Much of what follows will be recognized by many officers as true and accepted by them without argument. In fact, it has very frequently been the experience of those attempting to write a paper of this nature that they have been received with statements to the effect that they were not communicating anything new.
Probably it would be difficult for any of us to write upon professional subjects without reflecting the thoughts of others; few of us would be apt to submit a paper in which our brother officers would find nothing good!
By some officers, those anxious to learn and who have lacked opportunity, the arguments will be accepted and the statements believed. There will be officers, however, who will continue to look upon all pertaining to the title of this article with a certain amount of suspicion, and who will continue to smile inwardly at the three institutions, and who honestly believe they are not needed.
We need all three types of officers, but we need most more of those who already know, and these can only be recruited from the second lot, who are willing and anxious to be convinced.
Of the third lot, some can be convinced by the proper presentation of facts, and if this paper converts one man to the belief that what he calls "high brows" and "brain trusts" are essentials for success in war, this effort will have succeeded.
Suppose we assume that all officers in a naval service are expert electricians, but they know nothing about, and do not believe in, steam. The result, upon going to sea, could be foretold without a diagram.
Reverse the assumption and the answer to the problem is equally evident.
In other words, we must have experts in both electricity and steam. Take any branch of our widely diversified profession, and similar arguments will show the necessity for specialization.
It can readily be shown by a consideration of the characteristics of officers on both the retired and the active lists that an expert in one subject is sometimes quite helpless (and hopeless, too,) in another. It is quite unnecessary to name names, for most of us know examples aplenty, and besides, we know our own limitations pretty well.
It has frequently been remarked that "it is not the star men at the Naval Academy who make the best officers," but, not having been permitted to wear a star myself, I am prepared to argue this matter a bit.
In the first place, there are really very few "stars" who graduate, so it is rather easier to pick a poor officer from the few than from the many who are unable to "star."
In the days when an officer's ability to handle a ship under sail, and to get the maximum amount of work out of a crew of double-fisted, big-hearted, rough-and-ready sailormen from all countries in the world, represented his efficiency, probably the "wooden-section" outshone the first section; at any rate we know of enough examples to state the general rule. But these requirements no longer exist, since sailing a ship, or even a ship's boat, has become a luxury not often obtainable nowadays, and the character of the personnel to be handled has changed as greatly as the material. Therefore this rule about "stars" must not be accepted because of tradition, but may even readily be disproved by individuals now in the service.
It remains a fact, however, that some officers who excel in writing long "screeds," and convincing ones, too, about strategy, for instance, are rather in the way on board ship. Some of them succeed in bringing about a lot of unnecessary unhappiness afloat. Some of them positively cannot handle a ship or handle men to an advantage.
The "Plucking Board" has found some officers on account of this "unhappy ship" business, but, as this board has had access to all records concerning an officer, it is right to assume that the bad outweighed the good, even if some of them might have shown ability to expound upon strategy, or another so-called "highbrow" branch.
We need strategists and tacticians, "highbrows" as distinguished from the horny-handed sailor, as much as we need mechanics, electricians, and ship-handlers. Probably the men who have shown at the Naval Academy they can study and think well will be the best from whom to recruit this type!
One reason the need is not so generally understood is because we have been at peace for some years, and we haven't really needed "high-brows" for a very long time.
The need for officers qualified to solve the strategical and tactical problems, at once evident when war threatens, is somewhat similar to our need that will then arise for auxiliaries.
Some of the auxiliaries we don't really need in peace time (except for increased efficiency and for economy), but during war they are as necessary as the battleships. Anyone familiar With the scramble that had to be made in 1898 for auxiliaries, and With some of the poor make-shifts we had to make the best of, will agree that it would have been a good plan to have had some officers working on such matters before war threatened.
It is also a matter of official record that a board of officers was assembled at that time to consider and advise upon policy, strategy, and tactics.
