*Address delivered at the opening of the course for the Class of July, 1915.
I have much pleasure in welcoming.you to the War College and in looking forward to a year of association and of co-operation with you in fields of work where we of the College staff are, equally with you, seekers after truth, and, equally with you, in need of the enlightenment which can come only from earnest and thorough-going study of those subjects which it is the object of the College to develop and to teach.
The War College to-day enters upon a new and important stage of its development. Something like a year and a quarter ago a plan of reorganization was proposed by the President of the College and approved by the Secretary of the Navy, providing for a uniform course of study, covering 12 months, to replace the so-called " short " and " long " courses which had previously been recognized. The plan provided also that the course should be taken by two classes of 15 officers each, beginning, one in January, the other in July, of each year. This plan goes into full effect with the present class, which, I am glad to be able to inform you, will, before the end of the present month, consist of 19 members.
Thus, after Many years of struggle, during which the very existence of the institution has been threatened more than once, a point has, been attained from which it is possible to look out upon an assured and inspiring future. From this time forward we who represent the College shall have no need to beg for recognition. It has become our privilege to give, rather than to ask; to be sought for, rather, than to seek. Our concern must be hereafter to make sure that in giving we give worthily and with increasing measure of helpfulness to those whom it is our privilege to serve.
You who join us to-day join the College in the fullest sense. You become a part of the institution--as truly a part of it as those who, by reason not of greater wisdom but of greater experience, become your guides. You will find no one here to tell you what is the right Way; but many who will gladly help you to find the right way for yourselves.
I propose to give you this morning a brief statement of the aims and methods of the College and a general view of the work which lies before you, and of the way in which the course develops—each part leading, in intent at least, to that which follows, and preparing the way for it. You will find, as you go on; that this ideal of progressive development, like Many of our other ideals, is far from being fully realized; but this is only another way of saying that the College is still in process of evolution.
We say, broadly; that the College exists for the study of the art of war. If our course is to be defined in a few words, I do not think that we can improve upon this statement. But we must reduce the matter to lower terms than this before we can discuss it satisfactorily. Of what; then, does the art of war consist? War has been defined as an effort on the part of 'one nation to impose its will upon another by force of arms. But the national will is simply the expression of the national policy so that if we accept this definition, we must recognize war as a phase of policy. Thus, policy becomes a starting point for our present purpose, and takes its place as the first of the elements with which the art of war must deal.
Policy' tells us what to do. Where shall we look for guidance as to the manner of doing it? Manifestly, to strategy; for strategy, in its widest sense; includes all that goes to the realization of the ends of policy, whether through diplomacy or through that application of armed force which we call war. Thus strategy becomes a second element in our study of the art of war. To properly apprehend its full significance, we must trace it backward to its origin in policy and follow it onward to its manifestation in tactics; for, as strategy springs from policy—being, in fact, policy incarnated as action—so tactics springs from strategy; being, in its turn, strategy incarnated as violence.
Tactics, then, is the third of the subjects with which we deal in our study of the art of war; and policy, strategy and tactics together comprise a trinity which directs the operations of war.
But war needs something more than direction. It needs the material support of supplies, which must be prepared in advance and delivered with certainty when and where they are needed. And this brings us to logistics, a fourth element in the art of war, and perhaps the most vital one of all. It is possible to conceive of a campaign being won in Spite of poor strategy and blundering tactics. But a campaign in which supplies of food and fuel and ammunition fail is foredoomed to disaster. If you ask me for the derivation of the word "logistics," I shall have to confess that I have no satisfactory reply.. If you ask for a definition of it, I will say that, in my conception, it represents the art of equipping, moving and supplying forces.
The art, of war, then, must include a thoroughgoing study of logistics, and a recognition of its insistent and imperative demand upon the attention of those responsible for the conduct of war.
I need hardly direct your attention to the fact that when a war has already become imminent, the time has passed for proper consideration of any one of these four correlated subjects. A nation which finds itself upon the verge of War without the guidance of a clearly-defined policy is already half defeated. If it has given no thought to what shall be done, it can evidently have given none to the manner of doing it. Thus, its strategy must be improvised, its tactics must' wait upon the development of its strategy, and its forces must be halted until logistic preparations: can be made which should have been completed long before.
