The writer realizes that this subject is as old as the hills, and that it has been presented to the service via the "War College in a very thorough way by the officers there stationed, who can and do devote a larger amount of time to the subject than is possible for those elsewhere, but he also deems that not enough importance is given to the need of scouts in our navy programs, even in those submitted by our general board from year to year, and so is not adverse to reviving the discussion.
Since 1904 the general board has recommended altogether a total of 34 scouts, the department has recommended 14, and Congress has granted three. From 1908 to 1912 the general board has consistently recommended a program of four battleships, four scouts, 16 destroyers, during which period one gunboat also was recommended. In 1913 and 1914 no scouts were advocated; but instead two gunboats were included each year. As will be referred to later on, scouts of the proper type are excellently adapted for carrying on practically all the gunboat duty and hence we certainly now have a sufficient number of gunboats suitable for doing any work that the scout cruisers cannot perform.
However, in the recommendations for new construction before the 63d Congress in the fall of 1914, we find the general board states that the fleet is peculiarly lacking in naval scouts " so necessary for information in a naval campaign, and of such great value in clearing the sea of torpedo and mining craft, in opening and protecting routes of trade for our own commerce, and in closing and prohibiting such routes to the commerce of the enemy," and that they recommended four scout cruisers as this branch of the fleet " has been too long neglected."
Many incidents in history plainly point out that naval commanders have dire need of information before they can hope to successfully injure an enemy's sea power, and their only means of securing such intelligence is by the utilization of vessels specially designed and adapted for naval scouts. While it is no doubt true that in battle we may not have to make use of our scouts as Nelson did of his frigates at Trafalgar—" ranged along the two lines, to repeat signals and assist crippled ships, were the British frigates and small craft "—nevertheless it does not require much imagination to picture a situation such that a similar use of our naval scouts—when we obtain them—will be valuable and will bear a great weight in the obtaining of a favorable issue of the battle.
A few maxims as to why we need scouts followed by a few historical instances of their value are in place at this point. Those of us who have only played at war, as in chart maneuvers at the college, admit that the delay and uncertainty of the transmission of intelligence from one point to another at sea is the greatest bar to our offensive enterprises.
"Armies pass through countries more or less inhabited by a stationary population, and they leave behind them traces of their march. Fleets move through a desert over which wanderers flit, but where they do not remain; and, as the waters close behind them, an occasional waif from the decks may indicate their passage, but tells nothing of their course. The sail spoken by the pursuer may know nothing of the pursued, which yet passed the point of parley but a few days or hours before."1 "This difficulty of obtaining information at sea is apparent to all and in the game of hide-and-seek the advantage is with the sought, and thus the greatest importance accrues to the watch of the outlets of an enemy's country and stopping the chase before it gets away into the silent desert of the high sea. If such a watch is impossible the next best thing is, not attempting to watch routes which may not be taken, to get first to the enemy's destination and await him there, but then this knowledge of his intentions may not always be obtainable.”2
Divisions of the French fleet did escape from time to time (luring the War of 1778 due to stress of weather and consequent
1 Rear Admiral Mahan, U. S. N., in a Discussion of the War of 1778.
2 Mahan's Influence of Sea Power on History.
absence of the blockading fleet, but the frigates always caught sight of and reported them, thus proving that frigates have an enormous strategical importance.
Nelson keeping his lookout ships off Toulon under Pellew claimed the port was not blockaded but the reverse, because he wished the enemy to come out provided he could watch their movements. His frigates would sight them, pass the signal from frigate to frigate until the main fleet was reached, and then the latter would be able to bring on the engagement. The campaign of 1798, despite its brilliant ending at the Nile, is a case where failure nearly ensued, owing to the English having no force before Toulon when the French expedition sailed, and this was solely due to Nelson's being insufficiently supplied with frigates, for the lack of which he failed to secure the proper information.
