International Notes: Naval War Notes

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INTERNATIONAL NOTES

1.                                                                                                                                                        Navai. War Notes           2053

2.                                                                                                                                                       Diplomatic Notes          2073

NAVAL WAR NOTES

Prepared by Lieutenant R. S. Edwards, U. S. Navy

1.                          The Battle of Jutland............................................... 2053

2.                          Atlantic Ocean ........................................................  2061

3.                          North Sea and Channei............................................ 2062

4.                          Baltic Sea and the Arctic Ocean.......................... 2063

5.                          The Mediterranean ..................................................  2064

6.                          Turkish Waters, the Black Ska and the

Tigris .............................................................................................   2064

7.                          Table of Losses......................................................... 2066

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

CAPTAIN SIMS’ CRITICISM AND MR. POLLEN’S REPLY

Captain Sims, shortly after the newspaper accounts of the battle of Jutland were published, reported to the Navy Department as follows. The quotation is taken from the New York Herald:

“ 1 have read carefully the American press accounts of the action, also a considerable number of clippings received from England which give a much fuller account. The latter includes two comprehensive articles pub­lished in Land and Water by Pollen, the well-known naval critic.

“ I consider all these accounts distinctly on the defensive as attempts to justify the attack of a superior force (German battleships) by a greatly inferior force (British battle cruisers). As Mr. Pollen indicates, the accounts are published under the control of the censor. For example, (lie Admiralty permitted Mr. Pollen to make certain purely negative .state­ments concerning the causes of Ihe sinking of the battle cruisers, but declines for the present to publish the real cause. This is a common pro­cedure while war is in progress. For the same period, that is to avoid the loss of prestige, even radical mistakes in tactics may he defended.

" For the above reasons it may be quite possible that certain essential features of this battle are being suppressed, these reasons being both military and political. In view of this possible and even probable condition any opinions regarding the action should he considered only with extreme reservation.                                                                                                     ,

“ This reservation being clearly understood, the following comments are submitted,,based only upon the known essential facts:

“ (a) Referring to Mr. Pollen's article and particularly to the diagram illustrating the relative positions of the British main body and battle cruisers, and the German main body and their battle cruisers of the two sides, it will be noted that the situation was typical of that considered most probable in our war names on the sea and on the game board, in the opening phases of a sea battle between large forces.

“ (b) Assuming the above forces in the relative positions indicated and considering the marked superiority of the British in numbers of all the different types and assuming the British forces to have executed (in the circumstances) very simple maneuvers necessary' to concentrate their forces and strike with all their power, there can be no possible doubt as to what the result would have been. Considering the great superiority of the British, both in numbers and in power, one of two things must have happened:

“ (i) Either the German main fleet would have been decisively defeated, or

“ (2) It would have declined decisive action by retreating behind its defences, and even the latter would have inflicted upon the Germans a humiliation impossible to conceal, much less to claim as a victory for the encouragement of their people. The latter (forcing the German fleet to retreat before a concentrated superior force), could have been accomplished with little or no material loss, and if the Germans had elected to fight a devisive action there could be no doubt that both their proportionate and actual losses would have been vastly greater than those of the British. Also, in either case, the various types of vessels, including battle cruisers, would have been employed to the best advantage in the legitimate roles for which they were designed.

“ (c) The contention of British writers that the sacrifice of the battle cruiser squadron in fighting a delaying action against battleships, late in the afternoon, was justified in the hope of bringing on a general action between the main fleets, is not believed to be sound, and this for the simple reason that the military situation did not require the British fleet to fight a decisive action, or any action at all, because they already had practically as complete control of the sea as would have resulted from the defeat of the enemy fleet. Control of the sea is accomplished when the enemy fleet is defeated or ¹ contained,’ and the German fleet had been ‘ contained ’ since the beginning of the war, is now ¹ contained,’ and doubtless will remain so.

"(d) There is no reason to believe that the Germans have ever intended to risk their fleet in a decisive action against the greatly superior British fleet. They are not in the habit of pitting any military force against twice its numbers of at least equally powerful units. There is, on the contrary, every reason to believe that the Germans knew exactly what they intended to do during this last sortie of the grand fleet, and it is a reasonable pre­sumption that they accomplished what they intended—namely, the trapping and pounding of the British battle cruisers before they could be supported by the British main body.

“ (e) The surprise to naval critics, and doubtless to the Germans, was the extraordinary resistance battle cruisers can sustain and the extraordi­nary amount of damage they can inflict, even against battleships. This indicates a greatly enhanced value when they are employed in their proper role in a general naval engagement; that is, with their enfilading fire as fast wings, (heir driving power on the scouting lines, their support of destroyer attacks, etc.

"(f) That the British attacked battleships with battle cruisers and armored cruisers is their own affair. They doubtless bad what they considered sufficient reasons for doing so, but we rest assured that this was done with the full knowledge of the probable nature of the sacrifice and not with the idea that these vessels are a match for battleships, and if the conditions as to visibility had been better the sacrifice might well have been justified by success in engaging with the German main fleet. At all events, battle cruisers proved that in case of necessity they can fight a tielaying action against battleships with reasonable chances of success.

“ (g) There is nothing, however, in the incidents of the fight to justify any argument against the necessity of battle cruisers. When for any reason they are deliberately put against battleships they must expect to suffer in proportion to the relatively small number of their guns and the relative lightness of their armor. It is the same with all other types of vessels. If in this battle it had been considered necessary to launch flotillas of unsupported destroyers against the enemy’s battleships in daylight and half of them had been destroyed, there doubtless would have been some arguments in opposition to building any more destroyers, and these arguments would have been precisely as sound as the popular arguments now current as a result of the sinking of the three British battle cruisers.

“ (h) Beyond the demonstration of the unexpected resistance of the battle cruisers the incidents of the action in question have no bearing upon the arguments advanced in my hearing as to the immediate necessity of the addition of battle cruisers to the United States Navy in its present condition. J hat the battleships must constitute the main strength of a naval force admits of no doubt; hut, as I attempted to show by my testimony, an adequate force of battle cruisers is necessary in order that the battleships may be used against an enemy with their maximum power. This is particularly true of the situation that would confront us in case of the necessity of repelling the attack of an enemy fleet against our coast.

“ William S. Sims.”

To this Mr. Arthur Pollen, writing in Land and Water, replied as follows:

Oil August 17th, Land and Water published the text of a report 011 the Battle of Jutland addressed to the American Secretary of the Navy by Captain W. S. Sims—probably the most distinguished officer of his stand­ing 111 the United States Service. Apart altogether from the reputation of the writer, the document is interesting as the first critique of the engage­ment that has come to 11s from a member of a neutral navy. Coming from Captain Sims, a recognized authority 011 naval gunnery, the report is of peculiar interest, so that the validity of his criticisms are well worth discussion.

Briefly, his points are as follows: Assuming, he says, that the initial position of the fleets was as 1 gave them in Land and Water of June 8, it was quite easy for the British force to have concentrated and then struck with the whole of its power. Had it done so the German fleet must either have submitted to the humiliation of flight or to destruction. Either would have suited the British book, and had there been a battle there would have been no occasion to use battle cruisers for any except their proper role. The contention of British apologists that the battle cruisers were rightly sacri­ficed in an engagement with ships far more powerful than themselves in order to bring on a fleet action is an unsound argument, because the military situation did not demand one. Great Britain’s control of the sea was absolute and must have remained so whether the action was fought or not. There is no reason to suppose that the Germans wanted a decisive action; their only object was to trap and pound the battle cruisers fleet, and this they got the chance of doing. But they only got it because Sir David Beatty gave them the opportunity, fully knowing that he was risking his squadron in sending them against battleships, no doubt thinking lie had a just excuse for the sacrifice. There is nothing in all this he says, to justify any argument against battle cruisers, whose real role is to drive in the scout­ing line to support destroyer attacks, and so forth. It is no more ail argu­ment against battle cruisers that three were lost when they were improperly used in fighting battleships, than it would be an argument against destroyers, bad these in the same action been sent unsupported against battleships in

broad daylight and half of them been destroyed.

