THE SUBMARINE BLOCKADE
Under the title "Can the U-Boat Win the War?" the Literary Digest of February 17 gives the following summary of discussions of the possibilities of unrestrained submarine warfare and what it must accomplish to succeed in its object.
"The emphatic disapproval aroused throughout the neutral world by Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare leads many competent observers to inquire whether the Fatherland is not paying too high a price for what may, after all, prove an expensive luxury. Even in Germany itself there are naval critics of high standing who do not hesitate to warn the German nation that submarine warfare may not yield the great results that have been expected. To this number belongs Captain Persius, who, in the Berliner Tageblatt, asks whether the submarine war on merchant shipping will be 'a most important factor in bringing about peace,' and he is by no means sure that it will. Writing at the beginning of the year and having in mind just such a development as has transpired, he says:
"'The increasing success of our submarines has in the last few months become surprising. Nevertheless, nothing would be more foolish than to build up hopes on this and think, for example, that our successes must go on increasing at the same rate, so that in spring we might be sinking a million tons a month. The more the submarine war on commerce increases, the more serious become the difficulties it has to face. The number of ships daring to go to sea declines, the ships which still sail are more strongly armed, and the skill of their captains in repelling submarine attacks increases. Lastly, the number of enemy instruments for destroying submarines increases It would be a sin against our own people to conceal the truth—that endless waiting and inexhaustible confidence are necessary in our submarines till they will finally be able to reach the desired goal.
"'If one underestimates the difficulty of the task, it is sheer ingratitude to our submarine crews, who are beyond all praise, who fearlessly set out again and again on voyages full of danger beyond description, ready to offer their lives for their country, perhaps in a most painful fashion…That German submarines are inspired by an untiring activity is shown from the figures of tonnage destroyed: 1915: January, 14,000 tons; February-, 27,000; March, 83,000; April, 33,000; May, 93,000; June, 84,000; July, 77,000, etc. In 1916 the figures rose rapidly. In January-February, 238,000 tons were sunk, in March and April, 432,000 tons. In September, 141 enemy ships were sunk of 182.000 tons, and 39 neutrals of 72,600 tons, and in October, 146 enemy ships of 306,500 tons and 72 neutrals of 87,000 tons. In November the tonnage rose to 408,500, and the December total, not yet published, will, it is hoped, be similar.
'"The English Navy finds itself practically impotent against the losses of the mercantile marine. Its submarines cannot return like for like to the enemy. The merchant shipping of the Central Powers has disappeared from the sea since the outbreak of war, so that it cannot be attacked. Where traffic still goes on, as in the Baltic, the English and Russian submarines have been a failure. We have done our best, so far with success, to turn the fact that we are cut off from the world's markets to our advantage. We cherish the expectation that the enemy will not be so able to adapt themselves to the altered situation when the economic war has been intensified still more. There is therefore a contest between us, the object of which is to cripple the other side economically. The future still conceals from us who will hold out longest in the race.'
"Admiral Lacaze, the French Minister of Marine, tells the French Senate that Germany's move is 'horrible, but ineffective.' This judgment he bases upon the performances of German submarines in the past, and states that during the last 11 months they have sunk only one-half of 1 per cent of all the tonnage entering French ports. As reported by the Paris Journal des Debats, he began by stating that the aim of the German Government was rather to terrorize than to destroy:
"'The Germans are trying to do now what they always have done. The world ought to know that they have endeavored to terrify us since the beginning of the war. Disregarding the humanitarian engagements they made at The Hague, they have not hesitated to throw crews and passengers into frail boats and abandon them to the waves in tempests far from any coast. In a great many cases, even recently, numbers of their victims who could not be reached in time died of hunger, thirst, and cold. What more horrible than that can the Germans do? There is not a man in the world who has not learned with horror of the deeds of which the Germans have been guilty. The declaration of to-day does not move us. The army, the navy, and civilians all maintain the same calm before the horrible crimes of our enemy.'
"After saying that the French naval authorities had taken every precaution, he continued:
"'Fifty-one million tons of merchandise entered our ports during the last 11 months. One-half of 1 per cent has been sunk by submarines. Possibly in the future this proportion will be a little higher, but the sole result will be that the country will understand more thoroughly that we are at war.'