The French defeat at Trafalgar was rendered possible by Villeneuve's lack of information of his enemy's force and location on his returning from the West Indies. This incident is perhaps not so well known as others and it therefore is here given more at length. The plan of the French was to effect a junction off Cape Ortegal with the squadron from Rochefort and then push on up the channel to cover Napoleon's invasion of England from Boulogne, Nelson then being a full week behind Villeneuve and headed for the straits. This plan failed, for, because of the lack of fast frigates, Villeneuve despatched but one, the Didon, which, forgetting its real mission, engaged and was captured by the Phcrnix, thereby causing an absolute failure in the plans of campaign, and in consequence of this Napoleon's carefully planned invasion of England had to be' abandoned.
Before the battle of Trafalgar the Euryalus, the British frigate nearest to Cadiz, signalled the getting under way of the Allied fleet at 7.20 the morning before Trafalgar, and this news repeated from ship to ship of the chain reached Nelson 5o miles away in the Victory at 9.20, but two hours later. With the modern radio chain of scout cruisers replacing this flag signal chain of frigates, methods of obtaining information have improved faster than the speed and free movement of fleets.
Lack of information caused the surprise of Commodore Johnstone in Porto Praya harbor (1781), and the defeat of his object in life by the resolute action of Suffren, who in thus taking the English by surprise accomplished his mission even with his inferior force.
Lying in wait is hazardous and trying even when you know the point of arrival of the fleet, as is evidenced by Rodney's failures (1780 and 1782) to intercept the French convoys to Martinique. The reason again was the insufficient number of frigates.
Our failure in the Spanish War to locate Cervera before he entered Santiago was due to two causes, the primary one being the lack of scouts under the control of the commander-in-chief, while the secondary cause undoubtedly related to our lack of ability to use intelligently what we did have.
The success of the battle of Tsushima can be attributed in no small degree to the efficient work of Togo's few scouts under Admiral Dewa, whose converted cruiser Shinano Marie sighted the Russian Dneiper at 2.45 a. m. on May 27.
Von Spee seeking to acquire the English coaling station in the Falkland Islands saw, over the low neck of land forming the southern shore of Port Stanley harbor, but the one lone battleship lying there and therefore decided to risk an action. If he had had one modern scout with him, would he have been caught in the trap? We can but think that he certainly would not.
Thus history records many successes and failures of sea commanders due quite directly to the presence or absence of scouts.
Peace maneuvers repeat the lessens of history wherever a strategical problem is involved, as witness the failure of the English fleet in the 1913 maneuvers to prevent a raiding force descending upon their east coast towns. In just the preliminary search problem of our Atlantic fleet in January, 1915, two inferior forces were able to unite before either could be crushed by a fast powerful division operating with destroyers as scouts. A heavy sea obliged the destroyers, even though they were of our most recent 1000-ton class, to seek shelter for safety, thus abandoning the search in weather in which the battleships were having no difficulty in making 20 knots.
What is the proper designation for a vessel used for scouting? Early in 1913 the English Admiralty standardized their naval nomenclature by dividing their cruisers into three classes—battle cruisers, cruisers, and light cruisers. The class known as cruisers includes the armored and protected first class cruisers, which subdivision in our service would include cruisers of 8000 tons or above. Light cruisers include the others, exclusive of gunboats, and the name of "light cruiser" appeals to me as most appropriate, for a scout is more than a scout, doing the scout, the cruiser, and the gunboat work of peace and of war.
A scout cruiser, or using the better title suggested, a light cruiser, is not alone of value only as a scout but has a many sided role to play both in war and in peace. As part of a screen they protect the main battle fleet from hostile destroyers and thus preserve them for the main action. Professor Corbett says that not only is the screen of more importance than ever before in warfare, but that the light cruiser, in addition to being the eyes of the fleet, is just as important as a blindfolder of the enemy's eyes.
