International Notes: Naval War Notes

The Battle of Jutland

The treatment of the Battle of Jutland, which follows, was compiled from the most accurate published information that has been obtainable. The three accounts here published corroborate each other to a remarkable extent, when it is considered that they emanate from widely different independent sources. It is regretted that a more accurate and more detailed reconstruction of the battle cannot be furnished, but the information necessary is not as yet available. The first detailed account of the battle received in the United States and widely published (viz.: the account by British Naval Officers in the Glasgow Herald) has been proved in the light of subsequent reports to be quite inaccurate. Its principal errors are that (a) it credits Vice Admiral Beatty which a squadron of nine battle cruisers at the beginning of the action; (b) it states that the High Seas fleet stood down from the northeast, under cover of a smoke screen, to join the action; (c) it asserts that the British Grand fleet “crossed the T” of the High Seas fleet when within gun range (and by inference urges us to believe that Admiral Jellicoe permitted “low visibility” to keep him from taking advantage of such an opportunity). [Secretary’s note, J.W.G.]

Admiral Jellicoe’s Report

“Be pleased to inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that the German High Sea fleet was brought to action on the 31^st of May, 1916, to the westward of Jutland Bank, off the coast of Denmark.”

In these words Vice Admiral Sir John R. Jellicoe, commander-in-chief of the home fleets, opens his report to the Admiralty on the battle over which there has been so much discussion. Continuing, Admiral Jellicoe says:

“The ships of the Grand fleet, in pursuance of the general policy of periodical sweeps through the North Sea, had left their base on the previous day in accordance with instructions issued by me. In the early afternoon of Wednesday, 31^st of May, the first and second battle cruiser squadrons, the first, second, and third light cruiser squadrons and destroyers from the first, ninth, tenth, and thirteenth flotillas, supported by the fifth battle squadron, were, in accordance with my directions, scouting to the southward of the battle fleet, which was accompanied by the third battle cruiser squadron, the first and second cruiser squadrons, the fourth light cruiser squadron, and the fourth, eleventh, and twelfth flotillas.

“The junction of the battle fleet with the scouting force after the enemy had been signed was delayed owing to the southerly course steered by our advanced force during the first hour after commencing their action with the enemy battle cruisers. This, of course, was unavoidable, as had our battle cruisers not followed the enemy to the southward the main fleets would never have been in contact.

“The battle cruiser fleet, gallantly led by Vice Admiral Beatty, and admirably supported by the ships of the fifth battle squadron under Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas, fought the action under, at times, disadvantageous conditions, especially in regard to light, in a manner that was in keeping with the best traditions of the service.”

The report states that “the list of ships and commanding officers which took part in the action has been withheld from publication for the present in accordance with the usual practice.”

Admiral Jellicoe estimates the German losses at two battleships of the dreadnought type, one of the Deutschland type, which was seen to sink; the battle cruiser Lützow, admitted by the Germans; one battle cruiser of the dreadnought type, “one battle cruiser seen to be so severely damaged that its return was extremely doubtful”; five light cruisers, seen to sink – one of them possibly a battleship; six destroyers, seen to sink; three destroyers so damaged that it was doubtful if they would be able to reach port, and a submarine sunk. (In the foregoing Admiral Jellicoe enumerates 21 German vessels as probably lost. The last British report placed the total at 18.) In concluding, Admiral Jellicoe says:

“The conditions of low visibility under which the day action took place and the approach of darkness enhanced the difficulty of giving an accurate report of the damage inflicted or the names of the ships sunk by our forces. But after a most careful examination of the evidence of all the officers who testified to seeing enemy vessels actually sink, and personal interviews with a large number of these officers, I am of the opinion that the list shown in the enclosure gives the minimum numbers, though it is possible it is not accurate as regards the particular class of vessel, especially those which were sunk during the night attack. In addition to the vessels sunk, it is unquestionable that many other ships were very seriously damaged by gunfire and torpedo attack.

“I deeply regret to report the loss of his Majesty’s ships Queen Mary, Indefatigable, Invincible, Defence, Black Prince, Warrior, Tipperary, Ardent, Fortune, Shark, Sparrow Hawk, Nestor, Nomad and Turbulent. Still more do I regret the resultant heavy loss of life. The death of such gallant and distinguished officers as Arbuthnot, Hood, Captain Sowerby, Captain Prowse, Captain Cay, Captain Bonham, Captain Charles J. Wintour and Captain Stanley B. Ellis, and those who perished with them, is a serious loss to the navy and to the country. They led officers and men who were equally gallant, and whose death is mourned by their comrades in the Grand fleet. They fell doing their duty nobly – a death which they would have been first to desire.

“The enemy fought with the gallantry that was expected of him. We particularly admired the conduct of those on board a disabled German light cruiser which passed down the British line shortly after deployment under a heavy fire, which was returned by the only gun left in action. The conduct of the officers and men was entirely beyond praise.

“On all sides it is reported that the glorious traditions of the past were most worthily upheld, whether in the heavy ships, cruisers, light cruisers or destroyers; the same admirable spirit prevailed. The officers and men were cool and determined, with a cheeriness that would have carried them through anything. The heroism of the wounded was the admiration of all. I cannot adequately express the pride with which the spirit of the fleet filled me.

“It must never be forgotten that the prelude to action is the work of the engine-room department … Several ships attained speeds that had never before been reached, thus showing very clearly their high state of steaming efficiency. Failures in material were conspicuous by their absence.”

Of the medical officers Admiral Jellicoe says:

“Lacking in many cases all essentials for performing critical operations, with their staffs seriously depleted by casualties, they worked untiringly with the greatest success.”

