The United States should maintain the policies in which its people believe with a navy based on large battleships. These policies are not always clearly held before the public view; but those for which the country may sometime have to fight may be briefly stated as follows:
1. No entangling alliances.
2. America for the Americans.
3. An open market for all in the East.
4. The freedom of the seas for neutrals.
5. The superiority of the white race in America.
If the majority of the men and women of the United States believe in any one of these policies, or in all of them, it is the duty of the leaders, of the statesmen, to carry out that one or that all. This can be done by far-sighted political leadership, backed by force. Obviously, in our geographical position, the keenest, heaviest, weapon of force will be a strong and well-balanced navy. Such a navy will be one with a single objective in all its various departments—ability to successfully exert power at the necessary point. That is the real purpose of a navy.
The navy of the United States is for the citizens and is controlled by them through their representatives in the Congress and through the chief executive—the commander-in-chief. The commander-in-chief administers the navy directly through the officers, civil and military, appointed by him with the consent of the Senate. In turn these officers conduct the Navy Department with its various bureaus; the naval stations, building and repair plants; the educational institutions, and the battle fleet. In order that the fleet shall be a well-balanced, coordinated, fighting unit, all other departments and branches of the navy must be adjusted to that end—harmonized so that the wishes of the people will be expressed through the President to a fleet able instantly to exert the required pressure.
If we suppose, then, that all branches of the navy have been harmonized to the single objective of a combative fleet, the questions which we must propound are: Of what shall the body of this fleet consist? What class of vessels will best make the trunk of an organization, the purpose of which is to exert power at a particular point?
It is contended here that the most effective units for the intended purpose are large ships-of-the-line or battleships. By large battleships is meant those of the greatest practicable offensive and defensive power in guns, armor, cruising radius and speed; vessels of the type of the Oklahoma and the Pennsylvania. If the navy is supplied by the people with a certain amount of money to be expended on the body of a battle fleet it is claimed that the money can be put to better use in building the above-named type of vessels than in any other way.
The purpose of the navy is to exert pressure by the use or the "being" of the fleet; the mission of the fleet in war is to meet and destroy the main sea forces of the enemy. I shall endeavor to prove that not only the most effective, but the only effective instrument to this end is a force of large battleships with their proper auxiliaries.
For the large battleship embodies a concentration of power; a unified energy; an intensified strength in action.
I might argue that the large battleship is in the beginning, and is much more so in the end, a less expense in money to the state. I might contend that such a vessel is more economical in trained officers and men. These points may be proved, but it seems to me that they are comparatively of little importance. When that time comes when the armed force of the United States meets the enemy's fleet on the high seas, the great mass of people of this land in danger of invasion and, conquest will not think of the cost in money or in men. They will think and say: "Can we beat them?”
Beat them, destroy them, crush them. It all amounts to the same thing and that thing can be accomplished and can only be accomplished by a superior concentration of power.
The Century Dictionary defines concentration as: "The art of collecting or combining into or about a central point; the art of directing or applying to one object; the state of being brought from several or all directions to a common point or center, or into one mass or group." The principle of concentration is the basis of all successful strategy and tactics. The former may be termed the art of so directing military forces that they may advantageously make contact with the enemy, while the latter may be termed the science of maneuvering in the presence of a hostile body so that an overpowering energy can be brought to bear at some point of contact. All great leaders on land and sea have recognized these aims and have known that they depended upon concentration of some kind—concentration of strength in action.
In the battle of the Straits of Salamis, the first great decisive naval combat of which we have any account, the tactics were simple but effectual. The Greeks under the command of Themistocles and Eurybiades mustered 366 fighting galleys. The Persian armada had been reduced to some 600 vessels. The Greek commander sent a detachment to guard his rear, and with the remaining 300 galleys, the largest and best commanded, with the pick of the Athenian, Spartan, and island soldiers and sailors, be formed a close succession of lines between Salamis and the mainland. In this way his flanks were absolutely protected and he was enabled to oppose Xerxes' fleet with a force equal to it at the line of contact and with this force to break up and defeat the Persians. It was like one able man defending with his fists a narrow passageway against a number of lesser men. Leonidas at Thermopylae had done the same thing; but neglected to protect his rear. It was the principle of concentration of strength in action.