Reading Captain Labre's article3 in the U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, No. 153, I placed myself in my mind's eye as in command of our main—and only—battle fleet and endeavored to find for myself a method of procedure of adoption to solve his tersely put problems of strategy, and I still find myself groping in the dark and hopelessly handicapped for the complete lack of one essential fighting arm, scouts. As a practical case let us consider our fleet as the weaker awaiting the enemy on our own coast, we must take the offensive against him with such support as the coast affords, and we find that we must include among our operations the following:
(a) Send cruiser flotillas to harass and injure the approaching enemy while he is still at a distance from the coast.
(b) Employ our information service at long distance in order to learn of the approach and position of the enemy's attacking fleet and of its strength, composition.
(c) To hinder the enemy from gaining an advanced base, harass and fight his scouts and screen.
(d) To make night attack on enemy main fleet or engage it by day.
(e) Attack his reserves and convoyed train.
(f) To pursue predatory activities that will injure his commerce and communications while protecting our own.
How can we properly perform any of the missions above outlined without scouts of great speed, large cruising radius, and proper armament?
3 Strategic Problems and Their Solution.
Battle-cruisers, the ideal scouts and offensive screen, are probably outside the question for this country on account of their great cost and the folly of building less than a homogeneous division of five, hence we must content ourselves with the best type of light cruisers that can be obtained. Battle-cruisers would best carry out the mission noted as (a). The light cruisers will seek out the enemy and permit our destroyers to act to the best advantage in reducing his daylight strength. In speaking of this destroyer attack so fatal to morale even if only partially successful one student says: "The attack can only be avoided by successful screening. An attack can only reach home as the result of successful scouting.”4 No true offensive screening can be successful except it is performed by battle-cruisers, as the requisite sought for in this operation is the destruction of the enemy's scouting force. To carry out (b), the light cruisers are requisite, and upon their successful performance may depend the fate of the nation's fleet. In order to properly prepare for the action we must have accurate information of the strength and formation of the enemy's fleet, and inasmuch as we desire definite information of our enemy so does that enemy require it of us, and our light cruisers will be used to protect our main fleet from the enemy's observation and will prevent the surprising of our own fleet. Light cruisers are very potent in locating and annoying an enemy train, convoy, or an expedition sent out to seize an advanced base, and conversely our navy has to intercept and overcome any, convoyed force before a port suitable for a base could be secured and made defensible. It is impossible to determine in advance the objective point of attack of an enemy. The attacking and sinking of enemy transports under convoy is often of vital importance. The destruction of an enemy's train may defeat a whole campaign solely because the logistics of the enemy then become hopelessly confused. The mere obtaining of information is a very difficult problem, and the game board shows the little sea area that even the fastest scout can cover in the very best of weather, and what a mess a little fog makes even in that amount I The more one studies scouting the more one realizes that it is an art, and not only is it one not easily acquired, but it is one that requires actual sea experience to become proficient in, and this no matter how hard one may study supposititious cases and endeavor
4 Lieutenant Commander W. S. Pye.
to acquire the quick decision and good judgment necessary to a scout commander.
Blockading is evidently as necessary now as formerly because the destination of an enemy's squadron is never known, but only its presence in a port so long as a blockade is kept. It is of the greatest moment to intercept an oversea expedition because it may be and probably is impossible to know at which point or at which two points the enemy aims. The enemy proceeds with full knowledge direct to his aim, if he can deceive us. The blockading thus, a military blockade purely, becomes the more difficult if the expedition is being assembled in two ports, and will require more vessels of the one class, light cruisers. The principle of the open blockade now seems to have forced its recognition upon the world, the main factor in thus forcing it having been the ability of submarines to keep the sea and thus render the close blockade an extremely hazardous undertaking without commensurate gain. The close blockade has always been the weakest and least desirable form of war, it requiring a much greater force than any other operation, and with such severe wear and tear on men and ships engaged in the same that at least one-fifth of the force should be refitting in port all the time. An open blockade requires a watch of the sea area included in the blockade by fast sea-keeping vessels, and again only one class is fit for this duty and that is the high speed light cruiser, the employment of such vessels permitting the main battle fleet to be held at some position on interior lines where it is free from the task of watching, secure in the feeling that its light cruisers will give it a warning in sufficient season to enable it to fulfill its destiny by destroying the enemy fleet thus gaining the mastery of the sea, and being the better able so to do because of this period in which to prepare without the strain of watching and sea keeping.