The present almost world-wide war has many lessons for us as naval officers and Americans. Among these lessons, one stands out so clearly that they who cannot read it must be blind indeed. I speak of the lesson that success in war can come Only from preparation, and this not alone in a material sense, but in an intellectual and a moral sense as well. This' is neither the time nor the place for a discussion of our lack on the material side. Our deficiencies in battle-cruisers, scouts and aeroplanes are accentuated anew with every maneuver that is conducted at the College, and must have been brought home in a very striking way to everyone in the fleet, by the War Game recently played off the Atlantic Coast.
To bring out such deficiencies as these, to define clearly their effect upon our strategy and tactics, and to strive for their correction—all this is an important part of the work of the War College. But it is not the most important part. The ideals of the College aim at something beyond and above this. Preparedness for war is too often considered on the material side alone. It has another side which is of greater significance to us, and it is the privilege of the War College to deal chiefly with this side; with the development, not of material, but of principles, and, more important still, of men.
Your contribution toward preparedness is to prepare yourselves. And the contribution of the War College is to assist you in this preparation. We say, then, that the mission of the War College is to develop the principles underlying the art of war and to train officers in the application of these principles to situations such as may conceivably arise in war or in preparation for war. More briefly, it is to train officers for war command. Please note this statement of our mission carefully; for until you grasp its full significance, and recognize its limitations, you will be in danger of finding yourselves not only out of sympathy with our methods, but in direct antagonism to them. It is a common thing for officers coming here with false views of the purpose for which the College exists, to take an attitude toward certain parts of the course which has been described as "fighting the problems." A concrete illustration will make my meaning clear. Suppose that in our studies of strategy a problem is issued in which the assumption is made that a certain island can be held by our army for a year. An officer who happens to be familiar with the defenses of the island in question immediately announces that the problem is wrong because he knows positively that this island could not be held for a month. If the object of the problem were to develop a war plan, his criticism would be just. But this is not the object. The object is to furnish a basis for an instructive study in the conduct of war, and such study need bear no relation to conditions actually existing. A problem is a good one, if the conditions, real or assumed, are consistent with each other, and if it admits of a solution derived from these conditions by a logical process of reasoning.
There are, nevertheless, many advantages in taking conditions as they actually exist when these can be made to serve the purpose. The atmosphere of reality with which they invest the problem adds much to the interest, and there are certain by-products resulting from the study of such conditions which are of great, though not the greatest, value.
The point which I wish to impress upon you is that you are to deal with the conditions which you find in the problems—not with those which you think you ought to find there. For you, the conditions exist if the problem says that they exist.
The system used in our work is that known to modern' educators as the " case " system or the " applicatory " system, in which general principles are developed .through the study of individual situations. This is the exact opposite of the ordinary system of education, in which principles are first studied in their general form, and afterward Applied to individual cases. One system proceeds from the general to the particular, the other from the particular to the general. I am confident that your experiences here will convince you of the very great value of the applicatory system for our purposes.
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One of the first subjects which you will take up is a Series of collective readings on simple tactical problems, beginning with the classical letters Of Griepenkerl, and concluding with a few selected problems in naval 'warfare. The primary object of these readings is to illustrate the method of studying a situation and reasoning from it to a decision, which is then thrown into the shape of orders for the 'guidance of those who are to carry it into effect.
In these readings you will make your first acquaintance with the "Order Form "—not exactly in the shape in which you will be called upon to use it, but without any important difference in essentials. In these readings, also, your attention will be called to the importance of a thorough study of all the elements which enter into your problems; in other words, to what we call the " Estimate of the Situation." In this matter, as in the Order Form, Griepenkerl's treatment differs from ours, but the difference is one of form alone; and you will find it advantageous to study carefully the rules laid down by Griepenkerl in the introduction to his letters.
Both the Estimate of the Situation and the Order Form will be discussed in lectures very early in the course. Their importance as guides to your study, not of strategy and tactics alone, but of other and less important subjects, will become increasingly, apparent as your course proceeds. I urge you, therefore, to give them your earnest attention from the very beginning.
