DIPLOMATIC NOTES
From January 18 to February 18
Prepared By Allan Westcott, Ph. D., Instructor, U. S. Naval Academy
LONG RANGE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS
During the month ending February 18, the spokesmen of the warring powers continued the process—a noteworthy innovation and advance—of negotiations by public manifestoes without cessation of hostilities. In reply to the specific program of 14 points set forth by President Wilson on January 8, the German Chancellor and the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister addressed delegates of their respective Parliaments two weeks later (January 24). In subsequent comment on these replies (February 11), President Wilson stated that he found that of Count Czernin "friendly in tone," that of Count von Hertling "very vague and very confusing." In effect, the German Chancellor insisted that every territorial problem should be settled, not in general council, but in separate negotiations with the nations particularly concerned. Thus, as in the case of Russia, the Central Powers would secure the advantage of dealing severally with the weaker members of the Entente.
Count von Hertling's Statement.—In his speech before the Main Committee of the Reichstag on January 24, Count von Hertling maintained a truculent attitude. He declared that the allies spoke as "victors to vanquished" and "still cast covetous eyes on parts of our territories," that "Germany's military position was never so favorable as it now is," and that "if the leaders of the enemy powers really are inclined to peace, let them revise their program once again."
After an extended German version of international relations preceding the war and German claims in Alsace-Lorraine, the Chancellor discussed President Wilson's program, point by point, as follows:
[Note: President Wilson's address of January 8 appears in full in the February Proceedings.]
"The first point is the demand that there shall be no more secret international agreements. History shows that it is we above all others who would be able to agree to the publicity of diplomatic documents. I recall that our defensive alliance with Austria-Hungary was known to the whole world from 1888, while the offensive agreement of the enemy states first saw the light of publicity during the war, through the revelations of the secret Russian archives. The negotiations at Brest-Litovsk are being conducted with full publicity. This proves that we are quite ready to accept this proposal and declare publicity of negotiations to be a general political principle.
"In his second point Mr. Wilson demands freedom of shipping on the seas in war and peace. This also is demanded by Germany as the first and one of the most important requirements for the future. Therefore, there is here no difference of opinion. The limitation introduced by Mr. Wilson at the end, which I need not quote textually, is not intelligible, appears superfluous and would therefore best be left out."
[The limiting clause reads "except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants."]
"It would, however, be highly important for the freedom of shipping in future if strongly fortified naval bases on important international routes, such as England has at Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Hong Kong, the Falkland Islands, and many other places, were removed.
"Point 3: We, too, are in thorough accord with the removal of economic barriers which interfere with trade in a superfluous manner. We, too, condemn economic war, which would inevitably bear within it causes of future warlike complications.
"Point 4: Limitation of armaments: As already declared by us, the idea of limitation of armaments is entirely discussable. The financial position of all European States after the war might most effectively promote satisfactory solution. [Cries of 'Hear! Hear!'] It is therefore clear that an understanding might be reached without difficulty on the first four points of Mr. Wilson's program.
"I now come to the fifth point—settlement of all colonial claims and disputes. Practical realization of Mr. Wilson's principles in the realm of reality will encounter some difficulties in any case. I believe that for the present it may be left for England, which has the greatest colonial empire, to make what she will of this proposal of her ally. This point of the program also will have to be discussed in due time, on the reconstitution of the world's colonial possessions, which we also demand absolutely.
"Point 6: Evacuation of Russian territory: Now that the Entente has refused, within the period agreed upon by Russia and the Quadruple Alliance, to join in the negotiations, I must in the name of the latter decline to allow any subsequent interference. We are dealing here with questions which concern only Russia and the four allied powers. I adhere to the hope that, with recognition of self-determination for the peoples on the western frontier of the former Russian Empire, good relations will be established, both with these peoples and with the rest of Russia, for whom we wish most earnestly a return of order, peace, and conditions guaranteeing the welfare of the country.
"Point 7: Belgium: My predecessors in office repeatedly declared that at no time did the annexation of Belgium to Germany form a point in the program of German policy. The Belgian question belongs to those questions the details of which are to be settled by negotiation at the peace conference. So long as our opponents have unreservedly taken the standpoint that the integrity of the allies' territory can offer the only possible basis of peace discussion, I must adhere to the standpoint hitherto always adopted and refuse the removal in advance of the Belgian affair from the entire discussion.
"Point 8: The occupied parts of France are a valuable pawn in our hands. Here, too, forcible annexation forms no part of the official German policy. The conditions and methods of procedure of the evacuation, which must take account of Germany's vital interests are to be agreed upon between Germany and France.
"I can only again expressly accentuate the fact that there can never be a question of the dismemberment of imperial territory. Under no fine phrases of any kind shall we permit the enemy again to take from us territory of the empire which with ever-increasing intimacy has linked itself to Germanism, which has in highly gratifying manner ever and increasingly developed in an economic respect, and of whose people more than 87 per cent speak the German mother tongue.
"The questions dealt with by Mr. Wilson under points 9, 10, and 11 touch both the Italian frontier question and questions of the future development of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and the future of the Balkan States; questions in which, for the greater part, the interests of our ally, Austria-Hungary, preponderate. Where German interests are concerned we shall defend them most energetically.
"But I may leave the answer to Mr. Wilson's proposals on these points in the first place to the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister. Close contact with the allied dual monarchy forms the kernel of our present policy, and must be the guiding line in the future. Loyal comradeship in arms, which has stood the test so brilliantly in wartime, must continue to have its effect in peace. We shall thus on our part do everything for the attainment of peace by Austria-Hungary which takes into account her just claims.
"The matters touched upon by Mr. Wilson in point 12 concern our loyal, brave ally, Turkey. I must in nowise forestall her statesmen in their attitude. The integrity of Turkey and the safeguarding of her capital, which is connected closely with the question of the Straits, are important and vital interests of the German Empire, also. Our ally can always count upon our energetic support in this matter.
