Skip to main content
USNI Logo USNI Logo USNI Logo
Donate
  • Cart
  • Join or Log In
  • Search

Main navigation

  • About Us
  • Membership
  • Books & Press
  • USNI News
  • Proceedings
  • Naval History
  • Archives
  • Events
  • Donate
USNI Logo USNI Logo USNI Logo
Donate
  • Cart
  • Join or Log In
  • Search

Main navigation (Sticky)

  • About Us
  • Membership
  • Books & Press
  • USNI News
  • Proceedings
  • Naval History
  • Archives
  • Events
  • Donate

Sub Menu

  • Essay Contests
    • About Essay Contests
    • Diversity & Inclusion
    • Enlisted Prize
    • NPS Foundation
    • Naval Mine Warfare
  • Current Issue
  • The Proceedings Podcast
  • U.S. Naval Institute Blog
  • American Sea Power Project
  • Contact Proceedings
    • Submission Guidelines
    • Media Inquiries
  • All Issues

Sub Menu

  • Essay Contests
    • About Essay Contests
    • Diversity & Inclusion
    • Enlisted Prize
    • NPS Foundation
    • Naval Mine Warfare
  • Current Issue
  • The Proceedings Podcast
  • U.S. Naval Institute Blog
  • American Sea Power Project
  • Contact Proceedings
    • Submission Guidelines
    • Media Inquiries
  • All Issues

Strategic Problems and Their Solution

By Captain R. von Labres, Imperial German Navy; Extracted and Translated by Surgeon J. F. Leys, U. S. Navy
September 1914
Proceedings
Article
View Issue
Comments

The strategic problems which a fleet, as a whole and in its separate divisions, has to solve are various and depend in the case of any war upon the material available on both sides for its prosecution and a due consideration of the objects to be accomplished. The object of every action is the defeat, or at least the serious injury of the opposing force. To accomplish this it must be decided whether one's own forces in comparison with those of the enemy justify a going forward on the offensive or whether, compelled to be on the defensive, one will await the enemy's appearance on one's own coast and, taking the offensive then, repel his attack.

 

The strategic situations for a fleet may be classified, then, as follows:

 

A. Those in which both fleets are handled on offensive lines.

 

B. Those in which a stronger fleet, taking the offensive, seeks the enemy on his coast and there engages him.

 

C. Those in which a weaker fleet awaits the enemy on its own coast and, on the enemy's appearance, takes the offensive against him with such support as the coast affords.

 

D. Those in which the weaker fleet, with the object of driving off an enemy already attacking its own coast, is compelled to remain on the defensive.

 

E. Those in which on both sides the political and strategic conditions are such that the final issue will necessarily be determined by land forces, and consequently it is the paramount duty of the fleets to support the operations of the army.

 

1From "Politik und Seekrieg."

 

F. Those in which it is not the aim to take to sea in force, but only to injure the commerce and the sea-communications of the enemy as much as possible.

 

A. The various problems for a fleet to solve when it has every reason to believe the enemy's fleet to be equally prepared to take the offensive in bringing matters to an issue will find their solutions upon the following principles:

 

1. The fleets, within their spheres of operation, or wherever they can expect to encounter each other, will locate each other by their services for security and information, whereupon-

 

2. They will engage each other in battle in the open sea.

 

3. Following up and using to the utmost any advantage gained, according to circumstances-

 

4. The defeated fleet will fall back for shelter upon its own coast which has been put in a condition for defense at the time that the fleet was fitted out. By availing itself of these resources of the coast it will be possible for this fleet to repel the further attacks of the enemy, employing the principles indicated under the foregoing heading C.

 

5. With the assumption of the offensive on the part of the battle fleets, the separate cruiser flotillas come into play in the rear of the enemy's battle fleet to attack his reserves and to inflict damage upon his coasts wherever and however this is possible, while at the same time-

 

6. The battle fleet operating on the enemy's coast and away from its own must take precautions for the protection of its own coast from such enterprises by cruiser flotillas.

 

7. Further, the maritime commerce of the enemy must be attacked by the capture of ships and of enemy cargoes (contraband) under neutral flags, which activities come under the head of predatory operations (sometimes in the past carried on by privateering).

 

8. This leads us to the protection of our own commerce, by the convoying of merchant ships, which involves encounters with enemy cruisers.

 

9. According to the results of early battles, we come to the blockading of the enemy's coast or of a part of it, or to the raising of a blockade, if one of the fleets be strong enough to attempt such a measure.

 

10. Certain detachments of the fleet may be employed to cooperate with the army, especially if its operations lie near its own or the enemy's coast, or where navigable rivers offer easy communication with the sea or where they constitute a barrier between the opposed armies.

