MODERN MANAGEMENT APPLIED TO NAVY YARDS
By Naval Constructor F. G. Coburn, U. S. Navy
The attention of the country having been given recently to the preparedness propaganda, we are now in a fair way to receive large increases in number of ships, men, and officers, and in quantities of supplies, ammunition, and guns. It devolves upon the navy to maintain its new plant, to train and organize the new personnel, and to make scientific preparation for the use of the combination of plant and men. It is the purpose of this paper to point out the large work of making ready our navy yards for their work, describing by way of illustration, what was done at one navy yard, a few years ago, along these lines.
The primary function of navy yards is to repair and to refit naval vessels. In time of peace this work is merely maintenance work; in time of war the function of the yards would be to convert merchantmen to naval use and to repair men-of-war damaged in action or in the extremely strenuous service of naval campaigns.
Immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities the navy yards would be crowded with conversion work and that would probably be followed by repair work of great extent. It is essential, therefore, to the best interests of the navy that at the outbreak of hostilities the yards should be at their very best from the points of view of equipment, personnel and organization. To that end no opportunity should be overlooked in peace time to develop organization and train personnel. The modern ideas of management should find enthusiastic reception and intensive application in our navy yards.
At the Philadelphia Navy Yard a campaign of reorganization was undertaken a few years ago which was carried to the point of introduction of task work, that is, the assignment of definite tasks to workmen based on a clear and definite knowledge of the circumstances affecting them and their work; and the introduction of a time schedule for the control of the work as a whole, based on the knowledge of the time required for individual tasks, and the proper sequence thereof. The development was carried far enough to demonstrate the practicability of its completion; albeit a high order of organization and high tone of equipment will be demanded.
Navy yards in general are organized with the double purpose in mind of meeting both military and industrial requirements. The industrial plant, operated as a unit separate from the military plant, is called the manufacturing department, and is divided into two divisions, the one dealing with the hulls and permanent fittings and called the hull division; the other dealing with propulsive machinery, boilers, electric equipment, etc., and called the machinery division. The work to be recorded here was done in the hull division of that yard.
As organized at that time the work of supervising repairs was divided as nearly equally as practicable among the officers serving in the hull division, each officer looking out for the repairs to a certain group of ships. Each officer was required to attend to the correspondence, preparation of plans, and estimates, for the work on his ships, and to supervise the actual work of repairs, both in the shops and aboard the ship. Such an organization proved troublesome because, as is quite apparent, each officer was frequently required to be in more than one place at one time. A ship on which the repairs were being wound up preliminary to sailing would require his attention in order to insure her sailing at the appointed time; coincidentally, his attention would be required in the shop in connection with work on ships due to be completed the next week, possibly; and in the office, dealing with the correspondence and plans of work which it was desired to undertake as soon as possible.
To meet these conditions a more or less functional sort of organization was developed, the work being divided into two general classes, the one having to do with the correspondence, plans, estimates, etc., being a sort of engineering department; the other having to do with the execution of the work in the shops and aboard the ships, being a sort of production department. In the production department, then, the work was divided between officers as to work in the shops and as to work on the ships, and one officer given full control of the precedence of work.
This sort of organization has given good results and is in fact, not essentially different from that found in any successful private organization doing a general engineering and field construction business. First adopted at the Mare Island Navy Yard, it has since been extended to practically all of the yards.
There are in each navy yard a number of shops or producing departments; a pattern shop, foundry, and machine shop, a forge shop, plate shop, wood-working shops, etc. Each shop or department has its own foreman and he has as many assistants as are necessary for the supervision of the work. Under the old form of organization the foreman was so loaded with duties that he was, so to speak, too busy to attend to his job. A long period was necessary to correct this condition; to develop an organization which could relieve the foreman of everything except his real job of supervising the actual execution of work.
The condition found there was that which is found in the ordinary industrial plant where the foreman is held responsible for a great many things over which he has no control. An order for work would be issued to the foreman charged with the major part and he was held responsible for the prompt and efficient execution of all parts. It was necessary, then, for him to issue "auxiliary orders," as they were called, on other foremen involved, and the system thus held the first foreman responsible for other foremen's work. A little reflection will show how involved such a system may become and how impossible it was to localize responsibility. The foreman was also expected to maintain his force at the proper size; to have an eye to the stock of materials used by his shop; to hold down the cost of work; to develop improvements in methods; to maintain plant and equipment; and to be on the look-out for possible extensions of plant and facilities.