Some 2000 years later in the history of naval warfare the Turks opposed the Christians in the battle of Lepanto, the last great engagement fought with oar-driven galleys. The fleets were approximately equal in numbers of galleys and galliots; but the Christians had developed a large type of vessel called a galleass, the dreadnought of that day. The galleass was a heavy, three-masted craft with blunt bows and a great amount of tumble-home. Numbers of guns were mounted on the high forecastle and poop and in broadside. Below the gun-deck was the rower's deck where from 100 to 200 men pulled at the massive oars. Don Juan of Austria, the Christian commander, had worked out his plans with great care and attention to detail. He appears to have had something of the Nelson genius and the "Nelson touch." At any rate, he brought the enemy to action and used his galleasses in such a way that they were the deciding factors in that action. His plan was to form the fleet in line abreast with two of the galleasses in front of the center and two in front of each of the flanks. The right flank under Doria, with his two galleasses, did not get into line in time to resist the Turkish advance, but, as the Moslem fleet in line swept down on Don Juan, the four galleasses in the Christian van demonstrated the worth of the big-gun-big-ship. The Ottoman line swayed and hesitated and was broken. Exposed to a storm of concentrated fire the galleys surged past in disarray and in that confusion were fallen upon by Don Juan's line. The battle, lasting about four hours, was hard fought; but Ali Pasha's disastrous and overwhelming defeat may be ascribed to the initial advantage, to the first heavy blow struck by the forerunners of the line-of-battle ship.
In a discussion of the value of the ship-of-the-line when compared to fast cruisers and commerce destroyers, Mahan says in his "Influence of Sea Power Upon History":
It was not the policy of 1667 (commerce destroying), but Cromwell's powerful fleet of ships-of-the-line in 1652, that shut the Dutch merchantmen in their ports and caused grass to grow in the streets of Amsterdam. When, instructed by the suffering of that time, the Dutch kept large fleets afloat through two exhausting wars, though their commerce suffered greatly, they bore up the burden of the strife against England and France united.
And later on in the same chapter after a most comprehensive survey of the relative values of fleets of ships-of-the-line and of commerce destroyers in the various English, Dutch, and French wars, the War of the American Revolution, the War of 1812, and the Civil War, Mahan sums up as follows:
It is not the taking of individual ships or convoys, be they few or many, that strikes down the money power of a nation; it is the possession of that overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy's flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive; and which, by controlling the great common, closes the highways by which commerce moves to and from the enemy's shores. This overbearing power can only be exercised by great navies, and by them (on the broad sea) less efficiently now than in the days when the neutral flag had not its present immunity. It is not unlikely that, in the event of a war between maritime nations, an attempt may be made by the one having a great sea power and wishing to break down its enemy's commerce, to interpret the phrase "effective blockade" in the manner that best suits its interest at the time; to assert that the speed and disposal of its ships make the blockade effective at much greater distances and with fewer ships than formerly. The determination of such a question will depend, not upon the weaker belligerent, but upon neutral powers; it will raise the issue between belligerent and neutral rights; and if the belligerent have a vastly overpowering navy, he may carry his point, just as England, when possessing the mastery of the seas, long refused to admit the doctrine of the neutral flag covering the goods.
That Mahan was as great a prophet as he was an historian has been proved again and again.
It is probable that Napoleon was the greatest military strategist and tactician of modern times. He had a "topographical" mind. His genius was due to those qualities of acquiring accurate, detailed information; card indexing that knowledge in the proper files of the map of Europe carried in his head, and then acting quickly and decidedly to concentrate on his enemy's line of communications and strike that enemy or some part of him with a superior force. As long as he held to these principles he was successful. When, after 1810, he began to overrate himself, when he attempted the Peninsular War and the Russian War, when he abandoned the principle of concentration, he failed.
During the latter part of the seventeenth and the greater part of the eighteenth century it was customary for naval actions to be fought between fleets sailing close-hauled in parallel columns either in the same or in opposite directions. In this way ships were able to engage their whole broadsides with their opposites; but unless one belligerent was in overwhelming force the combats were frequently indecisive. It remained for Rodney to break the line at Saint's passage and by concentrating a local superiority of force win a decisive victory. Nelson, however, was the greatest exponent of these tactics and Trafalgar is the best example of their use. Briefly the action was as follows:
The allied French and Spanish fleet of 33 line-of-battle ships was in an irregular column on the port tack heading generally about north-northeast. The British fleet had the weather gauge, the wind being light from the northwest, and was in two squadrons; the northerly one of 12 ships led by Nelson in the Victory; the southerly one led by Collingwood in the Royal Sovereign. On signal from the flagship these two squadrons bore up and approached the allied fleet at an acute angle. Collingwood's squadron was headed so as to engage the Santa Ana and the 15 rear ships of the allied column. Nelson's squadron was apparently about to engage the van. At 11.30, as the Royal Sovereign came under fire, the Victory changed her course to the eastward and at 12 o'clock led the windward division into the allied center. Thus, for some time, the entire British fleet in overwhelming force was in action with 22 of the French and Spanish ships. The morale of the allied van was probably somewhat shaken. Admiral Dumanoir, taken by surprise, held his course in spite of Villeneuve's repeated signals to engage. In any event, it would have taken considerable time for him to fall upon the British. The breeze being very light he could not tack; if he had worn, his ships would have been well to leeward, unable to force the fighting. There can be no excuse offered for Dumanoir; his lack of initiative enabled Nelson to achieve a great local superiority of force, to attain a concentrated strength of action. The battle lasted until five in the afternoon; but, as at Lepanto, was decided in the first hour.
