Motto: "To win a race, the swiftness of a dart
Availeth not without a timely start."
INTRODUCTION
It is to be presumed that all students of strategy, at least those who have essayed the solution of strategic problems, are familiar with the principles underlying the estimate of the situation.
For the benefit of those who are not familiar with the estimate of the situation, the following brief explanation of its office is offered:
All organized human effort is based' upon the recognition and employment of three factors, which are co-equal and interdependent.
These three factors are, first, information; second, reflection and study; and third, execution.
When we receive a letter in the course of business, it is necessary to read it, reflect upon it, and, perhaps, to refer to other correspondence, or to refer to books, in order clearly to understand the subject matter, as affecting our action.
The letter may present a general statement, or situation, from which is obtained a special situation, indicating a mission for the recipient to carry out.
Upon study of the mission, and weighing carefully the relative advantages and disadvantages of certain courses of action open to us, we finally arrive at a decision, and proceed to carry it out; and, having once evaluated the mission, and arrived at the decision, the success. of the action depends largely upon the study given in arriving at the decision, and the firmness and resolution employed in carrying it out.
In whatever field of activity, the principle is the same; and the skill with which it is recognized and employed, in most cases unconsciously, governs the degree of success attained.
In the solution of strategic problems nothing should be left to chance; a systematic analysis of all the conditions which confront us is necessary, and a decision must be made as the result of clear and logical thinking. The decision, once made, should be adhered to, so long as the general plan is thereby advanced. A weak or poor decision, resolutely adhered to in course of action, is at any rate better than vacillation, or indecision.
Still, it must be borne in mind that the decision depends upon the mission, and if the mission changes, so must the decision be re-cast.
The course of action indicated by a decision must not be inflexible, for in war it is always the unexpected that happens; we must be prepared for any contingency.
There is nothing new in the principle; it has been employed by masters of strategy for many years, and is merely the Baconian method of inductive logic as applied to the solution of strategic problems.
In making an estimate of the situation, we must always be on our guard not to jump at conclusions, and then to reason so as to justify the conclusions previously assumed. We must proceed step by step, in critical analysis of the problem presented until, by inductive logic, we have arrived at a decision justified by the evidence adduced.
In the solution of problems in strategy it is usual to assume a general statement of the case to present all the facts, and then the special situation which calls. for action on our part, from which we derive our mission, and then.to group the estimate under four heads, as follows:
- The mission.
- The enemy forces; their strength, disposition and probable intentions.
- Our own forces; their strength, disposition, and the courses open to us.
- The decision.
The mission is the task assigned to us, and it is necessary first to have a clear understanding of the task.
To that end, the writer will endeavor to present the general situation, followed in sequence by the various processes of reasoning, in an estimate of the situation, to set forth clearly the needs of the navy in organization for war.
GENERAL SITUATIONS: THE RELATION OF THE STATE TO ITS ARMED FORCES
MILITARY POLICY
In every well-organized republic there exists a nicely balanced relation of civil to military power, so arranged that, while civil power is paramount at all times, the exercise of military power, when necessary, is not impeded or handicapped in its effective application, in the transition from a state of peace to a state of war. In order that the transition may be affected without turmoil or friction or costly blunders, it is necessary for a strong state to have a definite military policy, which may be defined as that governmental system of conduct concerned with the development and employment of military (land and sea) forces.
The military policy of the United States appears to be rather indefinite. It is many years since General Upton in his treatise on the Military Policy of the United States set forth with logical clearness the necessity for a definite military policy on the part of the United States.
In an address delivered at the laying of the cornerstone of the Army War College Building in Washington, on the 21st of February, 1903, the Secretary of War, in speaking of the recommendations of General Upton for the improvement of our military system, said:
More than a quarter of a century later, and long after death had ended the restless striving of the far-seeing intelligence, other men working out the same problems with which he dealt found the sanity and wisdom of his conclusions and gave them effect. Were Upton living to-day, still upon the active list of the army, he would see all of the great reforms, for which he contended, substantially secured. The three battalion system, the interchangeability of staff and line, examinations for promotion, and now, by the wisdom of the present Congress, the establishment of a general staff, and the completion of the system of military education under the controlling body which will find its permanent home in the building whose cornerstone we lay today.
In the preface to the 1904 edition of General Upton's Military Policy of the United States, the following statement appears, affirmed by the Secretary of War:
Upon the original manuscript, at the foot of the discussion of the War of 1812, is found a penciled note in the handwriting of General Sherman, which concludes in these words:
"I doubt if you will convince the powers that be, but the facts stated, the references from authority, and the military conclusions are most valuable and should be printed and made accessible. The time may not be now, but will come when these will be appreciated, and may bear fruit, even in our day.—W. T. SHERMAN."
General Upton performed a great service for his country in setting forth the proper relation of. civil to Military power, in a republic, so clearly, so logically, by the results of scholarly research extending over twenty years, that finally the principles he set forth were enacted into law, in the relation of civil government to the army of the United States.
The military policy of the nation comprises its program in regard to both land and sea forces, and includes naval policy, which may be defined as that governmental system of conduct concerned with the development and employment of the entire naval establishment.
The United States has no council of the national defence, and consequently it has no definite military policy based upon careful study of exterior issues in the field of world politics. Objection has been made to the establishment of such a body in that it would introduce a feature of government which was not contemplated when the government was organized in its three branches: legislative, executive and judiciary. Since, however, the composition of a council of the national defence would comprise representatives of the three branches of government, it is difficult to see how it could interfere with the proper offices of either branch. At best, such a body need be only advisory in character, and its greatest value would be in facilitating oral communications between the executive and legislative branches of the government.
At present, questions of naval policy are considered and handled by the legislative branch to a degree which appears to militate against the best interests of the executive branch. Questions of naval policy are most properly decided by the Congress, but the responsibility for the execution of that policy devolves upon the executive branch of the government.
There is an analogy between the naval profession and that of the surgeon.
War is a social cancer which occurs from time to time, caused by economic conditions beyond the control of any body of men known as government. To remove this cancer requires the skilled offices of military men, who, like the surgeon, are skilled in the use of the necessary tools with which to effect the operation. He who requires the services of a surgeon should not have the temerity to tell that surgeon how to conduct the operation or what instruments to use, nor should he cavil at the surgeon's fee within reason. 'The success of the operation being the end in view, the services of the most skillful surgeon would be sought and every opportunity afforded him for the exercise of his skill.
