During the year 1825, the following vessels were more or less continuously in the West Indies:
Guns
Frigate Constellation 36 Captain M. T. Woolsey
Corvette John Adams 24 Mast. Comdt. A. J. Dallas; then,
J. J. Nicholson
Sloop of War Hornet 18 Mast. Comdt. Edmund P. Kennedy
Brig Spark 12 Lieut. John T. Newton
Schooner Grampus 12 " M. C. Perry; then, J. D. Sloat
Schooner Shark 12 " John Gallagher; then, Otho Norris
Schooner Porpoise 12 " C. W. Skinner
Schooner Ferret 3 " C. H. Bell
Schoner Beagle 3 " C. T. Platt
Schooner Weazel 3 " Charles Boorman
Schooner Terrier 3 " J. S. Paine
Schooner Fox 3 " John A. Cook
Steam Galliot Sea Gull 6 " Isaac McKeever
Storeship Decoy " Mervine P. Mix; then, William Pottenger
Five barges.
Hawk (?).1
Eleven extra lieutenants.
Of the previous year's list, the Alligator and the Wild Cat were lost; the Greyhound and Jackall sold, as being too much out of repair.2
1So given in Message No. 15 of the President.
2RSN, January 12, 1825.
The disposition of his cruisers is thus given by Porter on January 1:
The Hornet, Kennedy, cruizing along the south side of Cuba between Cape Cruz and Antonio; the Porpoise, Skinner, and Weazel, Boorman. In the Gulf of Mexico; the Grampus, Sloat, and the Beagle, Platt, to windward and to the coast of Columbia; the steam galliot Sea Gull, the schooner Ferret, Bell, barges Diablita and Mosquito, in the neighborhood of Matanzas; and corvette John Adams, Dallas, and the schooner Terrier, Paine, at Thompson's Island. There are three barges here but no men.3
3C. L., 1825, Vol. I, No. 2.
Two aspects of the undertaking to suppress piracy in the West Indies forced themselves upon the government in Washington. The first, involving our relations with feeble yet ostensibly friendly Spain, was dealt with in the United States Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Relations made this report:
That our commerce, for years, has been harassed, and the lives of our citizens destroyed, by pirates issuing from the colonies of Spain, in the West Indies, is a fact derived not only from the message of the president, but is of universal notoriety. These outrages have been so long and so often repeated, and marked with such atrocious circumstances, that a detail of the particular cases would be as impracticable as unnecessary. Our government, with a view to protect our citizens, has resorted to the means within its power, by stationing a naval force near the places where the pirates resort; a measure also pursued by other powers. Every effort, heretofore, has been unavailing, to put an end to these atrocities. These desperadoes, acquiring confidence from impunity, becoming more ferocious from habit, and multiplying by recruits from the most abandoned of other nations, threaten the most disastrous mischiefs, justly alarming to that highly valuable and most respectable portion of our fellow citizens, whose pursuits are on the high seas. It is manifest, as well from facts derived from other sources, as from the message of the president, that the continuance of this evil is ascribable to the asylum afforded the banditti in the colonies of Spain. The government of the U. States, cherishing the most amicable disposition towards Spain, has presented the subject with great earnestness to the Spanish government, demanding reparation for the past and security for the future. To these reiterated remonstrances, no answer was returned till very recently; and, to this day, all that has been obtained is a promise of a satisfactory answer to the applications of the government of the United States:4 although Spain had been solemnly warned, that, if she did not promptly acquit herself of her obligations to us on this subject, our government would be constrained, from the nature of the outrages, to become its own avenger, and, availing itself of its own resources, protect the commerce and lives of the American citizens from destruction. In the same spirit of conciliation, an appeal has been made to the local authorities, accompanied with a request, that if, from weakness, they were unable to exterminate the hordes of banditti who took shelter from pursuit within their territories, that permission might be given our forces to pursue them on land. This has been denied, on the vain punctilio of national dignity. The posture in which Spain now stands, is that of connivance in these injuries, or incapacity to prevent them. "A sovereign who refuses to cause reparation to be made of the damage caused by his subject, or to punish the guilty, or, in short, to deliver him up, renders himself an accomplice in the injury, and becomes responsible for it." If the committee were of opinion that the refusal, on the part of Spain, was wilful, and not the result of inability, they would, with a full view of all the consequences which the measure involves, at once recommend an appeal to the last resort of nations against Spain, and all her dependencies. But, believing, as they do, that courtesy requires that her refusal to do us justice should be placed on the ground of inability—an inability resulting from causes which the committee intentionally forbear to enumerate, they content themselves with recommending only such measures as are believed to be indispensable effectually to reach the chief. And, hence, they beg leave to present a bill with suitable provisions for the end desired.5
4See Hugh Nelson's letter, supra.
