PROFESSIONAL NOTES
Prepared by Lieut. Commander H.W. Underwood, U. S. Navy
FRANCE
French Naval Progress.—The voting of the Marine Budget by the two Chambers has shown that the Senate is at one with the Chamber in urging the prompt taking in hand of an enlarged shipbuilding and aerial program worthy of France's past traditions and present responsibilities. Senator Berenger called attention to the growing competition of naval armaments that were themselves the expression of economic rivalry, and hinted at possibilities of the near future which France could not afford to ignore. Whilst having neither the wish nor the means of competing with her great allies, France owes it to herself as well as to her friends to remain a determining factor at sea and to make the most of her unique strategic assets for the defence of her vital interests. She must ever remember that the million troops she could raise in her colonies and the unlimited supplies she could draw from the same sources—and that would be vital assets against Germany—would be of no account whatever, but rather a ransom in the hands of her enemies, without the support of an adequate fleet at all times in a position to maintain safe communications by sea. Therefore the absolute naval command of the Western Mediterranean, together with the undeferred organization of a reliable trans-Mediterranean flying service, must be the basis of the French naval policy, which means—remembering the Goeben-Breslau affair—that the Republic cannot safely allow any continental power to eclipse her in the matter of speed and calibers. With these views, that were supported by the unanimity of the Senate. Minister Landry concurred, and announced that the 1021 Budget now under preparation would mark a first and vigorous step towards the expansion of the navy, and provide for super-scouts and aerial cruisers of bombardment.
Contracts are being awarded for six torpilleurs of under 1000 tons, to carry 4-inch guns and 22-inch torpedoes, intended for general duties off the coasts and with the fleet, as well as for six 2000-ton conducteurs d'escadrilles of 36 knots to mount 5.5-inch weapons, designed for high sea work with the cruiser divisions. The "fragilite excessive" of the destroyers of 800 tons, that has been denounced in the Chamber, is this time to be avoided, the war having brought home to French naval men the value of robustness and of reliable sea speed. Similarly the new submersibles, made with the cooperation of private constructors, are to be freed from the notorious defects of the Lagrange type and to have reliability as their strong points.
The foresight of the British Admiralty in providing for an ample reserve of oil fuel for British ships is much admired and envied on this side, where governmental instability and traditional incompetence at the head do not permit the application of the old precept: Gouverner c'est prevow. Oil fuel in adequate quantity has become the primary condition of sea and air power, and for the present at least France is badly handicapped in this respect, though bright hopes are entertained for the future. Under recent arrangements France is to receive 25 per cent of the production of the Mossul oilfields and of the Anglo-Persian Oil Co., but this source of supply is subordinated to the Franco-British alliance, and Gallic experts would like to be independent. Hence the efforts being made to develop the petroleum wealth of North Africa. The three zones of Algerian wells yield some 30 tons of oil per day, the rate of supply being relatively higher than is the case with either Rumanian and American wells. Preparations for the opening of petroleum wells are being made in Tunisia and Morocco, whilst Franco-British concerns are already tackling the problem of petroleum exploitation in Madagascar and Indo-China, where exist abundant oilfields. France is now suffering so very much from shortage of fuel that the administrative red tape that is peculiar to our Republican regime is not this time to be allowed to delay progress, and in a very few years there is a probability of our Republic being in possession of a fully-adequate oil supply of her own, a fait nouveau that will have far-reaching consequences in fighting efficiency and all-round maritime expansion. The unpalatable result of the actual fuel shortage may be gauged from the lamentations of a vieil amiral in a recent number of the Monitcur de la Flotte. French battleships are keeping to harbor for the sake of economy; erreur faialc. consequences incalculables, jubilation among Toulon publicans and spirit dealers, but indignation and disgust on the part of thoughtful Frenchmen. The 24,000-ton Courbets are reproached with consuming one ton of coal per mile—de l'argent en fumee, as used to say the late Mons. Pelletan— but a flotte immobile et stagnante is nothing more than expensive makebelieve that deceives no one. British squadrons, it is noted, are keeping in splendid trim, ever at sea, with motors and armament in perfect working condition; and even Italy, despite her slender resources, is straining every nerve to make her dreadnoughts and flotillas something more than a naval pretence. In truth, the situation is not quite so bad as depicted; new life is gradually being instilled into the flotillas that comprise newly-refitted destroyers and submarines, and the Charlicr battleships are to test at sea their recent motor and ballistic improvements in combined maneuvers with the Toulon and Biserta flotillas.
Investigations made by the Commission de la Marine point to a deterioration of the quality of the navy personnel as the consequence of injudicious recruiting and of disastrous blunders by the Leygues Administration. The seafaring Bretons, who formerly composed the bulk of the fleet and were a tried element of fighting strength, have been mostly replaced in the course of the last three years by 46,000 short-term volunteers (engage's volontaires), of whom it has been officially stated that 50 per cent remain invinciblement refractaires a toute education maritime. Happily this rabble in naval uniform that caused the Black Sea rebellion is to be completely cleared out of the service by the end of 1921, when the Gallic Navy will become anew a service of true seamen, fully alive to the grandeur of the maritime career and inferior to none in professional worth. The physical standard especially will be higher than at any previous time, as the result of the patriotic efforts of Minister Landry, who from the first grasped this capital fact, long realized in England, but ignored by his predecessors, that bodily health and strength is the true foundation of fighting efficiency. Gold lace on blue sleeves does not make officers, that is, military leaders, but only the love of manly efforts, both physical and mental, since victory in war requires a full display of the noblest qualities, together with constant watchfulness and cheerful readiness to face any odds.
Such are the new ideas being inculcated in the Hives de l'Ecole Navale and naval cadets who last week landed at Lorient from the destroyer Avenlurier (1000 tons, 30 knots), aviso Meuse (850 tons), and cruiser Jeanne d'Arc (11,000 tons, 21 knots) to witness at the Ecole de gymnastique a display of the novel methods of physical culture and to receive the explanations and commendations of Lieutenant Bonneau, who is continuing the remarkable work of Lieutenant Hebert in the physical training line. Henceforth, from afprenti-marin to admiral, the first duty of the Gallic seaman is, in the words of Herbert Spencer, to be a "fine animal," and, indeed, when past traditions are considered, it is not exaggerating to say that a new era is opening in French naval annals, due in a great part to British influence.
Whereas the physical standard of French naval officers was formerly rather low, owing to the absence of physical tests at the Ecole Navale, it is interesting to note that 10 per cent of the 1920 candidates have been rejected as being inferior to the required standard, though they had successfully passed through the competitive examination. This means something of a revolution. Navale is no longer to be the refuge of weedy youngsters unfit for St. Cyr. Under the new conditions greater physical endurance is required from naval officers than from army officers, and it is no secret that the war has seen occasional failings on the part of physically inefficient unit and group commanders.—The Naval and Military Record, August 4, 1920.
French Shipbuilding Outlook.—In its economic survey of certain countries specially affected by the war at the close of the year 1919, the British Department of Overseas Trade has this to say of France's shipbuilding prospects:
"The merchant navy of France before the war numbered 1895 steamships and 15,824 sailing vessels with a gross tonnage of 2,535,775 tons. These vessels were manned by 98,730 men. Construction had proceeded, but slowly during the years previous to the outbreak of hostilities and the inferiority of France in comparison with the great trading nations had become more marked.
"In the years 1912, 1913 and 1914 she purchased in foreign countries 156 steamships and 18 sailing vessels with a tonnage of 211,757 tons. Yet even with this assistance she was outstripped by other countries. A detail of some interest is that the average tonnage of steamers constructed in France in the three years mentioned was 3040, 3410 and 4260 tons respectively, while that of the steamers purchased abroad was only 1560, 1030 and 1780. The result of the slow increase of French construction was that France became increasingly dependent on foreign bottoms, and that a large toll in freight had thus to be paid for the service rendered, which has been estimated at 500,000,000 francs.
"The situation has not improved. It is estimated that during the period of hostilities 961,621 tons were lost by enemy action, and 136,887 tons by the ordinary accidents of navigation. Shipping under the French flag was thus reduced to 1,457,267 tons. To replace these losses 227,000 tons are now building. An estimate of future construction which has been prepared by the competent department gives the following figures:
Year | No. of vessels | Gross tons |
1920 | 159 | 605,665 |
1921 | 172 | 704,361 |
1922 | 176 | 765,377 |
1923 | 183 | 793,045 |
"A difficulty, which is a grave obstacle to the construction of merchant ships in France, is the high cost of raw material and in this respect the situation has become more difficult on account of the depreciation of the franc."—The Nautical Gazette, August 14, 1920.
GERMANY
"Deutschland Zur See."—Whilst the execution of the peace terms has deprived Germany of her most effective naval material, it is incorrect to assume that the German Fleet has entirely disappeared. A new fleet has already been formed, within the limits prescribed by the Treaty. The collection of vessels recently placed in commission is officially termed the Reichs-Flotte, but is sometimes referred to as the Verteidigungs-Flotte, or Defence Fleet. It may be recalled that the avowed object of the naval clauses of the Peace Treaty was to reduce German naval strength to the requirements of police and frontier control. The post-war fleet was therefore to contain no more than six battleships of the Deutschland-Braunschweig type, six light cruisers, 12 destroyers, and 12 torpedo-boats. With regard to the renewal of floating material, it was laid down that new vessels built should not exceed 10,000 tons for armored ships, 6000 tons for light cruisers, 800 tons for destroyers, and 200 tons for torpedo-boats, and unless ships were lost no Ersatz battleship or cruiser was to be built until the vessel it replaced was 20 years old, or, in the case of destroyers and torpedo-boats, 15 years old from the date of launch. The building or acquisition of submersible craft of any description was absolutely inhibited. The maximum strength of the personnel was fixed at 15,000, including officers and the staff ashore, and of this total not more than 1500 were to be officers and warrant officers.
Until quite lately it was widely supposed that Germany would not go to the trouble and expense of maintaining a properly-organized naval force, which, consisting only of out-of-date vessels, would have practically no defensive value. This expectation, however, has not been fulfilled. The latest news from Berlin shows that the full naval establishment authorized by the Treaty is now in being. There is some doubt as to the present condition of the six7old battleships which have been commissioned. Most of them had been partially dismantled before the end of the war, their guns being taken for work at the front, and certain fittings and structural parts removed to be embodied in new submarines. Probably, however, all the six have since been refitted and rearmed. The oldest ship in the group is the Braunschiveig, which was launched in December, 1902, and the youngest is the Schlesien, launched in May, 1906. Consequently in little more than two years from now Germany will be at liberty to lay down an Ersatz armored ship for the Braunschweig, and by 1926 she may be constructing new vessels in place of the entire six—always provided that the substitutes do not exceed 10,000 tons in displacement.
The six light cruisers of the post-war fleet are older even than the battleships, selected as they are from the best ships among the Gazelle, Frauenlob, and Bremen classes, dating from 1899-1905. As the oldest light cruiser, the Amazone, was launched in 1900, Germany will be free to lay down an Ersatz this year if she so desires; and whereas the Amazone is of 2,650 tons only, her successor may be anything up to a limit of 6000 tons, which is quite a substantial displacement for light cruisers. There would be no difficulty in building a cruiser of this size capable of steaming at 30 knots, with an extensive radius of action and a powerful armament. The 24 destroyers and torpedo-boats are mostly obsolete, but a few boats built in 1912-13 are included, these being about 600 tons, with an original speed of 32 ½ knots, and an armament of two 3.4-inch Q. F. and four 19.7-inch tubes. Some of the torpedo-boats now in commission are already eligible for replacement under the 15-year age proviso.
The following is a complete list of the vessels of the German Reichsftotte now in commission:
Battleships: Schlesien, Schleswig-Holstein, Hannover, Hessen, Elsass, Braunschweig.
Light cruisers: Berlin, Hamburg, Arkona, Medusa, Amasone, Thetis. Destroyers: G-8, G-10, G-11, S-18, S-19, V-2, V-3, V-5, V-6, T-185, T-190, T-196.
Torpedo-boats: No. 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108,109, no, in.
It will be seen that the German Fleet as at present constituted, is really a coast-defence force, more to be compared with the navies of the minor European states than with those of the great powers. But it is large enough to be used for training purposes, and this no doubt was the German Government's principle motive for organizing a post-war fleet at all. Wilhelmshaven, it appears, is to remain the chief naval base, in spite of the "demoralizing atmosphere" which Admiral Hollweg declares to have prevailed there since the revolution. Apart from its obsolete material, the German Fleet of to-day is sorely handicapped by a shortage of efficient officers. According to Admiral Hollweg practically all the officers who remained with the fleet after the great collapse have since resigned, owing to their inability to preserve discipline. The seamen are said to have become incredibly lazy and insolent, and the ships and establishments at Wilhelmshaven are run more or less on Soviet lines. So long as affairs remain in this condition the service will offer no attraction whatever to officers of a desirable type. It remains to be seen whether the drastic measures which have kept the Reichswehr free from Bolshevist contamination will eventually be applied to the navy as well.
Enormous harm was done by the late Minister of Marine, Admiral von Trotha, an officer of the highest professional attainments, but an uncompromising reactionary in politics. There is no doubt that he attempted to use the fleet as an instrument for the furtherance of Monarchist aims. This was bitterly resented by the seamen, and when, at the time of the Kapp affair, he pledged the navy's allegiance to the usurping faction, there was a general mutiny at the naval ports. Von Trotha's conduct bears out the oft-repeated statement that politics was one of the root causes of the German Navy's collapse. Further confirmation has just been supplied by Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, whose dissertation on the state of Europe, published in The Times last week, reveals him in his true guise as a zealous, but woefully misinformed politician. Had von Tirpitz set an example to his subordinates by studying Mahan and Colomb, instead of saturating himself with the Pan-German dodtrines preached by Treitschke and Schiemann, the German Navy might have proved less of a dismal fiasco in the late war. If von Tirpitz's appreciation of Weltpolitik gives the measure of his acumen in other matters, we need marvel no longer at the shipwreck of German naval policy.—The Naval and Military Record, August 11, 1920.
Shipbuilding in Germany.—The extent to which the construction of new ships is being carried on in Germany at the present time is probably not known outside the initiated circles of that country. The returns concerning the situation of the world's shipbuilding industry at the end of June in the current year were accompanied by the statement that the figures for Germany were not yet available. It is known, however, on the one hand, that the shipyards have been occupied for many months past with the completion of ships already in hand at the date of the Armistice, the repair of other vessels, and the finishing of floating docks for surrender to the Allies under the Treaty of Peace. Two of the docks of large dimensions are said to have been sold by, or with the consent of, the Reparation Commission, and to have been delivered to Holland and Norway respectively in the past few weeks. But it is known that ships were in progress in the German yards during the same period for the account of the Reparation Commission, and also for delivery to neutral countries. Indeed, it is claimed that although many contracts for neutral nations are still on hand, orders for neutral account similar to those which were extraordinarily remunerative a few months ago are no longer expected, as, owing to the inflated prices for iron and steel, the costs of construction have risen to the level of, even if they are not higher than, the prices prevailing in the world's markets. If the assertions respecting orders for work for other than Allied account are well founded they may possibly refer to small ships of ioco gross tons and less, but if the reports be true that much larger vessels have been or are being completed, it is impossible to avoid the impression that the Reparation Commission is in no hurry to exact the delivery of the particular amount of tonnage set forth in the Treaty. The Treaty provides that within three months from its coming into operation the Reparation Commission shall notify to the German Government the amount of tonnage to be laid down in each of the two years next succeeding the three months in question. No doubt such a notification was given, but the exact tonnage concerned has not yet been stated. A similar notification is to be given two years after the Treaty came into operation with regard to the three following years, and the amount of the tonnage to be laid down is specified as not to exceed 200,000 tons gross per annum.