Such cruisers also are required on our trade routes in large numbers, as we see that privateering, presumably abolished by the Declaration of Paris of 1856, was in effect subtilely revived by the Peace Conference of 19o7. The utility of such predatory activities to injure the enemy's commerce and to protect our own is very great. A review of the past eight months of European War proves that the light cruiser of high speed has proved its value
on all the seas, as witness the successful German commerce destroying work, and the fine work of the British Undaunted and Arethusa, the former being credited with the sinking of four German destroyers in one morning in a running fight. It is chiefly speed which has enabled the German light cruisers to achieve the amount of success placed to their credit.
Merchant ship reserves, if we had such, might permit us to delay urging the construction of scouts, as they form another element of defence in time of danger, perhaps as effective as any other available to wise and liberal statesmanship, and such means would be at hand if we had lines of ocean-going steamers of high speed able to keep the sea for long periods of time. Any of the ships could be converted quickly into a ship of war. A comparatively small force of this kind, appropriately armed and let loose
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“KARLSRUHE," FROM A PRIZE, FALL OF 1914
on the ocean under the command of bold and intelligent officers, would be a dangerous foe to the commerce of any country.
Destroyers in no wise make up for our deficiency in scouts, and furthermore they have another and distinctive role in battle and cannot be diverted therefrom without grave consequences. In the January, 1915, maneuvers, as mentioned previously, an attempt to use them as scouts failed utterly because, among other limitations, they could make but little over 10 knots in the moderate sea then running. Off Tampico in 1914 it was proven that though they have a large steaming radius their personnel cannot endure the discomfort due to rolling and the hardships of duty in the open spa very long, and that the destroyer with its lack of provision capacity added to the above defects cannot be made to take the place of a scout. Of the unfitness of a destroyer for the duty of a scout the Outlook recently has this to say, all of which is accurate: "In order properly to serve the fleet to which it is attached a scout must be able to keep going in all weathers. Destroyers are not designed with an eye to seaworthiness and consequently in rough weather they are not able to perform their duties as scouts. Three years ago, while attempting to perform scout duty during the fleet maneuvers, several destroyers were nearly lost, and maneuvers were abandoned because of the weather. The same thing has again occurred very recently; and the destroyer scouts were given permission to seek shelter.5 This statement is a proof that the people of the country are evincing an interest in the type and efficiency of the units of our navy.
Thus the navy to-day finds itself in practically the same condition as in the Spanish War as to its preparedness with scouts for use with the battle fleet. Then we had five, and these tailed to locate the squadron of Admiral Cervera. Tactical study proves that his squadron would have been located without fail by even these few scouts could they have been properly utilized, and the result of a successful search would have been the destruction of this squadron before it had reached port and in consequence of this the costly expedition to Santiago would have been unnecessary.
Should we not wake up to our need now and urge the provision of scouts above all other types until we have a real scouting force? The force of ships required to carry out a policy of a country must be well balanced as well as sufficient. Is not, as we consider the problems that will arise, our fleet now greatly deficient in its light cruisers and destroyers even so much so as to impair the probability of successful action of our squadrons of capital ships?
Place any one of us in the command of our main fleet and let us imagine what would become of our attempt to seek the enemy fleet and destroy it. Such groping in the dark would wear us utterly out with nothing gained. Work at strategical games convinces us that to conduct a naval war successfully without scouts will require more luck than brains or foresight. These games usually prove that it would be only due to good fortune if our battle fleet should meet and destroy an over-sea expedition landing on our coast, and that, in our present lack of light cruisers, no amount of good management could change this factor of luck to the factor of skill.
