A Letter from Mr. Roger Upton
Devereux, Marblehead, Mass., January 14, 1917.
Secretary of the United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md.
Dear Sir: I have been asked by several naval officers to write an article for the United States Naval Institute Proceedings, describing the United States power squadrons and setting forth suggestions relative to the organization of a motor-boat patrol.
I am not a good writer, but as I have navigated and cruised the Atlantic coast between Saint John, New Brunswick, and Norfolk, Virginia, for over 30 years, in steam, sail and motor yachts varying from 30 to 130 feet in length, and in merchant vessels, and have for over five years made a careful and intimate study of motorboats, it may be assumed that I am somewhat familiar with the coast, with yachtsmen and with motor-boats. From my association with naval officers I have obtained some idea of what would be required of a motor-boat patrol. Therefore, this letter is sent for whatever it may be worth and the question of its publication in the Proceedings naturally remains to be decided by you.
In 1912 the motor-boat owners of the Boston Yacht Club associated themselves together in what was then called a Power-Boat Division. Their purposes were to establish a high standard of skill in the handling and navigation of motor-boats, to promote social intercourse among themselves, and to try to so qualify themselves as to be of possible assistance to the United States Navy in time of war. In organizing the division, and in undertaking their drills and maneuvers, these owners were greatly assisted by suggestions and advice from Rear Admiral W. F. Fullam, U. S. N., and Commodore Edward Lloyd, U. S. N., retired. The division proved to be a success, and as a result a similar division was organized in the Portland Yacht Club of Portland, Maine. In 1913, at the request of the then commodore of the Boston Yacht Club, the name of the organization was changed to Power Squadron of the Boston Yacht Club.
News of the organization had clearly reached the Navy Department, because I was requested by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy to go to Washington and explain it. I did so, and was then asked by him to try to extend the movement among other yacht clubs and thus make it a national movement. I reluctantly assented to his request, as most of my time was, and is, taken up by my business interests, and I also much prefer to remain in the background rather than occupy a position towards the front of the stage. Invitations were sent to over 80 yacht clubs on the Atlantic coast to attend a conference on the subject. Thirty-three of the clubs sent delegates to a conference in New York, where the matter was explained and discussed. Three months later, a second conference was held and 22 clubs voted to form a national organization. The name selected for the national organization was United States Power Squadrons, and each branch unit was called a local squadron. The purposes of the organization were an extension of the original purposes of the first Power-Boat Division. Mr. Henry A. Morss of the Eastern Yacht Club was of invaluable help in planning the national organization, and the government evinced its interest by sending to the conferences Bear Admiral Fullam. to represent the Navy Department, and Deputy Commissioner of Navigation A. J. Tyrer, to represent the Department of Commerce. The organization was laid out on semi-naval or military lines, there being a chief commander, a vice commander, a rear commander, a secretary, a treasurer, four members-at-large of the governing board, a committee on rules, a committee on instruction and examination, and district boards of instruction and examination. The Navy Department and the Department of Commerce were each to have a representative on the governing board, and Vice Admiral D. W. Coffman was appointed to represent (and does now represent) the Navy, while Mr. Tyrer was appointed to represent (and does now represent) Commerce.
To ensure proper responsibility the organization was made an incorporated body, a charter being taken in Massachusetts, and the legal name being United States Power Squadrons. Incorporated.
The distinguishing flag first adopted by the national organization was a red, white and blue streamer or pennant, with a white star in the red, to be displayed as a commission pennant at the masthead day and night. This pennant proved acceptable and was well liked. It was, however, objected to by the Navy Department as not being distinctive enough. After careful deliberation and consideration, the present distinguishing flag was adopted, upon the advice of the Navy Department. It is a rectangular flag, the width being nineteen thirty-sixths of the length, consisting of a fly of seven blue and six white alternate vertical stripes of equal width and a red field containing a circle of 13 white five-pointed stars surrounding a white foul anchor. The idea advanced by the Navy Department was to have something on the lines of the blue ensign of England, which is used to denote naval reserve, wherefore the design approximated our yacht ensign with the colors reversed and with the stripes vertical instead of horizontal. (Horizontal stripes of blue and white would too closely approximate the colors of Greece, Cuba and Salvador.) To any person at all familiar with flags, this squadron flag cannot for a moment be contused with any other flag habitually used in our waters. The flag is protected by patent and by registration.
