REAR ADMIRAL BRADLEY A. FISKE, U. S. Navy.—It is to be hoped that every officer in the service will study Mr. Knox's essay, and become fired with the fine spirit it inculcates. In no better way can we train ourselves than by cultivating devotion to the cause we live for. In no better way can we cultivate devotion than by studying the thoughts and emulating the enthusiasm of devoted men. The military professions require a profounder sympathy, and a clearer understanding among their members than other professions do: a sympathy and an understanding that Mr. Knox's essay helps us to attain.
LIEUT. COMMANDER W. P. CRONAN, U. S. Navy.—No more timely, valuable, and useful article could be published than," The Role of Doctrine in Naval Warfare" by Lieut. Commander Knox. The writer is entirely in accord with all the views set forth by Lieut. Commander Knox with his customary clarity of thought and felicity of diction. Whatever I may have to say in connection with his essay cannot be criticism but only an extension of remarks, in so far as the truths expressed have been brought home to me practically in my own experience.
The gist of the meaning of the word "indoctrination," in a military sense, practically applied, depends upon decentralization and delegation of authority, with loyal adherence to plan. Nelson's marked success in this respect was the more remarkable in his day owing to the great conservatism with which authority was hedged and surrounded in the early days of navies. In the old days of the sailing ship, the captain was king and master of his profession in all respects. The tendency was for the captain to hold that there could not possibly be any combatant officer on board his ship who could know more about his profession than the captain. With the advent of steam, the position of the captain in this regard was somewhat modified, although the intrusion of a new corps of officers was viewed with suspicion and distrust, and perhaps jealousy. With the introduction of other mechanical appliances and the gradual disappearance of masts and sails, the days of the "Stick and String" Navy were over, and the most progressive officers have been those who delegated their authority while in command to their specialist subordinates, so that now in the modern battleship we find a degree of efficiency in coordinated control which is, perhaps, not equaled in any other line of human effort.
Of course there are ships and ships, but generally the methods of administration in the navy are uniform for each separate unit, in so far as ships of similar types are concerned.
Ships are organized into divisions, divisions into fleets or flotillas, each division with its own administrative head, subordinate to the commander-in-chief; authority flows down and responsibility up in the navy afloat, with resulting efficiency, in so far as efficiency is attainable within the limitations which restrict further organized effort.
But the resulting efficiency in gunnery, torpedoes, and steaming are of little value to the fleet unless the fleet is properly served by its shore facilities.
There are many well-meaning but misguided persons in our country who sincerely and earnestly believe that the earnest study of the art of war by a properly organized general staff, with the consequent indoctrination of the forces, actually tends toward war. To quote from the author, "there is no more important work in time of peace than thus to lay the foundations for united and enthusiastic action after the outbreak of hostilities and for decisive victory as their conclusion."
An efficient fire-engine company goes into action at the stroke of a bell, prepared in all respects. Can we say that our navy is in a state of equal preparedness and equally efficient in co-ordination of personnel and materiel?
A few days ago a gentleman who is in the moving picture business, and who had been with the fleet for some time making moving pictures, informed me that he had never seen a more efficient organization than the torpedo flotilla of the Atlantic fleet, where he had spent considerable time. He said that he found that all the officers of the torpedo flotilla spoke the same language and all thought alike on all questions pertaining to the efficiency of their ships. He said that in his business he had made an effort to apply the same principles, with marked success, and was surprised and gratified to find a coincidence of opinion obtaining in the navy.
He said that no business could be a success which was not handled in similar fashion, by the conference method, where many minds working toward the accomplishment of the common end were always more successful than the opinions of any one person, however competent that person might be. Such corroboration of the views set forth in this essay, from an outside source, at least tends to show that business men devote care and thought to the organization and control of their business, in order to gain success.
In this connection I have the honor to commend to members of the Institute the reading of the lecture by Captain W. S. Sims, U. S. Navy, commanding the torpedo flotilla, Atlantic fleet,' which was delivered by that officer at the War College during the summer of 1914, on "Naval War College Principles and Methods Applied Afloat," and which appears in this number.
It would not be proper to quote the exact figures, but the marked improvement in the efficiency of the torpedoes of the Atlantic torpedo flotilla, as shown by results at target practice, speaks for itself as to the success of coordination and indoctrination in a material matter; but the improvement in spirit, mutual understanding and devotion to the common cause which has been the result of indoctrination by conferences of commanding officers in
the flotilla cannot be expressed in figures and is of far greater worth than any materiel improvement, for materiel success is always a function of the efficiency of personnel. We learned this in gunnery.