It should be obvious that the foreman's real job in a plant of this kind is to supervise the work, seeing that all hands are constantly occupied, that the work is done properly, and that the plans for its orderly execution are carried out.
To arrange matters so that the foreman can attend to his real job means that he must be relieved of those things which he is doing, which he ought not to do. Peculiarly enough these extra things which are put upon the foreman to do, are more often things which he positively must do and it is usually so fixed that he can easily let his real job go; whereas of course conditions should be so arranged that the converse would be the case.
The moment one starts to relieve a foreman of extraneous responsibilities one finds a singular dearth of men capable of assuming them. Just as in the past it has been the habit to pick, for foremen, high grade mechanics because they know how a job should be done, so it has been the custom to pick assistants in the same way; the executive function has been overlooked. In very few cases is there found such an organization as will provide for teaching and training men to be assistants to foremen and then to be foremen themselves.
The best training for such men is the planning of work; how and with what equipment it shall be done, who shall do it, what material is needed, etc. Starting this in a small way, in a few months a considerable number of men were pretty well trained and it was possible to set up a manufacturing office of such size and ability as to provide the foremen with definite, specific orders as to what they were to do and in the course of time even to tell them when to do it. Then the foremen themselves were furnished with assistants who were capable of attending to the mechanical part of assigning work in detail to the men, with the result that the foremen found themselves relieved of all responsibilities as to material and preparation of plans, specifications, etc., and were able to devote their time to forcing the work. And moreover each shop or department was prepared to receive and execute an order and report having done so. This last is a primary requisite, to be satisfied before sending to a shop, orders which require clean-cut reports.
A certain amount of physical improvement was required among the early stages of the development and while these physical changes were in large measure alterations and extensions, yet particular attention was paid to maintenance; bringing up to date the small tool equipment, putting the machinery in first-class condition; introducing a system of belt maintenance, and making all the changes that are necessary to insure that the workmen should have at hand the proper things to do with.
A few illustrations are given here of these physical changes. Figure 1 is a photograph of a collection of photographs framed and exhibited permanently in the ship-smiths' shop. The upper row consists of four views of the shop as it was found; heavy with soot and dirt; the air full of coal gas; the floor littered with scrap steel and tools, good and bad; furnaces run down; hammers, cranes, and furnaces poorly arranged; no transportation facilities; it was in had shape, as such shops would he judged at present. The lower row consists of views taken from the same points, at the same time of day, almost exactly one year later; when the coal fires had been replaced by oil, the equipment rearranged, the walls and roof blown down and painted, suitable tool racks provided, transportation facilities provided, scrap stock picked up, etc. It was made into a new shop.
Figure 2 is a photograph of the boat-builder's standard boat plans (pasted on drawing boards), and stowed on top of a tool rack. Figure 3 shows the rehabilitated plan file. Figure 4 illustrates the improved facilities furnished in the joiner shop—tables on casters, the one for the material to be worked, the other for the worked material. The latter could then be pushed to the next machine, or to the assembling bench. There were enough to equip all machines. Note the safety devices about the machine—non-slipping linoleum for the operator to stand on, the cutter head protected, the belts housed, etc. This "safety first" work was very thoroughly done, throughout the plant.
Figure 5 illustrates another kind of betterment work. Just as in a gun-turret it is important to "have things handy," so it is in the shop. In the one place it saves time and increases hits per minute; in the other it saves time and reduces cost. This photograph shows a special bench constructed for the assembling of mess tables, with tools and hardware handy, and arranged to receive and hold the table properly. A great deal of this sort of betterment work was done.
