Upon the signing of the Treaty of Peace the department will be confronted with the question of peace organization, administration and training of the large force of naval reserves, enrolled throughout the country during the recent war. From the facts of the present war, it is evident that the navy must maintain this reserve practically up to its present strength, must organize, administer, train and recruit the same, and provide an economical and efficient method of keeping this reserve up to a high standard of mobility and efficiency.
It is realized that the department is making and has plans to this end and that the system now in effect can be developed efficiently. It is believed, however, that the department welcomes statements of the experiences and conclusions of officers under the present system and the writer therefore respectfully submits the following suggestions and comments for consideration and discussion by the navy and naval reserve. These are the result of thirteen years’ experience in the naval militia, in all grades, from lieutenant junior grade to captain commanding the largest naval militia battalion in the United States. Prior to the beginning of the war, the writer was called to Washington to assist the naval board appointed for the formulation of General Order No. 153 and in other matters affecting the naval militia. The writer was executive secretary of the Naval Training Association, composed of those who took the civilian volunteer battleship cruise in 1916 and was organizing volunteers for subsequent cruises at the outbreak of the war. Prior to the outbreak of the war, the writer cooperated at New York in the organization of the third naval district offices. During the war the writer has been continuously on duty in naval districts in connection with the mobilization, organization and administration of naval districts and of the reserves and has come in contact with many phases of this problem.
Administration, General
It is suggested that the entire commissioned and enlisted personnel of the reserves, should be administered at the Navy Department, in the Bureau of Navigation, by a separate division of naval reserve personnel, similar in scope, authority and organization to the former division of naval militia affairs. This division should be in charge of a line officer of the navy, not below the grade of commander, and preferably of the grade of captain. All matters pertaining to the naval reserve personnel should be handled by this division, through the commandants of the naval districts. It would have charge of all examinations, promotions, fitness reports, details of officers, records, training, assignments of officers and men for training, assignments of officers and men for training afloat and general service; and, in conjunction with the bureaus concerned; the arming and equipping of reserve units in the districts; and the assignment of vessels, officers, and men of the regular service to reserve units for instruction purposes.
Administration, District
It is submitted that, as at present, the administration of the naval reserve throughout the country should locally remain in the hands of the district commandants, who with their local organization and officers can best and most economically handle the local units, keep them organized, equipped, and in touch with the naval service. It is submitted that, as at present, the administration of the naval reserve personnel should be the duty of the aide for personnel in each district. This officer should be a lieut. commander or commander of the regular service and should be an officer not only of skill and experience in service afloat but should be a capable instructor of officers and men and also be possessed of tact and broad-mindedness in his dealings with those with whom he comes in contact. It would be the duty of this officer to act as inspector-instructor of all the naval reserve units within the district. He would, thereby, come in contact officially and personally with officers of the reserve of varying degrees of service and experience, and with city and state officials at various points in the district. The detail of a mediocre or uninterested officer to this duty simply because: “he wanted a shore billet,” would negative much of the value that the service or the reserve would otherwise obtain from an interested, tactful, enthusiastic officer, who in this capacity acts in a sense as a liaison officer between the navy and naval reserve. In this connection, the writer speaks from actual experience of a number of naval inspector-instructors assigned to duty throughout the country prior to the war. Some of them inspired the militia within their charge with a fine spirit of enthusiasm and ambition to qualify usefully for service with the navy, while others were an actual drag upon organizations naturally enthusiastic and ambitious, and upon whom the effect of an apathetic, indifferent officer was positively harmful. The naval reserve, as did the naval militia, naturally look up to the officers of the regular service as an inspiration and example. If, therefore, they observe that service of an officer is evidently not up to standard, their morale is injuriously affected.
The marking, rating and disrating of men in the district, the reports on fitness of officers and the records of officers and men should be in the hands of the aide for personnel of each district, as at present. Under the direction of the commandant, this officer would organize and assign the various units within the district, for purposes of mobilization and drill, would assign such instructors of the reserve and of the regular navy as were available within the district or assigned to the district by the department for that purpose. He would arrange for the participation of individuals and units in periods of service afloat in district vessels and in practice cruises in general service as directed by the Bureau of Navigation. He would arrange for periodical examinations of candidates for commission or warrant from the enlisted personnel and for the examination of officers desiring to qualify for confirmation in Class 2 or for promotion, as approved by the department after recommendation by the commandant of the district.
