REBUILDING THE NAVY'S ENLISTED PERSONNEL AND REESTABLISHING ITS MORALE AND SPIRIT
By Lieut. Commander J.C. Thom, U. S. Navy
The Situation To-Day
The navy is approximately 40,000 men short of authorized enlisted strength.
Enlistments are barely keeping pace with discharges and dis-enrollments.
Eighty-five per cent of enlistments are for two years.
Reenlistments are so few as to be negligible.
The navy is rapidly losing all of the older, trained, and experienced enlisted men.
Ninety per cent of the present enlisted force are young and inexperienced recruits, possibly good material, but woefully lacking in training, initiative, judgment, and physical development.
More than fifty per cent of commissioned line officers have been commissioned since the declaration of war, either from the Naval Academy, from the ranks, or from civil life, and these officers are generally unfamiliar with prewar conditions, standards, and training methods.
The prewar chief petty officer, the backbone of the enlisted personnel, has vanished. He is either an officer or a civilian.
The present chief petty officer, while representing the best among the present enlisted force, is inferior to his prewar predecessor by reason of lack of experience and training, and is therefore less competent to train recruits.
The Problem
How are we to rebuild the enlisted personnel, reestablish its morale and spirit, and regain the high standard of efficiency which existed in the forecastle prior to the declaration of war?
A Suggested Solution
Any innovation, however logical, is sure to meet with opposition. Naval officers are human, and when once established, they dislike any disturbance of their daily routine. It is not expected that these suggestions will meet with any marked approval from the forecastle, the steerage, the fourth ward, or the heads of departments. However, all hands will admit that something must be done, and the plan proposed herein, though it may never be adopted, may well be of value in causing a certain amount of thought, discussion, and protest, which may result in a better solution for the problem.
In this discussion the suggestions are made with reference to the deck divisions of the larger ships. Certain modifications will be necessary to suit conditions in other branches, and on smaller ships.
It is an acknowledged fact that the older and more valuable enlisted men can be retained in the service only if the present Congress provide for an adequate increase in pay.
Assuming that Congress will increase the pay of enlisted men, we must also assume that the Bureau of Navigation will offer all legal inducements to persuade ex-service men to return to the service. It is to be hoped that many will reenlist; but even the most optimistic among us must admit that a great many, and among them must be numbered some of the most valuable men, will have become established in civil life, with family and business ties which they will not care to break for the rather doubtful advantage of retaining their continuous service status.
At present we can expect that but a small percentage of the total enlisted personnel will be "old timers," men with two or more enlistments in the service. In fact, the great majority of the enlisted force will be recruits. Even those men who haw been in for as much as two years are, in a sense, recruits, for conditions in the service since demobilization began have been such as to preclude any thorough training of recruits, and the rapid loss of the older men has deprived the navy of the valuable services of experienced instructors, who were so largely responsible for the efficiency of the prewar enlisted personnel.
It is not intended to infer that the prewar enlisted man received all his training at the hands of his petty officers. All drills and exercises were, of course, directed by officers, and officers were likewise largely responsible for the efficiency, or the lack of efficiency, of their divisions as a whole, and of such drill units as gun and boat crews. Nevertheless, it is true that by no means all of the training of enlisted men was received during the periods between drill call and retreat. On the contrary the prewar recruit acquired a great part of his more intimate training and the greater portion of his knowledge of practical seamanship, from his association with the older enlisted men, the ship's petty officers. These experienced men were in great measure responsible for the transforming of recruits into sailormen. Their hours of instruction were not confined to drill periods. They taught by precept and example during the hours devoted to ship's work, to drill, and to play. They were the real backbone of the enlisted personnel and their loss cannot be overestimated.
It is obvious, therefore, that a great deal of the training of recruits must devolve upon the officers and particularly upon those who are now watch and division officers and junior officers.
Unfortunately, practically all of these younger officers are as lacking in experience and training as are the present day petty officers. Study the roster of officers of a modern battleship of the fleet. The senior watch officer is a lieutenant of the Naval Academy class of 1916. In prewar days he would be a junior lieutenant of less than one year. Practically all of the remaining watch officers are reserves, temporary regulars, or the product of the wartime three-year dash at the Naval Academy. They have been at sea, as officers, three years or less; have had no experience with prewar methods, standards, or requirements; and have, through no virtue of their own, been hoisted into billets beyond their capacity—which capacity is, except in rare cases, the product of experience and training alone.