Tsushima, the battle which decided the outcome of the Russian-Japanese War, is another and modern example of the virtues of a concentrated attack. At 2 o'clock the Russian main fleet was standing on a northeasterly course at about 12 knots in two columns; the right, containing the first division led by the admiral in the Suvaroff, slightly in advance of the left, containing the second and third divisions led by the Osslyabya. The Japanese main body of 12 ships was due north of the Russian second division and had begun to form single column and turn to the east-northeast, attempting to cap the enemy. The range at the time the Japanese began their turn was about 8000 yards. Rojestvensky opened fire on the Mikasa, and for a few minutes the Japanese were in a precarious position. Their ships were exposed to a heavy but ineffectual enfilading fire; concentrated, but not on the target. The Mikasa commenced firing at 2.10 when the range was less than 7000 yards. As the Japanese column straightened out, the Russians formed an irregular single column to the eastward. It was at this time that the Japanese closed to about 5000 yards and delivered their hottest fire. The Osslyabya was in flames. The rapidity and accuracy of the Japanese fire were remarkable. Semenoff, then on the Suvaroff, says:
I had not only never witnessed such a fire before, but I had never imagined anything like it. Shells seemed to be pouring upon us incessantly.
The fleet of Japan, with its greatly superior speed, was enabled to range ahead and center its fire on the Russian leaders. To quote Semenoff: "His 12 ships were in perfect order at close intervals, steaming parallel to us, but gradually forging ahead. No disorder was noticeable. . . . . But with us? I looked around. What havoc! Burning bridges, smouldering debris on the decks, piles of dead bodies." At this point, the Japanese official account, translated by Lieutenant W. T. Hoadley, U. S. M. C., says:
The Suvaroff, the leading ship, and the Imperator Alexander III, the second ship, both caught fire. The other ships, one after another, met the same fate. . . . . Our main fleet, while continuing the attack, ran to the southeastward and took position ahead of the enemy.
The essential part of the battle was over. The rest was merely a completion of the destruction. The Japanese won largely through their ability to deliver a hot, concentrated fire from a superior tactical position.
Now, since fleets are meant to exert strength in action—to win battles; and, since history shows us that battles are won on land and sea by securing an advantageous tactical position and delivering an overwhelming, concentrated fire, is it not logical to compose our fleets of units which are the embodiment of concentrated power—of large battleships? Such a vessel of war is necessarily a compromise. It must combine many qualities, and cannot wholly sacrifice one for the purpose of obtaining others. It must have sufficient radius of action to allow it to take and keep the sea at a distance from its base for long periods of time. It must have a maximum speed which will permit it to force an action when the commander-in-chief so desires, superior speed being the modern equivalent of the weather gauge. It must be protected in its vitals; able to withstand cruel punishment, such pounding as the Chen-yuen and Ting-yuen received at the Yalu. It must, above all, be able to deliver from guns and torpedo tubes the greatest possible accurate and sustained fire effect.
For only by bringing the enemy to action, receiving and giving blows, can battles be won. The ship of this type may be compared to the finely trained heavy-weight pugilist, able to endure tremendous punishment while beating his adversary into a coma. With the ship, as with the boxer, a preponderance of offensive skill and strength will largely, not wholly, make up for a lack of defensive toughness. As Farragut expressed it:
The best protection against the enemy's fire is the steady fire of your own guns.
