Policy.—The Century Dictionary defines "Policy" as an object or course of conduct, or the principle or body of principles to be observed in conduct; specifically, the system of measures or the line of conduct which a ruler, minister, government or party adopts and pursues as best for the interests of the country.
There are various kinds of policies, but this discussion is limited to National Policy. National policies are divided into two general classes: (a) Foreign or External, (b) Domestic or Internal.
The latter, domestic or internal policies, are in the domain of politics—the conflicts between party policies which are settled at the polls by the votes of the citizens of the various states and with which the military service has nothing to do.
1AUTHOR'S NOTE.—This paper is largely made up of extracts from the following:
Jomini: Art of War.
Clausewitz: On War.
Wilkinson: War and Policy.
Hill: Co-ordination Before and During War.
Roberts: Fallacies and Facts.
Taylor: History of International Law.
Murray: The Future Peace of the Anglo-Saxon.
Latane: Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish America.
Moore: American Diplomacy.
2EDITOR'S NOTE.—Lecture delivered before the Army War College, Session 1912-1913.
The foreign or external policies are established by the government (acting for the people) and are in the domain of international law, and conflicts under them are settled by diplomacy or war. It is this class of policies (foreign or external ones that may ultimately bring on war) that we are specially studying, in an effort to determine the proper relation between War and Policy.
Foreign policies may also be divided into two classes: (a) Offensive, those looking toward increasing our territory or interests beyond their present limits, and (b) Defensive, those intended to protect our present interests and territory from the aggression of other nations.
Offensive policies call for offensive strategy to enforce them, while defensive policies will only require defensive strategy for their maintenance. This will serve as an illustration of the close relation if not identity of foreign policy and military policy: Lord Roberts, in "Fallacies and Facts," says, "Foreign policy and military policy are, in fact, only different aspects of the same thing—the external policy of a nation."
All modern wars are caused by conflict of national policies; and as policy determines the political objective which in turn controls the military objective, it becomes absolutely essential that the naval and military branches of the government be in touch with, and have an understanding of, the policies announced by the State Department to the other nations, so that, when diplomacy proves inadequate, war may take its place and the substitution of "battles" for "diplomatic notes" be made without delay.
"An ideal policy would be one with a grand aim and a great force behind it; pursued with consistency from generation to generation, never deviating from its course and utilizing every opportunity to approximate toward its final object. In democratic states lack of continuity and persistence, due to change of officials, make policies weak. An autocratic state possesses three great advantages: (I) greater continuity of policies, (2) greater ability to obtain allies (having a permanent government independent of parties it can make agreements for longer periods), and (3) more experienced ministers, owing to longer continuance in office."
"The first mark of competence or efficiency of a government in relation to an international conflict is the clearness with which it knows its own mind, the facility with which it distinguishes between aims which are vital and must therefore be pursued without hesitation, whether in peace or war, and those which are subordinate and accidental."
"Under a despotic ruler one head alone settles the policy of the state and directs the strategy during war. Under democratic rule statesmen and politicians representing parties frame the foreign policy; and a different set of men, the military leaders, plan and carry out the war. This brings about the difficulty of insuring harmony and co-operation between policy and strategy."
It is only possible to obtain a proper conception of policy, if we regard it as continuous both in peace and in war, using sometimes diplomatic negotiations, sometimes war negotiations, as circumstances require, to attain the political object.
It is a mistake to suppose that when diplomatic negotiations cease (for they do not cease) they are continued in another form—that of war. The statesman still retains control, and uses the military events as they occur to attain his object. He is still responsible for the success of the warlike as well as the peaceful policy of the nation. The statesman is therefore bound to study war as he does his other instrument—diplomacy. This means only the general principles of war, the means, resources, and forces required to attain the object of the war—viz., the submission of the enemy.
The political object of a war is determined beforehand by policy, which orders the war; determines the type of war it is to be; with what means, resources and expenditures it is carried on; when its object has been attained, and when it is to cease. In fact policy prepares for, leads up to, orders, supports, guides and stops the war.
