Motto: Mahon in peius ruit,
Perfection adhuc perficienduni potest;
Quid multa!
The need of a higher standard of discipline in the navy does not imply that the discipline is lax. Inasmuch as nothing is perfect, discipline can be improved, and it is in this spirit that the following suggestions, evolved in nearly eight years' service afloat and crystallized by one years' experience as executive of a second rate ship and as commanding officer of a small gunboat, are offered.
There have been great advances in efficiency, in general, in the last five years. But has the state of discipline kept stride with this progress? It is possible that our complacency in regard to the state of discipline comes from a very misleading comparison with past accomplishments instead of a comparison with an ideal standard. The ideal should be used for the purpose of comparison, for, although visionary as regards accomplishment, it is real as regards standard.
1EDITOR’S NOTE.—This essay was submitted in the prize essay competition for 1913 and was accepted for publication.
It is the general opinion that the officers of the navy have worked very hard, an opinion that is justified by what has been accomplished. But more could have been accomplished if part of the work had been directed towards the establishment and maintenance of a standard of discipline. Will not a close analysis show that this progress has been made solely by the use of competition stimulated by money prizes? Will it not show that competition has done that which should have been done by discipline? This does not imply that competition is harmful. On the contrary it is the most powerful agent that can be used in a service like ours to produce excellence. But has it not been given such undue prominence that we are losing sight of the fact that discipline is the only foundation upon which a military organization can be built?
There has been a tendency to slacken up on matters of discipline in order to get the crew in a certain humor for target practice. Many ships upon which this has been done have made good records. Also many ships that have not done it have made good records. While it is only the shots which hit that count it must not be forgotten that discipline is the factor that will determine the behavior of the personnel during war.
To admit the necessity for competition and its stimulation by money prizes is equivalent to an admission that the American character is incompatible with military discipline. This is true if we try to develop a discipline based on the principle of the "divine right of kings." Every. American boy can rise to the highest position in the land, and he is taught this principle from the cradle as his birthright. Consequently no American boy can be expected to take kindly to the discipline exemplified in some foreign navies. It is contrary to all of the ideas he absorbed when learning patriotism, and therefore it is sensible to conform discipline to the American character instead of conforming the American character to discipline.
If we bear in mind that discipline in the American navy must be a means to an end, and not an end in itself, as it almost is in some foreign navies, the incompatibility will disappear. The product of foreign discipline is a machine, precise, exact, and perfect, but devoid of a great amount of intelligence. It is necessary to suppress intelligence in order to get the finished product. In contradistinction we want men of, initiative and intelligence and must take pains to develop these qualities.
We can cultivate this form of discipline, and it will be superior to any other. We must take into consideration our national characteristics, and conform the routine at training stations and the administration on board ship so that every man has before him the knowledge that, just as the sole reason for the existence of a battleship is to fight with her guns, so his sole reason for being on board is to contribute to that end. This must be brought into direct harmony with the idea that it requires merit for a man to keep his American birthright, and that the officers are, and must be, the judges of his merit.
In this conformation it is necessary to make use of the elemental forces that operate in the minds of all normal individuals. Without going too far into the question of ethics it may be stated as a broad principle that it is either fear of punishment or hope of reward that makes the world go round. These forces operating in the mind of the typical American boy will cause resentment if the idea of punishment is given too much prominence in the enforcement of discipline. Better results will ensue if the enforcement is based on the principle that the ultimate aim of every man is his own highest good. Highest good may take different forms in the minds of different individuals. In one it may mean a material reward or an advancement; in another it may mean the escape from or avoidance of punishment. In other words, it must be instilled into the minds of the individuals that in obeying all of the orders and regulations of the navy, they are working for their best interests in doing their duties well.