The administration of discipline in connection with the reserve force or in connection with any officers or men of the navy detailed as instructors within the district would come under the cognizance of the commandant through the aide for personnel, except for infractions of discipline on board of commissioned vessels operating in the district, where the commanding officer was authorized to act, or at regular naval stations in the district. The matter of discipline is mentioned here because it has been a difficult question in the past as regards the relation of the enlisted personnel of the navy assigned to naval militia vessels to the naval militia officers in command or on duty in connection with these vessels. Later legislation and departmental action cleared up this matter considerably and gave to naval militia officers the necessary authority to enable them to act, but it is evident that the relations between the enlisted personnel of the navy and these officers have not always been those between men and officers of the regular service, and in some cases there have been complaints on both sides, showing insubordination on one hand and tactless or arbitrary action on the other. This would be entirely avoided were these men under the control and authority of an aide for personnel of command rank of the regular service.
In matters of supply, repairs, equipment, etc., of reserve units and vessels assigned thereto, the district supply officer, the district industrial manager and other district officers would have jurisdiction, as at present in the case of district vessels. Pay accounts of officers and men on active duty in the reserve or officers and men detailed as instructors to the reserve would be carried by the district supply officer except in the case of vessels assigned to the district for training, large enough to justify a supply and disbursing officer in their complement.
General Organization
It seems to the writer, that the most important matter to be considered in arranging for a general organization of the naval reserve force, is that of stimulating recruiting and maintaining interest. It is submitted that the experience of years both in the army and navy for all volunteer forces is that “ local pride and local interest ” are the best means to this end. The evidences to this effect in the present war are overwhelming and it has been the experience of the navy within itself that nothing contributed so much to the efficiency of a ship’s company as stimulating their esprit de corps, to use the old term, or their “ ship’s loyalty,” to use a newer one. The organizations in the national army, in the national guard divisions, and even in the new divisions of the regular army, have all been based on this feeling. In the present condition of the naval reserve and under its present scattering of personnel throughout the entire country there is no incentive of this sort, but the spirit is there and only needs encouragement. It has but needed in the various districts a statement that the --- district or --- naval station, had to beat the other districts or other naval stations in the Liberty Loan Drive or in the standing of the officers or men it sent to Annapolis for the reserve class, to the radio school, etc., to stir up a fine feeling of enthusiasm and co-operation. This spirit should not be lost, and the only way to maintain it in £ national reserve, is by organizing the reserve into local units under designated names. This is the strongest argument that the former naval militia might put forth for its restoration, and it seems an unanswerable one; for it is the spirit of local pride and emulation, of camaraderie and good-fellowship, that have kept the naval militia organizations and the national guard in existence and under no other conditions could the navy have had a partly trained reserve of about twelve thousand men, ready to go into service the day war was declared. A system of individual appeal to individuals throughout the country, that does not give them a name and a local organization to work and to drill under and to work for, is going to fail in the case of men who are so drilling and working voluntarily, and not as a means of livelihood, but often at the expense of the time they should give to their business and their families. The spirit of patriotism is national, but it needs “ local color ” to make it effective!
In accordance with the above the naval reserve force should be divided into brigades, battalions, and divisions. The reserve battalions and divisions within any naval district would compose a brigade, the number of the brigade to correspond to the number. of the district. It is realized that this will make the brigade vary considerably in size, but the headquarters work of the brigade and its relations with the department can be so much better handled through the district headquarters that this irregularity could be disregarded. This would make thirteen brigades corresponding to the thirteen districts in the continental limits of the United States. Reserves in the Fourteenth district should be attached to the Twelfth district brigade, and those in the Fifteenth district to the Eighth district brigade.
Battalions would be organized at all important centers where there is sufficient personnel nearby to warrant.
Independent divisions could be organized at smaller centers or where isolated location did not permit of their attachment to a battalion. As a general proposition the divisions of a battalion should not be located more than one hundred miles apart, so as to be within easy telephone and rail access of the battalion headquarters.
The organization of brigades and battalions should in general follow that laid down in General Order No. 153, with the following modifications:
District brigades should be commanded by captains, with staff as assigned by General Order No. 153, paragraph 50.
