POLICY—ITS RELATION TO WAR AND ITS BEARING UPON PREPARATION FOR WAR
By Commander C.C. Gill, U. S. Navy
Policy, broadly speaking, maps the destiny of a state in the fulfillment of national aspirations as seen and interpreted by those in governmental control.
When national policies conflict, as they continually do and must, diplomacy, backed by potential power, attempts to negotiate a settlement by the medium of official notes and interchanges. These do not always succeed. Then, if the difference is justiciable, susceptible of decision by the application of principles of law and equity, joint appeal may be made to some international court such as that of the Hague; or, if the dispute is purely political and non-justiciable in nature, the nations involved may, by special agreement, resort to a tribunal of arbitration in the hope of arriving at a satisfactory compromise or other suitable arrangement.
But sometimes all attempts at peaceful adjustment fail. Then, if the issue affects the vital interests, the independence, or the honor of the disputants, it has been the experience of history that war usually results and each belligerent strives by force of arms to sustain its avowed policy. Active war is a continuation of policy by violent means.
"Unlimited War" and "Limited War"
It follows that wars are of various kinds according to the policies they are called upon to support. If the object is of great national importance, a matter of self-preservation in which the peoples of the belligerent countries are deeply aroused, and if the two contestants are evenly matched nations or combinations of nations of the first rank, then each side will institute extreme military measures, the utmost resources of the countries engaged will be under contribution—in such a struggle entire nations are in arms and the course of the civilization of the world may be in the balance. In so far as the chief participants were concerned, the World War of 1914-1918 is an example of this class known as "Unlimited War."
On the other hand, if the matter under dispute is of minor importance, a question relating to a distant possession, an issue toward which the people at large are indifferent, or a contention wherein the parties concerned are of unequal strength, then the objective may not be worth any great military effort, or the weaker belligerent may be incapable of offering significant opposition; in any such case, the point in policy under controversy will be conceded by one side or the other without extensive military operations. Wars of this class may prove of great importance in their ultimate influence on the history of the world, but they are decided without a wide disruption of society or far reaching derangement of the usual pursuits of peace. The Boer War in the Transvaal and the Spanish American War may be cited as familiar examples belonging to this second class called "Limited War."
Policy, therefore, controls the declaration of war, determines its nature and extent and is its master. The statesmen must instruct the strategists as to the political object of the war, and the extent of effort the nation is willing to make to attain it, before the latter can draw plans for its prosecution. In illustration, it is at once seen how the war plans drawn by the strategists of Brazil to govern her participation in the World War were, for political reasons, limited in demanding expenditure of national effort, as compared to the war plans which governed the participation of France.
Policy dictates grand strategy, which, in turn, determines the mutual relations and respective functions of its two branches, maritime strategy and land strategy. The line distinguishing policy from grand strategy is not sharply drawn; to wage war successfully politicians and strategists must meet on common ground and evolve a general plan of campaign to guide and coordinate major operations both ashore and afloat.
The Future of War
No discussion of policy would be complete without reference to the deep and earnest desire of mankind to safeguard the future against the catastrophe of war. The aspiration for honorable peace is shared by all high minded peoples irrespective of color, race, language, or geographical location, and is much in evidence in modern policy.
With the sufferings entailed by the world conflict fresh in memory, it was to be expected that revulsion to war should find strong expression in the enlightened statesmen gathered around the Peace Table at Versailles. Such was the case and there is nothing new in this. The same sentiment has been evidenced after all the great wars of modern times.
The ideal of world peace dates far back in history and has been recorded in numerous state papers, treaties, and conventions. Now we have the League of Nations, as the most recent manifestation of this world-wide wish to substitute law and order for the violence of war. If there is any immediate prospect of the practical realization of this wish it will have a direct bearing upon policy and especially upon the question of preparation for war.
As a result of Allied victory democratic forms of government are now in the ascendency. This favors the purposes of the League of Nations and if consolidated may well constitute a step toward the establishment of conditions which may eventually bring the ideal of world peace into the field of practical politics.
It is also a gratifying consequence of this war that the sympathies aroused, the community of principles voiced by many peoples, is unmistakable indication of advance toward an approximate unification of mankind. But, in order to reap the full benefit of these advances it is important to understand their limitations and to appreciate that, after all, they are only steps along a road which is sure to be long and difficult.
Danger lies in the beauty of the ideal. This, by influencing reason to capitulate to the bias of sentiment and inclination, may prove a serious menace to the very cause it seeks to promote. "The flower is not hastened in its growth by holding it to the flame." Harm rather than good results from attempts to contravene the slow processes of evolution ordained by nature. The goal of a lasting world peace is one which cannot be reached by short cuts, and attempts to do so will only result in increased difficulty and delay.
