Motto: Nil desperandum
In a war of the size and extent of the Great World War, the magnitude and importance of the major operations are apt to make one overlook operations of lesser military importance in other fields that may be very instructive to those interested in the art of war, and that may illustrate principles of universal application of such a nature seem to be the exploits of the Emden in the Far East during the first few months of the war.
The Emden was a small German cruiser of 3600 tons displacement, having two masts and three funnels and armed with ten 4.1-inch and eight 5-pounder guns and two submerged torpedo tubes,. Her speed was about 25 knots and her maximum coal capacity goo tons. Thus she does not seem to have been a very formidable or important unit of the great German Navy. Certainly from the standpoint of materiel she presented no unusual features, but her personnel, led by Commander Karl von Muller, commanding, made of the Emden a living force of character, determination, resourcefulness and daring that will cause her to be remembered in the Far East long after many of her more powerful confreres have been forgotten. Doubtless too she will be remembered in the admiralties of several first class naval powers with profound respect, though without bitterness, for she fought a good fight and played the game like an honorable adversary, traits which appeal with particular force to those who go down to the sea in ships, be they enemy, friend or neutral.
The details of hostile operations are usually held in secrecy in so far as the belligerents are able so to hold them, until long after the events, when, of course, the lapse of time has robbed them of much-of their human interest. The Emden has not been the subject of much official information for the public, but her exploits have been of too much interest to too many people for it to be possible to keep them from becoming known. The minor details as herein given may not in every respect be historically correct, but the main points are correct, and the details have been verified as far as possible in the absence of official reports and authoritative pronouncements.
In the early days of August, 1914, when nation after nation was sounding the call to arms and civilization itself seemed appalled by the enormity of the possibilities of the immediate future, the little Emden was in the harbor of Tsingtao in the German leased territory of Kiaochow in the province of Shantung, China. She did not remain there for many days, however, for on August 6 she inaugurated her war career by capturing a Russian volunteer fleet vessel near Quelpart Island. Her prize was sent in to Tsingtao, and it is not definitely known whether the Emden accompanied her or not, but it is probable that she did and she may have been blockaded in that port by the British naval force that appeared off Tsingtao about August 8. This blockade was maintained by the British until August 23, when Japan formally declared war against Germany. Then occurred in the blockade of Tsingtao a hiatus, to which the operation of allies are so prone. The British naval force withdrew on the evening of August 23, while the Japanese force did not arrive until about August 25, the notified blockade of the entire coast of Kiaochow dating from August 27.
It is possible that the Emden took advantage of this hiatus in the blockade to escape, say on August 24, but it is probable that she merely took her prize into Tsingtao, filled her bunkers and got out on the night of August 7. Some of the Emden's crew told a member of the crew of a captured merchantman on September 27 that they had then been at sea 50 days which would make the date of her leaving Tsingtao as above, August 7. The exact time and circumstances of her escape are unknown alike to belligerents and neutrals. Where she went and what she did for the next month is likewise unknown. She probably steamed to some little used part of the South Pacific and there awaited at an appointed rendezvous the arrival of a ship to act as coal and supply depot to accompany her.
It may be noted that Tsingtao was the only German port on the Pacific having any naval facilities, and German ports of any character were few and far between, being located at widely divergent points in the South Sea Islands. Thus the prospect for a small German cruiser at sea in the Pacific did not seem very favorable for accomplishing anything to injure or embarrass her enemies, which by this time included four nations possessing powerful navies—England, Russia Japan and France. On all sides her enemies had ships, naval ports and commercial ports ready and capable of naval use, while the little Emden had only her bunkers full of coal, her speed of 25 knots, her determination to accomplish something, and such facilities as the high seas afforded. Surely the conditions were far from equal, but by following the Emden, in so far as we are able, we shall see how much may be accomplished against apparently insuperable difficulties. The next time the
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THE EMDEN
Emden was heard from she was in the Bay of Bengal, a matter of 4000 miles from Tsingtao even by direct route and in what may be termed the heart of the enemy's sea area. On September 14 the Italian S. S. Loredoro arrived off Calcutta and reported that she had on the previous day been held up by the Emden, and on September 16 the British S. S. Kabinga arrived with the crews of five other British steamers that had been sunk by the Eniden in the Bay of Bengal between September m and 14.
