REVIEW OF BOOKS ON SUBJECTS OF PROFESSIONAL INTEREST
"The Maintenance of Peace." By S. C. Vestal, Lieutenant Colonel, Coast Artillery Corps, U. S. Array. (Published by G. P. Putnam Sons, New York.)
The secondary title of the book, "The Foundations of Domestic and International Peace as Deduced from the Study of the History of Nations," if for "Foundations" we substitute "Principles," more nearly indicates the scope of the work. The first few chapters are devoted to a discussion of the principles involved in the maintenance of domestic peace, and to showing how these principles have operated in Latin-America and in the United States. The remaining chapters are taken up with the major subject of International Peace. The ways of checking or controlling the tendency to conflict between nations are shown to be by world federation; by single nation domination; or by mutual guarantees of territorial integrity and independence, that is, treaties of alliance for maintaining the balance of power. All of these are fully discussed.
A Large part of the book is devoted to the history of ancient and modern wars, and the effect on the Balance of Power. The author is convinced that the maintenance of the Balance of Power is the only way by which the tyranny of a single nation may be avoided, and that the end of wars will come only by the efficient and immediate application of this principle, and that permanent international peace will exist only when the aggressor nation is sure to encounter overwhelming force, as would an aggressor state of the United States.
Arbitration as a panacea for war is fully discussed, and it is very clearly brought out that the problems of nations are of two general classes—political and legal. Legal problems may well be referred to an International Court of Arbitration, but political problems, which are by far the most numerous and vital, can only be settled by the people themselves, either by the ballot or by the bullet. In international politics, material strength, not morals, decides political questions, and the great problem of a world federation is to find some way by which international political questions may be settled by the numerical strength of the voters.
The book shows extensive study and thought on the part of the author, and his statements of facts taken from the history of the nations of the world, and his deductions of lessons to be drawn therefrom are clear, concise and entirely logical. The author concludes that universal disarmament is impracticable, as for domestic tranquility some preparedness for war is essential, and even if there were only one nation in the world the problem of domestic peace would still exist. No government can continue to exist unless it has the force to carry out its laws, and there is for every nation an irreducible minimum of preparedness that must be accepted. Universal disarmament would mean universal weakness for each subscribing nation as regards its own domestic force. Domestic peace can be guaranteed only by force in the hands of the majority. Disarmament makes civil war inevitable. International peace depends upon the known readiness of the nations of the world to aid each other in case of attack. The author shows how this end can be obtained.
In view of the recent general discussion of the principles of the League of Nations and the vital nature of the question of the advisability of the United States joining the League, this book should prove of special interest. It is well worth the reading and the careful thought of all students of governments and history, and should be particularly instructive to those in the military or naval service.
W. G. D.
"Hot Bulb Oil Engines and Suitable Vessels." By Walter Pollock, M. I. N. A., M. I. Mar. E., M. I. Mech. E., M. I. M. $10.00. (Published by D. Van Nostrand Company.)
The objects of this book, as stated in Chapter I, are: "(1) To popularize the engine, to explain what it has done and what it is capable of doing; (2) to enable those interested to appreciate the advantages and disadvantages of the various designs; (3) to facilitate the study and add to the general knowledge of this form of prime mover and its application to various types."
The author presents comparisons between the hot bulb oil engine (commonly and, according to the author, erroneously known as the Semi-Diesel) and all other accepted methods of propulsion for vessels of small and medium tonnage. A chapter on the different makes of hot bulb engines describes, without showing all detailed particulars, the characteristic features of some thirty-six commercial engines of this type, suitable for marine propulsion. The volume includes: A wealth of information, valuable to owner and operator, on design, parts, materials, fuels and lubricant, vessels for which suited and how placed therein, power, speed and consumption data; a chapter on operation and upkeep; a discussion of various methods of operating the auxiliaries on board a vessel propelled by this type of engine; and a very complete set of illustrations.
Descriptions of the engine plants in various types of ships include many classes of vessels from lifeboats to oceangoing ships, among which the motor-propelled reinforced concrete ship and the aerial-propelled surface vessel are of particular interest. The author presents an excellent argument for motor-propelled vessels in tropical waters.
This book should be highly instructive and useful to ship owners and operators, and of considerable interest to naval officers.
R. S. H.
"American Guns in War with Germany." By Edward S. Farrow. Price $2.50 net. (Published by E. P. Dutton & Co.)