If these lectures and readings accomplish the purpose for which they are designed, they will equip you for taking up the real work of the College, to which they are preliminary, by pointing out to you the road along which you are to seek the two great ends at which our training aims: First, a recognition of the underlying principles of the art of war; and second, the mental training which will enable you to apply these principles correctly, and more or less instinctively, to concrete situations arising in practice. The first part of the road we travel with you; none of it can we travel for you.
The first problems presented to you will deal with simple tactical situations, each one designed to illustrate an elementary principle, and affording practice in estimating situations and framing orders. These will be followed by studies in Scouting and Screening—subjects which are partly tactical in character and partly strategical.
Your study of Strategy begins in the second month of the course, with simple problems, which will be followed by larger ones, the scale increasing as consistently as is found practicable, and leading up to the culmination of our course, the Chart Maneuver, where we approach closely the conditions of an actual campaign.
At this point it will be advantageous to consider a little more fully what is meant by " strategy " and what by "tactics." If we cannot frame exact definitions for these terms—and it will be difficult to do this—we may still be able to arrive at a recognition of the principles for which they stand. It is often said that strategy governs the movement of forces not in contact with the enemy, while tactics governs them after contact is made. This statement is only partially true; and if it were entirely true, it would be only a step toward a definition. Moreover, it is misleading in that it assumes to draw a line at the point where strategy ends and tactics begins; whereas, in fact, there is no point at which such a line can properly be drawn.
To my mind, tactics appears as merely a phase of strategy—the final phase which strategy assumes, when, having conducted our forces to points of advantage, it draws its lines to a focus and delivers the attack for which it has prepared from the beginning. If I may be permitted a somewhat fanciful figure of speech, I will say that strategy is an arrow of which tactics is the head. Both strategy and tactics, then, have a common purpose: to bring to bear upon the enemy a maximum of pressure at the point where it will produce the maximum of effect for the accomplishment of the end at which we aim.
It has already been noted that the strategy of a far-sighted nation does not begin with the beginning of war. It has its origin far back in the history of international relations and runs parallel to national policies, taking account of the purposes at which these policies aim, and planning methods by which they may be attained. When war is seen to be imminent, strategy takes charge of forces already prepared and directs them along lines already marked out, toward points from which to strike or to exert compelling pressure without the necessity of striking. As this point is approached, the operations pass gradually—not abruptly—under the guidance of tactics, which, as we have seen, takes charge of the situation not as replacing strategy, but as executing its will.
The term " tactics " is sometimes used in a very narrow sense as referring to the tactical maneuvering of forces when no object is in view beyond the maneuvers themselves or beyond the training of officers to execute the maneuvers with precision. No doubt there is an art which concerns itself with maneuvering alone, taking no account of anything beyond; and no doubt also there is authority for calling this "tactics " ; but it will tend to clear thinking if we adopt for it some such term as "tactical maneuvering" and reserve the term ",tactics" to signify that sort of maneuvering which is directed toward the attainment of a definite object—this object being always and everywhere to gain an advantage over the enemy, usually by the concentration of force against some part of his formation.
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I have said that every problem presented to you will have in view the development of some principle. This is very important. There is little to be gained by merely plating two forces in a certain relation to each other and calling upon their commanding officers to maneuver for an advantage. It signifies nothing that a certain officer has out-maneuvered another, unless the maneuvers have taught some lesson. As many lessons may be learned from defeat as from success if principles are kept in mind and applied consistently. The clement of competition adds to the interest of the maneuvers, but it should never be allowed to obscure the real end in view, which is to develop new principles or to illustrate the application of those already known. I urge you, therefore, to consider carefully the effect of every move you make and to have a reason for making it, remembering that a bad reason is better than no reason at all. You will be required, after each problem, to state the lessons which you, have learned from it. If you keep this requirement steadily in view, it will prove an incentive to be on the alert for lessons as the problem progresses, studying the moves of others no less closely than your own, seeking to penetrate their plans, and criticizing both their plans and your own in the light of results.