5N, January 15, 1825, FR, V, 489.
At the same time, the House Committee on Naval Affairs took up the question of ways and means for prosecuting the work. This report is of particular interest as recording the official appreciation of Porter and his subordinates. It discusses the situation in extenso and necessarily speaks of the obstacles imposed by the inertia, indifference or veiled sympathy of the Spanish officials. The paragraph bearing on the arming of merchant vessels and the ease with which a stout resistance repels piratical attacks, is especially pertinent.
In this investigation they feel a satisfaction in stating, that the means employed have displayed the vigilance of the Government, and the activity, zeal and devotion of the officers and seamen who have been assigned to that perilous service; perilous, not from the numbers or courage of the enemy, but from the deleterious effects of a tropical climate upon natives of a more temperate region. The vessels procured for this service were better adapted to a short expedition than to long and tedious cruises. They were too small to afford the room necessary to preserve the discipline and the health of the officers and seamen assigned to them; yet, they enabled the Commander to scour the coast, to penetrate into the shoal waters of the creeks and inlets, to the very margin of the land; and, in effect, the pirates have literally been driven from the ocean, and confined to their fastnesses and haunts upon the land. Accordingly, their principal depredations, for the last twelve or fifteen months, have been confined to occasional sallies in boats and small craft, within one or two leagues of the shore. While these depredations, however, have been more limited in extent and in number, they have more frequently been attended with the most desperate and sanguinary destruction of the lives of the unfortunate victims.
It becomes necessary for the Government to adapt the force to the existing character of the evil; and the committee are of the opinion, that that the best species of force which can be employed in future, while the piracies are confined to small craft, are the boats and launches which are attached to larger vessels. Sloops of war of the largest class may be well provided with launches and boats, of which several might be constantly employed in ferreting out these marauders, and bringing them to condign punishment.
. . . . .There have, also, recurred (sic) to several instances, where a resolute resistance by a small crew of intrepid seamen has repelled the assailants, even when the disparity of force might have been expected to produce a different issue. From which it is manifest, that those wretches, who assume the vocation of pirates, are as dastardly as they are cruel, and may be generally repelled by a well armed crew, though not much exceeding the usual complement of the vessel.
The opinion has been expressed in some of the memorials of our principal cities, that the permission to the merchants to prepare a suitable armament for their defence, would be embraced at least to a sufficient extent to deter, in many instances, the attacks of boats from the shore, or to repel the foe in case he should attempt to carry by boarding. The committee believe, that, if a considerable number of trading vessels should provide themselves for resistance, and a few instances of successful resistance should be the consequence, the effect would be highly salutary, and would greatly discourage these banditti, by rendering their vocation dangerous and fruitless. . . . .
The committee have not overlooked the notorious fact, that the local authorities of the West India Islands, particularly those of Cuba and Porto Rico, have afforded shelter and protection to the pirates, and have given a character of boldness to their enterprizes, which it may be impossible wholly to repress without resorting to measures which may induce those authorities to unite their means in earnest in the extirpation of these foes of the human race. Whatever may be the personal feelings of some of the local Governors, they may, perhaps, find it difficult to restrain the cupidity by which a great portion of the community are so completely demoralized. In the island of Porto Rico, a species of legalized plunder has been for several years tolerated, if not encouraged, by the chiefs of the island, which, if not so sanguinary as in other cases, has, in other respects, differed but little from ordinary piracy. . . . .
While the utmost circumspection should be employed in maintaining the rights and dignity of our country, not to violate those of other nations, it cannot be denied, that a scrupulous adherence to the letter of national law, in regard to the territories under the nominal jurisdiction of a nation remote from the scene of action, distracted and feeble at home, and scarcely felt or feared in her remote islands and colonies, must amount to an indefinite denial of redress to our own citizens; must embolden injustice and violence, and impede or frustrate the most vigorous efforts of our naval force in the protection of our commerce against such an unhallowed combination of local jurisdiction and desperate outlaws. . . . . 6
6RC, 18C-2S; By Mr. Crowninshield—ASP, I, 1049.