The author is well known to the army as a writer of military works, including a military encyclopedia and has presented in readable form the gigantic problems met by the Ordnance Department, U. S. Army, in the production of arms and munitions for the American Forces. To anyone desiring to have at hand in a handy form the statistics of ordnance production the book will prove of value. It is a popular record of one of the remarkable war achievements of this country in the field of sudden expansion where the finest and most accurate machine work was required. Guns of all calibers, small arms, ammunition of all sorts, equipment such as limbers, caissons and tractors, sighting and fire control equipment of the most accurate sort, bombs, grenades, projectors, periscopes, and tanks, in fact the whole field of old and new devices for offensive warfare, are treated in most readable manner, and the result is well worth reading.
H.F.
"Diesel Engine Design." By H. F. P. Purday, B. Sc., A. S. G. I. Price $7.50. (Published by D. Van Nostrand Company, New York.)
This book written primarily for designers and draughtsmen will prove of interest to Diesel engine users and students.
Briefly, subjects taken up are Principles, Thermodynamics, Exhaust Suction and Scavenge, Similitude, Crank-shafts, Fly Wheels, Framework, Cylinders and Covers, Running Gear, Fuel Oil-Air-Exhaust-Compressed Air System, and Valve Gear.
One of the many interesting points brought out by the author is that the type of Internal Combustion Engine called Semi-Diesel is misnamed.
Two reasons are given for breakdowns of Diesel engines in marine work: (1) Steam engine plans are too closely followed; (2) designers assume a Diesel engine afloat radically differs from one ashore which is not borne out in actual practice.
The author states that indicator cards are even more important in Diesel engines than in steam engines.
The subject is clearly presented with numerous excellent sketches and references for details are given at the end of each chapter.
H. J. S.
"Fifty Years in the Royal Navy." By Admiral Sir Percy Scott. (Published by George H. Doran Company, New York.)
Admiral Sir Percy Scott, author of "Fifty Years in the Royal Navy," is well known to American naval officers. His brilliant career, and particularly the part he has taken in the development of gunnery, assures this book the welcome and close attention it deserves.
These memoirs include a narrative of personal experience afloat and ashore. Scott entered the navy at the age of eleven and a half years, saw duty suppressing slave trade in the Indian Ocean, fought in the Ashantee War, and, while still a junior officer, made a cruise around the world. As a lieutenant he made a reputation in mounting and handling naval guns in the Egyptian campaign. At a considerably later period the heavy ordnance landed from the ship he commanded in South Africa took an essential part in gaining the decision of the war of the Transvaal. From there he sailed to China; and Captain Scott's naval guns were again called into active service, this time during the Boxer Rebellion. Finally, in the World War he was assigned somewhat mixed duty in connection with naval gunnery and the defence of London.
All this makes good reading, interspersed as it is with entertaining anecdote and personal experience. But it is the more professional side of the work which gives it an important place in the naval book-shelf. This side points a lesson in preparedness.
In his preface Admiral Scott states: "This book has been written in vain if it does not carry conviction that our naval administration is based on wrong principles." The author then proceeds in vigorous and unmistakable terms to reveal, as he sees them, the faults in the British naval system and their consequences.
Amongst other things the history of "Director Firing" is told to illustrate damage done by ultra-conservatism, defective organization, and Admiralty mismanagement. An idea of this can be gathered from the following passages.
(In 1905 Captain John Jellicoe was made Director of Ordnance, and Captain Scott Inspector of Target Practice.)
"During our time in office we not only managed to introduce many reforms in naval gunnery, but tried hard to introduce "director firing." Unfortunately the Director of Naval Ordnance was not a member of the Board of Admiralty, and consequently carried no weight as regards naval gunnery, and this very necessary method of firing was not generally adopted until seven years afterwards, when war proved that the guns in our ships were of no use without it, a fact which throws a very heavy responsibility on the Board of Admiralty, which boycotted its introduction in former years."
(In 1907 Scott was ordered to command the Second Cruiser Squadron of the Channel Fleet, and he continued to occupy himself with progress in gunnery.)
"My attention was devoted to fitting my Flagship, H. M. S. Good Hope, with director firing, so that if she had to fight a German there would be a chance of her remaining on the top, instead of going to the bottom…This operation was difficult, as I could get no assistance from the Admiralty, and was forced to beg, borrow, or steal all the necessary material…I succeeded so well that the Good Hope became like the Scylla and Terrible in other years, top ship of the navy…But when I left the squadron
on February 15, 1909, the routine I had instituted, and the 'director firing' I had installed, were put on the scrap heap, and the old method reinstalled…That is one way we had in the navy—a determination to fight against any change, however desirable."
