When the Armistice went into effect at 11.00 a. m. November 11, 1918, the whole world was thrown out of adjustment or synchronism. Taking this time as a point of departure, it is necessary for the navy and the world in general to readjust itself to new ideas and new missions. We all believe that the war has not been in vain, but, to make this assumption true, it is necessary that we carefully consider the lessons of the war and profit by them in our plans for the future.
Previous to the war the navy had been gradually developing the policy of closer co-operation with civilian engineering activities, as may be evidenced by its representation on standards committees of various engineering societies, and by its calling on engineering societies and recognized civilian experts along certain lines for help in the solution of special problems. In particular the forming of the Naval Consulting Board may be cited as a recognition, by the navy, of the desirability of having the scientific engineering talent of the country available for consultation and advice where its services were required.
We need not necessarily consider the navy as conservative in only of late adopting such a policy, for it is one which has only lately come to the front in civil life. Formerly in the commercial field the utmost secrecy prevailed as to the research work undertaken, and shop practices employed, by the different companies. It has been found, however, that there is sufficient opportunity for all, and that the advantages of competition and emulation are but accentuated by the bringing of independent interests in close touch with one another under conditions such that their combined experiences and deductions may be co-related, with the result that standard rules and practices may be expressed.
The war has brought out, or at least hastened the development of, an enlightened policy between the Government and the various organizations of the country, and between nations as well, which may be considered an innovation. It consists of the pooling of experiences and opinions, without reservation, and the active co-operation of all concerned.
The world may be considered at present as in a nascent state; new plans can be put in actual practice now without the overcoming of inertia of settled conditions such as will exist within a few months. The immediate future, then, should be considered as the days of golden opportunity in applying the lessons of the war, rather than as a time of reaction and inactivity.
It is my idea, in this article, to present the needs of Naval Research and to show that now is the time to formulate a definite policy and make definite plans for such research, including a continuation of much of the work of this nature which was started during the days of the war under emergency conditions. Very few of the ideas here presented are original, but serious consideration of them by the navy at this time is of great importance to the future of the navy and the country.
To show that there is nothing new in the statement that Naval Research is necessary in order that there should be proper progress in the navy, the following extracts from a paper written by Admiral Melville in 1902 are quoted:
The success of Germany can be accounted for only by recognizing the fact that study, reflection, and research must have been expended in the preparation of plans, in the building up and the organization of the shipyards, and in laying out and carrying on the work of construction. It was the high appreciation of the value of original investigation, coupled with experimental work, that has caused Germany to advance progressively and successfully.
For over a hundred years Germany, as a nation, has carried on more original research along technical lines than any other power. While it is true that both England and America have put to practical application the principles discovered by German research, thereby gaining commercial and maritime advantages, it has been the Teuton who has sought after principles.
The cost of maintaining a battleship in commission will approximate $1000 per day, and warships have been tied up for weeks on account of the corrosion of a few hundred dollars' worth of boiler tubes. It will repay the laboratory will simply cause increased length of life of both boiler and condenser tubes.
It is methodical, thoughtful, and persistent work which counts, and as the Germans exceed in this respect, the engineering world is now beginning to understand in its fullness the value of the work done at the German engineering laboratories in promoting German success in both naval construction and maritime development.
It is an anomaly that the greatest of military nations should be the first to appreciate the scientific attainments and capabilities of the engineer, and it is for this reason that Germany has a start of at least five years over England, France and America in systematic naval engineering research. In all probability each of the three other nations has spent more money than Germany in experimental work, but German expenditure, in great part, has taken place before the article is manufactured or the ship is laid down, while in the case of some rival powers, tests and experiments have been conducted to discover means of overcoming avoidable defects.
The proverbs that "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure" and that "a stitch in time saves nine" are as applicable to-day as they were in the last century. It is for this reason that the preparatory experimental work conducted by Germany has been productive of greater results than that done by rival powers working in the direction of seeking remedies for existing evils.
The cost to the British Government of using the cruisers Hyacinth, Minerva, and Hermes for comparative boiler tests and experiments will approximate more than the cost of establishing and operating both the Charlottenburg and the Dresden stations since their inception.
Experience has shown that the German engineering laboratories are more than a good paying investment, for there is not an expert in that empire familiar with the work being done at these laboratories who does not believe that their destruction would be a greater national calamity to the navy and the nation than the loss of one of the battleships of the home squadron. The warship could be replaced in four years. It would take six years to rebuild and put in effective operation the complete installation for conducting experimental research that has been developed and perfected at the Charlottenburg and Dresden technical colleges.