What results followed the President's request for authority to act vigorously, without the consent of Spain, even on Spanish soil, I am unable to state. In a message to the Senate, on January 13, 1825, he says:
On the very important question submitted to the Executive, as to the necessity of recurring to other more effectual means for the suppression of a practice so destructive of the lives and property of our citizens, I have to observe, that three expedients occur: one by the pursuit of the offenders to the settled as well as the unsettled parts of the Island from whence they issue; another, by reprisal on the property of the inhabitants; and a third, by the blockade of the ports of those islands. It will be obvious, that neither of these measures can be resorted to, in a spirit of amity with Spain, otherwise than in a firm belief, that neither the Government of Spain, nor the Government of either of the islands, has the power to suppress that atrocious practice, and that the United States interpose their aid for the accomplishment of an object which is of equal importance to them as well as to us. Acting on this principle, the facts which justify the proceeding being universally known and felt by all engaged in commerce in that sea, it may fairly be presumed, that neither will the Government of Spain, nor the Government of either of those islands, complain of a resort to either of those measures, or to all of them, should such resort be necessary. It is therefore suggested, that a power, commensurate with either resource, be granted to the Executive, to be exercised according to his discretion, and as circumstances may imperiously require. It is hoped that the manifestation of a policy so decisive will produce the happiest result—that it will rid these seas and this hemisphere of this practice. This hope is strengthened by the belief, that the Government of Spain, and the Governments of the islands, particularly of Cuba, whose Chief is known here, will faithfully co-operate in such measures as may be necessary for the accomplishment of this very important object. To secure such co-operation will be the earnest desire, and, of course, the zealous and persevering effort, of the Executive.7
7FR, V, 490.
Cold blooded murder, rather than plunder, seems to have been the motive in the next mentioned episode; the official account is as follows:
On the 7th instant, Daniel Collins came on board this vessel in the harbour of Matanzas, and stated as follows: That he sailed from Wiscasset as second mate of the American Brig Betsey, Captain Ellis Hilton, bound to Matanzas on or about the 25th of Novr. That the Brig was cast away on one of the Doubleheaded Shot Keys about the 21st of December, when the officers and crew, seven in number, took the long boat and steered for the Island of Cuba, and the next day made one of the Keys about 20 leagues to windward, at which place they found two fishing huts and five men, with whom the Captain made an agreement to be brought with himself and crew to Matanzas. The night previous to their intended departure, which was two days after their landing, one of the fishermen was absent during the whole night; when they were upon the point of shoving off, they were boarded and taken possession of by a boat having ten men on board, armed with muskets, blunderbusses and cutlasses, which the fishermen told them when first seen was the King's launch, who soon after tied the Captain and crew of the Betsey, put them into the perogues of the fishermen, and taking them into a little lagoon about half a mile from the huts, where they left their boat, taking with them no other arms than cutlasses, they deliberately commenced an indiscriminate murder, by cutting off the head of Captain Hilton, which seemed to be the signal for dispatching the others; the informant was knocked overboard by a blow and finding that he had broken the cord with which he was tied, ran through the water (about knee deep) and swamps, followed by two of the murderers, but fortunately effected his escape after witnessing the murder of his comrades with the exception of one, who had also broken his cord and was trying to escape, but presumes that he was overtaken, being very closely pursued by two or three. The informant on the sixth day got to an estate called Santa Clara on the Rio Palma, where he received some nourishment and rest, and continued his route to Matanzas, where he arrived last evening, presented himself to Captain Holmes of the American ship Shamrock, belonging to the same owners (Mr. A. Wood of Wiscasset). Captain H. immediately recognized him, and says that he is a sober, honest and upright man.
U. S. Steam Galliot Sea Gull,
Matanzas, JanY 7th, 1825.
(Signed) I. McKEEVER.8
8C. L., 1823, Vol. I, Enc. to 43.
This incident illustrates the wrath of the pirates aroused by Porter's successes and vented on any unfortunate persons falling into their hands who belonged to the now hated American nation.
That the patience of Congress, as representing the sentiments of the people of the United States, was well-nigh exhausted is seen from the following Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations to the House of Representatives, under date to January 31, 1825:
From the commencement of the Revolution, which has terminated in the separation of Spanish Continental America from Old Spain; the commerce of the United States, in common with that of all other nations, has suffered frequent outrages from the vessels of the adverse parties duly commissioned, with doubtful commissions, and from pirates who sought to conceal their true character by the use of the flag of some one of the belligerents. Constant efforts have been made by this Government to redress injuries suffered, and to prevent future outrage. Congress have at all times, been prepared to give, and have afforded all the means necessary for these purposes within their province.