Clausewitz said, "All the leading outlines of a war are always determined by the Cabinet—that is, by a political, not a military functionary." For this reason, war being subordinate to and a part of policy, the statesman must study war and the strategist policy.
"The director of a nation's affairs, whether he is a despotic monarch or the chairman of a committee, must be supposed, before he begins to correspond on a contentious subject with the government of another power, to determine as well as he can whether the purpose he proposes to himself is vital for the nation which he represents, so that it must be pursued at all costs, and also whether the opposite purpose of the other government is regarded by that government as indispensable. If both sides take the matter seriously, a trial of strength is inevitable."
In a democratic state it is most important that the people should study war and take an interest in national policies; for upon the strength with which they grasp the central idea of the policy will depend its strength and continuity through successive changes of administrations.
Our policy is formulated by the President and his Cabinet; and as all are civilians, policy and strategy cannot be considered together. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy have their expert advisers, but by the time the advice gets to the Cabinet it is second-hand and liable to be more or less damaged. It would be much better, from this point of view, if the secretaries were officers of services they represent.
A logical order of procedure would be:
(1) The government decides on a policy,
(2) The military experts inform the government what this policy will entail should it lead to war.
(3) The government educates the nation so that it realizes its responsibilities, and prepares itself to meet them in case of war.
A government that knows its purpose will be quick to detect the beginning of a quarrel upon a vital issue; it will divine opposition in the distance and, long before there is any palpable sign of the coming struggle, will have analyzed all its possibilities, will have thought of every difficulty, and will have made ready for every emergency.
An illustration of the concrete declaration of a policy is given in the Czar's message to Alexieff in 1904:
This struggle must definitely assure the preponderance of Russia on the coast of the Pacific. To attain this end it is indispensable to conquer Japan completely, to force her to submit definitely, and to deprive her of the desire for embarking on dangerous military enterprises for several years to come. If we do not do this, we shall lose all our prestige in the East. The present war is summed up in the question, "Who will have the supremacy on the Asiatic coasts of the Pacific—Russia or Japan?" To share and agree is impossible.
Surely a splendid policy, definitely expressed, but which failed for two reasons—Russia had not prepared to enforce it, and Japan had been preparing every day for ten years to defeat it.
It is a military platitude that the soldier is the servant of the politician, and it is therefore the duty of the statesman to ensure by foresight that he, the soldier, shall not start a war with the odds against him.
Success or failure of a state's policy depends on the amount of armed force behind it, for upon this depends the greater or less amount of resistance-friction that it will meet from other nations. If the armed force be small, it will be checked, foiled and bullied by its neighbors, till at last it is goaded into a war which could have been avoided if its prestige, its armed force, had been greater. On the other hand, a national policy supported by a great armed force finds it opponents much more reasonable and inclined to a fair compromise; so that the greater the armed force behind the policy of a nation, the greater will be its prestige, and the more likely it is that all its negotiations will be settled by peaceful compromise, and the longer will it enjoy peace.
When a statesman has discovered that the question he is about to raise may possibly lead to the use of force, he will, if he be prudent, avoid raising it until he has satisfied himself that for the war which he may have to conduct he has secured, as far as human foresight can secure anything, the certainty of success. He may safely assume that the other side, fighting for an object of vital importance, will exert itself to the utmost of its resources. He will, therefore, take the full measure of those resources and compare it with the forces which he can bring to bear against them. If the comparison shows in his own hand such a preponderance as, making due allowance for accidents and miscalculations, gives a reasonable probability of success, he will raise his contentious question; but if the calculation shows the slightest doubt either as to the readiness or the superiority of his forces, he will use his utmost efforts to avoid a dispute until such time as his preparations are completed and the certainty of ultimate success has been practically assured.
The art of war is governed by one great principle—to secure at the outset every possible advantage of time, place, armament, numbers and morals. In modern war more depends upon what has been accomplished before the commencement of hostilities than upon what is done after the first shot is fired; and this preparation rests with the statesman, not with the military leaders. In these days, that nation which is beaten in preparation for war is already half beaten in the war itself.
“Mistakes made in the original assembling of armies can scarcely be made good during the subsequent course of the campaign" (Von Moltke); and such mistakes are usually due to the incapacity of a government to judge rightly the time when the assembling should begin.