"The great majority of the German papers think that the new campaign marks the beginning of the end of the war, which, they confidently believe, will be brought to a victorious conclusion before the summer. The Berlin Lokal Anzeiger voices the general opinion when it says:
"'What is now demanded of our U-Boats surpasses all they have heretofore accomplished. They are expected to shut off England, France, and Italy, from all oversea communication, a task which only a few years ago no sane person would have thought worth discussing. No higher praise could be paid to the excellent reputation which our u-boat commanders have created for themselves within two years than the fact that to-day nobody doubts their ability to accomplish this gigantic task.
"'They will do it. As to that, there is only one opinion in all Germany and among her allies. They will impose Germany's victorious will upon a vainglorious enemy.
"'In these last two years they have gained immense experience in the new method of warfare. They have learned to fight wind and sea and British cunning and their boats have developed an efficiency never dreamed of before. They have to deal with a hostile merchant fleet, which in the hard service of the war has lost much of its former efficiency, being manned by crews that are certainly no longer first class. The best seamen were long ago absorbed by the navy. Their places were taken by colored men. and we know by experience how the sight of our u-boats affects the spirit of hostile and neutral crews. Our u-boat commanders do not fear the enemy's mysterious means of destruction, of which there has been so much talk of late. The conviction that the whole German people is behind them will lead them and their brave crews to the highest spheres of glory.
"'Our enemies are seen to be already in fear of what is coming. They were asking for it and shall not be disappointed.
"'As to the neutrals—we can no longer be bothered by their opinion. We have only one duty now—to win. To this end we must look neither to right nor left until the German war-aims are reached.'"
Mr. Archibald Hurd in the Fortnightly Review, writing before the announcement of the intensified phase of the submarine blockade, says that the shortage of shipping is becoming a matter of importance to Great Britain. At the outbreak of the war, according to Mr. Hurd, a large proportion of the British Merchant Marine was at once diverted, part to the service of the Admiralty and part to supplement the inadequate transportation of the other entente nations. During the war there has been a relatively small but constant wastage of the merchant fleet without balance by captures from the enemy. Shortage of labor and government work in private yards has so interfered with the shipbuilding industry that losses have not been made good: ship construction being about one third as great now as before the war, according to the President of the Society of Naval Architects and Naval Engineers. Mr. Hurd suggests that the remedy is restriction of trade in luxuries and immediate acceleration of shipbuilding. He thinks that, since Great Britain is supplying ocean transportation for all the Allies, an equivalent number of men should be released from army service to reinforce the shipping trades.
Whether or not the conditions discussed by Mr. Hurd will be sensibly aggravated by the unrestricted use of submarines has been the subject of much speculation in the Allied Press. The general opinion expressed is that Germany can do little more than she has accomplished in the past. The achievements of the German submarines during February is discussed as follows in the Literary Digest:
"'We stake everything,' said the German Chancellor in offering unrestricted submarine warfare as Germany's answer to her enemies' challenge to light to the end. In view of such declarations, interpreted by many in this country and England to mean that the new campaign is Germany's last resource, the results of the first month of the campaign are well worth noting as an indication of probable success or failure. If successful, say some observers, the German u-boats may next appear off our own coast. One million tons a month was looked for as the ' wreck-crop' of Germany's submarine harvesters, the Chicago Evening Post remembers, and it joins with other observers in pointing out that the estimates far exceeded the actual returns for the first month of ' unrestricted' warfare. True. February is a short month, but this is not held to justify the 40 per cent discrepancy our editors find. The first month of the ruthless under-water campaign ended, reckons the New York Journal of Commerce, quoting figures slightly in advance of those printed in other dailies on March 1, with a total of 187 ships, aggregating 479,087 tons, lost as follows: British, 115; American, 2; other neutrals, 48; other belligerents, 20; not identified, 2. The New York Times prints this table of losses for the past five months:
? |
Entente |
Neutral |
||
? |
Ships |
Tons |
Ships |
Tons |
1916 |
? | ? | ? | ? |
October |
146 |
366,500 |
72 |
87,000 |
November |
152 |
230,000 |
68 |
82,000 |
December |
125 |
235,000 |
37 |
60,000 |
1914 |
? | ? | ? | ? |
January |
170 |
336,000 |
58 |
103,500 |
February |
134 |
368,274 |
54 |
97,496 |
"'While this attrition is serious,' comments the Chicago daily just quoted, 'it is not serious enough to achieve the original intent of Germany —the paralysis of Great Britain before her West front offensive begins.' Using British Admiralty figures, the New York Evening Post calculates that the daily average of U-boat 'frightfulness' was 17,000 tons last month as against 12,500 in December. Against such a drain The Evening Post does not think that England can cope indefinitely, but if the process of British collapse should be prolonged ' public opinion in Germany will have to be prepared for another disenchantment.' To the Louisville Post the fact that Great Britain imported more cereals during the first 10 days of February, 1917, than during the corresponding days of 1916 or 1915, means that the submarine campaign is probably a failure.'"
