XI
THE NAVY IN THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR, 1898
The larger features and the more important dates of the Spanish-American War will be readily recalled. The first precautionary measures of the department were taken in January, 1898, in view of the critical condition of affairs then existing in Cuba. The blowing up of the Maine on February 5 was followed by the appointment of a board of inquiry, of which Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard was president. On March 9, Congress appropriated $50,000,000 for the national defence. From this time until April 25, when war was declared, the department was incessantly busy preparing for the coming struggle.
The two principal theaters of naval operations were the coast of Cuba and Manila Bay. Since the operations in the Atlantic were chiefly within the West Indies, Key West assumed much importance as a naval base. In Asiatic waters there was a single squadron under Rear Admiral George Dewey. Early in the war the vessels in the Atlantic comprised three fleets: the blockading squadron, commanded by Rear Admiral W. T. Sampson; the flying squadron, commanded by Commodore W. S. Schley; and the northern patrol squadron, commanded by Commodore J. A. Howell. Later, these three squadrons were united under the command of Sampson. The principal events of the war were the destruction of Admiral Montojo's fleet by Commodore Dewey on May 1; the blockade of the Cuban coast throughout the war; the battle of Santiago on July 3, and the operations against Porto Rico in July and August. The ending of hostilities may be dated with the signing of the peace protocol on August 12, 1898.
The work of buying ships was in charge of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Between March 16 and August 12 one hundred and two vessels of all sorts were bought, at a cost of $21,431,000. Before their purchase these vessels were thoroughly inspected by boards of naval officers in order to ascertain whether they were fit for the navy. Many of them were inspected by the New York board, which was appointed on March 12, and of which Captain Frederick Rodgers was president. The most expensive ships and the first to be bought were the New Orleans and Albany, two protected cruisers, constructed at Elswick, England. The cost of the former was $1,429,000, and of the latter $1,205,000. They were purchased on March 16 from the Brazilian government. The Albany, not being completed at the outbreak of hostilities, was in accordance with the laws of neutrality retained in England until after the close of the war. The New Orleans rendered valuable service in Cuban waters. The gun-boat Topeka was purchased from the Thames Iron Works, in England; the torpedo boat Somers, from the Schichau Iron Works, of Elbing, Germany; and the torpedo boat Manly from Mr. Charles R. Flint, of New York. The rest of the purchased vessels were merchantmen. Five large ships, the City of Pekin, St. Paul, St. Louis, New York and Paris were chartered. The government paid for the St. Paul a rental of $2500 a day. Two yachts were loaned to the department without charge, and the city of Philadelphia rented her ice-boat for the nominal sum of one dollar. Fifteen revenue cutters, four lighthouses tenders, and two vessels of the Fish Commission were placed temporarily in charge of the department. Altogether 131 ships were added to the navy in one way or another. The maximum fighting force of the regular navy consisted of 73 vessels, and of the auxiliary navy of 123 vessels. Of the 73 ships in the regular navy, 14 had belonged to the old navy, including several old monitors which had not seen service for many years. The strength of the fleet for fighting purposes lay largely in seven ships: the first-class battleships Indiana, Massachusetts, Oregon and Iowa, the second-class battleship Texas, and the two armored cruisers Brooklyn and New York. These seven vessels, with the possible exception of the coast-defence monitors, comprised at this time our entire sea-going armored fleet.244
244Ann. Rept. of Sec. of N., 1898, pp. 21-24; Long, New American Navy, I, 150-153.