As a sequel to the obstruction and delay encountered in introducing director firing Scott refers to the British disaster off Coronel which occurred in the first months of the great war seven years later:
"On November 1, 1914, my old ship, the Good Hope, in company with the Monmouth, Glasgow, and Otranto engaged the German cruisers Scharnhorst, Gneisennau, Leipsig, and Dresden, in the Pacific. After a short action the Good Hope and Monmouth were both sunk by German superior shooting. These ships were caught in bad weather, and as neither of them was fitted with any efficient system of firing their guns in such weather, they were, as predicted in my letter to the Admiralty of December 10, 1911, annihilated without doing any appreciable damage to the enemy.
"These two ships were sacrificed because the Admiralty would not fit them with efficient means of firing their guns in a sea-way. Had the system with which I had fitted the Good Hope been completed and retained in her, I daresay she might have seen further service and saved the gallant Cradock and his men on this occasion."
To clinch his argument Scott then tells of an official inspection visit paid by him to the Grand Fleet in November, 1914. The condition of things was not found satisfactory, and of this he writes:
"I had a conference with the First Lord (Mr. Winston Churchill) and the First Sea Lord (Lord Fisher), and pointed out to them the serious state of affairs, and how badly we should fare if the German Fleet came out. They realized the position and approved of practically all of the ships being fitted with director firing; and further, they agreed that I could arrange it without being held up by the ordinary Admiralty red tape. Consequently the fitting of the ships went on rapidly, and had the ' push ' been maintained, our whole fleet would have been equipped by the end of 1915.
"In May, 1915, unfortunately for the nation, Lord Fisher left the Admiralty and all the 'push' ceased. I no longer had any influence; the authorities went back to their apathetic way of doing things; time, even in war-fare, was not considered of any importance by them…
"At the Battle of Jutland, fought on May 31, 1916, the commander-in-chief had only six ships of his fleet completely fitted with director firing—that is, main as well as secondary armament; he had several ships with their primary armament not fitted; he had not a single cruiser in the fleet fitted for director firing; he had no Zeppelins as eyes for his fleet; his guns were outranged by those of the Germans. He had to use projectiles inferior to those used by the Germans; and in firing at night: he was utterly outclassed by the enemy.
"One would have thought that, although their Lordships paid no attention to my warning in 1911, the moment the war was known to be inevitable, they would have bestirred themselves and ordered all the material necessary to put the fleet in a state of gunnery efficiency.
"And before I leave this subject of the unpreparedness of the Grand Fleet in some respects for war, I must revert to the criticism of Lord Jellicoe for not pursuing the German Navy after the battle of Jutland and fighting them on the night of May 31-June 1. Lord Jellicoe had a very good reason for not doing so. The British Fleet was not properly equipped for fighting an action at night. The German Fleet was. Consequently, to fight them at night would only have been to court disaster. Lord Jellicoe's business was to preserve the Grand Fleet, the main defence of the Empire, as well as of the Allied cause—not to risk its existence. I have been asked why the Grand Fleet was not so well prepared to fight a night action as the German Navy. My answer is, 'Ask the Admiralty.'"
This is a serious charge against the Admiralty and many will question whether or not all responsibility rests there. It may be that the Admiralty only expressed a conservatism prevailing throughout the service and a general naval system which resisted change and progress. It may also be added that the author himself showed intolerance of modification to his suggested schemes and methods.
"Admiral Scott emphasizes the importance of concentrating effort on preparing the navy for war, and points out the danger of unwisely diverting peace time activities into other channels.
"Training naval officers and men as housemaids is not good for war; Brains are required. But however faulty our training in peace may have been, it did not effect the character of the British naval officer and seaman. Whether in a ship, submarine, balloon, aeroplane, motor car, tank, or as a soldier, the men who bore an anchor on their caps, and others who wore a sou'wester fought with a bravery not surpassed by any men in the world. Of the many thousand who went to the bottom of the ocean, a large number might have been alive now if in peace-time our legislators had attended to the war-preparedness of ships instead of chiefly to the housemaiding of them. I once heard a statement that "the blunders of our politicians and legislators are paid for with the blood of our soldiers and sailors." How terribly the war has demonstrated the truth of this statement!"
In the closing chapter the author gives sensational opinions on submarines which are by no means concurred in by the concensus of naval opinion. On the subject of gunnery, however, Scott speaks with authority. As gunnery officer, as captain, and as admiral, his ship headed the navy list in target competition. Results show his diligence and enthusiastic interest in the development of team-work and skill. The experience of war has proved his wisdom on the subject of director firing.
These are considerations which will cause naval officers and naval administrators to read carefully "Fifty Years in the Royal Navy."
C. C. G.