"Point 13 deals with Poland. It was not the Entente—which had only empty words for Poland and before the war never interceded for Poland with Russia—but the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian monarchy which liberated Poland from the Czaristic regime which was crushing her national characteristics. It may thus be left to Germany and Austria-Hungary and Poland to come to an agreement on the future constitution of this country. As the negotiations and communications of the last year prove, we are on the road to this goal.
"The last point, the 14th, deals with a bond of the nations. Regarding this point, I am sympathetically disposed, as my political activity shows, toward every idea which eliminates for the future a possibility or a probability of war, and will promote a peaceful and harmonious collaboration of nations. If the idea of a bond of nations, as suggested by President Wilson, proves on closer examination really to be conceived in a spirit of complete justice and complete impartiality toward all, then the Imperial Government is gladly ready, when all other pending questions have been settled, to begin the examination of the basis of such a bond of nations."
Scheidemann for Peace By Agreement.—Replying to and criticizing Count von Hertling's statement to the Main Committee, the Socialist leader Philip Scheidemann asserted that agreement was possible in at least 11 points of President Wilson's program. "Two chief arguments," he said : "were advanced by the military party for the prolongation of the war, namely, the success of the U-boats and the strength of our army. But these were to have given us a decisive victory in six months, according to the announcement made in 1916. Alas, that period has long since passed, and while the U-boat has admittedly harmed England enormously, its chief visible effect has been the entry of America into the war. If the United States had not entered the war we may be sure the Russian revolution would long ago have brought a general peace.
"What about the army? Suppose the army should capture Calais and Paris; would that mean peace? I say 'No!' Suppose the army conquered France and England; would that mean peace? I say 'No!' for we would still have to conquer America."
Herr Scheidemann fiercely attacked the militarist leaders, asserting that their attitude toward Austria was likely to lose for Germany her last friend.
"If our government leaders cannot free us from these 'patriots,'" said the Social Democratic leader, "they had better go. I warn them that if they do not bring us peace with Russia they will be hurled from power."
Herr Scheidemann held that an agreement was easily possible on 11 points of President Wilson's statement.
"But Mr. Wilson must be told plainly," the speaker said, "that Alsace is Germany's and will remain so. If one clear word is spoken regarding Belgium, England's war mongering will end. An honorable, complete reinstatement of Belgium is our duty.
"I cannot see the day," Herr Scheidemann went on, "when Germany will say to the Entente: 'We accept your terms. We are beaten.' But just as little can I see the day when England, France and the United States will say the same to us."—N. Y. Times, 27/1.
Count Czeknin's Statement.—In his speech on January 24, before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian Parliament, Count Czernin dealt chiefly with the prospects of peace with Russia, affirming that Austria, for her part, sought neither "a square meter nor a kreutzer from the Russians." His comment on the allies' peace terms was at first reported as follows:
"I think there is no harm in stating that I regard the recent proposals of President Wilson as an appreciable approach to the Austro-Hungarian point of view, and that to some of them Austria-Hungary joyfully could give her approval. But she must first lay down the principle—that in so far as these propositions concern her allies, whether in the case of Germany's possession of Belgium or in the case of Turkey, Austria-Hungary, faithful to her engagements to fight to the end in defence of her allies, will defend the possessions of her war allies as she would her own. That is the standpoint of our allies, in regard to which there is perfect reciprocity."
Count Czernin said as to the second point in President Wilson's peace aims, freedom of the seas, the President had responded to the views of all and that he (Czernin) absolutely and entirely supported this paragraph. Regarding paragraph 3 in President Wilson's proposals—the removal of economic barriers and the establishment of equality of trade conditions—Count Czernin said:
"This article, which pronounces in a formal manner hostility against a future economic war, is so just and reasonable, and its application so often has been urged by us, that we have nothing to add to it."
According to later reports, this early version was garbled. Count Czernin did not refer to Belgium as a German possession, and expressed a willingness on the part of Austria to fight only for the pre-war possessions of her allies. This vital section of his speech should read as follows:
"So far as these propositions concern her allies, whether in the case of German possessions. Belgium, or Turkey, Austria- Hungary, faithful to her engagements, will go to the extreme in defence of her allies. She will defend the pre-war possessions of her allies as she would her own."
Supreme War Council on German Terms.—The Supreme War Council of the allies, which met at Versailles, made this official announcement in London on February 3, after its final session for the present:
"The council was unable to find in Count von Hertling's and Count Czernin's recent utterances any real approximation to the moderate conditions laid down by the Allied Governments. Under the circumstances, the council decided that the only task before them to meet was the vigorous and effective prosecution of the war until the pressure of that effort produced a change of temper in the enemy governments justifying the hope of the conclusion of peace based on the principles of freedom, justice, and respect for international law. The council arrived at a complete unanimity of policy on measures for the prosecution of the war."
Generals Tasker H. Bliss, chief of staff, and John J. Pershing, U. S. A., represented our government at the meeting.
President Wilson's Review of Peace Terms.—President Wilson in an address to Congress on February 11, analyzed the replies of the Central Powers and again outlined the conditions essential to an acceptable peace. He refused to accept Count von Hertling's proposal to confine territorial settlements to the countries immediately concerned. He pointed out that if territorial questions were so settled by separate bargains, separate economic and trade compacts would also be in order. In conclusion he laid down four general principles, requiring in substance that all territorial settlements should be made with the utmost regard for the national aspirations and the benefit of the populations concerned. The address follows in full:
Gentlemen of the Congress:
On January 8 I had the honor of addressing you on the objects of the war as our people conceive them. The Prime Minister of Great Britain had spoken in similar terms on January 5. To these addresses the German Chancellor replied on January 24, and Count Czernin for Austria on the same day. It is gratifying to have our desire so promptly realized that all exchanges of view on this great matter should be made in the hearing of all the world.
Count Czernin's reply, which is directed chiefly to my own address on January 8, is uttered in a very friendly tone. He finds in my statement a sufficiently encouraging approach to the views of his own government to justify him in believing that it furnishes a basis for a more detailed discussion of purposes by the two governments.