Nearly five million dollars were expended in preparing the auxiliary vessels for service. The fitting out and repairing of the ships of the regular navy also entailed much work. These tasks fell chiefly to the Bureaus of Construction and Repair and Steam Engineering. Their shops at the five principal navy yards—New York, Norfolk, Mare Island, Boston and League Island—were exceedingly busy throughout the war. The force employed at these yards by the Bureau of Construction and Repair increased from 2200 men in January to more than 6000 men in the summer of 1898. Private shipyards also aided in repairing and converting ships. The purchased merchantmen were strengthened to bear the shock of gun-fire; unnecessary woodwork was taken out, batteries were installed, steam machinery was renewed or repaired, articles of equipment were supplied, and the vessels were freshly docked and painted. Every available ship in ordinary was prepared for service. Some of the old single-turreted monitors of an ancient date were fitted with new boilers by cutting the old ones into pieces and passing them out through the smoke-pipe openings and passing in the sections of the new in the same way. The ship Vulcan was made into a floating repair shop, carrying forges, furnaces, machine tools, skilled mechanics and a large outfit of stores, and proved to be exceedingly useful in making repairs on the blockade. For the vessels operating in Cuban waters, Key West was a most important repair station. Many inconveniences, however, were experienced here for want of proper machinery, shops and outfits of tools. The deliveries of needed articles at this point were slow and uncertain.245
The Bureau of Equipment furnished the vessels with coal, fresh water, rigging, canvas, galleys, boat supplies, anchors, chains, ground tackle, hawsers, cordage, binnacles, compasses, sextants, chronometers, charts, sails and hammocks. The number of employees of this bureau at the Boston yard, where many articles of equipment were manufactured, was doubled. The number of charts issued by the Hydrographic Office increased six-fold. To meet the demand for new flags and signals, the force in the flag-making department at the New York yard was increased from twelve to eighty persons.
245Ann. Rept. of Sec. of N., 1898, PP. 34-35, 40, 514-515, 611-614.
Among the most important tasks of the Bureau of Equipment was the supplying of the fleets with coal and fresh water. Before the outbreak of hostilities, this bureau endeavored to procure coaling stations in the West Indies, especially in the vicinity of the passages of the Antilles. Such attempts of course could not succeed at so inopportune a time. Recognizing the importance of Key West and the Dry Tortugas as bases of operations, the bureau early contracted for the installation of modern coaling plants at these places, but they were not ready for use when the struggle ended. When the war began there was at Key West but one coal shed, with a capacity of 3000 tons, and before additional provision could be made, the war was well under way. Eventually, all the available space at Key West was covered with coal sheds. Their total capacity, however, was only 9000 tons, not sufficient to fill the bunkers of one of Sampson's largest vessels. Unfortunately, owing to their large drafts, these vessels could not enter Key West harbor or approach within six miles of the coaling wharf, and therefore had to be coaled from lighters or colliers.
Before the war commenced the Bureau of Equipment asked and obtained many offers to supply coal and to transport it to the West Indies. When the crucial moment came, all except one firm refused to adhere to their proposals, owing to the supposed risk of transporting coal to the scene of hostilities. In desperate straits, the bureau was compelled to purchase steamers, convert them into colliers and provide them with crews and officers taken from the navy. The owners of suitable vessels, knowing the necessities of the government, forced it to pay exorbitant prices. Early in April six ships were purchased for $1,247,000, and they were rapidly fitted out and were dispatched to the fleet with cargoes of coal. When the first great emergency was passed additional colliers, mostly foreign vessels, were obtained at fair prices. Recovering from its fright, the private coaling fleet on the Atlantic was employed in carrying coal to the shore stations. At one time 40,000 tons of coal were afloat at Hampton Roads, ready to sail at a moment's notice to any point desired. The fleet of colliers on the Atlantic belonging to the Navy Department in the summer of 1898 consisted of fifteen vessels, with a total capacity ,of 50,000 tons. Two colliers were purchased on the Pacific coast and sent with coal to Dewey's fleet at Manila. During the entire war no ship suffered the slightest delay from want of coal.246
246Ann. Rept. of Sec. of N., 1898, pp. 26-27, 270-271.