Battalions should be composed of not less than four divisions and not over sixteen; battalions of more than eight divisions to be commanded by a commander; battalions of eight divisions or less to be commanded by a lieut. commander. The headquarters for battalions of eight divisions or less to be as indicated in paragraphs 51 and 55 and the headquarters for battalions of more than eight companies to be as indicated in paragraph 52, necessary modifications being made to provide for petty officers of special rating, etc., created since General Order No. 153 was formulated.
The divisional organization should be as prescribed in General Order No. 153 except that the minimum number of men authorized for a division should be forty-eight, whether deck or engineer, and the maximum number ninety-six. The provisions of paragraphs 21 and 22 should be eliminated; as engineer divisions and aeronautic sections should be separate.
It is realized that this provides for thirteen reserve officers of the grade of captain, and a proportionate number of commanders and staff officers of assimilated grade who have not been specifically authorized by existing laws and regulations for the reserve. It is also realized that this feature will promote discussion and opposition by many officers in the regular service. It has been the subject of much past discussion between the naval militia and the department. To attempt to enumerate the reasons pro and con brought forward in this discussion would take more time and space than is available here. The writer as a former officer of the regular service and as an ardent believer in the federalization and centralization of the naval reserve or militia, as well as a naval militiaman of twelve years standing, has endeavored to look impartially on both sides of this question and to do justice to both; with a final conclusion that advanced rank is not only desirable but necessary for the upbuilding and efficiency of the naval reserve; while at the same time it works no injury or prejudice to the naval service or any individual in it. Provided, that is, that the control of promotion and assignment remain, as under present laws and regulations, entirely within the control of the department. In the past, officers of the service, realizing the grave responsibilities and personal and professional obligations and prestige attached to command rank in the navy have feared, and not without reason, that officers in the states might attain to this rank who were not worthy of it. It was entirely fitting and proper that they should be jealously watchful for the honor and dignity of the service, but under present legislation and departmental control no such unfortunate contingency should arise. If an officer proved to be incompetent or unworthy of the honor of rank conferred upon him, the department has the same control, by detail of duty and the usual disciplinary and remedial measures, that would obtain with an incompetent officer in the regular service. Another fear on the part of many of the younger officers, just approaching command rank after years of faithful service, was that they would be outranked on duty by a naval militia officer of limited service. As the matter of detail was within the control of the department, it would hardly seem that this fear was justified, and it is not believed that any case arose prior to the war or during its occurrence whereby an officer of the regular service had just cause for embarrassment or complaint in this respect. The department is the final judge of the qualifications of an officer and is always able, under the law, to transfer to Class 4 officers not qualified for command afloat, in which class these officers are strictly limited in their seniority and duties.
In further connection with the desire to safeguard the prestige of command rank, it might be stated that the officers of the reserve should be considered as officers of a separate corps of the naval service. They should be considered in the same relation as officers of the marine corps, which is also part of the naval service. It is not considered that there is any bitterness or anxiety on the part of the line and staff of the navy as to the rank attained or rapidity of promotion in the marine corps—any more than in the case of the army. The relations of the regular navy and the reserve and the mutual performance of duty are, it is true, much closer and more correlated than in the case of marines or army, but it should be perfectly possible for the two corps to maintain their mutual respect and harmonious co-operation. The reserve is a volunteer, auxiliary service. It does not seek absorption of or by the regular service and does not desire to infringe on the esprit de corps, or lifelong prestige of what it looks up to as its “ expert older brother.” The writer feels there was much real, but mistaken apprehension on this score on the part of some officers in the service. To some extent this was engendered by conversations with army officers about the relations of the army and the national guard under the Dick Bill, as it was called, and at the time of the Mexican Border mobilization. If such difficulties or encroachments on the regular army actually occurred, their incidence is no indication that the naval reserve contemplated any similar activities. The writer cannot speak officially or collectively for the naval reserve, but only from his own experience. That experience has brought him, however, into personal contact with the leaders of the naval militia throughout the country, and he feels competent to judge of their motives and plans. The sole aim of these officers has been to build up an efficient reserve for the navy. Their desire for retention of command rank in the naval militia and now in the reserve has been inspired by a realization of the necessity for such. Men of the type needed to organize and build up and lead the naval reserve are, naturally and properly, ambitious, aggressive men; successful men who expect recognition and reward for their services. The only possible recognition or reward is in promotion to a higher grade. If such promotion be denied them beyond the relatively restricted grade of lieut. commander corresponding to major in the army’s reserve of the national guard, what incentive have they and what inducement can they offer to the right sort of officer-material? These men may not be essential to the navy afloat in war, but they are capable of invaluable service ashore in administrative duty; and, prior to war, they are imperatively necessary in creating and organizing the reserve and rendering it attractive for those younger officers whose services will be needed afloat in war.
