The writer's naval service was partly ashore at navy yards and partly afloat attached to the commander-in-chief and to various force staffs for radio duty, and I have been at sea in practically every class of fighting ship, including airplanes and submarines. I therefore feel that I had a better than average chance to obtain an excellent "cross-section" of the radio situation, both as regards personnel and materiel. I became interested in amateur radio very early in the game, having what I believe to be one of the first amateur equipments in this country in 1903, and have been engaged in the practice of this art as an amateur and then as a professional ever since. I therefore cannot but feel that I have had the requisite training to make use of my opportunities for observation.
What is the matter with radio in the United States Navy? A great many officers will deny the implication, but I cannot but feel that these denials will not stand before the facts, and that they can be answered by the answer to one question: Is our radio service absolutely reliable? If anyone doubts that we have dropped behind our proper place in this art, he need only make comparison with the "W/T" service of the Royal Navy. A few such comparisons I will draw as we proceed.
First let us take up the engineering situation as it seems to-day, which is, of course, the kernel of the whole matter, for without adequate apparatus adequate results cannot be expected.
The engineering responsibility in this subject seems to fall between officers and civilians—largely on the latter perhaps, and for this reason let us first speak of them. The theory that civilian experts should be employed undoubtedly has its sound points, but it is impossible to obtain really first class civilian experts at the salaries the Department is able to pay. In time of peace no man is going to serve the government for, say, $3600 a year, when he can easily command twice this sum outside. Several splendid men have been lost to the Department lately for this reason.
It does not seem to be thoroughly realized that there are not 20 first-class radio engineers in the country to-day—and that even good installing men are scarce. This is a very new art, with very limited personnel.
There is also the objection that most of these civilians have been at sea very little, and have little or no idea of the practical difficulties encountered; the vibration which the apparatus has to sustain when installed over the screws of a destroyer; the whipping of topmasts and shock of gunfire; the corrosive effect of salt water and funnel gases; and above all the seemingly inevitable mistreatment to which the apparatus is subjected. As an example, I have seen a radio compass coil in a more or less exposed position designed with 124 unsoldered connections, and iron washers used at that, connected to the most easily disturbed piece of apparatus extant—the audion. Would anyone having any experience with the corrosive effects of salt water perpetrate such a piece of designing?
There are a great many civilians in the Department who are capable, if checked by an engineer, of doing excellent designing, but who at present seem to have no one of real engineering ability over them, and are, therefore free to make unlimited small mistakes. I call to mind a certain piece of apparatus, mechanically well made, consisting of a single series circuit. Part of the conductor in this circuit consisted of a copper bar 1" x 3/8" while part of the circuit was of wire about the size of a pencil lead. It is obvious that this is about as sensible as running a 14-inch steam line 90 per cent of the way to the main engines and ending up with 1-inch gas pipe.
Another example of insufficient engineering supervision is the average navy yard "radio gang." The writer has spent a good many continuous 24- and 36-hour periods ripping out and reinstalling the main radio installation aboard various destroyers at sea, not because the installation was poorly made but because the work was done in such a manner as to render the apparatus inoperative.
This sort of thing rarely happens with guns, engines, or ammunition hoists. Why should it happen with radio? Surely it must be admitted that we know enough about the art to install well-known types of apparatus properly.
The radio materiel officer at one of the larger yards remarked to me a few days ago that he had never received a wiring diagram that was perfectly correct—an undoubted exaggeration, but from my own experience containing too much truth to be funny.
Next the officers. We have a few officers—Naval Academy men—who have received a basic engineering training, and who have taken postgraduate courses in radio. These men have the right basis on which to build, but are they kept at radio? Rarely.
One of these officers who has the makings of an excellent radio physicist was "head of a department" afloat during part of the war ("gunnery" I believe); later a force radio officer, a largely executive job, and now holds a somewhat similar post ashore. Is not this a waste of good material?
We have some other officers who have come up from the ranks, some of whom have done splendid work, especially as their allotted tasks were often beyond their capabilities. These officers often lack the ability for sound basic reasoning that a knowledge of physics gives, and are therefore inclined to go about a research on the "try anything once" basis instead of first laying out a program based on constructive reasoning, and even if the solution is arrived at, the reason for this solution is often not. The chief petty officer, the electrician, the installer, is not in general an engineer or a physicist, and the only reason that I can see for this belief is that in the early days of radio, he knew as much as anyone, which was very little, and the halo has clung. One cannot imagine a civilian organization giving a good electrician or a good foreman, no matter how good, original research to accomplish.
As for the enlisted personnel, they seem frequently to have very little conception of the elements of the theory of their subject—and very little means at hand for learning it. I do not want or expect a chief electrician (radio) to express the theory of impulse excitation mathematically, but I do expect him to be able to tell me in plain language the four reasons why a quenched gap quenches. There is too much "dope," if I may use this word to express incorrect theories, conclusions drawn from false reasoning or incomplete facts, etc. As an example—a chief tried a very small antenna for receiving a short and rarely used wave length. It naturally functioned better than the large antenna at this particular wave length. The next thing was a letter to the force commander from the ship's "radio officer" telling of this marvelous discovery of efficient reception on all waves and begging to recommend the adoption of this "device" by all the ships of the force.