He is represented to have intimated that the views he was expressing had been communicated to me beforehand and that I was aware of them at the time he was uttering them; but in this I am sure he was misunderstood. I had received no intimation of what he intended to say. There was, of course, no reason why he should communicate privately with me. I am quite content to be one of his public audience.
Count von Hertling's reply is, I must say, very vague and very confusing. It is full of equivocal phrases and leads it is not clear where. But it is certainly in a very different tone from that of Count Czernin, and apparently of an opposite purpose. It confirms, I am sorry to say, rather than removes the unfortunate impression made by what we had learned of the conferences at Brest-Litovsk.
His discussion and acceptance of our general principles lead him to no practical conclusions. He refuses to apply them to the substantive items which must constitute the body of any final settlement. He is jealous of international action and of international council. He accepts, he says, the principle of public diplomacy, but he appears to insist that it be confined, at any rate in this case, to generalities, and that the several particular questions of territory and sovereignty, the several questions upon whose settlement must depend the acceptance of peace by the 23 states now engaged in the war, must be discussed and settled, not in general council, but severally by the nations most immediately concerned by interest or neighborhood.
He agrees that the seas should be free, but looks askance at any limitation to that freedom by international action in the interest of the common order. He would without reserve be glad to see economic barriers removed between nation and nation, for that could in no way impede the ambitions of the military party, with whom he seems constrained to keep on terms. Neither does he raise objection to a limitation of armaments. That matter will be settled of itself, he thinks, by the economic conditions which must follow the war. But the German colonies, he demands, must be returned without debate. He will discuss with no one but the representatives of Russia what disposition shall be made of the peoples and the lands of the Baltic provinces; with no one but the Government of France the "Conditions" under which French territory shall be evacuated; and only with Austria what shall be done with Poland.
In the determination of all questions affecting the Balkan States he defers, as I understand him, to Austria and Turkey; and with regard to the agreements to be entered into concerning the non-Turkish peoples of the present Ottoman Empire, to the Turkish authorities themselves. After a settlement all around, effected in this fashion, by individual barter and concession, he would have no objection, if I correctly interpret his statement, to a league of nations which would undertake to hold the new balance of power steady against external disturbance.
It must be evident to every one who understands what this war has wrought in the opinion and temper of the world that no general peace, no peace worth the infinite sacrifices of these years of tragical suffering, can possibly be arrived at in any such fashion. The method the German Chancellor proposes is the method of the Congress of Vienna. We cannot and will not return to that.
What is at stake now is the peace of the world. What we are striving for is a new international order based upon broad and universal principles of right and justice—no mere peace of shreds and patches. Is it possible that Count von Hertling does not see that, does not grasp it, is, in fact, living in his thought in a world dead and gone? Has he utterly forgotten the Reichstag resolutions of July 19, or does he deliberately ignore them? They spoke of the conditions of a general peace, not of national aggrandizement or of arrangements between state and state.
The peace of the world depends upon the just settlement of each of the several problems to which I adverted in my recent address to the Congress. I, of course, do not mean that the peace of the world depends upon the acceptance of any particular set of suggestions as to the way in which those problems are to be dealt with. I mean only that those problems each and all affect the whole world; that unless they are dealt with in a spirit of unselfish and unbiased justice, with a view to the wishes, the natural connections, the racial aspirations, the security and peace of mind of the peoples involved, no permanent peace will have been attained.
They cannot be discussed separately or in corners. None of them constitutes a private or separate interest from which the opinion of the world may be shut out. Whatever affects the peace affects mankind, and nothing settled by military force, if settled wrong, is settled at all. It will presently have to be reopened.
Is Count von Hertling not aware that he is speaking in the court of mankind, that all the awakened nations of the world now sit in judgment on what every public man, of whatever nation, may say on the issues of a conflict which has spread to every region of the world? The Reichstag resolutions of July themselves frankly accepted the decisions of that court. There shall be no annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages. Peoples are not to be handed about from one sovereignty to another by an international conference or an understanding between rivals and antagonists. National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. "Self-determination" is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.
We cannot have general peace for the asking or by the mere arrangements of a peace conference. It cannot be pieced together out of individual understandings between powerful states. All the parties to this war must join in the settlement of every issue anywhere involved in it, because what we are seeking is a peace that we can all unite to guarantee and maintain, and every item of it must be submitted to the common judgment whether it be right and fair, an act of justice, rather than a bargain between sovereigns.
The United States has no desire to interfere in European affairs or to act as arbiter in European territorial disputes. She would disdain to take advantage of any internal weakness or disorder to impose her own will upon another people. She is quite ready to be shown that the settlements she has suggested are not the best or the most enduring. They are only her own provisional sketches of principles, and of the way in which they should be applied.
But she entered this war because she was made a partner, whether she would or not, in the sufferings and indignities inflicted by the military masters of Germany against the peace and security of mankind; and the conditions of peace will touch her as nearly as they will touch any other nation to which is entrusted a leading part in the maintenance of civilization. She cannot see her way to peace until the causes of this war are removed, its renewal rendered, as nearly as may be, impossible.
This war had its roots in the disregard of the rights of small nations and of nationalities which lacked the union and the force to make good their claim to determine their own allegiances and their own forms of political life. Covenants must now be entered into which will render such things impossible for the future; and those covenants must be backed by the united force of all the nations that love justice and are willing to maintain it at any cost.
If territorial settlements and the political relations of great populations which have not the organized power to resist are to be determined by the contracts of the powerful governments which consider themselves most directly affected, as Count von Hertling proposes, why may not economic questions also? It has come about in the altered world in which we now find ourselves that justice and the rights of peoples affect the whole field of international dealing as much as access to raw materials and fair and equal conditions of trade.