A much more difficult task of the Bureau of Equipment was the providing of the fleet off the Cuban coast with adequate supplies of fresh water. Some of the boilers of the ships on blockade duty before Santiago were injured for want of this article, and gave Sampson much concern. The distillers on shipboard were generally too small to supply all the needs of the ships. Before the outbreak of the war the Bureau of Equipment contracted for a distiller to be erected at Key West, capable of making 45,000 gallons of fresh water a day, but the contractor failed to complete it until long after the specified time. When finally it was ready for use its capacity was only 25,000 gallons a day, and owing to its imperfect construction frequent repairs were found to be necessary. An evaporating and distilling plant, with a capacity of 50,000 to 60,000 gallons a day, was installed on board the Iris, but it was not completed in time to be of service during the war. It was first used in supplying the army at Camp Wikoff on Long Island. The bureau bought considerable water, for some of which it was compelled to pay exorbitant prices.247
When it became apparent that a war with Spain was inevitable, the Bureau of Ordnance placed orders with private manufacturers for large quantities of gunpowder, projectiles, fixed ammunition, small arms and guns for secondary batteries. The manufacturers showed every disposition to meet the requirements of the bureau, nor did they in any instance take advantage of its unusual needs. When necessary, they greatly increased the output of their factories and ran them without intermission. During the war one hundred and thirty-five vessels received batteries and complete outfits of ordnance. Five hundred and seventy-six guns were placed on board the vessels of the auxiliary navy. Seventy-five auxiliary torpedo boats were fitted out, and many gun-cotton mines and mining outfits were manufactured. The ordnance shops of the Navy Department worked night and day. The naval gun factory was equal to every demand made upon it. Indeed, the resources of the department and of private manufacturers for ordnance, ammunition and projectiles were but lightly taxed by the brief conflict with Spain.248
247Ann. Rept. of Sec. of N., 1898, PP. 41, 271-272.
248Ann. Rept. of Sec. of N., 1898, pp. 31, 463.
The plan for purchasing supplies that was inaugurated by Secretary Whitney in 1886 was thoroughly tested by the war, and its efficiency was fully proved. The Bureau of Supplies and Accounts during the period of active operations furnished 193 ships with naval stores. Early in March the bureau established a base of supplies at Key West and commenced making shipments thereto. Here and at several of the navy yards large quantities of provisions, clothing and other articles were collected. The bureau maintained at Key West a three months' supply of stores for 8000 men; at New York a three months' supply for 9000 men; and at Norfolk and Mare Island, each, a three months' supply for 4000 men. New York was the chief market for naval stores, and the New York navy yard was the chief receiving and distributing depot of the navy. To meet the needs of the greatly enlarged personnel of the navy, the bureau manufactured more than a million garments. The prices paid during the war were on the average no higher than those paid during peace.
Early in April the commander-in-chief of the Asiatic station was directed to fill his ships with stores and to buy a collier and supply ship, and within forty-eight hours after receiving his orders, he had purchased the Nashan and Zafiro. The former he loaded with coal and the latter with provisions. When war was declared, he was in possession of supplies sufficient to last for five months. Early in May the City of Pekin was dispatched from San Francisco with three months' provisions for the Asiatic fleet and a large consignment of miscellaneous stores. In June a refrigerating ship, laden with 600,000 pounds of fresh meats and a like quantity of fresh vegetables, was sent from San Francisco to Manila. Sampson's first refrigerating ship was the Supply, which on May 7 sailed for the fleet off Cuba loaded with fresh meats, vegetables, fruits, ice and other supplies. Subsequently, two other ships, the Celtic and Glacier, were fitted out with refrigerators, and were used to carry supplies to the naval vessels in the West Indies.'
Another task that fell to the Bureau of Provisions and Clothing was the caring for prisoners. On receiving information that 1720 Spanish prisoners from Admiral Cervera's fleet were to be quartered on Seavey's Island in Portsmouth harbor, New Hampshire, and were expected to arrive there within two or three days, the bureau at once assembled all necessary provisions at the island, and when the Spaniards arrived, all was in readiness. A wholesome dinner was served to the prisoners, and each man was furnished with a mattress, hammock, two blankets and such clothing as he needed.249
Immediately after the destruction of the Maine, the Bureau of 'Medicine and Surgery made preparations to meet every contingency. The naval hospitals were equipped to their full capacity for the accommodation of patients, and the naval laboratory at New York made preparations to issue supplies on short notice. Medical and surgical outfits suitable for the auxiliary vessels were purchased, assembled and boxed, ready for shipment whenever and wherever needed. In no instance did any vessel have to wait for its medical stores. Forty-two assistant surgeons were appointed, and nineteen assistant and passed assistant surgeons were mustered into service with the state militia. In sixteen days the merchantman Creole was converted into the hospital ship Solace, and fitted out with modern medical appliances, a well-lighted operating room, a steam disinfecting plant, an ice machine, a steam laundry plant, cold storage rooms and an elevator for taking patients from the operating room and upper deck to the wards below. The Solace accommodated 200 patients, either in berths, swinging cots or staterooms. She was supplied with fresh water by means of distillers and evaporators. Her medical officers inaugurated a complete system of antiseptic surgery at sea—the first ever established. The wounded at the battle of Santiago, both American and Spanish, were taken on board the Solace, and transported to the naval hospital at Norfolk. Temporary hospitals were erected at Seavey's Island to accommodate the sick Spanish prisoners. Several young women volunteered their services as nurses, and were assigned to duty at the naval hospitals at New York and Norfolk. A permanent naval hospital corps was organized in accordance with an act of Congress approved on June 17, 1898.250
249Ann. Rept. of Sec. of N., 1898, pp. 665-666.