5 Outlook, April 3, 1913.
That English naval officers now consider the need of scouts to be axiomatic is illustrated in the statement from the Admiralty (March, 1915) which announces the main features of six new battle-cruisers and adds "they will, of course, all have their proper complement of light cruisers and destroyers." In speaking of the need for these light cruisers an English admiral not long ago stirred the Admiralty to action: " No guns, heavy or light, will protect a battle fleet from torpedo attack at night. The only effective method of protection is to employ a large number of small cruisers to clear a wide area about the battle fleet at sundown." . . . . "The small cruiser force must be disposed so that they form a protecting screen distant 120 to 140 miles on all sides from the battle squadron. By no other means is it possible to move a battle squadron at night without risking its destruction by the attack of torpedo craft."6
For making a close approach in the daytime without being seen submarines are efficient, provided the fleet is at anchor or cruising at a low speed and is not protected by a screen of auxiliaries or destroyers. This approach can be made to within 3000 yards in clear weather, but in hazy weather or in a sea that has white caps this is decreased to 1500 yards, and if cruisers and pickets are distracted by a destroyer feint 1000 yards may be possible. To remove this source of danger, the light cruiser becomes a necessity. It is noticeable that the success of the German offensive by means of submarines has not continued, and the assigned reason is that England now having learnt a severe lesson in her losses of big ships keeps her light cruisers guarding her battleships in the manner pointed out by Lord Charles Beresford and thus saves both types from further damage by submarines.
Reasoning from the foregoing I believe we should begin the construction of light cruisers in real numbers at once; as did England in 1912 and 1913, when startled by Admiral Beresford's7 warning, she laid down eight light cruisers of the Arethusa class each year, although she had laid down but three light cruisers in each of the two preceding years. England's light armored cruisers "will be the smallest, cheapest, and fastest vessels, protected by vertical armor, ever projected for the British Navy. They are designed for attendance on the battle fleet, to be its eyes and ears
6 Admiral Beresford, R. N., in The Betrayal.
7 The Betrayal.
by day and night, to watch over it in movement and at rest. They will be strong enough and fast enough to cut down any torpedo-boat destroyer afloat.”8
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ENGLISH LIGHT CRUISER "DUBLIN"
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PROFILE AND DECK PLAN, "DUBLIN" CLASS
The Dublin class, the famous Sydney being one, of, three large sea-keeping scouts, laid down in 1911-1912, were followed
8 Mr. Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, in defining the need for such vessels.
in 1913 by three similar scouts, Nottingham class, and then immediately after this class in the same year eight light cruisers, Arethusa class, were laid down, and these were followed by eight more the next year, Calliope class.
This sudden increase in the building of light cruisers proves that the English Admiralty had become convinced in some manner, that, if the battle fleet were to find that of the enemy and be England's mainstay, it must needs have both service of information and service of security.
The Dublins made 25 knots, and an increase to 30 knots was designed for in the Arethusas, and 35 knots realized. In 1914 the Naval Annual credits England with 41 and Germany with 29 light cruisers of modern construction with speeds of 23 knots or greater and displacements between 3500 and 5400 tons.
For the outposts of a fleet cruising at sea we require 15 cruisers which will take our present whole cruiser force and leave us no scouts. Properly speaking we have now but three scouts and these are insufficiently armed, and have not made the designed speed with any certainty in actual work due to boiler and turbine troubles.
