One principal purpose in forming an auxiliary squadron in the fleet is to relieve the commander-in-chief of the burden of logistics, so that he may devote his attention to tactics and, strategy, uninterrupted by any but the large questions of administration which only he can decide. The success of such an organization is proportionate to the degree with which the admiral is relieved of matters which subordinates, cognizant of his general plans, can settle quite as well for all concerned as if decided by the admiral himself. To be effective, the auxiliary squadron should comprise all the elements and business which do not pertain directly to the military employment of the fleet, and also those necessary to sustain and prolong its military activity. By military employment and activity are meant the use of the fleet against an enemy, real or simulated, as distinguished from activities internal to the fleet, necessary to routine life and sustenance. In a word, the auxiliary squadron business has to do with supplies and facilities for maintaining the fleet's military powers.
The highest authority afloat has the gravest problems. He cannot delegate them, even if he would, for there is no other authority in a position to fulfill such a responsibility. Hence, unless the admiral be freed from distraction by minor matters, the larger ones cannot receive the continuity of concentrated thought which alone brings out true proportion. The organization should be such, therefore, that the commander-in-chief can count upon the various subordinate commands fulfilling their parts in his scheme of employment, without his paternal—one might almost say maternal—care in their preparation. He should no more have to deal with their coaling, provisioning, and manning than a captain should be referred to every time an ordinary seaman needs a new white hat. At inspection and in the course of everyday duty a captain notes whether his division officers have cared for their men's being properly clad. So with the fleet units. The admiral, having assured himself that the fleet's requirements have been seasonably arranged for, need not attend to their serving out.
For some years past in the Atlantic fleet the commander-in-chief has not concerned himself with these details in person. Nevertheless, they have been arranged by his staff, thereby taking a considerable portion of the time and energy of the officers upon whom the commander-in-chief must depend for assistance in matters of supreme importance. The charge is, not that the commander-in-chief's staff cannot attend to these matters, but that other authority, of secondary degree, can do so equally well, and that if, instead, the commander-in-chief and his staff do this indispensable but secondary work, they thereby sacrifice undivided attention to their paramount responsibility. Everyday needs are tangible and insistent. Matters of large comprehension contain an element of distance and uncertainty. It is easy to yield to demands which by their immediateness seem large; and so it will ever be, until the fleet be so organized and administered that routine matters will not tend to intrude upon the serious and general.
While routine details should not burden the admiral, yet he must be in touch with the fleet's maintenance. This explains why these matters have so long been handled by his chief of staff. Whoever they be placed under must know the commander-in-chief's plans intimately and keep him informed of conditions and resources. The principle would be met in a way by dividing the admiral's staff into the military or planning branch and the maintenance branch. This appears to have been the original idea in having a personal staff and a fleet staff, though the principle was not logically followed out and the terms were inappropriate. The Germans provide a commander-in-chief with "admiral staff officers," and also flag lieutenants, personal aids, and fleet officers— medical, engineer, pay, law, and chaplain. Their staff provision for the presence of a train is not known. Their present fleet bases directly on the great home military ports.
While the suggested division of the staff into two branches, military proper and maintenance, would work well, it would fall short of the desired end, in not relieving the commander-in-chief of some minor but continual distractions. Staff officers do not exercise military command and could not, therefore, relieve the admiral of certain administrative details, among them discipline. An auxiliary squadron commander and his staff, however, could take over all the fleet maintenance duties; and for disciplinary and other administration among the auxiliaries, their squadron commander would have the same command status as in other squadrons. While it may be that the amount of such business in the auxiliary squadron may be small now (though this is very doubtful), in time of war it would be much larger, and the need for prompt action imperative. The commander-in-chief could not attend to it then, certainly, and there would have to be a change of organization just when the smoothest unbroken working everywhere would be indispensable.
But whether the auxiliary business be small in amount or large, why should the commander-in-chief or his staff be burdened with it at all, needlessly? Gunnery, torpedoes, machinery, and athletics are all factors of the first order in naval efficiency, yet the commander-in-chief must leave even these almost entirely to the squadron commanders. He deals with squadrons as finished products, and to charge him with details of training and material preparation, or facilitate his mixing in them, is at once to divide responsibility with the squadron commanders, lessen their authority, and worst of all, lower their prestige and his own. Such a result is inevitable if the commander-in-chief retain duties in these connections for his own staff. How much more unsuitable for his staff then are the duties of the auxiliary squadron.