Since there was no German prize court available, the Emden proceeded with her captures as follows: The first ship captured was manned with a prize crew and forced to accompany the Emden. Then when the second capture was made the more valuable of the two captured ships was sunk by a mine or by gun fire, after the crew had been removed to the other vessel or to the Emden. This procedure was followed with each subsequent capture until the captured personnel become too numerous to be accommodated when they were all placed upon the one remaining ship and she was released.
It was reported by the captured crews that the Emden was accompanied by the large armed German S. S. Markomannia loaded with coal and provisions and the Greek collier Pontoporos. Thus she had a movable base with her, and could continue her career so long as her supplies lasted and she was not overhauled by a stronger and faster enemy force.
On September 16 it was learned that the Emden had coaled on the previous day in False Bay (British) about 120 miles from Calcutta. Three British cruisers and three French destroyers were sent in pursuit, a pursuit that proved to be long if not merry. On September 18 the quarry was located—but not by a man-of-war—about 20 miles off the mouth of Rangoon River, she having sunk the day before the British S. S. Clan Matheson. One Japanese cruiser now joined in the chase, which proceeded apace.
Doubling back across the Bay of Bengal the Emden appeared next about a mile off the harbor of Madras at nine o'clock at night on September 22. The Madras light was lighted and working, and the lights of the city were all ablaze. The first intimation to those on' shore that an enemy was near was the turning on of the search-lights of the Emden. Quickly picking up the large oil tanks of the Burma Oil Company she opened fire upon them. A few salvos and they were burning briskly. Firing ceased, search-lights were extinguished and the Emden disappeared into the darkness whence she had come. She had in these few minutes inflicted a damage of more than $100,000.
From Madras she steamed slowly down the coast, appearing off Pondicherry on September 24, having captured and sunk five more British steamers in the meantime. At this stage a British cruiser seems to have been within 5o miles of the Emden, but the latter appeared to be able to determine with fatalistic accuracy alike where enemy merchantmen were and men-of-war were not.
By this time the shipping in the Far East was panic-stricken. Ships were tied up in the harbors from Suez to Singapore and from Japan to Australia. British chambers of commerce were energetically passing resolutions and wildly calling for help. How can it be that one small cruiser, in defiance of the navies of its four enemies and without a friendly port of refuge, can paralyze for weeks the commerce of the East? asked those more familiar with the counting room than with war on the sea. The seas are wide and the Emden was wary and many more ships were to fall victim to her energy ere she finally paid the penalty to her boldness.
About this time, a Russian cruiser joined in the " Emden hunt," but unrestrained the Emden passed out of the Bay of Bengal, around Ceylon, and lay athwart the Aden-Colombo trade route. To the westward of Ceylon up to September 27 she sank five more British steamers and captured a collier with 7000 tons of Welsh coal. Thus she came into possession of sufficient coal to restock her floating base and this she proceeded to do in the Maldive Islands (British), remaining there until October 1. No doubt from any or all of her captures she replenished her store of provisions from time to time, as her needs required.
The latter part of September an armed British merchant vessel was sent to join the chase, and the first week of October saw the searchers increased by two cruisers and three destroyers. The hounds were scattered far and wide, but the hare still maintained a good lead.
During the first two weeks of October the Emden was rumored to be in the Makassar Strait, east of Borneo, at Padang on the Straits of Malakka and southeast of Sumatra, but in reality she seems to have been far away at Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago. There she cleaned her boilers, was heeled over and had her bottom scraped and painted as far as practicable. Then she steamed north again to near the Laccadive Islands. Here from October 15 to 19 she sank five more steamers and a large Tasmanian dredger and captured another large collier. Meanwhile two more Japanese cruisers and one more Russian cruiser joined the searching force.