The hardest fighting fell to the battle cruiser fleet, says Admiral Jellicoe, the units of which were less heavily armored than their opponents, and he expressed high appreciation of the handling of all the vessels and commends Admiral Burney, Jerram, Sturdee, Evan-Thomas, Duff, and Leveson, and continues:

“Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty once again showed his fine qualities of gallant leadership, firm determination, and correct strategic fighting. He appreciated situations at once on sighting the first enemy’s lighter forces, then his battle cruisers, finally his battleships. I can fully sympathize with his feelings when the evening mist and fading light robbed the fleet of that complete victory for which he had maneuvered, for which the vessels in company with him had striven so hard. The services rendered by him, not only on this but on two previous occasions, have been of the very greatest value.”

Vice Admiral Beatty’s report to Admiral Jellicoe particularly mentions the work of the Engadine, Commander Robinson, which towed the Warrior 75 miles during the night of May 31, and continues:

“It is impossible to give a definite statement of the losses inflicted on the enemy. Visibility was for the most part low and fluctuating. Caution forbade me to close the range too much with my inferior force. A review of all the reports leads me to conclude that the enemy’s losses were considerably greater than those we sustained in spite of their superiority, and included battleships, battle cruisers, light cruisers, and destroyers. This is eloquent testimony to the very high standard of gunnery and torpedo efficiency of his Majesty’s ships. The control and drill remained undisturbed throughout in many cases, despite the heavy damage to material and personnel.

“Our superiority over the enemy in this respect was very marked, their efficiency becoming rapidly reduced under punishment, while ours was maintained throughout. As was to be expected, the behavior of the ships’ companies under the terrible conditions of a modern sea battle was magnificent without exception. The strain on their morale was a severe test of discipline and training. The officers and men were imbued with one thought – a desire to defeat the enemy.

“The fortitude of the wounded was admirable. A boy of the first class, John Travers Cornwall, of the Chester, was mortally wounded early in the action. He nevertheless, remained standing alone at a most exposed post quietly awaiting orders until the end of the action, with the gun’s crew dead or wounded all around him. His age was under 16 ½ years. I regret that he has since died. I recommend his case for special recognition, in justice to his memory and as an acknowledgment of the high example set by him

“In such a conflict as raged for five hours it was inevitable that we should suffer severe losses. It was necessary to maintain touch with greatly superior forces in fluctuating visibility, often very low. We lost the Invincible, the Indefatigable, and Queen Mary, from which ships there were few survivors. The casualties in other ships were heavy. I wish to express my deepest regret at the loss of so many gallant comrades, officers and men. They died gloriously.”

Extracts from Vice Admiral Beatty’s report give the course of events before the battle fleet came on the scene of action. At 2.20 o’clock in the afternoon the Galatia reported the presence of enemy vessels. At 2.35 o’clock considerable smoke was sighted to the eastward. This made it clear that the enemy was to the northward and eastward, and that it would impossible for him to round Horn Reef without being brought to action. The course of the British ships consequently was altered to the eastward and subsequently north-eastward.

The enemy was sighted at 3.31 o’clock. His force consisted of five battle cruisers. Vice Admiral Beatty’s first and third light cruiser squadrons, without awaiting orders, spread eastward, forming a screen in advance of the battle cruiser squadron under Admiral Evan-Thomas, consisting of four battleships of the Queen Elizabeth class. The light cruisers engaged the enemy and the cruiser squadron came up at high speed, taking station ahead of the battle cruisers. At 3.30 o’clock Vice Admiral Beatty increased the speed to 25 knots and formed the line of battle, the second battle cruiser squadron forming astern of the first, with two destroyer flotillas ahead.

Vice Admiral Beatty then turned east-southeast slightly, converging on the enemy now at a range of 23,000 yards. The fifth battle cruiser squadron was then bearing north-northwest 10,000 years distant. The visibility was good. Continuing his report, Vice Admiral Beatty said:

“The sun was behind us. The wind was southeast. Being between the enemy and his base, our situation was both tactically and strategically good.

“Both forces opened fire simultaneously at 3.48 at a range of 18,500 yards. The course was altered southward, the enemy steering parallel distant 18,000 to 14,500 yards. The fifth battle squadron opened fire at a range of 20,000 yards at 4.08. The enemy fire then seemed to slacken. Although the presence of destroyers caused inconvenience on account of smoke, they preserved the battleships from submarine attack.

“Two submarines being sighted, and a flotilla of ten destroyers being ordered to attack the enemy with torpedoes, they moved out at 4.15 o’clock simultaneously with the approach of German destroyers. The attack was carried out gallantly with great determination. Before arriving at a favorable position to fire torpedoes they intercepted an enemy force consisting of one light cruiser and 15 destroyers. A fierce engagement at close quarters ensued and the enemy were forced to retire on their battleships, having two destroyers sunk and their torpedo attack frustrated. Our destroyers sustained no loss, but the attack on the enemy cruisers was rendered less effective.

“The Nesior, Nomad, and Minotaur, under Commander Edward Bingham, pressed the attack on the battle cruisers and fired two torpedoes. Being subjected to a heavy fire at 3000 yards, the Nomad was badly hit and remained between the lines. The Nestor also was badly hit, but was afloat when last seen. The Petard, Nerissa, Turbulent, and Termagant also are praised.

“These destroyer attacks,” continues Vice Admiral Beatty, “were indicative of the spirit pervading the navy and worth of its highest traditions.”

From 4.15 to 4.43 o’clock the conflict between the battle cruiser squadrons was fierce and the resolute British first began to tell. The rapidity and accuracy of the Germans’ fire depreciated considerably. The third German ship was seen to be afire. The German battle fleet was reported ahead and the destroyers were recalled.