No reflection on these officers is intended. They are of the identical breed, and potentially the same, as their older brothers in the service. It is an indisputable fact, however, that an officer with two years' sea experience cannot be expected to handle a division or take a watch as efficiently as an officer with six or eight years at sea.
A good watch and division officer is the product of experience, training, study, and observation. Like wine, he improves with age, and few of the older officers of to-day will say that when they graduated from the watch officer class they had no more to learn about that important duty.
The average Naval Academy graduate has had practically no experience in handling men; and has but the vaguest conception of his duties and responsibilities. If he is taken fresh from his school books, thrust into an officer's uniform with two stripes upon the sleeve, and given a watch and a division, the transition is likely to be too swift for his abilities and his character to keep pace. The sudden increase in rank has been known to cause inflation of the ego, and the change from the role of midshipman with attendant restrictions, to that of lieutenant with corresponding authority, often results in the overdevelopment of such qualities as arrogance, indolence and "tougeness."
"As the twig is bent so is the tree inclined." Failure on the part of the older officers in the service to correct any wrong tendencies and impressions on the part of the new fledged younger officers may result, at a later day, in injustice to these officers and to the service.
Since we must rely upon officers for much of the training of recruits that was formerly done by experienced petty officers, and since, in general, the division officers of to-day are proportionately as deficient in training and experience as are the present day petty officers, our first step in rebuilding the enlisted personnel must be the inauguration of a rigid system of training for the younger officers.
If we adopt such a system and carry it out conscientiously, we will, while designedly improving the efficiency of our officers, be simultaneously training our men, for the reasons that if, as an item in his own training, a division officer is held responsible for the appearance of his men and their conduct at drill, he will soon take steps to see that they are above reproach. Of course, an officer is now presumably held responsible for any irregularities on the part of his men, when such irregularities are brought to the attention of the proper authorities. In the past, however, heads of departments have not ordinarily called the attention of the executive or of the division officers to minor infractions, it being generally considered that such action savored of officiousness or of tale bearing. It is, therefore, proposed to assign older officers to specific duty as "trouble hunters" who shall be constantly on the watch for irregularities in order that the attention of younger officers may be called to errors in method and practice. It is proposed that temporarily, the heads of departments on board ship be designated as "discipline officers"—for lack of a better name—and that these officers be charged with the responsibility of correcting the faults of the younger officers, training these officers in their professional duties, and particularly in discipline and the art of handling men.
To-day the shortage of men and the inefficiency of enlisted personnel keeps the greater number of battleships tied up at the yards. The prewar exercises and maneuvers are largely abandoned. The time which was formerly devoted to these drills and exercises may now be most properly employed in a period of intensive training of officers and men. And as the younger officers and the enlisted men are to be the victims of this proposed system, it is proper that the older officers devote their time and energies to the task of instructing and training their less experienced shipmates.
To the average naval officer the subject of classes and schoolrooms is abhorrent. Few will accept with alacrity the combined role of pedagog, drillmaster, boatsmain's mate, and master-atarms. With efficiency and morale in the navy at the present low ebb heroic measures are necessary and every officer who desires to see a return to prewar conditions, should be willing to sacrifice a portion of his time and of his comfort to accomplish this result.
Since innovations are unpopular, the plan suggested herein if pursued perfunctorily and as an unpleasant extra duty, will be of little value. It is proposed that the system be made strenuous and exacting at the outset, and that it be given precedence over routine port drills and ship's work. It is proposed that division officers, junior officers, and men be on the job and on the jump from all hands until the end of working hours; that drills and exercises be long enough to be of real benefit but not so long as to become excessively monotonous; and that every drill and every exercise be conducted under the personal supervision of an older officer strictly charged with the duty of correcting errors, enforcing discipline, and requiring on the part of every officer and man concerned, strict attention to the job.