This, it seems to me, is a fair summary of Captain Sims’s argument.

But it would be hardly fair to Captain Sims to enter on this discussion without first making two points clear to to reader, lo begin with, the report was written before the despatches were published. The writer then had as a basis of his criticism nothing but newspaper reports and these contradictory, lie was thus left free to adopt whichever version of the facts suited him best. Next, lie'had extremely good reasons for choosing a particular version. Indeed, it would not lie going too far to say that he was compelled to accept the one lie chose. l^ror the occasion of the report was an official enquiry asking Captain Sims whether the loss of these cruisers had caused him to modify his urgent request to the House Com­mittee to include some units of this type in the new American program. It is evident that the opponents of battle cruisers had made a great point— in the American press particularly—that it was the thinness of their armor that accounted for the British loss of ships that had cost £6,000,000 sterling, and took with them to the bottom the best,¹ part of 3000 men Captain Sims then, not only had to defend the battle cruiser as a type, but he had to defend it from the accusation of having failed as a warship in action. As lie remained as strong an advocate of battle cruisers as ever, he, having rival versions of the facts, chose the one that was thrust upon his notice and gave him the easiest reply. What could have been more convenient for his case than to brush the whole accusation aside and explain the loss of these cruisers away by the one argument that would lie convincing to his auditors? lie virtually says, therefore, that Sir David Beatty, in bringing lightly protected battle cruisers into action against more heavily gunned and better protected battleships, was putting the battle cruisers to a use for which ships of this kind were not intended.

As everyone now knows, there is not a tittle of evidence to support this theory The facts correctly stated in Land and Water on June 8 make it altogether untenable. None of the battle cruisers lost fell in an engage­ment with battleships. Indefatigable and Queen Mary sank in the course of the first phase of the action when Beatty, with Ins six battle cruisers, was engaging von flipper with five.

The action began first, between ships of a similar class; next, with tile British with a 20 per cent superiority in numbers. After the two ships were lost, the British were inferior by 20 per cent in numbers, but 111 spite of this the British gun power, as measured by the weight of broadsides, remained the greater. Nor was this all, for before Queen Mary sank the German fire had become slower and had depreciated altogether in accuracy. In addition to greater material force, then, it is certain that our guns were shooting at a higher rate and with far greater efficiency, lo make the picture complete, let us also remember that the fifth battle squadron was firing at von nipper’s rear with their 15-inch guns, though the range was too great for this fire to he very effective. As to two out of three of the battle cruisers, then, it is quite clear that they were not sunk through any indefensible exposure to ships with which they could not engage on an

equality.                                                               ,                                             .

Invincible was lost in rather different circumstances. She came into action in company with Indomitable and Indexible, sonic time aftci 0.21, while the grand fleet was still deploying to the nprlh and Sir David Beatty was driving at full speed due east to clear out of its way. His object was lo get ahead of the German squadron and to throw the leading ships into confusion so as to make Sir John Jellicoc’s task easier. Precisely when be was wanted, Admiral Hood brought the third battle squadron to rein­force the vice-admiral. The whole of the seven battle cruisers closed down on the German line to within 8000 yards and, as shown 111 Sir David Beatty s despatch, crumpled it up. Here again the fire superiority was entirely on the English side. Invincible’s salvos were falling on the German ships and had turned one—Lutsow, which, admittedly, sank—clean out of the line. She was entirely unhurt herself till, just as in the case of her consorts, a chance shell hit her. It is not quite clear from the despatches whether it was possible that this shell was fired from a German battleship. Rut it looks as if three of von Flipper's battle cruisers were still leading the line, and if this is so, it was more probably a round from one of these that finished her.

The point to remember is this. It so happened that three battle cruisers paid the penalty. It was extraordinary that it should have happened three times. Rut had the battleships been in as close action and under as effective lire, for the same period, it was a thing that might just as well have happened to any three of them as to these three lightly armored ships, because the armor had nothing whatever to do with it.

With the facts rightly viewed the whole of the Sims argument naturally tumbles down. But the report contains certain incidental arguments well worth examination, apart from the merits of the case it was written to support. The most interesting of these is the contention that we had no occasion on May 31 to risk any ships in the endeavor to force an action in which the German fleet could be destroyed. Captain Sims is, of course, on impregnable ground when lie says that, for purposes of the general command of the sea, a fleet that is contained is as innocuous as a fleet that is defeated. But this is not the whole truth of the matter. A little exami­nation will show us that there were other objects to be sought beyond the general command of the sea. There was first the moral of the enemy to he considered which, if the general expert diagnosis of the military position that was likely to be characteristic of the third year of the war was correct, was bound to be a factor of such vast importance as to make it quite indis­tinguishable from any other military object. Next the military situation, demanding as it did the maintenance of our armies abroad and the supply of ourselves and our Allies with food, raw material, and manufactures from oversea, supplied a strong argument for victory. And, finally, there were direct economic advantages to be obtained by the sinking of the German fleet, that were anything hut negligible themselves and were cer­tainly of enormous import in a war that must strain all Allied resources to the utmost.

The relative naval strength in the spring of this year was not such as to afford the Germans the slightest hope for decisive victory if a fleet action were fought with Sir John Jellicoe, nor was there any military advantage to he gained by a temporary control of a passage through the North Sea, such as might conceivably have been vvon had a portion of the British fleet been defeated. There was then no military reason for the Germans seeking an action. But as we have just seen it is not always purely military reasons that count. Two forces were continuously driving the German seamen to fight. We are not flattering our enemy in supposing that the admirals and officers who commanded the second largest fleet in the world must have had a burning desire to justify their existence. We may be quite sure that the higher command not only saw a good use, but an absolute necessity, for any form of naval activity that could be interpreted as a victory. For, that the Allies were about to strike and strike hard, must in May last have been exceedingly clear.

It can hardly have been less clear that the Central Powers would he in no condition to hit hack effectively. Germany and Austria must have known that, in the military sense, it would he the beginning of the end. The only hope was to postpone the end until the resolution of the Allies would weaken, and postponement in turn would depend upon the moral of the German people. Perhaps our best grounds for expecting a collapse of Germany to come before the strictly military defeat is achieved is, that the German Government has never trusted its subjects with the truth. From the first they have been fed with the promise and the assurance of victory. But when tales of decisive triumph arc not followed by their

normal consequences, when the defeated enemy, far from inclining towards the discussion of honorable peace, shows an unlimited capacity to fight on, and what is worse, to starve their conquerors, it is little wonder if discon­tent arises. Was it not clearly a situation in which a new sort of victory altogether was wanted? Had not the German higher command the strongest of all motives for asking the navy to supply it ?

The navy was willing to oblige for two reasons. We can well believe in the first place that their wish to fight was ardent, but we know also that they were quite confident that they possessed the secret of fighting on principles of limited liability. Their experience probably was, that it was the British battle cruisers that were normally nearest to the German bases. They knew for a certainty that, if their licet came out and Sir David Beatty was on the spot, he would not be slow in giving them a fight. They could not, of course, trap him, because the Germans never possessed more than five ships fast enough to keep up with hint, and as Sir David Beatty had 10, and with the fifth battle squadron might have had 15, there could have been no question whatever of forcing action on him against his will. But if he engaged them it was a different matter, for the moment their fast squadron had joined up with the whole of the German fleet, Beatty would have to fly for his life, and then what a story the Germans would have of having driven the British fleet across the German Ocean! As to the grand fleet, Zeppelins, of course, would warn them if it was clear, and if it was misty the smoke screens and torpedo attacks would do for the German fleet, as a whole, what they had done for von Nipper’s squadron in the Dogger Bank affair.