Count von Hertling wants the essential bases of commercial and industrial life to be safeguarded by common agreement and guarantee, but he cannot expect that to be conceded him if the other matters to be determined by the articles of peace are not handled in the same way as items in the final accounting. He cannot ask the benefit of common agreement in the one field without according it in the other. I take it for granted that he sees that separate and selfish compacts with regard to trade and the essential materials of manufacture would afford no foundation for peace. Neither, he may rest assured, will separate and selfish compacts with regard to provinces and peoples.
Count Czernin seems to see the fundamental elements of peace with clear eyes, and does not seek to obscure them. He sees that an independent Poland, made up of all the indisputably Polish peoples who lie contiguous to one another, is a matter of European concern, and must, of course, be conceded; that Belgium must be evacuated and restored, no matter what sacrifices and concessions that may involve; and that national aspirations must be satisfied, even within his own empire, in the common interest of Europe and mankind.
If he is silent about questions which touch the interest and purpose of his allies more nearly than they touch those of Austria only, it must, of course, be because he feels constrained. I suppose, to defer to Germany and Turkey in the circumstances. Seeing and conceding, as he does, the essential principles involved and the necessity of candidly applying them, he naturally feels that Austria can respond to the purpose of peace as expressed by the United States with less embarrassment than could Germany. He would probably have gone much further had it not been for the embarrassments of Austria's alliances and of her dependence upon Germany.
After all, the test of whether it is possible for either government to go any further in this comparison of views is simple and obvious. The principles to be applied are these:
First—That each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent.
Second—That peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power; but that,
Third—Every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims among rival states; and,
Fourth—That all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe, and consequently of the world.
A general peace erected upon such foundations can be discussed. Until such a peace can be secured we have no choice but to go on. So far as we can judge, these principles that we regard as fundamental are already everywhere accepted as imperative except among the spokesmen of the military and annexationist party in Germany. If they have anywhere else been rejected, the objectors have not been sufficiently numerous or influential to make their voices audible. The tragical circumstance is that this one party in Germany is apparently willing and able to send millions of men to their death to prevent what all the world now sees to be just.
I would not be a true spokesman of the people of the United States if I did not say once more that we entered this war upon no small occasion and that we can never turn back from a course chosen upon principle. Our resources are in part mobilized now, and we shall not pause until they are mobilized in their entirety. Our armies are rapidly going to the fighting front, and will go more and more rapidly. Our whole strength will be put into this war of emancipation—emancipation from the threat and attempted mastery of selfish groups of autocratic rulers—whatever the difficulties and present partial delays.
We are indomitable in our power of independent action, and can in no circumstances consent to live in a world governed by intrigue and force. We believe that our own desire for a new international order, under which reason and justice and the common interests of mankind shall prevail, is the desire of enlightened men everywhere. Without that new order the world will be without peace and human life will lack tolerable conditions of existence and development. Having set our hand to the task of achieving it, we shall not turn back.
I hope that it is not necessary for me to add no word of what I have said is intended as a threat. That is not the temper of our people. I have spoken thus only that the whole world may know the true spirit of America—that men everywhere may know that our passion for justice and for self-government is no mere passion of words, but a passion which, once set in motion, must be satisfied. The power of the United States is a menace to no nation or people. It will never be used in aggression or for the aggrandizement of any selfish interest of our own. It springs out of freedom and is for the service of freedom.
Lloyd George Sees no Genuine Peace.—London, February 12.—Addressing the House of Commons to-day at its reassembling after prorogation last week. Premier Lloyd George said he had read with profound disappointment the replies given to President Wilson and to the declarations of the British Government by Count von Hertling and Count Czernin, and added that it was perfectly true that, as regarded the tone, there was a great deal of difference between the two speeches, and he wished he could believe there was a difference in substance, but when there was a question of considering the real demands of the allies, he said, Count Czernin was adamant.
He remarked that he would like any member to point out anything in the speeches of Count Czernin or Count von Hertling which could possibly be regarded as proof that the Central Powers were prepared to make peace on terms which could be regarded as just and reasonable.
Germany's action regarding Russia, he said, proved that her declaration regarding no annexations had no real meaning. No answer had been given regarding Belgium that could be regarded as satisfactory, he declared; no answer had been given regarding Poland or France, with her legitimate claims for the restoration of her lost provinces; not a word had been said about the thousands of the Italian race and tongue now under the Austrian yoke.
Until there was some better proof than had been provided in the speeches to which he referred that the Central Powers were prepared to consider the aim and ideals for which the allies were fighting, said Mr. Lloyd George, it would be the nation's regrettable duty to go on and make preparations necessary in order to establish international rights.
The Premier said the government stood by the considered declaration made at the meetings with the trade union representatives early this year.
It did not recede in the least from its war aims as they had been stated. It was no use, he said, crying peace when there was no peace.—N. Y. Times, 13/2.
Further Discussion to Follow.—It was announced from Berlin that Count von Hertling would take up the Ukraine Peace Treaty and President Wilson's message during the Reichstag sessions beginning February 21.
PEACE WITH UKRAINE
In the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, the representatives of the Central Powers deprived the Bolshevik commissioners of the chief card in their hands—Russian food supplies—by negotiating a separate peace with the newly formed republic of Ukrainia, comprising within its tentative boundaries one-third of the agricultural lands of Russia. The advantage to the Central Powers of this policy of separatism in Russia is obvious, since it not only divides the country into warring factions, but enables the Central Powers to conclude advantageous commercial and economic bargains with the weak states thus formed. The agreement with Ukrainia, however, created some difficulties, since the cession to the new state of the small district of Cholm in Russian Poland raised the hot antagonism of all Polish elements within the two empires. Furthermore, at the time of the treaty a struggle was still going on in Ukrainia between the bourgeois government under the Rada or legislative assembly, and the rival government set up by the Bolsheviki.
The treaty, which was signed February 8, established the old Austro-Russian frontier as the western boundary of the new state and gave it a liberal northern frontier at the expense of the rest of Russia. In particular, the treaty provided rates of exchange and other agreements for reopening trade. The terms of the treaty are in part as follows:
The treaty is entitled: "A Treaty of Peace Between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey on one Part and the Ukrainian People's Republic on the Other."