The value of preparation is shown in another quotation from Von Moltke, "It is the sword alone that now keeps the sword in the scabbard." It is the great armies of the Continent and their complete preparation, in combination with the British fleet, that have kept the peace of Europe for the past forty years.
History shows that in practically every war that nation has been successful whose rulers have recognized that a policy is useless unless the means of carrying it out are provided.
The most important duty of the statesman is to provide the necessary means for carrying into effect the policies adopted. As our statesmen do not have any practical military training and do not live in a military or naval atmosphere, it is all the more important that they should supply the practical deficiency by theoretical study of the principles of war. Our Cabinet and party system of government make us, as a nation, weak in both "preparing for" and "carrying on" war. There is lack of harmony between policy and strategy and of co-operation between statesmen and military leaders. We lack both the tendency and the machinery to bring about proper co-ordination and co-operation. Responsible statesmen and military leaders must work together so as to synchronize and maintain in their due relative proportions the policy and strategy of a state. The only effective way to bring this about is by an intelligent grasp by both statesmen and soldiers of the broad principles of strategy and policy and their relation to one another. To bring this about Clausewitz says: "If war is to harmonize entirely with the political views, and the policy to accommodate itself to the means available for war, there is only one alternative to be remembered when the soldier and statesman are not combined in one person, which is, to make the commander-in-chief a member of the Cabinet."
The dependence of policy upon preparation and means was well expressed by Lord Roberts: "Whatever the object and character of a nation's foreign policy, the success of the policy is directly dependent upon the actual fighting strength behind it "; and in another form by Secretary Meyer when he said: "The Monroe Doctrine is just as strong as our fleet, and no stronger."
"If you wish for peace prepare for war" is another form of "In time of peace prepare for war." Our wars have shown the folly of the other method, i. e., "In time of peace prepare for peace and in time of war prepare for war." This latter method increases ten-fold the cost in time, money and lives, and may lead to national humiliation.
The better the preparation the shorter the war, the less the cost in both time and money; and the poorer the preparation the longer and more expensive the war.
That the preparation of means and plans for war is not a new idea can be gathered from the following Biblical quotation:
"What king going to war against another king, sitteth not down first and consulteth whether he be able with ten thousand to meet him that cometh against his with twenty thousand? Or else, while the other is yet a great way off, he sendeth an ambassage and desireth conditions of peace."
"The right can often only be maintained by force; and the great test of character for nations, as for men, arises when they are confronted by a dilemma which requires them either to risk their existence in a conflict for the support of what they believe to be right, or to commit moral suicide by acquiescence in what they know to be wrong."
War.—This brings us to the definition of "War." Wilkinson says: "War is a form of political action, the only means by which a nation can assert against challenge its conception of right." Again, "War is a part of policy, the means whereby a nation attempts to enforce its will upon another nation and to obtain its political object by force." Every negotiation implies in itself that the pen is in one hand and the sword in the other. The pen and sword are the two mutually complementary instruments of state policy—diplomacy and war. As a further illustration, "War is merely a means to an end; it is a piece of political action." No statesman in his senses would resort to violence and bloodshed if he saw a way to attain his object without them; still less would any prudent man wish his nation to make the sacrifice and run the risks involved unless he was satisfied of success. One of the many definitions of War given by Clausewitz is as follows: "Violence arms itself with the inventions of art and science in order to contend against violence. Violence, that is to say physical force, is therefore the means; the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate object. To attain this object fully the enemy must be disarmed—the real object of hostilities."
"War is not a science. It may rather be compared to a business for the successful management of which a number of sciences and arts must be mastered."
"The popular belief regards war pre-eminently as the domain of luck and pluck. The strength and courage of the soldier and the genius of the general are thought to be the essential matters. In a higher view which embraces the whole subject, courage and right leading are consequences rather than causes—are the result of sound management of a nation's affairs."