'l ints the policy of the higher command, the natural desire for action of the German seamen, and their confidence that their defensive and evasive tactics, by guaranteeing them against defeat would ensure their having a story of victory, combined to make the naval sortie of May 30 anything but a harebrained proceeding. Now is it not clear that you have only got to state that the German fleet and the German higher command had an object of enormous importance to them in coming out, to prove that our fleet must at almost all costs prevent their achieving it? If their object was only to raise German moral, would it not have been worth a great sacrifice to achieve its correlative depression? Is there any train of reasoning by which you can distinguish this from any other clear demand of the general military situation? Obviously, if the length of the war depends on the courage and confidence, and hence the capacity to endure privation of the German people, is it not a very vital matter indeed to make quite clear to them by every means in our power, that their courage is wasted, their prospects hopeless, and their voluntarily endured hardship doomed to he without reward? On this ground alone then it seems to me that Captain Sims, in saying that the military position did not call for a decisive victory, while possibly correct if judged by text hook standards, was lamentably out if we judge him by the realities of war.

One of the things that more than anything else has puzzled lay students of the naval side of the war, is the precise reason why British warships cannot enter the Sound nor German warships the Channel. They know generally that narrow waters can be mined and clearly lend themselves to effective defence by submarines and destroyers. But they also know that mines arc not an absolute bar to the progress of a licet, for the simple reason that they can be removed; and that a fleet, adequately protected by light craft, can face torpedo attack, whether from the surface or from below, with a reasonable chance of protecting itself altogether. Why then, they ask, should we regard the Sound and the Germans the Channel as waters that cannot be entered? The answer is, that the best defence that a fleet has against torpedo attack is its speed. Capital ships cannot hang about where destroyers can attack them from under cover of the land or submarines from the unseen depths. If, then, a mine field has to be removed, which can only be done by sweeping, and even with the best appliances is not a very rapid process, the craft engaged in it must be on the spot, and finish their work before the capital ships come upon the scene to use the channel which they make. How are these craft to be protected? If they are only covered by light cruisers, the heavier ships of the enemy will come down and drive them in and then have the mine sweepers at their mercy. Their own capital ships cannot come to the rescue, except— ex-hypothesis—to fight in very disadvantageous circumstances. Thus the function of mine fields and torpedo-craft disposed for the blocking of narrow waters is not primarily the creation of an impassable physical harrier, hut the establishment of an obstacle that can only be removed by a lengthy process, during which the craft engaged in it must be supported by the strongest possible naval force. They cannot be thwarted or the harrier removed without the main fleet being involved. If this is a correct analysis, the removal of the enemy’s main lleets alters the problem altogether. If there were no German battleships nor battle cruisers, a passage into the Baltic could be forced and a fleet sent in adequately protected against underwater attack. The first result, then, of the total destruction of the German fleet would lie that a junction between the British and Russian navies would he feasible. What would he its military value?

The left of the German line in Russia rests on the Gtdf of Riga, which is too miles east and about 100 miles north of Mcmcl. There is, therefore, in the rear of the Germans over 200 miles of the coast of Courland open to invasion. If the Baltic were opened, if there was no German battle fleet to interfere with the operations, transports could be loaded with men, guns, and horses at Reval and Kronstadt, and a force landed north or south of Lilian. It would compel the withdrawal of the whole German line, and such a withdrawal might easily lie decisive. There is no lack of men in Russia, probably no lack of shipping in Russian ports. With the Sound open, the provision of the requisite shipping would present no difficulties anyway. The point need not be argued in detail, for it is clear that if the Allied control of the Baltic were absolute, as it would he if the High Seas fleet were destroyed, there would not only he 200 miles of the Russian Courland coast open to invasion, hut the best part of 500 miles of German coast as well.

When Sir lan Hamilton’s forces landed in Gallipoli, in the face of the most scientific defences conceivable, there was not wanting those who said that this was a final proof that England would lie successfully invaded by Germany. But they omitted from their calculation the governing con­dition at Gallipoli. It was, of course, that the invading force possessed an absolute command of flic sea. But they were probably right in interpreting the event to mean that if defences are military oidy, they cannot suffice to prevent a properly supported landing any more than the best trenches can resist penetration, if the right kind of force in adequate quantity is brought against them. And at Gallipoli the landing was attempted at a very limited number of points, and those made as impregnable as the engineering and artillery skill of the enemy could make them. Any such preparations would he impossible over the whole of the many hundred miles of Germany’s Baltic coast. The first, therefore, and the most obvious of the military advantages that the complete destruction of the German fleet would make possible, would be an Anglo-Russian invasion from the Baltic.

But, just as mine fields, torpedo defences and so forth, cannot he over­come except by the ultimate backing of overwhelming naval force, so, conversely, if there is no very formidable naval force at the disposal of the enemy, mine fields and barriers can he pushed into his own immediate neighborhood. In other words, instead of maintaining, as we now do, a long-range blockade of Germany, we could, if no German fleet existed, establish a short range blockade. Instead of mining them out of the Channel, we could mine the Germans into their own harbors. Instead of netting their submarines out of our waters, we could net and blockade them into their own. We cannot do so now because the establishment of barriers of this kind is the work of small craft, because it takes time, and because it has to be done by ships, either largely stationary or moving very slowly. It has to be done by ships that cannot protect themselves while they are doing it. But if there was no fear of their being attacked by very formid­able units, the problem of protecting them would be reduced to very simple proportions indeed. There would thus follow, from the final and complete destruction of the German battle ficet, tbe possibility of relieving British and Allied shipping from the formidable toll which tile German submarines take. And that this toll is, in spite of American protests and of German promises, both intrinsically heavy and taken without the least scruple as to safeguarding the lives of passengers and crew, is unfortunately still the most disconcerting feature of the naval position. To be almost altogether quit of it, would then, be an enormous relief to the whole Allied undertak­ing, which, it must never be forgotten, rests solely on the sea service that British naval supremacy guarantees.

But this again docs not exhaust the case, for, for nearly two years now, tbe whole resources of the British shipbuilding industry, together with a large proportion of the steel makers’ capacity, has been devoted—and quite necessarily! devoted—to building battleships, battle cruisers, fast light cruisers, destroyers, patrol boats, and auxiliaries, for the Royal Navy. The total shipbuilding capacity of the country has in past years shown itself to be equal to producing a million and a quarter tons of merchant shipping and over a quarter of a million tons of war shipping per annum. At war pressure, if the navy had no requirements at all, it could probably produce something between 180,000 and 200,000 tons of merchant shipping per month. It is only the continued existence of the High Seas fleet, and the continued liberty of the German submarines, that makes it necessary for the Tyne and the Clyde to work almost exclusively for tbe Royal Navy. If the High Seas fleet were sunk and the submarines restrained, the merchant ship losses both of the Allies and of the neutrals, could be made good by British builders in less than a year.

The reader may think that 1 am disputing Captain Sims’ critism with quite unnecessary particularity. The gallant captain bad this criticism forced from him, not as a considered judgment on British strategy, hut as incidental to his defence of the type of ship that he wanted Congress to include in tbe naval program. But I have pursued the subject for this reason. This chance observation of Captain Sims illustrates better than anything I can remember tbe astonishing difference between the point of view of those who only talk and reason about war, and of those who are faced by its realities. It was our own fate before the war to have our naval policy limited by civilian comprehension of our necessities. Such naval officers as were consulted had to limit their arguments to the con­siderations politicians would understand. Is Captain Sims’, report evidence that America is still in the same condition?