The foregoing preliminaries out of the way. the matter of wage payment could be considered. As a matter of fact the change was precipitated by a small number of workmen. The yard employed about 12 wood-calkers to calk wood decks. They were perhaps rather more independent than the circumstances allowed, although they did not know it. On a certain class of work these wood-calkers were averaging about 140 feet per day. From previous experience it was known that 420 feet, just three times that amount, was a reasonable day's work. But to obtain such a very large day's work a piece price would be called for and piece work was not then in vogue. At a fair price, however, an output of about 240 feet would have brought to the workman the day wages he was then receiving, and so was a reasonable day's work; therefore, the wood-calkers were advised that they must turn in 240 feet per day.
They at once objected, claiming that such a task was impossible of attainment; but it was well known that twice that amount could be well done and the wood-calkers were so informed; whereupon they decided to seek employment elsewhere. Within a month or so, piece work prices having in the meantime been established, other wood-calkers were obtained and the high output previously suggested was readily attained; 400 feet and more, to be compared with the 240 feet which, the men said, it was impossible to do. They simply did not know.
This matter formed a good introduction to the proposition which was shortly made to the paint-scaling gang. There were at that time at that yard three ships undergoing refit, from which all the paint, inside and out, above and below water-line, had to be removed; and all that surface to be repainted with three coats. Now this is a tremendous job and would occupy a large crew of men a long time, even working at top-notch speed. In this case time was an important feature; it always is in any plant, and is particularly so in a navy yard, where time is apt to become a military factor on brief notice.
Therefore it was determined to apply modern methods to the scaling of this old paint. Paint is removed with a chisel in a pneumatic hammer. There were different types of hammer available and different types of chisel and the preliminary work of course was to decide what was the best kind of hammer, best length and width of chisel, the angle of the cutting edge, etc. Incidentally all the pneumatic system of the yard was thoroughly gone over to eliminate leaks and thus increase the air pressure, a very important point in pneumatic machine work.
While the preliminary steps were being taken, the low quantity
and poor quality of the work going on were causes of great uneasiness.
The job was going very slowly indeed. The men who worked on the job were green, and they worked without much interest. Moreover it was impossible to get enough men to make the job go fast. As soon as a man became reasonably adept at the work, he would quit, as it was hard, dusty, most disagreeable work, to say nothing of the danger of lead poisoning. In these closed compartments below decks with the air hammers in operation the atmosphere was charged with fine lead dust which the workmen breathed and swallowed. Then too, these workmen were of a class which did not thoroughly comprehend all the advantages of personal cleanliness, which is so essential to the health of the lead worker. The photograph, Figure 6, illustrates the working conditions, except that the dust and poor lighting facilities are not apparent.
And even if it were possible to hire enough men to make the job go forward satisfactorily with low individual efficiency, there were not enough tools to equip such a large force and it would have cost a large sum to provide such tools; and with the increase in tools would have come an increase in air consumption which the plant was not capable of meeting.
The cost of the work being done was necessarily high not only because the men were working slowly but because of the excessive cost of training new men, which had to be borne by the job.
In short, to have done the work with men working at low individual efficiency would have taken too much time and also would have entailed an extraordinary overhead expense.
A way was found of offering a bonus of 24 cents per diem to the workmen who were scaling these interior compartments. This bonus amounted to more than 10 per cent of the men's regular daily wage and seemed fairly attractive. A task was therefore set after careful time study; the observer being a trained time study man, the workmen studied being in the "good average" class. After the task had been set, the men found by trial that it was not difficult to meet the task and started to increase their output. Incidentally, in spite of the preliminary preparations there was trouble due to lack of air pressure, deficiency in number of chisels, poor condition of hammers, brought to the surface at once by the pressing requirements of the bonus workers. This was expected; it always occurs in the development of shop management, just as the deficiencies of our ordnance material were brought to light when competitive target practice under standardized conditions was introduced in the navy. Day workers do not care, if conditions are not right; but the task worker knows that he must have them right.
So the men proceeded making their task; no difficulty whatever was had in getting a sufficient number of men and there were ample tools to insure that the work went forward rapidly. But the men soon struck a gait, turning in each day just enough to meet the task requirements and earn their fixed bonus, so that an opportunity was looked for to get to a complete adoption of the task-work-with-bonus plan of payment, in order to get a larger production—to get from each man the full measure of his ability.
