In discussing naval aviation, it is first necessary to have clearly in view what has been assumed as the role for this new and interesting development. The mission of that service is taken to be the development of a high efficiency in personnel and in material for co-operation with ships in naval work, on our own, on an enemy’s coast, or on the high seas.
I he soundness of any conclusions which we may adopt as the result of our study will depend upon a careful analysis of past experience, and proper deductions therefrom which are consistent with present conditions, and have regard for the probable development of the latest instruments of warfare.
Discussion concerning arms and their application is often without satisfactory outcome because of differences in the pictures and conceptions of the phases of warfare, retained in the minds of those indulging in the argument. It would seem logical therefore, before outlining views as to naval aviation, which cannot be considered independently of the fleet at this time, to indicate in a general way the ideas which have governed in reaching conclusions as to the part aviation is to play in connection with naval work.
As a sequel to wars, after test of military and naval materials and methods has become practicable, we find changes in thought have come. Sometimes these changes have been ill-advised and the tactical and material innovations introduced have not stood the acid tests imposed by the passage of time.
It is unnecessary here to point out the far reaching effects of the Russian explosive shell on the Turkish fleet at Sinope, of the Austrian ram at Lissa; of the resisting power of armor as shown in Hampton Roads, or that the results of the fire of the intermediate gun at Santiago were at once reflected in naval design as was also the power of large calibers at Tsu Shima. In the terrific struggle just terminated, new arms and novel methods of employing arms have been forcefully developed, and with these we are now particularly concerned. For the mariner the submarine, as a mighty agent of sea power, has definitely asserted itself, and the medium of the air has been first utilized for warlike purposes.
One notes in scanning the pages so absorbingly interesting to a naval officer that practically all of the great naval conflicts which history records have taken place near land. Naval battles have been waged as natural though sometimes eccentric features of campaigns and with the view of furtherance of governmental policies. Usually the conduct of what we most frequently term military or land operations has been intimately associated with maritime encounters and in them the aggressive side has been able to assume and to keep the initiative, usually because of his superior strength the application of which oftentimes has been made possible by better information and superior intelligence.
In glancing back through naval history, we see that actions between large fleets have been infrequent phases of naval warfare. Where forces have felt themselves nearly equal and the stakes at issue have been very important there has always been disinclination to engage.
Great naval battles generally have been fought when one side considered itself the superior of the other either in material or moral force—through surprise or a combination of circumstances, the other was forced to flight. History is replete with accounts of such engagements. As examples we may cite the British victory at Trafalgar, the defeat of the Spanish fleet in 1898, and of the Russian armada in 1904. Rodney’s celebrated action in the West Indies and the battles of Aboukir and of Lissa also may be placed in this same category.
One is impressed in perusing the frank and interesting book written by Admiral Jellicoe, in which he clearly records his thoughts, that these views still obtain. Under the British command in the recent war was the mightiest naval force ever assembled. The superiority in material strength of this armada was unquestioned and yet when the day came there was apprehension that the surface fleet of the enemy, composed of vessels which were visible, was perhaps being employed as a bait to lure the more powerful British force into a trap prepared for its destruction, and the idea was present that the British fleet was too valuable, in view of its responsibility, to be risked unduly.
The naval man is inclined to base his reasoning upon great fleet engagements of what may be termed the classic variety. Perhaps these to him present problems involving fewer variables and unknown quantities than is the case with other operations of sea warfare and the tedious and supremely important matters which have had to do with the bringing together of the antagonists in force. He is prone perhaps to overlook the fact that active naval wars may be conducted without such holocausts taking place. One may ask why and how is such possible, and it is well at this point to examine briefly the circumstances covering the past five years of operations in western European waters. We must not lose sight, however, of the peculiar conditions there existing. Geographically, the opposing forces were separated by very narrow seas. Visibility, always a matter of supreme importance to the sailor, was normally extremely poor. The water was usually discolored and contained much debris which materially assisted the submarine in its stealthy effort. We had during this conflict the British fleet, reinforced by allied units, superior in material strength, facing an inferior power, the German fleet, which presented a constant threat to the Allies. The German Navy was always an active menace because it contained elements of great strength and mobility. Supplied with the intelligence upon which to act, its power to do damage was enormous. These facts loomed up in front of the eyes of the world and were understood by all thinking men. To gain the information which permitted the application of an immense and mobile force was the problem of one antagonist—to obtain the knowledge necessary to counter this effort to surprise was of supreme importance for his opponent. No means were overlooked. The submarine assumed a most useful role formerly not conceded to it, that of a scout. Light, fast vessels were recognized as of paramount worth. A wonderful system of espionage was inaugurated and finally the air became accepted as a medium of value for the procuring of information.