About the time the Emden left Diego Garcia she seems to have parted company with her tenders, the Markomannia and the Pontoporos. Just why the skillful captain of the Emden permitted himself to be separated from his floating base, is not known. Doubtless the tenders greatly retarded the Emden by their inferior speed and it is probable that the former were sent to the eastward from Diego Garcia to an appointed rendezvous, whither the Emden would proceed after one more stroke at the Aden-Colombo trade route. In any case on October 16 near Sumatra the British cruiser Yarmouth sank the Markomannia with 1500 tons of coal and captured the Pontoporos with 5000. The blow was, of course, a serious one for the Emden, though she still might have continued her career by the aid of captured colliers. The last one captured seems to have been sunk soon after being taken, but the captain of the Emden doubtless relied upon finding his other two colliers at the appointed rendezvous.
Though by now two more Japanese cruisers had joined the hunt, all trace of the Emden was lost for ten days. As to her captures, if any, during that time no information is available but she next made her appearance about 1700 miles from where she had been last reported, and in a manner spectacular enough to please the most jaded imagination.
At early dawn on October 29 the quiet of a sultry summer night still hung over the harbor of Penang (British). The puffing little tugs and launches and the many sampans that give to eastern harbors their appearance of unusual animation, lay moored to the wharves or anchored near by, and sleep still held alike the people ashore and afloat. It was the hour so well known to all sailors at which a lamp is worse than useless, yet without which objects can be seen but dimly. The mist of the tropical morning began to lift from the harbor, slowly rolling up as though it were a curtain being lifted from a mammoth stage whereon some terrible tragedy was soon to be enacted.
Slowly from around the point to the eastward a steamer appeared, indistinct as to details and vague as to characteristics, but to the trained eye clearly a man-of-war. Any naval officer can picture to himself what followed on board the Russian cruiser Jemtchug peacefully lying at anchor in the harbor. Suddenly the quartermaster on watch sings out " Man-of-war standing in from the eastward, sir! " "Make her out," replies the officer of the watch, started from the boredom of the first part of the morning watch. For a moment the quartermaster gazes through his spy glass, and answers "Two-masted cruiser, with four funnels, sir ! " "Very well," comes from the officer of the watch, with an admonition to keep a bright lookout on the incoming cruiser, and report her actions. Doubtless the officer of the watch was momentarily alarmed when the ship was first sighted, but he was quickly reassured, for the only cruisers with four funnels in the waters of the Far East were British and Japanese, both friends. Of course, the ship slowly standing in around the point must be the British cruiser Yarmouth, thought he, or one of the Chikuma class of Japanese cruisers, all known to be in near-by waters. Perhaps he had moments of misgiving, as he thought of the great war being waged and the possible consequences of the visit of a German warship, but the very peace and quiet of the sleeping harbor pronounced such a thing impossible. Should he sound the general alarm and call all hands to their stations, or should he wait a moment to awaken the captain and report? Slowly and with outward calm the stranger stood in for the usual anchorage of the Yarmouth, next the berth of the Jemtchug. Now she has reached a point on the Jemtchug's beam and only about 300 yards away. On the stranger all are tense and alert, while on the Jemtchug sleep still holds the crew and officers—the last sleep for many, the next few moments proved. Suddenly the German ensign fluttered from the stranger's truck, a flash of light rippled along her broadside and a salvo hurled death and destruction into the inert Jemtchug. The tragedy had begun. As those on the Jemtchug sprang from their bunks to the sound of steel crashing through steel, of bursting shell and shrieks of pain, a torpedo sent a quiver throughout the ship as it let loose its energy beneath her. Torn by shell and sundered by torpedo and listing badly, the Jemtchug began to sink at once, but a few more salvos in rapid succession and a second torpedo made assurance doubly sure as the curtain of smoke rolled down where the curtain of mist had so recently lifted. When in turn the curtain of smoke began to lift, only the masts of the Jemtchug were visible above the bloodstained water, as the struggling survivors cried for help, which the now wide-awake harbor promptly gave. Disappearing out the western entrance of the harbor was the instrument of destruction, the Emden, for the stranger was none other than she. With the aid of a dummy funnel and the artistic use of paint and canvas she had succeeded in her disguise as the Yarmouth in the early morning light, and now was rapidly disappearing from view unscathed and undaunted.