It can be absolutely stated that the navy is behind the times in original work and research—one of the marine superintendents of one of the Great Lake transportation companies told me that if he were called upon to retrench in expenditures the last item to be cut down would be that for experimental purposes, since both the cost of construction and the expense of operation of the steamers under his control had been reduced as a result of the data secured from experimental work. There is not a leading university, large manufacturing concern, or great transportation company that does not consider it imperative to make tests and experiments. Every navy will also find that it will increase efficiency and promote economy to conduct and to encourage extended investigation of unsolved problems relating to its marine service.
This estimate of German research was written a number of years before the war, and we may now be inclined to look with distrust on such research on account of the uses to which it has been put. The fact that the Germans have prostituted research should not be an excuse for our failure to recognize the great advantages of research when properly applied. If the allied nations had patronized research before the war to the same extent as the Germans, the submarine frightfulness, the use of poison gas, and other devilish schemes of the Germans would have been answered immediately, and they would have been no real menace. The Allies soon recognized that intensive research was necessary in order effectively to combat the Germans, and by means of such research were able to find the answer to all the German schemes. At the end of the war the Allies were scientifically superior to the Germans and had proved that scientific research when combined with right must prevail. We have heard of many things which won the war, and there is more or less truth in all these claims, but .we desire to state, with a great deal of confidence, that the war was won by research.
Research is defined in the Encyclopedia Britannica as "the act of searching into a matter closely and carefully, inquiry directed to the discovery of truth, and in particular the trained scientific investigation of the principles and facts of any subject, based on original and first hand study of authorities or experiment." We are inclined, however, to give the word a more restricted meaning and apply it to the investigations of those who devote themselves to the study of pure, as opposed to applied, science, to the investigation of causes rather than to practical experiment.
Dr. W. R. Whitney in a recent paper on "American Engineering Research" defines research as "painstaking investigations which add to knowledge." Adding the word "naval" we obtain a definition of the title of this paper as "painstaking investigations which add to naval knowledge." It will be noted that this includes both theoretical and applied scientific investigations and that all improvements which are to be adopted by the navy in any line must be based in some way on such naval research. If we are content to follow the lead of other nations or to use apparatus and devices as manufacturers may bring them to the navy's attention, we may continue without any definite policy on research. If, on the other hand, we are to take a leading part in naval and maritime matters, we must have some definite plan of procedure so that the present needs of the service may be taken care of, and the new scientific discoveries be applied to improving the efficiency of the service.
It has been said that not one in a thousand of the many inventions and suggestions submitted to the government during the war by outside parties was worthy of any consideration, and that not one in a hundred of those worthy of consideration were in form for adoption without considerable research and experimental work. It is believed that the above statement is if anything optimistic. The new principles, apparatus and devices which were developed and used in the war were the result of careful and diligent investigation and experiment by persons devoting their whole time and purposes to new problems, and with which they had to be more or less familiar. Experience has been in clear contradiction of the rather universal idea of the country that we simply have to express a need for some new device or apparatus and the American genius will arise with the answer. Natural talents are of little avail, but, with orderly training and opportunity for expansion of intellect, such talents become of great value.
Although the testing of untried and doubtful devices that may be brought to its attention is a function of the navy's research and experimental work, this should not be considered as the major work of the research organization. It is necessary if our navy is really to be efficient, that it should originate new developments and keep ahead of the times. In other words, it should be a leader, rather than simply following the lead of others and simply testing out ideas which may be presented to it.
There was an enthusiastic response from the scientists and engineers of the country to the navy's request for assistance in solving the problems suddenly thrust upon it by the declaration of the war and the realization of the fact that many things had to be accomplished in a hurry if the war was to be successfully pursued. These men before they could intelligently undertake their work had to become familiar with the service needs and service conditions and become indoctrinated. This was accomplished in the case of a great number of these, but much time was lost and work was carried out at much greater expense than would have been the case if a nucleus naval research organization had been in operation during peace with a personnel familiar with the service and existing conditions.
It must be realized that research serves two purposes: to develop materiel and to develop personnel. The mere construction of laboratory buildings and providing of research facilities will not meet the needs of the service nor solve the problems of the service. The development of men capable of solving naval problems as they are presented might well be considered as the primary object of a research organization.