When you have once formed a plan, you should adhere to it until you are very sure that you have something to gain by changing it. Frequent changes of plan cause subordinates to lose confidence in a leader and the leader to lose confidence in himself. This does not mean, however, that you should refuse to accept an opening which promises success merely because it will take you along a line not contemplated in your original plan. Distinguish always between firmness and obstinacy. Consistence may be bought at too high a price. Let your rule be this—decide upon the wisest plan that you are capable of devising, and hold to it until you are convinced that you can improve upon it. Then be as resolute in changing as you have previously been in refusing to change.
Our work in both strategy and tactics is governed by rules which have been very carefully developed and written out for your use in great detail. It is of much importance not only to you but to the officers of the staff who direct the maneuvers, that you should understand these rules thoroughly, and that you seek opportunities for familiarizing yourselves with them by officiating as assistants on the game board and in the chart-maneuver room. An intimate acquaintance with the rules prevents the games from dragging, and adds to the interest by insuring that each participant shall know how to take advantage of every opening that presents itself. No doubt the rules will in some cases appear to you unreason, able. They are based upon experience in cases where experience is available; and in other cases, upon what has seemed to us a reasonable estimate of probabilities. Suggestions for improvement are always welcomed, especially when they are the result of observations afloat; but so long as the rules stand, we must all look to them for guidance. It is much the same with the decisions of the umpire. These may often be in error, but they must be accepted if the game is to go on. Their acceptance will be easier, the. more fully you accept the point of view which I have urged upon you---that the real object of the maneuvers is to develop principles, rather than to out-maneuver an antagonist.
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Of our work in International Law I need not speak very fully, as all of you have had something to do with this in years past. The methods heretofore in Use have proved so satisfactory that no important changes have been found necessary, except that the committee system has been done away with in this as in other parts of the course, and each officer now submits an individual solution of every problem assigned him. You will find some important changes in the general character of the subjects dealt with, resulting from the present unprecedented conditions in international relations throughout the world. When the European war is over, there will necessarily be a re-adjustment of many questions which a year ago we considered permanently settled; and when that time comes, we hope that the War College may be found ready, as has so often been the case in times past, with proposals which will command attention, if not acceptance, in connection with the subjects in which we are particularly interested.
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The part of our work which has called out most criticism from those who have recently taken the course is that which requires the writing of theses. Yet I believe this to be one of the most valuable parts of the course. The topics which will probably be assigned you this year are Strategy, Tactics, Logistics, Policy, Organization, and Loyalty and Initiative. In connection with these topics a reading course is prescribed, the afternoon periods throughout a large part of the year being left free for this reading and for the preparation of theses. You will miss much of the value of this work if you fail to understand its motive. To say that the College does not look to your theses for any important contribution to its stock of knowledge might appear to take something from the dignity of your work. I will not say this. But I will say that whatever benefit the College may derive from it will be altogether secondary to the benefit which you derive from it. Here, as always, we are seeking to help you. And here, more than at almost any other point, you are in a position to help yourselves. No one running through the list of officers who begin the course to-day can doubt that the theses which they submit will have a permanent value for the College. But still less can any one doubt that in the preparation of these theses they will so select and arrange and digest the material with which they deal as to make it wholly their own. And this is what we seek.
For you, then, a thesis represents a thorough study of one of the most important subjects of your profession, involving the careful weighing of authorities, a choice between conflicting views, a gradual absorption of the views which you accept, and, finally, an orderly presentation of the whole matter, with a resulting clarification of it in your minds. For the College, the thesis is a concrete evidence of your thoroughness. It is also, in many cases, a valuable contribution toward the literature which we hope sooner or later to give to the Service. If I have seemed to minimize the importance of this side of the matter, it is only because I like to keep always to the fore the fact that what we aim at first of all is training.
The connection between the theses and the reading course is very close and has led to the suggestion that the reading course might be condensed by bringing together extracts from many authors on subjects like strategy and tactics, thus saving time which is now wasted in searching through many volumes for the comparatively small amount of material Which is directly available for our purposes. This is what might be called a "tabloid" system of education. As a means of saving time it has advantages. As a means of education, it seems to me fatally defective. I do not admit that the time spent in reading a volume is wasted, merely because only a small part of the volume is found directly available for our immediate purpose. An author may condense his conclusions into a few pages, but it does not follow that we have nothing to gain from traveling with him the road by which he reaches these conclusions. It may be that the road will lead us to quite other conclusions. If not, we shall find ourselves agreeing with him as a matter of conviction, not as a matter of faith.