Vice Admiral Beatty altered his course to the northward to lead the Germans toward the British battle fleet. The second light cruiser squadron closed to 13,000 yards of the German battle fleet and came under heavy but ineffective fire. The fifth battle squadron engaged the German battle cruisers with all guns, and about 5 o’clock came under the fire of the leading ships of the German battle fleet.

The weather became unfavorable, Vice Admiral Beatty’s ships being silhouetted against a clear horizon to the Germans, whose ships were mostly obscured by mist.

Between 5 and 6 o’clock the action continued at 14,000 yards on a northerly course, the German ships receiving very severe punishment, one battle cruiser quitting the line considerably damaged. At 5.35 o’clock the Germans were gradually hauling eastward and receiving severe punishment at the head of the line, probably action on information from their light cruisers which were engaged with the third battle cruiser squadron or from Zepplins which possibly were present.

At 5.56 o’clock the leading ships of the British battle fleet were sighted bearing north, distant five miles. Vice Admiral Beatty thereon proceeded east at the greatest speed, bringing the range to 12,000 yards. Only three German battle cruisers were then visible, followed by battleships of the Koenig type.

Vice Admiral Jellicoe then takes up the story of the battle fleet. Informed that the Germans were sighted, the fleet proceeded at full speed on a southeast by south course during two hours before arriving on the scene of battle. The steaming qualities of the older ships were severely tested. When the battle fleet was meeting the battle cruisers and the fifth battle squadron great care was necessary to insure that the British ships were not mistaken for the German warships.

Vice Admiral Beatty reported the position of the German battle fleet at 6.15 o’clock. Vice Admiral Jellicoe then formed the line of battle, Vice Admiral Beatty meantime having formed the battle cruisers ahead of the battle fleet, and the fleets became engaged. During the deployment the Defence and Warrior were seen passing between the British and German fleets under heavy fire. The Defence disappeared and the Warrior passed to the rear, disabled.

Vice Admiral Jellicoe considers it probably that Sir Robert K. Arbuthnot, the Rear Admiral who was lost on board the Defence, was not aware, during the engagement with the German light cruisers, of the approach of their heavy ships owing to the mist, until he found himself in close proximity to the main German fleet. Before he could withdraw his ships were caught under heavy fire and disabled. When the Black Prince of the same squadron was sunk was not known, but a wireless signal was received from her between 8 and 9 o’clock.

Owing principally to the mist, it was possible to see only a few ships at a time. Toward the close of the battle only four or five were visible and never more than eight to twelve.

The third battle cruiser squadron, under Rear Admiral Horace Alexander Hood, was in advance of the battle fleet and ordered to reinforce Vice Admiral Beatty. While en route the Chester, Captain Lawson, engaged three or four German light cruisers for 20 minutes. Despite many casualties, her steaming qualities were unimpaired.

Describing the work of the third squadron, Vice Admiral Beatty said Rear Admiral Hood brought it into action ahead of the Lion “in the most inspiring manner, worthy of his great naval ancestors.” Vice Admiral Hood, at 6.25 p.m., was only 8,000 yards from the leading German ship, and the British vessels poured a hot fire into her and caused her to turn away. Vice Admiral Beatty, continuing, reports:

“By 6.50 o’clock the battle cruisers were clear of our leading battle squadron and I ordered the third battle cruiser squadron to prolong the line astern and reduced the speed to 18 knots. The visibility at this time was very indifferent, not more than four miles, and the enemy ships were temporarily lost sight of after 6 p.m. Although the visibility became reduced, it undoubtedly was more favorable to us than to the enemy. At intervals their ships showed up clearly, enabling us to punish them very severely and to establish a definite superiority over them. It was clear that the enemy suffered considerable damage, battle cruisers and battleships alike. The head of their line was crumpled up, leaving their battleships as a target for the majority of our battle cruisers. Before leaving, the fifth battle squadron also was engaging battleships.

“The report of Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas shows excellent results were obtained. It can safely be said that his magnificent squadron wrought great execution.”

The action between the battle fleets lasted, intermittently, from 6.17 to 8.20 o’clock at ranges between 9000 and 12,000 yards. The Germans constantly turned away and opened the range under the cover of destroyer attacks and smoke screens as the effect of the British fire was felt, and alterations of the course from southeast by east to west in an endeavor to close up brought the British battle fleet, which commenced action in an advantageous position on the Germans’ bow; to a quarterly bearing from the German battle line, but placed Vice Admiral Jellicoe between the Germans and their bases.

Vice Admiral Jellicoe says: “During the somewhat brief periods that the ships of the High Sea fleet were vicible through the mist, a heavy and effective fire kept up by the battleships and battle cruisers of the Grand fleet caused me much satisfaction. The enemy vessels were seen to be constantly hit, some being observed to haul out of the line. At least one sank. The enemy’s return fire at this period was not effective and the damage caused to our ships was insignificant.”

Vice Admiral Beatty’s report covering this period says the German ships he was engaging showed signs of punishment. The visibility improved at sunset at 7.17, when he re-engaged, and destroyers at the head of the German line emitted volumes of gray smoke, covering their capital ships as with a pall, under cover of which they turned away and disappeared. At 7.45, the light cruiser squadrons, sweeping westward, located two German battleships and cruisers. At 8.20, Vice Admiral Beatty heavily engaged them at 10,000 yards. The leading ship, being repeatedly hit by the Lion, turned away in flames with a heavy list. The Princess Royal set fire to a three-funneled battleship. The New Zealand and Indomitable reported that the ship they engaged left the line heeling over and afire. At 8.40, the battle cruisers felt a heavy shock as if struck by a mine or torpedo. This was assumed to be a vessel blowing up.

