[IMAGE: H. M. S. "QUEEN ELIZABETH," LARGEST OF BRITISH DREADNOUGHTS, AND THE ALLIED FRENCH AND BRITISH FLEETS IN THE DARDANELLES READY TO COVER LANDING FORCES “In order to reduce the wear on her guns caused by erosion which is the greater the greater the caliber of guns, and in order to produce a large angle of fall on shore in attack on the fortifications at the Dardanelles, the battleship Queen Elisabeth used but three of the four sections of the charges for her 15-inch guns in her work there.”
(This picture shows location of stacks, control stations, range finder and intermediate guns)
N. Y. Times.]
EUROPEAN WAR NOTES
Compiled by Lieutenant C. C. Gill, U. S. Navy*
GENERAL ARRANGEMENT PAGE
- Diplomatic Notes........ 629
- Naval Notes........642
- Miscellaneous Notes........675
(Details of Land Operations are not included.)
[Events of international significance will be briefly chronicled in large type. Notes and comments bearing upon these events will be interspersed in smaller type. Addenda will be published in future issues to correct and complete this compilation.]
DIPLOMATIC NOTES
GREAT BRITAIN AND UNITED STATES
In answer to agitation for more stringent blockade measures, Sir Edward Grey, on January 26, defended the government policy in Parliament. He pointed out: (1) That figures of exports from the United States do not indicate the amount of goods actually reaching their destination, since large quantities are stopped by the blockade. (2) The blockade cannot interfere with vessels “destined for neutral ports with bona fide neutral cargo.” (3) “We are applying the doctrine of continuous voyage.” (4) An actual blockade would differ from the present only by confiscation instead of payment for cargoes.
Criticism of Blockade.—In the British House of Lords on February 22 the matter of a stricter blockade of Germany was discussed at great length. Lord Beresford in his remarks demanding a more thorough blockade said, in part: “A war was never won by orders in council or proclamations, but by hard hitting. If we want to bring Germany to her knees we must exercise the blockade power thoroughly and completely under the principles of international law. To do that it is necessary to have a policy and to turn it over to the navy and let the navy enforce it. These orders in council may be statesmanship, but they are not war, and they arc not likely to win the war. I would allow nothing whatever to go into Germany, not even luxuries. I would abolish the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband. I would extend the doctrine of continuous voyage to all contraband. The war should be run by five cabinet ministers without departmental duties. The longer we have civilian control of the operations of the war the more disasters we shall suffer.”
Order in Council Versus Blockade.—The argument in favor of proceeding by blockade is twofold. The neutrals question the validity of the order in council. The legality of a blockade seems easier of establishment. If the validity of the blockade can be legally maintained, the blockading powers have the right to confiscate not contraband goods only, but both goods and the ships carrying them when they attempt to break through the blockade. It is then a more efficient process. If the supplies entering Germany have to be carried by ships that must insure against the risks the blockade runner has to face, two results would follow. Only a very small proportion of ship owners would face the risk, and supplies would not only automatically become less in bulk, but enormously more costly. It might be thought, if the United States has protested so vigorously against our proceedings in the matter of contraband, that they would protest still more vigorously if we adopted the infinitely more drastic measure of blockade. If the hanging up of American ships seemed a hardship would not the confiscation or destruction of the chartered ships seem intolerable? As to this we have something to guide us in the character of the Notes which the United States have addressed to the German Government. Omitting the case of the William P. Frye, a grain ship destroyed by a German cruiser after the cargo had been removed, there is not amongst Mr. Wilson’s published notes to Germany a single word of protest against the destruction —without legal trial or any prize court procedure—of a single capture made by the Germans, either by surface ships or by submarines. So far as we know the whole of the Washington-Berlin correspondence is concerned with the inhumanity and injustice only of the German proceedings. Indeed, there seems no other interpretation that can be put upon the third Lusitania note, than that Mr. Wilson accepts, as a necessary development of modern naval war, that prizes should be destroyed on the high seas. He is only concerned that if this destruction is carried out by submarines, the safety of the non-combatant passengers and crews should be properly secured. If then a plausible legal argument can be made out for the blockade, it is unlikely that the Americans, having waived the right to trial, will raise against our proceedings objections they have not raised against Germany’s.—Land and Water.
Defence of Orders in Council. Sir Edward Grey’s Speech.—The Russian press, which inveighs at the ineffectiveness of the blockade, does not seem to realize that, during the long Arctic winter which closes navigation in the White Sea, intercourse between Russia and the Allies depends entirely on Sweden. Simple measures of retaliation on the part of Sweden might arrest such intercourse, which is of primary importance. Moreover, France and England receive many useful imports from Sweden, and could ill afford to lose her trade . . . . . As for the United Slates, her position differs notably from that of the Scandinavian states and Holland. She cannot advance the arguments employed by these powers. The Allies have thus far been content to confiscate only indisputable contraband and to sequestrate suspected merchandise with provision for indemnity. The injury to American commerce is thus reduced to a minimum. In short, the United States is reaping immense profits from the war, and her government would be unwise to leave the field of platonic protestations.—Journal des Débats, 28/1.
Figures of U. S. Foreign Trade
Import and Export Trade with Germany
1913 1914 1915
Imports £30,336,454 £25,757,651 £8,194,537
Exports 54,129,494 31,211,761 2,357,561
Principal Exports
1913 1914 1915
Raw cotton £22,411,418 £13,634,643 £2,135,784
Maize 710,527 16,393 2,950
Automobiles 155,093 159,910 560
Fertilizers 940,221 373,287 1,490
Bacon 27,205 2,959 6,350
Lard Compounds 4,860 2,175 3,920
—London Times, 24/1.
Total Export Trade (in Millions)
1913 1914 1915
Europe 1,176 1,004 2,077
South America 124 80 116
Central America 76 59 62
Asia 100 77 115
Canada 346 268 276
—Journal des Debats, 25/1
1812 and 1915.—A very curious fact is that our shipments of foreign merchandise, imported first and then reexported, rose for the first time in our history above our similar exports in the Napoleonic wars. Until last year, the highest annual total of “foreign merchandise reexported” was the $60,283,000 of 1806—a result of the huge trade with Europe in West Indian merchandise, conducted by the neutral American merchant fleet when French and English merchant ships were subject to capture by the enemy frigates.
Never afterward, between 1807 and 1914, did the total come within 60 per cent of the Napoleonic maximum. Even in 1914 it was only $42,500,000, but last year it reached $61,464,000. It is not without interest to recall that, whereas in 1806 the foreign merchandise amounted to 50 per cent of our total exports, in 1915 the proportion was only i-34 per cent. Europe’s purchases of our own domestic products increased surprisingly little during the war period of a century ago; the present war has had a very different story to tell in that regard.
One other aspect of these detailed trade returns is of political interest. Last year’s exports to Germany and Austria decreased $158,000,000; but our exports to Holland. Denmark, Norway, and Sweden—countries with commercial access to Germany—increased $154,800,000 over 1914, and $182,800,- 000 over 1913, a normal year of peace. These figures are the basis of England’s effort to restrain exports to the above-named neutral countries, except when guaranteed against reexport to Germany.
Bearing on yet another problem, our exports last year to South America were $54,300,000 greater than in 1914. They were still a million dollars under 1913, though exceeding all other years. But exports to Asia, Africa, and Australasia surpassed by $42,000,000 the largest previous yearly total. This clearly reflects the reversion to the United States of trade with neutral consuming nations, previously in the hands of Germany and England, but partly or wholly lost by them because of the European war.—N. Y. Nation, 24/2.
Allies’ Pledge to Belgium.—On February 14 the Allies’ ambassadors presented the Belgian Foreign Office with the following statement:
The allied powers signatory to the treaties guaranteeing the independence and neutrality of Belgium have decided to renew to-day by solemn act the agreements made regarding your country, which has been heroically faithful to its international obligations. Consequently we, the Ministers of France, Great Britain, and Russia, duly authorized by our governments, have the honor to make the following declaration:
The allied and guaranteeing powers declare that when the moment comes the Belgian Government will be called upon to take part in peace negotiations, and they will not put an end to hostilities without Belgium having reestablished its political and economic indeoendence.
The Italian minister told Baron Beyens that, although Italy was not among the powers which guaranteed the independence and neutrality of Belgium, he had no objections to the foregoing declaration. A similar announcement was made on behalf of the Japanese Government.
Protests Mail Seizures.—On January 4 Secretary Lansing lodged with the British Foreign Office a protest against seizure of American mails in transit to neutral ports, and on January 25 a protest against the British “Trading with the Enemies” act. Sweden, on February 17, requested the cooperation of the United States to prevent seizure of parcels post from this country to Sweden, and censoring of first-class mail. Secretary Lansing, on February 21, despatched a second note to Great Britain requesting a prompt reply to previous protests.
Loss of “Maloja” and “La Provence.”—The sinking, presumably by mines, of 10 or a dozen ships in the last few days is regarded by the British press as evidence that, by some means, probably by the use of neutral vessels, new mine fields have been sown by the Germans in the North Sea and the English Channel. The most serious disaster was that which occurred on Sunday to the P. and O. liner Maloja, which struck a mine and sank within half an hour two miles off Dover. An official statement issued by the owners of the line on Monday gave the number of missing at 155, which included 49 passengers. The only American known to have been on board was saved. On Tuesday official announcement was made by the French Minister of Marine of the sinking last Saturday in the Mediterranean of the auxiliary transport La Provence, with a loss of more than 3000 lives.—N. Y. Nation, 2/3.
GERMANY AND UNITED STATES
Dutch Liner Sunk.—The Holland-Lloyd passenger steamer Tubantia (15,000 tons) was sunk early on March 16 off the Northhinder lightship. The steamer was bound from Amsterdam for the River Platte with 381 persons on board, of whom all but four were saved.
Second Engineer De Groot, of the Tubantia, now makes the statement that an hour and a half after leaving the ship he saw a submarine of foreign build.
The Netherlands Ministry of Marine does not declare definitely that the Tubantia was torpedoed, but from all evidence in his possession regards it as extremely probable. J. J. Rambonnet, Minister of Marine, to-day confirmed a report to The Associated Press that an affidavit had been made by the first mate, the fourth mate and the lookout, in which they said they saw a white streak, which is only explainable as the track of a torpedo approaching the ship. When the streak touched the Tubantia an explosion followed. The Tubantia, according to the affidavit, had all but stopped when the explosion occurred. The vessel was hit amidship, aft on the starboard side two meters below the water-line. In view of all of this evidence, Minister Rambonnet declared that the only conclusion left was that the Tubantia was torpedoed. “In fact,” he said, “I regard it as ninety-nine out of a hundred chances that she was torpedoed.”
The Vaderland, a Dutch paper, asks if the time has not come for America, Holland, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark to take combined action, “as their interests coincided and there can be no doubt concerning their sentiments. The South American republics are interested,” it continues, ‘‘because the loss of the Tubantia deprives them of one of the few remaining links with Europe. The Vaderland believes that joint diplomatic pressure would convince Germany that the present method of submarine warfare must be abandoned.”—N. Y. Times, 19/3.
By the middle of February it was understood that Germany had virtually acceded to the demands made by the United States in the Lusitania controversy-—namely, disavowal, indemnity, and assurances against similar attacks in future; and that disagreement had been reduced to the substitution of “recognizes” for “assumes” liability. At this point the whole controversy over submarine warfare was reopened by notice from Austria February 10, and Germany February 12, that after March 1 they would consider armed merchantmen as belligerents and torpedo them without warning. In spite of intimations to the contrary in Secretary Lansing’s modus vivendi note of January 18 to the allied powers proposing disarmament of merchantmen, the United States administration took a position opposing any change of international law by which vessels armed for defence only should lose their status as non-combatants, and refusing to withdraw its protection from American citizens sailing on vessels so armed. This policy was sustained by decisive votes in both houses of Congress. On February 28 Ambassador Bernstorff stated that “no enemy merchantmen would be torpedoed unless the presence of armament on board was proved,” and interpreted proof to mean actual resistance, thus bringing the German position again into accord with international law. According to the British Admiralty instructions to armed merchantmen (published March 3), emphasis is laid on the duty of avoiding combat, but the approach of aircraft or submarines is considered in itself evidence of hostile intention.
Secretary Lansing’s Proposals of January 18.—Secretary Lansing proposed the adoption of the following formula for the treatment of unarmed merchant ships:
First.—A non-combatant has the right to traverse the high seas in a merchant ship entitled to fly a belligerent flag, and rely upon the rules of international law and the principles of humanity if the vessel is approached by a belligerent war vessel.
Second.—A merchant vessel of any nationality should not be subject to attack without warning.
Third.—A belligerent armed merchant vessel should promptly obey any order from a belligerent warship to stop.
Fourth.—No such merchant vessel should be fired upon unless she tries to flee or to resist by force, and even in such a case any attack upon her by the warship must stop as soon as the flight or resistance ceases.
Fifth.—Only in case it should be impossible for military reasons for the warship to supply a prize crew or to convoy the merchant ship into port will she be justified in sinking such merchantmen, and in that case passengers and crew must be removed to a place of safety.
The concluding paragraph of Secretary Lansing’s memorandum was as follows:
I should add that my government is impressed with the reasonableness of the argument that a merchant vessel carrying armament of any sort, in view of the character of the submarine warfare and the defensive weakness of underseas craft, should be held to be an auxiliary cruiser and so treated by a neutral as well as by a belligerent government, and is seriously considering instructing its officials accordingly.—N. Y. Times, 15/2.
German Renewal of Submarine Warfare.—The German memorandum of February 12 closes as follows :
It is thus made plain that the armed English merchantmen have official instructions to attack the German submarines treacherously wherever they come near them, that is to say, orders to conduct relentless warfare against them. Since England’s rules of maritime war are adopted by her allies without question, the proof must be taken as demonstrated in request of the armed merchantmen of the other enemy countries also.
In the circumstance set forth above, enemy merchantmen armed with guns no longer have any right to be considered as peaceable vessels of commerce. Therefore the German naval forces will receive orders within a short period, paying consideration to the interests of the neutrals, to treat such vessels as belligerents.
The German Government brings this status of affairs to the knowledge of the neutral powers in order that they may warn their peoples against continuing to intrust their persons or property to armed merchantmen of the powers at war with the German Empire.—N. Y. Times, 17/3.
Instructions to Ambassador Bernstorff, February 27.—First.—Germany will stand by the assurances she has previously given to the United States with respect to the future conduct of submarine warfare.
Second.—Germany does not regard its newly proclaimed policy of sinking armed merchant vessels on sight after February 29 as having nullified the assurances previously given.