It is a generally recognized principle of war, that once war has been declared, the method of its conduct should be left to the discretion of the commander-in-chief, who should be given a free hand in carrying out his plans; but, unfortunately, time after time the commander in the field has been interfered with from the seat of government, has had his plans thwarted and has been faced with the alternative of either resigning his command or acting contrary to his best military judgment. Modern systems of communication will increase this tendency, and cutting the cable will be of no use in these days of wireless telegraphy. Every war we have ever had has shown numerous examples of this interference.
Behind the general is the government, and the best of leaders will be embarrassed and perplexed whenever, either in the preparation or during the course of a war, his government fails to know its own mind—that is, fails to have a well-understood policy.
The above discussion of policy and its relations to the war which may follow its enforcement shows the necessity of: First, a definite well-considered policy; second, thorough and complete plans to be followed in enforcing the adopted policy; third, supplying the means to carry out the plans; and fourth, some governmental organization to bring policy, plans, and means into harmonious co-operation toward the common objective—the purpose of the policy.
In an absolute monarchy this co-ordination of effort is simple, as all the elements—policy, strategy and preparation—are under one head, the Monarch, who is often commander-in-chief as well. This simplifies difficulties and leads, under an able head, to great efficiency.
In our country the various elements are in different hands—policy, in the hands of the President and his Cabinet; strategy, in the hands of the military and naval experts; the providing of the means or preparation, in the hands of Congress—and to be successful each of these elements (policy, strategy and means) must, in a general way, be known to and approved by the people to assure proper support. There is at present no organization by which co-operation, co-ordination—in short, unity of purpose and unity of action—can be brought about.
There are two methods suggested for correcting this weakness of our government:
First, to fill the offices of Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of War by carefully selected officers of the navy and army respectively. This would harmonize policy and strategy in the Cabinet by bringing the Secretary of State, representing policy, in touch with strategy and the military secretaries in touch with policy; but it is defective in that, while it might determine the means necessary, the secretaries would not be in such direct contact with Congress as to assure that these necessary means would be provided. There is also the fundamental objection of our people to having military officers form a part of the civil government.
A second and more popular method of overcoming our difficulties is by the formation of a Committee of National Defense made up of the Cabinet members representing policy and strategy, of army and navy experts representing strategy, and of influential members of both houses of Congress to represent means for preparation. This plan is now before Congress in the form of a bill to organize a Council of National Defense. The bill presented did not include the Secretary of State and was weak in that respect, but has been amended to include him.
As national defense is the highest duty of a statesman it is difficult to understand anyone objecting to serving on such a committee. This committee has the President as chairman ex-officio. It is not to meet in time of war and will therefore not interfere with strategy. It is suggested that the bill should be further amended so that the military and naval members form a joint board of advisers to the President during the war. He must have such advisers; and if they are selected during peace to make plans for war, for the success of which they will be responsible, the President will get much more valuable advice than from any voluntary or impromptu board he may be forced to rely on, if no legal one is provided.
Here it may be well to state what the army and navy are doing, and to suggest what they can do, to bring about co-ordination and co-operation within and between the two services.
At each of the War Colleges officers of all branches of the service, except chaplains, are being educated and trained to know the difficulties of war and the approved methods of meeting them.
The War Colleges are sending their graduates to the sister college, both as students and as advisers to or members of the faculty, and each service is thus educating and training a few officers to understand the language and the difficulties of the sister service, and fitting them to act as interpreters between their respective commanding officers in combined operations.
To bring about the necessary co-ordination of effort between the various organizations of the navy engaged in the preparation of the fleet for war, the Aid for Operations, the General Board; the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Naval War College, or—to give the duties rather than the titles—the Chief of Staff, the War Plans Section, the Information Section and the Educational Section, should be housed in one building in Washington under the direction of a single head—the Aid for Operations or Chief of Staff.
To co-ordinate the two services the two colleges should physically be connected by an auditorium, where both colleges would meet to solve combined problems and discuss combined operations theoretically in time of peace as the two services will solve combined problems practically in time of war. This would also make available to each service the mass of valuable information in the archives and libraries of both.