Yet in the relation of the legislative body of the government of the United States towards its military policy, we find a direct violation of this principle. It seems necessary to mention this in passing, before taking up the necessities of the navy within itself, to show how the navy, viewed as an instrument of war, is handicapped at the outset by indefinite naval policy.
SPECIAL SITUATION
NAVAL POLICY
Shall the shores of the United States be protected from invasion by a foreign foe?
Shall the rights of American citizens on the high seas be upheld in accordance with international law?
What influence have the foreign policies of other nations upon the disposition of our fleets?
What influence has the Monroe Doctrine upon our naval policy?
What influence has the Panama Canal on our naval policy?
Do we need a fleet in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific?
What influence does our hegemony in the West Indies, in Mexico, and in Central America have upon our naval policy?
What influence has the defence of our outlying possessions upon our naval policy?
These are questions to be considered in formulating a naval policy; taking into consideration the strength of the forces of our most probable enemies, after close study of the existing economic and political conditions.
All these questions require careful study and analysis before one step should be taken towards the creation of a navy. Either we need no navy at all or the navy should be adequate to conform to the necessities imposed by such of these various considerations as are comprised in our naval policy.
Such a policy could only be determined after a careful estimate of the situation and comparison of costs, and the question arises whether there now exists in our government any agency for the proper interpretation of naval policy.
The composition of the navy and its use are co-ordinate factors which depend upon naval policy, and this leads us to the consideration of:
PART 1, A. THE MISSION OF THE NAVY
The mission of the navy is to carry out the military policy of the government. If a navy be necessary at all it must be adequate to conform to the military policy of the government, and it must be efficient in carrying out that policy. If there be no military policy, or if it be indefinite, the mission of the navy becomes vague. If the military policy of the government is based upon careful study of extraneous conditions so that the navy becomes an efficient instrument of war to carry out that policy we then have a clear and definite mission.
The military policy of the country may change from time to time as conditions change, and naval policy will change accordingly, but the mission of the navy will remain unchanged, as it adapts itself to conform. to the change in policy.
PART 1, B
The mission of this essay is to set forth, as clearly as may be, the necessity for such organization of the navy as will enable it to conform to the military policy of the United States, with the greatest attainable efficiency.
PART 2. THE ENEMY FORCES: THEIR STRENGTH, DISPOSITION AND PROBABLE INTENTIONS
The forces which have prevented the attainment of a high degree of efficiency in organization of the navy can be called enemy forces, and the writer so chooses to call them, because they have worked in the interests of our possible enemies, rather than for our own interests.
These forces may be divided into two parts, (a) those within the navy, and (b) those outside the navy.
A. FORCES OPPOSED TO PROGRESS WITHIN THE NAVY
Let us begin by reviewing the history of the navy of the United States for the last fifty years, and consider the various barriers to progress. The navy of 1865 was thoroughly military in so far as the types of vessels were developed to meet the local conditions imposed by the Civil War. Heavily armed and heavily armored vessels of military characteristics had been developed, as the result of necessity, in large numbers. The all-big-gun ship with guns on the center-line had been developed. For one nowadays to see a drawing of the battery plan of the U. S. S. Roanoke is to be reminded that there is nothing new under the sun, for like Judy O'Grady and the Colonel's Lady, the Roanoke and the Michigan are sisters under their skins. One vessel marked the acme of naval construction, following a definite military policy, and the other, forty years later, also exemplified a type of vessel which was brought into being as a logical deduction from recognized principles.
The navy of 1865 was thoroughly efficient for the purpose for which it was intended. It had to be. There was a necessity for it. The nation was alive to that necessity. The fleet was military in spirit and in being, for it had been required to conform to the necessities of the situation, but when the war was over the great responsibilities of the reconstruction era absorbed the attention of the statesmen of the day. While foreign powers were quick to take advantage of the military lessons which had been taught them as a result of our daring and successful advances in naval architecture and military characteristics of ships, the navy of the United States dwindled away in materiel factors until in the early eighties our ships were like a lot of wooden cigar boxes as far as their military effectiveness was concerned. Discouraged and disheartened though they were, great credit is due to the officers of those days who strove to keep alive the best traditions of the service, and who endeavored to remain in the foreground of naval thought and science.
It is true that in the seventies intricate evolutions under sail appear to. have aroused greater interest than the perfunctory performance of routine duties in gunnery, with obsolete materiel. So gunnery died out and remained only as ordnance.
The archaic rites performed with spars and sails were defended by some of the best officers of the navy of that day as necessary in order to preserve the spirit of the navy, which otherwise had been irretrievably injured.
In the early eighties, under the wise guidance of several able statesmen, the navy began again to come into its own in so far as materiel was concerned. As an illustration of the extreme conservatism of navies, mention only need be made of the almost humorous retention of spars and sails in steel ships:
"Same old topsail, same old clew,
Same old engine, same old screw,
Same old navy, nothing new."
There appear to have been two schools of thought among the officers of those days, one of which stuck by its halyards, while the other insisted on manning the downhauls. The downhauls finally won through sheer weight of numbers, but even they, though in the van of progress, seemed to be engrossed with materiel issues. This, it seems, was only natural, as it was a tremendous upheaval within the navy itself to transform its materiel from wood and canvas and cast iron to steel and electricity .and high power guns. Even then the saying was wooden ships and iron men, and the contrary.
So the navy struggled along, engrossed with materiel issues until a few far-seeing officers began to realize that the navy was becoming like a man without a soul, and those officers, who deserve great credit, succeeded in the face of much opposition in establishing the Naval War College and all that it stands for. The War College continued in adversity, at times perilously near extinction, and the cruelest jibes it had to suffer were from officers of the navy who were not far-seeing enough to recognize its wondrous possibilities even as at first conceived in purely academic fields.
Those officers of the blue water school who jeered at the War College and its teachings, and ignored its deductions, were not farseeing or studious enough to realize that the navy can never attain its highest ideals unless it possesses and uses thinkers as well as doers. It is necessary for the navy to study its problems, donning the cap of introspection, and wearing the spectacles of research.