Then came the question of where the squadron flag should be displayed. Custom has decreed that motor yachts shall display a club flag at the bow, the owner's private signal at the masthead, and the yacht ensign at the stern, and we should remember that few, if any, motor-boats have over one mast. To display the squadron flag at a spreader would not accord with etiquette; to display it on the same hoist with another flag would brand the owner as a landlubber; to display it in place of the club flag or the private signal was not favored by the owners. What should be done? At this moment, it was discovered that the yacht ensign is not legally an ensign at all, but merely a specific flag designated by the Secretary of the Navy as a distinguishing signal for yachts. Custom has made of that signal an ensign. There was, therefore, no reason why a squadron member should not display the squadron flag at the stem instead of the special yacht signal, and the majority of squadron members have so preferred to do. As a matter of fact, the United States Power Squadrons has never specified how and where its flag should be displayed, leaving that question to the preference of its individual members. Moreover, the national organization has always expected that, when associated with or maneuvering with vessels of the United States Navy, or acting under the orders of naval officers, the squadron flag would not be displayed, club flags and private signals would not be displayed, and the flag displayed at the stern of the motor-boats would be the United States ensign; and this was carefully observed by the squadron boats which participated in the naval maneuvers off Boston in September, 1916. When not on naval duty, and during peace, I personally can see no good reason why a squadron boat should not display the squadron flag at the stern, if the owner so wishes.
This question of the squadron flag has been much misunderstood, and even naval officers have incorrectly and unjustly commented thereon. A careful investigation of the facts would have revealed to all critics exactly what I have herein explained.
The United States Power Squadrons has to-day over 20 local squadrons or branches, new ones being formed at the average of about five each year. To care for the ever-increasing administrative work, there has been created the office of chairman of the governing board, while the chief commander is the head line officer and attends to the purely fleet or squadron work. The fundamental idea of the squadron movement has, I am told, had quite a little influence in the motor-boat patrols utilized by England, by Russia and by Germany. It is perhaps to the credit of the United States that the plan assumed concrete form at least two years before the outbreak of the present war in Europe.
Relative to a motor-boat patrol, my suggestions are based upon several premises, namely: 1. That motor-boats can successfully be used as scouts or eyes to help our own submarines; as scouts and patrol to give warning of the presence of enemy submarines and destroyers; as scouts, guards and patrol of mine fields, harbor entrances, channels, and inshore along the coast; as light drag-net boats and mine sweepers; as dispatch boats under certain conditions; as transports (in a small way) in cases of emergency.
2. That, with the existing shortage of naval officers (a condition likely to continue for some years), there could be spared in time of war very few, if any, naval officers to have charge of the many details concerned with an efficient motor-boat patrol.
3. That, to particularly provide against premise two, the motorboat patrol be so organized and trained as to form a complete organization of officers and men competent to look after all of their special affairs, always under the orders and general supervision of the naval officer commanding the district, or section, or fleet, or squadron, or naval force, with which or in which the motor-boat patrol units are assigned. In other words, as this is a specialized work, I would have the motor-boat patrol made responsible for all the details in a manner similar to the torpedo-boat organization of the German Navy, so many complete units being provided by the patrol to the naval officer in command. The naval officer need not then worry his mind about the details, knowing he would have ready for his use so many units, just as a skilled workman is kept supplied with sharp tools by his helper.
4. That the ideal patrol boats must eventually be built by the navy. In no other way do I believe the proper number of proper boats can be secured. I would not discourage private building. But thousands of boats would be required for a proper patrol. Such boats must be seaworthy and strong, able to remain out at least six days, capable of comfortably sleeping a double crew, able to mount the proper guns, and able to produce the desired speed. Personally, I do not see how all these requisites can be put into a hull less than 80 feet in length, and nearer 100 feet would be better. For the average patrol boat, I believe a normal speed of 16 knots with a maximum speed of 20 knots is all that will be needed and will be practical. The boats must of necessity be spaced not over a mile and a half apart, as that distance seems to be the limit of visibility of a periscope under the most favorable conditions, so speed is not a prime factor under such circumstances. It would appear useless to give the average patrol boat enough speed to run away from a destroyer, as in most cases the destroyer's guns could end the career of the patrol boat. The primary purpose of the patrol boat being to give the alarm, the question of escape would probably be chiefly dependent on chance, on indifference or preoccupation of the enemy, and on skill of the patrol skipper, rather than on high speed. For certain special work, it might be advisable to have a few very high speed boats, but to install in the average patrol boat the expensive and delicate machinery necessary to yield over 20 knots seems to me unnecessary.
5. That the training of the motor-boat patrol personnel be under the navy and on the boats built by the navy. But, until the necessary number of ideal boats is obtained, such training be on the privately owned motor-boats that can be secured. For such purpose, under present conditions, slow boats can provide at least 80 per cent of the desired training, and numbers of motorboats which the Navy Department considers not suitable are plenty good enough for training purposes until the ideal craft are available. Moreover, should war come before enough ideal boats are ready, the navy must of necessity utilize everything of any possible use. I know of many small, slow motor cruisers on which I would rather take my chances in a gale than on most of the high speed craft I have seen.