The vast improvement in gunnery which resulted in proper understanding of this important principle was astounding to the uninitiated and was achieved only after overturning the inertia of the Navy Department at that time. There are many of us who remember that the principles which we now regard as basic truths in gunnery were then looked upon as rank heresy by those who could not or would not learn anything new. As soon, however, as the true relations of personnel and materiel were brought to light and the acknowledgment of this truth became evident by the improved scores in gunnery, similar improvement by similar methods was indicated and successfully attained in steaming competitions. Improvement of material followed in the wake of increased knowledge of material and skill in its use.
The torpedo has followed the gun in its development; but the co-ordination of all materiel factors in the instrument in our charge towards the accomplishment of its ultimate purpose, is the task that is before us, and its solution is to be found only in proper indoctrination and unity of effort.
The navy at present, as a whole, lacks the necessary machinery, properly organized, to gain efficiency by decentralization and delegation of authority. This is a question of national policy.
Without such machinery, however, we might say that the service cannot properly be indoctrinated in the art of war, skill in which art cannot come of itself or by individual effort any more than skill can be gained in playing the violin without tutelage and study. But, in the case of gunnery, steaming, and torpedoes, the truth was finally made evident and attained, for truth seeks the light.
The great truth now before us has always been before us in a nebulous state—the necessity for the proper co-ordination of all the materiel factors of the navy with a skilled personnel. With us of the navy this is not only a matter of life and death or of the honor of the service, but the protection of our country which we serve. Our education has taught us certain facts. It becomes our duty to make these facts clear in order that our country may be properly served.
CAPTAIN F. K. HILL, U. S. Navy.—The article on Doctrine is an interesting and timely contribution.
When we think of our many weaknesses, we are apt to be pessimistic but, if we will only look back 15 years or so we will all be inclined to become optimistic.
Our strides in advance have been enormous, and better-considered improvements are made each year.
We are not content with what we have, and yet it is far better than what we had.
Naturally, our first efforts were largely for the improvement of our materiel; but now we are realizing that we must take a broader view and that we must look to organization and to the best use of materiel and personnel to attain efficiency in the fleet. It is a good sign when all are not content to let well enough alone and some are striving to throw light into the dark corners.
Mr. Knox's article is not only a powerful searchlight penetrating to the foundations of our naval establishment; but also, what is finer, it shows us how to strengthen them.
COMMANDER RALPH EARL, U. S. Navy.—In the early pages of this essay reference is made to the fact that each officer should have previously acquired a spirit of intense loyalty to the plans of his superiors. This loyalty is the requisite the most needful and the one that will most certainly insure our navy being successful in all its duties. Loyalty is the whole thing in any organization from the smallest to the greatest unit. Unquestioning loyalty is required of us all and to all our seniors, however wrong we may believe their actions or plans to be or how little we may understand their _aims and ideals, and this adherence to seniors by their juniors must give them a confidence in themselves and their ability, that will make their efforts more ambitious and more successful, and without which great undertakings would fail or would not be commenced. One of the most pathetic of the historical instances in this connection is perhaps the frustration of Napolon's carefully planned invasion of England from Boulogne in 1805 through Vice Admiral Villeneuve's lack of absolute co-operation in his plans, and we know that this lack of obedience to orders was induced in Villeneuve directly because of his knowledge and self-consciousness of the utter lack of loyalty and trust in him that existed in the combined allied fleet.
I believe that without loyalty the "much deeper and more comprehensive understanding" necessary before an organization can act efficiently, is unattainable and that therefore all of us in the service should school ourselves to be always " aye ! aye!" sailors. Even if we do not understand the motives or actions of our seniors we must consider that their plans are best and that even unexpressed insubordination must not exist. Passive disobedience or the yielding of only such obedience as one may consider requisite to avoid trouble is a sin that we all wish could never exist, yet I fear it sometimes does in all organizations.
The German Army owes its indoctrination largely to the fact that in 48 years there have been but three chiefs of staff. A permanency similar to that in at least one high office in the service would be surely conducive of good actual results. Should not the term of the newly created Chief of Naval Operations be made eight to twelve years instead of but four as a start in the right direction? A continuous policy cannot be all wrong and must in the end prove superior to numberless different policies, some good and some bad, but all of short duration.
For our indoctrination we look to our Naval War College with confidence, and we must all agree that great advances have been made in this direction through its agency in the past decade. The author's suggestions relative to the further spread of this indoctrination must meet with everyone's approval, and we all realize that the War College by its correspondence course has started us not only to thinking but to think in similar ways, thus spreading a beginning of indoctrination which we all hope may continue and spread with ever increasing influence throughout the service.