The leading educators of our country complain of the mediocrity of college education in the United States; they maintain that the democratic spirit of the undergraduate bodies is opposed to the scholarship that lifts its head above mediocrity, and that it is this spirit which prevents general attainment of scholarship on a high plane, and lightly refers to such a plane as high-brow."
The same spirit has been manifest at the Naval Academy; it exists in the navy today. It may, be excused or explained as existent among college undergraduates, as due to the irresponsibility or flippancy of youth, but that it should exist among officers of the navy is inexcusable.
Whether or no such mediocrity is one of the defects of democracy, may be considered as belonging in the field of thought of the political scientist, but such mediocrity certainly should have no place in the navy.
As the navy progressed materially it did so without any definite naval policy as a guide. At first battleships were called coast-line battleships, under a misconception of their proper office. The navy's first cruisers of high speed were erroneously called commerce destroyers, without any regard to their relation to the main body of the fleet, all due to the lack of a consistently clear naval policy. Despite all these handicaps the navy continued its struggle, developing its materiel until the war with Spain, from which it emerged successfully despite the lack of appreciation within the service of the true scope and field of the War College.
The navy was engrossed with materiel matters and even though great strides had been in materiel, yet very little had been done in coordinating the various branches of naval activity to conform to any naval policy. There was no proper concept of war, and the operations of the fleet did not properly coordinate personnel training with materiel necessities. The true relation of personnel to materiel had not been evolved.
The gunnery of the navy during the war with Spain, while considered highly successful at the time, is now looked upon as almost a joke, and the navy now realizes how poor it was, and what is more important, the reasons why gunnery was so poor. The navy was long on ordnance and short on gunnery. There was but little naval gunnery, as distinguished from ordnance. Telescopic sights had been installed on some guns, and our navy was in the van in all the materiel advances of ordnance, yet those same telescopic sights were placed on the guns with inadequate recognition of the gunnery principles involved, because there was not enough gunnery in the navy to indicate the defective installation of the telescopic sights. The telescopic sights had come to stay, but poor gunnery retarded their development.
Even though we consider that "All's well that ends well" the fact still remains that our gunnery was execrable; it is not comforting to reflect upon, for we now realize that defective gunnery was due to faulty Organization, in that little if any attention was paid to the reports of our attaches, and that there was no system of independent inspections to pass upon the efficiency of gunnery and to make recommendations for the remedy of defects in the training of personnel or the design of materiel. Nor was there any responsible, competent technical authority to pass upon such recommendations, with authority to direct that they be carried out.
The business of the Navy Department had been distributed by law under certain bureaus, but in the laws establishing these bureaus not one word can be found prescribing their duties in regard to preparedness for war, the end in view for which the navy was created, if national policy should demand it. Everyone in the navy is familiar with the manner in which things drifted along, with all the military features of the naval establishment, where operations were concerned, handled by the Bureau of Navigation, by tacit consent of various secretaries of the navy, and more or less friction and jealously of other bureaus for lack of implied authority on the part of the Bureau of Navigation, until finally the dawning of the light which came forth from the War College showed the need of a proper military conception of the basis of organization of the Navy Department.
Following recognition of the need for organization, a system was instituted in the Navy Department in December, 1909, in which, for the first time, due recognition was given the military relation of the Navy Department, in its executive management, to the shore establishment and the fleets of the navy. This was done by the Secretary of the Navy without the sanction of law and the system could be carried out only by the cordial cooperation of the bureaus of the Navy Department, irrespective of any duty in that regard as devolving upon them by law.
The bureaus remained in a sense independent monarchies, there being no legally established organization for the coordination of their efforts in accordance with well-established principles. It is vitally necessary that bureau chiefs can be told what to do; not how to do it—that is their province.
In order to perceive the necessity for proper organization, it is well to examine the causes which led up to the development of the first organization of the Navy Department with a view to the attainment of efficiency toward the end for which it was created, and the causes of the failure of that organization.
As a result of dissatisfaction with the operations of the British Army in the field during the South African Campaign, the British Government of that day, in response to public demand, instituted a searching inquiry into the conduct of affairs of the British War Office, by a committee composed of one civilian as president, one naval officer; and an army officer as recorder. The committee of investigation was headed by Viscount Esher and the report of the committee is known as the Report of the Reconstitution Committee on the British War Office. The report was submitted in 1904. He who reads it will find in its clear analysis of the grave defects of organization in the British War Office at that time, an almost exact parallel to the conditions which obtained in the organization of our Navy Department until recent legislation removed them in some degree by a partial recognition of the principle involved.
To summarize the essential features of the Esher report it may be stated that the greatest defects found by the commission were: First, that the British War Office as constituted at the time possessed no thinking department. Second, that as a result of the lack of a thinking department there was no coordination in the efforts of the various materiel bureaus and that moneys were expended by the money spending bureaus without due regard to the efficiency of the British Army in carrying out the military policy of the British Empire. It also pointed out the need for independent inspections, in order that intelligent criticism might be made useful. Subsequently, the British War Office was reorganized, and placed upon an efficient military basis similar in principle to the organization of the British Admiralty.
In our own country two boards have analyzed and reported upon the requirements of organization in the Navy Department in order that the Department may be able efficiently to coordinate its activities with the requirements of naval policy.
The first of these two boards was known as the Moody Board, composed of eight members, three prominent civilians, and five naval officers, and a naval officer as recorder. It was presided over by the Hon. William H. Moody. It submitted its report to the President of the United States in January, 1909. The remarks of the President in submitting the report to Congress indicated the importance which was attached to the subject. No action was taken by Congress towards the enactment of the necessary laws to put the recommendations of this board into effect.
The second board convened was known as the Swift Board, composed entirely of naval officers, seven in number, with a naval officer as recorder; and while it went far more into details of organization than did the Moody Board, its recognition of the principle involved was practically the same. The report of the board was submitted in October, 1909.