Only a ship of great displacement is capable of combining these four essential characteristics—steaming radius, speed, ability to withstand punishment, power to deliver heavy blows. Admiral Fiske says in the North American Review for November, 1915:
There are two main reasons for building a small number of large ships rather than a large number of small ships. The first reason is that large ships are much more steady, reliable, safe and fast than small ships. The second reason is that, when designed for any given speed, the large ships have more space available for whatever is to be carried; one 15-knot ship of 20,000 tons normal displacement, for instance, has about one and one-half times as much space available for cargo, guns and whatnot, as four 15-knot ships of 5000 tons each. These two reasons apply to merchant ships as well as naval ships. A third reason applies to naval vessels only, and is that a few large ships can be handled much better together than a large number of small ships, and embody that "concentration of force" which it is the endeavor of strategy and tactics to secure. A fourth reason is the obvious one that large ships can carry larger guns than small ships.
The displacement or weight of a ship may be divided roughly into four parts to correspond to the tactical qualities required. First, there is that component which may be assigned to radius of action: this includes fuel and storage capacity, as well as living space. Then, some part is allotted to speed: boilers, engines and auxiliaries. Next, a certain weight is apportioned to defensive armament: this includes armor, cellular division of hull, and torpedo defence guns. Finally, some amount of the displacement is specified for purely offensive armament: for the torpedoes, powder and shells, and heavy guns. It is feasible, according to the best authorities, to allot about 20 per cent of the total displacement to that potential offensive power, the heavy guns with their ammunition. Thus, if we wish to mount twelve 14-inch guns, with a supply of 120 rounds for each, we should find that the total weight would be 5700 tons, requiring a displacement of at least 28,000 tons. The Pennsylvania's is 31,400. In one salvo, such a battery would throw at the target about eight tons of metal; while two vessels of the Michigan class, each half the size of the Pennsylvania and each mounting eight 12-inch guns, would only throw at the target a quantity of metal less than seven tons in weight. The total exploding charge carried to the target in the salvo from the two Michigans would be about 3 per cent of the weight of metal or 408 pounds, while in the case of the broadside from the Pennsylvania the exploding charge would be about 3½ per cent of the weight of metal or 560 pounds. Moreover, the respective penetrating powers, at mean ranges, of the 12-inch and 14-inch guns are in the approximate ratio of 12 to 15.
It would be possible to mount four 14-inch guns, but no more than four, on a vessel of 10,000 tons displacement or one-third that of the Pennsylvania. Then three such vessels would be equal in gun power to the large battleship. But, though practicable to mount four 14-inch guns on a vessel of 10,000 tons, it would not be possible to give such a vessel all the qualities of endurance, radius of action, and speed, of a Pennsylvania. Some characteristics must be sacrificed. In addition, a battleship of this type, simply because of its comparatively small size, would be neither as good a gun platform nor as good a sea boat as one of 30,000 tons. These are points of vast importance. Seaworthiness is not alone a matter of comfort; it is frequently a matter of ability to cast loose and fight in a heavy sea when a less worthy ship is burying her guns beneath every wave. There is all the difference betwen a poor gun platform and a good one that there is between an automobile ride over a country road and one over the Coney Island Speedway.
I have said that these three 10,000-ton battleships would be equal in gun power to a Pennsylvania, but that does not mean that they would be equal in hitting efficiency—in concentration of hits on one target. It is a well-recognized fact in fire control, that with more than two ships concentrating on one target, there is a certain loss of hitting power. In order to gain a maximum fire efficiency it is necessary that neither the rapidity nor the accuracy of fire of the individual ships be reduced. Experience has shown that ships concentrating on the same target, in order to avoid confusion should not fire simultaneously, but in succession. Now if we assume the time between successive salvos on each ship to be 40 seconds, there will certainly not be time for more than two ships to concentrate on one target without interference destructive to accuracy. If we assume a greater time between salvos, there will be an aggregate loss in rapidity of fire.
Let us imagine a fleet composed of 30 of these 10,000-ton battleships fighting an action against 10 Pennsylvanias. That a fleet of 30 small battleships would be difficult to handle is evident. We shall asume that the two commanders-in-chief are equal in ability. We shall not take into consideration that supreme factor—the morale of the personnel. Since the small battleships have no superior speed, they are not likely to gain an initial advantage of position. If in a simple line or column at a distance of 400 yards, they will be spread over 11,600 yards of sea, while the larger battleships at 500 yards distance will be concentrated in a column only 4500 yards long. Is it not reasonable to suppose that the commander-in-chief of the Pennsylvanias would keep his fleet at extreme range, direct his fire at the 10 nearest small ships, remaining out of range of all or nearly all of the others, while overwhelming the first 10 with a fire three times their own weight? Upon crushing them, would he not drop back to the next 10, and so on?