Third— Germany’s interpretation of the assurances previously given that ships will not be attacked without warning is applicable only to unarmed merchant ships, and not as being broad enough to cover .belligerent merchant vessels armed for defence, and which may use their armaments offensively against German submarines.
Fourth.—Germany regards the Lusitania case as embracing only the question of that government’s attitude toward unarmed merchantmen and not as involving the question of the treatment of armed merchant ships.
Fifth.—Germany does not offer to suspend her proposed campaign of submarine attack without warning against armed merchantmen, and inferentially the campaign is to become effective on Tuesday, as planned.
Sixth.—Germany calls attention to the assurances given by the British Ambassador the first month of the war to the effect that guns on British merchantmen will never fire unless such vessels are fired upon first, and contends that these assurances have been violated by British armed ships, and by secret instructions issued by the British Government, and in support of this contention Germany offers what she regards as evidence enumerating vessels that have used their guns offensively against German submarines and also copies of the alleged secret instructions to British merchant vessels.
Seventh.—Germany is willing to discuss with the United States the question of when defensive armament may be regarded as having become offensive.
Eighth.—Meanwhile Germany urges that Americans be warned not to travel on armed enemy merchantmen.—N. V. Times, 28/2.
Proof of Armament.—The memorandum is silent regarding the manner in which the German submarine commanders are to obtain proof as to the presence of armament on board enemy merchantmen, but it is understood that Count von Bernstorff informed the Secretary of State that it was his opinion that German submarine commanders would regard the actual use of the guns on such merchantmen as the proof for which they must look before carrying out their instructions to sink armed belligerent merchantmen without warning.
Under this construction is would appear that, at least in the opening stages of the new campaign, German submarine commanders must have proof of the presence of guns on board enemy merchant ships before attacking them, and this proof must take the particular form of actual use of the guns of the merchantmen.—N. Y. Times, 28/2.
President Wilson’s Stand on Armed Liner Issue
On February 24 Senator Stone, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, addressed to the President a letter expressing his unwillingness “to plunge this nation into the vortex of this world war because of the unreasonable obstinancy of any of the powers upon the one hand, or, on the other hand, of foolhardiness, amounting to a sort of moral treason against the Republic, of our people recklessly risking their lives on armed belligerent ships.”
In reply, President Wilson addressed to Senator Stone the following letter:
The White House, Washington, February 24, 1916.
My dear Senator.—I very warmly appreciate your kind and frank letter of to-day and feel that it calls for an equally frank reply.
You are right in assuming that I shall do everything in my power to keep the United States out of war. I think the country will feel no uneasiness about my course in that respect. Through many anxious months I have striven for that object, amidst difficulties more manifold than can have been apparent upon the surface, and so far I have succeeded. I do'not doubt that I shall continue to succeed. The course which the Central European Powers have announced their intention of following in the future with regard to undersea warfare seems for the moment to threaten insuperable obstacles, but its apparent meaning is so manifestly inconsistent with explicit assurances recently given up by those powers with regard to their treatment of merchant vessels on the high seas that I must believe that explanations will presently ensue which will put a different aspect upon it. We have had no reason to question their good faith or their fidelity to their promises in the past, and I for one feel confident that we shall have none in the future.
But in any event our duty is clear. No nation, no group of nations, has the right while war is in progress to alter or disregard the principles which all nations have agreed upon in mitigation of the horrors and sufferings of war; and if the clear rights of American citizens should ever unhappily be abridged or denied by any such action we should, it seems to me, have in honor no choice as to what our own course should be.
For my own part, I cannot consent to any abridgment of the rights of American citizens in any respect. The honor and self-respect of the nation is involved. We covet peace, and shall preserve it at any cost but the loss of honor. To forbid our people to exercise their rights for fear we might be called upon to vindicate them would be a deep humiliation indeed. It would be an implicit, all but an explicit, acquiescence in the violation of the rights of mankind everywhere, and of whatever nation or allegiance. It would be a deliberate abdication of our hitherto proud position as spokesmen, even amidst the turmoil of war, for the law and the right. It would make everything this government has attempted, and everything that it has achieved during this terrible struggle of nations meaningless and futile.
It is important to reflect that if in this instance we allowed expediency to take the place of principle, the door would inevitably be opened to still further concessions. Once accept a single abatement of right, and many other humiliations would certainly follow, and the whole fine fabric of international law might crumble under our hands piece by piece. What we are contending for in this matter is of the very essence of the things that have made America a sovereign nation. She cannot yield them without conceding her own impotency as a nation, and making virtual surrender of her independent position among the nations of the world.
I am speaking, my dear senator, in deep solemnity, without heat, with a clear consciousness of the high responsibilities of my office, and as your sincere and devoted friend. If we should unhappily differ, we shall differ as friends; but where issues so momentous as these are involved we must, just because we are friends, speak our minds without reservation.
Faithfully yours,
Woodrow Wilson.
Guns on Italian Liners.—The Italian passenger steamer Verona sailed from New York for Naples and Genoa, January 29, carrying her mounted 75-millimeter guns. Collector Malone received a telegram from the Secretary of the Navy early in the day instructing him to allow the Verona to clear with her guns. The Verona carries no passengers, but has 6000 tons of food supplies aboard and between 300 and 400 horses. Italy has given assurances to Washington that the guns mounted on the Verona are for defensive purposes only.—Army and Navy Journal, 2/5.
New York, March 1.
The Giuseppe Verdi, the largest and fastest of the Italian liners, left at 6.45 o’clock last night, carrying her two 3-inch rapid-fire guns on the stern with their gun crews. The ship carried 173 passengers. Two of those in the steerage were Italian-born American citizens.—N. Y. Times, 1/3.
Full Text of British Instructions to Armed Liners
London, March 2.
The British Admiralty to-night officially made public the Admiralty orders to armed merchantmen, given October 2, 1915.
The official statement reads as follows:
In view of the recent issue by the German Government of a memorandum on the treatment of armed merchant ships, the Admiralty has decided to make public the instructions actually governing the actions of British merchant vessels armed for self-defence:
Instruction, dated October 20, 1915, in re the status of armed merchant ships:
- The right of the crew of a merchant vessel to forcibly resist visit and search and fight in self-defence is well recognized in international law and expressly admitted by the German prize regulations in an addendum issued June, 1914, at a time when it was known that numerous merchant vessels were being armed for self-defence.
- Armament is supplied solely for the purpose of resisting attack by an armed enemy vessel and must not be used for any other purpose whatsoever.
- An armed merchant vessel, therefore, must not in any circumstances interfere with or obstruct the free passage of other merchant vessels or fishing craft, whether these are friendly, neutral, or hostile.
- The status of a British armed merchant vessel cannot be changed upon the high seas.
Rules to be observed in the exercise of the right of self-defence:
- The master or officer in command is responsible for opening and ceasing fire.
- Participation in armed resistance must be confined to persons acting under the orders of the master or the officer in command.
- Before opening fire the British colors must be hoisted.
- Fire must not be opened or continued from a vessel which has stopped, hauled down her flag, or otherwise indicated her intention to surrender.
- The expression “armament” includes not only cannon, but also rifles and machine guns in cases where these have been supplied.
- The ammunition used in rifles and machine guns must conform to Article XXIII, Hague Convention, 1907, that is, bullet must be cased in nickel or other hard substance and must not be split or cut in such a way as to cause them to expand or set up on striking a man. The use of explosive bullets is forbidden.
Circumstances under which aramment should be employed:
- The armament is supplied for the purpose of defence only. The object of the master should be to avoid action whenever possible.
- Experience has shown that hostile submarines and aircraft have frequently attacked merchant vessels without warning. It is important, therefore, that craft of this description should not be allowed to approach to short range, at which a torpedo or bomb launched without notice would almost certainly be effective. British and allied submarines and aircraft have orders not to approach merchant vessels. Consequently it may be presumed that any submarine or aircraft which deliberately approaches or pursues a merchant vessel does so with hostile intention. In such cases fire may be opened in self-defence in order to prevent the hostile craft from closing to a range at which resistance to a sudden attack with bomb or torpedo would be impossible.
- An armed merchant vessel proceeding to render assistance to the crew of a vessel in distress must not seek action with any hostile craft, though if she herself is attacked while doing so fire may be opened in self-defence.
- It should be remembered that the flag is no guide to nationality. German submarines and armed merchant vessels have frequently employed the British, Allied or neutral colors to approach undetected. Though, however, the use of disguise and false colors to escape capture is a legitimate ruse de guerre, its adoption by defensively armed merchant ships may easily lead to misconception. Such vessels, therefore, are forbidden to adopt any form of disguise which might cause them to be mistaken for neutral ships.
Admiralty comment:
These instructions, which are those at present in force, are the latest issued. Successive issues have been made, not by reason of a change in policy—the policy throughout has remained unaltered—but by improvement in wording and greater clearness of expression to emphasize the purely defensive character of the armament of merchant vessels.
It is because of the distorted interpretation given these instructions as a whole and the very forced character of the interpretation given by the German Government to portions which they quote from an earlier issue of the instructions that the Admiralty felt it desirable, with a view to allaying neutral anxiety, to publish these in extenso.
On March 9 Germany declared war on Portugal, basing the declaration on Portuguese aid to the English, principally in Africa, and seizure of German ships at Lisbon.
Eight German steamships lying in the harbor at St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, were taken in charge, February 24, by officials of the Portuguese Government. The Official Gazette of Lisbon of February 25 announces that the 36 German and Austrian merchant vessels seized February 24 in the Tagus River and placed under the Portuguese flag are refitting in order to adapt them for the transport and other purposes for which they have been requisitioned. It is distinctly given to be understood that they have not been confiscated. Germany has addressed a sharp note to Portugal in protest against seizure of German merchant vessels by the Portuguese authorities. This measure is characterized as a violation of Germany’s treaty rights, and the hope is expressed that Portugal will rescind its action.—Army and Navy Journal, 4/3.
War Strength of Portugal.—Portugal’s regular army consists of 30,000 regular troops and 230,000 reserves. She is credited with a maximum force of 870,000 fighting men. Her navy is negligible, consisting of five second- class cruisers and smaller craft, but her ports, from now on open to the British Navy, will be of great benefit to the allied fleets. (See p. 574.)
Italy Seizes German Ships.—In the House of Commons on February 29, announcement was made that 34 out of the 37 German ships interned in Italian ports had been requisitioned by the Italian Government. This action, following on a considerable popular clamor in Italy for war on Germany, may, it is thought, lead to a formal declaration of hostilities.—N. Y. Nation, 9/3-
The British liner Appam, West African coast to Plymouth, with 301 passengers and crew, was captured 60 miles north of Madeira . on January 16, by the German commerce destroyer Moewe. The liner, with her passengers and crew and 138 persons transferred from other captured ships, was brought to Norfolk, Va., February 1, by a German prize crew of 22 men. According to a later statement of the German Admiralty, the Moewe returned (o her home port March 5, after a successful cruise lasting several months.
Liner’s Assailant.—The crew of the Appam say they were told that the Moewe passed through the Kiel Canal into the North Sea, where she escaped capture by the British patrols by flying the Swedish colors, which were also painted on her sides. Captain Harrison’s own story sheds no light on this point. “The day was bright and clear when the Appam was captured,” the captain said. “She was travelling at a fair speed when we sighted what appeared to be an ordinary tramp steamer, which gradually came closer. We feared no danger and made no preparations to resist, as we were not expecting any attack. Suddenly the tramp fired across our bows. I immediately hove to. Simultaneously the tramp’s false forecastle head, which was apparently made of canvas, fell away, revealing a battery of huge guns. We surrendered without offering any resistance.” The names of the seven steamers sunk by the Appam’s assailant are given as Trader, Arthur, Corbridge, Ariadne, Dromonby, Clan Mactavish, and the Farringford. The Clan Mactavish, sunk on January 17, was only destroyed after a fight in which 15 men were killed. The other steamers were sunk without resistance between January 10 and 16. One suggestion put forward is that the Mowe is the Argo steamer of that name, of 1251 tons, belonging to Bremen.—Army and Navy Gazette, 5/2.
Status of “Appam.”—On February 19 a U. S. marshal boarded the Appam and tacked a notice of libel to her mast. The proceedings were brought by the owners, the African Steam Navigation Co., Ltd., in the federal courts. Her cargo is valued by the owners at $2,000,000, the vessel itself at $2,000,000, and gold bullion and diamonds to the amount of $800,000 are said to be on board.
Washington, March 2.
The State Department to-day sent to the German Ambassador its decision in the case of the British liner Appam. Public announcement of the decision will be withheld, pending a decision in the libel action.
The court consequently will be permitted to interpret the Prussian- American treaty, which it is claimed by Germany, provides that a German prize may remain in American waters indefinitely, with immunity from legal proceedings instituted by the original owners in an attempt to regain possession of the ship. In awaiting an interpretation of the treaty by the courts, the State Department is acting in accordance with precedent. The executive branch of the government always has refrained from interfering with the judiciary in such cases.—N. Y. Times, 3/3.
Charge Untruth in “Arabic” Note.—It is stated by British officials that the submarine which sank the Arabic on August 19 last was the U-27, and that this craft was destroyed by a British patrol boat the same day. This is considered to be verified by a German query through the American Embassy, as to whether Wilhelm Schulz, a warrant machinist of the U-27, had been rescued and was a British prisoner. If the British statement is accepted it throws an interesting light on the German memorandum of September 9 giving particulars of the attack, and on letter of Ambassador Bernstorff, October 5, quoting the report of the submarine commander.—N. Y. Times, 29/2.
AUSTRIA
“Petrolite” Affair.—The United States is preparing to make formal demands upon Austria-Hungary as a result of the attack by an Austrian submarine upon the American tank steamer Petrolite on December 5 last. A note on the subject will be dispatched within the next few days.
In reply, February 25, to the first American communication on the subject, Austria informed the State Department that its version of the affair was that the submarine commander thought the Petrolite an enemy ship disguised with the American flag; that he fired on the vessel because he believed it was about to ram his ship, and that the commander of the Petrolite voluntarily furnished provisions when asked to do so.
The State Department since has secured additional information from the captain and crew of the Petrolite directly contradictory to the Austrian version. They have declared in affidavits that the Petrolite was stopped in the Mediterranean by an Austrian submarine which fired a number of shells at her, that the submarine commander asked for food, which the commander of the Petrolite refused to give him, and that the commander of the submarine then held one of the members of the tanker’s crew as a hostage while his men went aboard the ship and took such stores as they desired.— N. Y. Times, 4/3.
THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY
Diplomatic Blundering.—One of the root errors committed by our Foreign Office in concert with the Allies was the allotment of portions of the bear’s skin before we had shot the bear, In effect, some of the arrangements into which we entered thus precipitately confirmed Bulgaria in her resolve to take sides against us, damped the fitful ardor of Roumania, and prevented us from helping our Turkish friends who were ready to overturn their present government. A little reflection would have served to convince men of insight that nothing could well be more damaging to the Allied cause at that juncture than the formal allotment of Contantinople to Russia. The direct and inevitable result of the ear-marking of Constantine’s city for the Tsardom must he a revulsion of feeling among Balkan neutrals from the Allies towards the Central Empires. M. Dclcass6 and Sir Edward Grey, with a generosity which would have challenged our admiration had it been compatible with justice to the Allies’ common cause, lent a willing ear to Russia’s solicitations, and the fateful transaction was completed. This momentous accord, many people imagine, was come to when M. Poincare was the guest of the Tsar in Russia. Others believe it was concluded as far back as the time when the naval convention between France and Russia was drawn up. Both dates are wrong. It was completed in the beginning of April, 1915.—Extracts from article by Dr. E. J. Dillon, Fortnightly Review, February.
UNITED STATES
Nicaragua Treaty.—On February 18 the U. S. Senate ratified the proposed treaty with Nicaragua, under which the United States is to acquire perpetual right of way along the San Juan River and the Lake of Nicaragua for a transoceanic canal by the payment of $3,000,000 in gold.
General Chamorro, the Nicaraguan Minister, stated immediately after the Senate had acted that he expected early ratification of the convention by his government.
As originally negotiated by Mr. Bryan, as Secretary of State, with the Nicaraguan Governor Chamorro, the treaty contained provisions for American supervision practically tantamount to an American protectorate. To meet what was then understood as opposition, those provisions were eliminated before Mr. Bryan resigned his portfolio. To-day, in the Senate’s resolution of ratification, those provisions, so far as they relate to American supervision of the expenditure of the $3,000,000, are largely restored.
The treaty provides for 99-year leases to Great Corn and Little Corn islands, and to a naval base yet to be selected on the Nicaraguan coast of Fonseca Bay.—N. Y. Times, 19/2.
The. Monroe Doctrine and the Great War.—An interesting article on this subject appears in the February Nineteenth Century and After. After pointing out that the Monroe Doctrine has 11 imposed a veritable strait- waistcoat on Germany, shutting her out of her place in the sun,” and thus operating as a cause of the present European war, the writer turns to the origin of the doctrine. It was proposed by the British Minister Canning to the American Ambassador Rush in 1822, as a means of checkmating the plans of the Holy Alliance to bring back the revolting Spanish-American colonies under the Spanish yoke. “I called the New World into existence,” wrote Canning, “to redress the balance of the Old.” Rush proposed the policy of cooperation with England to Monroe, who at once consulted Jefferson. The latter replied:
Monticello, October 24, 1823.
. . . . The question presented by the letters you have sent me is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of Independence. That made us a nation, this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of Time opening on us. . . . . America North and South has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe and peculiarly her own. While Europe is laboring to become the domicile of despotism, our endeavor should surely be to make our hemisphere that of Freedom. One nation most of all could disturb us in this pursuit; she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in it. By acceding to her proposition we detach her from the band of despots, bring her mighty weight into the scale of free government and emancipate a Continent at one stroke which might otherwise linger long in doubt and difficulty. Great Britain is the nation which can do us the most harm of any one, or all, on earth; and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world. With her then we should most sedulously cherish a cordial friendship, and nothing would tend more to knit affections than to be fighting once more side by side in the same cause.
On December 2, 1823, Monroe sent the historic message to Congress.
During the century following, the writer asserts that South America has been preserved from European aggression not so much by the official sponsors of the Monroe Doctrine as by the power of the British fleet. The removal of such support would throw upon the United States a responsibility quite beyond her power to sustain. " It is proper to point out that while we [the British] gain nothing by the Monroe Doctrine, yet, seeing it is our fleet which alone keeps Germany out of Cuba and the New World, the ‘loan’ of that licet is of transcendental importance to America."
UNITED STATES AND MEXICO
Report on Mexico.—On February 17 President Wilson transmitted to the Senate a reply prepared by the Department of State to the Senate resolution of inquiry of January 6, in which it is stated that in 1913, 1014, and 1915—generally covering the first three years of the present administration—76 Americans lost their lives in Mexico, 20 civilian Americans were killed in the United States as a result of border fighting, and 16 American soldiers were slain in the United States from the same cause—a total of 112 Americans. In the same time 87 Mexicans were killed in the United States by causes other than shots across the border, and 5 by such shots— a total of 92. This makes a grand total of 204 persons.—N. Y. Times, 17/2.
On March 10, Mexican bandits to the number of about 1500 under Francisco Villa attempted a raid on the town of Columbus, N. M. by about 650 U. S. cavalry. In the engagement and pursuit following, nine United State soldiers, five civilians, and about 100 Mexicans were killed. American forces have been sent into Mexico to capture Villa and his followers.
In response to American representations to the Carranza Government with regard to the pursuit of Villa by United States troops, Carranza's Minister replied, March 10, indicating efforts made to establish order in Chihuahua, and requesting permission for Mexican forces to cross into United States territory, if necessary, in pursuit of Villa forces.
To this request the United States Government replied as follows:
Washington, March 13.
The government of the United States has received the courteous note of Señor Acuna [Carranza’s Minister of Foreign Affairs], and has read with satisfaction his suggestion for reciprocal privileges to the American and Mexican authorities in the pursuit and apprehension of outlaws who infest their respective territories lying along the international boundary and who arc a constant menace to the lives and property of residents of that region.
The government of the United States, in view of the unusual state of affairs which has existed for some time along the international boundary, and earnestly desiring to cooperate with the de facto government of Mexico to suppress this state of lawlessness, of which the recent attack on Columbus, N. M., is a deplorable example, and to insure peace and order in the region contiguous to the boundary between the two republics, readily grants permission for military forces of the de facto government of Mexico to cross the international boundary in pursuit of lawless bands of armed men who have entered Mexico from the United States, committed outrages on Mexican soil, and fled into the United States, on the understanding that the de facto government of Mexico grants the reciprocal privilege that the military forces of the United States may pursue across the international boundary into Mexican territory lawless bands of armed men who have entered the United States from Mexico, committed outrages on American soil and fled into Mexico.
The government of the United States understands that, in view of its agreement to this reciprocal arrangement proposed by the de facto government, the arrangement is now complete and in force, and the reciprocal privileges thereunder may accordingly be exercised by either government without further interchange of views.
It is a matter of sincere gratification to the government of the United States that the de facto government of Mexico has evinced so cordial and friendly a spirit of cooperation in the efforts of the authorities of the United States to apprehend and punish the bands of outlaws, who seek refuge beyond the international boundary in the erroneous belief that the constituted authorities will resent any pursuit across the boundary by the forces of the government whose citizens have suffered by the crimes of the fugitives.
With the same spirit of cordial friendship the government of the United States will exercise the privilege granted by the de facto government of Mexico, in the hope and confident expectation that by their mutual efforts lawlessness will be eradicated and peace and order maintained in the territories of the United States and Mexico contiguous to the international boundary.
Secretary of State Lansing also issued this statement:
In order to remove any misapprehension that may exist either in the United States or in Mexico, the President has authorized me to give in his name the public assurance that the military operations now in contemplation by this government will be scrupulously confined to the object already announced, and that in no circumstances will they be suffered to infringe in any degree upon the sovereignty of Mexico or develop into intervention of any kind in the internal affairs of our sister republic. On the contrary, what is now being done is deliberately intended to preclude the possibility of intervention.—N. Y. Times, 13/3.
NAVAL NOTES
Naval developments in the following strategic areas will be considered separately and in turn;
PAGE
- Table of Naval Losses .............................. 643
- North Sea............................................... 652
- Baltic Sea................................................ 658
- Adriatic Sea ............................................ 639
- Mediterranean ......................................... 661
- Black Sea................................................. 664
- Atlantic ................................................. 665
- East Africa .............................................. 667
- Pacific .................................................... 669
TABLE OF NAVAL LOSSES OF THE VARIOUS BELLIGERENTS SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
The following table is compiled from various articles appearing in the press of the several belligerent nations. These reports are so contradictory that it is impossible to furnish an absolutely correct list of vessels lost to date. In many cases the belligerent powers have failed to acknowledge the losses of all the vessels. No attempt has been made to include herein a list of the various trawlers, mine-sweepers and such odd small craft which may have been destroyed while mine-sweeping or on submarine patrol duty.
(On the left margin of this table of losses is a page reference to the Naval Institute War Notes.)
LOSSES OF GREAT BRITAIN AND HER ALLIES
BRITISH WARSHIP LOSSES
[TABLE]
FRENCH WARSHIP LOSSES
[TABLE]
RUSSIAN WARSHIP LOSSES
[TABLE]
JAPANESE WARSHIP LOSSES
[TABLE]
ITALIAN WARSHIP LOSSES
[TABLE]
LOSSES OF GERMANY AND HER ALLIES
GERMAN WARSHIP LOSSES
[TABLE]
AUSTRIAN WARSHIP LOSSES
[TABLE]
TURKISH WARSHIP LOSSES
[TABLE]
NORTH SEA
“King Edward VII” Sunk off Spurn Head.—Captain Arthur K. Lindley, of the British Naval Reserve, who arrived in New York January 24. is quoted as saying that the spot where the British battleship King Edward VII was sunk by a mine was in the North Sea off the east coast of England. He said that the battleship was passing Spurn Head, near the new naval base at Immingham, when she struck the mine. Five German submarines were sighted off the Irish coast at the beginning of December, Captain Lindley said, and before he left London, two weeks ago, four of them had been captured or sunk, according to the report at the Admiralty. The new torpedo-boat destroyers, which can make 45 knots, he said, were scouring the seas in all directions in search of U boats. This, he said, made it difficult for the submarines to operate successfully for 1 any length of time.—Army and Navy Journal, 29/1. (See page 300 for further particulars regarding King Edward VII.)
“Arethusa” Mined.—The loss of the well-known light cruiser Arethusa, after a brief but glorious career, was revealed by an announcement from the Admiralty on February 14 as follows: “His Majesty’s ship Arethusa (Commodore Reginald Y. Tyrwhitt, C. B.) has struck a mine off the East Coast. It is feared that she will become a total wreck. About 10 men have lost their lives.” The Arethusa, type-ship of a new class of light armored cruisers for scouting and reconnaissance duties and for service as destroyer leaders, was authorized in the 1912-13 Navy Estimates, built in dry dock at Chatham, and floated out on October 25, 1913. She had not completed fitting out when war began, but to the general surprise she took a prominent part in the battle in the Heligoland Bight on August 28, 1914, although she had only been commissioned a day or two earlier as an emergency ship. She again flew the broad pennant of Commodore Tyrwhitt in the seaplane raid on the German fleet and base at Cuxhaven on Christmas Day, 1914. and in the battle off the Dogger Bank on January 24, 1915, and appears, so far as official information shows, to have been the only vessel of the navy which took part in these three main engagements in the North Sea.—Army and Navy Gazette, 19/2.
“Natal” Court-Martial.—In the House of Commons on Wednesday afternoon, Commander Bellairs asked what steps the Board of Admiralty had taken to ascertain the cause of the internal explosion which destroyed the Natal. Dr. Macnamara replied that the court-martial required under Section 92 of the Naval Discipline Act will be held shortly.—Army and Navy Gazette, 15/1.
“E-17” Lost.—The Dutch Ministry of Marine announced on January 6 that on the same day the Dutch cruiser Noord Brabant encountered off the Texel, outside territorial waters, a British submarine, which made signals of distress. The entire crew of 33 men were taken on board the Dutch cruiser and brought to the Helder. The submarine sank. From press accounts it would appear that when off the North Hinder the vessel got out of her course, and, running aground on the Haaksgrond Bank, sprang a leak. According to the Handelsblad, the submarine was not sighted by the cruiser Noord Brabant until she had been 10 hours in trouble. Later information showed that the boat was E-17, and a telegram from the Hague on Saturday stated that the Dutch Government, in accordance with the Hague Convention of 1907, had decided to intern the crew.—Army and Navy Gazette, 15/1.
German Raider “Greif” and British Converted Cruiser “Alcantara” Battle to the Death
London, March 25.
The news was given out here to-day of a fight in the North Sea between the German raider Greif and the British armed merchant cruiser Alcantara, in which both vessels were sunk. Five German officers and 115 men out of a total of 300 were captured. The British lost 5 officers and 69 men. The Grcif was sunk by gun fire, and the Alcantara by a torpedo.
The following official statement was issued to-day:
“An engagement occurred on February 29 in the North Sea between the armed raider Greif, disguised as a Norwegian merchant vessel, and the British armed merchant cruiser Alcantara, Captain T. E. Wardle. It resulted in the loss of both vessels, the German raider being sunk by gun fire and the Alcantara apparently by a torpedo.
“Five German officers and 115 men were picked up and taken prisoners out of the total complement, believed to have been over 300. The British losses amounted to five officers and 69 men.
“It should be noted that during the whole engagement the enemy fired over the Norwegian colors painted on the side of the ship.
“This news is now published as it is made clear by the receipt of a German wireless message that the enemy has learned that the Greif, a similar ship to the Moewe, had been destroyed before she succeeded in passing our line of patrols.”
The Greif attempted to run the British blockade the day the German cruiser Moewe returned. Evidently it was expected the patrol squadron would be engaged in hunting the Moewe, but the cordon of auxiliaries left no loophole. Seeing herself in a tight hole, the Greif turned eastward, proceeding toward home in a leisurely manner so as not to attract too much attention when she sailed by the Alcantara.
The two ships lay almost side by side while the captain of the British steamer inquired by megaphone for particulars of the strange vessel which, according to the official report, had the Norwegian colors painted on her sides, but which flew no flag. The inquiries from the Alcantara were answered in perfect Norwegian, but the actions of the raider aroused the suspicions of the British auxiliary. She was lowering a boat to send a searching party aboard when the German opened fire.
The action is described as one of the hottest of the war, recalling duels between evenly matched frigates in the days before the time of ironclads. According to the British account, the German raider was put out of action by a few broadsides, and sank after 12 minutes. She was followed to the bottom a few minutes later by her victorious adversary, which evidently fell victim of a torpedo launched from the Greifs tube a moment before the raider disappeared beneath the waves. Other British warships soon appeared on the scene and rescued many members of the crews of the two fighters.
The naval authorities say the Greif was as well equipped for raiding as was the Moewe.