The best suggestion that I have heard as to how to bring about efficient co-ordination and therefore intelligent co-operation in both peace and war, was made by Major Jadwin, Engineer Corps, U. S. Army, that we go back to a single Department of National Defense headed by a Secretary for National Defense, with the Army Section headed by the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Navy Section by the Aid for Operations. This would provide for joint effort under a single control, would prevent duplication of effort and expense, would increase efficiency and would result in the President and Council of National Defense getting advice from a single source and the Congress being asked for a single appropriation to cover a combined budget for national defense, and would inevitably bring about a better balance and proportion between the various parts—the Fleet, the Coast Defense and the Mobile Army—for each would be developed scientifically to meet the most probable enemy in the enforcement of each of our national policies, and all would be educated and trained to co-operate intelligently and efficiently in accordance with a single doctrine of war.
Even with one of the above plans in operation, we have no scheme for the education of the people so that the whole country would understand and support the government in carrying out any of our policies. This cannot, under a system of party government, well be carried out by any official organization, but must be left to some voluntary society, such as the Navy League, which should receive direct encouragement and sympathetic aid from the government. Such voluntary organizations have their greatest use in time of peace—that is, during the time in which we must prepare for war.
We have several well-recognized policies which in the course of time have come to be generally accepted by the people and by both political parties, either of which may, under certain conditions, directly or indirectly cause war.
Our well-established national policies are as follows:
First: "No Entangling Alliances." This was given its first formal expression in Washington's Farewell Address, and has been referred to in many state papers since. It grew out of the difficulties with France during Washington's administration. While undoubtedly the oldest and probably the most generally accepted policy, its importance in relation to strategy and means has not been appreciated. This policy, in its consequences, logically bars us from having the support of allies and, with equal logic, calls for such plans and preparations as will enable us to protect ourselves and our policies against any other power or powers that may oppose them.
The next policy in point of time, "The Monroe Doctrine," was first formally announced by President Monroe in his message to Congress, December 2, 1823. This policy grew out of two distinct situations—Russia in Alaska and the plan of the Holy Alliance (Russia, Austria, Prussia) as expressed in the "Treaty of the Holy Alliance," Article I of which announced their intention to "put an end to the system of representative governments in whatever country it may exist in Europe, and to prevent its being introduced in those countries where it is not yet known." The country referred to was Spain, and the plans included the Spanish colonies in America which were then in revolt.
The two parts of the Monroe Doctrine appear in separate paragraphs in the message. The first part forms the concluding sentence of the paragraph referring to Russia's proposal for a settlement of the dispute between England, Russia, and the United States as to the boundaries between Alaska, British Columbia, and the Oregon Territory; it is:
"In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers."
The second paragraph refers to the threat of the Holy Alliance to re-establish the Spanish monarchy in the revolted colonies whose independence the United States had recognized. The substance of this part of the doctrine was expressed as follows:
"We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States."
The doctrine as expressed in President Monroe's message has from time to time been explained and extended by various state papers. President Polk, in a message of December 2, 1845, said, "It should be distinctly announced to the world as our settled policy, that no future European colony or dominion shall, with our consent, be planted or established on any part of the North American continent." This declaration, by the use of the word "dominion," forbade the acquisition by conquest or purchase of any territory already occupied. In obedience to that principle France and Great Britain were more than once notified that the United States could not witness with indifference the transfer of Cuba and Porto Rico by Spain to any other European power.
France's intervention in Mexico was finally put to an end by a notice to France that friendship with that nation must cease "unless France could deem it consistent with her interest and honor to desist from the prosecution of armed intervention in Mexico to overthrow the domestic republican government existing there and to establish upon its ruins the foreign monarchy which has been attempted to be inaugurated in the capital of that country."
Secretary Fish, in a report to President Grant, published with the President's message of July 14, 1869, said:
"This policy is not a policy of aggression; but it opposes the creation of European dominion on American soil, or its transfer to other European powers, and it looks hopefully to the time when, by the voluntary departure of European governments from this continent and the adjacent islands, America shall be wholly America."
Secretary Fish then gives the basis of the claim:
"The United States . . . . occupy of necessity a prominent position on this continent, which they neither can nor should abdicate, which entitles them to a leading voice, and which imposes on them duties of right and honor regarding American questions, whether those questions affect emancipated colonies, or colonists still subject to European domination."