The writer has discussed above the opposition to command rank in the reserve. In favor there are the following reasons:
It furnishes a means of reward, in peace or war, for deserving officers.
It furnishes an incentive to enrollment and continuance in service of ambitious, efficient officers.
It provides a logical flow of promotion in the reserve.
It allows for a better and more systematic organization for the reserve by furnishing officers for the larger administrative units.
It gives the units of the reserve, through their commanding officers, a greater local prestige and standing in comparison with national guard organizations at parades, reviews; in connection with civic and community activities, etc.
Another reason, formerly of great importance in connection with the naval militia of the States was that the commanding officer should have adequate rank to command attention at the state capitol and to secure favorable legislation for the naval militia in active competition with the commanding officers of national guard organizations. Should the reserve be entirely dependent on federal support, this particular reason would no longer hold.
It may be stated, further that the granting of command rank to reserve officers entails no additional expense to the government in time of peace, as the highest retainer pay allowed under the law is based on the pay of a lieut. commander. In time of war it is believed that the services of those officers of the reserve attaining command rank would be fully worth the active duty pay; which, in most cases, would be considerably less than the compensation earned by men of their caliber in civil life.
In connection with the subject of organization, there should be considered the question of the different classes of the naval reserve. At present the relations of these classes to each other, and the method of transfer from one to the other are somewhat involved. The present arrangement is capable of much simplification and improvement. It is suggested that Class 6 be abolished entirely as unnecessary. There has been no occasion for its use since the passage of the act. There has been some discussion as to the desirability of merging Class I and Class 2. However, the former is of advantage in connection with the withdrawal from active service of men of the navy, and it would seem well to continue it. Class 2 should be confined exclusively to officers and men fully qualified and confirmed, in their grade or rating. Class 2 should be considered as an immediate reserve available for any duty anywhere. All in Class 2 should come from Class 4, and no enrollments or provisional commissions should be made in this class. Class 3, as now, should be the auxiliary reserve for merchant-type vessels, All officers or men seeking service with combatant vessels, should be transferred to Class 4 (G), whence if qualified and confirmed they may be further transferred to Class 2. Class 4 should be divided into two general groups: Class 4 (G) composed of those available for general service and seeking service afloat and further training with a view to confirmation and qualification in Class 3: Class 4 (T) composed of the technicist officers and men whose service, by limitations of age or other reasons, is confined exclusively to shore duty, and whose enrollment is frequently made for a special, designated job. To this Class 4 (T) would belong the Yeomen (F), etc.
Class 5 would be continued, as previously, for the aviation service.
IV. Equipment
The uniform equipment for officers and men of the reserve should be as provided by present regulations. It should be optional, however, for officers to have and wear, when same arc designated, such additional articles of uniform equipment as are prescribed or authorized for officers of the navy.
It is the belief of the writer, however, that the officers and men of the reserve should bear some distinguishing mark or device to differentiate them from the navy. This emblem should be of such a character that to the layman, or to a person at a distance of a few yards, there would be no apparent distinction between the branches of the service. To the initiated, however, the difference would be as distinctive and as useful as the differentiation in corps device or rating badges of the regular service. It is submitted that the same excellent reasons for indicating differences of the corps of the navy by device and rating badge, hold for differentiating the navy and the naval reserve as separate branches of the naval service. It is felt that this desire for differentiation is concurred in by very many of the reserve officers. They have no desire to pretend, within the service, to the knowledge and réclame due to the professional officer of the regular navy who has made the service a life vocation. They are, also, proud of the fact that their service is voluntary and tendered by them to the government in its time of need as a patriotic offering, often made at a sacrifice of personal and financial welfare. So, top, the officers of the auxiliary reserve (Class 3) though often ill at ease and hesitant in the unaccustomed surroundings of drill and life aboard a vessel of the regular service, are justly proud of their long training and the skill acquired thereby as competent navigators and seamen in the handling of merchant ships upon all seas. The fact that they enrolled and are skilled for a special branch of the service should be indicated in their uniform. Aboard ship, the ship’s company recognize the surgeon’s corps device and know wherein his skill lies. They do not expect him to handle the forward turret, any more than they expect the turret officer to operate upon them for appendicitis. If we dress all officers in the same uniform we have a right to expect of them the same standard of performance, which is not fair to the individual of special training or qualification. If, however, an officer has fully qualified in the department’s opinion for the duties of his grade he then should wear the insignia indicating that fact.