The act of the third of March, 1819, was passed specially to protect the commerce of the United States, and punish the crime of piracy. It gave the President power (a power, however, which the President possesses without an act of Congress) to employ the public armed vessels of the United States to protect our merchant vessels and their crew from piratical aggression and depredation, to authorize the detention, capture and trial of any armed vessels which attempted any piratical depredation, search, seizure, or restraint of an American vessel. It authorized our merchant vessels to capture armed ships not commissioned by a friendly power, and to recapture vessels taken by them, and it directed the condemnation of the vessels so captured or recaptured; it provided for the punishment of the pirates, when convicted by the competent tribunals. This act was limited to one year, but was continued in force by the act of May 15, 1820, for two years, and the first four sections made perpetual by the act of the 30th January, 1823.
. . . . During this desperate contest, General Morales, the commander of the Spanish forces, issued his extraordinary proclamation declaring a coast of twelve hundred miles in a state of blockade, and interdicting all foreign commerce with the Spanish Main as inconsistent with the colonial law of Old Spain. This proclamation has been the fruitful source of most of the evils since suffered by all commercial nations in the West Indies and in the Gulf of Mexico. Numerous pirates and swarms of privateersmen (subsequently degenerated into pirates) have preyed upon all neutral commerce. Protection to that of the United States should have been, if it has not been, afforded against pirates by the use of all the necessary means under the control of the Executive; by a vigorous exertion of the naval power; by incessant watchfulness on the seas, and on the coasts infested by them; rigorous examination of all suspected vessels of every size; ardent pursuit of all the persons found flagrante delitu, wherever they sought refuge; careful prosecution before competent tribunals of all the accused who were taken; unrelenting severity in inflicting punishment, where guilt was judicially established, against privateersmen; by appeals to the Government of Spain, requiring immediate redress for the past and security for the future; if made in vain, application should have been made to Congress to authorize reprisals, or to declare war, as the extent of the injury and a due regard to the condition of the Spanish Government should have required. A further reference, however, to the past would not be useful. For the present and for the future, if legislative provisions are necessary, they should be made.
Piracy at present exists in the same form as in the year 1822, when a species of naval force, supposed to be particularly adapted to suppress it, was placed at the disposal of the Executive. This force was believed to have answered the expectations entertained of it, as the President at the opening of the last session of Congress announced that "it had been eminently successful in the accomplishment of its objects." If further experience has shown that this species of force is inadequate to the accomplishment of the object, and that another may be advantageously substituted, there can be no doubt of the propriety of the substitution.
This is a point, however, that the committee do not consider it their duty to examine; it belongs properly VI another committee, the result of whose deliberations on it has already been presented to the House. The merchants of the United States who have, with the exception of our seamen, the deepest interest in this subject, suggest the propriety of suffering the owners of vessels to arm for their own defence. There is no law forbidding such defensive armament, nor is any law required to justify it. It is, however, asserted that the restraints upon the armament of merchant vessels are inconvenient and oppressive, and that they ought to be removed. The only provision on this subject is that which requires bond and security to be given to prevent an unlawful use of the armed vessel; a provision which should not be changed—an adherence to which the best interest of commerce requires.
The propriety of authorizing by law the pursuit of the pirates on land has also been a subject of consideration. The committee do not deem an act of Congress for this purpose necessary. The rule of international law is, that fugitives from the justice of one nation are to be considered in another as strangers entitled to protection, and having a right of residence, on the common principle that no nation has a right to punish a person who has not offended itself, nor is it bound to assist its neighbor in the execution of its criminal laws. Pirates are criminals against all nations, punishable in every tribunal; the common enemies of mankind; the duty of all nations and every man is, to hunt them down, that they may be delivered up to offended justice. Fresh pursuit of enemies into the territory of a common friend is not universally admitted to be a right of war. Powerful nations never permit feeble neighbors to enter their territory for this purpose, but enter without scruple in pursuit of their enemies the territory of such neighbors, unless restrained by the apprehension that the mutual friend seeks a fair occasion to become an ally against them in war. Practically, the question is not one of right, but of relative power. The pursuit of a mutual enemy into the territory of a friendly or allied power is a right of war; it cannot be deemed a violation of the sovereignty of that power; it confers a favor, and imposes upon him an obligation of gratitude.