Other matters besides mere supplies and repairs can be taken by the auxiliary squadron, among them intercommunication throughout the anchorage, berthing and traffic, patrol on shore, and guard afloat. Matters of this kind are reducible to routine handling, being practically the same during every visit of the fleet at the same anchorage, and at different anchorages varying only in minor details. A few examples may illustrate.
During a recent assemblage at Newport, with three battleship divisions, the torpedo flotilla, and a number of auxiliaries in harbor, four guard boats visited the senior flagships twice a day. The most distant guard boat would pass two other divisions on its way; the next, one other division; and all might have to wait a while off the flagship. Again, a dozen boats and working parties, from as many ships, would gather at Long Wharf twice a week or oftener, to receive freight shipments. An auxiliary squadron organized for the main purpose of efficient management of material supply could certainly arrange in both these instances with fewer boats and less mileage.
The functions of port captain being supposed vested in the auxiliary squadron commander, all incoming movement and shifting about would be governed by him, except of vessels belonging to other squadrons whose commanders were present. It is not vital, and seldom interesting, to the commander-in-chief or his staff to note matters of this kind. Where his various units may anchor can be indicated days or weeks in advance, or conform to a standing principle. As to occurrences in the anchorage, he need not be bothered. A case in point occurred recently. A collier got ashore and radioed for help. The chief of staff directed the auxiliary division to send a tug, later to lighter part of the cargo, and to report conditions, besides sending a staff officer to examine the situation. Now, with the auxiliary squadron established, its commander would be expected of his own motion to take complete charge in such a situation, whether the vessel ashore were a collier or a battleship. All tugs, lighters, repair ships, every facility, being under his immediate control, and he being a flag officer or senior captain, the commander-in-chief would be justified in having full confidence that all necessary action would be seasonably taken. At the outset the chief of staff would see that the commander-in-chief was informed that a vessel was ashore, imparting the news at a convenient time. In due time the report would come that the vessel was off, uninjured or with damage of so much, or that the situation was so and so, as the case might be. The auxiliary squadron commander would be in a position to investigate directly, and possibly in many cases this would avoid the delay of a preliminary board of investigation, permitting a court of inquiry or even a court-martial to begin at once where culpability was evident, or the incident closed promptly without any proceedings, on this flag officer's experienced recommendation. But the main point is that the matter would at no time be on the commander-in-chief's mind, as something for him to attend to. Similarly, superior control over the shore patrol could be left to the auxiliary squadron commander; likewise, beach-master's duty, apportionment of athletic grounds, marking and police of race-boat courses, etc. These matters may not take much time of the commander-in-chief's staff, but why should they take any time of a body concerned with larger matters which no one else can handle? It rather detracts from the prestige of the superior staff to have such minor duties; and as long as such duties concern his staff, it is inevitable that they will come before the admiral, sooner or later, for decision. If for decision he must go deep into the matter, it will be an interruption of more important business. On the other hand, if his decision be virtually only to confirm his aid's recommendation, why should he be bothered with the matter at all?
The business of the auxiliary squadron commander may be indicated most clearly perhaps by an outline of the proposed distribution of business among all the staffs of the fleet, organized to include an auxiliary squadron. For this see the appended diagram. This distribution makes the auxiliary squadron commander in effect the logistic member of the commander-in-chief's staff, and gives him besides full executive authority and responsibility. He is like a navy yard commandant. Ships could apply to the auxiliary squadron for their wants directly, just as they do at a navy yard. A ship in company with the flagship at a navy yard does not apply to the flagship for coal, but directly to the yard. A commandant is responsible to the department; the auxiliary squadron commander, to the commander-in-chief. The auxiliary squadron commander, knowing the commander-in-chief's plans, would decide whether the wants of a ship or other unit should be filled in whole or only in a specified proportion, whether immediately or in turn, etc. Upon this decision, made on military grounds, the auxiliary squadron staff would act directly.
Or, suppose the fleet at Newport or Hampton Roads. A vessel applies for coal. The auxiliary squadron commander, controlling the supply afloat and having arranged with the local authorities, sends alongside a collier, or lighters from the naval station, whichever suits the commander-in-chief's general plans the better. The auxiliary squadron would never clash with local facilities. Its commander would utilize them, whether naval or commercial, to eke out those of the train or furnish what it could not, or to spare or replenish its stock, so that the train might move on complete, with the fleet.
