"Now there may be 'too much Nelson' for the
Times have changed since then,
But as long as man is human, we shall
Have to count on men;
Though machines be ne'er so perfect, there
May come a day perhaps—
When you find out just how helpless is
A heap of metal scraps."
—Captain R.A. Hopwood, R. N.
Should the reader have to do with navy personnel in conjunction with the demobilization plan there may be no need of his going further than through the above few lines. Still, each has his view and, to properly arrive at the whole, many sides have to be considered.
On August 29, 1916, our navy was small. Since then it has grown large, at least in men. Hundreds of thousands of men have flocked to the navy's call. Now we trust that the reason of that great demand is wholly past, and the Navy Department stands ready to make their going out as voluntary as their coming in. A most liberal view has been taken and one that shows that the department has faith in the future.
But the navy must have men to exist. What will be the policy for the navy to adopt to man its ships? The answer to this question must be soon made and upon that answer depends the future of the navy. If that answer meets the navy's obligations it needs must be a liberal policy—a new policy—which concerns this article.
During the history of the United States our navy has risen four times and fallen three times. Its present rise has been consistent over a period of twenty years and at the present is in the zenith of that rise. During each rise and fall the material has followed the lead of the personnel. So will it be this time if the personnel does not at once lay the foundation for getting new blood into the navy during the demobilization from this war.
Men will have to be drawn into the navy for different reasons than have just caused its immense increase. The majority of men at present in the navy came in with a view of doing their bit to win the war. Now that the war is over they are naturally anxious to resume their studies or business in civil life. The men to run the navy in the future will come in from an entirely different motive and that motive will, to a large extent, have to be created if the navy is to get and to hold men. And to hold men is one of the most important, to use an anomaly, necessities; for a continuous service man is, on the average, worth two rookies.
As we look at recruiting in the past, it has depended largely upon the publicity the subject has received, and, in peace times, has not been greatly influenced by hard times nor by the seasons of the year. It is fairly well established from interviewing several thousands of men, that conditions existing in the navy, and even pay offered, have very little to do with a man's first enlistment, but it has all to do with his subsequent enlistments and his potential value as a recruiting agent even after he is out of the navy.
Our policy must be shaped for holding men and creating recruiting agents of all men. The way to hold one man may lose another. We must hold the home builder as well as the rover, the mechanic and specialist as well as the seaman.
The navy is largely made up, especially in the deck force, of what is known as the motive type of man. He loves motion, action, and change of scenery. This desire is what made him give up the school, the office, the farm, or the factory.
Another class, or rather the men with a different viewpoint, are the married men. Almost without exception men coming into the navy in peace times are single, but a large number of them afterwards marry. Their viewpoint then is apt to change. They then desire a home port—a place where at even irregular intervals of necessary overhaul to their ships they will have a chance to be with their families.
There are others who look upon the navy merely as a shop where advance and money will come to the industrious. This is especially so in the engineer's force and in the special trades. Military necessity and discipline are incomprehensible to them. Not that they are refractory themselves, but merely that they find their off-duty hours aboard most irksome. Their idea is work during working hours and then stop work and go home.
It is true that there are very many other classes, but the number in each class is very small and may be neglected in considering the whole. The two latter large classes enumerated above are evolved after the men come into the navy, but the first big class is inherent in them all and is never dormant no matter how much counteracted upon by other desires and conditions.
To shape a personnel policy to fulfill the above conditions would not be hard nor would it detract from the efficiency of the navy or add to the budget. We have a building program, a gunnery program, an engineering policy, and even an insurance policy, but we have no policy for attracting and holding enlisted men.
We remember, about nine years ago, of reading a department letter to prospective recruits that a policy of foreign cruises had been adopted and recruits were promised that they would have the education and pleasure of travel to offset the close confinement and artificial existence on shipboard. Since then, until the war, few in the navy have, barring Guantanamo Bay and the York River, which belong to us, seen any foreign land except the coast of Mexico.
We, in the navy, shouldered with the responsibility of making the navy efficient are very apt to lose the proper perspective and fail to appreciate the man's point of view. The officer at the Navy Department goes home when working hours are over and refreshes himself with other interests. The officers at sea on whose shoulders rests the responsibility are kept going and occupied all their waking moments, even with messages and "shop" throughout their meals and with scarcely a night passing without demands for their services. The enlisted man stands his watch or does his drill and cleans his station and then only thinks of his condition in general or sleeps. More thought should be given to the enlisted man's condition. The officers of the navy should arouse themselves to the vital needs of the thousands of men who are more necessary to make a navy than the ships themselves. What civilian, owning a factory or large business, would expect his employees, after working all day to then go to bed in hammocks swung over their machines, and continue to do this day in and day out, sometimes for months, and still remain contented and interested in their work?