If we consider the ideal and make comparisons, it is apparent that on some ships the daily drills are carried out in a slovenly manner and incompletely. In some cases it is the direct fault of the officers; while in others it is the indirect fault of the officers who have complacently followed an antiquated system. Some men dislike drills and hate to go to quarters. Consequently there are a few yeomen, artificers, etc., who hibernate during this period. Their dislike of drills and quarters gives rise to the numerous excuses which they invent to avoid taking part in them. The toleration of such a condition is equivalent in a degree to exempting such men from the discipline of the ship.
Drills and quarters are necessary and the likes and dislikes of the men in this regard should be given absolutely no consideration. Yet drills and quarters can be made less irksome, and drills can be improved by looking at the matter from the view-point of the men. Ordinarily a drill period of an hour is assigned to a drill that should require not more than half an hour. To utilize the extra half-hour requires a tiresome repetition of the drill, or else it is carried out by fits and starts, halfheartedly, and in a slovenly manner. There is no reason to believe that even on the largest ship the longest and most tedious drill should require more than half or three-quarters of an hour. This can be accomplished by impressing on the men that there is a standard of excellence for all drills, and that the drills will be as short as possible when they come up to the standard, but will be as long as necessary to make them come up to the standard. This is a concrete example of what constitutes highest good in a small thing. In this case "highest good" for the men, will be to avoid a tiresome repetition of the drill, and after this is brought to their attention a few times they will do their best at the first attempt. Therefore when drills are carried out in a slovenly manner by the ship's company as a whole, repeat them immediately. If only a few men are delinquent, an extra drill squad has a most stimulating effect. At the beginning this will require a little extra work on the part of the officers, and drills will often last longer than the allotted time. The executive officer especially must be constant in supervision and observation. He may find it necessary to inflict extra drills on individual divisions, but he will soon find that the division officers will pull with him in order to avoid extra drills on their own accounts.
To the casual observer the idea of spending only ten or fifteen minutes at a drill will appear outrageous. What can the men do except loaf during the remainder of the drill period? Why not permit them to loaf if they have carried out the drill rapidly and thoroughly? A repetition simply for the purpose of killing time will not make the drill any more thorough or rapid, but will have the opposite effect. Besides there is always plenty of work to do. A ship cannot be too clean. The men always work cheerfully, for they seem to look upon work as a permanent necessity and upon drill as an occasional necessity.
The following points are small things in themselves, but have considerable bearing on a proper standard:—Require every man to go to quarters, and to go at first call instead of waiting until assembly. Require all men to move on the double at all general drills no matter how trivial or unimportant their duties may appear to be. It is surprising how much time will be saved, and how much progress will be made toward a standard. It will entail a little more attention on the part of the division officers, but no division officer can spend a little time to better advantage than in anticipation and providing for all the details of the routine of his division. If the division officer is made almost supreme in his domain, and held strictly to account, he will get results in the complete administration of his division which will be as gratifying as those obtained when the present system of gunnery training began. Since our discipline must necessarily differ from that of foreign navies, the standard must be based on the formative influences, the pleasures, conveniences, and development in our homes. Discipline without contentment will be a failure. The only real factors in the contentment of the men are their food and liberty. Athletics and entertainments are the only diversions. If the food and liberty are neglected no amount of attention to the diversions will produce contentment. Under such circumstances the men will look upon the diversions as cheap attempts to buy favor and will accept them with contempt. Under such circumstances discipline would be improved by omitting the diversions, no matter how much they may contribute to the desired end at other times.
No greater mistake can be made than to coddle the men. It increases the difficulty of administration, and this difficulty grows ten-fold in the case of official coddling. It never has bettered the welfare of the men and never will promote discipline or efficiency. Discipline means efficiency and can be produced after giving due consideration to the adaptability of our national character, and the opportunity for comfort and enjoyment in our homes.
Every officer must be cold-blooded in his analysis and application of the foregoing principles. To try to be popular, and this fault is more or less common, is to be more or less of a failure. On the other hand a proper understanding and a ready sympathy for the men will aid materially. In some respects the lot of the men is not to be envied. In most foreign and many home ports, their enjoyments ashore are somewhat limited.