In my opinion, there is no more valuable result to be anticipated from even a technical education than the broad culture derived from a course of reading generously conceived and not too narrowly concerned with questions of practical utility. Something of this we can put into your course, limited as it is—and a something in which will enrich your experiences here with memories capable of becoming a source of pleasure and of inspiration long after you have forgotten the labor which you find so irksome now.
Your course of reading will include the papers written by members of previous classes, and I feel sure that in these you will find abundant evidence of the value of the system which has produced them. Some of them have such conspicuous merit that we hope to publish them sooner or later for the benefit of a wider public than they can reach in their present form. It is hoped, also, that a compilation may be made from these and later papers, composite treatises, which may serve as text-books for the College, not to take the place of the general course of reading which I consider so valuable, but as a guide and a supplement to that course and as adapted more directly for study than for reading. Such textbooks will bear the same relation to the reading course as that borne by a school history to a course of historical reading that is to say, they will furnish a skeleton which must be filled in with flesh and blood and endowed With life, by the absorption and assimilation of many books and by prolonged experience and reflection. You should use the papers of your predecessors as you use other parts of the reading course, taking from them what seems to you excellent, but giving it your own interpretation and your own coloring.
Your theses should not be unduly long. If you have clearcut view, of what you wish to say, you will be able to say it briefly. This does not mean that you should omit any single thought which seems to you of value. Your economy should be, not in thoughts, but in words. As a general rule, it is well to avoid long quotations. You will often find a thought which you wish to use, expressed so aptly that its force would be lessened by any change of form. In such a case, quotation is not only permissible but in all ways desirable. But such quotations are usually brief.
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You will find some terms in current use at the College which call at least for passing notice, because they stand for principles which, are fundamental in our teaching and because, also, the meaning assigned them here will not be found exactly duplicated in any dictionary. Such a word is "doctrine." A purist might well object to the meaning assigned this word in our vocabulary. I shall not take time to discuss this phase of the matter, but will try to make clear to you just what a doctrine is, in the War College sense. A common and convenient way of leading up to the definition of a term is to begin by showing that we have something in mind for which a term is needed. In other words, we build up a meaning and then attach a name to it. You will find in the College papers on the Estimate of the Situation and the Order Form, a full discussion of the various sources to which an officer charged with the execution of a task may look for guidance. He may have perfectly definite orders from which there is no occasion to depart. He may be in the presence of a higher authority to which he can look at any moment for new orders. If separated from higher authority, he may still be acting under orders; and those orders, if properly drawn, will include such information of his superior's plans that he can be sure of making his own plans square with them when he finds himself confronted by unforeseen conditions. But let us go one step further and suppose that he has no information as to the general plan, or that the conditions by which he is confronted are altogether different from any which were contemplated by the general plan. Where shall he now look for guidance to make sure of doing just what his superior would wish him to do and just what will fit in with the new plans which his superior will adopt? May we not assume, in the ideal case, a source of information which transcends orders and makes them largely unnecessary? It is said of Nelson, that his captains were so familiar with his views and with the working of his mind that they know instinctively what he would do in any given situation. This evidently does not mean that Nelson had communicated a definite plan for every individual situation which could be imagined. It means that he had, if you please, a code, not of rules, but of principles, broad enough to cover all situations, and that his captains knew this code thoroughly. In case Of necessity, it took the place of orders, and even of signals, and when Foley cut through the French column at the Nile, he was following, not a signal, but--a doctrine. He was " indoctrinated."
A doctrine then may be defined as a general policy outlined by superior authority and communicated to subordinates as a guide which enables them to predict the probable wishes of their superior in cases where a definite statement of those wishes is not available. The subordinates are indoctrinated when they have absorbed the doctrine so completely that they apply it instinctively in any given situation where they are obliged: to look to it for guidance.