This is the same principle, in a different form, of the concentrated strength in action shown by the Greeks at Salamis, by the Christians at Lepanto, by Nelson at Trafalgar, and by Togo at Tsushima. It is not meant to contend that the big ship has always won over the small one or that it always will. Frequently in the past the concentrated energy has been in the brain of the commander-in-chief and in his men rather than in the material of his fleet. Superior skill and discipline will win battles in the future as in the past; but, with these qualities considered equal, it seems clear that strength in action is best exemplified in the large battleship.
Those who are not in sympathy with the plea for the large battleship will say: "If one Pennsylvania is more valuable than two Michigans or three vessels of 10,000 tons, why not build a great ship of 60,000 tons, which, according to the above reasoning, would be worth more than two Pennsylvanias?" Well, why not build a 60,000-ton ship? The idea is not at all chimerical. Merchant vessels of that gross displacement were built several years ago. The only limits are the Panama Canal locks, the drydocks and the channels to our harbors. Is there anything more fantastic now about a 60,000-ton man-of-war, than there was 10 years ago about one of 30,000 tons? Such a vessel can be built—by some other nation. If the argument in favor of large battleships is good, if it is conceded that the body of the fleet should be composed of the most powerful type of fighting machine, why not risk something and construct a 60,000-ton ship now?
The dimensions might be somewhat as follows: Length, 725 feet; extreme beam, 102 feet; mean draft, 30 feet. A craft of these measurements, which I am merely assuming for one of 60,000 tons, would be able to dock in Newport News, Norfolk, Philadelphia, Boston or New York; only at high water, however, and after some changes have been made in existing or projected drydocks. Twelve thousand tons would be available for the main battery; enough for sixteen 6-inch guns, mounted four in a turret. These guns would throw in one salvo shells weighing 32,000 pounds, with a total bursting charge of 4½ per cent or 1440 pounds, and a penetrating power at mean range of 18 inches of Krupp armor. .Given a speed of 25 knots, and taking into consideration the concentration of power and simplicity of fire control, would not such a "large battleship" be more than equal to two Pennsylvanias or four Delawares? This may all sound like a dream; but a little dreaming mixed with a great deal of practical experience, such as our constructors have, ought to produce the ultimate type now rather than 10 years hence. It could not have been very long ago that someone dreamed the 42-centimeter howitzer—some American.
Thus far has been considered only one type of vessel, with which to make up the body of the fleet, in opposition to the large ship-of-the-line which has upheld the policies of great seafaring states since the days of Olaf Tryggveson. This type has the disadvantage of non-concentration, and a great advantage in that the loss of one ship is small loss to the fleet. The so-called battle cruiser has not been mentioned because it is, in reality, a large battleship with some offensive energy and considerable defensive armament sacrificed to speed. Battle cruisers are to-day necessary adjuncts to our fleet, simply because other great powers, with which we may come in contact, are equipped with them. There are, however, several other genera of vessels that might be proposed as foundations for the effective defence of America. Let us next consider the kind that largely surrenders defensive and offensive powers to speed and radius of action. Not the great battle cruiser, but the typical commerce destroyer, the corsair of the seas.
Fast commerce destroyers have been used in all ages. From the time of the long-oared Phoenician galleys, the piratical craft that roamed the Mediterranean and sometimes ventured into the broad Atlantic, to the vivid present, to this day of the Emden and Moewe, the commerce destroyer has been a recognized and capable instrument of war on the sea. But, capable as it has been in executing the purpose which its name implies, it has not in the past decided the results of great conflicts between armed states. Is it likely that the future will show a reversal of history?
England, in the reign of Charles II, after waging, with her fleets of ships-of-the-line, a successful war against the Dutch, placed these ships out of commission and determined through motives of economy to bring the conflict to an end by means of commerce-destroying frigates and privateers. The result was what might have been expected. De Ruyter, with a fleet of 60 line-of-battle ships sailed up the Thames, burned Chatham, destroyed merchantmen as far up as Gravesend, and remained in possession of the mouth of the river for several weeks. One month later the king agreed to peace.
Between 1701 and 1713, during the War of the Spanish Succession, it was the French nation that held to a policy of commerce destroying without adequate fleets. "Gibraltar temporarily in the possession of the English” to this day is one of the results.