A ready understanding of the feelings of recruits will help in many cases, and all that is needed is a little patience in order to give a man a right start who otherwise would leave the service with a bad-conduct discharge. It is now quite generally recognized that some men, who, at the beginning of their careers appear to be unfitted for the service turn out to be valuable men on board ship. The average recruit comes from a farm or an inland town, spends two or three months at a training station, and learns nothing about the navy except how to care for his clothes and keep himself clean. Next he is sent on board a cruising ship and his introduction to the service probably begins on a coal lighter shoveling coal. He is expected to fall into his place immediately. He finds something entirely different from what he expected and is consequently, lost, often for some months. Some never find themselves. It is a long step from a corn field to the gun-deck, and it is to the great credit of our American youth that so many do find themselves.
Liberty-breaking is the greatest menace to discipline with which we have to deal. This is apparent to one who has spent six months on a ship with only one instance of liberty-breaking after coming from a ship with the usual percentage of chronic offenders. After such a pleasant experience, the conclusion arrived at is that liberty-breaking should he treated as a much more serious offense. The reason that it is not so treated is because it is so common, and commanding officers have grown so used to it, that they look upon it as an incurable evil.
Yet it can be prevented or at least greatly reduced by looking at the matter from the view-point of the men and by shaping the means accordingly. There should be no deprivation of liberty as a punishment except by sentence of a court-martial. When a man is entitled to liberty, he should be permitted to go ashore unless it is necessary to keep him on board for extra drill or unfinished work, or the sanitary, political, or other conditions ashore render it inadvisable to grant liberty. As a punishment for minor offenses, deprivation of liberty, or restriction, or classing (any name will serve) is retaliative and not corrective. Any man is liable to commit a minor offense at any unguarded moment. If classing or restriction is part of his punishment, he is never sure of his liberty. Consequently when he does go on liberty he will stay overtime and get his fill on the least temptation. Incidentally, he knows that the punishment will be so light that he is willing to pay the price.
The punishment should be of sufficient severity to fit the offense. If a man was certain in the knowledge that if he stayed overtime, he would be court-martialed and lose both money and liberty, it would be very natural for him to return on time, knowing that for a petty offense committed on board he would not be deprived of his liberty.
The reason for the prevalent laxity in dealing with liberty-breakers is not hard to find. Many chronic offenders are so valuable on board ship that the commanding officer feels, justified in assigning a nominal punishment in order to retain such men in the service. No attention is paid to the demoralizing affect of a tolerated bad example, or else the commanding officer believes that the services of such men are of sufficient value to counterbalance the bad example. It is not the bad example, but it is the toleration that is harmful, and this toleration will create in the minds of other valuable men the idea that they also are exempt from discipline. The resultant progress is from bad to worse. It is not in accordance with the spirit of military preparedness, nor with natural order, that any man can be so valuable that his services cannot be dispensed with.
The question of liberty-breaking has been ably set forth by Captain W. F. Fullam, U. S. N., in his article on "Liberty-Breaking in the Fleet,"2 an article which impresses one with its sound common sense. It shows clearly and conclusively that a commanding officer can accomplish more by applying common sense to human nature, than by applying a theory to a peculiar sort of an individual, the bluejacket, who is not less human than any other man. It appears that Captain Fullam gave the men their rights as Americans instead of privileges as bluejackets.
It is the opinion of many officers of high rank, ability, and long experience, that the navy is beginning to feel the need of a proper military spirit. This need is made apparent if the ordinary routine on any ship be closely observed. Some units of the organization are allowed to look constantly at the things at hand, instead of those which are approaching. Their perspective becomes so distorted that they lose sight of the fact that their function is to contribute to the harmonious working of the whole. Men not having specific military duties, such as the engineer's force, are more or less imbued with the idea that doing their particular work is doing their whole duty. They look upon the military drills and the military features of the routine as incidental worries which interfere with the day's work. The drills, the state of discipline, and in short everything that will have a final bearing upon success in battle, should be the day's work, and every effort should be made to develop this spirit.