Loyalty requires us all to thrust our personal ambitions to one side, and give our honest opinions and advice to our seniors when it is requested, no matter what the result may be on our own careers, and then afterwards, even though the decision is against our judgment, strive to co-operate with our seniors to the utmost extent, thinking no more of our self interest, but only of the navy's welfare, and thus we will prove that our navy is loyal to the trust reposed in it by the nation, and our true indoctrination for war will be easily acquired.
COMMANDER C. L. HUSSEY, U. S. Navy.—Lieut. Commander Knox is to be congratulated upon successfully focussing the attention of the service upon the evil done by conflicting counsel, especially by those high in authority.
2. The value placed by officers on the various factors that enter into naval efficiency is largely affected by their practical working knowledge founded upon individual professional experience and study which is of a widely diverse character that becomes more varied with length of service. To this may be attributed much of the conflicting counsel and lack of unity of opinion in regard to matters of the highest importance, not only of advice but in administration and command.
3. The establishment of a conception of war and a doctrine of naval warfare would undoubtedly prove an effective remedy for our most serious troubles. The way in which the essayist proposes to accomplish this through a "reflective body of officers" is not entirely clear. Such a reflective body must be a continuing body, having a well-defined status, with the highest authority behind it, and the collective mind of the service to assist in the gigantic task, compared to which the elevation of gunnery to a high state of efficiency was a relatively easy matter. Obviously what is needed is a General Staff; lacking one what may be made use of as a substitute?
4. Fortunately Congress has now wisely provided us with a Chief of Naval Operations charged with the operations of the fleet and the preparation of war plans. He has the legal status to accomplish much of the work that would fall to the Chief of the General Staff, and, furthermore, he has the nucleus of a substitute for a General Staff already provided in the General Board, the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Naval War College. Then, too, the fleet is at his disposal for the practical testing of his plans. The means are ready for the directive force that has been wanting but is now provided.
5. The manifest reason for the creation of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations was not only for the preparation of war plans but for the better preparation for war in all respects. It is through these activities that a remedy for existing conditions must be sought. The war plan should be founded upon a proper conception of war based upon not only correct principles but also correct estimates of personnel and materiel available, or that should be available, and the proper employment of the same.
6. The "Tentative War Portfolio" proposed by Commander Schofield and the "Organization for the Command and Administration of the Navy" proposed by Commander Stirling as the result of protracted studies made at the Naval War College in 1912, may be taken as a basis for war plans and the organization that may be expected to produce the plans and prepare the navy for war in accordance therewith. Whatever may be the organization adopted it should be presented to the service so as to clearly show the "authority down and responsibility up" for every branch of naval activity, and all naval activities should have a recognized bearing on preparation for war. Continuity of effort must be ensured by having all these activities highly organized and thoroughly systematized. It is believed that all this may be done without encroaching upon any existing vested authority, except that the Chief of Naval Operations must be recognized as the one principal military adviser to higher authority on important matters of policy.
7. The broader phases of war plans—their dependence upon national policies, as distinguished from strictly naval policies, and their intimate relation to certain activities of other branches of the federal government, particularly the State, War and Treasury Departments—must receive due consideration. Provision must be made for co-operation with those departments and for keeping in touch with the President and Congress. This all-important sphere of activity, involving familiarity with changing conditions affecting policies outside as well as inside the Navy Department, should be dealt with only by duly appointed officers of experience, who should arrange for obtaining the information and co-operation necessary for the drafting of the naval war plans and for putting the joint plans into execution.
8. Provision should be made not only for current development but also for continuance of the work. This requires systematic education and training of officers throughout their career. Self interest and personal advantage must be employed in promoting systematic self preparation. A course of reading, and such other individual work as may be prescribed, as one of the professional requirements for promotion appears a practical and effective way of securing results. Such a- course of self-training, drawn up with care for each grade, and modified periodically as may seem expedient, will not only direct the service thought and opinion in a general way, but it will be a valuable preparation for further training at the Naval War College, which may be more advanced and progressive than is practicable now.
9. Existing evils are the natural result of the conditions that have prevailed. The natural remedy should be applied. As already indicated, this is believed to be well-directed, systematized effort in every branch of the service in which "the collective mind of the service" is utilized, but with special reference to their respective assigned individual duties. This will be most conducive to preparation for war including the war plans which should be advanced with all the energy and ability that the service now possesses. A satisfactory war plan involves a proper conception of war; and doctrine will follow as a natural evolution through the testing of the plan and preparing for war in accordance therewith.