The other staffs are freed of the business of providing material wants. Captains keep their immediate chiefs informed of their material states, but see to it themselves that they keep stocked and outfitted. Each chief places in the hands of the next higher chief a finished product, trained and ready for military use. In this way, unnecessary intermediaries are eliminated, and in responsibility and control, duplication, which means division, is avoided.
In the appended diagram, number of vessels in the various units are immaterial to this discussion. Whether there be 9, 8, or 16 in a battleship squadron, its commander's staff would need to have the same elements; and so whether a division be 3 or 4. Similarly, it is probable that the staffs of the torpedo and submarine flotillas may not be quite as their chiefs would recommend; but their basic principle is not different.
Elaborating somewhat on the auxiliary squadron staff's duties, the following parallel shows how direct and smooth would be the transition of the auxiliary squadron commander from the status of train commander to that of base commander, and vice versa.
The auxiliary squadron would be composed of all base defence and auxiliary vessels, including supply, fuel, ammunition, hospital and repair ships, transports, tugs, and other craft not intended for regular employment in the active offensive away from the base. There has been some question as to the suitability of mining vessels belonging to the auxiliary squadron. In the writer's opinion they should be there, since their employment is primarily at or near the base, and because they include some vessels, as tugs and small mine-layers and sweepers, which would be in constant demand, and for a large part of the time available, for non-mining duties (picket, patrol, transportation), within and near the base. Such of them as might be capable of operating at a distance could do so when required merely by being assigned as a detachment, joined for the occasion to some other command.
As a flagship for the auxiliary commander, there should be a separate vessel. It would not be suitable, either at the base or in the train, for the commander to be in a vessel of special type. The squadron commander's function is military command and administration of a military supply and auxiliary force. His prestige should not be prejudiced by appearances; and his flagship should not be subject to loading or discharging cargo or other material requirements that might block, interrupt, or retard the whole base or train administration, or displace its seat. Further, there is no probability that any special type would have the requisite complement, in character, ability, or number. Demands on the flagship's officers for work outside the ship would be incessant, making probably half of them informal attaches to the base commander's staff. It was so in Key West in 1898, where the volume of business was trifling compared to that of a train and base of to-day, while the anchorage area there was very small, and the auxiliary vessels few.
The flagship must have radio operators, signalmen, and yeomen, fully competent and ample in number. The business transacted would ordinarily be large; in war, voluminous. It would affect every ship in the fleet and have to be done with dispatch and without errors or confusion. There must be many boat crews in constant use. The ship herself must be fit to steam somewhat better than the rest of the train, and to fight her own armament with effect. Her crew should be known men, because a base and train could leak much information. A little malicious forethought here could start something disastrously. A ship as well trained as any in the fleet is requisite. Her condition would be a strong direct influence for good or bad throughout the whole train or base. Would it work for good, if the flagship were thrown together, on the outbreak of war?
An older cruiser or, preferably, battleship would be suitable, such as the Illinois or Chicago. With the train at sea there should always be armed vessels, and such a flagship, together with the mining vessels, all of them armed, would fulfill this requirement. At the base, the flagship's armament would be a material addition to the local defence against the possibility of a raid. There may be objection to appointing such a flagship at a time when officers and men are short in every employment. But such a shortage is really an additional reason, a very strong one, in favor of such a flagship now. As a general rule, strength in the battle line is the first consideration; but this principle degenerates to a fetish when the fleet is out of symmetry. The vitality of any body lacking several essential organs is most precarious. As exemplified in a recent strategic maneuver, and well known long before that, a fleet that is blind, short in reach, and inferior in speed, is woefully handicapped; and even were such defects removed, the lack of reliable steady sustenance means inability to get a second wind. Bringing a battleship to efficiency is the most familiar task in the navy, but do we know all that we should about a train? An inexperienced train organization will impair the value of every fighting unit. So, if, to keep one more battleship in full commission, the requisite train organization is suppressed, the result in war efficiency will be a painful disillusionment.