Vice Admiral Beatty reported that he did not consider it desirable or proper to engage the German battle fleet during the dark hours, as the strategical position made it appear certain he could locate them at daylight under most favorable circumstances.

Vice Admiral Jellicoe reports that, as anticipated, the Germans appeared to have relied much upon torpedo attacks which were favored by low visibility and by the fact that the British were in the position of a following or chasing fleet. Of the large number of torpedoes apparently fired only one took effect and this was upon the Marlborough, which was able to continue in action. The efforts of the Germans to keep out of effective gun range were aided, he says, by weather ideal for that purpose. The Germans made two separate destroyer attacks. The first battle squadron at 11,000 yards administered severe punishment to battleships, battle cruisers and light cruisers. The fire of the Marlborough was particularly effective and rapid. She commenced by firing seven salvos at a ship of the Kaiser class and then engaged a cruiser and next a battleship. The Marlborough was hit by a torpedo at 6.54 p.m. and took a considerable list to starboard, but reopened fire at 7.03 at a cruiser. At 7.12 she fired 14 rapid salvos at a cruiser of the Koenig class, hitting her frequently until she left the line.

During the Action the range decreased to 5000 yards. The first battle squadron received more of the enemy’s fire than the remainder of the fleet, excepting the fifth squadron. The Colossus was hit, but not seriously.

The fourth squadron, led by the flagship Iron Duke, engaged a squadron consisting of the Koenig and Kaiser classes with battle cruisers and light cruisers. The British fire was effective, although a mist rendered range-taking difficult. The Iron Duke fired on a battleship of the Koenig class at 12,000 yards. The hitting commenced at the second salvo and only ceased when the target turned away. Other ships of the squadron fired principally at German ships as they appeared out of the mist and several of the German vessels were hit.

The second squadron under Admiral Jerram engaged vessels of the Kaiser and Koenig classes and also a battle cruiser, which apparently was severely damaged. A squadron under the command of Rear Admiral Heath, with the cruiser Duke of Edinburgh, acted as a connecting link between the battle fleet and the battle cruiser fleet, but did not get into action.

The German vessels were entirely out of the fight at 9 o’clock, says the report. The threat of destroyer attacks during the rapidly approaching darkness made it necessary to dispose the fleet with a view to its safety, while providing for a renewal of action at daylight. Vice Admiral Jellicoe maneuvered the fleet so as to remain between the Germans and their bases, placing flotillas of destroyers where they could protect the fleet and attack the heavy German ships.

The British heavy ships were not attacked during the night, but three British destroyer flotillas delivered a series of gallant and successful attacks, causing heavy losses. The fourth flotilla, under Captain Wintour, suffered severe losses, including the Tipperary. The twelfth flotilla, under Captain Stirling, attacked a squadron of six large vessels of the Kaiser class, taking it by surprise and firing many torpedoes. The second, third, and fourth ships in the line were hit and the third blew up. The destroyers were under a heavy fire of German light cruisers. Only the Onslaught received material injuries. The Castor sank a German destroyer at point-blank range.

The thirteenth flotilla, under Captain Farie, was stationed astern of the battle fleet. A large vessel crossed in the rear of the flotilla after midnight at high speed. Turning on her searchlights, she fired heavily on the Petard and the Turbulent and the latter was disabled. The Champion was engaged for a few minutes with four German destroyers while the Moresby fired a torpedo at a ship of the Deutschland class and felt an explosion.

Concluding his account of the battle, Vice Admiral Jellicoe wrote:

“At daylight on the first of June, the battle fleet, being southward of Horn Reef, turned northward in search of the enemy vessels and for the purpose of collecting our own cruisers and torpedo-boat destroyers. The visibility early on the first of June was three to four miles less than on May 31, and the torpedo-boat destroyers, being out of visual touch, did not rejoin the fleet until 9 a.m. The British fleet remained in the proximity of the battlefield and near the line of approach to German ports until 11 a.m., in spite of the disadvantage of long distances from fleet bases and the danger incurred in waters adjacent to the enemy’s coasts from submarines and torpedo craft.

“The enemy, howeer, made no sign, and I was reluctantly compelled to the conclusion that the High Sea fleet had returned into port. Subsequent events proved this assumption to have been correct. Our position must have been known to the enemy, as, at 4 a.m., the fleet engaged a Zeppelin about five minutes during which time she had ample opportunity to note and subsequently report the position and course of the British fleet.

“The Waters from the latitude of Horn Reef to the scene of action were thoroughly searched and some survivors from the destroyers Ardent, Fortune, and Tipperary were picked up. The Sparrow Hawk, which had been in collision, was no longer seaworthy and was sunk after the crew was taken off. A large amount of wreckage was seen, but no enemy ships, and at 1.15, it being evident that the German fleet had succeeded in returning to port, our course was shaped for our bases, which were reached without further incident on Friday, the second of June.

“The cruiser squadron was detached to search for the Warrior, which had been abandoned while in tow of the Engadine on the way to the base, owing to bad weather setting in, and the vessel becoming unseaworthy. No trace of her was discovered, and further subsequent search by the light cruiser squadron having failed to locate her, it was evident she had foundered.

“The fleet was fueled, replenished its ammunition, and at 9.30 p.m., on the second of June, was reported ready for further action.”

Two estimates of the total tonnage lost by the Germans in the Jutland battle have been made by British officials. The more conservative one, who included in his list only vessels “seen to sink,” and based his estimate on the theory that the battleships sunk were of the oldest dreadnought type, gives the German tonnage lost as 109,220, as compared with a British loss in tonnage of 112,350. He concludes that the Germans lost two battleships of the dreadnought type of 18,900 tons each, one of the Deutschland type of 13,200 tons, the battle cruiser Lützow of 28,000 tons, five cruisers of the Rostock type, making a total of 24,500 tons for this type; six destroyers aggregating 4920 tons, and one submarine of 800 tons.