These two reports set forth clearly the basic military principles which apply to the proper organization of the Navy Department in an executive sense. The necessary law to carry either the Moody or Swift report into effect has never been enacted, although approximation thereto has been made in the establishment of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. In these reports, submitted by able statesmen and competent naval officers, great stress is laid upon the recognition of four coordinate divisions in the executive administration of the Navy Department; these four coordinate divisions are: Personnel, Operations, Inspections, and Materiel. It was recommended that each division be controlled by its own chief, and that four heads of divisions, collectively with the civil heads of the Department should constitute an executive council for the Department. The reasons for the establishment of these four divisions are clearly set forth in the reports, and space forbids their repetition here. The duties of these heads of divisions, subordinate to civil direction, lie entirely in the field of executive distribution of duties to the various bureaus in order that the strategic requirements of the situation may be met, and in operations of the fleets, and inspections to see that what is done, is well done, or that defects are remedied.
The Swift Board Report was tentatively adopted and put in practice, in 1909. But it had no sanction in law, and failed in practice. The forces opposed to progress, within the navy, were the causes of its failure. These were the same forces which had failed to recognize the vital basic defects in organization which had so long retarded the development of gunnery in our navy. These forces failed to recognize the true relation of personnel and its training, to materiel and its design. The spending bureaus, established by law, were under no competent technical agency, also established by law, to determine and direct expenditures to conform to the strategic requirements of naval policy.
B. FORCES OPPOSED TO PROGRESS OUTSIDE THE NAVY
Chief among these forces is sentiment, as opposed to logic. Logical methods of thought, based upon the consideration of facts, have no place in the minds of those who prefer to muddy the clear waters of reason with the prejudice of sentiment.
There are many well-meaning persons who abhor war, and who contend that the arbitrament of law, as in civil cases, can and should settle the differences between nations as readily as differences between individuals are settled by civil courts. These persons ignore the fact that there are certain international questions which may arise having no basic, mutually accepted law to govern them; until all nations are as one, in their acceptance of law, there are bound to be certain differences beyond the pale of arbitrament, where national safety or integrity, or freedom from invasion and alien rule is the issue at stake.
With society constituted as it is, for the present, at least, we must accept facts as they are, and reason in the light of those facts.
While it is true that civil issues are settled without the use of force, within civilized states, this does not necessarily mean that the use of force is wrong. Holy Writ is full of instances authorizing the use of force, on the part of duly constituted authority, for the righting of wrongs, and to further the ends of justice.
In fact, all governments are founded on force, in the last analysis. Murder, theft and arson, pillage, rapine and plunder are prevented by the strong arm of the municipality, state or nation. The entire machinery of the state is brought to bear on the vigorous prosecution of criminal cases, and the state exercises the right of , extermination, if necessary, in dealing with certain crimes, according to law. To say that such force is wrongfully applied, or unnecessary, is as weak an argument as to contend that no cause for such force exists.
That would be to say that there are no wrong-doers, no crooks of various types, no thieves and no murderers.
The effect of the propaganda of those who are inspired by such sentiments is insidious and far-reaching, and has had great effect in limiting our naval readiness for war. It would not matter so much, had the movement been world wide, but in the meantime other nations have gone on in their preparations for war to a degree which we cannot afford to disregard or ignore.
Another chief source of weakness, from without, is due to ignorance of naval requirements and standards on the part of the public.
It is the people's navy; they command its fortunes and its fate, through their representatives. Vast sums of money have been expended for the navy, particularly during the past ten years.
Another cause for halting the development of the navy has perhaps been the feeling that strong armed forces lead up to and cause wars. The history of our navy should dispel that fear. The navy has ever been the strong right arm of the nation, slow to wrath. However indirectly, the navy saved the Union.
The files of the Navy Department are replete with instances where the State Department has thanked the navy for its diplomatic victories, conducted with courteous regard for the rights of weaker powers, and based upon a sound knowledge of International Law.
It is probable that the Naval Committee of the House has more to do with naval policy than any other agency of the government, and it would appear that twenty representative men of civil professions, usually entirely unfamiliar with technical naval matters, especially in the esoteric fields of strategy, could have but slight knowledge of any other phases of naval policy than the assertion of the policy itself and the enactment of laws with which to appropriate the moneys necessary for the proper execution of their policy.
The location of naval bases, navy yards, and stations should be dependent upon military necessity, and not upon local political expediency. The question as to whether any navy yard is useful or the contrary should not be left to political fortune but should be based entirely upon a careful study of the advantages and disadvantages of the locality in regard to its availability in serving the fleet. One yard may possess ideal characteristics for a submarine base, another for destroyers, another for battleships; having due regard for the sources of supply of material, labor, ease of transportation, depth of water, facilities for training, and general strategic properties.
C. THE ENEMY FORCES: THEIR PROBABLE INTENTIONS
Again dividing these forces into two parts, (a) those within the navy, and (b) those outside the navy, we may first consider (a); these forces may be expected to diminish, with the growth of understanding of the principles underlying proper organization, as military education becomes diffused throughout the navy, as a result of the, teachings of the War College. Military education should begin at the Naval Academy, where minds are plastic. (b) The forces opposed to progress, in naval organization, directed from outside the navy, may be expected to continue in future, as in the past; but their effect upon the navy may be expected to diminish in direct ratio to the growth of intelligent public opinion on the subject.
PART 3. OUR OWN FORCES: THEIR STRENGTH, DISPOSITION AND THE COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO US
A. FORCES WITHIN THE NAVY, WHICH HAVE ASSISTED PROGRESS, AND IMPROVED ORGANIZATION
It was not until 1902, four years after the war with Spain, that the proper relation of personnel to materiel was recognized in reference to naval gunnery. This relation was clearly indicated by an able officer of the navy who had even to risk his commission in endeavoring to overcome the inertia of the Navy Department, in his efforts to correct the evils which existed as a result of the absolute lack of appreciation of the true principles involved in proper gunnery training. If it had not been for the personal interest and earnest efforts of the President of the United States at that time, it is interesting to conjecture when the Navy Department would have awakened to a realization that a long sleep had been enjoyed by naval gunnery since 1865. The rapid improvement of gunnery which resulted when the inertia of the navy Department was overcome, is well known to the service and was astounding to the unintiated.
The recognition of the principle involved was invaluable to the service, for it was not until then that it was realized that improvement of ordnance materiel could be obtained only by intelligent criticism, the fruit of experience in operation under exacting conditions, as closely simulating those of battle as practicable. Previously, poor as it was, the ordnance was better than the gunnery, so the defects of design were not noted. Soon after gunnery was first conducted by methods developed by sound organization, the skill of the gunners exceeded the limits of capability of ordnance as then designed, and design began to follow the demands imposed by skilful operation, and has done so ever since.
