Discussion

Can the Graduation of the Compass into Points be Dispensed With?

(See Page 1659, Whole No. 154, and 515, Whole No. 156)

Rear Admiral Seaton Schroeder, U. S. Navy.—As an addition of possible interest to the discussion of the advisability of abandoning the present unit of graduation of compass cards, I quote here a letter which I addressed to the Navy Department in February, 1914. I was not aware, at the time, of Professor Maurer’s paper which had appeared in the Marine Rundschau of July, 1912, but which did not come to my notice until I saw the translation of it in the Institute Proceedings of November-December, 1914. It is a matter that seems worthy of consideration.

Navy Department,

February 28, 1914. From: Rear Admiral Seaton Schroeder, U, S. N. Retired.

To: Secretary      of the Navy (Bureau of Navigation).

Subject:  Suggests a change in marking compass cards.

1. I respectfully suggest that consideration be given to altering the marking of the navy compass cards for both magnetic and gyro compasses and peloruses so as to effect a sub-division of the quadrants into a new series of sectors of 15 degrees each in place of the present illogical “points ” of 11 ¼° of the proposed new sectors to have also a name as at present.
2. In the working out of details in the recent reconstruction of the Naval Tactics and signal system of the navy I became confirmed in the opinion, formed while with the fleet, that in the changes of direction in battle approach and of relative bearings, small changes are not needed, and the unit of 15⁰ was finally arrived at for .... maneuvers instead

of one degree as heretofore  This virtually creates a new unit for battle conditions, and one which is also perfectly applicable to ordinary conditions of navigation; and it is surely logical to assimilate as closely as possible all methods liable to be applied under the varying conditions. Incidentally convenience will be promoted by having a name for that unit, and by having names for the multiples of that unit contained in the individual quadrants.

3. In increasing the size of the unit of angular measure to meet the conditions of battle approach and of battle, the old “point” of 11° 15' could have been used; but that is open to the objection that those points contain a fraction of a degree, whereas no course is given nearer than one degree. Of the 32 points, none except the eight cardinal and inter-cardinal points corresponds with any number of whole degrees, and the inconvenience of this incongruity has been increasingly apparent since the practice was adopted of naming courses by degrees from zero at North around through East and South and West to 360° at North again. A 15° subdivision gives a full unit at each cardinal and inter-cardinal point as at present, but will require new markings through the half quadrants.
4. This is a matter entirely and solely of convenience; but it is a convenience that is often material. For instance, it is observed that in the reports of battle and other exercises such statements are frequently seen as that “the course was 112°, with the wind fresh from NNE. on the port beam,” etc.; in the log books one reads that there was “a moderate swell from SSW.,” etc. This displays the intuitive desire, amounting almost to a necessity, to use a terminology by which a more or less general direction can be indicated when a precise direction is neither desired nor practicable. This will undoubtedly lead to a retention of points of the compass for certain purposes.
5. There must, of course, be some major subdivision marked on the compass card to help the steersman to keep his course; with nothing but degrees marked he could easily get 5° or 10° off without at first noticing it. In the days of sailing ships, frequently beating to windward, no steering was attempted closer than the quarter point; but now there seems to be no good reason for retaining a “point” of 11 ¼°, as a course is not given nor steered by those points and they constitute a broad subdivision which catches the eye but of which the essential feature is that they do not tally with any course except at the cardinal and inter-cardinal points. It is surely more rational to have those larger subdivisions so proportioned as not only to always tally with a whole degree of arc but also to tally with increments of 5°, which is the natural graduation universally used. This seems a logical moment to consider the change.
6. As requirements and implements progress, methods should keep in touch. There is nothing in this proposed plan that can materially antagonize any professional opinion or practice. One objection that may be urged is to the effect that the navy compass cards should not differ from those of the mercantile marine; but the consideration should be reversed to the end that the compass cards of the mercantile marine would better agree with those of the navy. There would be no difficulty on that score. Nautical instrument makers would soon effect the change, which, after all, is small and easily effected. In any event the officers and men of the naval militia, who would come to the navy in time of need, would have been trained with the compasses used by the navy.
7. A second objection that may be urged will require more consideration, and that is that the magnetic roses on charts should then be changed. This, however, is not an insuperable objection; the true compass rose is graduated in degrees on all except a few older charts, and the interior magnetic roses could gradually be changed. My impression is that all navy navigators now work out true courses, and that many in the mercantile marine do the same.
8. It would seem advisable to adopt a new term for the proposed new unit in order to prevent any confusion with the present “points” during the brief transition period. The term “sector” would be suitable, the only objection being that it is differently used in search-light work; but that objection applies only in the navy and not at all tangibly there.
9. I subjoin a tentative nomenclature of compass directions by sectors:

(See Page 1897 of This Number)

THE QUESTION OF GUN POWER AND SPEED

Mr. T. G. Frothingham.—Our best defense is our navy, and the strength of that defense is our battle fleet. Fortunately the policy of our navy ha's given us a heavily armored battle fleet with superiority in guns. As Admiral Goodrich says in his valuable article in the North American Review, “It is the gun, and the gun alone, which has determined the issue in naval battles.” Other navies have been led astray by the craze for speed. In the American Navy the gun has been the main thing. All the lessons of the war have vindicated this policy, and we have a consistent battle fleet that can command our seas. We must maintain a program of ship-building that will probably increase this battle fleet, and retain its superiority in guns. So far this program has been consistent, and we must not let any fashion for speed interfere with our main object—the heavily armed fleet of battleships. Everything else should be made auxiliary.

It is probably fortunate that our navy has not followed the latest fashion for battle cruisers. It was assumed that they would take their place in the battle line—and do everything else besides! The war has already shown the vulnerability of this class of ships, and they are not now really considered strong enough for the battle line. Their tactical value is still urged, especially by British experts, who have to justify the vast amounts spent on them.

The second battle in the Pacific was won by a long distance concentration of such ships against an inferior fleet. After all, the first battle was won by the Germans in the same way with no battle cruisers. In each action a complacent commander was sailing about in a fleet that he believed too strong to be attacked. The German concentration was as successful as the British, and giving battle was the mistake, in each case, of the commander of the weaker fleet.

The chase in the North Sea is the outstanding test of the tactical value of the battle cruiser. “On paper” the British squadron of battle cruisers started after an enemy squadron so inferior that it should have been practically destroyed, with no damage to the British ships. In fact one slower inferior German cruiser was destroyed, and the best British battle cruiser, the Lion, was so badly damaged by shot in her vulnerable forward part, that she had to be towed in, with a list and badly down by the bow. Another of the battle cruisers was similarly injured, and came back with her engines reduced in power. If the German submarines had been active, as later in the war, they would have been able to destroy the two battle cruisers and the ship towing the Lion. Why is it sensible to build $20,000,000 units of doubtful value at the expense of our battle fleet?

Our navy needs ships of great speed as auxiliaries of our battle fleet. By discarding the weight of armor (which is useless if not of the heaviest type) extreme speed is possible. A class of such ships could be built in a comparatively short time, each to carry two, or possibly four, of our most powerful naval guns. These ships would have greater speed than any battle cruiser, with guns of superior range and power. We would gain several efficient cruisers for the cost of one battle cruiser. These cruisers would be more useful as screen, scouts, raiders, or commerce destroyers. They would lessen the tactical value of the enemy battle cruiser, as a concentration of such ships against a battle cruiser would be serious. If we spend a great deal of money on a few battle cruisers, we are adopting the game of the other navies, with fewer pieces on account of our late start. Using such cruisers as I have described, with our consistent heavily armed battle fleet, we would introduce a new element in tactics which would neutralize the battle cruisers in other navies.

As I said before, the battle cruiser is no longer considered a “dreadnaught” in the sense of being a battleship. Its utility is to take the sea, trust to its speed, to raid and destroy commerce. A superior number of enemy battle cruisers minimizes this value. A class of ships of extreme speed, with heavy guns, could keep the sea in spite of any number of enemy battle cruisers. Nothing could catch them that they would not blow out of the water. Besides this value as raiders, commerce destroyers and scouts, the constant threat of a concentration against enemy battle cruisers would greatly limit the enemy’s use of battle cruisers. The logical auxiliary of a heavily armed battle fleet is to have the fastest thing afloat also heavily armed.