The Alcantara was a large liner belonging to the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company of Belfast. She had been in the service of the British Government for some time. Her gross tonnage was 15,300. She was 570 feet long and was built in Glasgow in 1913.
Three German steamships are listed under the name Greif. The largest, a vessel of 1165 tons gross, is 235 feet long, was built in 1912, and is owned in Bremen.—N. Y. Times, 26/3.
Another Submarine Stranded.—Following closely on the sinking of E-17 on January 6, off the Texel, and the internment by the Dutch authorities of her crew, another British submarine has stranded in the same locality, On January 21 the Secretary of the Admiralty made the following announcement: “One of His Majesty’s submarines has grounded off the Dutch coast. Part of her officers and crew were taken off by a British destroyer, and the remainder were rescued by a Dutch warship, and have been taken to Holland. There was no loss of life.” Although little information is available concerning the grounding of this second submarine, it appears that she immediately signalled to the torpedo-boat which was convoying her to send a boat to the assistance of her crew. Unfortunately, according to the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, this boat could only take off ii men, and the remainder of the crew were taken ashore by the Dutch cruiser Noord Brabant. The Dutch Government does not yet appear to have come to a decision on the question of interning the crew. It is probable, however, that the authorities will insist on interning the men, following the precedent established in regard to the crew of E-17, who were rescued by the same Dutch cruiser, and who were interned in accordance, it is said, with the Hague Convention.—Army and Navy Gazette, 29/1.
German Minelayers Active.—The sinking of the British passenger steamer Maloja by a mine on February 27, between Dover and Folkestone, and also the British steamer Empress, which attempted a rescue, leads to the belief that the Germans have managed to employ vessels flying flags of neutral countries in strewing mines about the English Channel and North Sea. The Empress hit a mine half a mile away from the Maloja, but had time to rescue all aboard. The Maloja was a passenger steamer of 12,300 tons and went down so quickly that some 155 lives were lost, which included 49 passengers. A third victim of a floating mine the same day was the Dutch mail boat Mecklenburg. Her passengers and crew were saved by two other Dutch steamers. A stricter watch on vessels flying neutral flags is demanded by British newspapers. It seems very certain that German submarines have been active in sowing mines, aside from those that may have been strewn by other means.—Army and Navy Journal, 4/3.
Zeppelin “L-19” Lost.—Most of the naval news of the week concerning home waters has been connected with Zeppelin activity. On February 3 the Admiralty issued the following statement: “A fishing trawler has reported to-day to the naval authorities that she had seen a German Zeppelin in the North Sea in a sinking condition.” Skipper W. Martin, of the trawler King Stephen, reaching Grimsby that morning, reported that early on February 2, in the North Sea, he saw Zeppelin L-19 with her gondolas and part of her envelope submerged. He saw from 17 to 20 members of the crew on the top of the envelope, and they asked to be taken off. In view of the fact that the small craft could not deal with so many enemies without grave risk, and the fact that the gasbag seemed in no immediate danger of sinking, the master, concluding that the Germans, if helpless, were safe for some considerable time, left to report the circumstances to the proper authorities. On February 4 the German Admiralty confirmed the loss of this airship, and admitted her to be L-19, the same vessel on which the Dutch had fired owing to her having violated the neutrality of Holland. Although two naval vessels were sent out from Grimsby, they were unable to find any trace of the Zeppelin, which must have sunk in the gale which sprang up after the King Stephen left her.—Army and Navy Gazette, 12/2.
“Franz Fischer” Sunk by Zeppelin.—The sinking of the Franz Fischer, a captured enemy vessel employed as a coasting collier, was reported in the press on February 4. The vessel left Hartlepool on January 31 on a voyage south. According to Charles Hillier, one of the three survivors of the crew, about 10.30 on the following night a Zeppelin appeared right over the vessel, then at anchor off the Kentish Knock, and dropped a highly explosive bomb, which struck them amidships. The steamer remained afloat only two minutes, the captain and 12 others being drowned. Next morning the wrecked Zeppelin L-19 was sighted in the North Sea by the skipper of the steam trawler King Stephen.—Army and Navy Gazette, 12/2.
Mine-Sweeper Sunk.—On February 11 the German Admiralty issued the following notice: “Last night, during an advance of our torpedo-boats, our boats met on the Dogger Bank, some 120 miles east of the British coast, several British cruisers, which at once fled. Our boats pursued them, sank the new cruiser Arabis, and hit a second cruiser with a torpedo. Our torpedo-boats rescued the commander of the Arabis, two other officers, and 21 men. Our forces suffered no damage and no losses.” With reference to this message the Secretary to the Admiralty states that the cruisers mentioned were four mine-sweeping vessels, three of which have returned safely. The sunken vessel is not included in the list of merchant vessels commissioned as warships and auxiliary craft appearing in the official “Navy List” for October. The only vessel of the name of Arabis in Lloyd’s Register is a motor ship of 3697 tons, belonging to the Flower Motor Ship Company. This vessel is now in far distant waters. In connection with the German activity in the part of the North Sea referred to, the Bergen correspondent of the Copenhagen Politiken stated on February 14 that incoming Norwegian ships reported having met a number of powerful squadrons of British warships everywhere in the North Sea from the Dogger Bank to the vicinity of the Norwegian coast. In the Atlantic also many British warships had been sighted.—Army and Navy Gazette, 19/2.
Dutch Ship Torpedoed.—The Dutch tank steamer Artemis, 3803 tons, was torpedoed on February 2 in strange circumstances, and the Naval Department at the Hague is making an official inquiry into the matter. The owners state:
The Artemis left Rotterdam on February 1, and was stopped at midnight by four light-colored German torpedo-boats four miles east by north of the Noordhinder. The commander of the torpedo-boats ordered the captain of the Artemis to steam full speed for one hour in a direction south by east and then drop anchor. He arrived at the appointed anchoring place, and the Artemis was again stopped by two dark-colored German torpedo-boats, which ordered her to Zeebrugge. The captain declared he did not know the waters there and asked that one of the German officers should pilot the Artemis. This request was not complied with, but the steamer was ordered to drop anchor, which was done. Then the captain was informed that he had not obeyed orders, that his vessel was to be torpedoed, and that they would be granted five minutes to leave the ship in boats. Before the boats were lowered the torpedo was fired, and the ship immediately listed heavily. The torpedo-boats disappeared after the shot was fired. The crew of the Artemis remained in boats during the night, and at daybreak boarded the vessel, which, at two in the afternoon, was able to go to Rotterdam under her own steam.—Army and Navy Gazette, 12/2.
Destroyer “Coquette” and Torpedo-Boat “No. 11” Mined
London, Friday.
The British official statement follows:
“The torpedo-boat destroyer Coquette, Lieutenant Vere Seymour, R. N. R., in command, and H. M. torpedo-boat No. 11, Lieutenant John A. T. Legh, R. N., have struck mines off the east coast and sunk. The casualties were:
“The Coquette, an officer and 21 men.
“The torpedo-boat, 3 officers and 20 men.”
The normal complement of the Coquette was 60 men. Torpedo-boat No. 11 ordinarily carried 35 men.
The Coquette was built in 1897. She was 210 feet long and 19 1/2 feet beam. She displaced 355 tons. Her armament consisted of one 12-pound gun, five 6-pound guns and two torpedo-tubes.
Torpedo-boat No. 11 was built in 1906. She was 172 feet long and displaced 253 tons. She was armed with two 3-inch guns and three torpedo- tubes.—N. Y. Herald, 11/3.
Engagement Between Destroyers.—A minor engagement between British and German torpedo-boat destroyers, the first sea engagement that has taken place in some time, occurred off the Belgian coast on March 20. The British Admiralty in its report said that four British destroyers engaged three German destroyers and that two of the German boats were hit by shells from the British destroyers. Four British sailors were wounded, the Admiralty stated, and the Germans escaped into the naval base at Zeebrugge, Belgium, after a running fight. The German destroyers are believed to have emerged either from the German base at Zeebrugge, Belgium, or to have made a dash along the Dutch coast from Heligoland, hugging the shore line until they encountered the British patrol boats. The German official account states that the fight was between three German torpedoboats and five British destroyers. “The enemy broke off the engagement after he had received several direct hits and he steamed out of sight at full speed. We suffered only unimportant damage,” says the German statement.—Army and Navy Journal, 25/3.
Attack Under Dutch Flag.—“Further details of the attack on a German submarine by a British auxiliary cruiser, flying the Dutch flag, are given from an authoritative source,” says the Overseas News Agency. “The submarine signalled the steamer to send boats, in order that the steamer’s papers might be examined. This was done after an interval. It is stated that the steamer was a freighter of 3000 tons, with nothing suspicious about her appearance. She flew the Dutch flag and bore the name Melanie.
“While waiting for the boats the submarine submerged. It approached within about 1000 meters of the steamship, which opened fire with two cannon of medium type and with machine guns. The submarine escaped only by submerging.
“The steamer then attempted twice to ram the submarine, flying the Dutch flag all the time.
“There is no Dutch steamer Melanie, but there is a British boat of this name of 3002 tons.
“In connection with these facts is recalled a report of the Havas News Agency that on January 28 the French mail boat Plata without being attacked, opened fire on a submarine and sank her. Rear Admiral Lacaze, French Minister of Marine, was quoted by the Paris press as saying that all French trading ships had been ordered to ram or fire at submarines, whether or not attacked by them.”—N. V. Times, 6/2.
Operations on the Belgian Coast.—Admiral Bacon’s Despatch.—The following despatch has been received from Vice-Admiral Reginald H. S. Bacon, K. C. B., C. V. O., D. S. O., commanding the Dover Patrol, reporting the operations off the Belgian coast between August 22 and November 19, 1915-
In the summer and autumn of this year circumstances enabled offensive operations to be undertaken from the sea at certain points on the Belgian coast. It is unnecessary to enter into the reasons for the various operations or the exact objectives attacked, since these are well known to their Lordships.
In all cases great care has been taken to confine the fire of the guns to objectives of military or naval importance, so as to inflict the minimum of loss of life and distress on the civil population, the larger number of whom are our Allies. In order to carry this principle into effect it has at times been necessary to modify and even postpone projected attacks. The results, therefore, have been effecticve rather than sensational.
On the evening of August 22 I sailed with H. M. ships Sir John Moore. Lord Clive, Prince Rupert, and 76 other vessels and auxiliaries, and on the following morning attacked the harbor and defences of Zeebrugge. The results were markedly successful; all the objectives selected were damaged or destroyed. It was satisfactory that extreme accuracy was obtained with the gun fire at the long ranges necessary for the best attack of such defences. This accuracy fully justifies the novel methods used and the careful training in attention to details to which the vessels are subjected. A similar organization was employed in subsequent attacks.
On the 6th of September I attacked Ostende with five monitors, includin General Craufurd and M-25, and damage was done to submarine workshops and harbor works. The enemy returned our fire with heavy guns of caliber probably larger than our own, and with considerable accuracy. Again the shooting on the part of our vessels was remarkably good, and the assistance rendered by the auxiliary craft most valuable.
On the same day Westende was subjected to attack by H. M. ships Redoubtable, Bustard and Excellent, under the direction of Captain V. B. Molteno, and with results that reflected credit on all concerned.
On the 19th of September, with several of the vessels, including H. M. S. Marshal Ney, I carried out an attack against certain defences in the neighborhood of Middlekirke, Raversyde, and Westende, which resulted in damaging and silencing the batteries. Valuable cooperation was received from the French batteries in the vicinity of Nieuport.
On the evening of September 24 I despatched H. M. S. Prince Eugene and one other monitor and the requisite auxiliary craft to bombard the following morning the coast of Knocke, Heyst, Zeebrugge, and Blankenberghe (east of Ostende), while with the other vessels, including H. M. S. Lord Clive, on the same day, I carried out an attack on the fortified positions west of that place. Again, during these attacks, considerable damage was done.
On the 26th, 27th. and 30th of September I made further attacks on the various batteries and strong positions at Middlekirke and Westende.
On the evening of the 2nd of October I sailed with four monitors and again attacked with satisfactory results the batteries at Zeebrugge on the morning of the 3d. The whole coast during our passage was showing signs of considerable alarm and unrest as a result of the previous operations. Our advanced vessels were attacked by submarine boats, but without result.
On the 6th, 12th, 13th, and 18th of October and i6th-ioth of November other batteries or positions of military value have been attacked by the vessels under my command.
Up to the present, therefore, concerted operations of considerable magnitude have been carried out on six occasions, and on eight other days attacks on a smaller scale on fortified positions have taken place. The accuracy of the enemy’s fire has been good.
The damage inflicted on the enemy is known to include the sinking of one torpedo-boat, two submarines, and one large dredger, the total destruction of three military factories and damage to a fourth, extensive damage to the locks at Zeebrugge and the destruction of 13 guns of considerable caliber in addition to the destruction of two ammunition depots and several military storehouses, observation stations and signaling posts, damage to wharves, moles and other secondary places. Further, a considerable number of casualties are known to have been suffered by the enemy.
I regret that three vessels were lost during the operations: H. M. armed yacht Sanda, sunk by gun fire; H. M. drifter Great H cart; sunk by mine; H. M. mine-sweeper Brighton Queen, sunk by mine.
Our total casualties numbered 34 killed and 24 wounded, which, considering the dangers to which the vessels were exposed by gun fire, aircraft, submarine boats and mines on an enemy’s coast, may be looked upon as comparatively small in proportion to the number of officers and men taking part in the operations.
It is with regret that, among others, I have to report the death of Lieutenant-Commander H. T. Gartside-Tipping, R. N., of_ the armed yacht Sanda, who was the oldest naval officer afloat. In spite of his advanced age, he rejoined, and with undemonstrative patriotism served at sea as a lieu- tenant-commander.
I cannot speak too highly of the manner in which the officers and men under my command have carried out the duties allotted to them. The work has been varied, and to a great extent novel, but in all particulars it has been entered into with a zeal and enthusiasm which could not have been surpassed. The gunnery results have exceeded my expectations. Their Lordships will appreciate the difficulties attendant on the cruising in company by day and night under war conditions of a fleet of 80 vessels comprising several widely different classes, manned partly by trained naval ratings, but more largely by officers of the Naval Reserve, whose fleet training has necessarily been scant, and by men whose work in life has hitherto been that of deep sea fishermen. The protection of such a moving fleet by the destroyers in waters which are the natural home of the enemy’s submarines has been admirable, and justifies the training and organization of the personnel of the flotilla. But more remarkable still, in my opinion, is the aptitude shown by the officers and crews of the drifters and trawlers, who in difficult waters, under conditions totally strange to them, have maintained their allotted stations without a single accident. Moreover, these men under fire have exhibited a coolness well worthy of the personnel of a service inured by discipline. The results show how deeply sea adaptability is ingrained in the seafaring race of these islands.