Turning to the apparatus itself, we do not seem to always have adopted the best engineering principles. After all, what is engineering but getting maximum results under any given set of limiting conditions with the least expenditure?
We adopt types frequently after inadequate or inconclusive tests. I have seen a so-called comparison made between two transmitters—from different craft on different days, with different receiving apparatus and different operators. (The same sort of thing was done recently on some static prevention tests.) Anyone of these factors might make a 50 to 300 per cent difference. Would it be logical to test two types of service rifles: one from a machine rest, indoors, with hand loaded ammunition, the other "off hand" on a "puffy" day with service ammunition, and make a direct comparison, or for that matter, could any conclusion be drawn? When there are 20 dependent variables and one wishes to determine the relation between two of them, it is just as well to see that the remaining 18 remain fixed if one's conclusions are to be anything but worthless.
We have adopted a type of transmitter which is probably the most efficient of its class and by efficient I mean only that its output compares well with its input, but it has two great military disadvantages. It requires a rather high standard of ability among the enlisted personnel—and it "shock excites" any nearby antenna so as to make simultaneous operation of one or more stations on the same or nearby ships almost impossible. (I will say in passing that the type of apparatus I design and manufacture is if anything more of an offender under this last count—so it will be seen that I have no axe to grind. This, however, is not a disadvantage to merchant ships which do not sail in formation.)
The British use a strong rugged type of transmitter about half as efficient—but not open to either of these objections. Therefore they can work two or more independent stations on the same ship. Does not this seem better engineering? After all, if there are real advantages to be gained, why consider whether the radio set takes 10 instead of 5 kw from the ship's source, which is probably from 50 to 600 kw? This is probably partially the result of relying somewhat on civilian engineers outside the department who have no conception of naval problems.
Another interesting comparison is to be had in receiving apparatus. We build a single cabinet containing all the necessary gear. Very nice and very pretty when it is the latest thing out. Very inaccessible if there is trouble, with all the wiring neatly concealed. If one part—an inductance say—is found later to be capable of a 5 per cent or 10 per cent improvement, this cabinet set, costing perhaps $400, must either be scrapped, sent to a navy yard to be rebuilt, or be 5 per cent or 10 per cent behind current knowledge. If a part is destroyed, it is usually a machinist's job to replace it.
The British, on the other hand, build up a sort of panel of separate units. If a unit is improved, a new one can be placed in service in a few minutes. The same is true in case of a breakdown. The wiring is all in front, of heavy copper rod enameled in various colors for the various circuits. A glance can tell if there is wiring trouble, and if trouble in any circuit is presumed to exist that circuit can be followed by its color without the aid of a blue print, and each unit in the circuit tested and replaced where necessary.
This procedure also gives the operator a greater chance to become familiar with the circuits of his apparatus, for they are always in front of him. It may entail a slightly greater first cost and a little more work on installation, but it seems more than worth it.
The British enlisted radio men are trained to do what they are told and to do it correctly. They are not given a chance to do experimental work of their own nor to form incorrect theories. (The long enlistment may help in this.) Your plugman and trayman knows his job and does it. He does not worry about exterior ballistics. I doubt if it would help the turret crew much if he did, but he is given apparatus which works every time he asks it.
Among other things attained by this attitude among the enlisted personnel of carrying out existing orders rather than formulating their own, is that when a British operator is guarding (listening in on) say 600 meters, he is on 600 meters and will hear anything on that wave that occurs. This enables the. British to largely dispense with all the calling and answering which we seem to find so indispensable, a saving in time and in interference.
If a ship is known to be within the range the message is sent and acknowledged—and that is all.
Another example is the use of only sufficient power to cover the distance easily—another obvious course toward minimizing interference. I have seen one of our ships "open up" on full power to a ship in the tail of the same column—enough power to be heard easily within a 400-mile circle.
Why this superiority? I firmly believe the reason to be a sufficiency of real experts; physicists and engineers.
What is the remedy for us? I see but one as long as we refuse to let line officers really specialize. The formation of an electrical or radio corps.
Our government, with its perpetual dread of becoming over military, will never, I fear, allow the Department to pay high salaries to navy employees—but some men, I may almost say our best men—will accept inadequate pay if they receive with it the honor of belonging to a great service. Witness the number of naval officers to-day who could earn vastly more in civil life.
After all, we have a medical corps, and is electrical engineering any less of a specialty than medicine? Is it any less important to the service ? Does it take a shorter time to master? Emphatically no. Is it fairer to expect a line officer to master strategy, tactics, gunnery, etc., and electrical engineering, than these same things plus civil engineering, or naval construction, or medicine?
As communications have a more direct bearing on the actual military operations of the fleet than civil engineering or medicine, I would suggest that this corps be formed largely of Naval Academy men who have seen several years of "watch and division" duty—have perhaps taken the War College correspondence course so that they may have a broad view of the bearing of communications on naval operations in general, who have been given a three-year course at Harvard or some like school and at graduation transferred to this new corps. We already have a few officers of this sort as a nucleus.
I would also suggest that each fleet radio officer, when relieved, be attached to the War College as aid for communications. I heard not long ago that the war games were being played based on radio ranges of five years ago. A flag officer does not go to sea without his radio officer, therefore it would seem that a school for flag officers should also have its radio officer.