The train at sea must be under a commander of its own in war, else the military commanders would be hampered in their measures to protect it. The first step would be to appoint a commander. At a base, permanent or temporary, the base commander must be independent and have full powers over his command, else he will be unable to get the most out of the facilities at his disposal. That a train or base commander's business will of itself, without actual trial and practice during peace, develop smoothness in administration is not to be expected. Even radical defects sometimes do not reveal themselves short of actual trial. Better administration throughout the fleet, in economizing commonplace effort to the advantage of fighting efficiency, and the necessity for thorough preparation in the vital matter in war of supply and maintenance, demand that delay continue no longer in establishing the fleet organization altogether as it should be for war, and putting into practice the training and development of that branch on which the fleet's staying power will depend.
II
Assume an auxiliary squadron established, the cognizance of supply affairs thereby taken away from an authority too preoccupied otherwise and placed with one able to devote to it his undivided attention. The whole administration of the fleet would benefit by this release from a cumbersome system or, rather, lack of responsible system. The military quality of the combatant elements, both singly and in combination, could not fail to improve. But this would be only half the gain. Improvement in combatant qualities means increased power. To this, the better organization of supply adds increased mobility. This is the second great reason for organizing: an auxiliary squadron.
The mobility of a naval force is perfect for a time; but the period is limited; and the ability to lengthen that portion of it which is devoted to activity against the enemy, and correspondingly reduce the unproductive portion consumed in recuperation, is the measure of efficient logistics in the theater of operations. The aim should be to render military activity continuous, not intermittent. Continuity of naval supply calls for well developed arrangements, fully prepared in advance.
Logistics has been well defined as "the feeding, inarching, and resting of troops in the field in the best order and in security." In naval application this becomes, "the supplying, moving, and refitting of the fleet in the best order and security." The auxiliary squadron's principal concern is supply and refitting; but it has much to do also with the security of the base in the absence of the fleet, with moving its own vessels in security, and with its ability to perform all its own functions in the best order; that is, to contribute its utmost to the mobility of the fleet. With an auxiliary squadron below par, the power of the fleet would be cut in half.
For a naval force of given strength, the logistic requirements for war vary according to the location of the principal theater of operations. The elements influencing such variation are:
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- the distance of the theater of operations from the home coasts;
- the possession of secure advanced bases;
- the availability of positions suitable for advanced bases;
- the direction and distance of sources of supply;
- the material resources of the belligerent's own country;
- the number and location of available lines of communication; and
- the degree of preparation existing during peace.
The elements of the enemy's logistics also influence our own to a certain extent, because his facility or difficulty of operating calls for greater or less effort to overcome him. The influence of enemy logistics thus bears first on our strategy, and so they affect our own logistics, indirectly it is true, but still surely. It is not pertinent here to discuss all these elements; but some of them bear directly upon the need to have a complete auxiliary squadron, well organized in itself and well established in its place in the fleet, before war becomes imminent.
Distance imposes a fourfold disadvantage; first, in expense, which is a factor of increasing weight as the complexity of modern warfare progresses. At the same time, since distance prolongs the duration of operations, the higher expense drains the national endurance, as well as the resources more peculiarly military. Then there are increased uncertainty and lengthened exposure, which may be regarded as the normal and the military risks of extended distance. They magnify the initial expense as well as the current, and add considerably to the military burden of guarding communications. Efficiency in the train and base administration, whereby the maximum possible is realized among all resources, operates directly to reduce this fourfold burden.
Secure bases advanced towards the theater of operations diminish the handicap of great distance from the home coast. This applies with greater force when the home coast does not afford military facilities uniformly over its entire extent. At the present time, we still lack a first-class continental base on the Pacific; and while we possess Pearl Harbor and appreciate its vital importance both offensively and defensively, it is not yet fully equipped. A permanent advanced base that is secure, and has ample repair and docking facilities as well as supplies, is second in value only to the principal continental base. Its distance from the continent is almost an entire saving out of the total distance towards the theater of operations. The transportation costs remain and some exposure, in degree dependent on relative situation and saliency. Uncertainties and time are saved largely, especially time for combatant ships, which means a great military gain. With the growth in our country of strictness in neutral observances, the availability of situations for bases diminishes, making the establishment of permanent adequate positions in time of peace more and more imperative.