In accordance with the foregoing, it is therefore recommended that the reserve uniforms be differentiated as follows:
Officers
Class No. i and Class No. 2 (fully qualified and confirmed), same as navy.
Class No. 3. Foul anchor in lieu of star on sleeve and shoulder mark.
Class No. 4. Circle around star, as formerly worn by N. N. V.
Enlisted Men
Class No. 1 and No. 2. Same as navy.
Class No. 3 and No. 4. Anchor within diamond as worn by N. N. V. formerly.
The question of ordnance equipment, etc., will be discussed under the heading of Training.
V. Training
The problem of training the naval reserve in time of peace involves several factors: the proper location of training points with reference to the distribution of the reserve personnel; the supply of officers and men for training purposes; the supply of the necessary material in way of ships or drill halls, navigation and ordnance equipment, etc.; the amount and kind of training to be given to each individual; the standardization of training so that the naval reserve may be developed systematically and as a homogeneous body through its ranks and ratings. In considering these factors much valuable information is gained from a study of the work of the naval militia through the past twenty-five years. In a general way, the system of the naval militia as modified and improved by greater departmental control and co-operation in three years or so previous to the war would seem the best for the training of the reserve. The local instruction, discipline and drill, however, varied considerably in the different states. With complete federal control, the routine of drills, schedule of instruction, length of drill periods, number of same, requirements as to orderliness, neatness, discipline and all the other essentials of an efficient organization should be standardized throughout the country and officer, petty-officer, or man drilling at Boston or Duluth, would undergo within the limits of human variability, the same discipline and training as those at San Francisco or New Orleans.
Let us take up, in order, the factors of training mentioned above:
First, as to location of training points, the problem is solved by the distribution of the local headquarters of the battalions and divisions throughout the districts, at points where there is the greatest density of reserve population. Naturally it is very desirable that these points should be on deep water, but considerable preliminary training can begin at armories inland, and there are many places inland where there is some body of water nearby on which rowing and sailing can be practiced in standard navy boats.
Along the coast, on the Great Lakes, and on the navigable rivers flowing into the sea, it will be possible to provide naval vessels for local organizations, to serve as armories, for drill and for practice cruising. The navy has a number of vessels which are not required by the active service, but which are desirable to be retained in reserve. No better way of doing this could be found than by assigning them to the training of reserves at every available point. The vessels could be kept in quite as good condition as at navy yards, and the personnel would be kept in better condition, it is believed. With the completion of their complement by reserves for training, these vessels would make frequent cruises. They would act as local rendezvous for the reserves within a certain radius therefrom. With our many harbors, oceans, lake, and river, it should not be necessary for any reservist to travel far in order to report on board of one of these vessels for a period of training. He should be allowed to do so at any time in the year, at his own convenience, with the understanding that his travel expense would be paid only for a period of service under conditions as follows or under some similar arrangement:
No period of training on rendezvous vessel, where subsistence and travel expense are provided, to be for less than one week.
If period is one week or more and less than fifteen days: no pay, but subsistence and travel-expense for a distance of not over fifty miles and return, to be provided.
For a period of fifteen days or over: no pay, but subsistence and travel expense for a distance of not over one hundred miles.
For periods in excess of three weeks, but in no case to exceed three months: no pay but subsistence, and travel expenses for any distance; but travel would be authorized only to specifically designated rendezvous vessel of recruit.
Except when mobilizing under orders, reserves desiring training at other points than designated rendezvous, would obtain special authorization for such training but would travel at their own expense. This would allow reserves to make choice of locality in which they volunteered for training, such as California or the south in winter, yet would not cause unjustified transportation expense to the department.
