board can prepare the way, and the sea maneuvers when executed will be more progressive as a result of its work. It would be well, if the new ships in building had installed a tactical game room compartment with its necessary equipment.
Tactical Study.—The establishment of a Junior War College course, as has been proposed, would aid materially in tactical preparation. This combined with the War College extension course and an expansion of the present War College to meet the requirements of all present flag and command officers would do much during the next few years in preparing the fleet and in holding it tactically ready for battle. And unless a fleet is tactically abreast or ahead of the times it is but a poor investment.
The whole subject of tactics is one that of necessity is in a state of flux. The force doctrine of attack of to-day, changes with new developments. Therein is the need for constant study, and for a tactical fleet organization that will readily disseminate and keep up to date all tactical information.
As examples for study the following are mentioned:
- Battle signals and communications of all types.
- Co-ordination in battle effort of the different fleet forces for the successive phases of action, day and night.
- Use of smoke screens with all classes of ships, and the employment of indirect fire control.
- Tactical scouting with the employment in combination of aircraft, and submarine.
It is in the fleet that progress must be made. Courses of instruction, as at the War College, prepare the mind and point the way. Full progress can only be made in the fleet where all the elements are present for sea test.
It is time that we as a service raise our eyes from the deck to the horizon, and the importance of tactical preparation.