It is proposed that the discipline officers devote their attention chiefly to the officers, but at the same time hold these officers responsible for the conduct, deportment, bearing, and efficiency of their men. In this way the discipline and training which is forced upon the officers will be communicated by them to their men, which is the ultimate result desired.
As an example of an average day it is suggested that reveille be not later than 5.30 a. m. and that all division officers be required to turn out at this hour and report to their parts of the ship to oversee the work of their divisions. It Is further suggested that the discipline officer having the day's duty be on deck during this period for the purpose of supervising the activities of all divisions and of the officer of the day.
Breakfast should be at 7, and at 7.45 all hands should turn to, all division officers being present, to clean up ship for quarters; division officers should muster and inspect their divisions at 8.15 and report them at quarters at 8.30, at which time discipline officers should inspect divisions and part of the ship.
From 8.40 to 9 there should be a brisk physical drill which should be conducted in person by division officers, under supervision of discipline officers, and performed by all officers attached to divisions.
From 9.05 to 10.30 there should be a snappy infantry drill, including physical drill with arms, instruction and drill in the salute with and without arms, etc. This drill should be personally supervised by the discipline officer detailed for this duty, and division officers should never be allowed to take out or send out their divisions for individual drill, except under his supervision. The supervising officer should himself drill the divisions as a battalion, and should in addition, require individual company drill, during which he should correct irregularities in bearing, manner of giving and of executing commands, etc. These drills should be made as snappy as possible. When available a band should be present. 'It is an accepted fact that nothing improves a man's military appearance, manner, and bearing as much as a thorough course of correctly administered military drill, and for this reason it is proposed to make this drill a daily affair and to lay particular stress upon the necessity for strict attention and proper performance on the part of all concerned.
Retreat from this drill should be sounded at 10.30, followed by a fifteen minute "breathing spell" before battery drill at 10.45. This drill should occupy the period from 10.45 to 11.30 and should be devoted to testing out fire-control and communication systems, followed by a short period of drill for pointers and loading crews.
The afternoon drill period should begin at 1 p. m/ and should be devoted to infantry, artillery, or boats under oars or sail. Retreat should be sounded at 2 and from 2.15 to 3 should be held school for officers, at which time lectures should be given by heads of departments to division and junior officers on subjects of professional interest. During this period the men would engage in ship's work or drills under the supervision of division petty officers. At 3.10 should be held school for enlisted men, under the instruction of division officers, and under the supervision of discipline officers. Twice a week this period should be devoted to inspecting bags or bedding, both operations to be under supervision of a discipline officer. Retreat should be sounded at 3.55. Night drills should be held twice weekly, all division officers being present.
The outline above is merely a suggestion and will of course require modification to suit particular conditions on individual ships. It is intended to indicate the amount of daily attention to, and supervision over, the activities of division and junior officers which should be exercised by discipline officers.
All officers who graduated from the Naval Academy in 1917 or later and all officers who have been commissioned from other sources since that date, should be required to keep journals in which should be written each week an article, essay, description, etc., on some subject of interest to the naval service. These journals should be rigidly examined by a discipline officer and marks assigned. Should a journal prove unsatisfactory the owner should be required to submit additional work.
During the period of intensive training, routine ship's drills should be reduced to a minimum. However, particular attention should be paid to the conduct of officers and men at these drills. Instruction in bugle calls and pipes should be given until all officers and men are thoroughly familiar with them, and with the fact that each call for drill, boats' crews, etc., is a signal for some one to step out on the double. This should be strictly enforced with officers and men.
In order to carry out this or a similar plan it is proposed that the heads of departments and other officers, preferably lieutenant commanders or above, be detailed as discipline officers for the training and instruction of division and junior officers, and to supervise these officers in their work as watch and division officers. These discipline officers should be assigned according to their qualifications, or their duties, somewhat as follows:
Executive: General supervision of all drills and instruction. Responsible for preparation of drill schedule and for assignment of discipline officers.
Navigator: In charge of schools for enlisted men of deck force, and of lectures for officers. In charge of officers' journals and note books.
Engineer: In charge of schools for enlisted men engineer force, and of junior engineer officers' journals and note books. General supervision of drills and inspections of engineer divisions.
Ordnance: In charge of infantry, artillery, and gunnery drills. First Lieutenant: In charge of emergency drills, physical drill, boat drill.