Many writers think that the German organization will continue to increase in efficiency, and that the February results are not an indication of what may be accomplished later. Arthur Pollen, the naval expert of Land and Water, does not share in this belief. He says that, since so much depends on the moral effect of immediate and overwhelming success of the submarine war, it is reasonable to suppose that Germany would apply all her resources at the start, and that sooner or later the necessity for replenishing supplies and overhauling the submarines will require the withdrawal of part of her underwater forces and the establishing of a system of reliefs, whereby part of the flotilla would be always in port.
The New York Times gives the following review of the first month of unrestricted war:
"The first month of unrestricted submarine warfare has developed one salient fact—the German campaign has been highly successful, inasmuch as it has disorganized and almost completely stopped neutral trade in European waters. American mail and passenger liners are held safely in our ports; only a few merchantmen are venturing forth to the barred zone. Traffic between the United States, Holland, and Scandinavian ports has stopped except for vessels which are taking the long northern route around the German danger zone.
"This situation may not last long. It depends upon the British Navy's success in subduing the submarine. Nevertheless, the cessation of neutral trade, even for a short period of time, is harmful to the Entente Allies and correspondingly helpful to Germany. It reduces the world's available tonnage. A considerable part of the neutral tonnage, particularly that owned by Norway, has been engaged in carrying for the Allies. It is no longer employed in any direction, and the Allies are therefore dependent upon their own merchant fleets, now the object of persistent attacks by the German u-boat flotilla.
"Germany's threat to sink all vessels found within her barred zones has had the effect desired by Berlin, but in another sense the C'-boat warfare has apparently not been as successful as its sponsors might have wished. An unofficial announcement at the beginning of the campaign said that the Germans hoped to account for 1,000,000 tons of shipping a month—a tonnage that should destroy England's merchant fleet within a few months, and so force her to sue for peace. The allied reports for February show that 466,073 tons of shipping were lost during the month. Fifty-four neutral vessels and 135 allied vessels were sent down. These figures may prove not to be complete, and it is probable that the German record will show a much larger tonnage destroyed.
"Whatever the correct figures, the loss is serious enough, and the question now is whether the rate of destruction will increase or decrease. The present month should give the real measure of the campaign and indicate whether England is actually losing command of the sea. In a sense Britannia no longer rules the waves. She certainly does not rule under the waves. While her naval strength is unimpaired—is, in fact, immeasurably stronger than when the war began—England is able to protect only a part of her merchant marine. The German submarine threatens to take command of the sea, not by destroying England's fleet, but by destroying England's merchant craft and cutting her communications, the vital artery by which her people are fed.
"The duel for sea control becomes more intense day by day and accounts for several significant naval moves made in the course of the last two weeks. For instance, England has modified her North Sea danger zone, but has tightened her blockade of Germany by requiring neutral vessels which may be suspected of carrying enemy goods to call at British ports for examination, or, if necessary, adjudication before a prize court. The British Parliament has been called upon to authorize new enlistments to increase the personnel of the Royal Navy to 450,000 men, and this alone would have been an acknowledgment of the gravity of the submarine menace had not Sir Edward Carson, First Lord of the Admiralty, frankly admitted to Parliament that the allied ship losses were serious and that there was no magic remedy for the u-boat evil.
"German spokesmen, on the other hand, notably Vice Admiral von Capelle, Minister of the Navy, and Dr. Karl Helfferich, the Imperial Vice Chancellor, have declared that they are well satisfied with the progress thus far made in their starvation campaign against England, and confident that it will bring them victory.
"Out of the submarine maze one may pick a few points of bearing. It is obvious that, aside from other defensive measures, the British Navy is trying either to seal the passages by which the German u-boats find their way into the North Sea, or restrict them to shallow water, in which submarine navigation is difficult. It is also apparent that, in adding to the number of men available for naval purposes, the Admiralty intends to increase the number of small craft and use them in strengthening patrol lines now weakly held.