It is to the excellent work done by the destroyers and the drifters that I ascribe our immunity from loss by submarine attack. The mine-sweepers, have indefatigably carried out their dangerous duties. Throughout these operations attacks have been made on our vessels by the enemy’s aircraft, but latterly the vigilance of our Dunkirk Aerodrome has considerably curtailed their activity. I wish specially to mention the cordial assistance always tendered to me by the Vice-Admiral Favereau, commanding the French second light cruiser squadron, whose patrol vessels have assisted to protect our ships from submarine dangers. In doing this, I regret to say, their patrols have lost three vessels and several gallant lives.—United Service Gazette, 20/1.
BALTIC
British Mine Field in Baltic—The British Admiralty on January 28 notified Mr. Robert P. Skinner, American Consul General at London, of the location of a new mine field in the Baltic near the sound across the channel southwest of Drogden light vessel, just off Danish waters. Obstructions to navigation also have been placed between the Danish territorial waters and the German coast southeast of Rixhoft.—Army and Navy Journal, 5/2.
New War Zone Declared by Germans.—The following communication from the German Minister, it is reported, has been sent to the Swedish Government, relative to a new war zone: “la short time shipping obstructions and mines will be laid out in different places outside of Swedish sea territory between 55 degrees 18 minutes and 55 degrees 25 minutes north latitude and 12 degrees 42 minutes and 13 degrees east longitude. As soon as further communications are received directions to shipping will be published.”—Army and Navy Journal, 19/2.
Statements by Chief of German Admiralty Staff.—In an interview intended for American reading, Admiral von Holtzendorff, Chief of the German Admiralty Staff, has declared that, for four weeks no English submarine has had any successes in the Baltic. He says:
The increase of our navy during the war and that of England is about the same, but Germany’s Navy will never be a danger to England. It is our merchant marine which England fears. The fact that to-day this fleet is undestroyed and ready at any moment peace is declared to resume its peaceful trading, is the one thing which causes the English anxiety. England does not fear the German Navy. She fears America and the growing American Navy.
The admiral denies that more than 50 German submarines have been lost. “Not one-half of that number, not nearly one-half,” he says, and claims that in less than a year more than 1,300,000 tons of enemy merchant ships have been destroyed by German submarines.
To a question: “There are many reports that a big naval battle may be expected. What can your Excellency say about that?” the admiral answered : “Only that the decision does not rest with us. We are always prepared.”—London Times, 1/2.
Patrol Boat “Ander” Lost.—The German patrol boat Ander foundered on Saturday night or early on Monday morning last off Kongshöj on Aeroe Island, in the Little Belt, about a hundred yards from the land. Wreckage and bodies were washed ashore, and apparently all the crew perished. The boat was attached to a patrol flotilla stationed in the waters south of Langeland. On Tuesday she was reported from Copenhagen to be completely broken up.—Army and Navy Gazette, 22/1.
ADRIATIC
The Command of the Adriatic.—The Austrian Navy has, within the last few months especially, enjoyed too great a freedom of action, keeping open her communications between her bases of Pola, Cattaro, and Fiume, while seriously interfering with the Allied transports with Montenegro and Albania. To this fact is due the collapse of the Montenegrin resistance, with its far-reaching consequences, at least so far as Italian ambitions are concerned. An experienced French journalist, now with the Italian forces in Albania and in a position to be well informed, recently made in the Petit Parisien the following noteworthy remarks: “The fate of Montenegro and Albania and the success of land operations on this side depend primarily on the effective command of the Adriatic, which cannot be said at present to be in the hands of the Allies.” This truth cannot be repeated enough. Ammunition and food make the difference between successful resistance or surrender, and that is entirely the work of the navy. Things would have turned otherwise had not the Austrians been masters of the coast from Cattaro to San Giovanni di Medua. Strange to say, “dans cette guerre de montagne, c’est à la marine qu’est reservé le premier role.” Events are fast leading, he considers, to a general sea action in the vicinity of Cattaro, but to render it decisive more unity and energy in that direction, a closer watch by scouts and flotillas, and the concentration of superior forces near at hand are needed on the part of the Allies. Already, on December 29, but for the superior speed of an Austrian scout and three destroyers, of 800 tons, a fight would have taken place that might have been a preliminary to an action between battle fleets.
There is no tendency here to exaggerate the importance of the capture by Austria of Mount Lovtchen, which commands the inner roadsteads of Cattaro. It is a purely Adriatic affair, without influence on the general course of events. At the same time it is a blow, perhaps a decisive one, to the legitimate ambition of the peninsula to dominate in the Adriatic, in the “mare amarissimo,” and for this reason it is much to be deplored. As everybody knows, Cattaro is the finest natural harbor in the Adriatic, and perhaps in Southern waters, with the possible exception of Bizerta; that has, of course a greater strategic value. The Power that is master of Cattaro, with its four interior bays of Topla, Teodo, Risana, and Cattaro, will possess a safe base for its battle fleet and a splendid point d’appui for its flotillas, easy to defend against either bombardment from the high sea or the ingress of hostile torpedo craft. The outer Bay of Traste, used as an auxiliary refuge for flotillas, is a further defensive asset. The importance of this naval center is all the greater as Italy’s action is being paralyzed by the total absence of reallv good harbors on the eastern coasts of the peninsula. Italian journals, in commenting on Austrian efforts to render Mount Lovtchen impregnable, regret the lack of decision and the inertia which permitted the “irreparable” to take place, and even blame France for not having done more, forgetting that the Republic could hardly be expected to consent to the heavy sacrifices necessary for the capture of a stronghold such as Cattaro, which she could not have kept without offending the just Italian susceptibilities. Of course, so long as Mount Lovtchen was in Allied hands and could be armed with long-range guns and supplied with adequate aerial flotillas, Cattaro ought to have been made a death-trap to Austrian squadrons and flotillas, and its ultimate capture did not present anything like the difficulties which the brave Japanese encountered at Port Arthur. It is to be hoped this hard lesson will not be lost upon the Allies, and Paris experts are at one in urging a decisive effort with a view to putting an end to the activity of Austrian flotilla, and so minimizing the consequences of Austrian successes.—The Naval and Military Record, 2/2.
[IMAGE: THE TAKING OF LOVTCHEN. Mount Lovtchen, the stronghold of Montenegro, from which the Austrian port of Cattaro and the Montenegrin capital, Cettigne. can be commanded, has fallen to the Austrians.—London Times, 12/1.]
Fall of Lovtchen.—In the Austrian communique of January ii, which announced the taking of Lovtchen from the Montenegrins after a three days’ fierce battle, it was stated that the Austrian infantry fought “in splendid cooperation with the heavy artillery and warships.” The fall of Lovtchen, an imposing summit, some 5600 feet high, situated just inside the narrow tongue of the Dalmatian coast, deprives Montenegro of access to the sea. Mount Lovtchen has been called the key to the Adriatic. Its capture renders impregnable the Bay of Cattaro, which it overlooks, the latter being used by the Austrians as a naval base, which can only now be attacked from the land.—Army and Navy Gazette, 15/1.
Austrian Torpedo-Boat and Seaplane Sunk.—On January 21 correspondents of various journals and news agencies at Venice recorded the sinking by a British submarine in the Adriatic of a disabled Austrian seaplane, and an Austrian torpedo-boat which came to its assistance. This is the first revelation of the presence of British submarines in the Adriatic, where hitherto French and Italian boats have been working with the Allied fleets. The incidents now reported occurred in the vicinity of Grado, in the Upper Adriatic, on the northern shore of the Gulf of Trieste. The two occupants of the seaplane had just been taken on board the submarine when a torepdo-boat arrived, which the submarine torpedoed and sank. The Austrian prisoners were subsequently transferred to an Italian battleship. It is stated that the vessel torpedoed in the Adriatic by the French submarine Foucalt, a fortnight or more ago, was the light cruiser Helgoland. —Army and Navy Gazette, 29/1.
Destroyer " Renaudin” Sunk.—The French Ministry of Marine on March 16 announced that the squadron destroyer Renaudin was sunk in the Adriatic by an enemy submarine on the morning of March 18. Three officers, among whom were the commandant and second officer, and 44 seamen were lost. Two officers and 34 seamen were rescued by a French torpedo-boat which accompanied the Renaudin. The Renaudin was built in 1913 and measured 756 tons. She was 256 feet in length and was a 30-knot boat, but in her trials had developed 32 knots.—Army and Navy Journal, 25/3-
Hospital Ship “Marechiaro” Sunk.—The sinking of the Italian hospital ship Marechiaro near San Giovanni di Medua, Albania, is reported in a despatch from Rome, February 28. The vessel is said to have struck an Austrian mine. It is reported there were numerous victims. The Italian steamship Marechiaro, 412 tons gross and 175 feet long, was built at Ancona in 1912 and was owned at Naples.—Army and Navy Journal, 4/3.
Hospital Ship “Elektra” Sunk.—The Austro-Hungarian hospital ship Elektra was torpedoed on March 18, 1916, in the Adriatic Sea by an Entente Allies submarine, according to the Overseas News Agency. One sailor was drowned and two Red Cross nurses were badly wounded. The statement of the news agency also says that the Elektra was provided with the prescribed visible marks.—Army and Navy Journal, 25/3.
MEDITERRANEAN
“Amiral Charnier” Sunk.—The French Ministry of Marine announced on Sunday that uneasiness was felt regarding the fate of the cruiser Amiral Charnier, which had been cruising off the Syrian coast. Nothing had been heard of her since the 8th inst., the date on which, according to a German telegram, a German submarine sank a French warship. On Monday the loss of the cruiser was confirmed. Off the coast of Syria a raft has been found bearing 15 seamen, only one of whom was alive. This man said that the cruiser was torpedoed on February 8 at 7 a. m. The vessel sank in a few minutes without being able to launch her boats. The cruiser was of an old type, having been completed in 1805, and was of 4702 tons. She carried about 370 men. Army and Navy Gazette, 19/2.
Auxiliary Cruiser “Provence” Sunk.—The French converted cruiser Provence was sunk in the middle of the Mediterranean February 26, it was announced officially by the French Ministry of Marine. At Malta 296 survivors have been landed and 400 were landed at Milo. The Ministry estimates the total number of survivors at 870. She was sunk by a German submarine, and was a vessel of 18,400 tons, with a length of 627 feet, and was built in 1905. She was formerly a passenger steamer and ran from New York to France, and was one of the finest equipped steamers afloat. Her passenger capacity was: First cabin, 400; second cabin, 204; third cabin, 1000; crew, 350. The vessel had twin screws.—Army and Navy Journal, 4/3.
Further details as to the sinking of the French auxiliary cruiser Provence II by a German submarine on February 26 in the Mediterranean announce that there were nearly 4000 men on board when she was sunk. It was stated that on board the Provence were the staff of the Third Colonial infantry regiment, the Third Battalion, the second company of the First Battalion, the Second Machine Gun Company and one extra company, in all nearly 4000 men en route to Salonica. Two hundred and ninety-six survivors were taken to Malta and about 400 to Melos by French and British patrol vessels summoned by wireless. The loss of upward of 3130 lives is the greatest marine disaster known.—Army and Navy Journal, 11/3.
[IMAGE: THE EX-FRENCH TRANSATLANTIC MAIL LINER "LA PROVENCE," REPORTED SUNK IN THE MEDITERRANEAN WHILE SERVING AS AN ARMORED TRANSPORT "LA PROVENCE" WAS OF 13,753 TONS GROSS, 22 1/2 KNOTS SPEED, BUILT IN 1905 FOR THE HAVRE-NEW YORK SERVICE. Shipping Illustrated 4/3]
Mine-Sweeper “Primula” Lost.—The British Admiralty announced on March 3 that the mine-sweeper Primula was torpedoed and sunk on March 1 in the eastern Mediterranean while performing her usual duties. All the officers and crew, except three men, were saved and landed at Port Said.—Army and Navy Journal.
“U” Boat Bases.—The Greek organ, Neon Asty, announced on January 18 that the Anglo-French fleet had made a search of various localities along the Greek coasts, with the object of discovering the bases of the Austrian and German submarines. This message explained the reason for various reports of what were called “landings of Allied troops” at points on the Greek coasts. The object of the later “landings” is apparently merely the one declared in the terms of representations to the Greek Government from the Entente Powers, as published last month. The Allies demanded the right of policing Greek territorial waters in view of the presence of lurking enemy submarines. Among the places at which parties are reported to have landed, there are Corfu, Santi Quaranta, Zante island, Piraeus (Port of Athens), Phaleron, near the Piraeus, Sayada, and Corinth.—Army and Navy Gazette, 22/1.
Japanese Fleet Reported in Mediterranean.—German newspapers print despatches from Italy stating that a Japanese fleet has arrived safely in the Mediterranean with a great number of aircraft. On January 3 announcement was made at Tokio by the Jiji Shimpo that a squadron of Japanese warships was to be despatched to the Suez Canal, presumably to protect Japanese shipping. The armored cruisers Kasuga, Tokiwa and Chitose were mentioned as having been assigned to this service.—Army and Navy Journal, 26/2.
The Goeben’s Escape.—German Version of the Maneuver.—A semiofficial history of the adventures of the Goeben and Breslau has been published in Germany. Its author, Emil Ludwig, says he acquired the facts at first hand during a visit to Constantinople. He has apparently had access to the log book of the Goeben, and has received information regarding the flight of these vessels from the commander-in-chief, Vice-Admiral Souchon, whose photograph forms the frontispiece.
The author says that on August 6, 1914, at midday the admiral issued the following order to the three ships under his command at Messina:
News about the enemy is uncertain. I presume his strength lies in the Adriatic and that he is watching both exits in the Messina Straits. Object: To break through to the east and reach the Dardanelles. Order of going: Goeben leaves at 5 o’clock, at 17 miles an hour; Breslau follows at a distance of five miles and closes it up at darkness. I want to create the impression that, we are wanting to go to the Adriatic and in case I so succeed in creating that impression that we are wanting to go to the Adriatic, we shall veer round in the night and make for Cape Matapan, if possible, throwing off the enemy. The steamer General to leave at 7 o’clock in the evening to keep along the Sicilian coast and to try and reach Santorin. Should she be captured, to try and let me know by wireless. If she receives no further orders from me, to ask for them at Loreley (Constantinople station ship).