The common enemy cannot avail himself of the protection of the territory of the third power but by surrendering himself as prisoner of war, and in that event, if the force of the pursuer was the cause of the surrender, the pursuer might rightfully claim the benefit of the surrender. Under this rule the pursuit and capture of pirates anywhere and everywhere may be justified. The Executive has acted upon it. Instructions have been given to our naval commanders to pursue and capture on Spanish territory pirates who seek refuge or concealment there. The Government of Spain has been duly warned of the existence of these orders; it knows that they will be obeyed. No remonstrance has been made by it; no objections have, as far as the committee have been informed, been urged. The acquiescence of Spain is all that should be desired. A distinction is supposed to exist between pursuit of pirates on lands uninhabited, and on those inhabited; and it is imagined that the authority of Congress is necessary to justify pursuit in the latter case, while in the former, the power of the Executive alone is sufficient. The committee do not admit the correctness of this distinction. Fresh pursuit is justifiable in either case, if necessary to the capture of the pirate. There is greater danger of collision with the friendly power, when the object of pursuit flies into a settled country, and greater care is requisite to avoid giving offence; but the same principles apply to either case, and it is just as necessary that Congress should legislate to justify the capture of pirates, as to authorize the pursuit of them into any place of refuge inhabited or unsettled.
From an attentive examination of the letters of the agent who was sent to Cuba to obtain information relative to pirates who have long infested the coast of that island, it would seem that no fresh pursuit on land will eradicate the evil. Authority must exist to search in the suspected settlements for persons believed to be guilty of piracy, and for the evidence of their guilt, and to bring them before our tribunals for trial and punishment. This authority Congress cannot give without making war upon Spain. It cannot be used without wresting from Spain her municipal jurisdiction. The evil lies too deep to be reached by any ordinary measures which foreign powers can apply to it.
The Government of Spain must give to the local authority what it is said to want—sufficient strength to prevent and to punish crimes; it must perform its duties, or those who suffer from its neglect or weakness will be driven by the necessity of the case to apply the corrective. . . . .
. . . . The committee have already referred to the injuries suffered in consequence of the proclamation of Morales. Those injuries are not yet redressed. The Government of Spain has not attempted to justify a Proclamation declaring, with a naval force insufficient to shut up the smallest port on the coast, a seacoast of twelve hundred miles in a state of blockade, nor the absurd pretension that the property of all neutral nations, is, under the colonial law of Spain, liable to confiscation, if taken on its way to Spanish America; but the property of American citizens captured by privateers from the Islands of Porto Rico and Cuba, and from Porto Cabello,' is now withheld under these pretensions. The Spanish Government having formally revoked the blockade, gives to the tribunals of Spain an excuse for the condemnation of all property seized prior to that revolution; an excuse of which they do not hesitate to avail themselves. Acting under instructions from the President, of the 28th April, 1823, the Minister of the United States, at the court of Spain, demanded satisfaction in January, 1824, from that Government, for the outrages committed from Porto Cabello,9 and the Islands of Porto Rico and Cuba, upon the commerce of the United States, and for the wanton murder of one of our gallant officers10 in the harbour of St. John's, by the officer commanding the fort at its entrance. In September of the same year, Spain was again called upon to indemnify those who had suffered in person or property under the proclamation of blockade, or from the interdiction of neutral commerce to the Spanish Main. In October, the just reclamations of our Government were, for the third time, formally made to the Government of Spain. No satisfaction has been given, no indemnity has been promised, nor has there been a satisfactory excuse given for the delay to answer the just demands of the Minister of the United States. . . . . 11
9Venezuela.
10Lieut. Cocke, supra, p. 195.
11RC, 18C-2S; FR, V, 585.
Things had evidently come to such a pass that war with Spain was less intolerable than Spain's practical support of piracy through her refusal to permit our naval police to follow up their work afloat by expeditions on shore. So little was our government willing to go to such lengths that it recalled Porter and ordered him, first, before a Court of Inquiry, and then before a general court martial, for having taken matters into his own hands at Foxardo. The regrettable result of this action is already noted. The finding of the Court of Inquiry, presided over by Captain Isaac Chauncey, is all to Porter's credit. As a résumé of the operations of his squadron, it is well worth consulting, but it is far too long to be quoted here. (See appendix.)
The Ferret, Bell, was capsized in a squall off the Cuban coast between Matanzas and Havana, on February 4, losing five of her men. The remaining members of the crew were saved by the Sea Gull and Jackall.12
Captain Lewis Warrington reports his departure, on February 14, on the John Adams, to relieve Porter who arrived at Norfolk in the same ship on March 5.