Frankly, 1 find it impossible to believe that Captain Sims had he been addressing a professional audience, would have used these arguments. For had he given any weight to the very obvious considerations which 1 have set out gbove, so far from saying that Sir David Beatty was not justified in risking the battle cruiser licet to bring on a decisive action—the charge is, as we have seen, quite unfounded, but let that pass for the moment—he would, 1 think, have gone with me in saying that, could the destruction of the whole battle cruiser fleet have ensured the total destruction of the German Navy, it would have been Sir David Beatty’s obvious duty to take tbe risk. And I am borne out in thinking this by one of Captain Sims’ own phrases. “When for any reason.” he writes “they (battle cruisers) are deliberately put against battleships, they must expect to suffer iu pro­portion to the relatively small number of their guns and the relative light­ness of their armor. It is the same with all other types of vessels. If in this battle it had been considered necessary to launch flotillas of unsup­ported destroyers against the enemy's battleships in daylight, and half of them had been destroyed, there would doubtless have been some arguments in opposition to building any more destroyers—and these arguments would have been precisely as sound as the popular arguments now current as a result of the sinking of the British battle cruisers." Here, it seems to me. speaks the real sailor. Because, in this very battle of Jutland, destroyers were launched, unsupported and against battleships, in broad daylight, and it was done by both sides again and again, a certain number of destroyers were lost. But no one squealed about the " rash impetuosity ” of those who risked unarmoured destroyers against big guns, a single shot of which coutd blast them into scrap iron. And the result has not been made the occasion for decrying the building of destroyers, but an excuse for building more!

In the end, then, 1 find myself in exact agreement with Captain Sims. Destroyers—like all other forms of warships—have to he risked at times in unsupported attacks on vessels vastly more powerful than themselves. And when this occurs, such ships must at times he lost. We must not forget, however, that this is their destiny. Anil whether it is the two- and-a-half million pound battle cruiser, or the destroyer that represents less than a tenth of its value, the principle is the same.

“ Arthur Pollen.”

ATLANTIC OCEAN " U-53 ” ON UNITED STATES COAST

The German submarine U-53 entered Newport harbor at 2.15 p. m., October 7. Her captain made the usual official calls. The U-53 left port at 5.30 p. m. the same day without taking on board fuel or supplies, although her captain stated that lie had left Wilhelmshaven 17 days before making Newport. The next day the submarine sank five merchant ships off Nan­tucket, leaving their passengers and crews to be picked up by American destroyers that answered the radio calls for help. Nothing further was heard from the U-53 until an official announcement from Berlin on the last day of October reported her safe arrival in Germany. In commenting on the occurrence the press was quick to suggest that one or more supply depots must have been available for the U-53 on the American coast, or else that a tender disguised as a merchantman was convoying her -the question of shore bases was soon settled by a search by the destroyer force which showed none to exist.

President Wilson outlined the policy of the United States would follow in reply to a demand by the Allies that German submarines be barred from American ports, declaring that no rule of international law had been violated and that the United Stales reserved liberty of action in dealing witli all such cases.

The mission of the U-53 has not been made public—one theory that received wide circulation in the American press is that she convoyed the Deutschland, while the Providence Journal asserts that she was a decoy sent to test the policy of America in regard to submarine warfare. The Journal claims that its information is from reliable sources and adds that the U-48 and the U-61 accompanied the U-53 and that all three submarines were, on October 23, still on this side of the Atlantic between Cape Henry and the West Indies.

British service papers appear to regard the issues raised by the operations of tlie U-53 as mainly legal and diplomatic, and express no fear that com­merce will be seriously menaced by submarine activity on this side of the Atlantic.

NORTH SEA AND CHANNEL

ZEPPELIN RAIDS ON ENGLAND

Two raids by German Zeppelins were made over England on the nights of September 23 and September 25. The British official statement reports that 38 persons were killed and 125 injured in the first raid in which “ 14 or 15” Zeppelins took part. Two of the raiders           and L-33) were shot

down by anti-aircraft guns in Essex; one fell in flames and was destroyed together with its crew, while the crew of the other were unhurt and gave themselves up as prisoners to a village constable. A description of the L-.J? is given in this issue of the Proceedings under the heading “ Aeronautics.’’ I he second raid was made by a weaker force—only seven airships accord­ing to British accounts. The Germans claim that much damage was inflicted on the naval base at Portsmouth and on military establishments at other places, but England denies serious damage of military importance. The raiders were not injured. On October 10 ten Zeppelins took part in a raid, two of them reaching London where one was promptly shot down.

ACTIVITY OF SEAPLANES

Seaplanes of all the belligerents have been very active, both over land and over water. Germany has used them to raid the English coast, while the Allies have made many aerial attacks on Zeppelin sheds and German military establishments. The details of these operations arc bewildering in their multitude and any military advantage gained by their use has been so well concealed that it is impossible to arrive at any conclusion as to the value of the results attained. The New York Herald says that England is now using seaplanes as convoys for merchant vessels, giving as an example the statement of several passengers on a Danish vessel that the ship was accompanied for about 25 miles after leaving Kirkwall by an armed airplane.

DESTROYER OPERATIONS

A channel raid by German destroyers on October 26 is thus described in an official communication from Berlin published in the New York Times:

“ Parts of our torpedo forces moved from a German bay through the straits of Dover and Calais to the line of Folkcstonc-Boulogne in the English Channel.

“According to the report of Commander Michelson, at least 11 outpost steamers and two or three destroyers or torpedo boats were sunk partially or totally near hostile ports. Some members of the crews who were saved were captured.

“ Several other guarding vessels, and at least two destroyers, were heavily damaged by torpedoes and artillery fire. Also the English post steamer Queen was sunk south of Folkestone, the crew having time to leave the ship. In the Channel, near the Feme Lightship, there was a strikingly active traffic by hospital ships.

“ Our torpedo boats safely returned to German waters without any loss.”

1 he British statements admit the loss of the empty transport Queen, the destroyer Flirt, and six drift net boats, while the destroyer Nubian was torpedoed and later ran aground. Mr. Balfour slated in the Mouse of Commons that “ there is ground for thinking that two German destroyers, after being hit during the action, struck mines and were blown up and probably sunk.” British dispatches state that 10 German destroyers took part in the raid but make no mention of the strength of their own forces.

This raid was repeated a week later, a Berlin dispatch to the New York Times quoting the Admiralty statement in substance as follows:

“On the night of November 1-2 small German naval vessels advanced from points of support on the coast of Flanders against the trade routes between the Thames and Holland. They stopped and searched several

Till'. MEDITERRANEAN

The most interesting event in the Mediterranean within the past two months was the seizure of the Greek Fleet by the Allies. What actually occurred seems to he somewhat of a mystery, hut it is evident that the Salonica expedition feared to leave the uncertain power of the Greek fleet in its rear and so in some way got possession of the vessels. The Ncre York Herald reported on September 29 that the battleship Hydra and two torpedo-boats had voluntarily joined the Allies’ fleet. By October 11 practically all the remainder of the Greek Navy was in tnc possession of the Allies. The Greek crews were landed and sent to Athens. No opposi­tion apparantly was offered by Greece except a protest through diplomatic channels; indeed, some of the press reports say that many of the vessels put themselves under the protection of the Allies’ fleet after a pacific munity against the Greek Government. The Arsenal at Snlamis and the forts at the Piraeus are reported to he also in the possession of the Allies.