The preamble states that the Ukrainian people, having in the course of the present world war declared itself to be independent and expressed a wish to restore peace between itself and the powers at war, desires "to take the first step toward a lasting world's peace, honorable to all parties, which shall not only put an end to the horrors of war, but also lead to the restoration of friendly relations of the peoples in political, legal, economic, and intellectual realms."
The names of all of the plenipotentiaries engaged in the negotiations are then set forth, and they are declared to have reached an agreement on the following points:
Article I.—Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey on the one hand and the Ukrainian People's Republic on the other declare that the state of war between them is at an end. The contracting parties are resolved henceforth to live in peace and friendship with one another.
Article II.—Between Austria-Hungary on the one hand and the Ukrainian People's Republic on the other hand, as far as these two powers border one another, those frontiers will exist which existed before the outbreak of the present war between the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and Russia. Further north the frontier of the republic beginning at Tarnegrad will in general follow the line of Bilgerey to Sroezeberzszyn, Krasnostau, Pugaszce, Radzyn, Meshiretschei, Sarnaki, Selnik, Wysekelitowsk, Kamietslitowsk, Prushany, and Wydozowskyesee. This will be fixed in detail by a mixed commission according to ethnographical conditions and with a regard to the desires of the population. Should the Ukrainian People's Republic yet have common frontiers with another of the powers of the Quadruple Alliance, special agreements will be made thereon.
Article III.—The evacuation of occupied territories will begin immediately after the ratification of the present treaty. The manner of carrying out the evacuation and transfer of the evacuated territories will be determined by the plenipotentiaries of the interested parties.
Article IV.—The diplomatic and consular relations between the contracting parties will be entered upon immediately after the ratification of the peace treaty. The widest possible admittance of the respective parties to Consuls is to be reserved for a special agreement.
Article V.—The contracting parties mutually renounce the reimbursement of their war costs—that is to say, the state expenditure for carrying on the war, as well as indemnification for damages—that is to say, those damages suffered by them and their subjects in the war, as through military measures, including all requisitions made in the enemy's countries.
Article VI.—The respective prisoners of war will be permitted to return home, and, as far as they do not desire, with the approval of the state concerned, to remain in its territories or proceed to another country. The regulation of the questions connected herewith will follow by means of separate treaties provided for in Article VIII.
Article VII.—The contracting parties undertake mutually and without delay to enter into economic relations and organize an exchange for goods on the basis of the following prescriptions:
1. Until the 31st day of July of the current year reciprocal exchange of the more important surplus supplies of agricultural and industrial products will be carried out as follows for the purpose of covering current requirements: The quantities and sorts of products to be exchanged will be settled by a joint commission, to sit immediately upon the signature of the peace treaty. Prices will be regulated by the joint commission. Payments will be made in gold on the basis of 1000 German imperial gold marks as the equivalent of 462 gold rubles of the former Russian Empire, or 1000 Austro-Hungarian gold kroner as the equivalent of 393 rubles, 78 kopeks of the former Russian Empire. The exchange of goods fixed by the joint commission aforementioned, which commission will consist of equal numbers of representatives of both parties, will take place through state central bureaus. The exchange of those products which are not fixed by the aforementioned commission will take place by the way of free trade, according to the stipulation of a provisional commercial treaty.
2. So far as it is not otherwise provided, the economic relations between the contracting parties shall continue provisionally, and in any case until the conclusion of a final commercial treaty. But until the termination of a period of at least six months after the conclusion of peace between the Central Powers on the one part and the European states at war with the Central Powers, as well as the United States and Japan on the other part, certain prescriptions are laid down as a basis of relations.
As regards economic relations between Germany and Ukraine the text of the treaty prescribes what parts of the Russo-German commercial and shipping treaties of 1894 and 1904 shall be put info force. The contracting parties further agree to maintain the general Russian customs tariff of January 13, 1903.
The treaty also provides (Section 3) which parts of the Austro-Hungarian-Russian commercial and shipping treaty of February 5, 1906, shall be maintained, and adds:
All parties agree that all articles transported across the territory of either party shall be free of duty. Trade-mark agreements are resumed, and the contracting parties agree to support each other in restoring railway tariffs. Economic relations between Bulgaria and Turkey and Ukraine are to be settled according to the most favored nation definition until definite commercial treaties are concluded.
If the period provided for in the first paragraph of Section 2 should not occur before June 30, 1919, each of the two contracting parties is free from June 30, 1919, to give six months' notice to terminate the prescriptions contained in the above-mentioned section.
Articles 4 and 5 provide that neither party shall claim preferential treatment such as conferred upon some third adjoining country by customs alliance, and that all importation restrictions shall be removed on goods of either party stored in neutral states.
Article VIII.—Restoration of public and private legal relations, the exchange of prisoners of war and interned civilians, the question of amnesty and the question of the treatment of merchantmen in enemy hands will be regulated in separate treaties with the Ukrainian People's Republic, to form an essential part of the present peace treaty, which, so far as practicable, will take effect simultaneously therewith.
Article IX.—The agreements made in this peace treaty form an indivisible whole.
Article X.—For the interpretation of this treaty the German and Ukrainian texts are authoritative 'in regard to relations between Germany and Ukraine, the German, Hungarian, and Ukrainian texts for relations between Austria-Hungary and Ukraine, the Bulgarian and Ukrainian texts for relations between Bulgaria and Ukraine, the Turkish and Ukrainian texts for relations between Turkey and Ukraine.
The concluding part of the treaty provides;
"The present peace treaty will be ratified. Ratified documents shall be exchanged as soon as possible. So far as there are no provisions to the contrary, the peace treaty shall come into force on ratification."
The supplementary treaties provided for in Article VIII, also were signed. They cover the following points:
Restoration of consular relations.
Restoration of state treaties.
Restoration of civil law.
