Director fire a century ago? "Nothing of the kind." you answer; "they loaded the old smooth-bores with black powder and round shot, sighted down the line o' metal, and let her go." And yet a system of fire-control bearing all the ear-marks of present-day director firing was proposed in those same days of smooth-bores and round-shot.
In director fire the guns are laid to a common angle of elevation, trained to converge upon a point of known range and bearing, and fired simultaneously from a single station more or less removed from the immediate vicinity of the guns. Such a system is what William Kennish, Carpenter, R. N., tried to achieve in 1829. At that time the British Admiralty was asking the service periodically the following questions:
1. "Is there any device to preserve a general level in a ship when heeling or otherwise? If so, describe it."
2. "Is there any method for concentrating the fire of a ship's broadside?"
These questions were undoubtedly born of the many actions in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, in which tons of shot were expended with extremely meager results, due both to inaccuracy of the fire and insufficient striking energy of the shot. As an instance of poor shooting, the action between the United States and the Macedonian resulted in only 100 hits in the two hulls, out of about 2500 rounds fired. And a good example of insufficient penetrating power is the Chesapeake-Shannon action, after which, although it was fought throughout "within hail," shot were found sticking in the sides of both ships. Again, in the battle of Navarino, the Albion, "74," fired nearly 7000 rounds without sinking a ship. The Genoa, "74," in that action lay for 3 ½ hours so close to her antagonist that the whites of the Turks' eyes were visible, and fired away 7000 pounds of powder with shot in proportion, but failed to sink or destroy her opponent. Small wonder then, that the Admiralty sought improved means of fire direction and control, and "a method of concentrating the fire of a ship's broadside"!
In attempting to solve the problem of concentration Kennish decided upon five different "fires" on either side as being sufficient to cover all conditions of range and relative bearing likely to arise in an ordinary action. No. 1 fire converged the guns upon a point only 90 yards from the ship, and abeam of the midship section. No. 2 fire and No. 3 fire were also abeam, at ranges of 500 yards and 800 yards, respectively, the latter being considered the "maximum effective range"! Nos. 4 and 5 each gave a range of 500 yards, and were directed two points forward and abaft the beam, respectively. (See Fig. 1.)
The means of training the guns upon these five points consisted of wooden "breast-pieces" pivoted at the gun ports. These were capable of being set in azimuth to any of the five positions necessary to align each gun according to the fire desired. (See Fig. 2.) The breast-piece having been set to the "fire" ordered, the gun carriage was run squarely against it, upon being returned to battery, and the gun was thereby properly trained.
The "elevation indicator" was somewhat similar to that for train, being simply the usual wedge-shaped "quoin" which was moved forward or backward along the "bed" under the gun, thus raising or lowering the breech. Kennish graduated his quoins in degrees, and also marked numbers upon them to indicate the elevation necessary for each "fire." Fig. 3 shows the arrangement of the gun, bed, and quoin, and also a form of "gunner's quadrant" in the muzzle of the gun, used in graduating the quoin. In addition to this means of showing the elevation, each gun was fitted with a simple open sight, graduated for the different "fires," to be used when heavy rolling required each gun captain to choose his own instant for firing.
By far the most interesting part of the system, in its relation to modern gunnery, is the instrument which Kennish invented for directing the fire. This device, which corresponds to our director or director-scope, Kennish named the "marine theodolite." (See Fig. 4.) It is worth noting that it included a telescope, fitted with crosswires. Mounted on the hammock netting at the fore part of the poop-deck this theodolite was used to measure both the bearing and the range of the enemy, and to indicate the proper instant for firing. The range was obtained by measuring the depression angle to the enemy's water-line, or the angle subtended by his masthead height, and consulting prepared tables for the corresponding distance. Then the proper fire number was sent to the battery, where breast-pieces and quoins were set accordingly. The helm was conned by the officer at the theodolite until the enemy was on the exact bearing. Then, upon the stroke of a gong, every lanyard in the battery was pulled, and a whole broadside of 32-pound shot would be on their way to land simultaneously at a single point on the enemy's water-line. Hardly a chance of failure to penetrate under these conditions!
In case of heavy rolling the theodolite was not used to show the instant for firing, because of the ballistic action of its pendulum, but was employed only for conning the helm. The range was measured by sextant angle, each gun-sight set for the corresponding "fire," and the pointer (who, in those days was the guncaptain) pulled his lanyard when his sight crossed the enemy's water-line. In other words, the system in a sea-way was director fire in train, pointer fire in elevation,—but firing "on the fly" instead of "steady on the bull."
Kennish first put his plan into practice on board H. M. S. Hussar, at Bermuda, in 1829, when he scored 3 hits out of 6 shots on a target 6 feet square at a range of 600 yards. Later, in H. M. S. Galatea, at Spithead, he met with even greater success. Upon a target of the same size, at the same range, a 10-gun salvo netted 7 hits. Then a 16-gun salvo completely destroyed the target, causing the captain of the Galatea to remark that "if a crow was standing on the target, its escape could only be attributed to a miracle." This same officer strongly recommended the scheme to the Admiralty, in an official report, not forgetting to mention the hypothetical crow; and several other officers of high rank also endorsed the plan. But either a less progressive regime came into power in the Admiralty, or else the service at large laughed the idea into the discard as a method impracticable for battle; for the system was never put into general use. It serves to show, however, that in naval gunnery, as elsewhere under the sun, there is nothing new.