"The wider radius of the new type of German U-boat has compelled a radical change in British tactics and strategy. When the submarines used in the first campaign succeeded in getting around the coasts of Scotland they were obliged to return almost immediately to replenish their supplies. They also had to work inshore, where nets and traps and other destructive devices could be effectively used. Not so with the big, new boats. A voyage around Scotland does not diminish the submarine's capacity to keep the sea for three weeks or more, and, moreover, the boat can work far out on the ocean trade routes, where the danger from nets is reduced to a minimum, and a close patrol is not wholly practicable.
"Therefore, the British problem is to confine the u-boat to the North Sea, or at least to prevent large numbers of them from getting into the Atlantic. Hence the new danger zone proclaimed in the British decree of January 25. This zone, as originally charted, spread in the shape of a fan from Flamborough Head, England, toward the coasts of Holland and Denmark. The narrow portion of the fan has now been eliminated, possibly because it served no useful purpose, and the danger area is therefore about half the size of the original. The nature of the zone is not exactly apparent. Probably it is a huge mine field, with a close patrol of surface vessels on the outskirts. It completely dominates the German coast on the North Sea, allowing but two passages for vessels, one about a mile wide off the coast of Jutland, beyond the territorial waters of Denmark, the other four miles wide off the coast of Holland and outside its jurisdiction.
"It is well known in England that the German U-boats make their way into the Atlantic by going through the northern end of the North Sea. Few, if any, find it possible to use the shorter route through the English Channel, for the narrow Strait of Dover, with its many defences, has proved to be a puzzle even to the most resourceful German officers. Emerging from Cuxhaven, Wilhelmshaven, and other ports, the U-boats skirt the coasts of Denmark and Norway, using territorial waters if they can, and finally find the open sea between Norway and the Orkney Islands, north of Scotland. From here they travel west and south to their hunting grounds in the Atlantic.
"In its effort to block the means of exit from German ports, or to make the channels so narrow as to hamper the submarine commanders, the British Navy is trying to do in the North Sea what the German Navy successfully accomplished in the Baltic. It will be remembered that in the summer of 1915 British submarines got into the Baltic through the tortuous channel between Denmark and Sweden. Their depredations continued for several months, then were brought to a close by winter. Their operations were not renewed the following spring because in the meantime the Germans had succeeded in sealing up the channel available to the British boats.
"This was a much simpler task than that facing the British in the North Sea. It is difficult to mine successfully against the submarine, except where the channels are narrow and the water shallow, and it is doubtful whether the British danger zone will prove to be more than a half measure of defence. If this is so, the alternative is a more rigid patrol of the sea, particularly that stretch of water, 300 miles wide, between the Orkneys and Norway. This wide outlet, unlike the Strait of Dover and the channel Teading directly into the Baltic, cannot be mined successfully on account of the depth of water, and demands a great fleet of patrol boats. It is the weak link in the chain of Britain's defence against the submarine, and is difficult to patrol on account of rough water. But it must be adequately patrolled, without weakening the squadrons of guardships at other points, and Sir Edward Carson's call for more sailors therefore suggests greater effort in the northern passage.
"It is possible that England's danger zone near the German coast is not wholly laid out to hamper the movements of submarines. It serves also to make more difficult a sally of the German High Seas fleet. Winston Churchill, formerly First Lord of the Admiralty, said the other day that the German submarine had thrown the British fleet on the defensive. That is largely so, and it may reasonably be supposed that the British Admiralty does not want to bring about an engagement between the two fleets while the energies and brains of British officers are engaged in the submarine problem. The simplest way to hold the German fleet to its ports is to mine their exits, and this has apparently been done. The danger zone, it may be said, covers the waters where the battle of Jutland was fought.
"There is one port, however, that remains a thorn in the side of the British. It is Zeebrugge, Belgium, a large submarine base far from the British danger zone, and the port from which the German destroyer flotillas emerge to make their raids against the cast coast of England. Last week's destroyer raid, like previous ones, served the purpose of harassing the enemy. It was disconcerting, but apparently was intended to achieve no military object of importance. At the same time it was another demonstration of that aggressiveness for which the German Navy has become famous.