COMMANDER C. T. VOGELGESANG, U. S. Navy.—In the minds of many, military doctrine savors of the academic and is dangerous.
This paper demonstrates clearly how extremely practical doctrine is, both in its conception and in its application, and how essential it is to the furtherance of efficiency In every phase of the navy's, activities.
Doctrine misconceived or born of ignorance is, of course, dangerous, far more dangerous than is no doctrine—so is philanthropy, so is legislation, so is any human activity.
But the doctrine that the author has reference to here is that based fundamentally on knowledge, on a true conception of war. Without that knowledge there will be either no doctrine or bad doctrine.
The author in his closing paragraph strikes the keynote of our present greatest need when he says, ". What we need first of all is a conception of war."
We must learn to think in terms of war; we must subject all our professional activities to a test in the crucible of war. We must never cease, in times of peace, in our efforts to become skilled practitioners in the laboratory of war. The besetting sin of our service is that we have failed to comprehend the magnitude of the task that our profession entails. We have almost completely neglected the main essential—to study war that we may gain a true conception of war—in the pursuit of knowledge of essential but less important details of our profession. The following is an extract from an official paper submitted by me to the department in 1912.
We have subordinated the science of war to the science of material. The result is that we have no educated school of thought, no doctrine crystallized from knowledge that should make us competent to render a sound military decision upon matters affecting general naval policy, strategy, and tactics, in which matters the line officer should aim to become an expert.
There are opinions galore, but the very diversity of those opinions in itself denotes that there is wanting trained judgment resulting from well digested knowledge.
To think in terms of war, we must know war. We can know war if we recognize it as the aim and object of the existence of a purely military profession, and set out at once to gain that knowledge which is accessible to us in the history of past wars. With that as a foundation we are prepared for intelligent deliberation and will ultimately approach a true conception.
The author has well said: "The task of creating a conception of naval war necessarily involves profound and exhaustive study and analysis of naval campaigns, followed by closely reasoned constructive work."
This paper indicates a very vigorous and healthy development of naval thought; and, whatever the source of inspiration, the service cannot but recognize that a notable progress in clear thinking and courageous exposition has been made that points the way to real efficiency.
With no intent to criticise adversely and only with a view to contributing to the discussion, I beg to submit to the author of this excellent paper a definition of Concrete Doctrine and of Common Doctrine:
Concrete military doctrine is that residuum of sound military principles derived from knowledge of the conduct of war, tested and proved in practice in accordance with a sound conception of war.
Common doctrine, in a military sense, is concrete military doctrine, diffused, understood, and accepted throughout a military service as the fundamental basis of military thought and practice; as a "guide to the application of mutually accepted principles."
CAPTAIN ROY SMITH, U. S. Navy.—No subject could be more timely, and the convincing and non-controversial character of its discussion is a model to be commended.
The main obstacle in the way of inculcating doctrine, that we are lacking in central direction, is set forth with clearness, but withal tactfully. This defect, fortunately, is in process of being remedied.
The nation has policies. Each policy may require the use of its armed forces—under what conditions, and with what appropriate action? These are questions for the Chief of Naval Operations, the General Board, and the War College.
The general plans once formulated, the operations of the fleet will be directed in the channel of training that will further the plans. This will ensure a consistent, progressive employment of the fleet, and always in the desired direction. It will not depend on any one individual, but on the continuity of the Office of Chief of Operations.
The grand strategy and tactics once determined, the methods of minor tactics, drill regulations, and the rest will follow. But the policy with regard to each will be consecutive and continuous, for each will be under a section of the Office of Operations in which all the information and experience relating to that subdivision will be kept tabulated and indexed. As an example, the Office of Target Practice would be one such section.
So much for building up from foundation principles; that is, from bedrock.
As for the rest, we must rely on practice alone. Genius is rare. Most minds operate safely only from habit. Habits are formed by daily experience. There is no other way.
We are all tempted to write down our experiences for the benefit of others. No use. The experiences will not be felt and appreciated unless they are experienced personally. The fleet and the War College can draw up and publish, for instance, plans for various tactical movements. Officers may study these plans and understand them at the time, but the chances are they will forget them when the time comes to use them, unless—and here is the whole point—they have come to know them, more or less as second nature, by practice on the maneuver board or in the fleet. Thus is produced real "doctrine."
The War College and the fleet are co-operating more and more all the time. But while they co-operate, they cannot very well do each other's work. The college certainly cannot do the fleet's work. Can the fleet do any of the college's work?