The opinion prevails in certain circles in Germany that the Allies will not incessantly demand the delivery of the ships provided for under the Treaty of Peace. This optimism is based, not upon any question of change of opinion on the part of the Allies, but solely upon the assumption that the reaction taking place in freights is causing, or has already caused a decline in the number of new orders received for ships both in Great Britain and the United States, and that with less work in prospect in the future Allied shipbuilders would not look on quietly while the German yards were busy on the production of ships for the Allies. We reproduce this view of the problem for what it is worth. At the same time there is no doubt that the German yards are constructing, and are being permitted to construct, ships other than those for the Allied account, consistently with the quantities of raw materials available. This view is supported by the fact that the shipowners and shipbuilders are demanding the delivery of twice as much shipbuilding material as they received in pre-war times, and are making representations to the Ministry for Economic Affairs, complaining that the steel makers are exporting three times the monthly tonnage of ships plates, etc., supplied to the national shipyards—a complaint which the iron and steel interests affirm is without foundation, 8000 tons monthly being delivered in each case. It is not easy to reconcile zeal of this character with work for Allied account and at prices per ton to be determined and accounted for by the Reparation Commission. It thus seems as if some relaxation of the conditions relating to the delivery of ships has already been made. As bearing on this matter, the following passage may be quoted from a German newspaper: "If we were entirely free in shipbuilding, and if we had sufficient constructional materials and a body of workmen again glad to work efficiently, it would probably be possible for our shipowners, with the large-hearted assistance of the Reich, within a few years to fill up in some measure their stock of ships by means of new construction in our own country-" The total production of the shipyards in Germany, in 1913, amounted to 510,000 gross tons, including warships, and included 34,000 tons for foreign account. It is calculated that with the new shipyards built during the war or approaching completion, and the extensions now in progress, the productive capacity of the country has been advanced or will soon be increased to 1,000,000 tons per annum. But there is a vast difference between output capacity and actual output, and a long time will necessarily elapse before the production reaches the level of that which prevailed in 1913 unless a very substantial improvement takes place in the supplies of raw materials to the iron and steel works, and consequently of semi-finished and finished materials and of machinery for the shipyards. The country has adequate coal resources, but it is desired to keep deliveries for home consumption; the production of pit coal was 10,000,000 tons greater in the first half of this year than in the corresponding half of 1919. In the case of iron ore there has been a considerable increase in the imports from Sweden this year. Iron ore resources have been obtained in Brazil; and German emissaries scoured Spain, South America and the Dutch Indies during the war in order to secure ore concessions, and have succeeded in some cases, while hopes are entertained of again receiving ore from South Russia at no distant date. Of course, most of these problems relate to possible future developments, thus showing the foresight exercised by the iron and steel interests during the years of hostilities.
For the present, German hopes are concentrated on the possibility of reconstructing the merchant fleets. Builders have been complaining that they are hampered not only by the scarcity of shipbuilding materials, but also by the high prices charged for them. They, however, now have the satisfaction of knowing that the price reduction of two months ago was followed by a further decrease last week, so that the costs of construction should further decline. The policy of steel makers taking up financial interests in shipyards, which was begun before and continued during the war, is now being extended so that the yards are gradually becoming assured of constant deliveries of plates, sections, etc. But the limits imposed by the iron ore problem upon the production of these materials will retard the revival of the shipbuilding industry on a large scale for some years.—The Engineer, Aug. 6, 1920.
GREAT BRITAIN
Ireland in War Time.—In view of our leading article a few weeks ago on the strategical aspect of the Irish problem it is interesting to note that Mr. Lloyd George has just told a Labor delegation that the granting of complete independence to Ireland would not be compatible with the security of British communications. He referred to the very large number of ships sunk by German U-boats off the Irish coast, and developed the point, raised in our article, that if during the war the Irish coast had been in hostile possession we could scarcely have hoped to overcome the submarine menace. It is reassuring to find that the government is not unmindful of this highly important aspect of the Irish question, to which far too little attention has hitherto been paid. Fairness compels us to add that service opinion is not unanimous as to the influence that Irish independence would have on a future war in which Great Britain was involved. We remember a prize essay published in The United Service Magazine some eight years ago on the subject of what changes would take place in the existing stretegical position of this country owing to a maritime war (1) if Ireland were neutral; (2) if that country were hostile. The writer denied that an enemy who proposed to invade England would gain any advantage by first landing troops and stores in Ireland. As regards the trade routes, he concluded that Irish hostility would not affect naval strategy, for Ireland had no navy. It would, however, facilitate the seizure and occupation of a suitable base. His summary of the whole matter was as follows: Ireland, possessing neither an army nor navy, could not enforce neutrality, and therefore her pretensions to neutrality would be wholly ineffectual. Ireland's hostility would react upon the military rather than the naval situation. It would not alter very much the distribution of the fleet, for that depends mainly on the whereabouts of the enemy's fleet, and an enemy would be unlikely to send his fleet into Irish waters which are in the area of Great Britain's maximum control where our fleet could wage war most successfully. This, of course, was written before the day of the long-distance submarine and its application to commerce-destroying work. In the essayist's opinion, Irish independence had another aspect in its relationship to war: "War is a reality, and its reality lies in this—that it requires a principle and practice of government entirely different from the piping times of peace. Ireland's economic existence is based on Great Britain. Her commerce and her shores are protected by our fleet, but the pillars of her national life are lost to view in the froth and spume of Hibernian provincialism. Ireland can only approach others by sea, and her real independence can only rest on British supremacy at sea. Ireland, so far as the sea is concerned, must remain one with Great Britain."—The Naval and Military Record, August 4, 1920.
Naval Research and Experiment.—In nearly every proposal that we have seen with regard to the broad principles which should govern British naval policy in the years ahead great emphasis is rightly laid on the necessity of devoting a generous percentage of available funds to research and experimental work. The Admiralty have given a definite assurance that everything possible will be done in future to keep the navy abreast of scientific and technical progress. A Department of Scientific Research and Experiment has been created under the Controller of the Navy, and steps are being taken to extend the facilities enjoyed by the service for working out problems in connection with the development of every description of naval material. For instance, experimental establishments have been attached to the technical training schools at Portsmouth, and it is well known that they have already performed a great deal of useful work in improving mines, torpedoes, and electrical apparatus. Another branch which the war brought into existence is the Anti-Submarine School, an institution of capital importance which ought on no account to be handicapped by lack of funds. The Admiralty's general scheme for promoting research looks satisfactory enough on paper, but we know from experience that these excellent projects have a way of getting quietly shelved in the course of time unless the searchlight of publicity is trained upon them at regular intervals. Next to the welfare and contentment of the personnel, we consider an unremitting study and application of war experience to tactics and material to be the most important present-day duty of the naval administration.
It would be absurd to pretend that the weapons and material we possessed at the outbreak of war were as perfect as they might have been. The German torpedoes, mines, and projectiles were superior to ours, and it is no use denying that the efforts of our commanders at sea were often stultified by the indifferent material they had to work with. Apparently there had been too much theory and too little experiment. It seems almost incredible that the deficiencies of our armor-piercing shell—to mention one notorious example—were not discovered until the day of battle. The suggestion that the projectiles were the best that could be manufactured at that period is preposterous; moreover, it is disproved by the fact that as soon as the failure became known we at once set about producing shell of infinitely better quality, although the enemy never gave us an opportunity to test them upon his ships. In this case no doubt departmental conservatism was at the root of the trouble, but a contributory cause was the shortsighted policy that refused to spend money on practical trials. Before the war we often drew attention to Germany's lavish expenditure on the testing of her naval weapons. It was the invariable practice there to make exhaustive tests of every class of material before finally accepting it for naval purposes. No new gun was adopted until it had been tried under conditions resembling as nearly as possible those of actual war. New projectiles were fired against targets representing the most strongly armored ships of the day. and if they failed to do all that was expected of them an improved type was at once designed. In this way the Germans had evolved a shell that would carry its powerful bursting charge through the thickest armor, while we had no thoroughly reliable A. P. shell until the third year of the war. The same policy of striving for maximum efficiency, regardless of trouble and cost, was pursued in the development of gunnery, torpedoes, mines, and systems of armor protection. Of course, it was a costly business. Between 1908 and 1914 Germany is said to have spent four times as much money on this sort of thing as we did, but her method proved in the end to be the most economical.
In the light of present knowledge it can be asserted with confidence that had all our material been as technically efficient as Germany's was, the task of crushing her at sea would have been enormously simpler and cheaper. Experience that might have been purchased in peace time for a very modest sum had to be hurriedly acquired in war at a terrific cost. It is not enough that the navy has learned its lesson in this respect; public opinion also needs to be reminded that the mere voting of money for men and ships is not the whole of its duty to the service. It is for the Admiralty to insist on proper financial provision being made for the continuance, on a scale of reasonable dimensions, of the research and experimental work that was in full swing towards the end of the war. Unless this is done the priceless experience we gained from the war will be wasted. As the Admiralty have said, "To stop pure research work altogether at this moment would be a retrograde step, and might conceivably have a serious effect ultimately on development of types of ships and weapons, and on economy generally." Advantage might profitably be taken of the pause in new construction to press for an increase in next year's vote for "scientific research and experiment," which in the current estimates stands at about £285,000. This sum is so obviously inadequate as to suggest that the old penny wise pound foolish system is already in force once more.—The Naval and Military Record, August 18, 1920.
Developments in Naval Design.—On the occasion of his recent visit to the industrial centers of Yorkshire, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Beatty made an important statement relative to naval policy. Speaking at Sheffield, he said that the history of the British Navy acquitted it of any taint of aggression, and was a sufficient guarantee that its powers would be exercised for the benefit of all those who used the seas for lawful purposes. Since the war, he proceeded, there had been no new construction; but ships did not last forever, and progress in science and in technique combined to shorten the "life" of a man-of-war. The Admiralty, however, took the view that we could afford to pause before resuming naval construction. The policy of the moment was to investigate the problems of war, and to assimilate and coordinate the lessons derived from experience, so that when the time came, as come it must, to turn those lessons to a useful purpose, they should be applied with wisdom and understanding. So far as facilities for experimental and research work were concerned, the navy was better equipped to-day than it had ever been before. He concluded by deprecating the wild and fantastic theories which had lately been propounded in certain quarters, "where surprise is felt that we are not to-day constructing big ships which would dive beneath the waves one minute and ascend into the clouds the next." The First Sea Lord's speech is a much needed reminder that our naval commitments did not terminate with the conclusion of peace. That we are able to postpone for a certain period the laying down of new warships is due, not to any fundamental change in the principles of national defence which hitherto have impelled us to maintain a supreme navy, but simply to the fact that our present margin of strength suffices to meet the requirements of the immediate future. Sooner or later, however, this margin will disappear already it is shrinking visibly—and when that occurs it will be the duty of our naval authorities to submit a new shipbuilding program. Meanwhile the Admiralty, as the First Sea Lord assures us, is utilizing the pause to determine what modifications in ships, machinery and weapons ' may be indicated by war experience. It is quite clear that the present board is in no mind to dispense with the battleship altogether. Its views on the question were set forth in the First Lord's memorandum circulated on March 12. This document stated that the Naval Staff, having examined the question with extreme care, profoundly dissented from the opinion that the battleship is dead and that submersible and air vessels are the types of the future. "In our opinion," it was added, "the capital ship remains the unit on which sea power is built up. So far from the late war having shown that the capital ship is doomed, it has, on the contrary, proved the necessity for that type."
We may, then, assume that capital ships will form part of the new naval program to be introduced when circumstances render it expedient, the more so because it is in this type that our lead is rapidly diminishing by reason of competition abroad; but no one outside the councils of the Admiralty is able to forecast the characteristics of our future ships. It is commonly supposed that H. M. S. Hood represents the last word in British naval design. This is an error, for the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff, Captain Sir A. Chatfield, has told us that if a new ship were to be laid down immediately it would not be a second Hood. He admitted that naval opinion no longer attached to high speed the importance that it did before the war, and that substantial protection was now considered an indispensable feature of every ship intended to lie in line. It would, however, be premature to conclude from this that the battleship of the future will be smaller and cheaper than the latest existing types. True, the demand for great speed has materially contributed to the enormous growth in dimensions, and when, as in the case of the Hood, that demand is coupled with a heavy armament and complete protection, it inevitably leads to huge displacements. But if the naval tactician is ready to forego high speed, it does not follow that he will consent to part with the extra percentage of displacement necessitated by installing high-powered machinery. On the contrary, he is more likely to resist a reduction in size on the ground that the weight saved on machinery can be profitably utilized by strengthening armament and protection. Nor would such an attitude on his part be unreasonable, for it is certain that the standard of offensive and defensive power, as represented by the Hood, will have to be raised if our future designs are to bear comparison with the best foreign ships. A "modified Hood" mounting the same armament as that ship and embodying the same system of protection, but with a speed of 25 knots instead of 31. might be built on a displacement of 32,000 tons, as against 41,200 tons; but if an extra pair of guns and a few extra inches of armor were postulated the figure would probably rise of 40,000 tons, if not more. As evidence that high speed is not necessarily the capital factor in determining size, we may instance the new American battleships. The North Carolina is not a particularly fast ship judged by modern ideas, for her machinery is estimated to develop 60,000 shaft horsepower for a speed of 23 knots; yet she displaces no less than 43,500 tons, or 2300 tons more than the Hood. In this case most of the weight has gone into artillery and armor. The North Carolina is to be armed with twelve 16-inch 50 caliber guns, and sixteen 6-inch quick-firers, which—counting the primary armament alone—will enable her to deliver a broadside of 25,200 lbs., as against the Hood's 15,360 lbs. Her belt armor is reported to have a maximum thickness of 16 inches, and all the main fighting positions to have equally substantial protection. It is obvious, therefore, that except in the matter of speed this American vessel will possess a marked tactical advantage over the Hood, and speed, as we have said, is an element to which British naval opinion no longer attaches cardinal value.—The Engineer, August 13, 1920.
Admiralty Concessions to the Lower Deck.—The decisions by the Admiralty on the requests put forward through the Welfare Committee in October, 1919, are promulgated in Fleet Orders. Altogether 307 requests, great and small, were put forward, 80 of which were of a general character and the remainder appertaining to particular classes. Each request has been carefully considered by the Board, and over 100 have been granted in whole or in part. In certain instances decisions have yet to be announced, many questions to which they relate being under consideration by special committees.
The principal benefits granted as a result of the welfare system during the year are set forth as follows:
- Permanent institution of marriage allowance.
- Increase of provision and long leave allowance from 2s. 1d. to 3s. 6d. a day in view of the present high cost of living.
- Improvements to be made in men's accommodation both in ships and shore establishments.
- Change of uniform for petty officers over four years.
- Improved scales of pension for service for men invalided for war disability.
- Concession to old roll pensioners.