 

Operations, according to circumstances in different wars, will take place similarly in the secondary fields of operation, usually on a reduced scale and with variations. It may happen, too, for example, that during war between two powers with both sides taking the offensive in the principal sphere of operations as indicated under heading A, their activities in one of the secondary fields of operation may be conducted with other objectives in view and may present problems the solution of which would come under the headings B to F. The possibility is not to be overlooked that though both parties at war be possessed of some forces in one of the secondary fields, no operations may take place there, because it is evident from the first that the issue will be decided in the principal theater of war.

 

B. The problem in offense, for a fleet seeking the enemy on his coast or wherever he may be found in order to engage him, involves the following operations:

 

1. The search for the enemy's fleet within his own chosen sphere of operation by the employment of the security and information service.

 

2. To engage his fleet when opportunity is afforded.

 

3. To make fullest use of any advantage gained, or be prepared if necessary to fall back upon the home coast.

 

4. To capture a base in advance in case battle be not joined before this can be done, in order that the fleet may use it as a point of departure for operations upon the enemy's coast or as a refuge in case of a defeat.

 

5. To engage the coast defense fleet and flotillas of the enemy which rest upon his coast and to attack and damage the fortifications and resources of his coast in every possible way that will contribute to his defeat or his injury.

 

6. In certain conditions, to establish a blockade of the enemy's coast in whole or in part.

 

7. To pursue the predatory activities that will injure his trade and communications.

 

8. At the same time to protect its own commerce by convoying merchant vessels and fighting the enemy's cruisers.

 

9. Detachments of the fleet can also act in joint operations with the army, especially where the field of operations is near their own or the enemy's coast, or where they can serve as barriers between the contending armies.

 

10. Though taking the offensive in operations upon the enemy's coast, nevertheless the fleet must bear in mind the necessity of precautions for the defense of its own coast and of its own reserves and reinforcements against enterprises undertaken by flotillas of the enemy.

 

C. The problems confronting a fleet compelled to await on its own coast the offensive attack of a stronger fleet are as follows:

 

1. To put its own coast defenses in order and to establish such a condition of its entire fleet, comprising battle fleet, coast fleet and flotillas, as to have at disposal all available forces at any time.

 

2. To send cruiser flotillas to harass and injure the approaching enemy while still at a distance, finding opportunity perhaps to attack him in the rear.

 

3. Employing its information service at long distance in order to learn of the approach of the enemy's attacking fleet and know its strength, composition, etc.

 

4. To hinder the enemy from gaining an advanced base, attacking him with submarines in the course of his operations for that purpose.

 

5. Incessantly to harass and injure the enemy by fighting his scouts and screens day and night wherever opportunity can be found.

 

6. If possible, to make night attack upon the enemy's main fleet cruising near the coast.

 

7. If the enemy has been shaken by this, to take the offensive and engage his fleet by day.

 

8. To bear in mind the desirability of bringing about a fleet engagement within navigable waters on the coast with the support of shore fortifications.

 

9. In case of a blockade by the enemy, to attack his blockading vessels.

 

10. To attack with cruiser flotillas the enemy's reserves and convoyed trains, whether in the neighborhood of his ports of departure, en route at sea, or near the home coast, and if possible to inflict damage upon the enemy's base ports.

 

11. To pursue the predatory activities that will injure the enemy's commerce and communications.

 

12. At the same time to protect its own communications and fight off the enemy's cruisers as far as circumstances make it possible.

 

13. To carry on joint operations with the army where these are to take place along the attacked coast, or to protect navigable rivers, especially where these constitute a barrier which must either be crossed by land forces or defended against such crossing.

 

D. If the entire fleet be too weak to engage in battle in the open sea and compelled therefore to hug its own coast, all the foregoing principles which apply to open-sea fighting are eliminated. The defense of the coast, giving due consideration to the available material, will be along the following lines:

 

1. Putting the coast itself in condition for defense, and so making ready all ship-material as to have all the available force at disposal.

 

2. Employing the information service within the field of coast operations to ascertain the approach, strength, and composition of the enemy's fleet, harassing and injuring him in case his final near approach be at night.

 

3. Hindering the enemy from gaining an advanced base, attacking him with submarines in the course of his operations for that purpose.

 

4. Fighting the enemy's scouts and screens and harassing and injuring his fleet at every opportunity.

 

5. Night attack upon the enemy's fleet with the torpedo flotilla as opportunity offers.

 

6. Repulse of the enemy's attacks within coast waters and with the support of shore batteries, as far as possible.

 

7. If the enemy set up a blockade, attack upon his blockading vessels.

 

8. Attacking the enemy's reinforcements and his convoyed trains near his own coast.

 

9. Carrying on predatory operations to the injury of the enemy's commerce and communications.

 

10. Carrying out joint operations with the army where these are to take place along the defended coast, or protecting navigable rivers, especially when these constitute a barrier which must either be crossed by land forces or defended against such crossing.