The method of payment described above was a task-work-with-bonus system in that a definite task was specified and a bonus offered for its accomplishment; but this bonus was a fixed bonus and no incentive was offered the workmen to do more than the specified task. Of course if all workmen were alike then the task could be specified of such character that the men could barely attain it and the offer of a fixed bonus would suffice: but all men are not alike, and a task which would be barely attainable by the best man would be totally beyond the reach even of the average man; and in the long run, methods of handling men must be based on the average man.
So therefore, if a task-work-with-bonus plan of payment is to be offered such that it will suit the average man and the best man, it must set a task which is attainable by the average man and offer a bonus which increases with the increase of work above the task limit. Thus the average man is set a pre-determined high level of efficiency and will be rewarded for attaining it; moreover the best man, and the other men grading in quality between him and the average, are able to obtain revenue according to their full earning capacity. Below-average men must he trained to better attainment, or may be transferred to employment to which they are better suited.
Under the operation of the plan first described, the workmen, finding that they had a fixed bonus, soon struck a gait which enabled each to earn the bonus but not do any more than the task specified during the day. Of course there were a number who could not learn to make the task and these men either quit of their own accord or when they showed a disposition to stick, were given other employment at which they could do well. The problem now was to advance from a fixed bonus plan (which was adopted as a temporary expedient only), to a variable bonus plan, which would offer additional reward for an increase of work beyond the assigned task.
The move was not only considered desirable; it was forced by circumstances. The work on the interior of the first ship was getting to a point where the end of it was in sight, and as circumstances were such that this 24-cent bonus could not be offered for outside work, either a new system had to be introduced or the management must face the same difficulties in getting the outside work done that had been contended with in getting the inside work done.
As a preliminary move a task was set for the outside work; the details of setting the task are not germane to this paper. Then, after setting the task, one or two fairly good men, not the best men nor yet were these barely average men, were selected and told to scale a stretch of outside work exactly equal to the daily task, this stretch having been carefully laid out in advance. They had no difficulty whatever in attaining the task in the prescribed time; both of them could have done more. This performance was to serve as an object lesson.
The proposition for a change in method in payment was then put right up to the men themselves. This was in a way a rather bold measure because the men were not of an educated class; they were ordinary day laborers who around Philadelphia could not hope to earn much more than $1.50 per day. Fully half of the men (there were 50 in all at that time) were negroes. The task before the management was to explain individually to these men in such a way that they could understand it, the workings of the complete task-work-with-bonus plan of payment; to show them that they would benefit by its adoption and yet make no statements that future experience would not bear out. It was in a way an amusing task because some of the questions asked were posers. Some of the men were suspicious. One big, husky negro refused to be interviewed alone; he insisted on having his mate with him, apparently fearing that he was going to be defrauded. After talking to each of the men individually they were all gathered together and the whole matter explained to them again and their questions were invited and answered fully. Absolutely not one phase of the matter was withheld from the men. The telling argument, of course was this: that no man stood to lose under the new proposition; day wages were offered to all hands and no matter how much of a day's work was turned in, day wages would be forthcoming, the management reserving the right, of course, to take action in the case of a man who constantly turned in an amount of work less than his day wages was worth, provided that it was clearly the man's fault. At the same time, to the man who turned in an amount equal to the task or greater, there was a very substantial bonus offered. Thus no man could lose and yet he stood to win; to increase his earnings 50 per cent. Many of these men had never before made more than $12 per week; $9 and $10 was a common average. They had recently been making about $14 per week and the opportunity was offered them to make from $20 to $25 per week. So they unanimously agreed to the new plan.
The new plan was submitted to the Navy Department and approved and very shortly thereafter put into operation. Incidentally it was required that each man should submit a request in writing for permission to work under this system of payment.
Very shortly the daily output of the good men began to increase. Where, for example, a man turning in 160 square feet per day under the fixed bonus plan, earned $2.24, under the variable bonus plan he earned as much more than $2.24 as his output was in excess of 160 square feet, at the rate of 1.5 cents per foot. The output began to increase, the work went ahead faster, earnings increased and while the cost per square foot for direct labor remained constant, the cost to the government was on the whole less because a greater output was obtained for the same overhead expense.