To a request that the mate scheme of advancement from the lower deck to commissioned rank should be open to all branches, with a few exceptions, the Admiralty reply that they are not prepared to extend the scheme to other than the seaman and engine-room branches, and the number of ratings advanced must depend on the requirements of the service. It is clear from the number of requests involving the principle of automatic promotion that there is a considerable body of feeling among the men in favor of it. The Board, however, are of opinion that automatic promotion is not in the interests of the Service.—The United Service Gazette, Aug. 12, 1920.
JAPAN
Japanese Building Program.—Much interest has been aroused in this country over the Japanese naval building program which calls for the construction of eight superdreadnoughts and eight battle cruisers—the eight-eight program, as it is termed. Information at hand shows that the battle cruisers of the Akagi and the Amagi type, are to be smaller by more than 3000 tons than the American dreadnought battle cruiser Saratoga and her class.
The Akagi and the Amagi are in a class of four under construction, the others being the Atago and the Atako. Four similar vessels are projected. Figures obtainable show the following comparative measurements of the Akagi class with the Saratoga class:
Akagi class—full load displacement, 40,000 tons: speed, 30 knots per hour; main battery, eight 16-inch guns; shaft horsepower not definitely known. One report is that the shaft horsepower is 250,000, but this is not believed, as the larger vessels of the Saratoga class are to be faster than the Akagi class with much less horsepower than 250,000.
Saratoga class—full load displacement, 43,500 tons; speed, 23.25 knots per hour; main battery, eight 16-inch guns; shaft horsepower, 180,000.
The Japanese dreadnoughts Negato and Mutsu are compared with the ships of the American Colorado class in that they are of the same classification and almost of a size. The Japanese vessels will have a slight advantage over the Colorado class in displacement and more than two knots better speed. The comparison follows:
Colorado—Full load displacement, 33,590; speed, 21 knots main battery, eight 16-inch guns.
Negato and Mutsu—Full load displacement, 33,800; speed, 23.5; main battery, eight 16-inch guns.
The Japanese vessels are supposed to be four-turbine ships. The Negato was launched on Nov. 16, 1919. The Mutsu was launched on May 31, 1920. The material for two other vessels of this class is being assembled. Four others are scheduled for completion in 1929. Of the battle cruisers of the eight-eight program two are being built to be completed by 1923. two others have been authorized and four are projected. These last mentioned six should be completed by 1927.
A comparison of the United States and Japanese battle fleets in 1923 will show the following:
United States—Battleships, 17; 14-inch guns, 84; 16-inch guns, 104; displacement, 624,074 tons.
Battle cruisers, 6; 14-inch guns, o; 16-inch guns, 48; displacement. 261.000 tons.
Total weight of broadside fire of American battle cruisers, 98,304 pounds. Japan—Battleships, 8; 14-inch guns, 48; 16-inch guns, 32; displacement, 258,860 tons.
Battle cruisers, 6; 14-inch guns, 32; 16-inch guns, 16.
Total weight of broadside fire of Japanese battle cruisers. 76.704 pounds.
In the seventeen battleships of the American fleet, built and building, are six vessels of more than 40,000 tons displacement. All are included in the program to be completed by 1923. In addition to these the United States is building four battleships of more than 33,000 tons.
All the new super-dreadnoughts of more than 33.000 tons and more than 43,000 tons will carry batteries of 16-inch guns, the four ships of the Colorado class having eight each and the six ships of the South Dakota class having twelve each.
The Saratoga class of battle cruisers, which the Navy Department hopes to complete by 1923, comprises six vessels. The American Navy has no battle cruisers in commission.
Under the intensive Japanese building program, eight battleships and six battle cruisers are to be completed by 1923 and it is expected that the rest of the Japanese program for capital vessels—those capable of going into the first battle line—will be completed in 1927 with twelve battleships and twelve battle cruisers added to the fleet. In addition, the Japanese program call? for eight high speed cruisers of 6000 tons, twenty-four light cruisers of 5000 tons, thirty-two destroyers of 1300 ton's, thirty-two destroyers of 850 tons, twenty-four submarines of 1300 tons, forty submarines of 800 tons, and twelve-special duty ships of about 12,000 tons.—New York Times, Aug. 27, 1920.
Japanese Launchings in First Half-Year.—The number and tonnage of ships of over 1000 tons gross launched in Japan during the first six months of 1920 were as follows:
Month | Number of ships | Gross tonnage |
January | 6 | 25,605 |
February | 7 | 41,415 |
March | 13 | 58,330 |
April | 12 | 56,725 |
May | 10 | 51,850 |
June | 8 | 32,770 |
Total | 56 | 266,695 |
—The Nautical Gazette, Sept. 9, 1920.
UNITED STATES
America and Poland.—It is one of the tragedies of the world we live in to-day that it produces no statesman of vision. The course events in Russia were taking was plain when the war ended. But the peace was made in a cloud of words and phrases as if the catastrophe in the East had no meaning for the West. The United States, being furthest away from it. has placed herself in a more difficult position than any of the other Allies for dealing with it. But there is a very real fear in American official circles of Bolshevism spreading across the Atlantic. That is why Mr. Colby, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, whose views are also those of the President has sent such a strongly worded Note to the Italian Government, who asked for the Washington standpoint in the matter. In it Poland's independence is upheld and the Soviet Government denounced as a menace to all moral, political and social principles upon which our civilization is based. Since the Senate has hung up the Peace Treaty the United States can give little practical effect to her policy. She cannot send naval or military aid, munitions, or arrange for a financial loan. But the Note definitely places her on the side of France as opposed to entering into any relations with the Terrorists, and gives Poland moral support at a very critical moment. It clears the air considerably, too, that the Government of a Great Power, and one whose democratic basis is so solid, should speak out plainly on the true nature and aims of Bolshevism. As in the Great War, so in the struggle which is just beginning, America, if slow in taking an active part is quick to show where her sympathy lies.—The Army and Navy Gasette, Aug. 21, 1920.
Is Naval Design in the Flux?—Are naval design, construction, strategy and all the rest of it in a state of flux? When Beatty led the German fleet into contact with the British, Jellicoe, with twenty-five battleships, had the speed and power to close in and absolutely annihilate the Germans. Why did he not do so? Because of his very proper fear of the torpedo. He escaped torpedo damage by keeping the German destroyers at such a distance that their torpedoes were discharged haphazardly, lost their speed before they reached the British line, and were easily avoided by maneuvering.
Have you ever considered that the gas engine is liable to upset many of the theories and practices of naval construction and warfare? It is a thought well worth consideration, and we invite attention to it just now.
Is it not rather strange that the British should have scrapped half their battleship fleet and stopped all battleship construction? And that they should so complacently sit down and watch another navy spending; seven hundred and fifty million dollars on eighteen battleships and battle-cruisers which, theoretically, when completed, will wrest from her that protective supremacy at sea which she has always believed, and still believes, to be necessary to the security of her far-flung empire? Why this complacency. If you asked Admiral Benson, he would probably answer: "They are hard up. It is necessity." But can we be so sure of this? Is it not possible that their vast war experience showed the British that the terrific punishing-power of the torpedo, due to new methods of bringing it within point-blank range of the enemy, demands a radical revision of some of our fundamental war concepts?
We believe that in future war the torpedo will at last come into its own, and it will be the internal combustion engine that will work the change. It gave us the motor car and the airplane, and now it is perhaps destined to dethrone the battleship and battle-cruiser as the supreme elements of naval strength. But how? Well, the British have several large and fast torpedo-plane carriers. Let us forecast a duel between a twelve-gun, 23-knot Massachusetts, and a 32-knot torpedo-plane carrier, with twice that number of planes aboard. Steaming outside of 16-inch gun range, the carrier would send in her planes which, swooping down from great height at 150 miles an hour, would drop their torpedoes within close range and return for more. But the bulge will save the ship? No; for the torpedoes will be set to pass underneath the ship and they will be fired magnetically by the action of the steel mass of the ship itself. And you could not put side and bottom bulges, both, upon a ship—she would be all bulge and but little ship.
Again, the internal combustion engine has opened up another form of attack in the shape of the so-called one-man torpedo boat—a type which is coming along very fast. It begins to look as though the gas-driven, high speed, motor boat, carrying its torpedo discharge below water, would fulfill the functions in which the torpedo boat failed utterly and the destroyer partially. It has the torpedo efficiency of the destroyer without its size and visibility. To hit, the torpedo must be fired at close range—the German's found that out at Jutland. The torpedo motor boat is so small a mark that it can dash in at thirty knots to within point-blank range without the anti-torpedo gunner being able to draw a bead upon it, so rapid is the change of range; and twenty sea-going motor boats can be sent in for the cost of one destroyer.
Seaworthiness? Well, they are growing in size, and the latest type would have no difficulty in keeping station as part of a fleet organization.
There are evidences, clear to the close student of naval development, that naval theory, construction, strategy and tactics are very much in the flux just now, or soon will be.—The Scientific American, Aug. 14, 1920.
The Design of War Vessels as Affected by the World War. (Rear Admiral David Watson Taylor, Chief Constructor U.S.N.).—The Battle of Trafalgar was fought October 21, 1805, or early in the nineteenth century. In the early part of the present century the tactics employed in that battle were still being discussed, but although Nelson's Flagship, the Victory, is preserved by England at Portsmouth, it is of no interest from a material point of view to designers of war vessels of the present day. Similarly, with the rapid engineering development of naval material which has been going on for more than 50 years and bids fair to continue, the material lessons from the World War must be gathered within a comparatively short time. Even so, to answer fully the question, "What has been the effect of the World War on warship design?" is not as yet possible. For years it will be necessary to collate and study an enormous mass of experience, some written, some oral, some originating from the responsible controlling bodies of the great navies, and much from individuals, including not only those of great eminence, but many whose names will never emerge from comparative obscurity, though their experience in the aggregate may in the long run exercise a dominating influence.
As a practical proposition the full effect of war experience will be demonstrated in concrete form only after service opinion has been crystallized and become definite in direction as a result of study and discussion by a large number of officers. Certainly that will be the case in the American Navy where the organization is such that service opinion necessarily controls policy in the development of naval types. The service is a customer of the naval designer, and although the latter may influence and at times interpret and lead service opinion, the customer will have what he demands. What I say to-day must therefore be taken more in the light of a discussion of this intensely interesting subject, than as a hard-and-fast laying down of principles or expressions of final opinion.
Let me call attention at once to the fact that, after all, there has been nothing startling or revolutionary brought about by the experience of 51 months of war. There has mainly resulted an intensive development of each of the accepted types which existed at the outbreak of the war and which were the results of many years of study, experiment, and practice in all of the great navies of the world. It is true that some new types have appeared, but with one exception, namely, aircraft carriers, they have been of minor importance when measured by the cost and time required for production.
When we consider types and not details, we must not look only to the few naval battles of the World War which can justly be classed as major actions for the influences affecting our naval construction of the future. It is necessary to consider the particular trend of naval events, the accumulated experience, and the principal phases of naval activity during the more than four years of hostilities.
The first of these must naturally be the causes which gave not only the initial but the continuing command of the sea to the Allies. We know that at the outbreak of the war all German mercantile vessels quickly disappeared from the high seas, being either held in their own ports or promptly interned in neutral ports. On the other hand, Allied commerce proceeded on its way. It was not the great British Battle Fleet which the German merchantmen feared, for they knew that this fleet would be concentrated at one point within easy striking distance of the German coasts and therefore it could be easily avoided. What they feared were the Allied cruisers, auxiliaries, destroyers and light vessels of every class. Just as the few German cruisers which were at large were captured or sunk within a few months, so could this cloud of Allied light craft have been swept from the seas had the German heavy fighting forces been able operate without first giving battle to the superior British Battle Fleet. They were unable to do this at any time during the war. As a result every military effort of the Central Powers afloat and ashore was made more difficult because of the slow but sure throttling of their economic and industrial life. Without the British Battle Fleet the blockade of Germany would have been ineffective. This factor had such a determining influence, both on the duration and final outcome of the war, that the types of vessel which make up the main fighting fleets are more firmly established than ever as the essential ones contributing to naval power. If these great battleships and battle cruisers disappear, either in the near or the distant future, it will be as a result of engineering progress and the invention and perfection of new weapons and not as a result of the World War.
Battleships and battle cruisers were in actual conflict with vessels of the same type and power on only two occasions: at the Dogger Bank on January 24, 1915, and at Jutland on May 31, 1016. These actions, however, do not by any means represent the sum total of their activity. When the location and activity of the German Cruiser Squadron in the Pacific was disclosed by the tragedy off Coronel, two battle cruisers at once sailed to search out and destroy this troublesome squadron. Perhaps they were lucky in coming into contact with the enemy immediately, but the celerity and success with which they accomplished their mission at the Falkland Islands gave a great impetus to the favor in which this type was held by naval men. The immediate effect of this sentiment was seen in the British battle cruisers Repulse and Renown, which represent the extreme of the type; that is, armor and gunpowder were sacrificed to speed to an even greater extent than in the original battle cruiser. These were quickly followed by an even greater extreme, the Courageous, Furious and Glorious, which can be denominated either small light battle cruisers or enormously large light cruisers, as they have the largest guns characteristic of the former and the total absence of armor protection characteristic of the latter, while possessing the high speed common to both. The battle off Dogger Bank served only to confirm the conclusions on which these two classes of ships had been laid down. In this engagement, the rival battle cruisers met for the first time, with the result that those on both sides demonstrated their ability to stand heavy punishment without succumbing to fatal damage. Even the older German cruiser Blacker, which was inferior in gunpower, protection and speed to all of the others, succumbed only after surviving for a considerable period of extremely heavy punishment. If there had been no further war experience with the battle cruiser type it is likely that the idea that protection is not important for them would have prevailed, and the combination of extreme speed, guns of the largest size, and the minimum of protection might have been in favor for some years. But the Battle of Jutland gave a rude shock to opinions based on earlier actions.
The Battle of Jutland is easily the foremost single event of modern naval history. The controversial phases of the tactics employed in this battle are only of interest to the naval designer in so far as the material in the two fleets influenced the judgment and decisions of the high command on each side, and to the extent that new instruments of naval warfare, not then available but developed since, would have exercised a determining influence in the tactics employed; in the latter class comes the use of aircraft, and I will have occasion later in this paper to refer to the use and influence of aircraft in naval operations from the designer's point of view. By far the most important aspect of this engagement to the designer is the manner in which the various types of vessels engaged fulfilled the functions for which they were originally designed. In regard to type, the first outstanding fact is that battle cruisers must inevitably play an important role in major fleet actions. Each side in turn, first the Germans and then the British, used their battle cruisers to lead the whole or a portion of the enemy's fleet to contact with the main body of their own fleet. In fact, with the single exception of the Warspite, it was the battle cruisers on both sides that stood the brunt of the action and received the lion's share of punishment from the enemy. If the battle had been fought to a finish between the battleships, there might have been a different story to tell. The losses and heavy damages sustained by the vessels of battle cruiser type bear out to some extent the pre-war contentions of those who maintained that it was not fit to take its place in the line of battle. On the other hand, excepting their greater vulnerability, it cannot be denied that they acquitted themselves with credit even when pitted against the more heavily armed and armored battleship. Furthermore, not only was the value of their great speed demonstrated, but also the value of one side holding the speed gauge over the other was shown, for, it was due to the possession of higher speed by the British that the German Fleet, at the end of the second phase of the battle, found itself in a position which was so bad tactically that the German Chief-of-Staff is quoted as saying that if any admiral had involved himself in such a position in peace time maneuvers he would never again have obtained a command afloat. Another result from this action of general influence on type is found, in connection with the use of older battleships, generally referred to as of the "pre-dreadnought" era. The German Fleet included one squadron of vessels of this type, and this squadron not only failed to be of any essential assistance to them but proved actually to be a handicap on their freedom of maneuver. The force of this lesson was shown by the fact that subsequent to the battle most of the German battleships of this type were retired from active commission. The material weakness of this type of older ships, when opposed to the most modern weapons, was shown in the case of the Pommeni, which blew up and sunk immediately as a result of a single torpedo. The ineffectiveness of these older ships, as shown by many incidents of war, will be referred to later.