 

E. If the issue of the war be dependent upon army operations and if it be the sole function of the fleet to assist the army, the questions to be solved by the naval forces will be insignificant and of little influence upon the result.

 

For stronger fleets, or in case one of them is stronger than the other, the circumstances would raise questions to be solved according to the principles already laid down under headings A to B. In general, an effective support of the army would be possible only to the stronger fleet. Probably the following strategic propositions would be presented:

 

1. Each fleet would maintain a close watch upon the other, neither risking in the beginning the chances of battle.

 

2. Support and assistance of the operations of the army by the fleet, supposing the enemy to be not strong enough to hinder this coöperation.

 

3. Coöperation where streams are to be crossed or to be obstructed and fighting off of the enemy's flotillas.

 

4. Making secure the defense of the coast, attacks by land and naval forces upon single positions, or repelling such attacks.

 

5. If the occasion arises, encounter and battle between the fleets.

 

6. Despatch of cruiser flotillas to injure the enemy on his coasts.

 

7. Maintaining a predatory warfare upon the enemy's commerce and sea communications.

 

F. In wars where, because of the lack of powerful fleets and the remoteness of the theater of war, no encounter at sea is possible, only a predatory warfare can be waged. The naval force will be concerned then:

 

1. To injure the maritime commerce of the enemy along his most important routes.

 

2. To take measures to protect its own sea communications.

 

3. To take appropriate measures for the security of exposed trade ports on its own coast.

 

The strategic problems which will occupy a fleet in war, as indicated in what has been said, are of many sorts, and to determine what services are demanded of the total sea force, according to the military situation and the political objects to be attained, will not be easy. Among the many possible strategic enterprises which might be successfully carried out, that only is to be considered which will accomplish an emphatically useful purpose. It must not be overlooked that even a very strong fleet having interests all over the world to protect and being in a position to injure the enemy can still have only one object to accomplish, namely, to attack and defeat the enemy where he appears in his greatest strength and where he can be most severely injured. To this end our own offensive fleet, according to a basic principle laid down by the great master of war, Napoleon, must be superior to that of the enemy, must indeed be as strong as it is possible to make it; "superior force" in a tactical sense depending upon both the number and the special serviceability of the component units, serviceability being made up of many factors.

 

In any case the sufficiency and efficiency of a fleet for any probable war with regard to the various points enumerated under headings A to F are to be estimated with reference to its own available material, the auxiliary support on its coast, and an exact knowledge of the enemy's fleet material and further resources.

 

Only upon due consideration of all these factors will it be possible to undertake the organization of the ship-material available, in doing which the best should be allotted to the fleet operating in the principal theater of war. Whatever the number and location of battle fleets to be established, in their organization only strategic objects are to be considered, whereas in the assignment of ships to certain groups both strategic and tactical considerations should govern.

 

The assignment of fleet material to secondary theaters of war, to coast fleet and flotillas, may well present many difficulties, in view of the strategic considerations hereinbefore stated, giving opportunity for the master mind to act with judgment within the limitations imposed.

 

The stronger the fleet as a whole, the more various the tasks it is called upon to accomplish, the more difficult will appear the work of organization. The difficulties will be fewer by far for those forces whose operations will be confined entirely to the principal theater of war and who for this reason need only one battle fleet.

 

In the strategic organization of the entire fleet, due consideration must be given not only to the political and military objects of the war as clearly laid down in advance, but also to the probable distribution of the enemy's forces and the probable ends which he will aim to accomplish by his operations. How the proper organization shall be or can be effected depends upon the special circumstances in which the parties at war find themselves, and will require a different solution in each case.

 

 

 

Digital Proceedings content made possible by a gift from CAPT Roger Ekman, USN (Ret.)

Quicklinks

Footer menu

  • About the Naval Institute
  • Books & Press
  • Naval History Magazine
  • USNI News
  • Proceedings
  • Oral Histories
  • Events
  • Naval Institute Foundation
  • Photos & Historical Prints
  • Advertise With Us
  • Naval Institute Archives

Receive the Newsletter

Sign up to get updates about new releases and event invitations.

Sign Up Now
Example NewsletterPrivacy Policy
USNI Logo White
Copyright © 2023 U.S. Naval Institute Privacy PolicyTerms of UseContact UsAdvertise With UsFAQContent LicenseMedia Inquiries
  • Facebook
  • Twitter
  • LinkedIn
  • Instagram
Powered by Unleashed Technologies
×

You've read 1 out of 5 free articles of Proceedings this month.

Non-members can read five free Proceedings articles per month. Join now and never hit a limit.