As the ships—flags flying and music playing—were reaching the open sea the following wireless message from the Kaiser reacher the admiral: “His Majesty expects the Goeben and the Breslau to succeed in breaking through.”
Shortly after leaving the harbor an English cruiser of the Weymouth class, alleged to be the Gloucester, appeared on the horizon. The English cruiser was emitting signals in three groups. The word “Mumfu” frequently occurred, and it was clear that it referred to the Goeben. The wireless receivers finally deciphered the signal of the British cruiser as follows: “Goben making for the Adriatic.”
The German wireless officer argued thus: “I can jam him. If I break my waves against his I can confuse, hold up, destroy his messages. Shall I jam his wireless?” he asked the admiral.
“Shall we fire?” asked the commander.
“No,” was the answer to both questions. No one apart from the staff understood the admiral. This is how he argued, however. “This boat is evidently a patrol intending to wireless our movements to the main British fleet. He shall save us, not ruin us. He shall do his work. We shall neither fire at nor jam him. Let him wireless that the Germans are making for the Adriatic, whereas the Dardanelles is our object.”
It was dark. The Breslau closed in. It was 10 o’clock in the evening. Then came the order from the bridge: “Right about; starboard; make for Cape Matapan.”
The watching British cruiser saw the maneuver, but before it could wireless the news that the Germans were making for the East the following order flashed out from the admiral: “Jam the wireless; jam it like the devil.”
For hours the Germans were travelling eastward without obstacle, while the patrol boat tried to make itself understood in vain. Where did the error of our enemy lie? In England the excuse was advanced that the Germans had acquired knowledge of the British secret wireless code and so deceived the latter into waiting. Is it worth while contradicting such stuff? The English should have waited before the Straits of Messina and nowhere else. But so confident were they that the Goeben and Breslau must try and break through to the Adriatic in order to reach an Austrian port that they thought it safe to wait in the Straits of Otranto, which are 40 sea miles wide. So positive were they on this point that the thought of our making for the Dardanelles never seemed to have occurred to them.
The writer admits that the wireless messages of the cruiser which he calls the Gloucester evidently reached the British fleet, but they reached it too late—the German ships were en route for Constantinople.—London Times, 14/2.
BLACK SEA
Russian Torpedo-Boats Sink 163 Sailing Vessels.—The destruction by Russian torpedo-boats of 163 sailing vessels in a raid in the Black Sea on the Anatolian coast on January 17 is reported in an official statement issued at Petrograd. Seventy-three of the ships, it is said, were laden with provisions. —Army and Navy Journal, 29/1.
Destroyer “Leit Pushtscheen” Sunk.—The Russian torpedo-boat destroyer Lett Pushtscheen was sunk by a mine March 10, 1916, according to Sofia dispatches. Four officers and eleven sailors were rescued. Presumably she was sunk off the Bulgarian coast. She was built in 1903 and displaced 350 tons. She carried a crew of 67 men.—Army and Navy Journal, 25/3.
Turkish Submarine Destroyed.—The destruction of a Turkish submarine, which it is possible may have been the ex-French boat Turquoise, captured by the Turks in November, is announced in an unofficial but well- authenticated statement from Petrograd. From prisoners captured on the sunken steamer Carmen, says this report, it was possible to obtain interesting information regarding the object of the despatch of two gunboats from Constantinople last December. The gunboats received orders to bring off a Turkish submarine, which had grounded near the shore. They were unable to carry out the order because, as is known, they were sunk by Russian torpedo-boats under command of Captain Prince Trubetzkoy. Acting on information given by the men of the Carmen, Russian torpedo-boats approached on January 10 the spot where the submarine was said to have grounded. They discovered the submarine near the mouth of the Melen, and destroyed it with gunfire. The same day the same torpedo-boats sank two Turkish sailing ships with cargoes of coal. Five men of the crews of these ships were made prisoners.—Army and Navy Gazette, 22/1.
Russian Activity.—There is sustained activity on the part of the Russian naval forces in the Black Sea. On Saturday last the Turkish communique admitted that the Russian fleet had on February 6 again bombarded the coaling port of Zunguldak. On Monday, a Russian communique contained the following later information:
On February 9 and 10 some vessels of our Black Sea fleet kept up a heavy bombardment of the Turkish positions near Vitzeh, north of the Lazistan chain of mountains, between Cape Loros and Cape Nironit. They successfully engaged the Turkish coast batteries, reducing part of them to silence.
On February 11 our squadron, supporting an offensive movement by our troops, destroyed two stone bridges, one of which was a three-arched one, and also four wooden bridges.—Army and Navy Gazette, 19/2.
“Sultan Selim” (“Goeben”) in Battle Trim.—The Turkish battle cruiser Sultan Selim, formerly the Goeben, of the German Navy, which according to quite a number of unreliable reports from various sources has frequently been sunk and battered to pieces during the past year, was still afloat and in fine trim on January 30, 1916. This fact is stated by a correspondent of the Associated Press, who went aboard the Sultan Selim at Constantinople. He states, among other things, that she shows the marks of many injuries received in her various encounters, notably three inflicted by Russian 12-inch sehlls, but only the scars remain. The correspondent was able to establish that she is not a cripple or “lame duck,” but in perfect battle trim, with every gun intact, and ready to emerge for action at a moment’s notice. Her recent encounter with the Russian battleship Imperatriza Maria indicated that her speed quality was little, if any, impaired, as the cruiser was able to show a clean pair of heels to the Russians’ best ship of the first fighting line. “I had heard the tale that the Sultan Selim had received a serious underwater hit from the Imperatriza Maria, but she showed not the slightest trace of a list, which might have been expected if she had been penetrated below the water line. Other signs of her earlier engagements, however, were easily discernible, Captain Ackerman and other officers who showed us over the ship pointing to the marks of repair work with all the pride of a student duellist exhibiting the scars from his fencing bouts. A big patch of new planking on the forward deck marked the striking point of a 12-inch shell that came from a long range shot and dropped at a high angle. A patch on the smokestack marked the work of another 12-inch shell, while a flying fragment of a big shell had bit a neat gouge across the muzzle of one of the cruiser’s 11-inch guns. Not a scar was to be seen from the engagement with the Imperatriza Maria, which the officers describe as a long range encounter, during the course of which neither vessel was injured. The officers of the Sultan Selim argue the presence of British officers with the Russian Black Sea fleet in the changed tactics, improved gunnery and greater aggressiveness of the Russian ships, and they expect, with the completion of the second and perhaps the third of the new Russian battleships, a display of greater activity against the mouth of the Bosporus.”—Army and Navy Journal, 5/2.
ATLANTIC
Exploits of “Moewe.”—The mysterious German converted cruiser Moeroue, which during her raids on the high seas captured or sunk 15 of the enemy’s merchant ships in less than two months, returned safely to a German port, on March 5, according to an official statement made by the German Naval General Staff. The name of the port the Moewe reached is not named, but according to Amsterdam advices, it was Wilhelmshaven. The Moewe, according to the official announcement, also had aboard of her $250,000 in gold bars, taken from captured ships, and 199 prisoners taken from 15 allied vessels, all British with the exception of one French and one Belgian, aggregating a tonnage of nearly 60,000. Of these 15 vessels the majority were sunk, the German Admiralty says, while “a small part were sent as prizes to neutral ports.” The Moewe, according to the statement, not only wrought havoc with enemy’s merchant ships, but also engaged in sowing mines at several points on “the enemy coast.” It was one of the Moewe’s mines, the Admiralty avers, that caused the sinking on January 9 last of the British predreadnought Edward VII, from which every one of the 777 men aboard was saved by British rescue vessels. The capture of the British steamer Saxon Prince, of 3471 tons, and the French steamer Maroni, of 3109 tons, as given in the list announced by the German Admiralty, had not previously been reported and it is probable they fell afoul of the Moewe on her home run. The Moewe has certainly made a record as a successful blockade runner and commerce destroyer, and the Germans have cause to feel elated at her clever work. Doubts are expressed in some quarters that the Moewe has really arrived home, and the opinion is expressed that the announcement was made to fool the Allied warships, and that the Moewe is still at sea raiding. What we consider more likely is that most of the officers and men of the Moewe were transferred to one of the captured steamers, together with some guns, in order to provide another mysterious raider, which may be heard from soon.—Army and Navy Journal, 11/3.
A photo of the German raider now at large, which was taken by a British official on the passenger steamer Appam just before her capture by the German, and the negative of which was secreted on the person of the official, was published broadcast in a number of American papers on February 6. It shows the raider to be a merchant steamer of about 6000 tons, built for carrying freight. She has a straight stern, one funnel and two masts, and her batteries forward and aft are hidden from view ordinarily, by collapsible steel plates, but her guns can be quickly uncovered and served. One of the British merchant captains who was a prisoner aboard says she was originally named Ponga, built in 1914, but that this name may have been changed to Moewe. The raider is now thought to have run the blockade from Kiel January 1 under false colors, with the Swedish flag painted on her abreast of No. 4 hatch and afterward obliterated with black paint. As a “neutral” vessel with Swedish colors the raider possibly was accorded the courtesy given to neutral shipping and it is thought possible she has been supplied with stores by vessels which bore the Norwegian flag on their sides and masts. One of these is said to have been the Freischland or the Freisland. From a passenger aboard the Appam, who understood German, it is said that the captain of the raider was well informed concerning the movements of British ships in the vicinity. It was also said that several other merchant ships have been fitted up by the Germans as raiders and may soon be heard from.—Army and Navy Journal, 12/2.
[IMAGE: THIS PHOTOGRAPH OF THE "MOEWE" WAS MADE THROUGH A PORTHOLE BY ONE OF THE PASSENGERS ON THE APPAM]
German Ships’ Dash.—In addition to the three German vessels which are reported to have escaped from Central and South American ports, a fourth ship made an unsuccessful attempt to leave harbor. On Saturday it was reported from Rio de Janeiro that the German steamer Asuncion, detained in the harbor of Belem, having asked permission to shift her position nearer the shore for the purpose of watering, took advantage of a fog to make an attempt to put to sea. She was, however, detected by the cruiser Republica and the despatch boat Teffe, which fired blank shots as signals to her to stop. This summons being disregarded, they opened fire, and the Asuncion then stopped and returned to port. The captain declares that he had no idea of escaping. An official inquiry has been opened.—Army and Navy Gazette, 19/2.
EAST AFRICA
Official Account of Destruction of “Konigsberg.”—The official account of the destruction of the German cruiser Konigsberg, which was bottled up in the Rufigi River in German East Africa, was published on the 7th inst., in a supplement to the London Gazette. The Konigsberg, a protected cruiser of 3348 tons and a speed of 23.5 knots, appeared early in the war in the Indian Ocean, destroyed the liner City of Winchester, and attacked the British gunboat Pegasus in Zanzibar harbor. Soon afterwards British cruisers compelled her to take refuge up the Rufigi River, where she hid herself in the jungle foliage from October to July. As no ships on the station could get at her, she was blocked in by sinking steamers in the channel. The story of how she was ultimately destroyed by monitors and aeroplanes is now graphically told by the Commander-in-Chief, Cape of Good Hope Station.
The following is the dispatch to the Admiralty:
“Challenger,” July 15.
Sir.—Be pleased to lay before their lordships the following report of the operations against the Konigsberg on the 6th and nth instant:
In accordance with orders issued by me, the various vessels concerned took up their appointed stations on July 5, in readiness for the operations on the following day.
At 4.15 a. m. on July 6, H. M. S. Severn and H. M. S. Mersey weighed anchor and proceeded across the bar into the Kikunja branch of the Rufigi River, which they entered about 5.20 a. m.
The Severn was anchored head and stern and fire was opened on the Konigsberg by 6.30 a. m. The Mersey was similarly moored and opened fire shortly after. Both monitors were fired on with 3-pounders, pom-poms, and machine-guns when entering the river and on their way up, and they replied to the fire.
At 5.25 a. m. an aeroplane carrying six bombs left the aerodrome on Mafia Island. The bombs were dropped at the Konigsberg with the intention of hampering any interference she might attempt with the monitors while they were getting into position. At S-40 a. m. another aeroplane left the aerodrome for the purpose of spotting for the monitors. At 5.45 a. m. I transferred my flag to the Weymouth, and at 6.30 a. m. proceeded across the bar, with the whalers Echo and Fly sweeping, and the Childers sounding ahead, the Pyramus being in company.
The Weymouth grounded on the bar for a few minutes on the way across, but soon came off with the rising tide, and advanced as far as the entrance to the river, where she anchored. Fire from small guns was opened on her, and on the whalers, from the shore, but beyond one shell, which struck the Fly, no damage was sustained. A few rounds from the 6-inch guns put a stop to the firing, although it was impossible to locate the position of the guns owing to their being concealed amongst the trees and dense undergrowth. After anchoring, the Weymouth did what was possible to assist the monitors by bombarding at long range a position at Pemba, where a spotting and observation station was supposed to be, and by keeping down the enemy’s fire at the aeroplanes. This was done very effectively. At the same time the Pioneer, under the orders of the Hyacinth, engaged the defences at the Ssimba Uranga mouth, her fire being returned until the defences were silenced.
Returning to the operations of the monitors; fire was opened, as before stated, at 6.30 a. m., but as the Konigsberg was out of sight it was very difficult to obtain satisfactory results, and the difficulties of the observers in the aeroplanes in marking the fall of the shots which fell amongst the trees were very great, and made systematic shooting most difficult.
There being only two aeroplanes available, considerable intervals elapsed between the departure of one and the arrival of its relief from the aerodrome 30 miles distant, and this resulted in a loss of shooting efficiency. At 12.35 one of the aeroplanes broke down, and at 3.50 the second one also. I signalled to Captain Fullerton to move further up the river, which he did, until about 12.50 the the tops of the Konigsberg’s masts were visible.
The Konigsberg kept up a heavy fire on the monitors until about 12.30, when her fire slackened. At 2.40 p. m. she ceased firing, having for some time limited her fire to one gun. At 3.30 p. m. the monitors ceased fire, and retired out of the river, rejoining my flag off Koma Island at 6. p. m. On their way out they were again attacked by the small guns from the banks. I had returned over the bar in Weymouth at 12.30 p. m., and transferred to Hyacinth at 3 p. m.
The Mersey had four men killed and four wounded, two of whom have since died, and her foremost 6-inch gun, at which most of the casualties occurred, was put out of action. The Severn fortunately suffered no losses or damage. The various ships, whalers, etc., anchored for the night off the Delta, and proceeded to their various stations for coaling, etc., the following morning.