How much better it would have been to have had all this worked out beforehand—to have been able to consult a card-catalogue and pull out a well-digested plan!
It takes about three years to get a battleship from her keel-laying to the fighting line. It requires many times three years to develop an officer qualified to employ that battleship, with others, to the best advantage in war.
There are some natural strategists. Unfortunately the number is small and the opportunities to develop the natural ability have been, in the past, too few. Doubtless there are officers now on the retired list who, if they could have had the benefits of the War College course (not once, but from the time they were lieutenants till they become captains, from time to time), would no doubt have presented us with some definite policies, almost rules, concerning strategy and tactics.
There are some officers now who know that a certain maneuver in the presence of the enemy (for instance) would result in defeat.
Why should not that fact, with others equally as certain, be a matter of common (confidential, if you like) knowledge among all commissioned officers?
Owing to the great number of games that have been played at the War College, certain principles are recognized by those officers who have been fortunate enough to get the experience. Why not codify these, spread the information, invite comment?
The duties of a general staff have been recognized by major nations for some years.
Futile efforts have been made to include a general staff in the organization of our Navy Department. Probably lack of information on the part of our law makers is the only reason we haven't one, for the personal objections that have actually prevented legislation could not have prevailed against patriotism backed by knowledge.
It is a possibility that when war threatens we may be fortunate enough to find a genius, or more than one, who may, without previous study, advise the civilian Secretary (the civil administration) as to the best strategy and military conduct of the war, from a naval point of view, but how much better it would be to have a number of officers previously trained by study of other wars, by strategical and tactical games, and by constant thought inspired by these on the various problems presented, to be able to answer the questions as they arise!
The best personnel in the world, the most accurate marksmanship, the finest vessels, and the country, may all be sacrificed by a failure to grasp the possibilities brought about by the information that an enemy fleet has sailed from a given port bound in a given direction.
Those who have previously studied such a problem will at once be able to say, with authority, "he is bound there, or here, or there, and we most do this, or that, or this!"
Others may guess, and possibly guess right, but the stake is too high to be won (or lost) by guesswork.
Several books have been written about the game of whist, with its two more recent modifications. One who has played the games can read these books and learn things from them. Only a genius could, without present or previous practice, read the book and play a satisfactory game. Quoting from many writers, and most recently from Captain Sims, "war is a game," and the same reasoning applies to the correct solution of its varied problems. Reading alone will not suffice—we must have sub-caliber practice!
The General Board is the nearest organization to a general staff we have been able to establish, and as that organization cannot exercise authority (and has usually had opposition), it lacks that great necessity to military efficiency—responsibility.
The only responsibility falling to a member of the General Board is that resulting from his loyalty and his professional pride. Of course we may always count upon these, but they are poor substitutes for the real thing, for in a military organization sentiment has no real place. There are too many demonstrations of the correctness of the definition given war by General Sherman to warrant much argument on this score.
At times the General Board has been called upon for recommendations upon matters concerning which important information has not been furnished, for the simple reason that no machinery existed to insure its delivery. A proper organization would prevent this to a great degree, but a proper organization in our Navy Department can only result from legislation—a difficult thing to get.
The Naval War College and the office of Naval Intelligence are so closely related to the duties of the General Board that the three organizations should be under one roof, and the officers detailed to the three should be in constant daily consultation, with committees representing all three in frequent session.
There should be one head—properly a chief of general staff—to whom the heads of the three natural divisions should be responsible. Each should know the needs of the others, and the work of each should be so regulated that these needs might best be met.
No one of the three can intelligently carry on without the others, and their relations should be those of fact, not hampered by the requirements of correspondence, with its resulting delays and well-known limitations.
The office of Naval Intelligence seems somewhat handicapped by lack of funds, and of course the only relief from this situation must come from the Congress, but it seems that a re-organization to meet the demands of the department, the bureaus, the War College, and the General Board, is not only practicable, but easy to accomplish.