Dr. F. B. Jewett, chief engineer of the Western Electric Company, in a recent address before the Royal Canadian Institute on the subject of "Industrial Research," spoke as follows in regard to the research work of his company:
Even to-day and despite the aggregation of human and material resources which have placed our laboratories in the front rank of industrial research organizations, there are on my list a large number of problems which we are not in a position to undertake. These problems, which are directly and solely in the communication field, are problems of major interest to the industry and are of such a nature that we are absolutely sure they can be solved with positive results of inestimable value to the telephone and telegraph companies and to the public at large, provided only that their solution can be obtained through the application of well organized industrial research. Why then do these problems lie essentially untouched? Is it because of a lack of material facilities, of money, of courage to go ahead, or the feeling that these particular researches will not recommend themselves to the business men who are responsible for the commercial destinies of the telephone and telegraph systems? It is none of these. There is no lack of money, no lack of material facilities, no lack of courage, no lack of approval on the part of directors, for we have long ago learned that material facilities are easy to obtain, that money spent in properly directed fundamental research, large though the sums may be, is small in comparison with the direct and indirect returns, and finally that apparent courage in deciding to go ahead is not so very courageous after all when it is exercised by men of ability, training and experience who have shown themselves competent in their own fields, whether those fields be within the laboratories or within the precincts of the executive offices.
What then is it that should stop us from an immediate attack if we are so sure of the ultimate result? The answer is the simple, three-letter word "men." Not mere human male bipeds, but men endowed by nature with at least a modicum of the spirit of scientific research to which has been added, either through fortune, personal initiative, parental solicitude or a far-sighted policy on the part of the state, that orderly training and opportunity for expansion of intellect without which natural talents are of little avail.
Our case is typical of the situation which confronts every industrial research organization on the continent. The matter of an adequate supply of properly equipped and trained investigators and directors of research is absolutely vital to the growth of industrial research, and I am as sure as one can be of anything in the world that all of our visions of the benefits to be derived from a large expansion of industrial research will come to naught if we fail to realize or neglect the fact that in the last analysis we are dependent absolutely upon the mental productivity of men, and men alone, and that we must in consequence provide adequately for a continuous supply of well trained workers.
The navy might, by keeping in touch with developments in other navies, utilize apparatus and methods that were fairly advanced and up-to-date, but this system fails when new problems are presented in an emergency, as during a war. Also if we have developed men capable of handling all naval problems and carrying out original research on them, we need not necessarily hold secret the nature of the various apparatus which we have developed and are using,—the knowledge, based on experience, which is locked up in the brains of the research men, and men trained in the use of the apparatus cannot be transferred or obtained by other countries unless they have actually had similar experience and training.
Some of the personnel in a proper naval research organization should consist of persons making this their life work, while certain of the personnel might well consist of officers who have specialized in a particular line and would be given an opportunity to devote a certain number of years to research along their specialty.
A large .number of eminent scientists and research engineers of the country have been connected, during the war, with the navy and its activities, in one way or another, and become more or less familiar with the navy. Contact should be kept with these men in civil life and their interest in the navy maintained, so that when particular problems arise on which they are more or less specialists their services may be called for, as required. Also these men in their work in civil life will at times make discoveries or become cognizant of facts which have naval applications, and they should be encouraged to keep the navy informed of such matters. Arrangements could well be made for a certain number of eminent civilian scientists to come into the organization for active duty for a period of a year, to go back to their universities or outside employment at the end of that time and be replaced by other scientists. The navy, by this plan, would be kept in touch with outside researches and developments and the civilian scientists would be kept in touch with, and interested in, the navy and its problems.
The question may naturally arise as to the possibility of doing much of the naval research work in outside laboratories, or at the Bureau of Standards. It is considered that this is impossible and that the navy must have its own research organization and its own laboratories and application stations. Naval research must be directed and carried out by personnel intimately familiar with the naval problems and service conditions. The writer put the question to the scientific director of the British Admiralty as to the advisability of utilizing the British National Physical Laboratory for the pure research work of the Admiralty rather than establish a separate Admiralty Pure Research Laboratory in London. It was found that the British idea was the same as expressed above: that naval research must be directly under naval control and that the personnel directing and conducting such research should be thoroughly familiar with the naval problems and conditions.
It is hardly necessary, or indeed possible, to give at this time a list of naval problems which require research and experimentation. Also, needs will develop as researches are carried out, which cannot now even be given names. However, to show the scope of the work which it is considered should be covered by naval research, the following partial list of desirable problems may be stated:
Bearings and Lubricants,
Diesel Engines,
Electric Arc Welding,
Erosion (guns, turbines, etc.),
Fire Control,
Light and Illumination (including searchlights),
Optics (range finders and periscopes),
Powdered Fuel,
Radio,
Sound (including the use of underwater sounds for navigation purposes),
Steel Alloys,
Turbines.