The possession, or the lack, of suitable bases determines whether the first naval operations of war shall be offensive or defensive. From a salient base already in possession, the fleet may at once, by an active course, prevent or neutralize the gain which would otherwise accrue to the enemy through delay on our part. Even were the fleet at a distance, there would still be advantage, in our fleet's freedom to proceed unencumbered by a train. When, however, the fleet is under the necessity of seizing a base, there is first delay until the convoy is complete, and then the expedition has to proceed at a low speed. It is tactically encumbered seriously, both by the presence of its convoy and by the fact of being on the defensive; and finally, even if the base be acquired without opposition, the fleet, after such an effort, is liable, in its first encounter with the enemy—an occasion of the highest importance—to be not at its best but rather in a worn material condition.
The most damaging result of having no base is the necessity for starting the war with the defensive attitude. With the quick wit and enterprise of our people, reasonable preparedness would give us a tremendous advantage. These same qualities, however, if not rightly employed—possible only through due preparation— taking ebullient form, would force an outlet in hasty, ill-considered action, leading to disaster. If the government be unable, or neglects, to make those principal preparations during peace which possible wars demand, we cannot expect that same government to have the power, in the early excitement of war, to conform the popular will to the careful procedure which, with initial unpreparedness, offers the only prospect of success.
Discussing the foresight which aims to acquire and equip during peace the positions needed for support in war, Mahan writes of "the inevitable tendency, the necessity, to proceed to the gradual acquisition of permanent bases as soon as national policy impels a navy to a new scene of activity." He names communications the "living connection with the national power." "Communications dominate war." Daring and robust vigor mark the activities sustained through a sound artery. When the life channel is precarious they show the grip of invalidism. Like other forms of human activity, this "living connection" will not spring into being full-grown. Such a course should be taken in peace as will enable a fleet to pursue the strong policy in war.
In extension of the saliency of permanent bases, advanced, temporary, or flying bases may be needed, according to the direction and character which the operations may take. The existence or absence of suitable places may determine the intended operations. Where a force may be sustained and refreshed in close proximity to its appointed station, the admiral may press vigorously some bold operation which would be impossible even to attempt from a distant base. Togo could not have watched Port Arthur so effectively from Wei-Hai-Wei or Chemuloo as from the Elliott Islands; nor would San Nicolas Mole or Nipe Bay have been equally effective for us against Santiago.
It can hardly be expected, however, that the United States will for some years to come possess in time of peace secure positions for use as naval bases at all the points that our naval effort may require for support of the national policies. Even were it probable that we had them at the principal points, there would still be other places where at some time in the campaign temporary occupancy might be necessary. For probable campaigns away from our continental coast we need extreme mobility of our naval force. This comes back with increased emphasis on the auxiliaries supporting the fleet. To quote Mahan again, "a fleet charged with the care of its base is a fleet by so far weakened for effective action— weakened both strategically and tactically." Conversely, a fleet like ours, whose probable employment demands that it be peculiarly unhampered strategically and tactically, must have bases wherever it needs them, and these to be dependable must be capable of taking care of themselves. The advance base force and outfit, therefore, if it is to be strong for its own defence as well as capable of rapid establishment in a new place, must be up to its work in all respects, to the degree that only well thought out preparation and thoroughly practiced organization can produce.
Certain preparations require large expenditures and outside sanction. The establishment of suitable bases falls under this head. But whether the bases be completed or not, and wherever they may be placed, there will always be large transport and supply requirements, and these should be thoroughly organized and arranged for now. Much of this can be done with small expenditure and without further authorization than already exists in law.
War organization might be divided into three main branches: (1) the permanent naval force, including the serviceable fleet and auxiliaries as they stand on the navy list in peace; (2) the auxiliary naval force, embracing the vessels of all kinds necessary to acquire for naval commission in war, in augmentation of the permanent force and for troop transportation; and (3) supply. Our existing naval administrative organization takes account of the first and the third—how effectively as a whole for a state of war is not a question for this paper. The organization of permanent auxiliaries into a squadron is the principal recommendation here. The second branch, comprising supplementary auxiliaries and troop transport, has not yet been adequately provided for, and it is in this direction also that great improvement could be made.
One step would place all sea transportation under the navy. Unless this be done there will be duplications, omissions, unaccountability, conflict of authority, weakness of control, inefficiency of material, and wasteful expenditure, besides the high initial expense due to having two branches of the government go into the ship market at the same time. This step would necessarily involve the interworking of the army and navy in transport matters, which can be provided for by the permanent association of one or more officers of the army general staff and quartermaster department with the naval transport organization.