Indemnification for civil damages caused by laws of war or by acts contrary to international law.
Exchange of war prisoners and interned civilians.
Care of burial grounds of those fallen in enemy territory.
Provision for the return to their homes of persons affected by the treaty.
Treatment of merchant vessels in enemy hands.
The Brest-Litovsk dispatch says that the text of the supplementary agreements must be withheld for the present to avoid overcrowding the telegraph wires.
POPULATION AND RESOURCES OF UKRAINE
The population of Ukraine consists of about 28,000,000 Ruthenians, or Little Russians, speaking a dialect differing from Great Russian as Lowland Scotch from English. Three million members of the same race inhabit the Austrian province of Galicia. The old regime in Russia opposed every nationalistic aspiration on the part of the Ukrainians, denying the Little Russian dialect any official status in court or schools. As a result, in spite of the fact that the Poles have been favored at the expense of the Ruthenians in Galicia. there has been a flourishing pro-Austrian propaganda within the Ukraine which has facilitated the present outcome.
The Ukrainian movement in Russia is partly national and partly a land question. The Bolsheviki, who believe in a redistribution of land, emphasize the latter; the Rada group stand alone on their separate and proclaimed nationality.
Both questions, however, are of as great importance to Austria-Hungary as they are to Russia, for the Ukraine include not only the southeastern provinces of Russia, but a large portion of territory in East Galicia, in Northeastern Hungary and in Bukovina, and in the latter territories the national character of the movement is most pronounced. This is in the main due to the policy of the Austrian Government before the war, which favored the Ukrainians of East Galicia in proportion as the old Russian Government persecuted them. The result was that Lemberg became the intellectual center of the Ukrainians where refugees from Kiev found a ready welcome.
Just a month after the March revolution in Petrograd, the Ukrainian National Congress was opened at Kiev. It confined itself to a proclamation of national territorial and political entity and provided for the election of the Rada. The election was held immediately, and the Rada, from a National Council, later transformed itself into a legislature under the presidency of Professor Hrushevski.
When the Provisional Government collapsed the Rada lost no time in grasping the situation. Its first act was to attempt to prevent the spread of Bolshevism in the Ukraine; its second was to present its nationalist question to the Central Powers and attempt to negotiate peace on that basis in exchange for the vast stores of wheat and other supplies which had' been collected at Kiev and neighboring cities for the use of the Southern Russian armies.
On November 20 the government of the Ukraine was entirely reconstructed on democratic lines, with Socialist proclivities. Its president was M. Vinnitchenko, himself a Social Democrat. Professor Hrushevski was still president of the Rada. Warned by the fate of Kerensky, the government pursued what it called a ''Nationalist Democratic" course, supported by, but not recognizing, the bourgeoisie on the one hand and on the other opposing the extreme demands of the Bolsheviki.
The new republic, if it can maintain its existence, will control about 850,000 square kilometers, with Kiev as its chief city and the port of Odessa on the Black Sea, through which, before the war, 70 per cent of Russia's exports were shipped. Ukraine, comprising one-sixth of European Russia, has 32 per cent of all the farm land, about 60 per cent of the iron mines, 75 per cent of the coal, and in peace time about 30,000,000 head of cattle.
One difficulty in developing trade with the Central Powers will be the present disorganization of the country and lack of railroad facilities, there being but one or two rail routes across the border, with a change of gauge at the frontier. Upon peace with Roumania, goods could be shipped by way of the Danube.
Opposition of the Poles.—The Austrian Poles, furious "at the violation of the national unity" by the peace with the Ukraine and the old Polish territory thereby handed over to the Little Russians, are uniting with the Czechs, Italians, Rumanes, and South Slavs. In parliament these anti-German elements slightly exceed the government bloc. The Social Democrats hold the balance of power, and they are expected to use it to overthrow the government. Meanwhile, in Cracow, which still remembers its part in the Polish insurrections of 1830 and 1846, the peace with the Ukraine is celebrated by the displays of black flags, insulting the festivity at Vienna. The position of the Austrian Government has been ticklish for a long time. The bitterness and the independent policy of Czechs, Slavs, Slovenes, Slovaks, Poles against that government have been steadily increasing. The worse the plight of Austria the sharper the demands of the discontented nationalities.—N. Y. Times, 17/2.
Count Czernin on Ukraine Peace.—Amsterdam. February 15.—A dispatch received here from Vienna says that Count Czernin spoke as follows of the treaty with Ukraine:
"What has happened at Brest-Litovsk," Count Czernin said, "is not yet the end of the war, but it is the beginning of the end. Not only political diseases but political recoveries are infectious, and peace will be so, too.
"Moreover, the strangling blockade of the Entente has been broken by the signing of the peace with the Ukraine, with its bread. The difficulties of transport certainly still are considerable, but all necessary preparations have been made, and, if conditions do not alter, an improvement will take place."
Count Czernin added that he had assurances that Austrian prisoners of war would be released. Civil war between Russia and the Ukraine might cause difficulties, but he was full of hope. In conclusion Count Czernin said;
"If ever confidence was justified, it is to-day. I am firmly convinced that we have only to hold out a little longer and an honorable general peace will be attained."—N. Y. Times, 16/2.
TROTZKY BREAKS OFF NEGOTIATIONS
On February 10, following the peace treaty with Ukraine, negotiations ended between the Bolsheviki and the Central Powers, Leon Trotzky refused to accept the terms offered by Germany, but at the same time declared Russia out of the war. The following official statement was issued explaining the attitude of the Bolshevist Government.
The peace negotiations are at an end. The German capitalists, bankers, and landlords, supported by the silent co-operation of the English and French bourgeoisie, submitted to our comrades, members of the peace delegations at Brest-Litovsk, conditions such as could not be subscribed to by the Russian revolution.
The governments of Germany and Austria possess countries and peoples vanquished by force of arms. To this authority the Russian people, workmen and peasants, could not give its acquiescence. We could not sign a peace which would bring with it sadness, oppression, and suffering to millions of workmen and peasants.
