(SEE PAGE 387, WHOLE No. 193)
REAR ADMIRAL SEATON SCHROEDER, U. S. Navy, Retired.—The able paper by Captain E. J. King, U. S. Navy, on "The Effects of Increasing the Size of Battleships," in the March number of the PROCEEDINGS, commands a most interested attention. And conviction attends the reading of most of the statements and conclusions expressed.
On one point, however, there is, I think, room for discussion. That point is contained in the sentence, "Also the larger ships should be better gun-platforms, especially in heavy weather." The superiority of larger ships in that feature is dwelt upon throughout the paper, and it seems to be a generally accepted fact in professional discussions. The question in my mind is, "Are we sure that the statement is correct?" I must say that I am not sure; in fact, I incline to think that it is a mistaken notion as applied to ships to meet our particular needs.
As stated in the article, increase of size must largely be gained by increase of length and of beam, because any appreciable increase of draft is prohibited by the depth of water available, or likely to be available, in harbors and channels leading to our navy yards. Increased beam undoubtedly tends to increase stability, but it does so at the cost of steadiness; the two are antagonistic. The diminution of steadiness may be explained either by putting it that the deck of the broader ship follows more closely the surface of the waves, or by the more fundamental statement that the broader ship has a greater metacentric height. Even supposing, however, that by some inspiration the naval designer were able to shift his weights so as to appreciably raise the center of gravity and thus decrease the metacentric height, the result would still not be satisfactory, for the reason that winging the weights, either laterally or vertically, increases the roll after it is once started.
A condition is generally more convincing than a theory, and the first appeal on this subject was made to me by a condition. In the spring of 1906 a battleship, which I was to command later, was being swung for compass adjustment by the builders off the Capes of Virginia. I was surprised by observing a marked and disconcerting motion, while the sea seemed quite smooth; close attention then detected a long slight swell heaving. I spoke of it afterwards to the superintending naval constructor at Newport News, suggesting that the ship's behavior betrayed a considerable metacentric height, and I was told that the computations were not at hand, but that I was undoubtedly right and that it would probably prove to be something around 6 feet. This turned out to be about right, as well as I can remember. And, also, as well as I could judge, the motion was greater than what I had observed with smaller ships under the same conditions.
As the size of ships has increased, the question of limiting the draft has come to the fore, and an interesting comparison came under my observation later. One pair of sister ships (battleships), in which restriction had been placed upon the draft, were seen, when in column, to roll considerably more than another pair which were a little larger, but of a draft much heavier in proportion. I have not had personal opportunity to see the performance of the heavier tonnages built since that time; but from what I have been told, I gather that certain ships of 11,000 tons more displacement and 15 feet more beam and 2½ feet more draft have proved very lively in heavy weather, while two vessels of a displacement about midway between those extremes, but with 7 feet less beam and 6 inches more draft than the heaviest of those mentioned, are fairly easy.
All this is not very precise, and therefore not very convincing; but as we get above 30,000 tons the contrast between performances becomes greater, the increase in size and beam being out of proportion to any slight increase of draft that may be considered expedient. We should not go far above present figures without trying to reach some positive decision as to what the result will be. Especially should we guard against assumptions in problems in which the conditions change; we may be insensibly led on in a certain path without noting the effect of the advance in that path, and taking heed perhaps mostly of the progress in the mechanical arts which has made possible the great increase in size and power. After the battle of Lissa, in 1866, when the Re d'Italia was fortuitously rammed and sunk in the smoke of that rough and tumble Donnybrook fair engagement, attention became centered on the ram and the ram bow, and it took nearly half a century to remove the obsession and leave it clear that the danger to own ships in formation and to docks and piers, and the inconvenience in mooring and unmooring, more than offset any remote possibility of using the ram in action. Indeed, the acceptance of that weapon was so general as to cause it to be regarded as a means to an entirely different end; upon one occasion, when I ventured a protest against handicapping a ship with that dangerous excrescence, I was told that that increase of length underwater was necessary to ensure obtaining the required speed.
That increase of size must produce a steadier gun-platform seems a manifest truism, provided other elements remain the same; but, after determining the suitable proportion of beam to draft, any material departure from it changes the problem. It may be found, if it has not already been found, that, with normal distribution of weights and fullness of body, there is a critical ratio of beam to draft which should not be exceeded in solving the problem of steadiness.
In this connection it is to be observed that if two vessels, one drawing normally several feet less than the other, should be wounded seriously, the deeper draft vessel might be unable to enter a port and dock accessible to the other.
The advantage of higher command is conceded, of course; but in displacements larger than what we now have the increment will be small; in fact, I understand that in the recent conversion of some of our predread-noughts into one-caliber ships, the elimination of the broadside guns has left the remaining battery as a whole possessed of a very fair command.
In the matter of concentration of fire by more smaller ships on a less number of larger ones, or distribution of the fire of less larger ships against more smaller ones, there are several things to be considered. A ship distributing her fire against two targets can do it well enough as long as two spotting or fire control stations are working well; but if one is knocked out the distribution will be affected. On the other hand, two ships concentrating on one can certainly maintain the fire in satisfactory succession. In 1909, at the first battle practice ever tried by our fleet in which concentration of two, and more, ships was attempted, it became evident that certainly two and probably three ships properly trained could alternate salvos efficiently. Those were pioneer days, and what we did fairly well then (somewhat to the surprise of the Naval War College, I understood) can certainly be much better done now; and then there will be the security of having a spare fire control station.
If some of the advantages claimed for greater displacement are denied to ships materially larger than those of the present fashion, thus diminishing the tactical superiority claimed for them, there will naturally be corresponding increase in the importance of strategic features, expanding the scope of strategy to comprise world-wide operations. This may lead to more favorable consideration of the possible importance of diffusion. Of course, either extreme—excessive diffusion or complete concentration—is impossible of serious consideration; there may be compromises affected by political and diplomatic situations of individual countries. With us, the exigencies of world politics and the demands of various parts of our somewhat far-flung national or state interests may have an influence in shaping our program of construction; but we must not lose sight of the fact that control of some particular area may be decided by a fleet action in a different part of the world, and fleet efficiency should not be impaired either by building ships smaller than is necessary or by vitiating their individual tactical qualities by making them too large.