There has been much activity among sulmarincs and small craft in the Mediterranean. The French submarine Faucault was sunk in September by Austrian seaplanes which effected a gallant rescue of the submarine’s crew. On October 4 a submarine sank the French transport Gallia with 2000 French and Serbian soldiers on board, most of whom were saved by a cruiser and patrol boats. On the same day the British transport Franconia, an 18,000 ton Canard liner, was also sunk. No troops were on board. A curious account is the following from the London Times:

Bukahest, Sept. 21.

The aeroplanes which arrived here from Salonika brought an interesting account of the destruction of a German submarine at Hagios Kosmos, on the coast of Attica, a few miles cast of Phalcron.

After the arrival of the Allied licet at the Piraeus the discovery of a large depot of lubricating oil on this coast was made by scouting vessels. A tube about 600 yards in length was found connecting the depot with a German submarine, which plunged immediately when detected. The tube was broken, hut the portion attached to the submarine floated. Various fragments of the wreck were found two days later.

The depot, which had been constructed underground, was lined with concrete, and contained an enermous quantity of oil. It is stated to have been constructed by a Greek merchant ai the Piraeus who recently acquired great wealth from unknown sources.

A Paris despatch to the Nciv York Times says that a large Austrian battleship blew up in the harbor of Pola in September but the story is based on somewhat vague reports and is denied at Vienna.

TURKISH WATERS, BLACK SEA. AND THE TIGRIS

'The Army and Navy Gazette (Loudon) in its issue of October 21 thus describes two rather unusual naval operations:

“ As illustrative of a very different phase of submarine warfare, the gallant exploit of the Tyulen, commanded by Lieutenant Kitizin, of the Russian Navy, in the Black Sea, deserves mention. The Tyulen is a Rus­sian submarine of 600 tons displacement, launched in 1913, according to the latest issue of the Dickinson Return. I ler engines for surface work are of 2000 horse-power, giving her a speed of 15 knots, and she carries eight torpedo-tubes. The submarine was lying submerged east of Kefken Bay, on the Asiatic side of the entrance to the Bosphorus, when the Rodosto, an armed Turkish transport of booo tons, under the command of German officers, was observed steaming to the eastward. Lieutenant Kitizin took his boat within a mile of the transport and opened •fire. The Rodosto replied with heavier guns, but after an hour’s light, during which the submarine gradually drew closer, fire broke out on board the transport, and her crew began to jump overboard. Among the men picked up by the Tyulen was the Rodosto's commander, a captain in the German Navy,

and a German chief engineer. The submarine then took off the remainder of the Turkish crew, put out the fire and repaired the damage to the prize sufficiently to enable her to proceed under her own steam. The Tyulen with the liodosto reached Sebastopol in 40 hours. The Tsar has conferred on the commander of the submarine the Order of St. George, a similar honor to that conferred hy his Majesty upon British submarine commanders for their daring and skilful work in the Baltic. This is the first recorded occasion on which a submarine has engaged in a gunnery duel with an armed ship of the enemy, and has captured and taken her into port.

“ In the Kut despatches, issued last Friday, General Sir Percy Lake, in describing the operations in Mesopotamia from January to the end of April in this year, makes mention of the assistance rendered by the navy. Sir Percy Lake refers at length to the last chance there remained of reliev­ing Kut, by attempting to supply provisions by means of the river. The Julnar was prepared for an attempt to run the enemy’s blockade. With a naval crew, under the command of Lieutenant II. O. B. Firman, R. N„ assisted hy Lieutenant-Commander C. H. Cowley, R. N. V. R., this vessel, one of the fastest steamers on the river, left Falahiyah at 8 p. m. on April 24, carrying 270 tons of supplies. She was soon discovered and shelled by the enemy oil her passage, and at about midnight a burst of heavy firing was heard at Magasis, some eight and a half miles from Kut by river. There the enterprise appears to have failed, and the next day the air service reported the vessel in the hands of the Turks. Both the olticcrs reported to have been killed and the remainder of the crew, including five wounded, were made prisoners of war.”

German aircraft have been active over the Black Sea and Roumania, a Zeppelin having taken part in a raid on Bucharest in September. Despatches from Sofia and Berlin to the New York Times say that the Russian battle­ship Impcrairitsa Maria (22,500 tons, 12 12-inch guns) struck a mine near the mouth of the Danube early in November and was destroyed. It is well known that the Russian Black Sea fleet has been active in this region in cooperation with the land forces, frequent reports of bombardments of Constantza and other ports hy the licet having been published within the last month, but the despatches from Petrograd make no mention of Russian losses in the Black Sea.

TABLE OF NAVAL LOSSES OF THE VARIOUS BELLIGERENTS SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

The following table is compiled from various articles appearing in the press of the several belligerent nations. These reports are so contradictory that it is impossible to furnish an absolutely correct list of vessels lost to date. In many cases the belligerent powers have failed to acknowledge the losses of all the vessels. No attempt has been made to include herein a list of the various trawlers, mine sweepers and such odd small craft which may have been destroyed while mine-sweeping or on submarine patrol duty.

(On the left margin of this table of losses is a reference to the whole number in which an account of the loss is given. A page index of these losses is given in the whole number referred to.

ABBREVIATIONS FOR TYPE OF VESSEL

Dreadnought battleship ....................... d. b.

Battleship . ...i...................................... b.

Battle cruiser .......................................  b.    c.

Armored cruiser.................................... a.    c.

Protected cruiser .................................  p.    c.

Cruiser .................................................  c.

Light cruiser .......................................  1. c.

Gunboat ...............................................  g.    b.

Torpedo gunboat ................................  t. g.

Monitor ..............................................  m.

River monitor .......................................  r. m.

Flotilla leader ......................................  f.   1.

Destroyer .............................................  d.

Torpedo-boat .......................

Submarine ............................

Auxiliary cruiser ..................

Transport .................................

Minelayer..............................

Coast guard ..........................

Hospital ship .......................

Training ship .......................

Patrol boat............................

Armed merchant vessel....

Yacht ....................................

h. s. tr. a. p. b.

a. m. v.

y.

n. t.

t. b. sm. ax. c. tr.

in. 1.

Naval tender .........................

Losses of Great Britain and Her Allies

BRITISH WARSHIP LOSSES

TONNAGE                         .REMARKS                         DATE

34.0.           . Reported sunk off Irish coast. Cause

unknown. British Admiralty, non­committal .. 29-10-14

15.0.            . Internal explosion at anchor in the

Thames............................................................ 25-11-14

15.0.            .5.nk by German sm.. North Sea.... 1- 1-15

15.0.            . Sunk in the Dardanelles ............. 18- 3-15

12.950..        Sunk in the Dardanelles .............. 18- 3-15

16.350..        By mine, North Sea...................... 9- 1-16

13,050. .Torpedoed in      Dardanelles............. 12- 5-15

11.800..        Sunk by sm., Dardanelles............. 35- 5-15

14.900..       5.nk by sin., Dardanelles.............. 27- 5-15

14.0.            .5.nk by mine, Mediterranean....... 26- 4-16

37.0.           . Sunk by gunfire, battle of Jutland      31- 5-10

18.750..        Sunk by gunfire, battle of Jutland...... 31- 5-16

17.250..        Sunk by gunfire, battle of Jutland...... 31- 5-16

13*360.. Internal explosion and sunk at anchor. .30-12-15

13.550.        • By mine....................................... 5- 9-14

12.0.             . Sunk by German sm. U-29, North Sea.. 22- 9-14

12.0.           . Sunk by German sm. U-29, North Sea.. 22- 9-14

12.0.           . Sunk by German sm. U-29, North Sea..22- 9-14

7.350..        Sunk by German sm. U-9, North Sea... 16-10-14

14.100..        Sunk by    German forces in Pacific      1-11-14

9.800..        Sunk by    German forces in Pacific...... 1-11-14

10.850..        Ran aground, cast coast of Scotland... .38-10-15

14.600..       Sunk by gunfire, battle of Jutland 31- 5-16

13.550.        • Sunk by.... gunfire, battle of Jutland. 31-           5-16

13,550-. Sunk by       gunfire, battle of Jutland 31- 5-16

10.850..        5.nk by     mine, off Orkneys........ 6- 6-16

2.940..        5.nk by German sm., North Sea...... 5- g-14

5.250..         5.nk by German sm., North Sea..... 19- 8-i6

5.440..        5.nk by German sm., North Sea..... 19- 8-i6

3.360..        Sunk by mine, North Sea.............. 6- 8-14

3.135..         Sunk by German c. Koenigsberg at

Zanzibar ......................................................... 20- 9-14

3*750.. By mine off east  coast of England....... 14- a-16

5.600..        Sunk by German sm. U-27, North Sea. .30-10-14 3,600. .Reported damaged beyond repair, attack