One goes to the War College to study quietly the principles of war. It needs steady, consecutive application and wide reading. Little progress in this direction can be made by officers of the fleet who have had no previous War College experience. It is not an economical expenditure of time for them to try and work out War College problems. Their work connected with the ship keeps them fully occupied. They can take up the other work more profitably when they go to the War College. The advance in both directions is greater if their efforts are concentrated on one or the other in succession.
The case is different with the officers who have been to the college; that is, in general, the older officers of the ship. It is certainly beneficial to them to work out the problems set the fleet on the maneuver board, or in any other way.
As to the War College course, it has always been the policy to send there a few younger officers whose inclinations lie in that direction, to get a preliminary idea of the subject and to prepare themselves in a measure for work that will ordinarily come much later in their career; but the course is primarily for officers in the grades of lieutenant commander, commander, and captain. Probably every officer should go there once as a lieutenant commander or a commander, and once as a captain. Assuming the course to be a year, with present numbers and length of service in the grades, there should be at the college at all times, either taking the course or as members of the staff, about nine captains and 18 commanders and lieutenant commanders, or 27 of the above grades, besides flag officers and lieutenants. The present number is 21, which is a fair proportion of the theoretical number. It is apparent that much good work can be done by such a force, both at the college itself and afterwards in the fleet.
The most important requisite in fleet training is permanency of the personnel. A well-trained crew is worth a battleship. It goes without saying that the complements should be kept full and officers and men should be kept together for a cruise. If we have enough officers and men this can be done. If we have not enough, and there is no way to get any more, it is probably better for the sake of the great gain to be expected, to put a few ships out of commission and then train the rest to the highest point of excellence.
Finally, as the essayist has so well pointed out, the first thing is to know in general our object; the next is to go after it steadily. If we wish to play golf, we do not study books of rules, at least not immoderately, but we go to a golf course and after some preliminary instruction we play golf, every day if possible, and in course of time the average man can play a fair game. Something similar is the true policy in the fleet, and it is safe to say that no one knows this better than the commander-in-chief and that he will carry it out as far as in him lies.
COMMANDER F. B. UPHAM, U. S. Navy.—The prize essay leaves little room for discussion unless it be in the nature of an effort to point out means for acquiring a conception of war. The author mentions a general staff as one means. I would add, as being equally effective, promotion to flag rank by selection only, assuming a satisfactory method of selection.
As a rule, we reach flag rank so late as to pass on to the retired list too soon after acquiring experience in high command for that experience to become available to the service through a period of years in which to impress upon the fleet a conception of war.
Therefore, let the five senior rear admirals (or any five designated by law) compose a board to select annually, from, among all the captains, those for promotion, basing their findings upon merit alone, and having in view the best interests of the service. Let their proceedings and votes be confidential, and let us require the votes of .f our of them to select a captain for promotion. This method of selection, and this legal composition of the board, should eliminate fear of favoritism.
It is conceivable that rear admirals would be most particular in making selections, since only by selecting the most promising material would they obtain the best for high command under themselves and preserve the high standard of their own grade. It is conceivable, also, that this method of promotion to flag rank would serve as a mighty incentive to all officers of all grades.
By such selection the service should acquire the best material for flag rank and should have as captains in the fleet the better men in such as would be striving, by study and application, to attain selection up.
It would bring to flag rank able officers far enough in advance of retirement to afford them experience in high command; and their retention in command, to the great benefit of the service, would be possible.
These officers should be retained in command for so long a time in prospect as to feel that hostilities might overtake us even while they command the destinies of the fleet, so far as may be humanly done.
CAPTAIN RIDLEY MCLEAN, U. S. Navy.—The fact that I have the honor to occupy a position on the Board of Control of the Naval Institute, which voted the gold medal to this essay, is sufficient evidence, were evidence necessary, of my opinion of it. To my mind, the truth so clearly set forth in this essay is of such underlying importance in our naval training that, in addition to my commendation as indicated by my vote, I cannot refrain from commending this essay in special terms.
I have neither the temerity nor the ability to enter into a discussion of the paper in an endeavor to more clearly portray the importance of "doctrine" in naval warfare. All that I can do is very heartily to approve and to commend, and to congratulate the essayist upon his timely and able presentation of this not generally understood subject.
I cannot but attribute this essay to the effects of work at the War College. This institution, like the Church during the Middle Ages, has for Tatty years kept alive the spark of higher professional thought and education along the lines covered by the essayist. Aside from the very high merit of this essay, both from a professional and literary standpoint, the mere fact that naval thought has produced an essay of this nature, and that it has been awarded the gold medal among a large number of competitors, is most encouraging in indicating the trend of naval thought toward subjects of fundamental importance in warfare, as distinguished from details of routine and administration.