The prestige of sea power was vastly enhanced through the results of the war. We have seen the German battle fleet penned up in harbor. For a while, because of an ability to assure itself reasonable freedom from molestation on the part of its adversary it was able to make sorties, and so to preserve morale and sea spirit. In this work the assistance of the German air service was invaluable. When the ties were tightened, however, and the German ships were denied the sea, their discipline and morale, shaken by the affair at Jutland, crumbled just as has been the case with all fleets of all periods of history when confined for long in port.
In our studies we note the importance of the mine, the torpedo and the bomb conveyed by fast surface, sub-surface vessels and by aircraft. During the war just ended these destructive agents were of the gravest concern to the antagonists. They have now all taken on definite roles which, in the future, will make all naval operations conducted on the coast of an aggressive enemy exceedingly interesting for an invader or for one who wishes to carry the battle into the waters of his adversary. It seems evident that these formidable weapons will force the conflicts between big ships, if such are to occur in the future, into the wider waters of the ocean. It also appears that these deadly tools have definitely enhanced the value of that always important characteristic, speed, and the importance of small units of light draught which can best operate in coastal waters.
The procurement of information, together with mobility and speed, appear to supply the keys with which to unlock the doors that open to success in the conduct of military and naval affairs now that the power of the machinery with which to do damage is so tremendous, the types and numbers involved are so great, and the areas over which operations are conducted is so vast.
To sum up, during this conflict, we have seen the heavy battleships with their numerous crews spending months anxiously awaiting a call for service. We have participated in an exceedingly active naval campaign carried on by what might be considered as secondary units. In it the inferior naval power has made a strong fight and one which promised success primarily by reason of the efforts of its forces on land and the ability to secure information. Finally, we have seen the air develop as the medium through which information could most readily and surely be procured. In the light of recent events, is it not safe to predict, that while slow battleships will be retained in navies for the present, no one will wish to invest heavily in them in the future? Possibly they may soon become obsolescent. The importance of having information will constantly increase and, as mobility at sea improves, the side which possesses superiority in speed and the better intelligence will always enjoy the advantages accompanying an ability to select and to seize opportunities as they are presented.
Speed affords a measure of protection against the torpedo, speed also permits an ability to alter the range and the change of range for the gun, which indicates a crying need for improvement in the power to hit with artillery. In the past fifteen years the initial velocity of our main batteries has increased more than a thousand feet per second. It is submitted in passing that a continuation of the effort to increase the muzzle velocity and so to flatten the trajectory is of supreme importance for the armament of great ships.
Does it not appear that the capital ship of the future will be of the battle cruiser type? Supplied with intelligence, speed will enable that class of vessel to carry great concentrated power into action or to evade battle with a superior force. With guns of high power their ability to do damage is enormous.
Now to end our preliminary argument—as aircraft furnish a means for making a naval force numerically the smaller useful in that they may procure information permitting a swift but heavily armed force to act intelligently; also since aircraft may assist to give to a larger force the knowledge which would make absolute the suppression of a weaker naval body, do we not see clearly the growing value of this arm ? In our consideration, however, we must not lose sight of the influence of wind, water and visibility upon actions. Bad weather has usually been taken as an ally by the force seeking to surprise his antagonist or to escape him.
There was a time when being weather wise was important for the sailor in peaceful cruising as well as during hostilities. Of late years we have been able to ignore the weather to a considerable degree in moving our great ships about on blue water and possibly the importance of always having a regard for the elements as a factor in war may wane in the eyes of those who fail to keep before them the practical side of war-like enterprises.
Naturally, nature’s limitations, always affecting military and naval operations, will always be supreme in the medium of the air. The aerographer now has become a most important member of society and it is not hard to see that he is destined to have a far wider range of activity in the future than has been conceded to him in the past. In this country we have not yet begun to put into operation the machinery necessary for scientifically observing and forecasting for the upper air—or for collecting data and communicating the results of observation and forecasts.
So far we have touched only upon the importance of having information; the removal of the bandages from the eyes of a man before he is called upon to fight.
With our slight practical knowledge of the art one would be bold indeed at this time to set forth methods and to advise exactly as to how to carry out our desires. Brief thought, however, will make evident that many of our ideas with regard to scouting are subject to change. Daylight and dark zones for surface vessels may be very much upset by the swift moving air scout, just as the development of the listening device for surface craft may modify our procedures for that class in fog and darkness.