As it was necessary to make a fresh attack on the Konigsberg to complete her destruction, further operations were carried out on July 11, by which date the aeroplanes were again ready for service, and the monitors had made good certain defects and completed with coal. The attack was carried out on the same lines as on the previous occasion, and the same mouth of the river was used.
The monitors crossed the bar at 11.45 a. m., followed up to the entrance by Weymouth and Pyramus, the latter proceeding three miles inside, and both searching the banks. Hyacinth and Pioneer bombarded the Ssimba Uranga entrance. On this occasion the monitors did not fire simultaneously; the Mersey remained under way and fired while Severn moored, and ceased fire when Severn commenced. The Severn was moored in a position 1000 yards closer to the enemy than on July 6, which made her fire much more effective.
The observers in the aeroplanes, by their excellent spotting, soon got the guns on the target, and hit after hit was rapidly signalled. At 12.50 it was reported that the Konigsberg was on fire. As previously arranged with Captain Fullerton, as soon as they had got the situation well in hand, the monitors moved up the river, and completed the destruction of the Konigs- berg by 2.30 p. m., when I ordered them to withdraw.
The Konigsberg is now a complete wreck, having suffered from shells, fire, and explosions, several of which latter were observed.
The only casualties sustained were three men slightly wounded in the Mersey. There were no casualties in Severn. By 8.00 p. m. all ships, except those detached on patrol, had returned.—United Service Gazette, 16/12.
Operations on Lake Tanganyika.—In order to combat the German squadron of four armed steamers which held control of Lake Tanganyika, in Central Africa, until two months ago, the British authorities sent out from England a number of steamers of superior armament, which were taken to pieces, transported overland and launched on the lake, with the result that the Germans were soon chased into their port of Ujiji, on the eastern shore.—Army and Navy Journal, 26/2.
PACIFIC
Part Played by; British Fleet at Tsingtau.—The following is the first authoritative account which has yet been published of the work done by the British fleet at Tsingtau. It fills in many gaps in our knowledge of the siege and is a document of first-class historical importance.
The blockade of Tsingtau was established on August 24, and the landing of the Japanese army was commenced on September 2, at Lungkow, to the westward of Chefoo, whence a fairly level plain exists to the terrain of the German territory. On September 10 the Triumph, then at Weihaiwei, received instructions by wireless to join up with the Japanese Navy forthwith, together with the Usk to take part in these operations. The ship at the time was at sea carrying out gunnery practices, and returned at once to Weihaiwei, coaled all night and proceeded on September 11 for Tsingtau, arriving off the Island of Chalientao on the morning of September 12. Off Chalientao was the Suwo, flagship of Vice-Admiral Kato, C. in C. of the second squadron, with the Yakune.
A conference of Allied captains was held on board the Japanese flagship and the system of patrols set out. On the arrival (September 13) of Admiral Tochinai in H. I. M. S. Iwate with auxiliaries, which included a large repair ship, the Triumph and Usk were ordered to act under his direct command.
During the blockade of Tsingtau the British ships conformed to the movements of the Japanese ships, taking part in all the operations and being based on Weihaiwei (except in the case of emergency) for coal and supplies. During this time in accordance with orders received from the C. in C., four maxims were prepared to fire vertically and two companies of men trained for defence against aerial attack.
The work for mounting one of the 6-pounders was also commenced and sweeping practices carried out.
On September 15 the Triumph and Usk left to convoy the G. O. C. and staff, together with the twenty-fourth regiment from Taku Bar to Laoshan Bay. On September 20 they called at Weihaiwei with transports, which embarked 259 mules, sailing for Laoshan Bay on the 21st, where they were met by a Japanese destroyer which led the British ships into the anchorage through the swept area. The British troops were landed on September 23 in the Triumph’s and Japanese boats, and the following is a general description of the landing place in Laoshan Bay and arrangements made by the Japanese.
Landing in Laoshan Bay.—A broad flat shelving beach with a fair rise and fall of tide and deep water close to, sheltered from the north and west, provided a splendid landing place with plenty of inshore room for parking guns, exercising horses, storing ammunition and fodder, and laying sidings for a light railway. A very fair road (as roads go in China) leads inland to the mountain passes. The first pier to be built was a floating one by the navy, and this lasted well until heavy seas came in on October 16 and 17. but by this time it had served its purpose. Two pile piers were at this time under construction for landing the heavy howitzers, etc.
Flat bottomed sampans were mostly used for landing, each carrying 15 to 20 men or six horses, the latter being made to walk ashore when the sampans grounded. Large iron lighters were used for landing the gun carriages, gun stores and railway material, lighters being beached at high water and emptied at low. These same lighters carried the heavy guns, and howitzers, to the big pile piers, and a special vessel fitted with a powerful crane lifted them from the transports into the lighters, whilst a wooden gantry erected at the end of one of the pile piers was the means of landing them, side tracks front the railway being laid up to the pier head. A vast number of Chinese were employed on all kinds of work, carrying stores and laying the railway, and appeared to take to the work with alacrity, as they did in all the operations on which they were engaged on inland.
An Inspiring Scene.—The Japanese themselves did the water work and the actual landing. The beach generally presented a most inspiring scene, British and Japanese flags crossed before the commandant’s office, wireless station erected, long trains of ammunition and stores moving off, in one long continuous line, with an occasional howitzer battery interposed; railhead being pushed rapidly along, care being taken as much as possible to avoid crops; whilst the work of pile driving and pier building goes on incessantly, with continual landing of men, horses, and all kinds of material.
Total Number of Guns Landed.—The total number of guns believed to have been landed is made up as follows:
Fifty-eight siege guns, including six 28-centimeter (the same as used at Port Arthur, and nicknamed “Bottles” on account of their similarity), and six 10-inch guns, remainder heavy howitzers. Thirty-six field guns and 18 mountain guns. In addition four 4.7-inch and four 6-inch guns which are to be worked by a naval brigade of 500 men. At this time the Japanese believed that these guns would be in position and ready to open fire about the end of October.
After the landing of the troops had been effected, all ships continued to carry out the system of patrols laid down by the C. in C. During the whole of the operations mine-sweeping was continually carried out, and at about this period especially in and around Laoshan Harbor.
It was desired to clear an approach to this harbor as soon as possible, to enable an attack in force to be made on it from the sea, as, once secured, it would form a very convenient seaplane base, whilst as an advanced base for forwarding supplies to the army it presented many advantages on account of its comparative proximity to the firing line, compared with Laoshan Bay. Moreover it is also served with an excellent metal road.
Daily Reconnaissances by Seaplanes.—Daily reconnaissances, weather permitting, were made by the Japanese seaplanes. Working from the seaplane mother ship, they continued to bring valuable information throughout the siege. The mother ship was fitted with a couple of derricks for hoisting them in and out. During these reconnaissances they were continually fired at by the German guns, mostly with shrapnel, but were never hit. The Japanese airmen usually carried bombs for dropping on the enemy’s positions. By September 27 the area swept was sufficient to warrant an attack being made on Laoshan Harbor from the sea, and accordingly all battleships and certain cruisers were ordered to return to Laoshan Bay. When assembled, a conference was held on board the flagship, and instructions given for the attack ordered for the next day, the general idea being that the second division (Sumo, Iwarni, Tango, Triumph) should attack litis fort and adjoining works, whilst the Tokiwa, Yakumo, and destroyers would cover the landing of a naval force in Laoshan Harbor. These operations were timed to synchronize with the advance of the army, to the line of hills, of which Prince Heinrich is the southern extremity or the position of the left wing of the army, whilst the right was to rest on the shore of Kiaochou Bay, and the bombardment of the second division was intended to cover to some extent this advance.
Bombarding the Forts.—On September 28 both divisions proceeded to carry out their respective attacks. As the battleship squadron passed Laoshan Harbor it could be seen that the landing had been effected with but little opposition. At 8.45 a. m. the Suwo led the division up to the predetermined bombardment position, ships five cables apart, speed 12 knots, and opened fire at 14,000 yards, each ship opening fire in succession on reaching that range. Owing to the haze and mist both gunlaying and observation of fire were difficult. The Chitose had been previously posted off Taikungtao for the purpose of spotting, but during this run did not prove of much assistance. The German forts did not reply, and it is probable that they were not ready. Whilst the squadron was steaming away to take up a position for another run, litis fort was observed firing at the troops advancing, and was thereby accurately located by our force.
At 9.35 a. m. the second run was commenced; by this time the light had improved considerably. Shortly after the Suwo had opened fire on this run, Fort A replied straddling her with a salvo. Each ship as she turned came under this fire, which was maintained by the fort throughout the run, and, though in many cases shots came close to the ships no hits were received.
The result of the bombardment could not be accurately determined owing to the great range and the fact that many of the works were hidden from the view of the squadron, but the operation was successful and covered the advance of the infantry to the predetermined line where they entrenched to await the bringing up of the siege guns.
It not being then known for certain what success attended the army advance, the fleet received orders for a further bombardment on the next day in the event of it being required. This time, however, it was intended to carry out a different plan, a slow steady fire being maintained from 7 a. m. till 5 p. m. by the battleships working in pairs (Okinoshima and Mishima being included to make six).
On September 29 the bombardment was cancelled, however, as news had been received during the night that the troops had effected their lodgement successfully the previous day, capturing an officer and 56'fnen. On October 1 Vice-Admiral Toohinai was ordered to take his squadron to cooperate in southern Korean waters, and accordingly relinquished direct command of the British ships; before leaving he presented a captured field gun and carriage to H. M. S. Triumph as a memento of British cooperation in the attack on Laoshan Harbor.
Seaplane Base at Laoshan.—By this date the minefield off Laoshan Harbor had been sufficiently cleared to permit of the establishment of a seaplane base on shore, and the work of landing a branch of the light railway and stores had commenced. The recovery of mines was undertaken by a flotilla of trawlers and torpedo-boats together with steam launches, and this was not performed without the loss of two trawlers and several lives, whilst the seaplane ship was badly damaged and had to be beached for temporary repairs before being sent to Sasebo. After these losses, trawlers were not much used as they drew too much water and before the end their use had been abandoned.
The Seaplane Corps and three Henry Barman ioo-horse-power seaplanes were, in consequence of the damage done to the mother ship, landed at the base already established in Laoshan Harbor and this proved eminently satisfactory.
Landing of the Naval Brigade.—At this time, October 3, the Austrian cruiser Kaiserin Elisabeth and the German gunboats were annoying the Japanese right flank and supply columns continually by an enfilading fire from Tsanghou Deep in Kiaochou Bay.
To deal with this anticipated fire a naval brigade of 500 men with four 6-inch and four 4.7-inch guns had been sent and was established by October 4 on Kushan. This battery later on did good service, and on one occasion hit the Kaiserin Elizabeth three times, using indirect fire and driving her out of range to a position whence she could do but little damage to our troops.
A German aeroplane (Taube) came out during these days and attacked the repair ship (Kwanto Marti) dropping two bombs which, however, did not hit.
On October 4 a Japanese seaplane made a reconnaissance and reported that the Cormoran and two other gunboats had disappeared from view; it was concluded that the Germans had sunk them in the harbor as it was known that they had not escaped.
German Aeroplanes and Balloon.—At the commencement of the siege the Germans had one observation balloon and two monoplanes.
The balloon was constantly used by the Germans for directing their fire and was the only means, other than the aeroplanes, that the Germans had of seeing over the hills behind which our troops were entrenched and siege guns emplaced. It was constantly fired at by the Japanese, though never hit, and it was finally lost on October 7 by being blown away. In its course the balloon passed over the Chitose and Triumph and was fired at by- maxims and rifles, but was at too great a height to be struck, and when last seen it was drifting to the northeast and was never heard of again. Of the aeroplanes, both were damanged by accident during the early part of the operations; but one was repaired and continued to do good service until the end, on one occasion fighting a duel with a Japanese aviator without success. At the fall of Tsingtau it was seen to fly away to Chinese neutral territory.
On the 6th a telegram was exchanged with reference to the number and names of prisoners, which was courteously answered by the Japanese. On this date the Suwo and Triumph carried out a long range bombardment, but owing to mines having been found in the vicinity of the position used by the ships when bombarding on September 28, and as this area had not yet been thoroughly swept, it was not considered advisable to go inside 15,000 meters of Iltis Hill, and at this range the fire was ineffective; consequently, after a few rounds, the bombardment was stopped. Mines during this period were daily recovered and one taken to the Chitose was the subject of examination the results of which will be forwarded by the Naval Attache to the British Admiralty.
It is known that the Germans laid 296 mines; a plan was obtained after the capitulation.
Bombardment by the Fleet.—On October 12 orders were given to the fleet to bombard on the 13th, the plan being for the Suwo to bombard continuously Fort A, whilst the Tango and Triumph attacked Iltis Hill alternately.
These orders were subsequently postponed on account of the Emperor having intimated by wireless that he would graciously and humanely permit the non-combatants to leave the beleaguered town, as a consequence of which a flag of truce was sent in on the 13th and details arranged.
The fleet therefore carried out the usual patrol. On the '14th the bombardment was carried out in accordance with orders given on the 12th. The Suwo's 10-inch guns having greater elevation (24 degrees compared with the Triumph’s 13 degrees) enabled her to fire at Fort A keeping out of range.
Fire was opened at 9 a. m. by the Suwo at A and the Tango at Iltis.
Fort A replied, but fell short of the Suwo. At 9.40 a. m. she switched on to the Tango, shells falling all round her, and it was a marvel that she got away untouched. She ceased fire and steamed out of range. At 9.46 a. m. the Triumph came into action and for half an hour delivered an effective fire on Iltis Fort. At 10.30 a. m., just after the completion of the bombardment and when about to move away, she was struck by a heavy shell at a range of 14,570 yards just under the main crosstrees, doing considerable damage and splinters, passing through the main control roof, killed one able seaman and very seriously wounded an officer and one marine N. C. O. stationed in this position for range-finding duties.
The fire of the Suwo, though appearing effective, did not prevent Fort A from replying during the bombardment. The Tango and the Triumph had 10 hits signalled on the enemy’s works by the Akitsushima which was marking. The fleets returned to Laoshan Bay after the bombardment and anchored.
German Squadron Reported.—It was reported from Tokio that a Japanese station in Formosa had observed a German squadron steaming in a northerly direction and accordingly the fleet proceeded to sea to meet it. European War Notes
The weather at this time was very bad. The detailed instructions issued to the fleet are given below:
Orders for Allied Squadron.—First Division: 1. Suwo, 2. Iwani, 3. Tango, 4. Triumph.
“Maneuvering speed 10 knots. Full speed 15 knots. Tango to join near Tchalientau. During the day the squadron will patrol between R. 3 and M. 3, and during the night between R. 9 and L. 4 going east and west.