Each man's work was measured and inspected each day, and he was promptly advised as to whether he had made bonus, and how much. A running record was kept of their performances, on a bonus chart, Figure 7, which showed at a glance how each man was doing. Failures to make bonus were promptly investigated, with a view to helping the men, as well as to keeping up production.
The chart is interesting, as it shows that some men dropped out, due to unsuitability to the work; that some succeeded right away, and that some had to learn; it will be noted that the amount of gray in the second month is far less than in the first month, a graphic indication of the men's improvement. Some men, though they did well, quit anyhow; in most cases this was because they could not stand prosperity.
A great many of these scalers were rated as painters' helpers and they were making as much money as the painters themselves. This drew the attention of the painters to the new method of payment with the result that they began to suggest that tasks be set on painting work. Previous to that time the output of the painters had not been at all satisfactory. In the case of first coat red lead over scaled surfaces, for example, an output of only 150 square feet per man per day had been the rule. This was so absurdly slow that disciplinary measures were called for, and very shortly afterward the level was raised to about 400 square feet per day. At the same time, time study showed clearly that an output of from 900 to 1800 square feet per day was reasonable, depending on the location of the surfaces and the attending conditions.
A very considerable time was spent in the time study of painting, as it is not by any means the simple art that it looks to be. Incidentally while this work was proceeding, a painter who was invited to work for purposes of time study, refused, stating that he had been advised by friends not to work under the observation of a stop watch man. His view point was respected. He was kept at work; in fact, instructions were issued that he was not to be discharged under any circumstances other than at his own request; this as an evidence of the management's desire to respect every man's opinion and force no man to do anything that he did not think was for his own good.
For there is this difference between military organization and industrial organization: that whereas the underlying principles of both kinds of organization are the same, in putting these principles into effect in industrial organization the policy must be to observe the paramount interest of the individual, whereas in military organization it is the state's interest which is paramount and that of the individual must always be subordinated to it.
To make a long story short, be it said that after considerable investigation a way was found to set tasks for painting which were fair to the painter and to the government, and the painters were allowed to take up the work. The chart shown in Figure 8 compares individual production under day work with that under task work; it shows how greatly the painter increased his earnings; at the same time reducing the unit cost; and the high individual production indicates that the work went ahead rapidly—and that the progress of the work could be forecasted with great accuracy.
Far from being overlooked, the matter of quality of work was carefully attended to. Standards of quality were set, and no work was paid for which was not up to standard. This requirement called for rigid inspection, and ensured high grade work. Under this plan of management the quality of work desired is established in advance, and must be attained, with the result that not only is more work turned out by the individual, but moreover, he does better and more nearly uniform work.
The work of a navy yard consists of a large number of little jobs. If each little job is done at the right time, in the best way, the work of the yard as a whole will be done promptly, well, and with economy. The only way to ensure that each little job is done at the right time is to appoint the time for its execution, and see to it that the appointment is kept. Left to itself the little job will be done, but not at the right time. The arrangement of little jobs as to precedence is known as the scheduling of work. To arrange these little job properly, it is essential to know how much time each little job will require. Hence the close connection between task work and scheduling.
With all the work of the yard on schedule, the Navy Department may know definitely when each ship is to be completed; what the effect on the dates of completion of other ships will be if the completion of a much-needed ship is to be advanced; the commanding officer may know well in advance when store rooms and magazines will be ready, and may learn the effect on his sailing day of an additional item of repair work; there will be an end to these exasperating waits between the disappearance of one gang and the appearance of the next.
It has not been possible, within the limits of this paper, to go into details, nor even to set down all the things that were done. The aim has been, rather, to illustrate what is meant by the application of the principles of modern industrial management to the problem of navy yard management; to show that something more than a superficial administration is needed, if the details of the work are to be looked after; that there is a wealth of detail that requires this attention; and that it can be done in a navy yard.
The problem before us is to train officers for navy yards in modern industrial management, so that they may really see what is to be done, and may know how to do it; to ensure that in peace time we realize the full value of every dollar that the Congress gives us, in maintenance and preparation; that upon the outbreak of hostilities our yards will be ready, with smoothly-working organizations, to get the fleet with its auxiliaries out to sea; that during hostilities the fleet may receive quick and efficient service.