The engagement, if engagement it may be called, lasted scarcely a quarter of an hour, but the destruction of the Jemtchug was complete. Her casualties reached the total of one officer and 84 men killed and two officers and 112 men wounded, being approximately 60 per cent of her complement.
As the Emden steamed out of the. harbor she fired on a patrol boat, but only damaged her slightly. Outside she came upon the outer-patrol, the French destroyer Mousquet, and quickly sank her by gun fire. She stopped long enough to pick up the survivors of the Moztsquet, 36 men and officers, and further out stopped a British steamer to which she transferred.them. Then she again disappeared into her habitat, the high sea. Two French destroyers at anchor in Penang harbor quickly raised steam and gave chase, but in vain, for the Emden was not seen again for more than 10 days.
The raid of the Emden into Penang harbor deserves to be rated as a naval classic. Boldness, determination, plan and execution can but win the admiration alike of enemy, friend and neutral. Unquestionably she was favored by the god of luck, for the Jemtchug only entered the harbor the afternoon before, and she might just as well have been the Yarmouth herself. It seems impossible that the Emden could have known in advance just what she would find in the harbor, or whether she would find anything. However favored by luck she may have been, one cannot withhold from the Emden admiration for her boldness and applause for her success. She had added two men-of-war to the long list of her prizes, and once again eluded her pursuers and disappeared into the unknown.
After the Penang raid, two more cruisers, two gunboats, three destroyers and an armed merchant cruiser were added to those exclusively engaged in searching for the Emden. This brought the number so engaged up to 19 all told, and in addition a large force was being used in convoy duty in the Far East, almost entirely on account of the Emden's activities. Surely for one small cruiser she was occupying her share of the attention of her enemies.
Not until November 9 was she again heard of, and again a tropical island was the object of her attention. Alas, all things must come to an end, and the next exploit of the Emden brought to an end her eventful career. At daylight on November 9 she ran in for the harbor on South Keeling Island in the Cocos or Keeling group. She still had her dummy funnel rigged, but its effectiveness as a disguise had vanished with the Penang exploit. The harbor on South Keeling is an important British submarine cable and radio station. As soon as the Emden was sighted, the word was cabled to London, Adelaide, Perth and Singapore, but what was more important, it was flashed into the air by radio that all who could might hear. Of all the ships searching through many weary weeks for the Emden, not one caught the important radio message. This time, however, the god of luck withheld her favors from the Emden and bestowed them elsewhere.
Some general has said that the best strategist is he who can guess best what his enemy is doing, on the other side of a hill, and it may be said that the best commerce destroyer is he who can guess best what is happening below the horizon, captain von Muller's inability to guess what was happening below the horizon was the cause of the loss of the Emden.
Passing near the Cocos Islands was an army expedition from Australia, bound for the Suez Canal and with it, thanks largely to the Emden menace, was a strong naval convoy. The Emden used her radio outfit to the. best of her ability to interfere with the message being sent, but the keen ear of the radio operator on the British cruiser Minotaur caught it just the same. The Minotaur had the power and the desire to engage the Emden, but the speed was lacking. Of *hat use is it for a 23-knot cruiser to pursue one of 25 knots! To another she was forced to pass the honor and glory of placing the Emden among the ships that have been. One of the units of the convoy was the Australian cruiser Sydney. Faster, larger and more powerful than the Emden, she was just the ship- for the job at hand, and away she steamed full speed for South Keeling and the Emden.