In 1756, the Seven Years' War broke out. Again France relied on cruisers and privateers to capture and destroy the enemy's merchant shipping. Martin, in his "History of France," says: "From June, 1756, to June, 1760, French privateers captured from the English more than 2500 merchantmen. In 1761, though France had not, so to speak, a single ship-of-the-line at sea, and though the English had taken 240 of our privateers, their comrades still took 812 vessels. But the prodigious growth of the English shipping explains the number of these prizes." As Mahan so ably shows, these great losses of individual Englishmen caused suffering, but did not effect materially the growing strength and prosperity of the country as a whole. Great Britain and her allies, with their fleets, secured the most valuable colonies of France and Spain, including Canada and the great American hinterland. France was terribly humiliated by Lord Chatham in the Treaty of Paris, which in Article XIII provides that: "The Cunette (at Dunkirk) shall be destroyed immediately after the exchange of ratifications of the present treaty, as well as the forts and batteries that defend the entrance from the sea; and provision shall be made at the same time for insuring good air and health of the inhabitants, by such means as shall be approved by the King of Great Britain." The French ministry, by its parsimonious naval policy, allowed disgrace to fall upon a kingdom, and lost an empire in the west.
However, France learned its lesson and, in the war of the American Revolution, put great fleets of ships-of-the-line upon the sea—fleets under Suffren and de Grasse. The surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown was one of the consequences.
The War of 1812 is of particular interest to Americans. Many successful frigate actions were fought. American cruisers and privateers captured or sank large numbers of the enemy's merchantmen and whalers in the Atlantic and Pacific. For the first two years the naval warfare on British trade was conducted with vigor and good fortune. But, when Napoleon fell and the British ships-of-the-line, which had been guarding the French "fleets in being" at Toulon and Brest, were released for duty abroad, our frigates were blockaded in port, an army was landed on the banks of the Chesapeake, and Washington was burned.
Again, in the Civil War, the damage done to Union shipping by the Florida, the Sumpter, the Alabama, and other Confederate cruisers, was tremendous; but that damage did not affect the final result in the slightest. That result was accomplished by a process of attrition, made possible by an iron-bound naval blockade on the sea and rivers, supplemented by overwhelming concentrated attacks at the strategic points on land.
The admirable conclusion following a discussion of this subject written by the late Admiral Mahan has been quoted in the opening part of this essay. At the end of "The Influence of Sea Power Upon History" he sums up as follows:
Commerce destroying by independent cruisers depends upon wide dissemination of force. Commerce destroying through control of a strategic center by a great fleet depends upon concentration of force. Regarded as a primary, not as a secondary operation, the former is condemned, the latter justified, by the experience of centuries.
There remain two types of craft that, it may be contended, can be used to protect the United States against invasion. The type which has apparently done such effective service in the present conflict—the submarine; and the much discussed semi-submersible ship-of-war.
The submarine, by no means a new implement of warfare, has developed remarkably within the past 10 years and will, undoubtedly, continue that rapid development. It is essentially an instrument with which a state, relatively weak in sea power, may harass or worry an opponent; but it does not have the characteristics necessary to make it a decisive factor in war, the distinguishing traits incorporated in the expression, "concentrated strength in action." The submarine has, or can be given, great radius of action, fair speed below the surface as well as on the surface, the defensive property of submerging, and the offensive power of a considerable number of torpedoes. On the other hand, it lacks proper vision, the mobility is comparatively poor, systems of communication when submerged are not adequate, and it has proved recently to be extremely vulnerable to small, agile, screening and patrol vessels.
It is, of course, not asserted that submarines are of no military value. It is claimed that they cannot take the place of capital ships as a basis of naval defence, because they do not and, necessarily, cannot come up to the requirements of an instrument of war which has for its object "to meet and destroy the main sea forces of the enemy."