The ability of the large, modern, heavily-armored ships not only to survive, but to continue in action after the most severe punishment, was perhaps best shown by the British battleship Warspite, which, due to an unfortunate accident to the steering gear, sheered out of the battle line and made two complete circles within short range of the German Fleet. This vessel was hit by major caliber shell between 20 and 25 times. The net result of this tremendous hammering was that one out of eight 15-inch guns was put out of action; there was no damage of any kind to her main machinery plant; the upper works and unprotected portions of the ship were riddled; communications were interrupted to a considerable extent; and some compartments at and below the waterline were flooded by water which came in from above, but none of the main compartments were affected to such an extent that the entering water could not be handled by the pumping arrangements provided. In short, although the ship had lost a certain amount of her margin of safety, due to decreased buoyancy and stability, and her speed had suffered on account of increased resistance due to her greater draft, she was entirely capable of resuming action after adjustments to her steering gear.
The Marlborough was another example of a battleship continuing in action after receiving what we were inclined formerly to consider would be a disabling attack. This vessel, although of the "dreadnaught" era, has not what is now considered a highly efficient form of protection against torpedo attack, yet, after being struck by a torpedo, resulting in the flooding of a number of compartments, which produced a list of about 7 degrees, the vessel continued in action at a speed of 17 knots. "
Similarly, the German battleship Ostfriesland (of the "dreadnaught" era) was struck by a torpedo which produced some flooding, but the vessel was otherwise unaffected and continued on with the German Fleet.
No other British battleships received any considerable amount of punishment, but three of the modern German ships of this class received, respectively, 7, 7 and 13 hits from major caliber guns, but none of them were disabled or even damaged to an extent sufficient to prevent them continuing in action. The Markgraf, which was struck 13 times, is a particularly illuminating example of the amount of punishment which a modern heavily armored ship can stand. The only damage affecting the efficiency of the ship was the cutting of the communications from the masthead fire control positions, and this only resulted in shifting the control to the lower armored station provided for this purpose. The casualties on this ship were likewise remarkably low, as there were only 8 dead and 9 wounded, or only a little more than one casualty for each major caliber hit.
One particular class of hit of special interest to American designers is that in which turrets or their barbettes have been hit. Taking the case of four British and four German vessels which suffered heavy damage, it is found that out of a total of about 116 hits, 19, or 16.5 per cent, were on turrets or barbettes, of which 16 were struck. Of this number, four were completely put out of action and one gun in each of four others was disabled, while the remaining eight escaped without serious damage. In other words, out of 66 big guns carried by these ships, the emplacements of 32 were struck, but only 12 were sufficiently damaged to prevent their further use. This comparatively low proportion of casualty in the major offensive armament, together with the demonstration of the ability of the mechanism of a turret to continue to function even after the turret has had a direct hit, appears to dispose of the argument of "too many eggs in one basket" so frequently advanced against the American three-gun turret.
Turning to the damage sustained by the battle cruisers, one's attention is naturally taken first by the tragic loss of the three great British vessels of this type. Although in one case the Germans claimed a torpedo hit on one of them, it is generally accepted that the loss of all three was directly attributable to gunfire, but the immediate cause of the loss in each case is still, and always will be, shrouded in mystery. It is, of course, known that each one sank In an appallingly short interval of time and that in each case at least a portion of the magazines blew up. The mystery lies in the immediate cause of the magazine explosion. Many different explanations have been advanced, but all of these affect details rather than the general characteristics of type. There seems little doubt that one of two tilings happened: German shell either entered the magazine through penetration of the protective deck, or, having pierced turret or barbette and exploded, flame was communicated to the magazine along the path followed by the ammunition from magazine to gun. From the fact that in the case of British ships that survived, there was only one case of penetration below the protective deck at any part (no harm resulted from this), it would seem to be highly improbable that the three battle cruisers were all sunk by protective' deck penetrations directly over the magazines, and not very probable that any one of them was so sunk. We must not permit our judgment to be swayed too largely by this particularly spectacular phase of the battle. Just as in the case of the battleships previously referred to, the remaining battle cruisers on both sides demonstrated ability of modern ships of large size to withstand heavy punishment without losing their fighting efficiency. The battle cruiser type is essentially and unavoidably less thoroughly protected than the battleship type. This greater vulnerability must result in greater loss of the battle cruiser type, other things being equal; but in the Jutland fight the battle cruisers were engaged much longer and much more severely than the battleships, so that a greater percentage of loss of this type should have resulted even had their protection been equal to that of the battleships. A notable fact in regard to the modern ships, both battleships and battle cruisers, on both sides, is that not a single one experienced a disabling casualty to its machinery, either as a result of damage from enemy fire or as a result of engineering breakdown. In the case of one British ship and one German ship, fires were drawn from under the boilers in one fire-room, due in each case to leakage from adjacent compartments, but in each case this leakage was controlled by the pumping plant provided for the purpose. Leaving out the three lost battle cruisers, for which no data is available, the dozen large ships in the two fleets which bore the brunt of the punishment were hit a total of about 150 times by large caliber shell, or an average of more than 12 times each. Only one of these dozen ships, namely, the German battle cruiser Luetzotv, sunk as the result of the damage received. Even this vessel sank only after six hours. She had received 17 large caliber hits and one torpedo. She continued to try to make the best of her way to port, but the struggle was given up about one o'clock in the morning; her crew was taken off by destroyers and she was finally sunk by a friendly torpedo.
The results of the battle, as a test of the defensive qualities of capital ships, show- that in the entire action only four modern armored ships, all of -them of the battle cruiser type, were lost as a result of the action. This was out of a total of 14 engaged and at least seven out of the remaining 10 survived heavier punishment than most designers in pre-war days would have considered possible.
Before the war there were two distinct schools of naval thought in regard to the main armament for the largest fighting ships. This difference of opinion existed internally in probably every navy, but internationally the American and British navies represented the "Big Gun" advocates, as is shown by the fact that in the former we find successive increases from 12-inch to 14-inch to 16-inch, and in the latter from 12-inch to 1354-inch to 15-inch. On the other hand, the Germans adhered for a number of years to the 11-inch gun and increased their caliber to 12-inch with apparent reluctance, and a larger caliber did not appear until close to the end of the war. There were undoubtedly excellent theoretical arguments on both sides of this contention. Even now the argument cannot be definitely settled in terms of absolute material results, for too many other factors, which cannot be eliminated, enter into the problem. A convincing answer, however, appears to be provided in the very decided trend of German Naval opinion since the Battle of Jutland. Practically every report from German sources and every German publication bearing on the Battle of Jutland lays stress on the superiority in range and accuracy of the British 15-inch guns. Even if no definite material advantage for the larger caliber gun could be established, there appears to remain a marked moral superiority on the side possessing the biggest guns. This, of course, only confirms the previous views and policies followed in our service.
Summing up, therefore, we find that four outstanding facts of interest to the designer appear to emerge from the smoke and flames of the battle:
First. The value of armor protection.
Second. As a corollary to this, the necessity for the maximum number of major caliber guns; for, if the modern ship can withstand great punishment, we must, for purposes of offence, provide a sufficient number of guns to inflict a degree of punishment which will be fatal.
Third. The tactical value of speed.
Fourth. The futility of subjecting older ships to the attack of modem weapons.
In other words, the value of each one of the three major elements entering into capital ship design was demonstrated and it cannot be said that any single one has emerged with an importance transcending that of the others. If, however, one must choose among them, the consensus of opinion will probably attach more importance to protection than before the battle. This arises largely from two causes:
1st. The deep impression on the human mind by such an outstanding tragedy as the almost instantaneous loss of the three great British battle cruisers.
2d. The impression that German ships, generally speaking, stood punishment better than the English. Admiral von Tirpitz has been reported to have laid down as the fundamental principle of German design: That vessels before everything else must float; that they must not sink, and if possible, not even list, and that all else is of secondary importance.
This emphasis on the feature of protection is shown already by the intensified and successful efforts of both the British and the American navies to perfect an efficient form of torpedo protection. In this connection, I think I can safely say that both services have solved this problem so far as the torpedo has been developed to date. It is also interesting to know that during the war the two services frankly and fully compared their solutions of this problem, and that although the solutions differ radically in details, they do not differ much in underlying ideas and both are believed to be successful iii result. This emphasis of the protective feature is further shown by the fact that our battle cruisers, whose construction was delayed, due to the necessity for our concentrating on the construction of torpedo craft and merchant vessels during the war, have been re-designed and given much heavier and more complete protection than was originally contemplated, accepting at the same time the slight decrease in speed necessitated thereby. We find precisely the same influence in the case of the latest British battle cruiser, the Hood, which was laid down shortly after the battle of Jutland and in which we find more than a 50 per cent increase in size as compared to the Renown, which I have previously referred to, an increase of protection almost to a battleship standard and a decrease in speed.
Turning to the lighter craft used in the Battle of Jutland, it will be found that at several critical times during the engagement both sides used their light cruisers and destroyers to obtain a tactical advantage. Each side likewise used craft of this character to repel the attacks of similar vessels of the enemy. Although the material effect was small, there being probably not more than six torpedo hits on the large vessels of both sides, the necessity for their use is clearly demonstrated not only by their success in obtaining certain tactical advantages, for which they were used, but also in the demonstration that if either fleet had been without these light craft, the torpedo casualties inflicted on the big ships by the light craft of the side possessing them would have been enormously greater. The losses of light cruisers and destroyers on both sides were heavy in actual number, but not in proportion to the total number engaged, as will be seen from the following table:
? | Light cruisers | Destroyers | ||
No. lost | No. engaged | No. lost | No. engaged | |
British | 0 | 26 | 8 | 78 |
German | 4 | 11 | 5 | 77 |
Total | 4 | 37 | 13 | 155 |
Submarines played no direct part in this battle, and it is reliably established that neither fleet was accompanied by submarines, nor were any submarines even within striking distance of the scene of action.
Similarly, aircraft played no part in the action, although it is understood that it was a part of the German plan to utilize Zeppelins for scouting purposes in connection with the sortie of the Fleet and that this was only prevented by unfavorable meteorological conditions on the 31st of May. On the following morning, however, German aircraft were out over the North Sea and were undoubtedly of some small assistance to the German Fleet in insuring their safe withdrawal to their harbors.
Passing once more to the general phases of the war, we come at once the outstanding feature of the war at sea, the submarine campaign and the methods adopted to combat it. Now that the veil of secrecy has been lifted, we all know how close the German submarine campaign came to being an outstanding factor in the final result. Without entering into the legality and ethics of the German use of the submarine against merchant shipping, which all thoughtful and enlightened men join in condemning, we cannot escape the fact that we must in the future be prepared to find the submarine playing an important part in attacking and throttling enemy commerce, even on their own coasts. This is indicated by the result of the discussion at the Peace Conference when the world at large was so incensed by the barbarous methods used in the German submarine campaign that proposals were seriously put forward to abolish the submarine entirely by international agreement. This proposal, however, was wisely not adopted for, so long as the possibility of war remains, progress of science and engineering and their application to the art of war cannot successfully be throttled unless there is complete unanimity of sentiment throughout the civilized world. The use of submarines during the war has led to placing very great emphasis on the value of radius of action of these vessels, and with radius of action there must go hand in hand improvements in the living conditions on board, so that the physical endurance of the personnel may be sufficiently conserved to permit it to make full use of the material capabilities of the vessel. Both of these elements, even without the usual and concurrent demands for higher speed and greater offensive power, inevitably lead to increased size, except for a limited class of small boats, which, due to a particular strategic situation, such as that occupied by the Germans on the Belgian Coast, makes it possible to use with good results a large number of submarines of small size and limited speed and cruising radius. The technic of mine-laying has, during the war, so kept pace with the strategical and tactical demands for the use of this weapon, that the demonstrated practicability of laying them on the enemy's coast by means of submarines must in the future be taken into account, but this does not affect the general characteristics of the type, as the mine-laying feature can easily be substituted in whole or in part for the torpedo armament. Although the submarine was throughout the war something of a disappointment in the actual results which it obtained in inflicting loss or damage on the fighting ships of the enemy, its indirect effect on the freedom of the action of the main fighting fleets was so considerable that the problem of the development of the so-called fleet submarine is still with us and must be solved largely from theoretical and engineering considerations, rather than from direct experience in action. Another use of the submarine, not largely foreseen, which developed considerable importance during the war, is that of scouting. It has been conclusively demonstrated that these underwater craft form one of the most valuable assets to a navy in obtaining and transmitting information in regard to the movements of the enemy's forces.
War experience developed and emphasized certain facts regarding submarines as a type which are very important from the point of view of a designer, and even more important from the point of view of those who have to determine the constitution of a navy. The submarine is essentially an instrument of stealth. Once detected, it must take refuge in the depths where, for any design not yet known, its offensive powers become nil, and to the depth charge or explosive bomb developed during the war it is exceedingly vulnerable. In other words, once detected and accurately located, a submarine is at the mercy of a surface vessel. While detection devices, ir spite of the enormous effort expended upon them during the war, did not reach perfection, they made much progress and will undoubtedly be steadily improved as time goes on. If we had to-day an accurate device which would locate a submerged submarine with reasonable approximation several miles off, and with accuracy when one or two hundred feet directly under the surface vessel, the submarine would be already obsolete as a weapon of war. While we may never reach this ideal, and while the submarine may be given offensive features to enable it to deal in some fashion with the surface vessel from beneath the surface, the submarine is essentially a vulnerable, and, if I may so express it, a precarious type; is necessary to-day and probably, will be for many years to come, but could not be relied upon as the main feature of a navy. We read at times of proposed submersible battleships and other such imaginations, but the experience of the war does not seem to indicate this as a probable future development even if mechanically possible.
On this same subject Sir Eustace d'Eyncourt, the Director of Naval Construction for the British Admiralty, very recently stated his views in the course of a paper presented before the British Institution of Naval Architects. He said:
"A good deal has been written and talked of lately about the surface capital ship being dead and the necessity for submersibles. But with our present knowledge it would be quite impossible to design a submersible ship which on the same displacement and cost had anything like the fighting qualities on the surface, which are possessed by the Hood (the latest British battle cruiser). Every ship is a compromise, and if in addition to the ordinary qualities of a battleship, she is required to submerge, or even partially submerge, a very considerable percentage of weight has to be added to give her this additional capability of submergence. She becomes still more of a compromise, and the added weight must detract from the fighting qualities of the ship when on the surface, so that whatever is done, other things being equal, the submersible ship must be inferior to a surface ship in an ordinary action. There are many difficulties of details in the design of a submersible battleship which would take too long to go into fully now, and although there is no doubt that submarines are capable of great development, a little thought will make it clear to anybody that if naval warfare is to continue, the surface ship of the line must still hold the field as the principal fighting unit of any great navy."