The more liberal estimate places the German loss at 117,220 tons, as follows:

One dreadnought of the Kronprinz type, 25,480 tons; one of the Helgoland type, 22,440 tons; battleship Pommern, 13,000 tons; battle cruiser Lützow, 28,000 tons; five Rostocks aggregating 24,500 tons; destroyers aggregating 4000, and a submarine of 800 tons.

Under the caption “The Battle of Jutland and What It Means,” the British Government will issue in London (July 7) a statement, in part, as follows:

“Seen in its broadest aspect, the battle stands out as a case of a tactical division of the fleet, which had the effect of bringing an unwilling enemy to battle. Such a method of forcing an action was obviously drastic and necessarily attended with a certain measure of risk.

“In the present case there was only an appearance of division. The battle fleet was to the north and the battle cruiser fleet to the south, but they formed, in fact, one fleet, under a single command, and were acting in combination with one another. They were at the time actually engaged in carrying on, as they had been in the habit of doing periodically, a combined sweep of the North Sea, and Admiral Beatty’s fleet was, in effect, the observation of advance squadron.”

Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge has prepared the following commentary on Admiral Jellicoe’s report:

“To put the situation succinctly, it may be said that before the battle the British fleet at sea was divided into two parts, one force under Sir David Beatty and the other, the battle fleet or main body, under the commander in chief, Sir John Jellicoe. This distribution of the ships was the dominating factor in bringing on the battle. Had the whole British fleet been massed and close together it is more than likely that no battle would have occurred at all. So with the British fleet divided the Germans were encouraged to give battle with Beatty. Sir David, determined to get them into a fight, arranged the management of the action so that he could draw them nearer and nearer to Jellicoe’s main body which was coming up in support. He thus greatly shortened the interval between the first collision and eventual participation in the action by Jellicoe’s battleships.” – New York Times, 7/7.

Early German Reports

The preceding report of Admiral Jellicoe is so complete that it is unnecessary to publish the official bulletins previously issued by the British Admiralty. On the other hand, the German Admiralty’s account is incomplete without the series of statements which went before it; they are therefore published. It will be noticed that the times given in the German report are two hours later than those of Admiral Jellicoe’s; after correcting the time discrepancy the two reports check each other very closely even down to details of maneuvering.

The first German communique, dated June 1, was as follows:

“During an enterprise directed towards the north, our High Sea fleet on Wednesday last met a considerably superior main portion of the British battle fleet. In the course of the afternoon between the Skager-Rack and the Horn Reef a number of severe and, for us, successful engagements developed and continued all night.

“In these engagements, as far as is at present ascertained, we destroyed the great battleship Warspite, the battle cruisers Queen Mary and Indefatigable, two armored cruisers of the Achilles class, one small cruiser and the new destroyer-leaders Turbulent, Nestor, and Alcaster. According to trustworthy evidence a great number of British battleships suffered heavy damage from the artillery of our vessels and the attacks of our torpedo-boat flotillas during the day battle and during the night. Among others the great battleship Marlborough was hit by a torpedo, as is confirmed by the statements of prisoners. A portion of the crews of the British vessels that were sunk were picked up by our vessels. Among them are two sole survivors of the Indefatigable.

“On our side the small cruiser Wiesbaden was sunk by enemy’s artillery in the day engagements, and during the night the Pommern was sunk by a torpedo. Regarding the fate of the Frauenlob, which is missing, and some torpedo-boats, which have not returned up to the present, nothing is known. The High Sea fleet returned to our harbors in the course of to-day.”

This was supplemented on June 3 by the following:

“In order to prevent the spread of fantastic reports, it is again stated that in the battle off Skager-Rack on May 31 the German High Sea forces engaged the entire modern British fleet. To the statements already published it must be added that according to the official British report the battle cruiser Invincible and the armored cruiser Warrior were also destroyed.

“We were obliged to blow up the small cruiser Elbing, which on the night of May 31 was heavily damaged owing to collision with another German war vessel, so that it was impossible to take her back to port. The crew were rescued by torpedo boats, with the exception of the commander, two officers, and 18 men who remained on board in order to blow up the vessel and who, according to subsequent Dutch reports, have been brought to Ymuiden in a tug and landed there.”

On June 8, the longest of the German communiques was received. It opens by controverting “all official and semi-official press reports from the British side, which are systematically spread abroad in order to deny the greatness of the British defeat in the naval battle on May 31 and create the impression that the battle was a victory for the British arms.” The telegram continues:

“It is asserted, for instance, that the German fleet left the battlefield, and that the British fleet remained master of it. As regards this, it is stated that by the repeated and effective attacks of our torpedo-boat flotillas during the battle on the evening of May 31 the British main fleet was forced to turn round and never again came within sight of our forces, and in spite of its superior speed and reinforcements by a British battle squadron of 12 vessels, which came up from the southern region of the North Sea, never attempted to come again into touch with our forces to continue the battle or to effect a junction with the above-mentioned squadron in order to bring about the desired destruction of the German fleet.

“The British assertion that the British fleet in vain endeavored to reach the fleeing German fleet in order to defeat it before reaching its home points d’appui is contradicted by the alleged official British statement that Admiral Jellicoe with his Grand fleet had already reached his base at Scapa Flow (Orkneys), 300 miles from the battlefield, on June 1.