Certain good things must be accredited to some of the Spanish authorities. During March, Lieutenant Sloat, in the Grampus, fitted out a trading sloop with a complement of 27 men, all told, and captured a piratical vessel cruising off St. Thomas. The latter vessel was destroyed, two of the crew killed, and 10 were made prisoners, among them being the celebrated piratical chief Colfrecinas. The prisoners were taken to Porto Rico and there executed by the authorities of that town.13
12M, 11, 40.
13 NE, 548.
14 Between Cariba and Barca Islands, south side of Porto Rico.
In the several reports of lieutenant Sloat to the Secretary of the Navy, dated U. S. schooner Grampus, St. Thomas, 12th and 19th March, and the several documents accompanying the same, a more full and detailed account is given of the capture of the pirates, in the harbor of Boca del Inferno,14 by a sloop under command of lieutenant Pendergrast, mentioned by lieutenant Sloat in his foregoing letters to commodore Porter; and also of the conduct of the government and people of Port Rico, and St. Thomas, in relation to, and in consequence of, that affair.
From these, it appears that lieutenant Sloat, having learned that several vessels had been robbed by pirates near Foxardo, and that two sloops (those of Pastorise and Low before mentioned), recently taken by them, had been fitted out, and were cruizing as pirates, obtained two small sloops at St. Thomas, free of expense, by the cordial co-operation of governor Von Scholten; who ordered a temporary embargo, to prevent intelligence of the expedition reaching the pirates. These sloops were manned, and sent, under the command of lieutenants Pendergrast and Wilson, on a cruize after the pirates; but anchored, on the 3rd March, at Ponce, where the officers and crews of the sloops were taken on board the Grampus; having missed the object of the cruize. But a sloop, confidently supposed to be one of those fitted out by the pirates, being seen, the next day, off the harbor of Ponce, one of the sloops, before in service, was again manned, and sent in pursuit, under command of lieutenant Pendergrast; who overtook and engaged the pirates in the harbor of Boca del Inferno;15 which is described as very large and full of hiding places. After an action of forty-five minutes, the pirates ran their sloop on shore, and jumped overboard; leaving behind them four dead. The survivors, thirteen in number, with a noted and formidable piratical chief, called Cofrecinas, at their head, were met, near a place called Guayama, in Porto Rico, by a colonel Renovales, at the head of a party of soldiers; and, after a desperate resistance, were all taken, badly and most of them mortally wounded; and sent to St. Johns, Porto Rico; to which place lieutenant Sloat proceeded, and addressed a note to the governor,16 offering the testimony of himself and crew, to convict the captive pirates. The governor's answer is profuse and warm in expression of thanks and commendation of lieutenant Sloat, his officers and men; and states, that the most energetic orders had been issued, for all the authorities of the coasts to co-operate with the American squadron, in the most efficacious manner. The evidence, offered by lieutenant Sloat, is stated to be unnecessary, as the pirates had confessed enough to convict them.17
Extract of a letter from lieutenant Sloat to the Secretary of the Navy, dated—"St. Thomas, 5th April, 1825"—
Under date of the 19th March, I had the honor to inform you that I had visited St. Johns, Porto Rico, for the purpose of offering our testimony against the pirates that made their escape from the vessel taken on the south side of that island, when the captain general assured me that these miscreants should have summary justice.
15Boca del Infierno.
16Don Miguel de la Torré.
17ASP, II, 104; NE, 547; CHN, III, 30; E, 78; JDS, 26.
On my arrival at this place yesterday, I had the satisfaction to receive the information, that all who made their escape from the vessel, (eleven) were shot, on Wednesday, the 30th ultimo. They all, except one, met their fate in the most hardened manner. The celebrated Cofrecinas refused to be blindfolded, saying, that he himself had murdered at least three or four hundred persons, and it would be strange if, by this time, he should not know how to die. From his and other confessions, twenty-eight others have been taken, and seventeen are to be executed in a few days, and the remainder in a short time after. Those already executed have been beheaded and quartered, and their parts sent to all the small ports round the island to be exhibited.
This capture is thought, by the government of the Island, to be of the greatest importance, and it is believed, from the number taken and convicted, that it will be for a long time a complete check to piracies about that island.18
A letter from Porto Rico stated that
Lieutenant Sloat is a most vigilant and active officer, and is rendering the most important services to his countrymen and others.19
18N, April 30, 1825.
19N, April 23, 1825.