A doctrine instead bf 'taking its origin solely in the mind and will of the superior, may be evolved from consultation of all who are concerned with it. Nelson never lost an opportunity to confer with his captains, and. we may well suppose that the doctrines of the Fleet took shape at those conferences and bore the impress of many individualities. In the end, however, they received their vitality from the will of the supreme authority; so that, while the method of their evolution is a matter of interest, and contains in itself valuable lessons for us, it does .not change the fact that, as stated in the above definition, the doctrine represents, in the end, the views and the will of the supreme authority.
Other terms which I might define for you are "orders and commands," "the area of discretion," "the province of the sub, ordinate," etc. These are not merely phrases. They stand for principles, and principles of commanding importance. Obvious as their definitions may seem, they are all charged with lessons which are not apparent at first thought. Some of these lessons will be pointed out in the papers to be read in the near future. Others will come to you gradually as your course progresses. This, indeed, is true of every principle that the College teaches, you—its deepest and most valuable lessons will prove matters of slow development, and their value to you will be the greater because you have not seen their full significance at once.
I have said that your contribution to, preparedness for war is to prepare yourselves, and that the contribution of the War College is to assist you in this. And I have pointed out certain of the lines along which our assistance is directed. These lines all tend toward the widening of your intellectual horizon. I should do scant justice to the ideals of the College if I failed to point out that it aspires to do more, than this it recognizes in fitness for leadership something which dominates the intellectual as pronouncedly as the intellectual dominates the material, and holds it true to the, path marked out by loyalty. This something is manifestly a matter of character; and while it is hardly to be hoped that the ideals and traditions of the College can greatly modify the character of those who come under its influence for a period so short as that covered by our course, the privilege is ours at least to indicate the path which leads to military efficiency through the development of military character.
The basis of military character is loyalty; not loyalty which expresses itself in a slavish acceptance of the views of those above us so long as the door remains open for a proper expression of differing views. Constructive criticism may be the highest manifestation of loyalty. But criticism, to be constructive, must find its object in the plan proposed, not in the authority proposing it. This distinction is too often overlooked. I ask you to keep it in mind. You will find in it, I believe, a justification for honest differences of opinion between juniors and seniors. But you will find in it also a condemnation of the loose talk sometimes indulged in, which, in expressing dissent from the views of a higher authority, includes the authority itself in the criticism expressed.
Even within the limits of permissible criticism, there is, of course, a marked distinction to be drawn between the plans of a higher authority which have not yet crystallized in orders, and those which have so crystallized. From the moment when orders are received, loyalty finds its only expression in obedience. But here there enters into the matter another element which we call "initiative "—the element which, when we find ourselves confronted
by conditions unforeseen when our orders are issued, not only permits us, but requires us, to depart from the letter of the orders if this is necessary for compliance with their spirit.
You will see, when you become familiar with the spirit of the order-form, how obedience, which we commonly think of as one of the homely virtues, gains in vitality and charm, when we view it in the light of initiative. In this light we see ourselves as partners in the general scheme, contributing our share, not blindly, but intelligently, toward the success of the scheme as a whole sharers with our leader in the conception of the plan as well as in its execution.
I like to believe that as the ideals of the College become clearer to you, your own ideals will clear up also; that loyalty, which means much to you now, will mean more; that initiative will take its proper place, with its proper limits, in your conception of obedience; that obedience itself will become a matter, not of obligation, but of instinct that, in short, those elements which go to the building of an ideal military character will every one take on a new significance to you, and every one become more intimately a part of yourselves, with every day of your stay at the War College.
There has been much talk of late about co-ordination in the navy, and the lack of co-ordination. Whatever any of us may think about other phases of this matter, no one can doubt that co-ordination is assured between the War College and the Service, who notes the character of the class which graduated here two weeks ago and that of the class which comes to us to-day—most of its members directly from the Fleet, all of its members looking to their course here as a preparation for service in the Fleet.
Once more I welcome you to the War College, and once more I ask you to remember that the line which separates you from the staff of the College is very lightly drawn—that we are all students together, traveling the same road, seeking the same end. If it is true, as we believe, that we have something to give you, it is equally true that you have something to give us. You bring to our work a fresh point of view, and a critical one. I believe there is, nothing that we need more. We look to you, then, to keep us from becoming academic; to bring into the College the spirit of the fleet; just as, later, we shall look to you to carry out into the fleet the spirit of the College.