It will be noted that, while some of these problems may be considered as purely military, the majority of them have wide application to the merchant marine and to the country in general.
The advantages which have accrued to the navy, as a result of preliminary research on two of the above subjects, are cited:
1. Electric Welding for Marine Work.—An investigation of the use of electric welding for navy work was carried out at the New York Navy Yard in 1914 and 1915, and the navy was ready to use this method for repairing of the ex-German ships when they were taken over by the United States, with the result that these vessels were ready for service much earlier than they could otherwise have been. The value of this knowledge of the possibilities of electric welding for repair work was probably worth more to the navy than has ever been spent by the navy on research.
During the war considerable research on electric welding has been carried out and much has been learned. There remains, however, much to be learned on this subject, and it appears desirable for the navy to carry out further research on this problem.
2. Searchlights.—The navy has for a number of years been carrying on investigations and researches on searchlights. There is no particular reason for commercial companies carrying out research on this problem as long as they have a satisfactory commercial product. The improvements in searchlights of the present time over those of a few years ago have really been forced by the navy. This is as it should be, for the navy is the user of this apparatus and is the party directly interested in having the most efficient obtainable. It may be noted that the British services maintained during the war a searchlight laboratory in London which was directed by a searchlight council made up of representative officers of the navy, army and air service. There were officers on this council from the Admiralty, the war office, the air office, from the forces in France, the fleet, H. M. S. Vernon, etc., and all questions of experiments, types of apparatus, and quantities to be manufactured, and allocation of finished apparatus, were decided by this council. The writer attended a meeting of this council and was very favorably impressed with the manner of carrying on this work and the co-operation which obtained between the various services and interests involved. There are at present, however, fundamental facts in regard to military searchlights which remain to be investigated. Undoubtedly careful research will produce a much more satisfactory apparatus than we now possess.
In research, applying this term in its broad sense and including both theoretical and applied investigations into the matter, there are two general types of problems with all gradations between:
(a) The problem of a pure research type, exploratory and fundamental in character, and involving work of a high order in physics, chemistry, mathematics, etc.
(b) The problem of industrial development and application, involving thorough engineering, design and manufacturing ability, and experience of the service conditions to which the apparatus or material will be subjected.
The man who is interested in the problem of a pure research type, and is most competent for work of this character, is not generally interested in its engineering application, except indirectly, and for efficient work should not be burdened by consideration of that side of the question, except as necessary for effective direction of his own work as a whole. This man should, however, be familiar with the navy service conditions so that he may realize the difficulties and restrictions imposed by service conditions. He is generally not competent in the applied side of the problem and any attention given by him to that work, except as necessary to better understand his own part of the problem, is inefficient. On the other hand, the engineer who is competent in design, development and production, to meet service conditions and service needs, is generally not especially interested, nor competent, in the pure research side of the problem. To properly carry out his work, however, he must have a general understanding and appreciation of such pure research work, in order to secure effective co-operation.
At the naval experimental station, New London, Conn., the demarcation, as given above, between the two divisions of research and development work, has been generally followed, with, however, a liberal interlocking of the two divisions. The experience of this station tends to show that this organization is correct and satisfactory. It is believed that those industrial-engineering organizations that have recognized the above situation and have developed two groups of men in their research-development divisions, with close contact between the two groups, have secured the most effective organization, and that their experience under the emergency conditions of war has proved this system to be most satisfactory. Substantially this is the form of organization of the General Electric Company, the Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Company, and the Western Electric Company, as well as others.
It is believed that the navy should organize two such groups of men to handle its research and development problems, these two groups, while distinct, being in as close contact as possible with each other. It is probable that the majority of the arguments would favor the creation of a centralized laboratory and staff in the vicinity of Washington, devoted to the pure research work and the development of such apparatus as does not require sea experimentation or trials with various types of craft, and the maintaining of such other stations, as the naval experimental station, New London, as may be necessary for the applied engineering development and manufacture of material and apparatus in small quantities until the type has proved satisfactory and can be turned over to manufacturers for quantity production. The groups on the applied development work should be located where local advantageous conditions dictate, but it will, of course, be most effective to bring as many of these groups together in a given location, and to maintain as few stations for such work as possible. It may be pointed out that this suggested plan is quite similar to that of the Department of Agriculture, with its centralized laboratory and staff in Washington, and its distributed experimental stations in each state for study and application under the local conditions of soil and climate.