For operations in the clear weather of the West Indies and of the Pacific the value of the rigid dirigible as a scout seems evident and one must regret our failure to appreciate the importance of these great vessels and deplore the fact that, before this, we have not undertaken their construction. Abroad the tendency is apparent to drop the small dirigible which was most valuable in coastal convoy and patrol operations and which can be quickly- produced in case of need. While retaining a few of this smaller class for instruction and experimentation, the purpose seems evident everywhere to develop larger and more useful units. This practice appears logical and wise. The big rigid with its wide radius, high ceiling and great lift is indeed formidable and the production of helium gas will vastly increase the safety and value of this class of vessel.
In the consideration of heavier-than-air types, we must have careful regard for the details of the work which it is desired to accomplish. At present we have the difficult task of designing a machine for flying over the water which will be air-worthy when in the medium intended for it and also moderately sea-worthy when once it has landed upon the surface of the sea. Weight, speed, ability to climb and air performance generally must necessarily be sacrificed to some extent in the development of the boat which is the present form of the hull of the seaplane. The difficulties of getting off the water in any other than smooth conditions are well understood. The recent voyage of the NC planes has been a triumph for the advocate of the large boat, and it is reasonable to suppose that the construction of hulls in boat form will continue. It is also logical to infer that improvement in the reliability of machinery will tend to increase constantly the airworthiness of this class. Where wide radius of action is desirable there will always be use for large seaplanes of the NC type. With tenders supplying quarters for personnel, and shop and repair facilities, bases for their purposes may be moved and established anywhere. With such tenders available the necessity for now building and maintaining many permanent and costly bases along our shores, for naval purposes, would diminish. Through these vessels mobility, a first attribute of modern military and naval force, would be secured and by means of them the problem of putting aviation with the fleet or in regions where operations are to be conducted is simplified.
It is not necessary to point out to the sailor that in order to be useful for scouting it is essential that the aircraft know its position. The trans-Atlantic flight gave valuable results in so far as navigation was concerned. It was shown that the hazy appearance of the sea horizon when viewed from an altitude, the tremendous effect of the wind, and the rapidity of travel necessitated the development of an artificial horizon sextant, a drift indicator, and short methods of making astronomical calculations in order to permit oversea navigation in the air. The instruments and methods which were successfully improvised for the transatlantic flight, are now being improved.
But a short time ago, a considerable run over a flat, even surface was necessary in order to permit a machine taking the air. To-day we see light planes able to jump from the turrets or decks of a ship. We also have as a possible development the ability of these machines to return to and light on decks prepared for their reception. These recent improvements, which have been very rapid, indicate the practicability of further advances, and they have enhanced the value and established the utility of flying machines for ship’s purposes. There are those who have faith in the catapult, the uses of which have not been fully exploited. This machine may enable larger and heavier craft to be launched from ships.
The utility of aircraft as scouts has been already explained, but we now see them given other important roles. From high in the heavens the observer can keep a constant watch for the stealthy submarine which may be expected to take a prominent part in naval actions of the future. He has been employed as a guide to direct the movements of the submarine. He can also look for the mine or for the torpedo when once the latter has left its tube in pursuit of the target at which it has been directed. He is able to overlook a smoke screen created for the purpose of embarrassing the adversary. A spotter in an aircraft is in a commanding position for observing the fall of projectiles fired from the guns of water borne vessels and in a duel between ships, in bombardment, or in opening a fleet action there can be no doubt of the importance of aviation for the control of gun fire.
The usefulness of the aircraft for the purposes enumerated above is hampered materially by difficulty of communicating promptly and surely. Within the last few years, however, we have seen the radio telephone and telegraph both develop to a wonderful degree, and we may confidently expect that in the near future, science will give us far greater surety in our communications.
In a melee at present the advantages of the kite balloon as a post of observation, clear of the interferences incidental to gun fire, are definite. For this craft, positive and direct communications are assured. Towing them about and keeping these unwieldy balloons in service are to-day looked upon as serious embarrassments by the personnel of surface vessels.
Of the offensive power and the tactics of fighting planes accompanying ships, one can say but little to confirm or to disprove what may be already in the mind and the imagination of the reader. If the battle of the future is to be of the classic order of the past, may we not expect, as a preliminary phase, an aerial encounter between aircraft? Possibly defeat in the air may result in the capital ships of one side being assailed by planes designed to suppress the anti-aircraft defenses of the other and those planes being followed by low-flying heavily loaded bombers and torpedo carriers driving home the assault and in a very serious manner, interfering with the formation, the plans, and the efforts of the side so assaulted.
As the chemist has pushed his way into the fighting line, it may not be out of place to mention that the bomb supplies a ready vehicle for the transportation of gas. There is also plenty of room for a quantity of gas compound within the walls or wind cap of a long-nosed shell.
The gas specialist of the army considers the effective radius of his shell as far greater and more destructive to life than is that of the simple explosive projectile. We are told that he claims a fume that will stick to a moving ship for some time. What is to be the result upon the design of openings such as turret gun and sight ports, conning-tower slits and of ventilator, and forced draft systems, and what effect will the wearing of gas masks have upon the rate and accuracy of fire?