250Ann. Rept. of Sec. of N., 1898, pp. 769-773.
The supplying of the new ships with officers and seamen fell to the Bureau of Navigation. In all 813 officers received temporary appointments. Of these, 456 were line officers, varying in rank from commander to naval cadet. Two hundred and sixty-three officers entered the service from the naval militia. Two hundred and twenty-five officers on the retired list of the navy were assigned such duties as their age or physical condition permitted. Many more men applied for service than were needed. Examining boards were appointed to ascertain the professional knowledge of the applicants. The volunteer officers were assigned to duty in the Auxiliary Naval Force and the Coast Signal Service, and on board the small cruising ships, such as the Yankee, Dixie and Prairie. A few of them saw duty in West Indian waters, but many of them did not leave the coast of the United States. Naturally they were deficient in professional experience and training, but they were zealous and attentive to duty. Immediately after the signing of the peace protocol most of the volunteer officers were discharged; a few, however, still remained in service in 1899. During the war forty-three second lieutenants received commissions in the marine corps.251
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities the number of enlisted men allowed by law was 12,500. On August 15, when the enlisted force reached its maximum, it numbered 24,123 men. On March 28 a circular letter was issued by the Navy Department calling for enlistments for one year, and on this basis 9767 men entered the service. Three thousand eight hundred and thirty-two men were obtained from the naval militia. Thousands of men applied for enlistment, whose services were not needed. For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1898, 63,135 applicants were rejected. Many of the recruits were landsmen, perchance clerks, lawyers, or professional men, and not seamen in any sense, and totally unfit for their new calling. By June 30, 1899, the enlisted force had been reduced to 14,501 men. During the war the marines were increased by some 2100 men.252
251Ann. Rept. of Sec. of N., 1898, pp. 29-30, 132.
252Ann. Rept. of Sec. of N., 1898, pp. 23, 320, 827; 1899, pp. 19, 404.
Two large and important organizations, the Auxiliary Naval Force and the Coast Signal Service, were established early in the war, and were discontinued at its close. The Auxiliary Naval Force, organized for the purpose of defending the coast of the United States, constituted the "second line of defence." It guarded and patrolled the coast and protected the submarine mines, and served to give the people of the Atlantic Gulf and Pacific states a feeling of safety. The commencement of this organization may be dated with the order of the Navy Department to Commander Horace Elmer to prepare with all possible dispatch a plan for a "mosquito fleet," in "general accordance with the methods prepared by the Naval War College." Elmer, who established his headquarters at New York, was assisted in his work, which was most complicated and arduous, by the officers and clerical force of the New York navy yard, by the New York naval militia and by the New York board on auxiliary vessels. When war was declared on April 25 many details of a plan of organization had been worked out. At this critical moment Commander Elmer died, and was succeeded by Rear Admiral Henry Erben (retired), who proceeded to put into operation the plan of his predecessor. During the first month of his work he was considerably hampered by the delay of Congress in passing legislation providing for an auxiliary force. A measure which met the views of the department had been drafted in the first week of April. Finally, on May 26 a joint resolution of Congress was passed authorizing the organization of the United States Auxiliary Naval Force, and appropriating $3,000,000 for the purchase or hire of vessels.253 Erben was at once made chief of the new organization. The officers and enlisted men of the force were paid from the regular appropriation for the "pay of the navy."
253U. S. Statutes at Large, XXX, 744-745.