The War College, the office of Naval Intelligence, and the General Board should have a common stenographic force, with a chief clerk to regulate its use, subject to the control of an officer secretary, who would decide upon the relative urgency of the work. Much delay now existing would be avoided in this way.
Of course the immediate foregoing is not suggested as a total solution to existing handicaps—it offers a basis upon which to begin.
It has recently come to my knowledge that several offices under the Navy Department have applied to a civilian business office for the same information. Putting aside the loss from unnecessary wasted activity on the part of all but one of the branches of the department, such procedure probably does most harm by convincing the recipient of the requests for information of the lack of departmental organization. We must avoid such unfavorable just criticism by improving our organization. While we need publicity, we do not need the very just unfavorable comment caused by the incident cited. It is an example of what criticism teaches us, but why remain liable to a repetition thereof on the same subject?
The General Board, since its origin, has partly solved the problem of co-ordination with the War College and the office of Naval Intelligence by alternating between Washington and Newport.
This practice was one of expediency, and was brought about by the late Rear-Admiral Henry C. Taylor, U. S. Navy, whose loss to the navy can only be appreciated by those fortunate enough to have served intimately enough with him to know his aims.
However, when in Washington the General Board suffers because of its physical distance from the War College, which even the efficiency of the United States mail cannot bridge. The same applies as regards the office of Naval Intelligence (to omit details of the inefficiency resulting from the absence of the Board from its files), when the General Board is in Newport.
A study of the navy regulations on the subject will readily convince one of the close relations of the three offices in theory.
Heretofore insurmountable obstacles have prevented their closer physical proximity.
We can never get the full benefit of the valuable work done in the three organizations until we do get this physical proximity, and our efforts to accomplish it should not cease until the result is obtained.
Very brief consideration and general information only should convince one that the only logical locality for these "three-in-one" is in Washington.
They form a most necessary part of the Navy Department, and while the ideal arrangement of the department would be to house it all under one roof, we simply cannot hope for such a condition in the near future. We may hope to have the department in one city, and probably the most obstinate objection to be overcome would be the deep-rooted belief in some parts of official Washington to the effect that all naval officers want duty in the Capital City, and that the minimum possible number should be permitted to reside and have duty there.
By way of suggestion, why would not a proper building for the Navy Department form a dignified, valuable, and lasting "Lincoln Memorial?"
The objections to "ordering officers to Washington" result only from ignorance, and this particular ignorance can be corrected. I suggest that it be corrected!
With the Secretary's aids and the General Board made legal and obligatory, and the housing of the three offices in the title under one roof, our Navy Department would possess a general staff of which we could expect the maximum efficiency, and that seems to be what we are here for.
The facts being so evident to us who are informed, it is our duty to inform those through whom alone we may accomplish the end.
Certainly we are not immune from the need of a general staff, and more warlike nations have adopted them.
Possibly because of our lack (as a nation) of a naval policy, we need such a staff rather more than nations possessing such a policy.
The somewhat advertised, much needed and proposed council of national defense would go far towards filling our wants, but could' not take the place of a general staff, for the council could not take up the details for which a general staff exists. Probably a council of national defense would go far in the educational direction hereinbefore advocated.
Recently we have been fortunate enough in having an administration in the Navy Department that has, by departmental action, overcome many of the handicaps under which our navy has previously suffered.
The fact that it has been due entirely to individuals forms its weakness, and much of the existing good organization may be entirely done away with by simply failing to provide officers for it.
Owing to the vast amount of instruction necessary to enable mature minds to grasp the details of a naval organization of which they have previously been in total ignorance, the activities .of the naval officers in the Navy Department cannot be devoted entirely to their professional duties. Much time has been spent in the past, and without adequate legislation much time will be spent in the future, for the sole reason that we have been and will be on the defensive.
Our arguments are so convincing and self-evident to us that we often fail to impress the uninformed with their truth and justice.