“Mogami will be day and night 20 miles south of B. 4 on right trunk line.
"Okinoshimi and Mishima leave Laoshan Bay 4 p. m. and patrol five miles east of Kitinean on a line parallel to AL and DL.
“Saga leaves at 2 p. m. and goes to position 30 miles from Tchalientau on Ross Island line.
“Lighthouses: Tchalientau will be lit as usual, but if necessary will be put out.
“When enemy is found patrol ships will inform by W/T at once and keep in contact with them.
“Full speed of Okinoshimi and Mishima is 12 knots. Rear-Admiral Okada with Tone and two flotillas (9th and 13th) will go to inner patrol line and attack enemy if necessary.
“Kwanto, Kumano, Matsuye, and sweeping flotilla will stay at Laoshan Bay under command of Kumane.
“One of sweeping flotillas will patrol entrance to Laoshan Bay and if enemy appears he is to be attacked.
“Aeroplane Corps will throw bombs on the enemy if case permits.”
The Japanese undertook to repair the Triumph’s mast, but in consequence of the report of the approaching squadron, the mast was only temporarily shored up and the squadron proceeded in the evening. The fleet anchored oft Tchalientau on the 16th, patrolling again at night, and as no further news had been heard of the enemy’s squadron, the fleet returned to Laoshan Bay on the morning of the 17th and a permanent repair of the Triumph’s mast was undertaken.
The “Takachio” Sunk.—The night of the 17th was very dark and favorable for torpedo attacks, and this together with the fact that the enemy had no doubt observed the fleet at sea for the last two nights, decided him to send out S. 90; and she, falling in with the Takachio at 1 a. m. fired two torpedoes, sinking the Takachio, only one petty officer and two men being saved. The latter ship carried mines, and it is thought that these detonated and the great force of the explosion and the close proximity of the destroyer caused some of the latter’s plates to open up, since she was afterwards found on the 20th instant beached on Tower Point 30 degrees S. W. Toni Bay, the crew escaping to the shore and eventually being interned at Nanking. From the time she escaped until her discovery on shore, extra patrols were put on all night, and special destroyers detailed to search the coast.
On the 20th No. 7 British Hospital Ship arrived and was placed at the disposal of the commander-in-chief. The bad weather experienced from the 15th to the 17th did great damage to the landing facilities, washing away the pontoon pier and wrecking some 50 sampans and drowning some 25 Japanese soldiers. The pile piers stood the buffeting without suffering at all. At this time practically everything of importance had been landed, and the heavy rains rendered the roads impassable and washed large sections of the railway away, hindering the transport of the heavy howitzers and ammunition, the delay in consequence being estimated at from a week to 10 days.
By October 27 the Japanese had established a spotting and signalling station on a spur at Prince Heinrich Hill 900 feet high, situated N. 75 E. 6400 yards from Iltis. This station was used by both navy and army for directing the fire and was in connection by telephone with the shore gun positions and the shore wireless stations which latter signalled the results to the ships. It consisted of a strong bomb-proof shelter well concealed from the enemy. The view of the enemy’s positions obtainable was good. In addition to this aid to the fleet’s shooting, special squared charts showing the enemy’s defences were issued, and a general outline sketch showing the points of aim. This method of controlling the fire proved simple and effective. The defences of Tsingtau, in addition to the permanent works, mentioned in the military report on Kiaochou, 1906, with addenda, had been further strengthened, particularly against land attack by:
- A continuous barbed wire entanglement and trench stretching right across the peninsula. This was supported by:
- A chain of five redoubts; these redoubts were situated on the rising ground, between the barbed wire entanglements and the permanent works on Iltis, Bismarck, and Moltke hills.
- Numerous batteries of a semi-permanent nature had, in addition, been erected in support of the redoubts, mostly in the rising grounds behind.
The defences’ strength lay primarily in these redoubts, which were individually very strong; and, if these could be captured, the fortress must fall.
These redoubts, while differing in detail, were constructed on similar lines.
The Final Bombardment.—A half battalion of the 36th Sikhs arrived from Tientsin, and were landed on October 22. On the 26th the siege guns were being rapidly completed and communication trenches were being pushed forward by night and also artillery concrete positions, and, to assist in keeping down the enemy’s artillery fire, the ships of the fleet bombarded certain of the enemy’s positions during the day.
On the 29th instant the bombardment of the fleet was increased in intensity and was kept up practically all day. Ships were listed some five degrees, being thus enabled to keep out of range of Fort A, the only permanent work which could get at them in the line of approach adopted. The principal positions which could be reached by the guns of the fleet were Fort A and all works on or near Iltis Hill.
In addition, Forts A and C and the dockyard could be reached from behind the Haihsi Peninsula, but at this time the area had not been swept clear of mines.
Destruction of Floating Dock.—On November 3 it was reported that the Kaiserin Elizabeth had been blown up and had sunk off Chitosan, and this was later confirmed. Owing to the proximity of the attacking troops to the redoubt, it was considered no longer safe for the ships to fire at the low- lying works. Portions of the dockyard were burned and tbe large crane destroyed, the floating dock also careened and sank.
On November 4 the 28-centimeter guns opened on Fort A, whilst other positions were bombarded, particularly the redoubts, by the siege guns. During the 4th, 5th, and 6th the bombardment continued from the siege guns and also by the Tango, Okinoshima, and Mishima, from behind the Haihsi Peninsula. During" the night of the 5th, Fort C was destroyed by the Germans without ever having fired a shot at the ships. The army sapped up to the crest of the first glacis.
On the night of the 4th the army sapped towards the 3d attack parallel and on the 5th dug the 3d attack parallel on the crest of the first glacis, this parallel being occupied on the night of November 6. During this night officers’ patrols entered the 3d and 4th redoubts, No. 3 being captured, No. 4 blown up, and just before dawn No. 2 fell and white flags were flying everywhere by 7.00 a. m., November 7.
Reported Casualties.—Germans, 600 to 1000; Japanese, 300 killed, 900 wounded; British, 52; and Indian, 13.
During the night and early morning of the 6th and 7th a tremendous bombardment took place and was supported by shrapnel up to the last, a general assault was made on the redoubts, which fell in quick succession. The Germans did not wait for the bayonet but evacuated the redoubts, losing heavily as they retreated without cover up the slopes of the hills behind.
At the time of writing the casualties on either side had not been officially announced, and as the fortress was not entered by the writers no certain details of damage done to the enemy’s positions or their contents and construction can be given. But it was reported that some of the guns on Fort Iltis had been completely demolished. Certain guns and howitzers on Bismarck Hill had also been actually struck and then further disabled by the Germans themselves. The parapet of the redoubts had been blasted away by high explosive shell, both men, rifles and machine guns being completely destroyed.
Number of Rounds Fired.—The following is a record of the rounds fired by the squadron during the five days’ bombardment prior to the fall of Tsingtau: 12-inch, 180; 10-inch, 408; 8-inch, 107; and 7.5-inch, 120.
Total number of hits signalled, 150.
Hits were on works being attacked and not necessarily on guns. Guns reported demolished: Five on Iltis Hill and one on slope. On four other occasions trenches were reported to be badly damaged.
List of Ships Which Took Part.—Battleships: Suwo, Iwami, Tango, Okinoshima, Mishima, Triumph. Armored cruisers: Iwate, Flag, Tokiwa, Yakumo. Light cruisers: Chitose, Flag, Akashi, Akitsushima, Ghiveda, Takachio. Flotilla cruisers: Tone, Flag, Megami, Yedo. Gunboats: Ugi, Saga. Late Pebiedo, Flag, late Orel, late Poltawa, late Ad’Aperaxin, late Ad’Senyavia. Destroyer depot ship: Kumano Maru. Repair ship: Kwanto Maru. Seaplane ship: Hospital ship, surveying ship, 8 mine-sweeping trawlers. Destroyers: Usk and 15 Japanese. Torpedo-boats: 12.—North China Herald.
MISCELLANEOUS .
British Mercantile Marine Under Government Control.—Announcement that the whole British mercantile marine was now under control of the British Government and that a special committee, headed by Lord Curzon, had been appointed to deal with the shipping problem was made January 28 by Walter Runciman, President of the Board of Trade.—Army and Navy Journal, 5/2.
Court Martialed for Loss of “Jemtchug.”—As a result of a court martial held August 21-25 at Vladivostok over the loss of the Russian cruiser Jemtchug, the following verdict was presented:
The captain of the ship, Baron Tscherkassof, was found guilty of the following negligence: He had been in command of the Jemtchug since June 14, 1914. On August 25, 1914, he left Vladivostok for the scene of hostilities, where he was to place himself under the direction of the British Admiral Jerome. In spite of the fact that he was on war service, he had given the order that in case of smoke or lights on the horizon no general call should be given; he had not seen to it that the crew should sleep at regular hours; at night he had not increased the number on duty; he had not put torpedoes in readiness for an engagement; on entering harbor he had given orders to put the ship out of war trim; during the ship’s stay in port he had allowed her to lie at anchor with open lights; with only an anchor watch, and with strangers at liberty to visit the ship and look her over freely.—Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 1/10.
Sailors in Serbia.—It was announced in the Court Circular on February 8 that Rear Admiral Troubridge had been received by the King. This was a welcome indication that the admiral had returned safely to England after his trying and arduous service in assisting the Serbian army. As the story of the doings of the naval and marine contingent under his orders is revealed, it is learnt how timely and useful was the aid given in defending Belgrade, and even after it became necessary to retreat from the capital the seamen and marine gunners continued to render valuable, aid with their heavy guns. It is not known at what date the mission under Rear Admiral Troubridgc was sent out, but the admiral appears to have been at work in the country for the greater part of last year. In December it was stated by Dr. Macnamara that the contingent was sent to assist the Serbian army in the defence of the river frontier of Serbia, and it had played, said the Parliamentary secretary, a highly creditable part in the resistance offered to the overwhelming Austro-German attack. It afterwards accompanie the Serbian army in its retreat. One of the most satisfactory features of the work of this contingent was the daring attacks of the improvised monitors and river gunboats under Commander C. L. Kerr. This little force was first heard of as having attacked the Austrian monitors on the Danube on the nights of April 21 and 22, 1915. Major Bertram Elliott, R. M. L. I., appears to have been in charge of another section which was responsible for the mining of the Serbian rivers during a period of several months— work which was often carried on under the fire of the enemy’s patrols, and always demanded skill and courage in its execution. Both these officers received the D. S. O. for their services, and some other officers and men were “mentioned” in the Gazette of January 21 last. It is much to be hoped that the Admiralty will be able to issue the despatch of Rear Admiral Troubridge covering the operations of his force and its retreat. This should certainly prove one of the most dramatic and thrilling narratives in which seamen have figured in the war. No doubt the British officers and men served under the orders of the Serbian military commander-in-chief, but our gallant ally probably has no objection to a report being published in this country.—Army and Navy Gazette, 19/2.
[IMAGE: The above diagrams show ships attacked or sunk by mines and submarines in the months of October, November and December, 1915, and January, 1916. Circles denote ships sunk in the Mediterranean ; squares, the ships sunk elsewhere. Blanks indicate British ships; the letter A, Allied ships; and N, neutral ships.—Land and Water, 10/2.]
Merchant Vessels Lost.—More than 2000 merchant vessels of nearly 4,000,000 tonnage have been taken from the seas by the European war, according to figures published by the Department of Commerce at Washington March 20. Germany, with 600 vessels sunk, captured or detained, heads the list of losers. Two hundred and twenty-five of the 500 British vessels lost were sunk by submarines. Great Britain’s allies lost 80 and Turkey 124. The total of neutral losses is put at 736, but most of these were released after being reported captured. Ninety-two neutral vessels have been submarined, and 94 sunk by mines. Twenty-three have been damaged by submarines and mines.—Army and Navy Journal, 25/3.
A Cruiser’s Log.—All naval men and students of sea warfare will be interested and instructed if they read “The Log of H. M. S. Bristol," which the Westminster Press have just added to their well-known “Log Series.” This first naval record of the war to be written by someone inside the service sheds light, so far as the censor permits, upon the manner in which the flag is kept flying in distant parts of the world by those ships which have not the luck to go into action. From the time the Bristol was sent to Mexico in May, 1914, until she returned to pay off at Portsmouth in December last, she covered 58,361 miles, and put in an immense amount of strenuous work, steaming and coaling incessantly, but the only incidents in the nature of fighting which came her way were the skirmish with the Karlsruhe on August 6, 1914, and the sinking four months later of the transports accompanying von Spee’s squadron. For the rest, the wearisome months passed by the Bristol searching for enemy cruisers in South American waters supply an effective answer to the query, “What is the navy doing?” The brush with the Karlsruhe is a suggestive commentary upon the policy which prevailed in the early days of the war of trying to catch the raiders with ships of inferior speed. It was during the afternoon of August 6 that the Suffolk, then flagship of Rear Admiral Cradock, reported that she had the Karlsruhe in sight, and the Bristol was worked up to full speed in the direction indicated. About 8 p. m., in the bright moonlight, she also sighted the German vessel, which had by then given the slip to the Suffolk. The Bristol opened fire with her 6-inch guns, but in the darkness it was impossible to see the result. The Karlsruhe replied vigorously, but her shells all came short. After an hour’s firing she drew away out of range. One of the signals received by the Bristol during the skirmish was the following from the Suffolk, “Stick to it—I am coming,” but Cradock, in a 12-year old cruiser only designed for 23 knots, was helpless in his attempt to get up with the two-year-old Karlsruhe, designed for 27 knots. How he must have longed for an Invincible! When at length the Admiralty, after Lord Fisher’s return, sent out the two battle cruisers which were afterwards to knock out von Spee’s squadron, the compiler of this log tells what happened after their arrival at the appointed rendezvous in the Atlantic:
“They coaled, and then the whole squadron was organized and a systematic search was commenced southward. The squadron, consisting of seven ships, spread out to extreme visual signalling distance, which reduced the use of wireless to a minimum, a valuable asset in our search . . . . search was continued to the Falkland Islands—a distance of 2400 miles— but no Germans were sighted, and we reached the Falkland Islands on December 7.”
Here we have the spider’s web theory in working on a small scale, and remembering how completely Admiral Sturdee swept the board by its means, what a difference it would have made had the two “spiders” been put on sooner. There are many other scraps of useful information in the “log,” and the author, Mr. William Buchan, leading signalman, is to be complimented on his work.—Army and Navy Gazette, 4/3.
* Acknowledgment is made to A. F. Westcott, Ph. D., Instructor U. S. Naval Academy, for help given in making this compilation.