on Ilovestoft.................................................... 25- 4-*6

810..            Sunk by mine,    North................ Sea.. 3-           9-14

810..  Sunk by German sm. while at anchor.. 11-11-14       Sunk by Turkish gunfire, Gulf of

Smyrna............................................................. 13- 5-16

1,850?. Sunk by gunfire, battle of Jutland....... 31- 5-16

----------- ..Sunk by gunfire, battle of Jutland. 31- 5-16

BRITISH WARSHIP LOSSES—.Continued

161 .. Abbas

161 161

DATE

. Sunk in collision with Dutch merchant

ship .................................................. 18- 8-14

.l<an ashore, Scotch coast................ 27*12*14

.Wrecked in a storm.......................... - 2*15

.Sunk by German sm., North Sea....... 1- 5**5

.Blown up by mine off Belgian coast... 7* 5**5

.Sunk by mine......................................   8-15

.Wrecked, Eastern Mediterranean..... 10-11*15

.Sunk by mine, North Sea................... ?- 3-16

.Sunk by gunfire, battle of Jutland.... 31- 5-16

.Sunk by gunfire, battle of Jutland.... 31* 5**6

.Sunk by gunfire, battle of Jutland.... 31* 5*16

.Sunk by gunfire, battle of Jutland.... 31- 5-16

.Sunk after collision, English Channel.. 16* 6-16

•Sunk by gunfire, battle of Jutland.... 31- 5-16

.Sunk by gunfire, battle of Jutland.... 31- 5-16

.Sunk, mine or torpedo, North Sea... 13- 8-16

•Sunk in collision ...........................  ?

.Sunk by gunfire of German d.......... 26-10-16

.Torpedoed by German d. and ran

aground ........................................... 26-10-16

.Sunk by German sm., North Sea........      6-15

.Sunk by German sin., North Sea...... 10* 6-15

.Sank after collision with merchantman,

Straits of Gibraltar............................. 1-11-15

.Sunk by mine, North Sea................. ?* 3**6

•Accidentally sunk off Australian coast.. 14- 9**4 .Rammed and sunk by German vessel... 18*10*14

.Sunk by German mine, North Sea..... 3-11-14

.Reported lost. Details not known.... 1-12-14

.Missing, North Sea..........................

.Ran aground in the Dardanelles and de­stroyed by own picket boats     *7*           4**5

.Stranded, Dutch coast............................. 6*......... *-*6

•Reported as sunk off Holland................ 6*......... 1*16

.Sunk, Sea of Marmora............................ 30*          4**5

. Sunk by German torpedo craft off

Danish coast .................................... *9*

.Sunk at Dardanelles........................... p

.Announced as sunk by Turks in Darda­nelles          5*

.Sunk off Holland.............................. 6­

. Ran aground off north coast of Scotland in storm                8­. Sunk in battle, North Sea   29-

.Ran aground off Whitby, completely

wrecked ............................................ 30-

.Dost off Irish coast......................... *4-

Lost in a gale............................... . • 3*

. Probably torpedoed by German sm. in

Irish Sea .......................................... **■

.Sunk by German ax. c. Meteor, North

Sea ....................................................  8-

.Sunk by German sm., North Sea...... *o-

.Sunk by German sm., North Sea...... 24-

.Sunk by sm., JEgean Sea................. *4*

.Sunk by German sm., /Egcan Sea.... 26-

.Sunk by German sm., ^Egean Sea..... 17.

.Sunk off coast of Morocco.............. 30-

.Torpedoed by German sm................ 4-

.Collision, i’Egean .......................... 29-

.Internal explosion off Sheerness..... 27-

8-15

9**5

**-*5 1 -16

9*4 2-16

10*14

**5

a*is

3* *5

8-15

8-15

8-16

8-15

*0-15

9**5

11*15

10-16

*0-15

5**5

298. .Sunk by German sm. off Solium Harbor,

160,161 161 161

.Abdel Monaym

.Anglia ....... -.

Fishguard II ..

.Tarn ..............

.Aries .............

.Irene .............

. .c. g. .

.. li. s.

. .tr. s.

. .p. b. ..y. ... . .y. .. •

598 1,862

Egypt ............................................................................  6-11-15

.Sunk by German sm. off Solium Harbor. 6-11-15

.Sunk by mine, English Channel.............

. Foundered in gale, North Sea...............

6,322.. Sunk by German am., Mediterranean

.17-* 1-15 *7- 9-14 5-1 * - * 5 *5 *5

In addition to the above, the press reports that several other English submarines have been destroyed. The list above includes only those widen were apparently officially announced by the British Admiralty.

WHOLE

NUMBER

Athos . Portugal

Sunk at the Dardanelles.................. 18

Torpedoed by Austrian sin., Straits of

Otranto........................................

Torepdoed^ Mediterranean ........

Sunk by Ernden at Penang..........

Sunk by Austrian mine oft Antivari.

Sunk by mine .............................

Torpedoed, Adriatic ...................

Sunk by Austrian sm._f St. of Otranto

Sunk incident to collision.........

Sunk by German cruisers at Tahiti.

Sunk in collision with each other...

3*15

4-15

2-16

10-14

a-15

-  3-16

?-6-i6

-    6-16 2- 9-14 9-10-14

16

1*15

6-15

- 1-15

-12-14

• 1-15

m. 1.

.h.

345-490. .Rammed and sunk during maneuvers

Cape Lardier..............................................

522-615 .. Sunk at tlie Dardanelles...........

386- ? ..Sunk in the Sea of Marmora.........

392- ? .. Sunk in the Adriatic by an Austrian

390..       Destroyed by Austrian seaplanes...

18,400. .Torpedoed, Mediterranean ........

800..       Sunk l>y sin. off Rhodes............

------- . .Sm., Mediterranean ....................

15.0.    . Sunk by sm.................................

945• • Sunk in the /Egcan Sea by a mine. ..

392- ? ..Sunk by Austrians, Adriatic.........

WARSHIP LOSSES

22.500.. Sunk by mine (not confirmed)....

7.775* • Sunk by German sm., Baltic..........

3,130. .Sunk by Ernden, Penang. .

1.224..     Sunk by Turks, Black Se

Russians ...................................................

1,280. .Reported by Turks sunk by Turkish

875..       5.nk by Germans, Baltic Sea........

1.200..     By gunfire, Odessa......................

------- ..Sunk by mine, Black Sea...............

------- . . By gunfire...................................

5.440..    5.uttled to avoid capture............

3.522..     Captured by Ernden.....................

2.926..     Sunk by German sm., Baltic........

1.125..      5.nk, Black Sea............................