Meanwhile the Emden had entered the harbor and immediately landed a party of three officers and 40 men, who proceeded to destroy the radio and cable-stations. The Emden stood back to the harbor entrance to keep watch. Apparently her captain was somewhat worried about the radio message that had been sent, for at 8.45 he steamed in again and recalled his landing force by flag signals and by siren. The party did not respond promptly enough, and at 9.30 the Emden, leaving her landing party behind, headed out at full speed as the Sydney came charging up.
The action began at the harbor entrance at a range of only about 4000 yards. Before she turned to head away, the Emden fired a broadside salvo that injured both fire control stations, on the Sydney and destroyed one of her range finders. Then she, turned and the chase began, and the fight continued bow to stern. The Sydney had 2 knots superiority in speed, and 6-inch guns against the Emden's 4.1-pounders. Slowly the Sydney hauled out and up, and brought her broadside to bear, almost out of range of the Emden's battery. Soon the Emden lost a funnel, and almost immediately thereafter a mast. Then another funnel went by the board, and fire broke out aft. Handicapped by her landing party left ashore, outranged and outstripped by her larger adversary, the Emden ran on the reef at North Keeling. With flag still flying, and burning fiercely, she still continued firing her one available gun, and not until the Sydney had reluctantly fired three more salvos into her, was the flag hauled down on the mass or blackened and twisted steel that had been the Emden. She made a game fight against heavy odds, as is freely admitted by her vanquishers.
The casualties on the Emden, as is usual with the vanquished in a naval action, were enormous, only four officers and about 75 men being saved, and a number of these were wounded. The Sydney was but little damaged, and her casualties amounted only to three killed and 15 wounded.
Among the belligerents hostile to Germany many expressed their personal pleasure that Commander von Muller, the gallant and sportsmanlike commanding officer of the Emden, was among the fortunate survivors. The London Chronicle's naval expert referred to him as "the gallant commander who handled his ship with the skill of an accomplished sea officer and the courtesy of a chivalrous gentleman," and said of him, "He has been an ornament to the sea profession and an honor to the brotherhood of the sea." . . . . The London Daily Telegraph said: "He has shown himself an officer and a gentleman. He has been enterprising, cool, and daring in making war on our shipping, and has revealed a nice sense of humor. He has, moreover, shown every possible consideration to the crews of his prizes The war on the sea will lose something of its piquancy, its humor and its interest now that the Emden has gone." . . . . Truly this is a high tribute from the press of an enemy.
When the landing party from the Emden saw their ship steam out to meet the Sydney, leaving them behind, they at once returned to the cable station. The German flag was hoisted, martial law was proclaimed and it was announced that anyone communicating with an enemy of Germany would be punished in the most drastic manner. A schooner was then seized and provisions sufficient for several months were commandeered. At 6 P. M. the German flag was hoisted at the peak of the schooner and she sailed away on the broad Indian Ocean whence no word of her has come.
Thus came to an end the truly remarkable career of the good ship Emden. Alone, without a friendly harbor in which to obtain rest or refreshment, and sought by many enemies, she kept the high sea for 94 days. Not once did she enter a port, except that of an enemy, and even now her torn and twisted remains lie rusting on a reef of an enemy shore. She occupied the exclusive attention of no less than 19 of her adversaries, and at last fell the victim of the watchfulness and speed of two others. She largely made the convoying of oversea military expeditions necessary in Eastern Seas, and she paralyzed for weeks the sea-borne commerce of a third of the world. She captured or destroyed about 30 enemy merchantmen and two men-of-war, and burned the oil depot at Madras, causing in all a direct monetary loss of more than $25,000,000 and an indirect one incapable of being estimated.