"Several naval authorities in England believe that the submarine menace is the direct outcome of the sea doctrine which holds that 'containment is equivalent to victory.' Mr. Churchill, who now hopes that some way may be found to bring about a naval offensive against Germany, is credited with having been a strong advocate, if not the originator, of that doctrine, or heresy, as some naval writers call it. Those who believe in a more vigorous policy hold that the British Navy should have tried in the beginning of the war to seek and destroy its enemy. They believe that that would have been the best way to have protected England's commerce, and contend that a decisive action might have been forced before the German fleet laid its great protective mine fields in Heligoland Bight, where Admiral Beatty fought his first successful battle. Now it is too late. It is for the German fleet to decide the time of action. Meanwhile its submarine flotilla can go ahead with the work of destruction which the German Government hopes will bring England to her knees and end the war.
"Of the official statements made in Germany recently relative to the success of the U-boats, that of Dr. Helfferich is the more interesting because he gives tonnage figures. The Imperial Vice Chancellor said that 'already the navigation which links the British Isles with the rest of the world has been depressed to the danger point. The tonnage arriving in British ports in December last was only 2,000,000, while the monthly average of the last peace year was 4,200,000 tons.'
"This is a formidable decrease, but the figures are misleading. Dr. Helfferich omitted to say that one-half of the British mercantile marine had been requisitioned for the army and navy, and that the movements of these vessels do not appear in the daily lists of arrivals and departures. He also failed to say that almost since the beginning of the war, England has been using but half of her merchant tonnage to carry food for her people and to care for her export trade.
"Accordingly, there is certain to be a wide discrepancy in the amount of reported tonnage arriving in British ports when two months—one of peace, the other of war—are compared. If we could add the tonnage of commandeered ships to those engaged by private interests and make a comparison we should get nearer the truth of the statement that the submarine has shaken the foundations of the British Empire. If the British Empire is not tottering, it is at least facing a grave crisis, as Premier Lloyd George pointed out to Parliament 10 days ago."
On March 14 the Associated Press issued the following dispatch, which is quoted from the New York Herald:
"The Associated Press has been placed in possession of a review of the first six weeks of the German unrestricted submarine campaign. The figures given are from the Board of Trade reports, and the conclusions are those of a highly competent authority.
"' The German submarine campaign, reported to have assumed enhanced vigor on February 1, must be singularly disappointing to the Germans themselves,' says the review. 'At the beginning of January, 1917, Great Britain possessed approximately 3731 vessels of 1600 tons or over. Many others of lesser tonnage are not taken into consideration, owing to the importance of restricting the question to over seas traffic and cargo, judging the results carefully and looking to possible future developments.
"'From February 1 until March 14 the losses of British ships of over 1600 tons were approximately 78, which number, deducted from the total, leaves the British mercantile marine with 3653 ships of over 1600 tons after six weeks' German submarine warfare.
"'It should be remembered that a very large proportion of tonnage is on the docks building for the British mercantile marine, and a fair percentage of the total is being turned out monthly. In the total above mentioned no account is taken of ships completed or bought in neutral countries.
"'During the period from February 1 to March 10 no British ships have been in any way blockaded in harbor. Every opportunity of carrying out their plans has been at the disposition of the Germans after their declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare. It is extremely improbable that the German authorities ever will have the same opportunity, for the following reasons:
"'First. A large number of old tramp steamers, slow of speed, have been sunk, as they afforded easy prey.
"'Second. Their efforts would be directed for the first six weeks or two months toward producing the most considerable results by careful organization and administration, with a view to affecting the morale of neutral nations. A careful study of the German methods has been made by the British naval authorities, and anti-submarine measures have been adopted, which, as the outcome of experience, have attained a large measure of success.
"'Third. The arming of merchant vessels is rapidly taking place, and it is capable of proof that a submarine takes particular care in attacking armed vessels, a large percentage of which always escape.
"'Fourth. Anti-submarine devices are being daily perfected, but a little time must necessarily elapse in order that they should receive a proper trial.
"'Fifth. The German naval authorities are bound to find some difficulty in replacing the trained personnel of which they have lost a considerable portion. It should be remembered that there is considerable difference between the efficiency of individual commanders, and the greatest losses have been incurred through the action of a few German submarine commanders, who by their skill and training stand far above the average £/-boat officers, who leave Germany on missions of destruction.
"'The losses of the British mercantile marine are being steadily reduced. During the past two weeks only 29 have been sunk, as opposed to 48 sunk in the first two weeks.
"'The vessels engaged in the coastal trade are continually exposed to German submarines and are naturally included in a German commander's reports.