It has been stated above that a policy would be easy of shaping. So it would and, not only easy, but very beneficial. In laying out a program some of the well recognized facts should be kept in mind and not wholly smothered as has been done in the past. A few of the most patent ones are as follows:
(a) Nothing makes sailors of men like going to sea.
(b) Nothing keeps machinery in such good condition as habitual use.
(c) Ships seem especially designed to prevent freedom of movement and nothing makes men, especially the type of men in the navy, more apathetic in their duties than continually doing the same thing and staying in one place.
(d) The fleet should maneuver together as a whole and divisions should have opportunities of exercising as divisions.
(e) Ships should not be kept too long in one place, as it is demoralizing both to the crew and the place.
(f) When giving liberty, ships should not be gathered together but should be disposed in the smallest possible units. A fleet giving liberty and leave in one place demoralizes the place by congesting the restaurants, the transportation facilities, amusement places, the sleeping accommodations, etc., to the annoyance of the citizens. If possible, only such number of ships should be sent to a place as can be easily assimilated by that place. In other words, "the dog should wag the tail" in every instance, and not the "tail wag the dog." Balance is necessary in all things.
(g) The thirty days leave periods should be equalized over the year.
(h) When giving liberty, thought should be given to transportation facilities and the pocketbooks of the men.
(i) Finally, work should be distributed evenly over the year in kind and amount, again preserving balance.
(j) Ships should have a home yard in which the plans and conditions are personally known by the yard personnel and the facilities and conditions known by the ship's personnel.
Bearing the above well recognized facts in mind, also the weather conditions of the seasons, a rough schedule of employment is outlined for a year, having regard for the enlisted man's contentment:
January 7. Leave home yards and go to Guantanamo, having fleet exercises on the way.
January 15 to March 1. At Guantanamo preparing for target practices. One day a week devoted to division maneuvers at sea.
March 1 to March 20. Devoted to target practices and war problems.
March 20 to April 1. Disperse fleet in West Indian towns of historical interest—one ship to a town—for liberty; allowing a pair of ships to change place.
April 1. Go north to home yards to grant leave and liberty. Fleet maneuvers en route.
April 10 to May 15. Leave and liberty periods doing repairs and overhaul with ship's force and drilling men in divisional drills, especially infantry drills in the yard.
May 15 to June 15. Assemble in some base away from distractions and hold gunnery and torpedo practices.
June 15. Start on European cruise having fleet maneuvers en route and arriving July 15. When in European waters disperse ships to seaports, two at most to any seaport. Interchange ships in different ports.
September 1. Start for home and hold fall practices on southern drill grounds before giving liberty.
October 1. Go to home yard for leave, liberty, drill, and ship's force repairs.
December 1 to December 15. Fleet or divisional maneuvers.
December 15 to January 7. At home yards for leave and liberty.
No contention is made that the above schedule is the best one, but it is simply given to clearly express the idea in a few words.
The home yards are thought best from which to give leave and liberty, as the ships are automatically dispersed, the men know the local conditions, many of them have established friends and families there, and it affords excellent opportunities for shore drills.
Leave and liberty are frequently mentioned in the above schedule, but that is principally with what this article has to deal. No one thinks it amiss if a workman goes home after his work is clone, so each man should have the opportunity of going home as often as possible after working hours. It must be remembered that a certain proportion have to stay aboard to stand the watches, so they cannot go daily. Work on shipboard has, to a large extent, to go on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays. As to leave, only a portion can go on leave at once, so it takes a considerable time for a ship's company to finish its leave schedule. Each man is at present allowed 30 days' leave a year, which all government employees get, but only a very small percentage of the men now ever have the opportunity to take what is allowed them.
As outlined above, it is only contemplated allowing repairs to lie made by the ship's force during the above visits to the yard. Regular overhaul periods will be had at stated times or when necessary. When at anchor in an open roadstead it is impossible to disable engines and overhaul boilers as they may be necessary on short notice on account of weather, but time should be given for the necessary upkeep by the ship's force as opportunities offer. As a side issue from the subject, this would result in much economy in repairs.
If such a program, taking into consideration the enlisted personnel's welfare, is put into effect and that program made public it is earnestly believed that the navy will not want for men and that the right men will make it their life work and a better navy will result.