But we also cannot, will not, and must not continue a war begun by Czars and capitalists in alliance with Czars and capitalists. We will not and we must not continue to be at war with the Germans and Austrians—workmen and peasants like ourselves.
We are not signing a peace of landlords and capitalists. Let the German and Austrian soldiers know who are placing them in the field of battle and let them know for what they are struggling. Let them know also that we refuse to fight against them.
Our delegation, fully conscious of its responsibility before the Russian people and the oppressed workers and peasants of other countries declared on February lo, in the name of the Council of the People's Commissaries of the government of the Federal Russian Republic to the governments of the peoples involved in the war with us and of the neutral countries, that it refused to sign an annexationist treaty. Russia, for its part, declares the present war with Germany and Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria at an end.
Simultaneously, the Russian troops receive an order for complete demobilization on all fronts.
The signatures of Leon Trotzky and other members of the delegation are appended.
Future Course of Germany.—In spite of the bewildering situation created by the action of Trotzky, it appeared clear from despatches of February 17 that Germany would require military forces to maintain her eastern line, and that she would be called upon to give military support to the Ukraine. At this date Germans and pro-Germans in Russia were being arrested, and the German commission at Petrograd found it difficult to continue negotiations for the exchange of prisoners.
Austria manifested an unwillingness to take further part in hostilities against Russia.
RUMANIA
Despatches of February 10 stated that Field Marshal von Mackensen had sent an ultimatum to the Rumanian Government on February 6 demanding that peace negotiations be entered upon within four days. Newspaper discussion in Germany indicated a possible policy on the part of the government to offer Rumania compensation in the Russian territory of Bessarabia for the loss of Dobrudja to Bulgaria.
The resignation of the veteran Premier of Rumania, Bratiano, was reported on January 28, and was explained as the result of disagreement between liberal and conservative factions within the cabinet. Despatches of February 15 announced a non-partisan ministry under General Averescu, former Minister of War, and lately commander in Dobrudja.
As a result of the occupation of parts of Bessarabia by Rumanian forces and hostility to Bolshevist propaganda on the part of Rumania, the Bolshevist Government on January 26 announced that diplomatic relations with Rumania were broken off, and that the Rumanian gold reserves in Moscow, amounting to 1,200,000,000 rubles, were to be seized.
SECRET DOCUMENTS PUBLISHED
The N. Y. Evening Post of January 25, 26, and 28 published a series of secret agreements, telegrams, memoranda, etc., exchanged between the Western Powers and the old regime in Russia. These had been thrown before the world by the Bolsheviki as evidence in their case against the ruling powers in both groups of belligerents. While the documents reveal the pitfalls and evils of secret diplomacy, it is difficult to see how the Entente could have united and increased its strength without such bargaining. There is little in the documents that has not been for some time a matter of common knowledge or general suspicion.
Foreign Minister Trotzky contributes a preface condemning secret diplomacy as part and parcel of "imperialistic rapaciousness" and the "domination of capital." The contents may be listed as follows:
1. The Entente agreement with Italy (May, 1915) pledging military and naval cooperation, recognizing Italy's irridenta claims in Trent, Istria, and Dalmatia, and promising a loan from England of at least £50,000,000.
2. A memorandum from General Polivanof on the effect of Rumania's military defeat upon her territorial claims (November, 1916).
3. A confidential memorandum of offers to Greece of territory in southern Albania and Asia Minor (November, 1915-May, 1916).
4. An agreement for the future division of Asia Minor and the Near East (February 21, 1917).
5. Telegram from Sazanoff to Russian Ambassadors referring to future territorial adjustments and a project for excluding Germany from trade with China.
6. Telegram from Russian Foreign Office agreeing to French proposals for restoration of Alsace and neutralization of territory west of the Rhine (January 30, 1917).
7. Agreement to Russian control of Constantinople and the Dardanelles, with Constantinople a free port, and freedom of passage for merchant vessels through the straits (March 4, 1915).
8. Report of a conference of bankers from the Central Powers and the Entente at Berne in September, 1917, at which the German delegates proposed peace terms at the expense of Russia. Following the conference, according to a telegram from the Russian charge at Berne, "an Anglo-Jewish financier stated that the German aim was to promote separation in Russia so far as possible, so as to split her up into small states. For Germany it will be easy to conclude commercial treaties with weaker states (Lithuania, Courland, etc.).
9. A series of telegrams from Foreign Minister Tereschenko to Russian diplomats abroad explaining changes in the Russian situation (August-October, 1917).
GERMANY
Labor Distances Suppressed By Military Force.—During the last week in January strikes and peace riots broke out in Germany and spread with great rapidity, crippling the great war industries and threatening the government. At Hamburg the laborers in the Vulcan Works struck on Monday, January 27. At Kiel the workmen in government and private shipyards went out. It was estimated that there were nearly 500,000 strikers in Berlin alone.
The movement was under the control of Socialist leaders of both the majority and independent factions. A ''Workmen's Council" was formed, with an " action commission " of 10 members including Haase, Scheidemann, Ledebour, Dittmann and other Socialist leaders. At the court martial of Dittmann, according to an Amsterdam despatch of February 6, he declared that the uprising was "a demonstration strike against a peace of annexations and in favor of a peace by understanding."
"If the government had entered into negotiations as requested." Dittmann testified, "the strike would have lasted only three days." Scheidemann supported Dittmann's testimony as to the political purpose of the strike. Dittmann was sentenced to five years' confinement for inciting to high treason.
The disturbances were in the nature of a counter-demonstration against the propaganda of the Fatherland or Pan-German party. Meetings of this party at Munich, Stuttgart, and elsewhere were broken up by hostile masses. At Munich, according to the Tagliche Rundschau, the singing of "Deutschland Ueber Alles" was drowned out by a crowd shouting the "Marseillaise." The following demands were addressed by the strikers to the government:
- Accelerated conclusion of a general peace without indemnities or annexations.