As soon as the reasons for the wonderful improvement in naval gunnery were understood a great white light broke upon the naval service. It was then clearly realized for the first time that naval materiel is a function of the training and skill of naval personnel, for man is mightier than the machine.
Marked improvement in steaming of vessels and the upkeep of their machinery followed in the wake of the improvement in naval gunnery, based upon the same sound conception of fundamental principles fostered and encouraged by healthy competition.
Remarkable improvement in the performance of torpedoes then followed in the wake of the improvement of steam engineering. This, however, did not take place until 1911, when the torpedo first began to come into its own. Thus we see the development of materiel improvement within the navy until 1912, when a crisis arrived; it was not until approximately that year that the naval service awakened to the fact that a bigger issue was involved than any materiel improvement.
Until 1910 the activities of the Naval War College had been almost entirely academic and it is seemingly by the merest chance that in 1910 a new thought suddenly imposed itself upon the consciousness of the War College.
THE EVOLUTION OF DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY
A talented and studious officer of the navy, on duty at the Naval War College, was sent to attendance at the Army War College, from 1907 to 1909. It did not take this studious officer long to realize that the fundamental laws of warfare on land were directly applicable to naval operations, and after painstaking study of the principles underlying the strategic successes of Von Moltke and the tactical principles clearly outlined by such authorities as Griepenkerl, Buddecke and Audibert, he was able to lay before the Naval War College, in 1909, a clear and definite conception of the practical application of the laws of war for the use of the navy.
In 1910 the War College adopted the new system and again a great white light broke on the service, especially in 1912, when the War College first laid emphasis upon the importance of doctrine. Until then the navy at large had no clear and definite concept of the art of war and was devoid of true military spirit in an organized sense, disseminated throughout the body by doctrine.
For the first time the importance of a proper conception of what naval doctrine means was made clear to the service and it was also made clear that the highest form of obedience is not blind conformity to commands, but intelligent initiative so exercised by each subordinate commander as to make his action contribute to the successful attainment of the end in view. The importance of this step cannot be over-estimated.
The Naval War College has been of greater practical value to the navy at large during the past five years than at any other time since its institution. The logical methods employed by the masters of strategy in Europe, their logical deduction of the course to be pursued after a careful estimate of existing conditions, have been studied with care during this period, and the necessity for, the application of similar sound principles and methods to our naval operations was made evident.
The relatively superior excellence of the noncommissioned officers of the army and of the marine corps, as compared with the petty officers of the navy, had long been a matter of concern among progressive officers of the navy, but having no underlying military concept of the art of war they did not realize that they themselves were standing in the way of similar efficiency. It is only necessary to cite as an illustration of the increase of power on the part of higher command, by delegation of authority, the fact that the power exercised by a corporal in command of a squad of an infantry company does not in any way detract from the authority or power of the captain of that company. On the contrary it increases the flexibility of his command and extends it, especially upon the firing- line, because the corporal, by dint of intensive training, is able to conduct himself in an emergency in accordance with the policies of his captain, and so to further the end in view. It seems perhaps trite to mention this minor incident even by way of illustration, but it must be understood in order that an intelligent grasp of the situation may be obtained.
In the clear light thrown on this subject by Griepenkerl the following is quoted from his "Letters on Applied Tactics":
THE ORDER MUST NOT TRESPASS ON THE PROVINCE OF THE SUBORDINATE
This is an error only too often committed both in the field and in the solution of problems. Beware of it.
On principle, your orders should contain only what your subordinate cannot of himself arrange for the carrying out of your intentions. The details of the execution you must leave to him, especially if your orders require considerable time in transmission, where therefore it is possible that conditions you have presupposed may have completely changed. Through your orders acquaint your subordinate with his task; the manner of execution is his affair.
Now what is doctrine in a military sense? We have only to read Griepenkerl, the master of tactics, to see that doctrine is a code of principles definitely held by superiors and thoroughly understood in spirit by subordinates. Doctrine is an intelligent comprehension of tasks assigned, coupled with ability to accomplish those tasks with the loyalty and initiative which is the highest form of obedience. Doctrine does not concern itself with methods—it demands results, not excuses. The word "doctrine," as defined by Webster, is inadequate to convey the idea completely, but it is the best word we have for the purpose.
To understand the application of doctrine in a military sense, we may study the application of doctrine in the fields of commercial activity, where it has long been recognized and employed by the great successful commercial companies of our country, who not only spare no pains to perfect their organization, but take care to see that their field forces of buying and selling agents are carefully indoctrinated, in that they are expected to use loyalty, zeal, and intelligent initiative in the relations between their company and the market.
In the stations of one of the greatest and most successful railroads of the United States, there is posted a bulletin for the information of the public, from which the following are excerpts:
The management of the --- Railroad System believes that the company's greatest asset is the loyalty and efficiency of its men.
This company is endeavoring continually to develop its organization, to assure itself of the loyalty of its men, and to build up an efficient and economical transportation enterprise.
The end in view of the commercial company being results, expressed in terms of dollars and cents, nothing in the way of defective organization can be allowed to interfere with the successful accomplishment of the end in view, and consequently, the need of doctrine is recognized in commercial circles, and doctrine is employed therein with a degree of success that has brought great wealth to the well organized commercial business of our country.
The defect of the navy in that it had no doctrine and that its organization was not in accordance with basic military principles was not apparent to the officers of the navy themselves until comparatively recently. Now that they have awakened to a realization of the fact that for many years some of the armies and navies of the great powers of the world have employed scientific principles, based upon the strategic successes of Von Moltke, in teaching the art of war, they have come to realize that a great and dire need for recognition of the principles involved confronts our navy, as great as was the need for reform when it was first realized that naval gunnery had been allowed to fall into a deplorable condition. But in order to remedy this grave defect, the navy needs help from without, as was the case in regard to gunnery.
The Development of Organization in the Navy Department
In 1889 a Board on Construction was established by the Secretary of the Navy. We find its duties prescribed in the Navy Regulations, 1900, as follows:
A board having general supervision over the designing, constructing and equipping of new ships for the navy, known as the Board on Construction, shall be composed of the chiefs of the Bureaus of Equipment, Ordnance, Construction and Repair, and Steam Engineering, the Chief Intelligence Officer, and such other officers as the Secretary of the Navy may designate.