For, in order to meet the enemy, it is essential to have a speed and mobility about equal to his; and in order to destroy the enemy, it is necessary to concentrate and deliver an overwhelming attack. It is unreasonable to suppose that the submarine running submerged can ever attain a speed comparable to that of surface craft. This is merely a matter of physics and laws of resistance. When, however, the submarine is in a "light" condition it is extremely assailable. It may be attacked with comparative impunity by destroyers, air craft, and motor boats. If it submerges on the approach of these enemies, it is still visible to aeroplanes which may direct sweeping and netting operations. Probably, heavy gun-fire will never be used as a primary defense against submarine attack when these vessels are acting in conjunction with battleships which are in contact with the enemy. But, when large battleships with their auxiliaries are fighting against sea-going submarines assisted, perhaps, by hydroplanes, the high-powered rifles will, undoubtedly, be used to throw 12- or 14-inch common shell and shrapnel at the enemy. The submarine on the surface is visible to a battleship at from 12,000 to 14,000 yards, moderate gun range. Once visible, it can instantly be put under fire. Then it must either remain "light" and retain its speed or submerge. If it chooses the former course it will be subjected to a series of high-explosive shell salvos at a probable rate of one volley every 30 seconds. Since one hit is sufficient to demolish the strongest submarine, is it not likely that the boat's life under these conditions would be exceedingly short? If it chooses the alternative method of procedure, it will lose its chance of getting to torpedo range—4000 to 8000 yards. Moreover, since it takes about five minutes to go from "light"to submerged condition, the boat is in imminent peril of being destroyed while going down. Five minutes under the concentrated fire of a dreadnought will seem like an eternity and will very probably lead toward eternity.
In a discussion of "The Future of the Submarine," appearing in the North American Review for October, 1915, Franklin D. Roosevelt states the case plainly as follows:
The submarine has come to stay. It has taken its place, not as the sole weapon in naval offence and defence, but as an adjunct to other weapons. That it is useful for coast defence, for commerce destroying, for scouting purposes, and as a part of the protection to and attacking power of a battleship fleet is established. That it alone is capable of defending a coast against invasion is claimed only by the type of people in this country to whom national defence means preventing an enemy from landing an armed force on our Atlantic or Pacific seaboard—a Chinese wall kind of defence that requires necessarily the total abandonment of Alaska, of the Canal, of Hawaii and our other dependencies overseas, the stopping of our exports and imports and the inability to protect against aggression our citizens abroad and our well-considered international policies. In other words, free communications across the seas are just as much an integral part of our national defence as is the protection of New York harbor.
In the same magazine for the month of September, 1915, that eminent naval authority, Admiral Goodrich, writes:
In one sense it may be said that this war is between the battleship and the submarine. The latter has certainly come to stay. It has lately taken on the role of a gun-vessel, in addition to that of a torpedo-boat. I have long known confidentially that it has been extensively used as a scout. The submarine has brought new problems into naval tactics, which must gravely influence the handling of battleships. It acts, however, under two disadvantages. Its invisibility is not entirely completed. It must at least lift its periscope above the water in order to recognize its target, and it is extremely vulnerable.
Finally, the general board of the navy; in its report dated November 9, 1915, after a brief but convincing analysis, of the recent work of the submarine, asserts:
Both in the North Sea and in the Mediterranean the submarine upon its first appearance scored heavily. Its high score was obtained by surprise; it was not due to inherent combative superiority.
And later on the board says:
The submarine is a most useful auxiliary, whose importance will no doubt increase, but at the present time there is no evidence that it will become supreme.
But if the submarine cannot take the place of the dreadnought in the main battle line of our country, what may be said for and against the semi-submerged battleship, a by no means visionary craft, which has been discussed by naval officers here and abroad for years?
Lieutenant V. N. Bieg, U. S. N., in an article in the UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS of January-February, 1915, describes a proposed heavily armored submersible as a ship with a hull designed mainly for surface running. "No provision for diving would be made." He says farther on: "Due to the fact that the hull would not be specially constructed to withstand the pressure encountered in deep water, it would be possible to build the ship any size, the only restrictions being the requirements for speed and the limit of power for oil engines. If steam were used, and with proper design this is possible; as has been proved in the Katahdin, this latter limit is not narrow." Reliance would be placed on invulnerability rather than on invisibility. He asserts that: "At practical torpedo ranges the angle of fall for large guns would be so small that an underwater run of projectiles would be exceedingly rare, and it is believed that even the largest shells impinging upon an almost flat armored deck would be ineffective, so that the nearer the submersible approached her enemy the more secure from attack she would become." In claiming this, Lieutenant Bieg forgets that it is a simple and economical expedient to increase the angle of fall of projectiles by decreasing the powder charge. He then goes on to show, "that with side armor extending only 6 feet below the surface when the ship is submerged, the protection afforded would be ample." But, even if the proposed submersible were equipped with 10,000-yard torpedoes, it would require side and deck armor 15.6 inches thick to resist the penetration of 12-inch, armor-piercing shells fired at that range. Moreover, it would clearly be at least as susceptible to torpedo attack from auxiliary submarines, destroyers and scouts as the surface battleship.