6. That the backbone of the personnel of the motor-boat patrol should be yachtsmen. Knowledge of local waters, keenness of observation and quickness of decision are forced upon the yachtsman by the very nature of his sport. Such men are peculiarly fit for the difficult special work of the motor-boat patrol. With their active cooperation an efficient motor-boat patrol can be established within 12 months. Without their cooperation, it would take five years to attain equal results. The average yachtsman is a man of moderate or limited financial means, and is dependent upon his occupation for his bread and butter. He seldom can leave his occupation for more than two continuous weeks at a time, and in planning for his vacation he must consult well in advance the exigencies of his occupation, the convenience of his associates and of his employers. To successfully interest the average yachtsman, the requirements of the motor-boat patrol should provide for not over 10 continuous days' duty afloat each year in addition to a certain number of week-end periods, and certain instruction meetings during the winter months. The proposed requirement of three continuous weeks' duty afloat each year would bar out 80 per cent of the very men who would be the most valuable for patrol work.
It should be remembered that for every wealthy yachtsman known to the public, there are from 40 to 50 yachtsmen, seldom heard of, of limited financial means but who nevertheless derive fully as much pleasure from the sea as does their wealthy brother.
7. I have no desire to pose as a naval expert, and have no intention of criticizing any individual naval officer. I do believe, however, that yachtsmen are more familiar with motor-boats, their needs, their advantages and disadvantages, than are naval officers. That is of necessity so, because few naval officers have had the chance to live in and handle a motor-boat as yachtsmen have had. For that reason, I believe that the yachtsmen can the more efficiently organize, officer, man, equip and maintain a motor-boat patrol, securing from the navy the needful training and discipline to properly accomplish the patrol duty.
For want of a better name, I call my suggested patrol organization the Volunteer Motor-Boat Reserve. At the head of the reserve should be a naval officer. As understudy or second in command, there should be a reservist with a staff comprising a paymaster, an engineer and a surgeon, all reservists. Were the naval officer taken away in time of war, or emergency, the reservist understudy would be competent to take charge. A man like Mr. Stuart Davis would be just the person for this understudy office.
In each district there would be a naval officer in charge, with a reservist understudy and a reservist staff of paymaster, engineer and surgeon. There could be a similar arrangement in each section.
Then comes the organization afloat. That should comprise squadrons, each squadron to consist of three divisions, each division to contain six patrol boats. Each squadron should have a mother ship. This organization is calculated to provide two divisions on duty, and one refitting and taking on supplies; that is, each division would be on duty six days, refitting three days, on duty again six days, etc. By providing six boats to a division, there would be some assurance of always having five ready for service. The mother ship could be a large motor-boat or a steam yacht, fitted to carry some spare parts, stores, supplies, with a shower bath so the patrol boat crews could get clean, with a drying room to dry wet clothes (this is very important, as dry clothes on a motor-boat at sea are often unattainable), and with some extra sleeping facilities so that an exhausted patrol boat crew maybe able to secure some rest. The squadron commander should be a reservist, with a paymaster, an engineer and a surgeon, all reservists. The division commander should be a reservist. The boats would be officered and manned by reservists.
The head of the reserve would presumably be located at Washington, and would report to such officer or bureau as the Secretary of the Navy would designate. He would be chiefly occupied with the many details pertaining to the formation, enrolling in, maintaining and equipping the reserve. The district and section reserve commanders would assist him in carrying out such work.
The district and section commanders, under the direction of the district commandant, would supervise also the training.
The squadron commanders, while reporting through and looking to the section and district commanders on matters pertaining to training, enrolment, maintenance and equipment, would, when associated with or assigned to a naval force afloat, report to and take orders from the officer in command of such force.
You will note that my suggested organization is formed somewhat on business lines. The patrol duty is a specialty. So much so, and so different in many respects from usual naval work, that I believe it can be better treated as a semi-business organization. In most business enterprises, when experts are called in to solve certain problems, the plan proposed by those experts is usually adopted for want of something better, and after the plan has been tried out it may be modified as circumstances warrant. For the many details of a motor-boat patrol (exclusive of the purely naval features), the yachtsmen at present are probably more expert than others, wherefore their plan deserves consideration and trial. The organization suggested by me is really the crystallization of many opinions from representative and qualified yachtsmen. For it, I deserve only such credit as may be due to my success in formulating their ideas.
This article has more ego in it than I favor or like, but it did not seem possible to set forth the ideas in any other way. That you, and your readers (if you publish this) will pardon it is the sincere wish of the writer.
Respectfully yours,
Roger Upton
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