“Our numerous German torpedo-boat flotillas which were sent out after the battle to make a night attack towards the north beyond the theatre of the day battle did not find the British main fleet in spite of a keen search. Moreover our torpedo-boats were able to rescue a large number of British survivors of various vessels which had been sunk.

“As further proof of the fact disputed by the British of the participation of the entire battle fleet in the battle, it is pointed out that the British Admiralty report announced that the Marlborough was disabled. Furthermore, one of our submarines on June 1 sighted another vessel of the Iron Duke class heavily damaged steering toward the English coast. Both the vessels mentioned belong to the British main fleet.

“In order to belittle the great German success, the British press also attributes the loss of several British vessels to German mines, submarines, and airships. In this connection it is expressly pointed out that neither mines (which, by the way, would have been just as dangerous to our own fleet as to that of the enemy) nor submarines were employed by our High Seas fleet, and German airships were exclusively used for reconnaissance work.

“The German victory was gained by able leadership and by the effect of our artillery and torpedoes. Until now we have refrained from contradicting many of the alleged official British assertions regarding German losses. The latest assertion, again and again repeated, is that the German fleet lost not less than two vessels of the Kaiser class, the Westfalen, two battle cruisers, four small cruisers, and a great number of destroyers.

“Moreover, the British indicate that the Pommern, which we reported lost, is not a ship of the line of 13,000 tons, built in 1905, but a modern dreadnought of the same name. We state that the total loss of German High Seas forces during the battle of May 31 and June 1 and subsequently are:

“One battle cruiser.

“One ship of the line of older construction.

“Four small cruisers, and

“Five torpedo-boats.

“Of these losses, the Pommern, launched in 1905, the Wiesbaden, the Elbing, the Frauenlob, and five torpedo-boats have already been reported sunk in official statements.

For military reasons we refrained till now from making public the loss of the vessels Lützow and Rostock. In view of the wrong interpretation of this measure, and, moreover, in order to frustrate English legends about gigantic losses on our side, these reasons must now be dropped. Both vessels were lost on their way to the harbor after attempts had failed to keep the heavily damaged vessels afloat. The crews of both ships, including all severely wounded, are in safety. While the German list of losses is hereby closed, positive indications are to hand that the actual British losses are materially higher than established and made public by us on the bases of our own observation.

“British prisoners state that besides the Warspite, the Princess Royal, and the Birmingham were also destroyed. According to reliable reports the dreadnought Marlborough also sank before reaching port.

“The battle of the Skager-Rack was and remains a German victory, even if the result is judged solely by the losses in ships officially admitted by the British.

“The total tonnage of German losses is 60,720 tons, against 117,750 tons British losses.” – The Army and Navy Gazette, 17/6.

Estimate of Forces Engaged

Berlin, June 8, by wireless to Sayville, NY.

At the high tide of battle during the North Sea action of last week the strength of the British and German fleets engaged as given to-day from an authoritative German source was:

“British – at least 25 dreadnoughts, six battle cruisers, and at least four armored cruisers.

“German – 16 dreadnoughts, five battle cruisers, six older German battleships, and no armored cruisers.”

In addition, numerous light warships were engaged. – Washington Star, 8/5.

German Admiralty’s Account

Berlin, June 29 (via London, June 30).

The German Admiralty has given to The Associated Press a detailed account of the recent naval battle in the Skagerak. The following abstract has been taken from the Admiralty statement:

“The High Seas fleet, consisting of three battleship squadrons, five battle cruisers, and a large number of small cruisers, with several destroyer flotillas, was cruising in the Skagerak on May 31 for the purpose, as on earlier occasions, of offering battle to the British fleet. The vanguard of the small cruisers at 4.30 o’clock in the afternoon suddenly encountered, 90 miles west of Hanstholm (a cape on the west coast of Jutland), a group of eight of the newest cruisers of the Calliope class and 15 or 20 of the most modern destroyers.

“While the German light forces and the first cruiser squadron under Vice Admiral Hipper were following the British, who were retiring northwestward, the German battle cruisers sighted to the westward Vice Admiral Beatty’s battle cruiser squadron of six ships, including four of the Lion type and two of the Indefatigable type. Beatty’s squadron developed a battle line on a southeasterly course and Vice Admiral Hipper formed his line ahead of the same general course and approached for a running fight. He opened fire at 5.49 o’clock in the afternoon with heavy artillery at a range of 13,000 meters against the superior enemy. The weather was clear and light, and the sea was light with a northwest wind.

“After about a quarter of an hour a violent explosion occurred on the last cruiser of the Indefatigable type. It was caused by a heavy shell, and destroyed the vessel.

“About 6.20 o’clock in the afternoon five warships of the Queen Elizabeth type came from the west and joined the British battle cruiser line, powerfully reinforcing with their 15-inch guns the five British battle cruisers remaining after 6.20 o’clock. To equalize this superiority Vice Admiral Hipper ordered the destroyers to attack the enemy. The British destroyers and small cruisers interposed, and a bitter engagement at close range ensued, in the course of which a light cruiser participated.

“The Germans lost two torpedo-boats, the crews of which were rescued by sister ships under heavy fire. Two British destroyers were sunk by artillery, and two others – the Nestor and Nomad – remained on the scene in a crippled condition.

“While this engagement was in progress a mighty explosion, caused by a big shell, broke the Queen Mary, the third ship in line, asunder at 6.30 o’clock.

“Soon thereafter the German main battleship fleet was sighted to the southward, steering north. The hostile fast squadrons thereupon turned northward, closing the first part of the fight, which lasted about an hour.

“The British retired at high speed before the German fleet, which followed closely. The German battle cruisers continued the artillery combat with increasing intensity, particularly with the division of the vessels of the Queen Elizabeth type, and in which the leading German battleship division participated intermittently. The hostile ships showed a desire to run in a flat curve ahead of the point of our line to cross it.