Considering types of war vessels existing at the commencement of the war, the position of the destroyer has been enhanced perhaps more than that of any other, and this has been brought about by our experience in its use against the submarine. As mentioned above, in discussing the results of the Battle of Jutland, the destroyer has established its indispensability for use with the fleet, both to attack the enemy and to protect its own capital ships. This use, however, was foreseen and provided for to at least a limited extent in all of the principal navies of the world before the war. It was not, however, foreseen that this type of vessel would be required in undreamed-of numbers to protect the sea lines of communication from the lurking underwater enemy. During the first three years of the war, it had already been found that the destroyer was the most efficient type of vessel for hunting down and destroying submarines, and for convoying or protecting a particularly valuable transport or cargo ship. In the spring of 1917, however, the losses of merchant vessels had reached such an alarming rate that the responsible authorities recognized that a new and radical method of protection must be adopted. It was then that the convoy system was put into effect, and soon proved its efficiency to a degree which could hardly have been foretold. It became then imperative that convoy should be provided as nearly as possible for every ship approaching England and France. The only available type of vessel which could perform this very arduous service, requiring many days continuously at sea in all kinds of weather, frequently at very high speed in order to accompany high-speed transports, was the destroyer. This demand placed a tremendous strain on the resources of the Allies in this type of vessel, and it is now a historic fact that the United States Fleet was stripped of its destroyers which were sent to the war zone to perform this service, and that British destroyers were detached from the combined British and American battle fleets, upon which we depended to maintain our command of the seas, until that fleet was actually seriously inferior to the German fleet in destroyer strength. From our entrance into the war the United States Navy concentrated upon destroyer building, its destroyer construction undertaken during the war being on a scale never before considered possible. It is a matter of congratulation that this has resulted in our now possessing a fleet built or to be completed this year, of more than 300 modern destroyers of the most efficient type. In regard to the effect of the war on the characteristics of destroyers, the principal demand has been in the same direction as in the case of submarines, namely, for greater cruising radius and increased shelter and comfort for the personnel. Whereas, during the greater portion of the time of actual hostilities, convoy was provided for transports and cargo vessels only in the so-called submarine zone, extending 300 to 400 miles off the European coast, it had become evident before the Armistice that as soon as we had sufficient destroyers for the purpose, escort would have to be provided, at least for the most important groups of vessels, entirely across the Atlantic. This was brought about by the ever-increasing tendency of the German submarines to operate farther afield and by the approach to completion of a very large type of cruiser submarine, which it had been known for some time was under construction in Germany in considerable numbers. The later United States destroyers would have been prepared to cope with such submarines, as the size of their guns had been increased from 4 inches to s inches. To obtain these increased qualities without considerable increasing the size of the boats, which was of course undesirable under the emergency demand for quantity production, meant the acceptance of a small decrease in speed. This we could accept with equanimity as our destroyers were already somewhat superior in speed to the latest types of corresponding size abroad.
The necessities of the anti-submarine campaign brought about new uses for several existing type of vessels, and the development of several new types. It had always been contemplated that fishing trawlers, drifters and other small vessels of similar type could be used in time of war as mine sweepers and tenders. With the development of the depth charge, a bomb containing about 300 pounds of high explosive with a detonating mechanism, which functioned only when it had sunk to a certain predetermined depth below the surface of the water, it became evident that any small type of vessel possessing the necessary seagoing qualities could be usefully employed against the submarine. As a consequence, this became the principal use to which these small fishing boats were put during the last year and a half of the war. They could not, of course, perform the high seas functions of the destroyer, but they proved most efficient for hunting operations and for coastal convoy purposes. The esteem in which they were held is shown by the fact that in the summer of 1917 the British Navy put in hand a construction program of more than 500 of these little craft. The limitations on the use of the fishing boats and the limitations on the production of the destroyer, due to its large size and cost, resulted in the development of intermediate types which would give good seagoing qualities combined with a speed comparable to the surface speed of the submarines themselves, and at the same time sufficiently small and simple in construction to permit of their production in large numbers. The British patrol boats and the United States eagle boats are the principal examples of this type. The latter is really a small destroyer of 200 feet in length and 600 tons' displacement, having a good cruising radius and a speed of 18 knots and carrying an armament of two 4-inch guns with unusually good command and a large number of depth charges, together with the various devices for dropping or throwing these bombs. The British also developed and turned out a considerable number of a somewhat larger type, which were known as " Sloops." which were given a slower speed but a larger cruising radius, together with a more robust type of construction and special features to insure their buoyancy in case of damage by torpedo. All during the war. as previously referred to, the best scientific talent, both in this country and abroad, was making every endeavor to perfect devices which would permit a vessel on the surface to hear a submarine moving below the surface. Various types of these so-called listening gears were developed and some attained a sufficient degree of success to exercise a considerable influence on the development of types of vessels from which they could be used with the maximum of efficiency. It was in fact the development of these devices in America which led to the laying down of our eagle boats, and the machinery of these boats was designed with especial view to quick starting and stopping, so that internal noises should not in any way effect the use of the listening devices. Even before our actual entry into the war, it had become evident that it would be necessary for us to produce, in the minimum of time, the maximum number of vessels of every type which could be utilized against the submarine. This led to the planning of our program of sub-chasers. Earlier in the war, the British had purchased in this country over 500 gasoline-driven wooden hull boats of 85 feet in length for general coastal use. Their experience indicated that there was a distinct field of utility for vessels of this class, but that they should be of a somewhat larger size with better sea-keeping qualities. In order, therefore, to profit by their experience and at the same time to utilize the considerable resources in this country for the construction of small wooden-hull vessels, resources which were not required in the accomplishment of any of the various other war programs, we undertook the construction immediately upon entering the war, of 350 of these sub-chasers, each no feet in length, about 75 tons displacement, and having three 200-horsepower gasoline engines, giving a top speed of about 16 knots. They were fitted with special facilities for the use of various types of listening gear. They carried one small gun and a number of depth charges. In their seagoing qualities, these boats more than met the anticipations of their designers. About 200 of them crossed the Atlantic under their own power and performed most useful service in the Mediterranean Sea and on the French and English coasts. However, these boats must be regarded as stopgaps rather than a type to be found in large numbers in a permanent navy.
Another class of operation which resulted in the development of a new type, or rather the resurrection with new features of an old type, was the naval operations against shore fortifications. When the Germans had occupied the Belgian coast, it became evident that the navy must be prepared to undertake operations against that coast, unless the Germans were to be permitted to remain in undisturbed possession, allowing them an extremely undesirable freedom of action by using the ports as bases for submarines and destroyer activities. To meet this condition and the possibility of similar conditions arising elsewhere in the vast theatre of the war, the British very early put in hand a number of modernized monitors, which repeated the well-known characteristics of the early American vessels of this class; that is, slow speed, the heaviest guns, armor protection, low freeboard, and small size, but added to these a modern and efficient form of torpedo protection; the last named really forms the sine qua non of the modern monitor, for it must of necessity operate off hostile coasts and by its slow speed is peculiarly liable to successful attack by submarines. These monitors at intervals throughout the war carried out a series of very interesting bombardments on the Belgian coast, which were accompanied by the use of such modern methods as spotting by means of aircraft and protection by means of smoke screens, produced by small fast boats accompanying them. In general, however, these operations failed to produce any decisive results, and this experience, combined with that gained through the attempts by older British and French battleships to reduce the fortifications of the Dardanelles, has gone far to confirm the opinion held prior to the war that ships cannot compete successfully with shore fortifications.
Although not productive of new types, and not, strictly speaking, exercising any influence on naval types, it is not possible to pass over the development of the transport service during the war, as its operations were on such an enormous scale. The British conveyed to and fro from the various theatres of war a total of something like 13,000,000 men, but the great bulk of these was for short distances across the Channel. The most impressive undertakings were the combination of the American and British resources, with some help from the other Allies, in transporting to Europe nearly 2,000,000 men during the war, and the bringing of them home in a period of a little over six months by the American Navy with some help from foreign sources. The enormous undertakings demonstrated that the great passenger vessels used commercially in time of peace can be quickly and efficiently converted for use as transports, and that, therefore, the naval designer need in the future only provide for the intelligent utilization of the great mass of experience accumulated in fitting merchant vessels for this purpose. As an example of the progress made in this direction in the course of the war, can be cited the fact that when some of the large passenger vessels were first fitted for use as transports, it was thought that they had been given the maximum troop capacity. After some months of experience, however, it was possible so to modify and perfect the arrangements that their capacity was increased in some cases as much as 50 per cent.
In reviewing the use of existing novel types during the war, one cannot omit reference to the active and important part played by certain types of auxiliaries. Colliers, tankers and supply ships were used to an enormous extent, but these are of such a purely merchant type that they require no especial note, except to remark that the few colliers we had built as naval auxiliaries, with special handling appliances showed up exceptionally well. The purely naval types which demonstrated their efficiency and value were the destroyer and submarine tenders and repair ships. One or more of these vessels were stationed at each one of our principal operating bases abroad, and without them our destroyer and submarine forces would have been unable to maintain their great efficiency and high percentage of time employed in active service. Due to the shortage of shipping, it was not possible to fit out and supply an unlimited number of vessels of this type, and it soon became evident that each existing unit must be utilized to its highest degree of productivity. This led to the erection on shore at the principal bases of barracks for housing the shop operating forces, so that the ships themselves could be run 24 hours a day, using three shifts of mechanics. This development leads to the belief that in the future in certain types of operation we may be led to provide special barrack ships for carrying and berthing sufficient personnel to utilize to the full the repair facilities provided on the vessels specially fitted for that purpose.
I have previously referred briefly to the development of the new and large type of naval vessel called an aircraft carrier. In the very early stages of the war, attempts were made to attack the principal naval bases in Germany by means of aircraft, but it was found that neither the aircraft themselves nor the commercial vessels hastily fitted up for the purpose of carrying them were sufficiently developed to permit of success in such an undertaking. I cannot in this paper take up in detail the wonderful development in aircraft during the course of the war, but the technical development resulting in increased size and speed and carrying capacity are well known. These were quickly taken advantage of by naval designers to fit them for such purely naval purposes as scouting, fire control of the heavy guns of big ships, torpedo carrying and launching, etc.
The actual offensive use of aircraft against naval vessels was little developed during the war. Perhaps the most prominent case was that of the Goeben which was ashore near the Dardanelles, and for six days exposed to aircraft attack, it being stated that some 217 bombs were dropped against her. There is no doubt that there will be a great development of aircraft for naval use as a result of the war experience, and some enthusiasts have visions of navies of the air rendering obsolete the navies of the ocean.
The United States Navy, which has in its own hands the development and control of its aircraft for use over the water, should take lead in any air naval development: but there is no doubt that, step by step with the air offensive, there will be developed a defensive. The defensive, moreover, will not be passive. We have seen in the late war how the light craft, destroyers, etc.. on one side met and countered the attacks of similar craft on the other side. Had either side been deprived of its light craft, it would have been at most serious disadvantage. Similarly, developments in the air will undoubtedly be along the line of defending the capital ship by auxiliary and offensive aircraft. The big ship which must be protected from projectiles of a ton weight falling at angles of 30 degrees, fired from ship' almost out of sight below the horizon, is not yet in serious dancer from bombs carried by present-day aircraft, with chances of hitting small indeed.
At the moment it appears that the torpedo plane is the most promising development: its weapon of attack is the torpedo which the capital ship must already be prepared to defend itself from, whether fired by a surface vessel or a submarine. A torpedo from a ship in the air is no more deadly than from a submarine under the surface. It seems probable that aircraft will sooner become dangerous to destroyers and the vessels generally than to the large ships of the line. The former are more vulnerable and will be less able to protect themselves.
Even these early developments of naval uses for aircraft made it evident that they could not efficiently perform such functions with the fleet unless they could be carried with the fleet, not only on long cruises but actually in battle, with the result that special types of ships have appeared to fill this requirement. The first essential of this type is that it should be capable not only of launching aeroplanes but also of receiving them back after the accomplishment of their mission. With the present development of aeroplanes and seaplanes, the only practicable method of providing the latter requirement is the provision-of an enormously large and absolutely clear deck upon which the planes can light and be brought to rest. The next requirement is that such a vessel shall have a speed sufficient to permit it to keep up with the main battle fleet when it is going into action. This means a speed of 20 to 25 knots. These qualities, together with the need for sufficient space to house and care for a considerable number of planes, together with their personnel, have resulted in vessels of 10.000 to 25,000 tons displacement. To obtain a clear upper deck requires special arrangements for funnels, navigating bridges, etc., which has resulted in the only absolutely new type of naval vessels of large size and cost which has appeared as a result of the war experience.
At the other extreme among new types appearing as a result of the war, comes what have been termed coastal motor boats. These appeared more as a result of possibilities presented by modern engineering developments than as a result of the need for filling a specific naval requirement. The perfection of the gasoline motor led in the years before the war to the construction, for sporting purposes, of very light high-speed small boats. Due to the fact that they were developed primarily for racing, they were suitable for use only in comparatively smooth water and had to be handled with extreme care. A study of their possibilities by British designers, supported by the enthusiasm of young naval officers, resulted in the production of boats of 40 to 70 feet in length and capable of speeds from 35 to 45 knots an hour, each carrying from one to three modern torpedoes, and with the hulls constructed on such scientific principles that they could go to sea in comparatively rough weather, and could be hoisted on board light cruisers or other types of naval vessels. These little boats performed splendid service off the Belgian Coast, and the tale of their operations forms one of the most exciting chapters in modern naval annals. But the most spectacular, and at the same time valuable service performed by boats of this type during the war, was the daring penetration by the Italians into a fortified Austrian harbor where they sank a battleship lying at anchor. Later, in operations against the Bolshevists, a small British flotilla penetrated to the inner harbor of Kronstadt, where they succeeded in sinking two battleships and two other large vessels.
I have several times, in the course of this paper, referred to the results experienced when war vessels of older types are subjected to attack by modern weapons. During the war there were sunk by hostile action 21 pre-dreadnaught battleships and 27 armored cruisers; of this total of 48, 11 were sunk by gunfire and 37 by mine or torpedo, only a single explosion in nearly every case being necessary to inflict the fatal damage. It is only necessary to refer briefly to such incidents as the sinking of the British battleship Formidable, the three cruisers Cressy, Aboukir and Hogue, the loss of four old battleships at the Dardanelles, the sinking of the Gneisenau and Scharnhorst off the Falkland Islands, the loss of the British Hampshire, and the American cruiser San Diego as the result of striking a single mine, together with numerous other incidents of similar nature, to show that such vessels as these, most of which were commissioned within ten years immediately preceding the war, are totally incapable of withstanding the terrific effects of present-day gunfire and torpedo attack. This showing is particularly impressive when compared to the demonstrated ability, as discussed above, of the most modern vessels to survive severe and repeated attacks. These qualities of resistance and defence can only be provided on vessels of large dimensions and displacement. The necessity for retiring these older types was well demonstrated by the fact that except for a few used for special purposes, both the British and the Germans had placed most of their older capital ships out of commission before the war had run its course.