The general dimensions of the Dublin class are a length of vessels for scouting duty now appears to be fairly uniform. Scouts of three nations have characteristics as follows:
Nation | Class | Displacement | Speed | Armament |
Japanese | Hirado | 4,800 | 26 | 6 6-inch, 3 tubes |
German | Breslau | 4,500 | 27.5 | 12 4-inch, 2 tubes |
English | Dublin | 5,400 | 25.5 | 8 6-inch, 2 tubes |
The general dimensions of the Dublin class are a length of 430 feet, a beam of 49 feet, mean draft of 15 feet 10 inches, having an armor belt of 3-inch nickel steel, developing 25,000 h. p., carrying a complement of 400 men, with a steaming radius of 4500 miles. The Hirado is 465 feet long and 46 feet beam, 16.5 feet mean draft with a conning tower of 4 inches, and a protective deck of 3 to 2 inches. She has lofty masts with specially designed crow's-nests to permit the greatest efficiency in sighting vessels at a distance. The German scouts of the Breslau class are 446 feet long, 44 feet beam, i6a feet draft with a 2-inch armored deck and 2- to 4-inch side armor, and made 26.9 to 27.2 knots as their mean speeds for their six-hour full power speed trials, developing from 25,136 to 28,872 s. h. p. The German protected cruiser Strassburg of this Breslau class is credited on her official trials as having made the best speed of the four sister ships, that of 28.28 knots per hour, and I do know that in actual service
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JAPANESE LIGHT CRUISER "HIRADO"
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PROFILE AND DECK PLAN, ”HIRADO”
recently she has made several long runs that averaged over 29 knots per hour, making 30 knots for part of the time. The speed of the Karlsruhe was stated to me by her commanding officer to be over 30 knots.
A noticeable fact in connection with the building up of the German light cruisers is, that in the Ersatz Hela class of four, laid down late in the fall of 1914, the armament of twelve 4.1-inch guns
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GERM AN LIGHT CRUISER "BRESLAU"
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ELEVATION AND DECK PLAN, "BRESLAU"
was abandoned in favor of ten 6-inch guns, which shows that they now consider the 4-inch caliber too light. This one caliber armament is preferable to the armament of the English Arethusa class, for the good and sufficient reasons that have been thrashed out so often in our service publications. The Sydney's victory over the Emden is due to one fact and one only, and that one is that she possessed 6-inch guns that outranged the Emden's 4-inch guns.
The development of the present type of swift light cruisers in the English service commenced in 1903 with the Sentinel, having a displacement of 2895 tons, which displacement gradually increased, and, in 1910, we see the Active class of three vessels, of 3440 tons displacement, and of 26 knots speed, with no armor and only guns of 4 inches in caliber, being slightly smaller than our Chesters built in 1907. This class was recently brought more up to date by the remodeling of their batteries, substituting the latest type of 4-inch guns for her low powered guns. Next come the
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THE "EMDEN" AND "DRESDEN"
five Bristols of 4800 tons displacement, having two 6-inch guns in their battery with 26.8 knots speed; then the five Weymouth. We now find the displacement has risen to 5250 tons and that an armor belt of 2 3/4 inches in thickness has been added that extends from the upper deck to well below the water-line and for the whole length of the ship. The battery becomes eight 6-inch. The Dublin class in 1911 of three ships has the displacement increased to 5400 tons, the battery being the same, but a double skin plating on the water-line is similar to the protection of our Chester class. The three 1912 light cruisers, Nottinghams, are of the same tonnage but with 2 inches of side armor in addition to the protective deck, and carry nine 6-inch guns, an addition of one. This class have tripod foremasts for stability of fire control and vision. They burn both coal and oil, and the speed is still held at 25 knots. Here the increase in tonnage of the light cruisers stops and we find a return to a tonnage of but slightly more than the Active in the Arethusa class of eight vessels of the 1912 program; then we note the eight of the 1913 program, Calliope class, again increasing in displacement, their displacement being put at 3800 tons. The
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ENGLISH LIGHT CRUISER. "ACTIVE"
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PROFILE AND DECK PLAN, "ACTIVE"
armament goes to but two and three 6-inch guns respectively, and six 4-inch guns, while the armor belt amidships is 2 inches. A noticeable feature of these vessels is the fact that they burn oil only and are designed for 30 knots and 35 knots was speed hoped for.
France is now building three light cruisers of 4429 tons in displacement, to steam at 30 knots, to burn oil only, and to carry a battery of eight 4.6-inch guns with a protection of a belt 1.6-inch. These are to be called flotilla leaders.
Russia is building the Admiral Nakhimov class having the large displacement of 7500 tons, armed with sixteen 6-inch guns, with armor belt of 3 inches. The after part of these vessels is to be especially constructed so as to launch seaplanes. They will also carry 100 blockade mines.