For the attack upon fortified bases and the bombardment of ports aviation has created a means which, it appears, will nullify the efforts of a passive system of coast defense such as that of our coast artillery.
A close blockade of a neighborhood in which many airplanes are based would seem impracticable. A landing operation on any large scale and the establishment of a base would be fraughted with extreme difficulty were these efforts actively opposed by aircraft.
A navy is called upon, during what are termed the normal times of peace, to land parties to suppress disorder and to enforce the policies of peace in turbulent countries. Here again we have an important use for naval aviation. Through the use of aircraft, reconnaissance is possible and landing operations may be covered.
It is manifestly improper to presume that aviation, at the present time, furnishes a panacea for all of the many evils which may be showered upon us by the enemy. There can be no doubt, however, that despite their limitations, the airplane, the dirigible and the kite balloon have all assumed definite and important roles in the arena of battle. The suggestion is ventured that in connection with maneuvers and academic studies based on the capping of battle columns of capital ships that serious complications have been introduced into the naval game, and, while exercises along the old line are of importance, it appears necessary now to work out what may be called the complete tactics of a naval force. To ensure success, one must be stronger than his opponent in every department. The problem of coordinating all of the many factors now involved in naval war is big with interest. Victory awaits him who can best control and coordinate all of his weapons, and reliance on certain types and instruments to the exclusion of others may be disastrous.
The Wright brothers believed that their inventions were important in that the development of the art of flying would make war impossible. This idea may or may not be correct. It would seem certain, however, that the prediction of Admiral Fiske will be verified and it may be stated with every confidence that in years to come the effects of air power upon history will be as interesting to the historian as, in the past, have been the supreme influences of sea power.
Though we in this country were pioneers in aviation, the great stimulus which accompanied intensive utilization of the air from the very start of the war just ended soon left the United States far in the rear in all matters having to do with flying. When called upon to take a part in the conflict we at once awakened to the bitter realization of our deficiencies, not only in so far as the design and production of machines was concerned but also regarding methods of employment. Such a condition was a humiliation to those who, concerned with aviation, had struggled hard to make the subject one of live interest to the legislators on whom there is dependence for funds and to the older officers of the navy upon whom reliance for support is essential. It is unnecessary at this time to enumerate our defects and deficiencies.
We know now that European nations have created organizations as well as an interest which, will insure on their part further immediate and rapid progress in the mastery of the air. The problem for the United States is how to organize, not to follow, but to retain a place abreast of the leaders in a field open to all and which offers great, indeed unlimited, possibilities.
On one side We hear the low voice of old conservatism warning against steps which may be faulty, and against undue confidence when moving in a new, and little understood domain. 1 he tone is the same as that which history records as protesting against the use of metal as a material for the construction of the hulls of warships, and the abolition of lofty spars and sails as an auxiliary if not a primary means for the propulsion of these vessels.
On the other hand we hear the shrill, sharp notes of youthful progress. Filled with enthusiasm and optimism, the aviator of to-day sees in his role the solution of almost all the vexatious problems of war.
Besides these we also have the subtle, powerful and not always wise influences of politics and of industrialism confronting us. Opportunity for extravagance and for the uneconomical expenditure of public funds without adequate return is present.
Needless to state, the road over which common sense is to lead is filled with pitfalls and our path must be carefully chosen. The navy should look seriously into the subject of aviation at this time. Knowledge of the art is widely spread and is by no means confined to the service as has been information regarding other naval activities in the past. Unless it can be clearly shown that we are organized to move promptly to a position abreast of the leader in so far as naval aviation is concerned, and to hold a station there, the navy may expect to have to defend its attitude before a well informed and keenly interested public with regard to the use of the wonderful art now available for our purposes. The British Navy lost its aviation branch because of diffidence and disinclination to accept new conditions and innovations which had forced themselves to the front. The same arguments which produced a united air service in Great Britain are now being utilized by those wishing to establish a similar organization in the United States, despite the wide differences that exist in the forms of government and the military methods of the two nations. A united air service of the kind proposed perhaps would best foster the development of flying and the production of machines, but the creation of a new department would certainly entail many new expenses to be borne by the taxpayer and would be unwise until ideas regarding the military employment of the aviation arm are far better crystallized than is the case at present. An independent aeronautic service would surely result in a serious sacrifice of war efficiency because of the added complications incidental to the coordination of the present military and naval organizations with that of a new force having cognizance in the air. Of the difficulties and of the importance of absolute coordination of arms in time of war, the producer, who is the strongest exponent of the united service, can have no knowledge.