An official suggestion that the Naval War College should be moved to Washington would, at one time, have almost certainly caused its abolition. There has been a well-defined belief among our law makers that all naval officers desired nothing so much as to be ordered to Washington, and more than once Congressional inquiries have handicapped the Navy Department by preventing its natural expansion, due to increased activities afloat and to the growth of the personnel and material.
To those who know there seems no argument that can prove the falsity of the belief that all officers want duty in Washington.
Those of us who have heard so many officers state the opposite as their desires know the belief to be erroneous. How prove it? I suggest that officers having, for some time, been directed to state their preferences as regards duty, it would be rather simple to determine exactly how many have stated their desire to serve in Washington.
This is an example of the difficult educational feature of our organization, and while all who really know about such matters will agree that the offices named in the title of this paper should be physically present in the Navy Department, only a few are in a position to attempt to prove it and to bring it about.
Without ability to anticipate questions that may arise one cannot advance convincing arguments, but it is possible to give concrete examples existing in nations whose daily existence depends upon military preparedness for war.
Anyone who has read the newspapers during the most recent wars cannot fail to be impressed with the results due to preparedness, and the failures due to a lack of it. Those familiar with our own situation in 1898 have always since then appreciated the efficiency due to readiness and the inevitable mistakes caused by lack of previous plans.
We have, fortunately, been able to progress, but why not perfect our readiness?
Under existing legislative sentiment we will need all the advantages to be gained by previous preparation, for it is now certain that the Congress has already handicapped our national defense by failing to provide an "adequate navy."
We all hope that the United States will not be forced into war, but wars are declared suddenly nowadays, and the only insurance against a war, disastrous to the lives and property of Americans is a sea power, backed by a knowledge of its proper use, that will make it dangerous for another nation to undertake war with us.
It will not be necessary, nor work harm, for us to advertise our condition--the others know it now, and they will take note of any improvements we may be able to bring about.
It will only be a knowledge by them that we are efficient and strong that will prevent war, for we have no right in fact to sit calmly down and announce "We will never go to war!"
With all due respect to the honest gentlemen who believe they can bring about a state of perpetual peace by making statements not upheld by facts, it can scarcely be disputed that we always have had wars since we became a nation, and other nations are at war to-day. What has made us immune?
The Naval War College, the General Board, and the office of Naval Intelligence are as necessary to a proper preparation for war as is the gun factory at Washington.
They are all concrete necessities (name them what you like) of a general staff (and I don't care what you call that, either, so long as it delivers the goods), and example, if nothing else, teaches us that such an organization is a military asset.
It is a fact that in the past much effort has been lost because of a lack of co-ordinated effort.
Congressmen have had positive statements from one officer concerning a particular proposition, and immediately have gotten an equally positive contradictory statement from another, the reason being that one officer knew his subject and the other did not.
We have all known men who found it difficult to say "I don't know" or "My knowledge on that subject is of a general nature, and I must study the details."
None of us may now properly be expected to be experts on all relating to our profession, and it is not to our discredit to acknowledge inability to answer questions on subjects with which we are not familiar.
It would be equally consistent to expect us to be familiar with the pilotage of all ports in the world, whether or not we had visited them. It would be as reasonable as to expect a modern lawyer to be familiar with all branches of his profession; or to expect a physician to be a specialist concerning every part of the human anatomy. We know that lawyers and physicians specialize, and, in law courts, for instance, only experts are called.
There have been examples known to many of us of success in obtaining legislation because of co-ordinated effort with knowledge of the subject, when equally valuable measures have failed to succeed because of a lack of knowledge on the part of the law makers.
Therefore, let us decide now what we want and go after it.
I suggest that the thing. most urgently needed now is the necessary law to firmly establish a general staff or its equivalent, and as a part thereof should be the combination and co-ordination of the Naval War College, the General Board, and the office of Naval Intelligence.