1.743 •• Sunk, Black Sea............................

sh

Raised

8- 7-i5 20- 7*15

3-             11-15 5-12-15

- 9-16 26- 2-16

8- 9-15 -11-15

4-             10-16 3- 6-15

28-12-15

. .   -11-16

..11-10-14 . .28-10-14 by

. .31-10-14

I. .29-10-14 . .20- 8-15 . .29-10-14 .. io- 3-16 . .30-10-14 .. 29-10-14 .. 6-8-14

. • 4- 6-15

. .24-12-14 . .24-12-14

FRENCH WARSHIP FOSSES

Various German reports state that Russian mcn-of-war were destroyed in the several minor engage ments in the Baltic. These losses were never officially announced by the Russian Admiralty.

380..                                                                Ran ashore, Tsing Tao.    4- 9-14

82..         Sunk by mines while mine-sweeping oil

Tsing Tao.......................................................... 1 -11 -14

-------- ..By mine ............................................

3,700..    Torpedoed by German d., S-90, off

. .                                                                    Tsing Tao ................................... 17-10-14

In addition to the above, five special service ships were sunk during the operations off Tsing Tao.

ITALIAN WARSHIP LOSSES

.Caught fire and blew up, Taranto har­bor   -          8 16

.Sunk by internal explosion.............. 28-  915

.Sunk by Austrian sm., Adriatic......... 7- 7-15

.Torpedoed off Ragusa, Austrian sin....18- 7-15

.Scuttled to avoid capture after engage­ment with Austrian vessels. Adriatic. .24- 5-15 .Sunk by Austrian sm., St. of Otranto. .26?-6-16

.Sunk by mine, Adriatic.................... 17-12-15

.Sunk, Austrian sm., Otranto Straits. ... 10- 7-16 .Torpedoed by Austrian sm. oil Venice..26- 6-15 .Sunk by own mine while mine-laying off

Salvorc..................................................   7-15

.Torpedoed and sunk, Austrian sm.... 17- 6-15

.Sunk by Austrian sin., Adriatic........ 5- 8-15

.Captured by Austria............................ • 8-16

.Reported missing ..............................  - 8-16

.Sunk bv mine. Adriatic.................... 17-12-15

Losses of Germany and Her Allies GERMAN WARSHIP LOSSES

WHOLE

NUM11ER

164

164

164

164

.Elbing .................. I.   c...... 5,000?

.Wcisbndcn .......... 1. c. ....      5,000?

.Rostock ............... 1... c       . 4,820.

. Fraucnlob............. 1.. c         2,650.

Mocwe ................. g. b.    ...     640.

Wissman

155 . .S-134

V-186

S-106

640.

,604.

886.

886.

886.

886.

168.

168.

689.

4*3-

413­

413.

4*3-

396.

27 6.

463­750. 675 •

REMARKS                                                 DATE

.Sunk by gunfire, battle of Jutland..... 31- 5-*6

.Sunk by gunfire, battle of Jutland       1- 6-16

. Sunk by German mine near Wilhclins-

haven ...............................................    3-ii-M

.Sunk by English forces off Falkland#.. 8-12-14 .Sunk by English forces off Falkland#.. 8-12-14 .No official report. Press reports that she

was lost       in the Baltic........................ 13-14

.Sunk by British forces off Doggerbank. .24- 1-15

.Sunk by British sm. in Baltic............ 33-10-15

.Sunk by British forces, North Sea.... 38- 8-14

.Sunk by British forces, North Sea.... a8- 8-14

.Sunk by British forces, North Sea.... 38- 8-14

.Sunk by British sm. E-9, North Sea.... 13- 9-14

. By gunfire................................... . . . 7- 8-14

. Sunk by Australian c. Sydney, Indian

Ocean ....... ........................................  9-11-14

.Sunk by English forces off Falklands.. 8-12-14

.Sunk by English forces off Falklands. . 8-12-14 .Sunk by British cruisers in Pacific..... 14* 3-15 .Sunk by English forces in Rufiji River. 11- 7-15

.Sunk by British sm. in the Baltic..... 7*

.Sunk by sm. in the Baltic................. 17-

.Interned, Norfolk  7­. Interned, Norfolk                 29­. Interned, Norway                               16-

.Seized by Argentina, violation of neu­trality                         

.Interned, Bahia ................................  •

.Interned, Guam ................................ 15

.Gulf of Riga..................................... 17-

Ran ashore in fog in Baltic; blown up . by own crew after engagement wit 11

Russians ........................................... 27

.Interned in Honolulu....................... 8

.Press reports state she was blown up by internal explosion while cruising in

the Atlantic........................................ 4

Sunk by gunfire, battle of Jutland... 1

Sunk by gunfire, battle of Jutland.... 1

Sunk by gunfire, battle of Jutland.... 1

Sunk by gunfire, battle of Jutland... *

Sunk by her own crew at l)ar-es-Salam

when English vessels appeared.......... 14

Captured by English on Lake Nvasa...2o Sunk by her own crew at Yap Island on

approach of Japanese fleet.................. 7

Sunk by Germans in Kiao-Chau Bay be­fore surrendering Tsing-Tao to Allies. 6 Sunk by Germans in Kiao-Chau Bay be­fore surrendering Tsing-Tao to Allies.

Sunk by Germans in Kiao-Chau Bay be­fore surrendering Tsing-Tao to Allies.

Sunk by Germans in Kiao-Chau Bay be­fore surrendering Tsing-Tao to Allies.

Sunk by Germans in Kiao-Chau Bay be­fore surrendering Tsing-Tao to Allies, o-

Interned, China ............................... 17-

Interned, China ............................... 17

Sunk by British forces, North Sea... 28

Sunk by English destroyers, North Sea. 17 Sunk by English destroyers, North Sea. 17 Sunk by English destroyers, North Sen. 17 Sunk by English destroyers, North Sen. 17 Driven ashore and wrecked by own crew off Tsing-Tao after having torpedoed

the Japanese ship Tnknemho............. 20

Sunk by Germans in Kiao-Chau Bay be­fore surrendering Tsing-Tao to Allies. 7 Accidentally rammed nnd sunk by a

merchant vessel in Baltic................... 22

By gunfire........................................

By gunfire........................................

11-15

13-15

4-15

4-15

i i i.}

9-14

13-14

8-15

8-14 11-14

11-14

6-16

6-16

6-16

6x6

8-14

8-14

b-11-14

6-11-14

6-11-14

6-11-14

6-11-14

8-14

8-14

8-14

10-14

10-14

10-14

IO-14

10-    14 •11-15

11-   14

GERMAN WARSHIP LOSSES—Continued

WHOLE

NUMBER

*54

*59

*59

. S* 126 .0*196

TYPE

.d. ... .d. ... .d. ...

TONNAGE

•     487

.      689

REMARKS

DATE

.By sm. ....... ..........................................  6-io-m

.Sunk by British sin., North Sea....... a6* 7-15

Announced by France as sunk by two French torpedo-boats off Belgian coast.22* 8-15 .Reported sunk by Russians in Baltic... 19- 8*15 . Reported sunk by British sm. E-19 be­tween Denmark and Sweden. Not confirmed               14-10-15

..Sunk by gunfire, battle of Jutland.