On July 9 Erben was succeeded by Captain John R. Bartlett (retired), the chief intelligence officer, who had charge of the force until it was discontinued, and on the same day the headquarters were removed from New York to the Office of Naval Intelligence in the Navy Department at Washington. The Auxiliary Naval Force was under the general supervision of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Early in July its staff consisted of two lieutenants, two naval constructors, six chief engineers, two pay officers and three surgeons. It was recruited almost entirely from the state naval militia, from which source about 1400 men, exclusive of officers, were derived. A few men came from the merchant service. To facilitate the work of the force, the coast of the United States was divided into nine districts (six on the Atlantic, two on the Gulf and one on the Pacific coast), and a naval officer was placed in charge of them. The vessels of the force, forty-one in number, were distributed among the districts, and were stationed at the important ports and strategic points. Twenty-three vessels were employed in patrolling mine-fields and in maintaining the quarantine regulations. Some of them cruised from port to port, or went to sea for target practice. Ten of the vessels were old monitors, which had been in ordinary for many years. The officers of the force furnished their own uniforms and side arms, and the enlisted men came into the service uniformed, armed and equipped. The officers and men of a given district were generally selected from the naval militia of the adjoining states, since their knowledge of local waters and of local conditions gave them a special aptitude for patrol duty near home.254
254Ann. Rept. of Sec. of N., 1898, pp. 19-20, 105-137, 143.
The Coast Signal Service, like the Naval Auxiliary Force, was organized to assist in the defence of the coast. Before a war with Spain was anticipated, Secretary Long on October 18, 1897, appointed a board, of which Commander John Schouler was president, to consider the establishment of "coast signal stations for naval defence." On October 27 this board reported a plan for a coast signal service, but no further action was taken on the subject by the department at that time. On March 15, 1898, Secretary Long, moved by the prospects of a war, ordered Captain C. F. Goodrich, president of the Naval War College, to make and report with dispatch a preliminary plan for the establishment of a coast signal service on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. Goodrich made a report which closely followed the recommendations of the Schouler board, and on April 9 the department ordered him to establish a coast-line system of signal stations in accordance with the plan contained in his report and in consultation with the Naval War Board. Goodrich fixed his headquarters at New York on board the U. S. S. New Hampshire, the armory of the First Naval Battalion of New York. On April 23 he was relieved by Captain Theodore F. Kane (retired), and on May 9 Kane was succeeded by Captain John R. Bartlett, who served until the service was discontinued. Bartlett transferred the headquarters to the Naval Intelligence Office in Washington, and conducted his work under the general supervision of the Bureau of Navigation.
For the purposes of this service, the coast from Maine to Texas was divided into eight districts, and thirty-six signal stations, officered and manned entirely by men drawn from the naval militia, were established. The stations were in telegraphic or telephonic communication with the central office in Washington, and were connected with the lines of the Life Saving Service on the beach. The light-house keepers and the observers of the U. S. Weather Bureau along the coast were also brought into the system. Altogether there were in the service 210 naval militiamen, 1443 men of the Life Saving Service, 850 light-house keepers and 33 observers of the Weather Bureau; a total of 2526 men. These observers were stationed on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, and were continually on the lookout for the vessels of the enemy and suspicious craft of all sorts, as well as for American vessels, the movements of which they watched. While no Spanish ships came within the range of their observations, they several times made important reports of the vessels of our own fleet, and announced the arrival of the Oregon from her famous cruise around Cape Horn. The knowledge that was gained in establishing the system will be of much value in case of another war.255
In its efforts to mobilize rapidly a naval force the department was much hampered by its want of jurisdiction over the naval militia of the states, which were of course organized under state laws. Officers and enlisted men were mustered into the several divisions of the federal service from the militia as they were needed. On the outbreak of the war, the number of men in these state organizations was rapidly increased, and many militiamen were disappointed in not being called into the federal service. All told, the naval militia furnished the navy 4316 men. Of these, 2600 men served in the regular navy, and the rest in the Auxiliary Naval Force or the Coast Signal Service. The militiamen of a state were often assigned to widely different duties. Those of only one state, Michigan, were kept together, being assigned to duty on board the U. S. S. Yosemite. While the officers and seamen from the state organizations were zealous and patriotic and rapidly acquired experience and efficiency they naturally were less competent than the regularly-trained officers and seasoned man-of-wars' men.256 After the war many attempts were made to obtain the establishment of a permanent national naval reserve, but they all failed.
255Ann. Rept. of Sec. of N., 1898, pp. 20, 386.
256Ann. Rept. of Sec. of N., 1898, PP. 137-149.