“At 7.45 o’clock in the evening British small cruisers and destroyers launched an attack against our battle cruisers, who avoided the torpedoes by maneuvering, while the British battle cruisers retired from the engagement, in which they did not participate further as far as can be established. Shortly thereafter a German reconnoitering group, which was parrying the destroyer attack, received an attack from the northeast. The cruiser Wiesbaden was soon put out of action in this attack. The German torpedo flotillas immediately attacked the heavy ships.

“Appearing shadow-like from the haze bank to the northeast was made out a long line of at least 25 battleships, which at first sought a junction with the British battle cruisers and those of the Queen Elizabeth type on a northwest to westerly course and then turned on an easterly to a southeasterly course.

“With the advent of the British main fleet, whose center consisted of three squadrons of eight battleships each, with a fast division of three battle cruisers of the Invincible type on the northern end, and three of the newest vessels of the Royal Sovereign class, armed with 15-inch guns, at the southern end, there began about 8 o’clock in the evening the third section of the engagement, embracing the combat between the main fleets.

“Vice Admiral Scheer determined to attack the British main fleet, which he now recognized was completely assembled and about doubly superior. The German battleship squadrons, headed by battle cruisers, steered first toward the extensive haze bank to the northeast, where the crippled cruiser Wiesbaden was still receiving a heavy fire. Around the Wiesbaden stubborn individual fights under quickly changing conditions now occurred.

“The light enemy forces, supported by an armored cruiser squadron of five ships of the Minotaur, Achilles, and Duke of Edinburgh classes coming from the northeast, were encountered and apparently surprised on account of the decreasing visibility by our battle cruisers and leading battleship division. The squadron came under a violent and heavy fire, by which the small cruisers Defence and Black Prince were sunk. The cruiser Warrior regained its own line a wreck and later sank. Another small cruiser was damaged severely.

“Two destroyers already had fallen victims to the attack of German torpedo-boats against the leading British battleships and a small cruiser and two destroyers were damaged. The German battle cruisers and leading battleship division had in these engagements come under increased fire of the enemy’s battleship squadron, which, shortly after 8 o’clock, could be made out in the haze turning to the northeastward and finally to the east. Germans observed, amidst the artillery combat and shelling of great intensity, signs of the effect of good shooting between 8.20 and 8.30 o’clock particularly. Several officers on German ships observed that a battleship of the Queen Elizabeth class blew up under conditions similar to that of the Queen Mary. The Invincible sank after being hit severely. A ship of the Iron Duke class had earlier received a torpedo hit, and one of the Queen Elizabeth class was running around in a circle, its steering apparatus apparently having been hit.

“The Lützow was hit by at least 15 heavy shells and was unable to maintain its place in line. Vice Admiral Hipper, therefore, transhipped to the Moltke on a torpedo-boat and under a heavy fire. The Derfflinger meantime took the lead temporarily. Parts of the German torpedo flotilla attacked the enemy’s main fleet and heard detonations. In the action the Germans lost a torpedo-boat. An enemy destroyer was seen in a sinking condition, having been hit by a torpedo.

“After the first violent onslaught into the mass of the superior enemy the opponents lost sight of each other in the smoke by powder clouds. After a short cessation in the artillery combat Vice Admiral Scheer ordered a new attack by all the available forces.

“German battle cruisers, which with several light cruisers and torpedo-boats again headed the line, encountered the enemy soon after 9 o’clock and renewed the heavy fire, which was answered by them from the mist, and then by the leading division of the main fleet. Armored cruisers now flung themselves in a reckless onset at extreme speed against the enemy line in order to cover the attack of torpedo-boats. They approached the enemy line although covered with shot from 6000 meters distance. Several German torpedo flotillas dashed forward to attack, delivered torpedoes, and returned despite the most severe counterfire with the loss of only one boat. The artillery fight was again interrupted, after this second violent onslaught, by the smoke from guns and funnels.

“Several torpedo flotillas, which were ordered to attack somewhat later, found, after penetrating the smoke cloud, that the enemy fleet was no longer before them; nor, when the fleet commander again brought the German squadrons upon the southerly and southwesterly course, where the enemy was last seen, could our opponents be found. Only once more – shortly before 10.30 o’clock – did the battle flare up. For a short time in the late twilight German battle cruisers sighted four enemy capital ships to seaward and opened fire immediately. As the two German battleships squadrons attacked, the enemy turned and vanished in the darkness. Older German light cruisers of the fourth reconnaissance group also were engaged with the older enemy armored cruisers in a short fight. This ended the day battle.

“The German divisions, which, after losing sight of the enemy, began a night cruise in a southerly direction, were attacked until dawn by enemy light force in rapid succession. The attacks were favored by the general strategic situation and the particularly dark night.

“The cruiser Frauenlob was injured severely during the engagement of the fourth reconnaissance group with a superior cruiser force, and was lost from sight.

“One armored cruiser of the Cressy class suddenly appeared close to a German battleship and was shot into fire after 40 seconds, and sank in four minutes.” – New York Times, -- 1/7.

The Battle of Jutland

By Arthur Pollen

In the early afternoon of Wednesday, May 31, a battle was begun between the battle cruisers of the British and German fleets. The action was fought in misty weather in which contact between the two fleets was occasionally lost. The fighting, therefore, was necessarily of an intermittent character. More especially was this the case in its later phases. From a quarter to four until a quarter to five the engagement was between the battle cruisers only. By this time von Hipper had been driven back on to the High Seas fleet and the British fast squadron, reinforced by four Queen Elizabeths fought a holding action for the next hour and a quarter, drawing the German High Seas fleet towards the forces that were approaching under Admiral Jellicoe. During this phase the British squadron was greatly outnumbered, of course, by the Germans, but at 6 they were reinforced by Rear Admiral Hood with three further battle cruisers, and at 6.20 by Rear Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot with four armored cruisers of the Defence and Duke of Edinburgh classes.