The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation had also become a member of the Board on Construction, by courtesy.
During the Spanish War a Strategy Board was convened on May 2, 1898. This board was composed of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, four naval officers, and a naval officer as recorder. On the 7th of May, 1898, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy left the board, and on the 20th of May, 1898, one of the naval members was detached. The last session of the board was held on the 24th of August, 1898. The board was called into being to supply the navy with plans of campaign, and when it was dissolved no agency remained for the purpose until the establishment of the General Board.
The General Board was established by a general order of the Navy Department on March 13, 1900, with a view to supplying the need for studied plans of campaign, and to act in an advisory capacity in the military administration of the navy.
The Board on Construction designed all ships of the navy until it was abolished in 1909, when the duties formerly performed by the Board on Construction, in regard to the military characteristics of ships, were assigned to the Aid for Operations and the General Board.
The General Board then supplied the need to the naval establishment of the studies formerly made by the Strategy Board of 1898, and the Board on Construction, but the influence of the General Board in regard to the military characteristics of ships had been felt before the abolishment of the Board on Construction. Until the Michigan and South Carolina were laid down in 1906, those vessels of the navy which were designed by the Board on Construction had been either, at best, copies of foreign design, or original experiments which were expensive mistakes. Every man-of-war is of necessity a compromise in regard to the requirements of construction, engineering, and ordnance, and it was not until the military characteristics of the ship were first determined and then submitted to the materiel bureaus in order that the vessel might be built to conform to those characteristics that our navy finally succeeded in evolving military designs of vessels which were successful. The ships of the Michigan class were the result of such design, and were the first all-big-gun battleships, with guns on the center line, and all vessels designed since 1906 have been developed by the same system.
The designs thus evolved have been copied in all the navies of the world. These designs were the result of the application of gunnery principles to naval construction, and their efficiency was due to the fact that naval gunnery had been developed to a high degree of efficiency in our navy by proper organization, and the General Board was enabled to bring to the question of ship design lessons which had been gained by practical experience in the fleet. No fault can be found with the present system of military design of vessels of the navy, as the value of the advice given by the General Board is beyond question. While the tentatively adopted Executive organization of the Navy Department, the Aid System, broke down in practice, the General Board had become indispensable.
The General Board, under the Navy Regulations, has great responsibilities, for it "shall devise measures and plans for the effective preparation and maintenance of the fleet for war." It also prepares plans of campaign and keeps them revised in accordance with the latest information received, and recommends the various types of ships to be employed, and prescribes their military characteristics.
Proper organization cannot exist where the weight of responsibility is not relieved by correlative authority.
In the conduct of war no principle is better established than this: That within the province or territorial limits assigned to any military commander, his authority must be supreme.—Upton, Military Policy of U. S., page 405.
If the present organization of the Navy Department be inadequate for the proper conduct of affairs in time of peace, it cannot serve adequately and properly under the stress of war.
B. FORCES OUTSIDE THE NAVY WHICH ASSIST PROGRESS, AND POINT TO A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEEDS OF THE NAVY IN ORGANIZATION
It is certain that in no field of human activity has more studious research been conducted than in the analysis of the history of war, and of the art of war.
The great authorities on war should be as familiar to naval officers as the authorities on law, medicine or surgery, or statesmanship are to those who follow those professions.
The naval profession is one which includes many professions, and which probably makes more demands upon the exact sciences than any other profession.
The authorities on war, indeed, form a military galaxy, and it would seem that he who runs could read and understand the basic truths set forth on their pages. Of course, those who are swayed by sentiment do not want to believe that what they see therein is true, or that it forms a guide for the future.
But we are not dealing with sentiment, but with cold facts, in the light of reason; if a navy be needed at all, it will be badly needed when called upon, and no pains should be spared in time of peace, to perfect its organization, above all things.
Those who decry adequate and efficient organization for the navy on the ground that it is a menace to our liberties, or incompatible with our system of government, seem to forget that the navy is not the state. The navy, is an instrument of the state, and serves the state with an efficiency which is a direct reflex of its organization.
It is traditional that navies have never menaced civil power. On the contrary they have a dependence upon civil power which at times has been almost pathetic, if not tragic. Ministries have sent fleets to certain disaster as a political sacrifice, despite the fact that those same ministries had failed in time of peace to accord to their fleets that proper measure of recognition which would provide the necessary preparation for the successful conduct of war.
The fact that a naval officer has never been President of the United States has often been remarked, and the reason for it is obvious. Sailors are far removed from the ballot box and knowledge of practical politics. The navy serves the state, and its activities are entirely subordinate to national policy.
Not a shovelful of coal, nor a gallon of oil, nor an ounce of powder can be provided or expended for our navy without the knowledge or consent of civil power. The operations of a fleet are entirely dependent upon intricate mechanism and trained personnel, which cannot be provided without studied effort and adequate, intensive training. Surely, the most efficient organization that can be devised for the navy cannot but redound to the advantage of the state.
Let us analyze the executive organization of our government, so that we can conform our ideas on naval organization to our ideals of government.
The office of the President of the United States carries with it the prerogative of appointment of the heads of all executive departments. The President of the United States is also commander- in-chief of the army and of the navy. It is practically impossible for the President personally to attend to all the vast mass of executive business, therefore, he delegates his authority, as successful business men always do in their management of large corporations.
It is necessary that a spirit of loyal cooperation shall permeate the entire executive establishment of the government of the United States. It appears that this loyal cooperation and unselfish subordination should be the result of corresponding delegation of authority downward throughout the several executive departments. The spirit thus developed, all partisan issues being forgotten, flows throughout as doctrine. Therefore it appears that naval doctrine is a necessity. It also appears that it can easily be gained and that no money need be expended for its acquisition. On the contrary, if the principle of the short ballot, on which the executive business of the United States is managed, were coupled with a budget system of appropriation, greater efficiency and economy would obtain throughout the entire government structure. This is merely, however, by way of illustration. The important point to be considered as far as the navy is concerned, is that it is practically impossible to have doctrine, that mighty spirit of loyal cooperation, without proper organization.