"'The most serious aspect of the German submarine warfare is that reflected by consideration of post-bellum conditions with regard to shortage of world tonnage. Besides affecting the whole world it is likely to affect most seriously the smaller nations who have no mercantile marine of their own to rely upon and are dependent upon that of other nations for their sea traffic. However much the Germans may desire to force neutrals to lay up their vessels and close neutral harbors, such a state of things cannot exist long, because the neutrals themselves must obtain certain necessaries in order to avoid the intense economic situation which at present obtains in Germany. This fact is necessarily better known to the neutrals themselves than to those not immediately concerned.
"'As regards the general situation of the submarine warfare, it may thus be summed up: It is having a more serious effect upon European neutrals than upon belligerent mercantile marine. The continual losses of ships will seriously affect post-bellum trade. The losses of British mercantile vessels in the first six weeks represent a percentage of 2.3, while the average daily movement of vessels in United Kingdom ports is 710. This figure excepts fishing and local craft.
"'If the same rate of destruction were to continue at this average it would take at least a year to reduce the British mercantile marine by one-half, without taking into consideration additional tonnage procured from building or purchase.
"'Food restrictions in Great Britain are very necessary and have been imposed in order to avoid the effects of the war pressing too hardly upon the poorer classes of the country, and they further curtail lavish expenditures and the waste of provisions.
"'It is the custom of the German authorities to issue official criticisms of measures adopted by the Allies as regards the control of foodstuffs and restrictions on imports, and these criticisms are produced entirely for the consumption of neutrals and are an attempt to impress their own population with the efficiency of what they term their "submarine blockade."
"'It is only to be expected that we are bound to take precautions in order to avoid within the next two years economic stress which might then exist here, as it actually does in Germany to-day. The passage of troops and munitions continues without any diminution, and only the neutral countries of Holland, Denmark and Sweden are experiencing a temporary reduction in the amount of exports from England. Apart from butter, the import of foodstuffs in February has been very satisfactory, and it should not be forgotten that in the statistics showing the quantity of foodstuffs imported in the month of February to British ports a considerable quantity which would normally reach them has been diverted to French ports for the use of the British Army.
"'Despite this, however, the position regarding home imports themselves is satisfactory. Flour and grain for February are above the average. Meat shows from 10 to 15 per cent increase above the average of the last seven years. Margarine is coming in greater quantities than in any previous year, and this provides for the falling off in butter. Rubber is increasing slowly each month, and the February average was above that of January. Iron ore shows one-third increase over 1915 and 1916.
"'If any conclusion can be drawn from the Board of Trade statistics of the import of necessities into Great Britain during the month of February, a very different result would have to be shown by the German submarine blockade, for up to the present time there has been no falling off except in sugar, wood and butter.'"
NAVAL OPERATIONS
(From February 17 to March 17)
Italy Mines Her Coast.—The Italian Government put into effect March 1 the adoption of "urgent and special" measures designed to guard the commerce of Italy against indiscriminate German submarine warfare against all merchant craft traversing the waters around the Italian shores. These measures embrace the establishment of extensive barriers of mines by means of which it is expected that merchant vessels bound for Italian ports will be protected against submarine attack.
The action of the Italian Government was communicated to the State Department in a dispatch, under date of February 27, received by Secretary Lansing to-day from American Ambassador Page at Rome. A paraphrase of Ambassador Page's message was issued at the State Department as follows:
"In a communication dated February 27 the Foreign Office requests that the Secretary of State be immediately notified of the decision of the Minister of Marine on account of the blockade of Italy by the Central Empires to take urgent and special measures to protect commerce of Italy by extensive barriers of mines along the Tyrrhenian seacoast from the first of March.
"Some barriers will be variable, others permanent, and others temporary anchored mines. Neutral boats arriving and departing Italian ports will, through special service organized therefore, be informed routes to follow, as a protection against all danger. Details of geographic position of danger regions cannot be given owing to military exigencies."— N. Y. Times.
Vessels Lost.—Naval vessels have been reported lost during the period February 17 to March 17 as follows:
Italian Transport.—The Italian transport Minas, 2854 tons, was sunk by a German submarine in the Mediterranean on February 16.
British Destroyer.—A British destroyer sank with all hands in the North Sea on March 1. It is believed she struck a mine.
British Transport.—Berlin announces the sinking of a 35,000-ton transport in the Mediterranean on February 24. The name of the vessel is not given and the report has not been confirmed by Great Britain.
French Destroyer.—The French destroyer Cassini was sunk by a submarine while on patrol duty in the Mediterranean on February 28.