Shortly after 6.30 Sir John Jellicoe brought the Grand fleet on to the field of the battle, upon which von Sheer retreated incontinently. From 7 o’clock until darkness fell, the bad light, the thick weather, and the disorderly retreat of the German squadron made anything like an artillery duel between the two fleets impossible. The German destroyers did all in their power to hamper the pursuit by the British dreadnoughts, and when pursuit by the capital ships was made impossible by darkness, the British destroyers were sent forward amongst the German ships. There then followed a night action, the pursuit being carried on by the British cruisers and destroyers until 3 on the following morning, when such of the German fleet as survived had reached the mine defences of their main base. The commander-in-chief then recalled his fleet, and at daylight made a systematic search of the scene of the previous day’s engagement, but without finding any disabled ships. At noon the British force returned to its bases, refuelled, and 24 hours later was once more ready for action. * * * *

The Germans had entered the North Sea according to their own account to engage and destroy the British ships that have been systematically sweeping the waters north and east of the Horn Reef. The plan of overwhelming the British fast division with superior numbers was defeated by the masterly handling of the British force, combined with the effective use that force made of its artillery. So far from Sir David Beatty having been overwhelmed, he succeeded admirably in his main object, which was to draw the German fleet into a position where Sir John Jellicoe’s squadrons could engage it. * * * *

The Story of the Battle

I have attempted in the following pages to collate all the available information and to elucidate it by a series of sketch charts to illustrate the principal phases of the action. But I offer this narrative and these sketches with considerable reserve. Practically nothing is known of the movements of the main fleet after contact was made around 7 o’clock in the evening. Of the pursuit from then till darkness all the accounts are most confused. And of the final phase – the night attack by the British light craft on the flying German fleet – nothing is known whatever, except that the commander-in-chief seems to have recalled all his units at about 3 in the morning of June 1. The narrative and sketches then, are offered for what they are worth, and no more can be claimed for them than that they contain nothing, so far as I am aware, inconsistent with reliable information to hand. Though the positions of the fleets are, I believe, generally correct, the sketches are not to scale and indicate only the general direction and character of each movement. In the phase, for instance, in which Sir David Beatty, weakened by the loss of Indefatigable and Queen Mary was reinforced by Admiral Evan-Thomas’s four Queen Elizabeths, I have indicated the courses of the British vice admiral and of the German fleet as straight and continuous. It is most improbably that this can represent the events of an hour and a quarter of fighting. So, too, with the rest. At many periods during the afternoon the shifting mists and fogs made it impossible for the British to see their opposite numbers in the German line, and again and again the gunlayers had no other mark to aim at but the flashes of their opponents’ guns. These conditions not only made gunnery extremely difficult, they made it quite impossible for participants to keep any clear recollection of the courses steered.

The Disposition of the Opposing Fleets

This sketch indicates the approximate position at 2.15[i] of the forces engaged in the course of the afternoon of Wednesday, May 31, Sir David Beatty was at position 1, steering southeast or east-southeast. He had with him four Lions, Indefatigable, and New Zealand. There were of course some flotillas of destroyers and probably more than one squadron of light cruisers. Throughout these sketches the small craft have not been indicated, but they must be assumed to accompany all of the main squadrons. Slightly astern and a little to the southward of Sir David Beatty, Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas, flying his flag in Barham, commanded a squadron of four Queen Elizabeths, the name ship only being absent. Some 75 miles north by east of Admiral Beatty was the Grand fleet under Sir John Jellicoe, steering a south-easterly course. With Sir John Jellicoe was a squadron of three battle cruisers under Rear Admiral Hood, Invincible, Inflexible and Indomitable, and, in addition to light cruisers and small craft, Sir Robert Arbuthnot’s squadron of four armored cruisers of the Defence and Duke of Edinburgh classes. Ten miles to the northeast of Sir David Beatty, von Hipper – who commanded in the affair of the Dogger Bank, January, 1915 – was in command of five German battle cruisers, Derflinger, Lützow, Moltke, Seydlitz, and either Von der Tann or Hindenburg, probably the latter. This squadron was heading north by west; and some 60 miles astern of him was the High Seas fleet under Vice Admiral von Scheer, consisting of all the German dreadnoughts, 16 in number. He also had with him half a dozen pre-dreadnoughts of the Deutschland and Braunschweig classes.

It was when the fleets were so disposed that the advanced light cruisers of Sir David Beatty and von Hipper’s squadrons sighted each other and Sir David thereupon closed the German squadron at top speed. Von Hipper immediately turned his squadron eight points to starboard, and steered either east or east-souteast, and a stern chase followed. After about an hour and a half the battle cruisers got within 18,000 years of the enemy, now bearing northwest[ii] from them, and opened fire. The four Queen Elizabeths had necessarily been left behind in this chase. The mist being thick and visibility poor, Sir David Beatty closed the range fairly rapidly and 10 minutes after the engagement had become general Indefatigable was hit, blew up and sank. Twenty minutes later Queen Mary shared the same fate. One German cruiser was also sunk at this stage. Von Hipper had meanwhile been gradually changing course southward, Sir David conforming to the same movement as soon as he had got to a range that it was imprudent further to reduce. His squadron, it must be remembered, had now been reduced from six to four. Southerly courses were followed until at about a quarter to five, the entire fleet of German dreadnoughts was seen coming straight up to von Hipper.