To sum up, therefore, the experience of the war, so far as it can be grasped to date, has resulted in demands in the case of every existing type of war vessel which can only be met by increased size and cost. It has resulted in the introduction of only one new type of major importance, namely, the Aircraft Carrier, but it has introduced a number of small types which will probably survive but will not be constructed in large numbers in times of peace, as they are peculiarly adaptable to being produced quickly in large numbers after the emergency of war has arrived.
Although we must conclude that the present tendency is toward increased size and cost, one cannot overlook the fact that this very tendency, under the present financial, economic and political conditions in the world, may actually result in the long run in the disappearance from future building programs of these very types and the substitution for them of smaller and cheaper units made possible by new developments in science and engineering. To meet this condition there never was more need than at the present time of vision and imagination on the part of the righting forces afloat and the naval designers ashore, for that nation which can develop the weapons which will render obsolete the present great ships and can substitute for them a smaller and cheaper unit capable of defeating them will win in the new era the command of the seas, which this war has shown is so all important to ultimate victory.—The Franklin Institute.
The Increased Strength of the United States on the Sea.—It has suddenly become apparent that our naval-building program has been steadily increasing the strength of our fleet of battleships, and that the United States Navy is at the point of surpassing the British Navy in this most important element of sea power. At the same time the British have realized the great increase of our merchant marine in comparison with Great Britain's.
These revelations have been something of a shock to the British public, and many articles have been published commenting on the growth of our navy and merchant marine. Among these is a notable contribution by Archibald Hurd in the Fortnightly Review for June.
For many reasons, a statement of the situation from an American point of view is needed at this time. In the first place, one prevailing tendency in the British comments should be set right. Many of their writers, as is perhaps natural in the surprised realization of the change in Great Britain's position on the sea, reflect a feeling that the forward stride of the United States indicates hostility on our part and a determination to win dominion of the seas. Comparisons are made with the systematic campaign undertaken by Germany to gain the commerce of the world, which had so much to do with bringing on the World War. Mr. Hurd even sees "a menace to the peace of the world, and especially the peace of the English-speaking peoples."
Many British writers now appear to believe that America has recently changed her attitude and become hostile to the nations of Europe. The position of the United States in delaying ratification of the Peace Treaty is interpreted as meaning that America has withdrawn from association with Europe, and that this is to be followed by a national policy of aggrandizement, "a demand for nationalization," as Mr. Hurd expresses it.
The True Explanation.—It is true that the present position of the United States on the sea was brought about by, conditions created by the World War, but these were straight-forward natural conditions that- made an appeal to the common sense of our people. We saw the need of a larger navy for defense, and we were also suddenly obliged to build a great tonnage of carrying ships in the emergency caused by the shortage of the world's shipping at the time of Germany's U-boat campaign. These were the reasons for our naval and maritime activities. There were no underlying motives that influenced the United States.
Our Naval Program.—The circumstances of the naval increase should first be explained ; it will then be evident that our present program for building warships is not the product of any recent change of policy. Our increase was determined in 1916, through the most natural causes, as will be seen when the course of events is traced leading up to the adoption of our naval-building program.
The following is the history of our naval increase: In the period of dawning suspicion and hostility which preceded the World War there was a sudden keen competition for naval superiority between Great Britain and Germany. This began in 1906. and each nation entered upon an enlarged program of building battleships. This naval activity was stimulated by the unusual condition that the capital unit of battle fleets had changed in that year to a new type, following the British design of the dreadnought, which became the name of the new all-big-gun battleship.
The adoption of this new fighting unit gave Germany an unexpected opportunity to threaten the supremacy of the British Navy, a development that would have been out of the question if the two navies had kept on in the even course of adding battleships of the old type. In 1907, Germany laid down four dreadnoughts, in 1008 four, in 1909-1910 five, in 1911 four. In these years Great Britain was perforce obliged to respond with a corresponding increase that would maintain the existing British superiority—and this pace was continued until the outbreak of the war.
In 1906, when this great increase of building warships began, the United States held second place among the navies of the world; but, through all these years of activity, until the catastrophe of 1914, our successive Administrations adhered to the policy of restricting the building program of the United States Navy to two capital ships per year. The inevitable result was to put our navy in the third place, far behind the German Navy in number of capital ships.
Then came the World War, and the United States woke to the fact that it was comparatively weak in the most essential element for its defense, a battle fleet. So evident was this, that public opinion asserted itself, and in 1916 Congress authorized the present building program.
Purely Defensive Move.—It should be strongly emphasized that this act of the people and Congress in 1916 fixed the terms of our building program, which is now suddenly causing so much comment in Great Britain. It involved no change or threat. Our program is only the result of a timely realization among our people that our necessary defense must be a strong navy. There was, at the time, no definite thought in the public mind of using this naval force against any particular nation, although naturally the unbridled ambitions of Germany showed our need of defense. But defense alone was the object of the increase—and defense alone is the reason for its continuance, impersonal and not directed against any power.
This instinct for defense on the seas has been most fortunately aroused in our nation. Our country is bounded by two great oceans, and the only real defense of our boundaries is the far-flung use of our battle fleet upon these wide stretches of sea. For the United States Navy, more than for any other, the ultimate service is a battle of fleets. In all human calculation, our country is safe from attack as long as we maintain a battle fleet that is able to defend our sea approaches in a naval action.
Consequently, for the United States, a battle fleet that can hold its own in an action of fleets is a necessity—and the posession of such a fleet has been insured by the building program of 1916. That is the whole story—and in this wise policy, which our country adopted four years ago, there is no trace of new influences at work "for fanning into flame the instinctive national jealousies of the two nations"—to quote again from Mr. Hurd. Any American knows that our country is barren ground for jealousy of any other nation.—Current History Magazine, September, 1920.
Our Dirigible "R-38".—We understand that the American crew to be trained in England to fly back our monster airship, the R-38, has been selected. We hear also from England that the ship will be ready to commence her exhaustive trials fairly soon. It takes a long while to tune up an airship—there are so many balances to be perfected, apart altogether from engine trials and the like. The following figures which have not been published in this country before will give a fair idea of the dimensions, of the R-38, in comparison with the R-34, which flew the double Atlantic journey last summer. The German airship Bodensee, to which so much publicity has been given, is more than one hundred feet shorter than the R-38, has a gas capacity of only 700,000, and is of 21-3 tonnage. It is claimed, however, that her maximum speed is 80. Her main disadvantage is obviously her inability to travel great distances on account of her limited gasbag capacity.—Scientific American, Aug. 21, 1920.
The Relative Position of British and U.S.A. Shipping.—The figures issued by Lloyds' Register a week or so ago indicate a marked change in the position of the shipping in this country and the United States of America. One June 30th a year ago the latter had about one and one third million tons of shipping under construction over that of this country, and in six months this disparity had been wiped out, and an excess credit of twenty-seven thousand tons created in favor of Great Britain. The returns for the present year show that over three million and a half are now under construction, which is nearly one million and a half in excess of that of the United States. To show the rate of reduction, in March, 1919, just over four millions was under construction, and now fifteen months later only about two millions is the figure—a reduction of one-half. Taking the figures for this country for the same period, in March we had two million and a quarter under construction, and now we have over three million and a half, which is an increase of sixty per cent. The reasons for this change are not far to seek. The United States was persuaded by the Allies to build ships at a rapid rate as one of the most useful steps to rendering assistance in the war, and right loyally did the statesmen, business men, and manual workers in America respond. We have recorded on more than one occasion the remarkable feats of production performed, and drew attention to the stimulating effect it had on us, and the depressing effect it had had on the enemy. After the Armistice the conditions due to the war practically ceased, involving the solution of a number of difficult problems. The most optimistic of those in the United States who had long cherished ambitions with regard to the development of a Mercantile Marine on a vastly extended scale, and saw the possible opportunity when the States entered the war, recognized, on the cessation of hostilities that a number of the newly organized shipyards could not survive the new conditions. For example, a large number of yards were devoted to the building of wooden ships, and in June, 1919. four hundred and twenty thousand tons of such ships were then building, while in June this year that enormous tonnage has shrunk to twenty-nine thousand, which is about one-fifteenth the previous year's output The United Kingdom, on the other hand, had a large number of yards engaged on warship construction, and it was more or less easy to turn the activity of the yards towards the production of mercantile tonnage. Another point that must not be lost sight of, which is, assuming a nation can produce ships, it does not follow it can man them. It will, therefore, be seen that not only could the conditions of production be rapidly changed over in this country, but We had another great advantage. For centuries, a very considerable proportion of the inhabitants of the United Kingdom have found employment at sea, and the in-born liking for the sea enables ships to be manned by those who have inherited the necessary qualifications for such service. Under these conditions we can afford to run a Mercantile Marine on a profit basis, whereas other countries find they cannot do it at all, or if they do, it is at a loss. It seems fairly evident that, however strongly some of the United States citizens desire a large Mercantile Marine, this cannot be brought about unless the national energy now being utilized so successfully in its vast and bountiful interior, and in such a profitable manner, can be diverted into other channels, which, under all the circumstances, will not happen while present conditions obtain.—The Marine Engineer and Naval Architect, August, 1920.
Fighting for Our Place on the Seas.—The opening gun of a worldwide shipping war is discerned by the Brooklyn Eagle in the recent offer of British ship-builders to construct steel vessels for a hundred dollars a ton less than the cost-price at which the Shipping Board is offering its ships for sale; and other papers remark that a retaliatory' spirit in government and shipping circles of Japan. England, and France first manifested itself to the press of the United States soon after the enactment of the Jones Merchant Marine Act law last June. Particularly did the preferential rate clauses, which were discussed in The Literary Digest for July 3d, arrest the attention of foreign shipping interests, for these, according to Senator Jones, would assure to America "her rightful place on the seas." Admiral Benson, the new chairman of the Shipping Board, announces that the Board "will live up to the letter of the Jones law in spite of the threats and propaganda carried on by foreign interests to seek to defeat the purpose of the law." He frankly resents "the secret and underhand means that are being taken to hamper the growth of our merchant marine and the development of our foreign trade"; and he declares, with emphasis, that "we shall maintain and protect our merchant marine and foster American commerce in American bottoms against any and all nations." So "all this 'bunk' is not going to scare the admiral; fighting used to be his business," says R. H. Semmes in the Seattle Times.
Another development which has caused freight-rate slashing, we are told, is the twenty-year agreement entered into by the American Ship and Commerce Corporation with the Hamburg-American Line, whereby a joint service "will be established to various parts of the world, and a close working agreement entered into for the mutual benefit of the two corporations," in the words of the Washington Post. This despite the fact that "we are technically at war with Germany," points out The Post. In the meantime Japan has decided to subsidize its shipping business to the extent of two million dollars, we are told, and "Britain and Germany are trading with each other almost as if there had never been a misunderstanding," declares the Rochester Democrat-Chronicle. So that at the present time, thinks the New Orleans Times-Picayune, "unfair discrimination would be a short-sighted policy to launch out on in the development of a permanent foreign commerce or a stable, adequate merchant marine." Foreign shipping interests declare that the Jones law does discriminate. And even in this country we find conflicting opinions as to just what sort of panacea for shipping the Jones law is. Admiral Benson and Senator Jones both agree that this country is faced by the question of the survival of American ships or foreign ships, and that the Jones law will protect the merchant marine which we acquired during the war. As J. J. Underwood writes in the Seattle Times:
"There is still much discussion in Washington about the Jones law, and the remarkable thing about it is that American ports fear they will lose foreign ships and foreign ports fear they will lose American business. But there are no two opinions about it among Shipping Board officials. They say that the only condition that can possibly be changed by the law is the substitution of American ships for foreign ships, and that if the change is made the advantage will lie with the American ship-yards, ship-chandlers, and those who deal in merchandise that American ships consume.
"They declare that American ships have had to leave foreign ports for the United States cargo-light, while British and Japanese ships plying between foreign countries and the United States have come loaded to the guards with cargo. American ships also have had trouble in getting water and fuel, while foreign ships have been accommodated. Already the word has gone forth that this discrimination against American ships must cease or the provisions of the Jones law will he made effective against those companies which practice it."
So the shipping war goes merrily on. The Cincinnati Post declares that the Jones law, far from benefiting the American people, "contains the trickiest little joker that ever snuggled in a mess of legislation—a combination of ship subsidy and protective tariff that will cost the United States the commercial friendship of all other nations." Furthermore, asserts The Post, this "joker" "will give fortunes to the owners of ships and cost the people hundreds of millions of dollars every year." But the Minneapolis Tribune has a different idea of the things which the Jones law will accomplish:
"The Merchant Marine Act is designed to make use of and to develop the merchant marine structure erected for war-emergency purposes. It lays down explicitly a 'policy of the United States to do whatever may be necessary to develop and encourage the maintenance of such a merchant marine.' This is a sweeping way to put it, but a policy of sweeping character was adopted deliberately. To carry out the provisions of the bill, it will be necessary to abrogate or modify more than a score of commercial treaties with other nations. There is no halting anywhere along the line at preferential rates and terms that may be needed to make and keep the merchant marine a going concern against all comers and ail competition.
"In the broadest sense the act is American in spirit, purpose, and term. It includes government encouragement, supervision, and protection, but it does not contemplate government ownership or operation. It serves notice upon the world that henceforth the United States will put its own interests foremost in its shipping laws and rules."
According to Lloyd's Register, of London, the gross tonnage of United States shipping has increased since 1914 until in this respect we are second only to the United Kingdom. In other words, the United States has twenty-four per cent of the world*s shipping. Thus did the war provide our merchant marine. Next in order come France, Japan, and Norway. But, the St. Louis Globe-Democrat points out,
"The goal of our merchant-marine plan is not to secure a tonnage greater than Great Britain, and thus to become the greatest maritime nation in the world. Our object is to provide ships for American commerce, enough ships to carry all our exports and imports if possible, certainly enough to promote our export trade and relieve it of the handicap of relying upon foreign bottoms for carriage."
The New York World's Washington correspondent reports "an alliance of British, Japanese, and other foreign shipping interests with the view of crushing the American merchant marine, in retaliation for what is considered discriminatory provisions in the Jones law. The Washington Star, however, takes such a procedure as a matter of course. "We may expect vigorous competition as we go along; that is business on the water as well as on land," notes The Star, and its Washington contemporary, The Herald, admits that the act "cannot be enforced without provoking defensive and retaliatory action." The Oakland Tribune merely remarks that "all of these manifestations are England's disappointed and frightened outcry against America's program for achieving and maintaining independence of American maritime trade." But, points out the New York journal of Commerce:
"The discriminatory sections of the law are not intended as a 'club' for use against foreign competitors, but are merely a means of compelling them to 'play fair.' It should be recognized by every one who desires the establishment of an American merchant marine that there has been gross discrimination abroad against American interests and that the 'shipping game ' has been anything but fairly played by many of the foreign pools, combinations, and 'conferences.' Whether it will be possible to Correct these abuses by introducing similar discriminations in the United States is, however, a very different question."—The Literary Digest, Sept. 4, 1920.
AERONAUTICS
Photographing Haiti’s Coast Line with Airplanes.—The present strength of the Marine Corps aviation force in Haiti is ten officers and 90 enlisted men, and the organization, Squadron E, is engaged with Squadron D, of Santo Domingo, comprising eight officers and 84 men, in making a photographic survey of the entire coast line of the island of Haiti, under the direction of the interior department of the U. S. Military Government of the island. Several officers who have completed the course in aviation at the Quantico Marine Air Station will be sent to Haiti at an early date to assist in this work.—Aerial Age Weekly, Aug. 16, 1920.