Well done Emden! Against overwhelming odds you did your utmost, and angels can do no more. Even among your foes none could be so ungenerous as to begrudge you your full meed of admiration. May you rest in peace. The principles applicable to the art of war illustrated by the exploits of the Emden are most instructive. First and most prominently one is struck by the influence of a leader's personality in war operations, for who can doubt that the career of the Emden was largely due to the personality of her commanding officer. The difficulties in the way of accomplishing anything of importance by the Emden at the beginning of the war seemed well nigh insuperable. What naval officer at that time would have believed it possible for a small cruiser to keep the sea for more than three months in defiance of the combined exertions of the navies of four other powers? Yet this the Emden did, and made of herself during that time a living force in the war. Her movements were directed by boldness, determination, resourcefulness and good judgment. First she struck near the northern end of the Bay of Bengal, well knowing that her enemies would be searching the regions of German possession in the South Seas and blockading the naval port of Tsingtao. Then, as they dashed
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The Scene of the Emden’s Exploits
for the threatened area, the Emden worked to the southward, out of the large bay and to the westward of Ceylon. Here she tarried only long enough to capture one batch of steamers, for, of course, as soon as she sent in the crews of her captures her whereabouts would become known. What now could she do to throw off her pursuers? Steam away to the southward, far from all important trade routes; remain away long enough for the searchers to satisfy themselves that she was not in the locality of her last activities, and then again strike the same region. This the Emden did, taking advantage of her wait to refit as far as possible. After her second appearance to the westward of Ceylon, she must again throw off the pack. Shall she repeat her tactics, and again strike in the region of her first stroke? Assuredly not, for by now the pack has become too numerous for the restricted area of the Bay of Bengal to be safe, and besides, all enemy merchantmen are safely at anchor in friendly harbors where they are being held indefinitely. So she changes her tactics, and boldly strikes at one of the very bases of her pursuers, far from where she was last reported. Placing the destruction of two of her enemies to her credit, the Emden knows the regions thereabouts are no longer safe for her, so again she leaves the trade routes, with their covering cruisers, and strikes at the cable station on Cocos Island.
The judgment of the Emden's captain was still good, but his luck was now bad. Just as he judged, there was no one of his pursuers near the Cocos Islands. Had all gone well, he could have destroyed the station and escaped in a few hours, long before one of the searching men-of-war could have arrived. Then as they dashed south, by a detour he could have gone north and repeated the game ad lib.
All very simple and easy, provided the leader has the requisite amount of trained judgment, self-confidence, initiative and boldness. Without these it is probable that the war career of the Emden would have been both short and uneventful.
The speed factor in the Emden is one that must not be overlooked.
While she was never sighted at sea by one of her enemies until the day of her destruction, and so did not owe her immunity directly to speed, yet her superior speed did give her the ability to rapidly change the locality of her operations, and thus throw off her pursuers. More than this, her speed largely restricted the number of enemy ships available as searchers, for in order for one of them to accomplish her destruction, except by chance it was necessary not that she be as fast as the Emden but faster.
It is reported that the Emden obtained much of the information that controlled her movements by "listening in" at all hours for radio messages from merchantmen and men-of-war. If this be true, it simply shows that since war is a serious business it should be taken seriously by all hands.
The Emden has been referred to as the modern Alabama, laboring under the additional handicap of a world begirt with cables and dotted with radio stations. Who can say that the depredation of the Alabama lengthened by one day our civil war, or deterred in any way the final success of her enemies? Since wars began there have always been those who would win success by some simple means, as embargoes, non-intercourse, commercial blockade, commerce destroying and the like; but the real masters of war have known that as war is conducted by force, so it must be terminated by the destruction of force. The above may have their minor uses as annoyers and breeders of discontent, but the major operations elsewhere will go on just the same as though they had never been. The present war will be decided solely by the results of the battles in Europe and adjacent waters, and not by the far-flung exploits of a hundred Emdens, however spectacular and interesting they may be.
It is not in any way intended to belittle the truly wonderful exploits of the Emden, or to detract one iota from the glory that is hers, for there can be only admiration for the principles that guided her throughout her war career. Character, resourcefulness, boldness, sound judgment, determination and initiative were hers, and these are the principles that lead to success in other and more fateful fields of naval and military activities.