Under the present law, the minimum period of service for retainer pay is fifteen days. For active service in qualification for retainer pay this minimum is correct; as past experience with naval militia has shown that so much time was taken in embarking, assigning and “ shaking down ” men, and in disembarking them that shorter periods did not leave enough actual available time for a course of instruction sufficient to cover even an outline of ship’s work, and justify the expense of mobilization. The periods intended above are to be undergone without active duty pay and not as a part of the required active service period, but as a part of the system of instruction, and should be applied as credit on the annual requirement of thirty-six drill periods a year. Credit should be allowed at the rate of four periods for each week day from 8.00 a. m. to 4.30 p. m., on board; except Saturday from 8.00 a. m. to noon; for which two periods would be credited. No credits to be allowed for Sundays and holidays except when underway on cruise. In addition, of course, there should be a series of evening drill periods through the year, which local reserves should be authorized to attend. These periods should be of two hours’ '
duration, partly theoretical and partly practical instruction. Attendance at one of these should count as one drill period towards the thirty-six required. The calendar dates assigned these can be left to the district aide for personnel, but the scheme of instruction and subjects taken up should be arranged by the department, to insure uniformity throughout the reserve.
In regard to the assignment of vessels, it is recommended that reserve battleships be assigned to the larger ports, with reserve destroyers or Eagle boats, and subchasers as tenders and auxiliaries. At secondary points reserve cruisers should be assigned with auxiliaries and at points where single divisions are located Eagles or subchasers should be assigned.
To indicate any tentative assignment of vessels would call for a complete knowledge of the distribution of reserve personnel and a knowledge of the vessels available under “ exigencies of the service ” that is at present not available; but, to indicate roughly the suggestion of the writer, the following would be assignments for the Third and Eighth districts under this plan :
Third District | |
Type of Vessel | Locations |
1 Reserve battleship | North River, New York City |
1 Reserve battleship | Off Bay Ridge, Brooklyn |
1 Eagle boat and 2 Subchasers | Attached to each of the above |
1 3d-class cruiser or gunboat and 1 subchaser | New Haven, Conn. |
1 3d-class cruiser or gunboat and 1 subchaser | Newark, N.J. |
1 Eagle boat | Newburgh, N.Y. |
1 Eagle boat | Bridgeport, Conn. |
1 Subchaser | Albany, N.Y. |
1 Subchaser | Ossining, N.Y. |
1 Subchaser | Yonkers, N.Y. |
1 Subchaser | Flushing, N.Y. |
1 Subchaser | New Rochelle, N.Y. |
1 Subchaser | Port Jefferson, N.Y. |
1 Subchaser | Sag Harbor, N.Y. |
Eighth District | |
1 Cruiser (Chicago or Olympia) | New Orleans, La. |
1 Eagle boat and 2 Subchasers | Attached |
1 3d-class cruiser or gunboat | Galveston, Texas |
1 Subchaser | Attached |
1 3d-class cruiser or gunboat | Mobile, Ala. |
1 Subchaser | Attached |
1 Eagle boat | Pensacola, Fla. |
1 Subchaser | Port Arthur, Texas |
1 Subchaser | Vicksburg, Miss. |
1 Subchaser | Memphis, Tenn. |
It is recognized that at many large centers of population it will be necessary to provide armories or drill halls, where vessels are not available, or in addition to vessels. In fact, such armories are desirable for the providing of assembly and recreation places for the organized reserve units, and, as previously stated, for the furthering of their esprit de corps and interest. Such armories will be a source of considerable expense by purchase, or rent; but if the reserve is truly to be what its name indicates, a reserve of selected, available, partly trained officers and men, and not a mere card-index of raw material, then the government should be prepared to go to any reasonable expense to further such a body awl "in time of peace, prepare for war."
The foregoing notes are but a general outline of the questions to be considered in regard to the future of the reserve and many important points have perhaps not been touched upon. It is hoped that the officers of the navy and of the naval reserve will devote their thought and effort to further discussion of this subject to the end that this great reserve organization may be continued and perfected in every detail so that the “ man behind the man behind the gun ” as represented by the reservist may be ready and trained to take his place in line with his senior brother of the navy.
Note.—The above was prepared in June, 1919, since which date the Department has gone ahead with the systematic organization of the Naval Reserve, and in so doing has provided for many of the points covered by recommendations in this article. In particular, provision has been made for organization along the lines of the recommendations of Section III, paragraphs two, three, and four. The Department has also provided for distinctive uniform devices and thereby rendered superfluous the recommendations of my Section IV regarding uniforms. The Department also contemplates acceptance of one week’s continuous service under drill and instruction as the equivalent of the thirty-six drills a year. This is more liberal than the recommendations of Section V, paragraph five above, and undoubtedly will allow of more reserves qualifying than under the plan above. C. L. P.