England's naval construction is, of course, better known to us than is that of other countries, and, considering the cycle of
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PROFILE AND PLAN, " ARETHUSA " AND " UNDAUNTED " CLASS, 8 SHIPS changes in that country together with the trend of construction in Japan and Germany, so far as we know it, the type of scout the writer recommends for our construction is a vessel of the protected light cruiser class with general characteristics as follows:
THE BEST TYPE OF LIGHT CRUISER
Displacement 5200 tons.
Speed 28 knots.
Length 430 to 460 feet.
Beam 48 feet.
Draft Maximum not over 19, and mean about 16.5.
Armor A partial side belt of maximum thickness of 3 inches, a conning tower and armored tube of same thickness; protective deck over machinery and boilers.
Fuel to he oil and sufficient for a steaming radius of 5000 miles at is knots.
21-inch submerged torpedo-tubes, mines and gear for quickly planting them, one 3-inch field gun, two automatic guns.
One hydroaeroplane or more properly speaking, seaplane with catapult launching device and proper hoisting apparatus is to be carried.
Lofty pole masts well stayed, fitted with crow's nests, protected from the weather for the lookout and fire-control stations and for the aerial of a powerful radio sending apparatus.
The provision and water capacity, bake shops, and refrigerating plant must be sufficient for three months at least.
The reasons for adopting the characteristics outlined above are now given in a brief manner, but sufficiently at length to indicate the principal arguments for the type of cruiser selected.
The displacement should be great enough to attain both high speed and a large cruising radius, to permit the carrying of a seaplane, to accommodate large supplies of provisions and yet it must be small enough to permit the scout to pefform during peace most of the duties now assigned to gunboats. The cost of a light cruiser must be kept within reasonable limits and this requirement also keeps displacement low. Hence 5000 tons seems to be the higher limit.
The speed of 28 knots is great enough to catch destroyers in any but the smoothest seas, and is considered as high as is within the limits of practicability while retaining moderate dimensions and cost. In building the boiler plant let us not repeat the mistake made in the types of small tube boilers adopted in our present three scouts and which types have proven failures; but adopt boilers of known merit, such as the Yarrow, the Miyabara, Schultz, Thorneycroft, White Forster, and many others. Our engineering plant must contain only turbines, pumps, and auxiliaries of proven efficiency.
The draft should be kept as low as practicable and, having a maximum of 19 feet, the cruiser will be able to enter most of the ports where our gunboats can, such as for instance the Panuco River in Mexico. As a matter of fact we have very few really light draft gunboats, and even the Nashville has great difficulty in crossing the bar at Santo Domingo, a feat which the Dolphin, with her 17 feet draft, cannot accomplish any more than could a modern scout. A light cruiser of this type will do the gunboat duty as well, if not better, than the gunboats do it, and this fact is worthy of emphasis.
The unrest in Mexico during the year 1914 proved that scout cruisers do take the place of gunboats very well, and in addition that they have a real military value to the nation possessing them
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OUR LIGHT CRUISER “CHESTER”
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PROFILE AND DECK PLAN
in time of war. As examples, are cited the Bristol, the Dresden, the Karlsruhe, the Chester, all of which did gunboat duty, even ascending the Panuco River. The ability of the Chester to carry a large marine guard was of immense military value, and this feature is most important in most of our peace duties for gunboats and cruisers in the many countries we deal with that have unstable governments. Save then for duty in the Ozama River at Santo Domingo City for which duty only few gunboats, Nashville and Helena class, are suitable, others being of prohibitive great draft, we do not require light draft gunboats, and have sufficient now. Thus, in considering the building of scouts, we bear in mind their availability for many of the multitudinous duties of our navy in time of peace, and their general superiority over gunboats in that duty, the cost of maintenance being very little greater, and add the war valuation of the scout.