- Participation of workmen's delegates of all the countries in the peace pourparlers.
- Amelioration of the food situation by better distribution.
- Immediate abolition of the state of siege and restoration of the right of public meetings suspended by the military authorities.
- Abolition of militarization of war factories.
- Immediate release of all political prisoners.
- Fundamental democratization of state institutions.
- The institution of equal electoral suffrage by direct or secret ballot.
The strike movement was crushed within a week's time by strong military measures—declaration of martial law, arrest of strikers, and court martial of the leaders.
Amsterdam, February 4.
Although the German strike appears to be a pretty complete failure, nevertheless it will not remain without consequences. The attitude of the strikers and those who remained outside the movement is certain to be made more bitter.
Once more it has been impressed upon German workers that they live under a system which is little better than a military dictatorship. They will not fail to note the difference between the action of the German Government and that of the Austrian authorities. In Germany the government clamped down all freedom, refused to have anything to do with the workers, and left the military to put down the movement by force. Not for a minute did justice to the workers' demands influence the government.—N. Y. Times, 6/2.
AUSTRIA
Strikes and Food Riots.—On January 18 a general strike was proclaimed in Austria, 100,000 men quitting work in Vienna and Neustadt. While the strike was precipitated by the reduced flour ration, the delegates of the workmen informed the government that "the demand for peace took precedence over other demands."
The labor agitation in Austria excited great interest and expectation abroad, but it appears that it lasted not more than two or three days and was ended by consultations between the workmen and the government, after which the strikers went back to work.
The N. Y. Herald of February 7 wrote as follows:
"In the latest despatches there are intimations that the Austrian strike situation is clearing, the government having indicated its willingness to accede to the surface demands of the strikers. That is not unlikely, and yet we may be just at the beginning of the wider agitation of which the strikes are an advance manifestation.
"More significant of a real situation in the dual monarchy than reports of happenings there which come by either of the long way around routes is the comment of the German press. Vorwaerts calls upon the German Government to negotiate peace on the Czernin program announced at Brest-Litovsk and is promptly suppressed. The Tagliche Rundschau charges the Austrian Government with promoting the "democratic internationalism" that in turn is assumed to have promoted the strikes throughout Austria-Hungary, while the Frankfurter Zeitung intimates that the strike situation is of Count Czernin's "stage management." The German press as a whole is critical. Austria-Hungary is reminded that its armies would have been wiped out except for German leadership and German support, and is taunted with lack of gratitude—which is rubbing salt into the open wound."
Seydler Cabinet Resigns.—Amsterdam, February 8.—Dr. von Seydler, the Austrian Premier, has offered the resignation of his entire cabinet to Emperor Charles, according to a dispatch from Vienna.
The resignation of the cabinet, it is understood in parliamentary circles in Vienna, is due to the opposition of Polish Deputies to special debates and the provisional budget. The opposition of the Deputies makes a majority for the budget doubtful.
The cabinet of Dr. von Seydler, which was formed last June, was reported to have resigned while the recent labor crisis was on in Austria-Hungary. This report was not confirmed.
Dr. von Seydler was able to bring about the cessation of the strike by informing labor delegations on January 20 that it was the wish of the Austrian Emperor to end the war at the earliest possible moment by an honorable peace. Other members of his government promised labor and military reforms, after which the labor leaders ordered their followers to return to work. This virtually ended the strikes in Vienna.
The cabinet of Dr. von Seydler was of a stop-gap bureaucratic character, organized after it had been found impossible to form a ministry which could work with the Austrian parliament on a positive program of internal reform and reorganization.—N. Y. Times, 9/2.
UNITED STATES
All U. S. Exports and Imports Under License.—By a sweeping proclamation issued February 15, President Wilson made subject to control by license the entire foreign commerce of the United States. The object of the proclamation was to release ships for the transport service to France, and it is estimated that at least 1,000,000 additional tons will be made available.
Trade with South America and the Orient will be largely affected, according to a statement of the War Trade Board on February 15. The action was decided upon finally when agreements with Holland and some of the other neutral nations of Europe brought within the control of the government 500,000 tons or more of shipping, which is not to be sent into the submarine zone. French sailing ships will also be used to take the place of some of the diverted American tonnage, and the general result will be the withdrawal within a comparatively short time of all American tonnage fit for overseas service from coastwise South American and Pacific trade.
It is possible also that with the reduction of trade between the United States and nations in the Orient, additional Japanese tonnage will be brought into the transatlantic service, thus contributing more directly to the war.
Shipping Agreement with Holland.—In London M. van Vollenhoven, special commissioner for Holland, and Charles H. Sherrill of the American War Trade Board, who represents all the allied governments, are completing details of an allied-Dutch agreement concerning Dutch shipping for the allies and allied food and other supplies for Holland. Holland is to receive rations of foodstuffs and industrial materials based on the known necessities of the country subject to the world shortage of food and raw stuffs. These will be carried in Dutch vessels. The entire residue of the Dutch merchant marine will then be placed at the allies' disposal for transportation needs outside the war and danger zone.—N. Y. Times, 12/2.
Trade Agreements with Northern Neutrals.—Our government's new trade agreement with Sweden, parts of which have been signed at London, completes the list of such compacts with the northern European neutrals. It follows acceptance of the War Trade Board's terms by Switzerland, Denmark, Finland, Holland, and Norway. Some of the Swedish ships lying at our ports will unload their cargoes and then, under charter to our government, go into the trade with South America. A few will be permitted to carry supplies to Sweden. A final decision as to the quantity and character of these has not been reached, and the terms soon to be accepted are not published. Undoubtedly they forbid the sale of food or metals to our enemies. Until a few months ago Germany was importing from Sweden large quantities of high-grade iron to be used in her munition factories.
All the northern neutral countries from which Germany in 1916 received food enough to support her entire army on the west front are now assenting to the blockade designed to deprive her of imported food, metals, and other essential products.—N. Y. Times, 31/1.