War is a great evil but there are others greater. History has taught that when two policies conflict, moral motives on the one hand avail little against unscrupulous ambition on the other, unless the reasonable contention of the former be backed by adequate physical force. A war which causes good policies to triumph over bad is not an unmixed evil. So used it is preventative and remedial against dangers and diseases which menace the progress of civilization.
Many instances in history may be cited, wherein policy had to decide between just war and dishonorable peace. Of these, three of the 19th century might be mentioned—Crete, Armenia and Cuba. In the cases of Crete and Armenia, war was avoided, but at what a price: the cause of humanity was sacrificed and national consciences surrendered to iniquity. On the other hand, in the case of Cuba, war was preferred, and few people will contend that this just war entailed greater evil than would have been incurred had the United States submitted to the continuance of a dishonorable peace.
But here the objection may be made that these evils greater than war have at last been eliminated, that the overthrow of Hohenzollern ambition marked the final need of war for any such purpose. To this it may be answered that the same thing has been said many times in the past and has always proved an over sanguine and premature assumption. It would hardly be prudent to accept this objection without more convincing demonstration of its truth than is now available, although, as has already been stated, there is encouraging indication that the spread of democratic forms of government may tend to reduce the evils which cause wars of this class. Even after this has been accomplished, however, there still remains another class of wars, the causes of which must also be eliminated before disarmament can safely be proceeded with in the security of world peace.
This type of wars includes those resulting from a clash of policies in which the moral motives of neither one of the belligerents can be fairly impugned. It may happen, and not infrequently has happened, that both sides wish to be guided by moral motives and yet fail in the peaceful settlement of their dispute, because of an honest irreconcilable difference of ethical opinion. A difference of opinion in which neutral judges might also be equally divided.
This condition will continue until all peoples of the world are influenced by the same moral motives in the same way, and are bound together in a common desire for peace by a natural community of interests. Then all mankind can intermingle and meet for discussion on the same plane or approximately the same plane. It is obvious how far the nations of the world as they now exist, are from this ideal state of reciprocity and agreement.
In illustration of present day divergence, it is well to consider the situation in the Pacific. We have here on one side of this great ocean Asiatics, and on the other side English speaking communities of a quite different race. The former are by far the more numerous in population while the latter in America and Australasia possess an equally disproportionate greater extent of sparsely settled territory.
Racial characteristics and the evolution of history have placed these peoples on different planes of spiritual and social development. The English-speaking communities have evidenced a deep-rooted determination to prevent Japanese and Chinese immigration. The Asiatics object to this and other discriminations against them. Here we have the alleged right of prior possession of property arrayed against the alleged right of equal opportunity for expansion. This is not a new situation in history, and in the past, sometimes the right of possession has prevailed and sometimes the right of expansive growth. The ethical arguments which enter appear to be of such equal balance on the two sides as to render a decision extremely difficult by any principles of law or equity which have so far been established. What persuasion is going to convince intelligent Japanese that it is morally wrong for them to use force to attain what principle and custom indicates to them to be a right? And again, looking at the question from the other angle, what argument can be advanced which is likely to move the inhabitants of California to the admission that their contention of property rights by which they exclude Asiatics is unjust?
Until the barriers which separate nations are broken down, until the relations between Asiatics and Californians are on a parity with the relations between Californians and New Englanders—it is clear, when such situations arise as the above, that the policy which will prevail, either in peace or in war, will be the one which is backed by adequate physical force.
Experience and logic indicate that an approximate world unification is a pre-requisite to lasting peace, and that this can only be effected, if it can be effected at all, by a series of wars, the extent and violence of which will depend largely upon the qualities of measuredness and wisdom displayed by those in governmental control in formulating and carrying out the policies of the various states which make up the society of nations. Hence, it is of primary importance that statesmen should study war and its causes, try to lessen its frequency and virulence without impairing its usefulness, and at the same time endeavor to eliminate those evils and resistances which can be overcome only by physical force.
The Bearing of Policy upon Preparation for War
In due process of time an adequate code of international law and machinery for enforcing it will doubtless be evolved, but, in the meantime, war will have to continue as an instrument of policy. As long as this condition lasts prudence requires that policies be insured by adequate armed force which includes special safeguards such as frontiers protected by mountains, water or other barrier to unlawful aggression, and properly defended lines of communication to outlying possessions.
In a crisis, and in preparation for a crisis, fortunate indeed is the nation whose trustees for the future, those who shoulder the responsibility of governmental control, understand and conform to sound principles in shaping and carrying out an insurance policy of national defense. This is an urgent question affecting the public welfare and the fact that it is intricate and difficult makes attention to it the more important.