The question of armor protection is one on which many will differ, yet the reasons for the amount of protection recommended for light cruisers are considered to be sufficient, and this protection must be placed on a vessel of this type. While willing in the case of battleships to subscribe to the words of the late Rear Admiral Cradock as he writes an epitaph for armor in these words: "Armor seldom gives any trouble; even the plates themselves know they are on their last legs, and another decade will see them in the museum, alongside hauberk, helm, and visor, dusted twice weekly“;9 I am not prepared to do so in the case of light cruisers. Considering the English recent light cruisers we find that the Nottingham class has an outer plating in its belt of nickel steel, the whole three inches in thickness. Having decided upon three inches for our new type let us consider the reasons why we consider that necessary and adequate. The scout cannot fight a battle cruiser, so we will not protect against such a contingency, but it has a fast enemy in the destroyers, the best of which are armed with 4-inch 50-caliber high velocity guns. Under the most favorable circumstances this gun's maximum penetration of Krupp armor at 4000 yards is 3.2 inches, at 3000 yards it is 3.9 inches. So we have practically protected the engines and the ship control stations of our scout from destroyer gun-fire. Again, the scout may do duty in a narrow river where it is exposed to 3-inch field guns at almost point blank range—as in the Panuco—and we find that at 300 yards a 3-inch field piece can penetrate but 1.6 inches of Krupp armor, a 3 inch 50-caliber gun at the same range just getting through 2.96 inches of similar armor. Thus the choice of three inches as a belt protecting the engines and boilers seems justified for our light cruiser.
9 Sir Christopher Cradock, R. N., in Whispers from the Fleet.
The 6-inch gun is chosen for the one caliber battery of the ship, as that caliber gives the cruiser an immense superiority over its enemy, the destroyers, and gives it a weapon capable of fighting the best vessels of its own class built or projected in other countries. The torpedoes and mines are necessary for both the offence and defence.
Before leaving the question of armor and armament the need for having gun shields on all gun mounts of a vessel of this class is considered sufficient to warrant them being placed there. At least they will protect the crew against rifle and machine gun-fire in times of insurrection when on the duty of protecting American interests abroad, and they may even deflect the 3-inch shells of destroyers under certain conditions of impact. The moral effect is certainly great and is worth some sacrifices in weight to attain. Gun positions open to rifle fire are not conducive in stimulating that confidence and repose a pointer must possess before he can shoot accurately.
The increase in value of the vessel as a scout by having it carry a seaplane is so great as to make it essential that a modern scout be equipped with one. The value of a seaplane is only nullified by fogs or strong winds and therefore it is more often efficient than not. Lieutenant Saufley10 states as a result of his figures that a fleet even though it be without screen or scouts can, in clear weather, by sending up seaplanes, search out such an area that, if no destroyers are visible therein, the fleet is secure from attack until 11 in the evening. By sending these seaplanes up from a scouting line an area can be searched out and the seaplanes be back at dusk such that the battle fleet can relax and be secure from attack the entire night. What a needed respite from anxiety will accrue to a fleet thus protected
Such a vessel will cost exclusive of armor and armament about $3,000,000, and this is under the cost of the St. Louis class, which cost was $3,818,190, while it gives us a vessel much superior in every way.
Emphasis has been laid in the foregoing pages on the utility of scout cruisers for the peace as well as the war duties of the navy and upon the fact that they can do gunboat service better than the gunboats on account of their speed, steaming radius, provision
10 PROCEEDINGS NO. 1531 p. 1463.
capacity, large crew and a landing force of efficient marines so necessary in times of insurrection. A light cruiser can act alone for considerable periods of time, while a gunboat, independent for but two weeks at the most, must depend for its supplies on larger vessels being near, requiring a battleship as a mother vessel, with the result that two such vessels are required for the duty one light cruiser would do as well.
In concluding this article the writer expresses the hope that our navy will soon possess its light cruisers and thus will be rounded out into the moderate-size well-balanced navy that our country requires in order to protect our citizens from any interference with their territory, their rights, and their privileges, and to preserve and protect their lives and their property wherever they may be situated.