C. THE COURSE OF ACTION OPEN TO US
It has been said that there is no royal road to knowledge.
This is nowhere so true as in the development of naval thought and science. The marked progress of our navy, especially since the renaissance of gunnery, in 1902, has not been along easy or clearly marked paths.
The best efforts of many minds in the navy +Lave been applied to the solution of the difficult problems which have arisen, with intense devotion on the part of those officers of the navy, to the cause to which they have dedicated their lives. Their efforts to better the navy, and to make it more efficient, have been opposed by inertia and objection from within the navy, as well as from without. This has been due in large measure to ignorance of the underlying principles of military organization which have been the main springs of action of those who had mastered those principles by intensive study and research.
The navy itself is to blame for this condition; and the only course of action which is properly open to officers of the navy is so to prepare themselves, by earnest and conscientious study of the art of war, that the entire navy May think alike, and think rightly, on questions of military organization.
Statesmen and legislators cannot be blamed for inaction, or faulty action, as the result of dissentient opinions expressed to them by officers of the navy.
Summary.—We have seen that whatever successes the navy has attained, in the way of organized effort to better its efficiency, have been obtained in most cases by the sporadic efforts of talented individuals. While some of these successes have been very great, and reflect credit upon their originators, there has been no sound organization, in accord with the principles set forth as vital by the best authorities, to raise the entire leaven to a high standard.
It is axiomatic among organizers that individual mediocrity can be brought to a high standard of efficiency by organized effort.
But the personnel of our navy, particularly the enlisted men, is not mediocre; it is of a high order of intelligence, above the average of civil life, due to careful recruiting. Only about fifteen per cent of applicants are accepted, and that moiety is subjected to rigid tests and thorough winnowing before men are placed in important positions.
Therefore, if the principle of organization which have been laid down as correct by the best authorities, are applied to the organization of the navy as a whole, we may confidently expect a marked increase in efficiency for war.
There is no use blinking the facts: The navy must be ready for war, at all times, or the money spent on it is thrown away, and the lives of its men endangered.
The greater relative importance of the spirit and the morale of the navy, as compared with its materiel, is not always comprehended by the layman, and the navy is generally discussed in terms of ships, guns and torpedoes, with evident lack of appreciation of the fact that battles are fought by men, and that decisions are carried and gained by the skillful employment of trained intellect.
The paramount duty of the navy, in order that the Nation may be properly served, is to foster and to keep alive, within itself, with a true sense of great responsibility, the noble traditions and martial spirit which have been bequeathed to its officers and men as a priceless heritage.
Theories of government may change from time to time, but the duty of the navy remains unchanged..
The navy of the United States is now confronted by a condition, not a theory.
Most of the great Powers of the world have spared no efforts to perfect the organization of their armed forces for the support of their military policies, and the results obtained by them have been marvelous in practical efficiency. As navies are competitive in character, it is absolutely necessary for us to adopt a similar organization for our own navy, or to devise something better, or else to accept the humiliating consequences of defeat, in the event that the navy should ever be called upon to contest the ruthless invasion of our beloved land by some power which had left nothing undone to perfect the efficiency of its armed forces.
It is clearly understood that naval policy is in the field of activities of the statesman, not of the naval officer, in its primary inception, but it must be made clear that the execution of that policy is primarily the duty of the naval officer. Organization in a fleet, squadron, division or on board individual ships is a vital necessity and no effort is spared to make that organization as nearly perfect as is humanly possible.
The laws of Poseidon are immutable:
"Tempt not with painted cloth for wood,
My fraud avenging hosts,
Nor make at all or all make good
Your bulwarks and your boasts."
The naval officer, in addition, has to conform to the well-nigh immutable laws of war upon the sea, superposed upon the laws of navigation on the sea, or under the sea.
The navy is an instrument of war and the proper operation of the whole is dependent upon intelligent comprehension by subordinate commanders of the relation of the various component parts to higher command.
The navy has been enabled by the War College to realize that the greatest necessity for the navy is ability to conduct its operations with methods deduced from sound military principles derived from a proper concept of the art of war on the sea.
In order that the navy may be indoctrinated with a proper military conception of its duties in carrying out naval policy, it is essential that there shall be some agency in the naval establishment which shall have power to coordinate its various activities with technical skill. The end in view being naval efficiency, it would appear that the best results could be obtained by careful and intensive study of the necessities imposed by naval policy, by an expert agency in the navy itself. The program determined by expert analysis could then be submitted to the legislative body, as approved by the executive branch, for the enactment of the necessary laws to place the policy into executive being, which all points towards the necessity for the budget system of appropriation. Such a system would combine efficiency with true economy. No moneys could be wasted, for all would be expended in conformity with the end in view.
The response to such scientific management would be prompt and in accordance with those principles of organization which are recognized throughout the business world. If these principles are recognized and applied in commercial business with great success, how much more important it is that the same principles should be brought to bear upon the organization of the nation's primary bulwark of defence.
We have seen how there has gradually been evolved, in the Navy Department, an organization which attempts to coordinate all the efforts of the Naval Establishment, beginning with the hydra-headed Bureau System, in which, for want of a better system, all military questions gravitated to one bureau.
To solve the vexed question, the Moody and the Swift Boards made certain definite recommendations, and finally, the Swift Board recommendations were tentatively adopted; but they appear to have been defective, in practice, because there was no responsible head to the organization in a military sense. The Moody Board had recommended that the Aid for Operations should be the senior, but in neither system was there an Aid for War, responsible for the military efficiency of the entire Naval Establishment.
The Navy Department is in receipt of information through its attaches from all the counties of the world to which they are accredited. It is in receipt of information by cable and radio from its commanders-in-chief and commanding officers acting singly, and such information is constantly pouring into the Department in telegrams and radio messages from its various shore establishments. This information has to be sifted and acted upon; sometimes immediate action is imperative, but in every case there must be opportunity for the consideration of the special problem presented and a definite decision must be made as to the course of action to be taken, after which the necessary executive action should be taken with the least possible interference or handicap. There must be some facility for the higher command of the navy to give reflection and study to some of the problems presented. Some problems are solely military in character. Others affect the activities of bureaus of the Department, and others call for consultation with the Department of State in order that the action taken may conform to National Policy. Other problems, such as the military characteristics of ships, and the program of their numbers and distribution by types, and the formulations of plans of campaign, call for reflective study and careful planning before execution can be attempted. What should be the agency which receives this information, digests it, and acts upon it?