The naval auxiliary and transport service administration should be under the division of operations, with no other function than to maintain preparation for complete or partial mobilization of the auxiliary naval force and sea transport. Already we have, in the navy yards, the branch hydrographic offices, the custom houses and the naval pay offices at all principal ports, the means necessary for the actual inspection, purchase, equipment, and supply of vessels and material. Before this point is reached a large amount of business is to be done in general arrangements; and in making these a careful study of coastal rail and sea traffic is necessary, in order to make sure that in taking over American vessels interior communication is not disorganized just at the time when its burden would become heaviest. The naval authorities need to keep in close touch with railroad and steamboat officials, therefore, as well as with foreign going shipping. In a paper on the 1911 army mobilization on the Mexican frontier, General Tasker H. Bliss commented on the railway transportation difficulties and delays. We are accustomed to count upon rapid and prompt movement of men and material within our own borders as a matter of course; but, as General Bliss points out, the actuality presents many difficulties. Accidents, bad weather, excursion crowds, etc., are frequent disturbers of railroad schedules in times of ordinary quiet. In war, with movements of large numbers and quantities, mostly in one general direction, the congestion is liable to be serious. Hence, in planning for the days of mobilization, when normal economic conditions will already be suffering, smoothness of administration, private and public, is very important; and unless our plans avoid all unnecessary disturbance of normal commercial transport, we help defeat our own ends.
Another most important measure necessary to insure reliability of logistics in war is the establishment in peace of a naval reserve, of adequate enrollment and training of the merchant marine and ex-naval men. The merchant marine taken into service will be largely employed in duty with the train and bases. Some naval experience for them before the outbreak of war would be an obvious advantage. Here lies a large field for the auxiliary squadron.
The general preparation for war during peace comprehends all branches of the art of war; but unless the degree of preparation is uniform in all branches, deficiency in one impairs the others also. In a healthy body, symmetry is requisite not alone in organism but also in development. Lack of symmetry in preparation leads to improvisation, to supply deficiencies. Improvised means, whether men or material, lack the trained character and tested reliability of the regular. And not only is it they that are less efficient. The commander fated to use them is hampered, through inability to gauge their real capabilities—anxious not to entrust them with too much, yet unwilling to utilize less than the full value which such means ought to represent. Makeshifts in military measures have long been our curse.
The postponement of logistic preparation until war begins adds great expense outright, by reason of many purchases being made under pressure. No experience shows that more clearly than ours in the Spanish war. But it does not stop there; for with high cost for poor material goes a restricted market. With preparation completed in advance, every advantage is open, especially when salient bases are adequately equipped. In such a situation, a navy could pass from a state of peace to one of war almost imperceptibly, and against an equal or less prepared power be initially so strong and commandingly placed as to dominate the opening campaign if not the entire war, or even to prevent a war's outbreak altogether.
The well-ordered arrangements of a campaign begin during peace, and unless largely completed before war becomes imminent will lack the tested adjustment which marks the difference between well considered plans and hastily improvised expedients. Test and adjustment are fundamental principles of sound naval practice, so that it is inconceivable that we should wittingly neglect any preparation for the conduct of war which is in our power to make.
Initial advantage in preparation tends to secure the initial success. In the froth of popular discussion of our military affairs, hardly yet crystallized into a policy, the probability of initial disaster has by many been lightly accepted, in the confidence of ultimate success; but, aside from the inhumanity of thus courting waste of life which might be spared, history teaches that few causes so fortify the numerically weaker contestant as initial success, which thorough preparedness may make possible to him.
In policy, no deliberation would be complete that did not take into account the logistic magnitude of any conflict liable to evolve. In major strategy, appreciation of the logistic problems of both sides is necessary to sound conclusions. In strategy of the theater of operations, a belligerent's own logistics determine his attitude, and limit the freedom, the reach, the force, the duration, and above all the confidence, with which he can act. Finally, in the strategy which merges directly into the tactics of battle, the efficiency of the logistics that have brought the forces to the fighting situation will be a large factor in the admiral's calculation. Superior physical and material condition count more than numbers. They have never existed with poor administration. Morale may occasionally surmount bad management, but only by supreme effort and excessive cost in life, too great to be prolonged. The only sure way to possess sound morale is to organize and work for it. Its basis is mutual confidence between superior and subordinate. Well-ordered arrangements not only produce sound physical and material condition, but instill that superior spirit and confidence which unite effort and intensify its power.