Aeroplane Turret Take-Offs Successful.—The first flight of the new Vought aeroplane under test for the U. S. Navy from the turret platform that the U. S. S. Oklahoma was successfully accomplished August nth, and the following day four faultless take-offs were made from the turret, completing the test. The aeroplane acted satisfactorily on each trial, according to reports to the Navy Department.—Aerial Age Weekly, Aug. 16, 1920.
Navy Smoke Screens from Air Bombs.—Tests conducted by representatives of the Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Department, with smoke bombs designed to lay a smoke screen for naval vessels from aircraft, proved that a satisfactory screen can be laid in this manner. Experimental models of smoke bombs weighing 50 pounds were tested on August 11th, but after the experiments it was agreed that a bomb weighing not less than 100 pounds would prove to be more satisfactory for the purpose for which the experimental models had been designed.—Aerial Age Weekly, Aug. 16. 1920.
Naval Flight from San Diego to Panama.—Eighteen seaplanes of the F-5-L type and two of the noted NC's, Nos. 5 and 6, are to take part in a 3600-mile flight from San Diego, Cal., to Panama, beginning about Jan. 1,1921. The plans for the voyage specify that 12 of the F-5-L design ships will be supplied by the Pacific Fleet detachment and six by the station at San Diego. The crews have not yet been selected. Air officials of the San Diego station are quoted as saying that the flight, the course of which will be down the Mexican and Central American coasts to the Isthmus, will probably be made in about sixty hours.—Aerial Age Weekly, Aug. 16, 1920.
NC Seaplanes for Fleet Operations.—Five of the large NC seaplanes have been assigned to operate with the U. S. Navy fleets, three on the Atlantic and three on the Pacific. These seaplanes, carrying crews of five men each, will be employed on scouting problems and long-distance work, for which they are well adapted, being fitted for navigation on the surface and with the radio direction compass. The definite program for their employment is being worked out by the Fleet Air Detachment commanders. Captain George W. Steele, Jr., U. S. N., of the U. S. Atlantic fleet, and Captain H. C. Mustin, U. S. N., of the U. S. Pacific fleet. The ATC seaplanes will have destroyer tenders for these operations. This is the first time seaplanes of this type have been thus employed and the work will begin before September 1.—Aerial Age Weekly, Aug. 16, 1920.
Americans in Dirigible Flight Over London.—London.—The British dirigible airship R-32 flew over London in the commencement of a twenty-four hours' instructional flight.
The airship carried the American crew which is training in England to take over the dirigible R-38, which has been purchased by the U. S. Navy and is under construction at Bedford.—Aerial Age Weekly, Aug. 16, 1920.
Air Tanks.—July 15.—Ten armored triplanes will be built for the United States Government under a contract awarded to the Boeing Airplane Company of Seattle, construction starting at once with the first delivery scheduled in November and the other machines following rapidly before the end of the year. These planes, representing a new type of construction, are designed to serve in aerial service for ground attack, having a function similar to that of the tanks on land. They have been characterized as "flying tanks." Quarter inch armor plate protects the fuselage and nacelles. The armament includes a thirty-seven millimeter rapid fire gun mounted in front, four machine guns trained to fire through the floor, two machine guns at the back and two above the wings.—Flying, September, 1920.
Great Lakes Has Large Aviation School.—Nearly 100 men are being graduated every three weeks at Great Lakes Naval Training Station from what naval officers describe as the biggest trade school in the world.
The school is devoted exclusively to the training of aviation mechanics and at the present time 3225 students are taking the courses, which range in length from 16 to 36 weeks.
More than 1000 men have graduated since the school was established slightly more than a year ago and another 1000 will complete their work by November. Lieut. Commander E. E. Wilson, commandant at the school, says all of the 6000 men provided for in the naval air force will be graduates of the school within another year.
The cost of turning out the first 1000 graduates was $7000, making the average cost of producing trained aerial mechanics $7 each. The low cost was due to the fact that the students produce nothing in their studies to be wasted. Instead of making the frequently useless examples they work on parts actually needed for repairs and construction of new aeroplanes.
A number of planes ranging from small land flyers to huge seaplanes, only a step smaller than the famous NC type, have been completed.
Lieut. Commander Wilson started the school from the bottom a year ago. As the first step the navy officer wrote all the text books to be used.
No flying is done but the best men from each class are eligible later to attend a school for enlisted pilots. The 3225 students now here include 440 marines.—Aerial Age Weekly, Aug. 8, 1920.
ENGINEERING
The Electrically-Welded Ship "Fullagar."—The motor coasting vessel Fullagar, which has recently been completed by Messrs, Cammell, Laird & Co., Ltd., Birkenhead, is noteworthy both on account of the employment of electric welding in her hull construction, and because she is the first vessel to be fitted with the Cammellaird-Fullagar type of marine oil engine.
The leading particulars of the ship are:
Length B. P 150 ft. 0 in.
Breadth moulded 23ft. gin.
Depth moulded to main deck 11 ft. 6 in.
Depth moulded to raised quarter-deck 15 ft. 6 in.
Load draft 11 ft. 4 in.
Load deadweight, about 500 tons
Cargo capacity, about 25,000 c. ft.
Speed 9 ½ knots
In general arrangement the vessel is of the ordinary coasting type.
The electric welding has been carried out on the Quasi-Arc system, introduced by the Quasi-Arc Co., Ltd., of London, who have carefully supervised all welding operations, as have also the representatives of Lloyd's Register of Shipping, with which society the vessel is classed.
The main engine is of the Cammellaid-Fullagar opposed-piston type, and is capable of developing about 500 B. H. P. when running at 100 to 120 revs, per minute. The engine has four cylinders 14-inch diameter, each piston having a stroke of 20 inch, and working on the Diesel cycle. Air at a pressure of 1000 lbs. per square inch is used for injecting the fuel into the cylinders. A three-stage air compressor is driven from the forward end of the crankshaft, and the circulating pumps are arranged forward of this again, thus rendering the engine a self-contained propelling unit. The saving in weight and space effected by this type of engine is considerable.
On the 28th June trials of the vessel were carried out in the River Mersey, in the presence of a large number of engineers and shipbuilders from all parts of the country. The ease and quickness with which the engine could be maneuvered impressed all present. Front full speed ahead to full speed astern only required about ten seconds, the engine easily starting action with full ahead way on the ship.
At about 11.40 p. m. on the same day the vessel started on her maiden trip to the Clyde. After getting clear of land extremely rough weather was encountered; and as this became worse, it was found necessary to put into Ramsey until the storm abated. During this part of the voyage the engine ran steadily throughout, no racing being experienced, and there was only a slight variation in the revolutions. The hull was well tested, and withstood perfectly the severe shocks and stresses experienced through the force of the waves.
The vessel left Ramsey at 4.20 a. m. on the 1st July, and reached Greenock about 6 p. m. The engine continued to run steadily at a speed of 106 r. p. m.. the ship doing about 9.75 knots per hour against wind and tide.
On the 2d July, a large party of Clyde ship-builders and engineers were present and witnessed trial runs on the mile and maneuvering tests. All expressed satisfaction at the running of the engine and the promptitude and satisfactory manner in which orders from the bridge were executed.
The Fullagar left the Clyde at 11.30 p. m. the same day, and arrived in the Mersey at 8 p. m. on the 3d July. The engine ran satisfactorily and without sign of trouble at an average speed of 107 r. p. m., the vessel averaging about ten knots. During this run the fuel consumption worked out at 2.1 tons per day of 4 hours.
Some of the readings from the engine were as follow:
Scavenge air pressure 1 ¼ lb. per sq. in.
Circulating water pressure 6.5 lb. per sq. in.
Lubricating oil pressure 12 lb. per sq. in.
Blast air pressure 1,000 lb. per sq. in.
Scavenge 50° F.
Circulating discharge temperature 100° F.
Engine-room temperature 62° F.
—The Shipbuilder, August, 1920.
Concrete Shipbuilding.—It can be stated with fair certainty that reinforced concrete will not replace steel for ordinary cargo carriers unless the hull can be built for considerably less than half the cost of building the same hull in steel.
Where the additional weight is more than counter-balanced by the durability and reduced prime cost of the new material there is reason to expect that its adoption will naturally follow. The lower first cost of concrete vessels is partly due to the fact that no heavy plant is required for reinforced concrete work, partly due to the relatively lower cost of the reinforcement, as compared with other forms of steel and partly to the lower rates of wages paid to the men employed. The saving in the cost of steel seldom exceeds 50 per cent. On an average the cost of a concrete hull is about 70 per cent of that of a steel hull of the same dead-weight capacity.
In the case of pontoons the cost of construction (prior to 1914 was found to be about one-half, and the cost of maintenance and repairs only one-quarter to one-third that of similar structures in steel. (A. B. Searle. Concrete and Constructional Engineering, July, 1920.)—The Technical Review, August 17, 1920.
The Most Powerful Gas Engine in the World. (La Nature, June 19. 1920.)—This distinction is claimed for an engine made by the Crockerill Society in Liege, Belgium. In August, 1914, it was in process of erection. The Germans after the capture of the city allowed it to be put into operation and, when they were assured of its success, took it from its owners and sent it into Germany, to Duisburg, where it was running at the time of the Armistice. It was then sent back to Liege, where it was installed for the second time, with the addition of some improvements. It develops 8000 horsepower. The cylinders, four in number, are 1.3 m. in diameter, 1.5 m. stroke, 94 r. p. m. The heat of the gases coming from the engine is used to generate steam for a turbine.—The Franklin Institute, August, 1920.
New Bethlehem Fuel-Saving Diesel Engine.—Once more Charles M. Schwab appears in print with a statement of vital interest to ship operators. This time it is an announcement of a new type of Diesel engine representing, says Mr. Schwab, a greater advance over the oil-fired steamer than the latter represents over the coal-fired vessel.
Mr. Schwab's statement reads as follows:
"It is a great pleasure for me to announce a new two-cycle fuel-saving marine Diesel engine especially designed for American operating conditions and adapted to land use as well as cargo vessels of any size. In the science and practice of marine engineering this new engine represents a far greater advance over the oil-burning steamship than the latter is over the coal-fired steamship. It is also regarded as a signal triumph for American engineering skill in a field hitherto dominated entirely by Europeans.
"The development of the new Bethlehem fuel-saving Diesel engine represents two distinct phases of advance in marine engineering:
"1. For the first time an internal combustion heavy oil engine for either marine or land uses has been perfected which is not only designed and built by Americans, but is built especially for Americans, and is adapted to American operating conditions.
"2. For the first time a two-cycle internal combustion heavy oil engine has been perfected which produces the same horse-power as a four-cycle engine practically twice its size, and is at the same time adapted to large cargo ships while saving two-thirds in fuel cost alone, as compared with steam-driven, oil-fired vessels.
"Neither of these developments is theoretically a new idea. For years Europeans have successfully operated large ships with Diesel engines. The achievement of Arthur West, the Bethlehem designer, who is at the head of our power department, is in the adaptation of the two-cycle engine to American operation and in the perfection for practical use in cargo vessels of any size.
''The success of this engine has already been demonstrated in two ways. It was installed and operated for ten months as part of, the power plant of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation at Bethlehem, Pa. It was then installed in our new ore-carrying vessel, the Cubore, which to-day completed on regular schedule time its first voyage to Cuba and return.
"The operation of the engine at the Bethlehem plant was so successful that we are building another one to take its place as part of the auxiliary power plant for the steel mills. Its operation on the Cubore not only demonstrated its practicability but its remarkable economy. The Cubore made the voyage from Sparrows Point, Md., to Cuba and back without stopping her engines except to come into port and consumed one-third of the amount of fuel oil ordinarily used by her sister vessels fitted with oil-burning steam machinery of the usual type when running on this same voyage and at a much greater rate of economy than has been achieved by any other Diesel engine operated ship of which we may have any record.
"We also have in service between here and Cuba duplicate ships, except that some are fitted with turbine reduction gears and some with reciprocating engines so that we have a direct comparison between the oil engine installation and the most modern steam installation."—The Nautical Gazette, Sept. 2, 1920.
ORDNANCE
New Light on the Jutland Battle.—Many and varied have been the theories advanced to account for the practical immunity enjoyed by the German High Seas fleet in the Jutland action. The attempts to reconcile our undoubted victory with our heavy material losses have, in many cases, been very wide of the mark. A careful study of the official documents on both sides, bearing in mind the actual state of affairs with regard to the personnel and material of both the British and enemy fleets reveals the fact that the elements which contributed to our losses have, to a large extent, been overlooked by the critics.
Our heaviest losses occurred in the battle-cruiser action between Beatty and von Hipper's squadron, before either of the main fleets joined in the fight. Our forces were, on paper, immeasurably superior to the German, and it was not long before our ships of the Warspite class came to their support. Thus we had 32 15-inch guns and 32 13.5-inch guns in action at this phase of the battle, whilst the heaviest piece mounted in any of the enemy vessels was the 12-inch. Yet we lost the Queen Mary and the Indefatigable, the former one of our finest battle-cruisers, right at the outset, whilst the Germans only lost one modern capital ship, the Lutzow, during the entire course of the battle.
Going into the matter more closely, it will be found that the German ships received a most terrific hammering, however, and that the majority of the British craft came through a series of sanguinarily contested actions almost scathless. Our guns were better, our shooting was probably better, and our morale was certainly far better than that of the enemy. Yet, at a later stage of the action, we lost another battle-cruiser, the Invincible. In face of these facts, it is no wonder that such difficulty has been experienced in accounting for the heavy losses on the British side. Viscount Jellicoe has been blamed on account of imagined weakness in both strategy and tactics and has generally been made the scapegoat for failures and shortcomings over which he could nowise have had any control.
Whitehall was entirely to blame for both our failure to inflict more heavy damage on the German High Seas fleet and for our own losses. With our splendid secret service and our very efficient gunnery experts, there was no excuse at all for the blunder made in the designing of our ships of the line and for the failure to fit them to attack and to resist attacks of the only fleet they would have to encounter. For that was the cause of the Queen Mary and Indefatigable disasters and the reason why the Lutcow was the only German capital ship to be sunk. Ship for ship, on paper, the British seemed to be superior, and their numerical advantage in the battle overwhelming. Actually, the Germans were so superior that the greatest numbers of Jellicoe's fleet was more or less nullified and by withdrawing at the right moment, von Scheer was able to avoid the real defeat which Britain expected the Grand fleet to inflict upon him.
All our naval artillery had been designed with a very high velocity, consequently with a long range at a small angle of elevation and a correspondingly large danger space. To combat this, German capital ships had been provided with very stout vertical armor. In addition, they had a more minute internal sub-division, a better disposition of their magazines, and thick horizontal deck armor, funnel glacis and turret roofs to afford protection from our heavy shells, descending at steeper angles at the long ranges at which it was anticipated the British guns would be brought into action.
On the other hand, the German theory differed widely from our own. Their guns were lighter and shorter, and their velocity was lower. But their mountings were designed to give a very great angle of elevation and their effective range was as great as that of our heavier pieces. In order to obtain accuracy at these long ranges, they had developed range-finding and fire control to an extent which was never realized in this country until hostilities had ceased. Their guns were of an accuracy that was deemed impossible for a "built-up" weapon and they calibrated them so as to give no spread or a salvo.