2”Absence Over Leave in the Fleet," by Captain W. F. Fullam, U. S. Navy; page 1103, Whole No, 14o; Vol. 37, No. 4; December, 1911.
The engineer's division has a routine entirely different from that of the other divisions of the ship. Is such a routine necessary for repairs to the machinery, or for the efficient performance of the machinery? It does not seem improbable that such a routine was originally fathered by the men's aversion for drills and quarters. In order that the idea that a ship exists for the purpose of fighting shall not be lost, it might be advisable to give the engineer's force a monthly drill under arms or at the ship's battery. Machinists, boatswains, carpenters and other specialists, should have some function at all military drills for the same reason. In theory, the drill regulations provide for the manning of part of the ship's battery under certain conditions of service. Why not make this possible of accomplishment in fact? It certainly cannot be done efficiently or satisfactorily on short notice, under the existing routine.
For lack of a practical demonstration at first hand, it is possible that the casual reader will call the foregoing ideas visionary, if he does not use a stronger adjective. Yet, if intelligently and patiently applied, these principles will better the conditions on board ship, will materially raise the standard of discipline and efficiency, and at the same time make the discipline less irksome—a point which should not be passed over too lightly.
If it were not the impropriety of making invidious distinctions a practical demonstration could be furnished by the comparison of one ship with the ships of the fleet. This ship had two commanding officers in a period of eight months, both of whom believed thoroughly in the consistency of discipline and contentment. The first commanding officer had special ideas on organization which, condensed as much as possible, are as follows:
In all matters of discipline, consider things from the other fellow's point of view, before enforcing them.
Subordinate everything to efficiency in battle and thereby arrive at the greatest general efficiency without being very mediocre in any of the details incident thereto. Make the gun's crew the actual unit of organization. Make the organization of divisions, watches, and sections, incidental to the actual unit, the gun's crew, instead of making the gun's crew incidental to the organization of divisions, watches and sections.
Co-ordinate and conform all details of the organization so that there will be mutual support, and so that the most can be accomplished with the least expenditure of time and effort. Make this co-ordination and conformation simple enough to be as near fool-proof as possible.
Lastly, let there be no divided responsibility in any unit.
The mere recital of these ideas does not convey much information as to their value. The value will become apparent after the comprehensive study of a station bill constructed accordingly.
The ship was taut. The men knew exactly where they stood, and were contented. Their bearing and appearance ashore when compared with other men of the fleet was such as to excite favorable comment. The ship was always clean above and below, and the drills were excellent. The ship was very old, yet in connection with short drills and their relation to the ship's work, it is a significant fact that she needed fewer repairs than other and newer ships in the fleet.
For a period of over seven months there was only one instance of liberty-breaking, the case of a man who was unfortunate enough to get into trouble with the police on his return to the ship. During the greater part of this time the ship was alone. Part of this time was spent in ports where conditions were unfavorable for liberty-breaking. The remainder was spent in ports where conditions, especially as regards liquor and kindred vices, were very favorable. After falling in with the fleet, liberty-breaking commenced again, but it was less than was expected. The small amount was without doubt due to the pernicious effect of tolerated bad examples on other ships.
When the first commanding officer left the ship for a better command, he put all of the foregoing ideas into effect on his new ship, immediately. It is enlightening and gratifying to note that this ship won the trophy shortly afterward.
In conclusion it is possible that the above-mentioned results were accomplished by an exceptional crew under exceptionally favorable circumstances. But if there are any officers who are inclined to stand pat on the question of a higher standard of discipline, it would be interesting and instructive to hear their explanation as to why our newly-commissioned ships require such a long period to shake down.