The executive officer should prepare a comprehensive schedule of drill, instruction, and ship's work, so varied as to reduce monotony, but arranged to cover the entire working day, with fifteen minute "breathing spells" in forenoon and afternoon. He should assign as discipline officers his heads of departments either as outlined above, which outline is based on the duties performed by these officers, or according to the particular abilities or preferences of the officers concerned.
The navigator should have charge of instruction of enlisted men, the actual instruction to be performed by division officers. He should arrange a schedule for approval by the executive, and personally supervise all classes in order to assure himself that this schedule is properly carried out and not in a perfunctory and dilatory manner. This instruction should be confined to purely practical subjects such as seamanship, gunnery, primary navigation, signals, radio telegraphy, naval regs., naval etiquette, customs and traditions, military law, etc. Instruction in academic subjects and specialties should not be included but should be given in special classes upon request.
He should also have charge of the instruction of division and junior officers should arrange for lectures on naval and allied subjects by officers from his own and other ships, and by civilian specialists when practicable.
He should have charge of officers' journals and note books; should require diligent and conscientious work in these journals, and should, if necessary, assign subjects to be investigated and written upon by officers. He should carefully examine these journals and assign marks, requiring officers whose journal work is unsatisfactory to submit additional work.
At sea, and when practicable in port, he should require officers to perform a reasonable amount of navigation work and should correct all navigation notebooks.
The engineer officer should exercise similar supervisory duties in connection with the school for enlisted men of the engineer force, conducted by the junior engineer officers.. He should prepare schedules of instruction and see that these schedules are properly followed. He should, in addition, exercise personal supervision over the drills and inspections of the engineer divisions, and should assign notebook subjects to junior engineer officers, which work he should examine, correct, and mark.
The ordnance officer should have charge of all gunnery, infantry, artillery, and similar drills. If necessary he may be assisted by other officers, such as assistants to heads of departments. He should prepare a schedule of his drills for approval by the executive, and should personally supervise and direct such drills. His paramount duty should be the instruction of division officers in their duties in connection with these drills, and the correction of errors of officers in manner of giving and of executing commands, military bearing, rendering salutes, naval phraseology, attitude toward enlisted men, and toward other officers. The first lieutenant should have charge of all emergency drills, physical drill, and boat drills. His particular interest should be the instruction of officers in the proper stationing and handling of their men, and in the proper deportment of officers and men at drill. He should require all officers to move at the double during emergency drills, and to take part in all physical drills. He should instruct officers in the proper handling of boats under sail and oars, and in the proper method of giving commands for boat evolutions. He should cause to be submitted to him all division watch, quarter, and station bills, and division books, which he should require to be kept up to date and in approved form.
In addition the discipline officer having the day's duty should supervise bag and bedding inspections, and require division officers to correct all faults.
It should be impressed upon all discipline officers that they are strictly charged with the duty of instructing watch officers in the proper method of standing watch on deck or on the bridge, and that they are required to correct any faults of bearing, deportment, or language on the part of the officer of the day which may come to their attention.
To be of any value this, or any similar system, of intensive training must be relentlessly prosecuted. No errors due to ignorance, indifference, carelessness, or any other cause, should be overlooked. Discipline officers should, from the first, take subordinates to task for all irregularities however slight, of conduct, bearing, manner or giving and executing commands, attitude toward enlisted men and toward other officers, personal appearance, and for all irregularities on the part of their men. Until the present slackness and inefficiency is largely corrected exaggerated disciplinary measures should continue in force until sufficient improvement is visible to warrant gradual modification. Return to normal conditions should depend upon the results obtained and should be a goal for which the chief sufferers, junior officers and men should strive.
In conclusion, the present lack of efficiency and morale can be remedied only by a radical change in training methods. Nothing suggested above is new. Everything has been tried out in the past to a greater or a lesser degree. It is merely proposed to combine various disciplinary and instructional features in one program of intensive training, the primary object being the development of the efficiency of the junior half of the officer personnel; and the ultimate aim the training of the enlisted men, and of the entire service. It is not expected that these suggestions will be adopted, but it is hoped that they may cause some constructive criticism from which a better plan may be evolved.