As previously stated, the personnel side of research work is considered of greater importance than the mere providing of laboratory buildings and facilities, although these latter are, of course, very necessary. It is desired to emphasize, though, the fact that the mere creation of buildings and equipment will not in itself provide the effective research which the navy requires.
As the head of the navy's research organization there should be provided a director of research, probably under operations, and associated with him a research council. This council to be made up of representatives from all the bureaus, from the different forces of the fleets, and, possibly, from the bureau of standards, and probably including a few eminent civilian scientists and engineers,—care being taken not to get a body too large and unwieldy. It would be best to have a small executive council, and allow for calling in of other members when problems, of which they were particularly cognizant, were to be considered.
The close tying together of the different bureaus by their representation on the special board on anti-submarine devices has been of the greatest value to that board in effectively carrying out its mission, and it is believed to have been of considerable value to the bureaus as well, by keeping them closely informed of the work under way and the results being obtained. The close cooperation obtained in England in several organizations combining naval officers, civilian scientists, engineers and manufacturers, was particularly noticed, and it is believed, as a result, that very effective and expeditious work was carried out by this procedure.
Assuming that the departmental part of the research organization can be taken care of, the real difficulty of naval research presents itself. This is the obtaining of the proper grade of research scientists and engineers. The following plan is proposed:
(a) Select a group of naval officers who have shown an inclination toward engineering and scientific research and who are interested in carrying out intensive investigations along their specialties, these officers to be available for this work for a term of years in either administering or actually carrying out research.
(b) Elect each year five or more eminent scientists for a one year appointment as professors of mathematics in the navy (or possibly as lieutenant commanders (technicists) in the reserve force) to serve during a year's leave of absence from their universities or civilian employments.
(c) Designate each year a certain number of Naval Academy graduates to the naval research laboratories for postgraduate work, and provide instructors for them, these officers to specialize in research in the same manner as officers are now given postgraduate work and specialize in ordnance, electricity, radio, steam engineering, naval construction, etc.
(d) Obtain a sufficient number of young scientific graduates from universities to take up scientific work in the organization, either temporarily or permanently.
(e) Each summer invite at least ten professors or other civilian scientists to carry out investigations at the central laboratory or associated experimental stations.
At the research laboratory ample opportunity should be afforded for research on any problem in physics, with an opportunity for the investigator to publish the results in a journal established at the laboratory, which journal should have a wide circulation throughout the navy, and among civilian scientists and engineers. It is well known that a scientist's chief reward and chief incentive for his work is the acknowledgment of his work, and the credit which is given to him for original investigation or development, by other scientists and the world in general.
It may appear that the navy would not sufficiently profit from its research work unless its results are kept as naval secrets, and it will be seen from the plan here outlined that it is proposed to give publicity to the research work. It is believed that in most matters, if not in all, there is more profit in developing competent men to produce results, than in the results themselves, regarded as naval secrets, for, in the case of national stress, these men can be called upon to use the organization to meet the emergency. It is also felt that many of the applications, arising from the researches undertaken, would be desired for the merchant marine; as well as the navy, and that therefore the navy could not properly restrict them to its own use.
By adopting the scheme for obtaining personnel as suggested above, new blood and new methods of attacking problems would be continuously brought into the organization. Contact would be closely maintained with the civilian scientific developments and researches of the country, without losing touch with the navy's needs and desires. In this scheme there should be no danger of naval research getting into a rut, while at the same time there would be developed, both in the navy and out or it, a trained research personnel capable of understanding and solving various naval problems as they were presented. The navy would become acquainted with the applications of research to its problems, and the civilian scientists of the country would become acquainted and interested in the navy and its problems.
In the navy we have been inclined to think of a scientist as a long haired crank whose mind is full of complex mathematical formulae and obtuse theories, and that he could be of little or no assistance to us. Many of us, though, who have come in direct contact with real scientists, have found that they take a real interest in our problems, and knowing, as each of them does, some special application of natural laws, they have been able to point out naval problems which we did not realize existed. That is, individual scientists, when acquainted with service conditions, have been able to show that some of their special knowledge of physical laws could be applied so as to simplify our ways of doing some particular thing, and thereby improve the naval service, while we in our ignorance would have been satisfied with things as they were and never realized that better and more efficient ways could be devised.
Let us realize then that the essence of ability is the same in all people, be it naval officer, scientist or business man, and that their minds are really much closer together than we usually grant.
Given, then, a close co-ordination between the proper types of naval officers and scientists, the navy should, in its research organization, become the greatest patron of science in this country, if not in the world, with resultant improvement and progress, not only in the navy, but in the whole country.