These facts were known at the Admiralty before the war started and we had ample proof of them in the early actions. Yet the Hood was the first, and is still the sole ship, flying the White Ensign to embody in her design an effective form of defence against these tactics. Our ships had a minimum of horizontal protection and our range-finding was of an order that made shooting at anything like the extreme range of our guns very much a matter of chance.
In the Hood, many of the features of the German battle-cruisers interned at Scapa Flow in 1918 have been embodied. She embodies ideas of protection against a "plunging" fire, and is sub-divided and strengthened very much as was the Hindenburg. The peculiar thing about it is that every naval power but Germany copied us in adopting high velocity guns. And now we have mounted our armament on their lines, so as to give a big angle of descent to the projectile at the target end, as have the Americans in their newest battleships. The numerous long-base range-finders in the Hood were in use in the German fleet before the Jutland battle.
The German policy of ship design and their artillery scheme, were both thoroughly vindicated in the Battle of Jutland, just as the British were shown to be faulty. Strategically and morally von Scheer was badly beaten off the Horn Reef on the fateful 31st of May, four years ago. Officers and men on both sides performed epic deeds of gallantry. But since then we have had time to find out just how our "expert" advisers had muddled and bungled and how they had "let down" those gallant men who fought the stern fight in the watery wastes of the North Sea.—Marine Engineer and Naval Architect, August, 1920.
The Pressure Distribution on the Head of a Shell Moving at High Velocities. (L. Bairstow, R. H. Fowler, and D. R. Hartree. Proceedings of the Royal Society, A684, May 1, 1920.)—The problem proposed to themselves by the investigators was one of great difficulty. Any kind of registering pressure-gauge placed within the shell would need to be insensible to a spin of 11,660 r. p. m. and to the shock of landing. This difficulty was avoided by employing a service time-fuse as a manometer. The rate of burning of such a fuse depends on the total external pressure on the vents. In the fuse a train of gunpowder is ignited by a detonator pellet by the shock when the gun is discharged. The time of burning is taken as the interval from the discharge of the gun to the explosion of the shell.
In the experiments shells were fitted with caps enclosing the fuses. In each cap was a series of holes equidistant from the nose of the shell. The relation between rate of burning and pressure was obtained from a set of experiments made with a fuse body mounted on the shaft of a Laval turbine and run in an air-tight box in which the pressure could be varied.
A series of shells provided with caps pierced with holes was fired along the same trajectory at brief intervals and the time of burning of the fuses was noted. From this and the length of the fuse the rate of burning was deduced and in turn from the rate of burning the pressure was derived at the part of the shell where the holes were located. This last step was made by reference to the laboratory experiments under varied pressure. "At all speeds in the range covered the pressure has a maximum positive value at the nose of the shell. The pressure falls rapidly as the point of observation moves toward the base, and is negative some distance before the cylindrical part of the shell is reached."—The Franklin Institute, August, 1920.
NAVIGATION AND RADIO
New York’s Radio Pilot Cable.—Much has been written about the electric cables used during the war for the purpose of piloting ships in and out of harbors at night. Indeed, it now appears as though this system of navigation is one of the greatest benefits derived from the war, and one that is just as important in peacetime as in war. However, with the installation of such a system in New York harbor by the United States navy, it is now possible to give exact details of how the radio pilot cable operates.
In brief, the principle of the radio pilot cable, as it is called, is to employ a cable through which flows alternating current. Ships intending to use the cable while passing in or out of waterways are provided with a pair of coils which intercept the electromagnetic waves emanating from the cable. By noting the relative strength of the waves reaching each coil, it is possible for the ship's navigator to determine when he is astride of the cable. Once riding astride the cable, it is relatively easy to follow it along and thus steer a correct course. In certain installations two cables are laid, each carrying a current of a given frequency. Ship navigators can tell which is the incoming and which is the outgoing cable by making careful note of the sound of the waves. In this manner a route is provided for ships going in either direction, and the chances of collision are reduced to a minimum.
In the New York harbor installation, which will follow the Ambrose Channel, one type of cable has been specified. This cable consists of seven strands of No. 16 tinned copper wire insulated with a layer of 30 per cent Para rubber 3/16-inch thick, over which is wrapped a layer of tape and jute, impregnated with a water-proof insulating compound. Over this layer of jute is an armor which consists of a wrapping of No. 12 galvanized steel wire. The overall diameter of this cable is approximately one inch. Some 87,000 feet of cable will be required.
There will be two anchors secured to the extreme end of the cable and only one anchor will be used at each of the three other points along the cable.
A one-killowatt motor-generator will be used for supplying 500-cycle alternating current to the cable. The voltage may be either 125 or 250 volts. Provision will have to be made for driving this generator from local source of current supply so as to maintain the motor-generator set at a constant speed. It is obvious that a fluctuation in the speed of the generator results in a change of note, which is apt to cause much confusion when using the cable. The amount of current flowing in the cable will be under control at all times and will range from one to eight amperes. A telegraph key is to be installed for the purpose of breaking the cable current in order to transmit signals; in fact, an automatic sending apparatus may be installed so as to send out given signals over and over again when necessary.
So much for the cable. Now the receiving end aboard ship is quite as simple. Two coils are required, each four feet square and wound with 400 turns of No. 24 S. C. C. copper magnet wire. Care should be exercised in making these coils so that each coil will have the same resistance and inductance values. Much depends upon this precaution as the signal strength received by each coil is the function of the resistance of each coil, and should their resistance be different, a signal strength of different intensity will be received by each coil when at the same distance from the cable. The best shape for the coils is the pancake. The wire can be wound in pancake form four feet square, with a winding space of one inch. The coils are impregnated in paraffin and then placed in wooden boxes with more paraffin in order to protect them from abrasion.
The coils should be placed over the side of the ship approximately amidship, one coil on one side and the other coil on the opposite side, below the surface of the water or slightly above the water line.— The Scientific American, Aug. 28, 1920.
The Largest Wireless Station in the World.—The Radio-Corporation of America has purchased 6000 acres near Port Jefferson (Long Island) for the erection of what will be the largest wireless plant in the world.
Seventy-two towers will be employed, and it is said that the Alexanderson high frequency alternator system is to be used with multiple antennae. This system requires relatively small generating plants and towers only about 400 feet high. The report states that communication will be established with South America, Germany, France, Italy, and Poland, and that each unit will have a speed of 100 words per minute, thus permitting a total transmission of 500 words per minute with simultaneous reception at the same rate. According to an official statement by the company this report is premature. (Electrical World, May 22, 1920. ½ col.)—The Technical Review, August 3, 1920.
France’s Wireless Plans.—A dispatch from Paris states that the French Government has recently announced plans for an elaborate wireless system whose center will be in Paris and which will cover Europe, Asia, Africa and South America and connect with North America. If this system, part of which is already in existence, is integrally applied as now proposed, France's wireless communications throughout the world will be able to rival with Great Britain's cable communications. According to the details made public at a recent meeting at Rennes, wireless communication was established with Hungary May 20, 1920, and will soon be opened with Belgrade. For commercial communication with the United States there is a station at Doua, near Lyons, in addition to the Lafayette station near Bordeaux. Between France and its colonies there will be stations with a range of 7500 miles at Caigon and at Tahiti. Stations with a radius of at least 4375 miles will be established at Djibouti, Tananarivo, Noumea, and French Guinea. In Africa the system will include stations at Saida and Bamako, which will take care of the traffic between Paris, Algeria and West Africa; another station in Senegal, near Dakar, and finally that of Brazzaville.— The Scientific American, August 14, 1920.
High Speed Wireless.—Manual operation is doomed as far as long-distance radio traffic is concerned. The ever-increasing cost of high-powered stations makes it necessary to handle a far greater volume of traffic than can be handled by the usual method. Thus some of the present transatlantic stations are operating at 50 words to 100 words per minute by means of automatic transmitters and receivers. In England experiments have been going on for some time with automatic transmitters capable of a normal speed of 450 words per minute, and even 1000 words per minute during demonstrations. The recording is effected by means of a special electro-chemical apparatus. This apparatus consists of a specially prepared paper drawn between a roller and a marking pointer. The arrival of a signal causes a current to pass through the paper, producing discoloration.—The Scientific American, September 4, 1920.
Wireless Telegraphy in the British Army. (Electrician, June 25. 1920.)—instruments used at Woolwich are reported to transmit more than 2000 words per minute. A range of 250 miles with an accuracy ot one degree of arc is claimed for a new maniature, revolving direction-finder. Moreover, an instrument has been devised for transforming ground line telegraphic signals into wireless with a normal speed of 450 words per minute.—The Franklin Institute, August, 1920.
MISCELLANEOUS
World’s Decreasing Coal Output.—Figures compiled from official sources show that the world's production of coal for the last completed year, 1919, stood at the lowest figure since 1910. The total production last year was 1,170,000,000 metric tons, lower by 10,000,000 than the figures for 1910 and a decrease of 171,000,000 tons as compared with the year 1915. The figures of the world's coal production for the last seven years are as follows:
? | Metric Tons |
1913 | 1,341,000,000 |
1914 | 1,208,000,000 |
1915 | 1,190,000,000 |
1916 | 1,270,000,000 |
1917 | 1,336,000,000 |
1918 | 1,332,000,000 |
1919 | 1,170,000,000 |
Great Britain is responsible for very nearly one-third of this enormous decrease in production, her output having dropped from 292,000,000 metric tons in 1913 to 237,000,000 tons in 1919. Belgium's production dropped by the best part of one-fifth of its 1913 total, whilst the French production fell by one-half from 44,000,000 tons to 22,000,000.—The Nautical Gazette, Aug. 14, 1920.
Experimental Distillation of Kelp at Low Temperatures.—G. C. Spencer, Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry, 1920, has made 16 distillations of dried kelp in an oil-jacketed wood retort at temperatures not exceeding 320° C. Aqueous liquor, tar, and a non-inflammable gas were obtained. The residual charcoal was not sufficiently heated for the good extraction of potash or for use as a filtering medium, therefore kelp must be distilled at a much higher temperature.—The Franklin Institute, August, 1920.
Wire Ropes: Their Uses and Misuses.—Steel wire ropes in the hands of competent men are in most cases better and safer than chains, however well made. The strength of a chain is the strength of its weakest link, whereas if a strand in a wire rope breaks, it does not mean that the whole rope will fail.
Wire ropes have also to a great extent replaced hemp and manila ropes, especially in countries where the climate has a bad effect on the latter; the wire ropes are less cumbersome for hoisting, etc. For instance, a hemp rope for hoisting sections in the erection of masts would be much more unwieldy than a steel rope of the same strength. They are also much more suitable for staying the masts, as they can be made taut; whereas, if a hemp rope is made taut and then gets wet, it is liable to fail owing to shrinkage.
These ropes are stronger than the material from which they are made, for the following reason.
Manufacture of Ropes.—The wire from which the rope is made up is at first about twice the diameter of the finished wire; it is then reduced in size by being drawn through a hard steel drawplate. The result of this drawing action is to compress the steel, and at the same time to form a hard skin on the outside of the wire. This skin is, in fact, a thin cylinder which keeps the steel compressed, therefore increasing the density and hence the strength.
This cylinder is perfectly elastic, but not so ductile as the steel inside. If the cylinder is broken in any way, the strength of the rope is reduced 5 per cent to 10 per cent. New ropes are often reduced this amount in strength owing to kinks getting in the rope. ,
The use of small winding drums is also another cause of this skin becoming cracked. The use of a small drum is the cause of a still more serious action. A rope may pass round a small drum or pulley perhaps a thousand times, and then suddenly fail, the reason being the repeated bending of the wire. So that while kinks usually only reduce the strength of the rope, the use of small winding drums or pulleys is even more dangerous. Steel wire ropes are more flexible than iron ones, but a bad kink will do more harm to a steel rope than to an iron one, as the iron rope is more ductile.
This damaging action by bending depends also on the speed of the winding drum or pulley over which the rope passes. For slow speeds the size of drum should not be less than 80 times the diameter of the rope, and for high-speed winding 120 to 150 times the diameter. Guide pulleys may be less, as the rope does not pass all the way round them. They should never be less than 50 times the diameter of rope.
The weakest point in a rope is at the capping, or where it is attached to the crane hook, or to the anchor in the case of a stay for a mast.
Methods of Capping.—The best method of capping, in fact the only satisfactory method, is as follows:
About 6 inches from the end, the rope is seized. The wires are then frayed out, well cleaned, and put into a cone-shaped casting; then white metal is run in. The efficiency of a rope capped in this way is from 95 to 99 per cent.
Some engineers object to this method of capping, on the ground that the hot white metal anneals the steel. This objection is dealt with in the following manner. It has been proved by experiment that steel is neither reduced in strength nor in hardness, unless it is heated up to the recalescence point, this point being 1441° F. for ordinary purposes. The white metal used may be melted at a temperature of 7000 F., and so does not anneal or reduce the strength of the steel in any way whatsoever.
The efficiency of a spliced rope is from 60 to 80 per cent, depending on the man who makes the splice.
The method of capping a rope by splicing a thimble into the end is usually quite good if made by an experienced man. A straight splice is in general nearly as strong as the rope itself, but when it is bent to take the thimble, the wire is not uniformly loaded, so that if it were spliced for double the usual length, it would not be anywhere near the strength of the rope.
The first method also has the advantage that it does not require skilled labor as is the case with a spliced capping.
The efficiency of ropes using the various kinds of screw-grips is from 30 to 50 per cent. The use of any type of grip which tends to deform the rope is bad practice; in the first case, because it crushes the rope, and secondly, because the rope is not uniformly loaded.
The efficiency of a rope is worked out in the following manner:
The rope is first fractured in the testing machine in the usual manner. Then each separate wire is fractured in a smaller machine.
Laying of Wire Ropes.—Wire ropes are laid up in two different ways. (1) Ordinary lay. The wires in the strand are laid right-handed, and the strand laid up left-handed in the rope. Ropes laid up in this manner are cheaper to make, and are, or should be, only used for stays and guys, and never for hoisting; the reason being that they wear out very quickly owing to only a small proportion of the wires coming in contact on the drum. (2) Lang's lay. In this method the wires in the strand and the strand in the rope are both laid up in the same way, and hence have a smoother surface and no sharp corners as in the ordinary lay. This rope wears uniformly.
No general formula can be given for the strength of wire ropes, for the simple reason that they vary so much with different makers.
If first-class ropes are used, however, the following are sufficiently accurate:
C= Circumferences, measured in inches.
Breaking load in tons = 3 C (steel).
Breaking load in tons = 3C (iron).
The following is an actual test on a steel wire rope, 4 inches in circumference:
Actual breaking load in tons = 51.7.
From 3 C breaking load in tons = 48.0, so that if dealing with first-class ropes the 3 C is quite safe.
For dead loads, such as the load on a mast stay, the safety factor may be taken as five. For live loads, for instance, the rope used to hoist sections in the erection of masts, a safety factor of at least eight should be used. When paying out rope from a coil it should always have the twist taken out as it comes off the coil, otherwise kinks will result; and it should always be laid out flat before being wound on the winch drum.—Engineering and Industrial Management, August 19, 1920.