In The Independent of September 30, 1909, Park Benjamin outlines "The New Altrurian Battleship" as follows:
Now the Altrurian vessel looked a good deal like a "whale back," such as one sees on the Great Lakes, only she was longer and narrower, say 500 feet in length and perhaps not over 30 or 40 feet in beam. Her deck, which curved over on each side, rose at the highest barely 3 feet above the water and was armored. Nothing showed on it except a low conning-tower and a periscope tube, which, as is now common in torpedo-boats and submarines, projected the picture of her surroundings upon the whitened table in front of the helmsman far below the water-line. Her frames were of light but excessively strong steel, some one of the odd alloys which have lately been invented, and they were filled in with immensely strong but again light comprest paper pulp. Oil carried in her double bottom supplied the fuel for her tremendously powerful internal combustion engines, which drove a multiplicity of propellers, and gave her a speed of at least 35 knots per hour. Her sole armament was 10 fish torpedoes on each side, each delivered from a separate water-tight compartment, each capable of going straight for 4000 yards under water, and at a speed of perhaps 37 knots, and in the racks adjacent to each torpedo-tube were six spare torpedoes. The absence of guns and of all armor except the protective deck, together with the light construction of the hull, rendered it possible to give to the gas engines the high power noted, not only for a sudden dash, but for comparatively long periods of time, and while the vessel was driving ahead, a peculiar formation of her bow sent the sea over her for a depth probably sufficient to cause any projectile striking her at the necessarily low angle to glance and ricochet from her deck without penetration. The Altrurians found that they could build six vessels like that for the cost of one dreadnought, and that she needed for her management less than one-fifth of a dreadnought's crew. And because of her speed she could lie far off from the fleet and arrive close at hand at any desired moment, say in thick or foggy weather, or when the fleet was threading narrow straits, or otherwise navigating troublesome waters.
At the time the above was written this sounded, perhaps, phantasmagorial; but the subject has lately been brought before the people by Captain Sims, and it is possible that the near future will see a semi-submerged battleship in action. If so, it is likely to be as an adjunct to a great fleet; certainly not as the basis of that fleet.
When compared with the battleship, the proposed undersea craft would seem to have three great disadvantages: It would be extremely uncomfortable. It would lack mobility. It would not be able to exert an overwhelming concentration of force at a particular tactical point. In addition, the cost would probably approach that of the large surface ship.
Comfort should not be a primary requisite of any man-of-war, but discomfort has a certain effect on the morale and health of the officers and crew that cannot and should not be disregarded. The care that Nelson exercised in providing for the health and happiness of the British crews before Toulon is said to have been largely responsible for the glorious victory of Trafalgar.
Mobility and concentration of force at a particular tactical point may be considered together since the latter depends in great degree upon the former. In spite of the great speeds claimed possible for the semi-submersible, it is difficult to comprehend how any vessel which has to overcome the resistance of water against its entire hull can attain a velocity through this fluid comparable to that of a ship traveling on the surface. With sufficiently powerful engines high speed is, perhaps, possible; but, as the demand for horse-power increases, so will the displacement grow. Displacement given to speed must be taken away from fuel and stores and living space, and from armor and torpedoes. in other words, rapidity of motion is acquired only at the expense of radius of action, defensive toughness and offensive energy. Concentrated strength in action requires: First, ability to force the fighting; next, preponderating power at the tactical point. The semi-submersible cannot fulfill both of these demands, therefore it is not logical to assume that it can take the place of the battleship.
The United States of America has certain ideals which it must preserve. These ideals comprehend definite national policies in which the people believe. Such policies must be upheld by farsighted political action backed by force. Because of the character of some of these policies and because of the geographical position of this country, it is clear that the most effective implement of force is a powerful and well-balanced navy. The purpose of a navy is to exert pressure. It is here maintained that pressure can be best brought to bear by a fleet having for its mission in war ‘to meet and destroy the main sea forces of the enemy.’ The affirmation has been made that this mission can be most thoroughly accomplished if the body of the fleet is made up of the biggest of all-big-gun-ships. Proposed substitutes for this class have been considered under four general heads: The small battleship in the strict sense of the word, the fast cruiser or commerce destroyer, the submarine, and the so-called semi-submersible. Evidence has been put forth tending to show that, useful as these various classes of vessels may be when employed in an auxiliary capacity, they cannot be substituted for large battleships in the main fighting line. It is claimed that the great ship-of-the-line, from the early days of history, has justified itself when handled by commanders and men of skill and character. It is held that, the lesson of the past should be the criterion of the future.
Consider the end—concentrated strength in action.