Numerous considerations enter and interact on each other in a confusing way. Some of these are of an elusive and unstable nature. Consequently wide diversity of opinion frequently results. The interests involved, moreover, are largely of the future and therefore not brought home to the average citizen whose chief concern is the business of the present. In deciding matters of national defense it is not surprising that prejudice and expediency so often overrule logic, especially under the shifting statesmanship of democracies. The subject itself, however, is capable of scientific analysis. A satisfactory solution— a matter of growing importance as improved means of communication draw the peoples of the world closer together—is not to be arrived at by evasion or guess work. And it may be added that there is promising evidence that in the future a better informed public opinion will not be so tolerant as in the past of blunders caused by ignorance and stubborn sentimentalism, but will demand that national affairs be managed in an honorable business-like manner. The field is one of cooperation between statesmen and their military advisers.
The particular function of the statesman is to set forth the policies of the nation, indicate how they do or may conflict with the policies of other nations, and distinguish between policies which are vital, and those which are merely desirable. This information having been supplied, the particular function of the military adviser is to point what armed force is required to make these policies prevail either through potential influence in peace or by active use in war. Taking into consideration the resources as well as the aspirations of the nation, the responsible statesmen must then decide what policies shall be insured by the provision of armed force and what policies should be pushed only so far as is possible in peace, with the idea of abandoning them rather than to incur the hazard and expense of war. This is a question of what a nation can do and is willing to do to safeguard its interests.
It is thus seen that the line of demarcation between the province of the statesman and that of his military adviser is fairly well defined. This does not mean that the former should not concern himself with army and navy matters nor does it follow that the latter should remain ignorant of statesmanship. On the contrary, the more each knows of the entire subject the better, and it is essential to cooperation that each should know at least the broad principles which guide the other. At the same*time, the line of divided responsibility should be clearly understood and remembered in order that ill-advised trespassing may be avoided. In this connection it may not be superfluous to observe that regardless of whether the government sees fit to provide an army and navy in accord with expert advice or not, it is the duty of those in the military services to make the means that are provided, be they great or small, as efficient as possible and in active employment as effective as possible.
Principles of Policy
In making and promoting state policies two considerations enter, one of self-interest and one of ethics. In this respect we find that the fundamental rules of policy governing the relations between nations are not very different from the rules of conduct governing business and social relations between men.
In a community of individuals each man seeks to increase his wealth and to add comfort and pleasure to his own life and to that of his family. Nor do his neighbors question the propriety of this objective so long as the means employed are honorable and do not infringe the rights and privileges of others. It is recognized that the worldly success of a good citizen benefits his community.
It is similar to this in the community of nations. Policies of self-interest, to increase the wealth, power and influence of a state, are the outcome of a natural ambition for progress, and so long as they are furthered by just and honorable means such policies advance the cause of civilization and contribute to the world's welfare. National wealth and power, under control of a good- government, commands respect and exerts a beneficent influence in the conduct of world affairs, just as wealth honestly amassed and wisely used by an individual commands respect and works for good in the business affairs of men. It is thus seen that there is a balance between self-interest and altruism. Power of doing good is not helped but hindered by blind idealism which neglects the essentials of self-interest. This applies equally to individual men and to nations. But in this, as in nearly all arguments by analogy, pitfalls will be met if the comparison is pressed too closely. There are marked points of difference between a community of individuals and a community of nations. For one thing, the regulation of intercourse between men has reached a more advanced stage than has the regulation of intercourse between the various states of the world.
In summing up it may be fairly stated that self-interest constitutes the major consideration of state policy, and that it should be frankly accepted as the adequate motive which it most assuredly is. It is a fundamental of human nature, and under the control of enlightened intellect is worthy and productive of happy consequences. This is not to say that sentiment and idealism have no place in policy. On the contrary they have an important influence on and are closely associated with the more materialistic considerations. In the grouping and regrouping of nations, in the movements of humanity which make up the history of the world it has been shown that the ties of blood and language have a holding power not to be overlooked, that these, however, do not bind as do territorial limits and the forces of physical propinquity, and finally that neither racial ties nor boundary lines, nor do the two together arouse human passions and influence combinations and separations of men as do pressures exerted by economic conditions.
State policy may be said to rest on three principles:
- The Principle of Self-Interest.—Economic considerations count first, territorial second, and racial or ethnological considerations third.
- The Principle of Humanity.—No nation will long endure whose policies violate the moral code of civilization.
- The Principle of National Defense.—A state too weak to defend its policies must be prepared to give way to more ambitious rivals.