President Cleveland, in his special message to Congress, December 17, 1895, in reply to the claim of the British Prime Minister that the Monroe Doctrine had been given a new and strange extension and development, said:
"The doctrine upon which we stand is strong and sound, because its enforcement is important to our peace and safety as a nation and is essential to the integrity of our free institutions and the tranquil maintainance of our distinctive form of government. It was intended to apply to every stage of our national life, and cannot become obsolete while our republic endures. If the balance of power is justly a cause for jealous anxiety among the governments of the Old World and a subject for our absolute non-interference, none the less is an observance of the Monroe Doctrine of vital concern to our people and their government."
The Monroe Doctrine finds its recognition in those principles of international law which are based on the theory that every nation shall have its rights protected and its just claims enforced.
Commenting on the settlement of the Venezuela incident by Great Britain agreeing to our acting as arbitrator, an English writer said, "It admits a principle that, in respect of South American republics, the United States may not only intervene in disputes, but may entirely supersede the original disputant and assume exclusive control of negotiations."
As illustrated above, the Monroe Doctrine has grown with the growth of the country, and now stands ready to adapt itself to all future developments. The change that has taken place is less in its outward form than in its inward spirit.
It is taken, for example, to apply to Hawaii since annexation, although not a part of the territory originally covered.
The latest extension of the Monroe Doctrine prohibits the acquirement and control by foreign steamship companies, etc., of coaling stations which might later be used by foreign governments as naval advance bases.
The third of our national policies to be considered is the so-called "Open Door" policy. In effect this guarantees "equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire." This policy was first announced by Great Britain in opposition to the "Sphere of Influence" policy according to which Russia, England, Germany, France, and Japan had certain well-defined areas in which their interests, influence, or control was to be primary and all others secondary. As the United States had no "Sphere of Influence" and would have been allotted no section of China, in case of partition, we stood to lose all trade opportunities in the greatest new market in the world. This state of affairs caused the then Secretary of State, the late John Hay, to send a note to Germany, with copies to the other powers, suggesting an agreement by Germany that—in view of our treaty rights—duties, taxes, etc., should be the same for all nations in the lately leased territory and port of Kiao-Chow, and stating that the other powers had been requested to make a like agreement as to the Chinese ports under their control. All the powers finally agreed. The next step as a circular note to all the powers whose troops were then marching on Pekin, requesting an agreement "to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaties and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire." By the acceptance of all the powers this note prevented the partition of China and reaffirmed the policy of the "Open Door." Our government showed its sincere support of the "Open Door" by applying it to our new oriental possessions, the Philippine Islands, where the United States products pay the same duties as those from other countries.
The fourth policy, "Asiatic Exclusion," has only lately met with acceptance by the whole country. This policy is considered essential for the protection of American labor in the Pacific Coast States, and the rest of the country have accepted it as a national policy.
The latest policy is "The Exclusive Military and Commercial Control of the Panama Canal." After a prolonged discussion Congress finally decided to fortify the canal and passed laws permitting our coasting trade to use the canal free of tolls, while placing our vessels in foreign trade on the same footing as foreign vessels.
Each of the above policies calls for particular plans and means to carry them out, although the plans and means provided for one might serve perfectly in the enforcement of one, or more, of the others. In fact, were full and complete plans made and adequate means provided to insure the carrying out of our first and oldest policy, that of "No Entangling Alliances"—or, in slang, "Playing a lone hand against the world"—we would be splendidly equipped to carry out each or all of the others.
In addition to familiarity with our own policies and the supplying of the means to carry them out, we should study the policies of other nations, both announced and secret, so as to make the preparations necessary to defeat these should they come in conflict with out national interests.
Having provided through the Committee of National Defense to bring the policy, strategy and means together, our remaining task is to insure the education and training of our naval and military officers to make the best plans, to select the best means and methods with which to carry out these plans and, most important, to educate the people to understand and therefore to support the administration in its policies, the Congress in providing the means, our commanders-in-chief in the execution of the plans.
This will insure proper preparation, which will, with a nation in arms, insure success in war should it come; but will, if well done, serve its higher purpose, that of keeping the peace