6-

about 150. .Sunk bv British destroyers! North Sea.. 1­,..                           Officially announced by Russia, blown

10-14 6-16 * 5-* 5 *5-*5

6-15

8-15

8-15

12-15

8-15

10-15

10-14

up by mine.......................................... 30-

..Announced by German Admiralty, sunk by mines, Baltic                                     19­

. .Announced by German Admiralty, sunk

by mines, Baltic.................................. 19-

..Sunk by sm., Baltic..... 17­.. Gulf of Riga 17­.. Collision, Baltic                               15*

...Sunk by British c. Birmingham........ io-

. .Destroyed by English d. Garry off Scotch

coast ................................................... 23-11-14

..Sunk by British destroyers............... 4- 3-*5

..Sunk, Black Sea................................ 17* 7-15

.. Rammeil and sunk by British d. Ariel.. 10- 3-15

.. Announced sunk by British. Loss ad­mitted by German Admiralty       26-           3-15

..Sunk by British forces..^.................   8- 6-15

.. Otficialjy announced by French sunk in

English Channel by French sejuadron. 4- 7-15 ..Announced by German Admiralty as

missing ................................. _t........... 10- 8-15

..Announced by English Admiralty as sunk by British aeroplane off Belgian coast. Denied by Germany               20-           8-15

.. Reported run ashore near Riga in Baltic and probably lost. Not confirmed by Germany     19-           8-15

• .Interned in Holland. Reported as beimj

the U-8, but this vessel had been offi­cially reported as having been sunk by the British                                                     

• • Reported by British Admiralty as sunk

by British seaplane off Belgian coast.27-1 1-15

..Rammed ...........................................  g- 8-14

. .Sunk by gunfire............................... 24- 9-15

• • Accidentally grounded and destroyed by

. 4-11-16 .                                                 - 8-14

.15- 8-14

crew ....................................

6,030.. Captured by British c. 5** *3 •• Captured by British c.

*3.952* Sunk by British c. Highflyer............ 27- 8-14

7.548..                                                           Captured by British             7- 9-14

3.899..Captured............................ by British c   12-                9-14

18,710.. Sunk by British............. ax. c. Carmania  14-               9-14

4.579* • Captured by British ..................................  - 9-14

299..      5unk by  French          g. b. at Cameroon 24-              9-14

150..      Sunk by  French          g. b. at Cameroon 24-              9-14

150* • Captured by English c. off Cameroon

River ............................................................  1-10-14

8.185.. Sunk by Belgians prior to evacuation of

Antwerp .......................................................  8-10-14

Captured by           English ......................... 10-10-14

Sunk by British c. in Indian Ocean.... 16-10-14 Sunk by English             ax. c. in Atlantic      11-11-14

•Sunk by Australian c. Australia.

•Captured ................................

•Reported as sunk in the Baltic..

•Sunk in battle, North Sea.......

•Captured by Australian forces..

-----  6- 1-15

--- 30- 4-15

. ... -8-15 ... .29- 2-16 . ... 18-10-14

4,437.

3,000.

2,163.

GERMAN WARSHIP LOSSES—Continued

m. 1.

2,165 • 3,6i3.

Several armed trawlers

•Interned, Chile ...............................  • 11-14

.Sunk by Russian destroyers............. 13- 6-16

Sunk by English d.. North Sea......... 5- 8-14

.Sunk by Germans in Kiao-Chau Pay be­fore surrendering Tsing-Tao to Allies 7-11-15

•Reported by the 1‘rctich captured out­

side of Havre disguised as French

collier ..............................................

. Sunk by Russians in Baltic. Reported raised and interned in Sweden                  ■»-

•Sunk by own crew after attempting t

escape British forces, North Sea...

Lost in Baltic.................................

8- 8-15 17-12-15

---- • • Captured by the British on Lake

ianganyka ..................................................

1,020.. Interned, Honolulu ........................  8-11-14

i,i53Captured bv English c., North Sea.

English claim vessel an ax. c., while Germany claims her a hospital ship. . 17-10-15     Sunk by Russian destroyers    13- 6-16

In addition to the above, there seems to be no doubt that a great number of German submarines have been destroyed around the British Isles and possibly also in the Mediterranean and near the Darda­nelles.

AUSTRIAN WARSHIP LOSSES

161

161

153

153 155, 162 161

.Zenta .................... c.. ...

.Kaiaerin Elizabeth . .c. ...

•---- (Novara typc).c. ...

~.........................  K-. ^b'

I ernes ...................  m.

.Triglav ................. d.. ...

.Lika ...................... d.  ...

.No. 19 ................... t.. b. .

2.264..    5unk by French fleet off Antivari 16- 8-14

3,937• • Sunk by her ow.n crew at Tsing-Tao... 7-11-14

3,384 . .Torpedoed .................................... 13- 1-16

---- ..Sunk, Adriatic .................................. 24- 5-15

433. .Struck a mine and sank off Shabatz... .23-10-14

787..    Sunk by gunfire in Adriatic........... 29-12-15

787..    Sunk by mine in Adriatic............... 29-12-15

78.. Struck by a mine and sank at entrance

to Pola....................................................... 18-8-14

---- ..Sunk by mine in Adriatic..................

---- ..Sunk by mine in Adriatic..................

10,000, 9,900,

3,330.

502, 886. 492,

725.

500. 502.

210,

284.

97

97

---- ..Sunk by an Italian d......................... 17. 5-15

685-860.. Reported by France sunk by a French

aeroplane, Adriatic..................... i- 7-15

---- ..Torpedoed and sunk by an Italian sin.,

upper Adriatic .......................... 12- 8-15

333-295 •• Sunk by French d. Bisson................. 13- 8-15

---- ..Gunfire, French fleet.........................

860..    Sunk by aeroplane.............................     1-  7-15

5.0.            . Sunk by Italian warships, Dmazzo

roads; loaded with munitions..

3.0.            .5unk by Italian warships, Dmazzo

roads, loaded with munitions..

---- .. Torpedoed, Adriatic ........................ 18- 3-16

---- . Struck a mine and foundered 17-12-14 .Sunk by British sin. B-n, Dardanelles. 14-12-14 .Torpedoed by British, Sea of Marmora. 9- 8-15 . Sunk by Russian mine, Gulf of Odessa 3- 4-14

.Scuttled to avoid capture................. 31-10-14

.Sunk in Sea of Marmora, British sm...24- 5-15

.Sunk by British in Tigris River....... 1- 6-15

.By mine near Dardanelles................ 29- 4-15

.Scuttled ..........................................  1-11-14

.Officially reported by Petrograd as sunk

in Black Sea.............................. 10-12-15

.Officially reported by Petrograd as sunk

in Black Sea.............................. 10-1215

.Sunk by British am.......................... - 5-15

.Sunk by British sm., Sea of Marmora.. 3-12-15

•    Stranded and interned at Chios.... 17- 4-15

•    Driven ashore, Greece.................. 17- 4-15

.Sunk by British sm., Sea of Marmora.. - 5-15 .Sunk by Russian warships; contained

troops ......................................

TURKISH WARSHIP LOSSES—Continued

WHOLE                    NAME                TYPE TONNAGE                             REMARKS                        DATE

NUMBER                                                                   „ _w

16o..Carmen ................................ tr.......... 4,424..Sm., Marmora ................................... 24-10-15

161 . . Rcchid Pasha ..................... tr.......... 8,ooo..Sm., Marmora ....................................    -12-15

Bezemialeti ................................. tr.......... .......... ..Sunk, Black Sea ................................ 14-11-14

Bachriachtnar .............................. tr.......... .......... ..Sunk, Black Sea ................................ 14*11-14

Midiat Pasha ............................... tr..........     ...... ..Sunk by ............................................  6- 9-15

166 . .Rodosto ............................. tr.......... 6,000. .Captured by Russian  sm.................... -10-16

In addition to the above, other Turkish mcn-of-war may have been destroyed around the Dardanelles and in the Black Sea. Reports from England, Russia and Turkey in regard to these operations are so conflicting that it is impossible to accurately state what Turkish vessels have been destroyed, especially transports and supply snips.