In other navies than that of the United States, the agency by which this end is attained is generally known as a general staff, a body of trained experts comprising the best brains obtainable in the navy to direct its activities towards attaining the end in view with the least possible friction and the most effective coordination of all factors.
The government of the United States in its executive organization carries on its operations by the employment of agencies conforming to the principles of the general staff.
It appears that there is nothing new in a general staff as far as a recognition of the principles is concerned, and that it conforms to our ideals of government.
Let us again consider the fundamentals of organization as applied to any branch of human effort. All organized human effort is dependent for its successful operation on three factors, namely: First, information; second, reflection and study; third, execution. These three factors are equal in importance, and a recognition of their existence may be accepted as a basic conception of what a general staff means.
PART 4. THE DECISION
It is not for the writer to make a decision as to what the organization of the navy should be, in order that it shall be best prepared for war. But, in this Estimate of the Situation, having summed up the evidence adduced, certain conclusions derived therefrom may be set forth.
The character of the American people is such that they firmly believe that many minds working toward a common objective are collectively more efficient than the mind of any one man, no matter how gifted that person may be. Also, that the result of the deductions of many minds working toward a common objective can safely be entrusted to properly organized executive civil power.
Therefore it is evident that adequate organization is necessary for the navy, in order that it may conform naval doctrine to national character. What then remains to be done in order that the organization of the Navy Department may conform to well-established principles?
The following diagram is intended to show in a general sense the relation of naval policy to naval doctrine, and the organization indicated as necessary to the end that the entire naval establishment may conform to naval policy: It constitutes a naval general staff, and requires recognition of principle, enacted into law.
In order to conform to the basic principles underlying the organization of a general staff we see that the proposed Executive Council of the Department supplies the need for an executive agency. We have still to provide for the proper receipt of information, and for the reflection, study, decision, and consequent planning as a result of the information obtained. We then see that it is necessary to create agencies to fulfil the two remaining requirements. It dawns upon us that there is very little to be done in the way of changes, provided the principle be recognized and accepted. The agents necessary to conform to that principle already exist in the Naval Establishment. We have the Office of Naval Intelligence organized for the receipt and dissemination of official information from abroad, and we can easily organize an office for receiving and sending all radio, cable, and telegraphic communications. This, in fact, has been done during the past year.
Where shall the study and planning be done? The Naval War College exists, and is equipped for the academic study of the art of war. A general board exists and is equipped for the preparation of strategic plans and determination of military characteristics of ships, submarines, and aeroplanes, location of naval bases and all other planning necessary for conformity with naval policy.
We now have three grand divisions: First, for information; second, for reflection and study; third, for execution. For convenience sake, the division of reflection and study is divided into two parts, one of which is now represented by the general board, and which would become the planning section. The other, now represented by the War College, remains as at present devoted to the academic study of the art of war.
If the necessary law were enacted, the heads of the four divisions of the Navy Department, with the heads of the information, planning and study sections, presided over by the chief of staff, would constitute a general staff, and with the Secretary of the Navy and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy would constitute the navy's General Council which would be enabled, as a result of its scientific organization, to conform all naval activities with naval policy. The Departmental Executive Council would be composed of the Secretary of the Navy, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, the chief of staff, and the four heads of departmental divisions, personnel, materiel, operations, and inspections.
This council, meeting daily, presided over by the Secretary of the Navy, or in his absence by the Assistant Secretary or the Acting Secretary, ex officio, entirely subordinate to that civil officer in matters of policy, would be enabled, with technical skill, to cause naval policy to be carried out by a proper coordination of all the activities of the naval establishment.
The chief of staff, alone, should be responsible by law for the military efficiency of the Naval Establishment, and should be endowed with correlative authority.
There should be one avenue only for communication with the civil power, in reference to matters pertaining to the readiness of the navy for war, and that should be through the chief of staff. As Spenser Wilkinson says, "The essence of good management is unity of direction."
Centralization, however, should be guarded against, and can be prevented by delegation of authority, which is the soul of proper organization, when coupled with sound doctrine.
CONCLUSION
The estimate of the situation is finished. The writer has endeavored to set forth what he considers to be vital defects in our system of naval administration, and the remedy therefor.
The United States Navy is the only large navy in the world which is not administered by a staff system. It cannot be denied that there exists in the public mind a distrust of a general staff, which is our greatest need, and it is probable that laymen do not understand what a general staff is; they regard it as a decorative and comparatively idle body of officers at the seat of power; deriving their views from the composition of the usual governor's staff, in the several states: and, perhaps, a general staff is regarded as a military Moloch, seeking power, instead of what it really is, a body of studious officers, who bring to bear on naval problems the coordinated efforts of the best professional talent available.
A general staff is an aggregation of students, organized with scientific precision, who study the art of war, and lay down principles and systems of procedure to guide the service at large, with sound doctrine.
Napoleon is reputed to have said, when generals failed him, that they did not understand his system. The fault was his, for he went to no pains to teach them.
This vital defect caused the French defeat in 1870-71.
In our own Civil War, general after general was set up in command of the Army of the Potomac, only to be knocked down like a man of straw by the civil power, for the lack of understanding, on the part of statesmen, of the tasks the army had to perform, until finally the President turned the army over to professional soldiers who knew their business, and who were allowed to carry the war to a decisive finish.
But even then they were sadly handicapped for the lack of efficient staffs; in this the Confederates were superior, for their staff organizations had been continuously developed, beginning several months before war was actually declared.
There is a lesson in this for us, at this day.
NOTE.—The following named authorities have been freely consulted in writing the foregoing essay: War and Policy, Spenser Wilkinson; Military Policy of the U. S., Upton; Science of War, Henderson; Letters on Applied Tactics, Griepenkerl; The Economic Aspects of War, Emery; Trained Initiative and Unity of Action: The True Bases of Military Efficiency, Knox; The Estimate of the Situation, Knight; The Estimate of the Situation, Schofield; Various Navy Department Memoranda, especially those of Fiske, Knox, and Madison.