The Period Before 1868
Commodore Perry's landing on July 14, 1853, convinced the Japanese that foreign demands could only be resisted by a navy. In 1854 the Shogun government decided to procure war-ships through the Dutch in Nagasaki, and the Daimios of the southern provinces were authorized to possess war-ships. In 1863 the government sent two officers to study in Holland, where the steam corvette Kagomaru was purchased.
The greater part of the little navy was lost in 1868 by the insurrection of Admiral Enomoto, an adherent of the last of the Shoguns.
The First Naval Development Period, 1868 to 1894-95
The present imperial Japanese Navy was developed from the vessels remaining after the war of restoration of the Mikado with the war-ships of the Daimios of the southern provinces, Satsuma, Choshiu and Hizen. The building of the navy was delayed at first by the more urgent needs of the army to suppress internal disorders.
The navy was reorganized in 1872 on a plan substantially as at present. The expedition against the pirates in Formosa in 1874, Chinese interference there and in Korean relations, together with disorders in the island provinces, required rapid development of the navy. England served as a pattern and three armored corvettes were built there and delivered in 1877.
Progress was slow until the war with China, 1894-95. Japan could not afford armored ships but procured cruisers and torpedo boats. The larger vessels were procured from Europe; smaller vessels were built in Japanese shipyards. The first government shipyard was laid out at Yokosuka in 1871.
At the beginning of the war with China, 1894, Japan had a fleet of 32 war-ships and 23 torpedo-boats, with a total displacement of 65,582 tons and complement of 13,928 men. The annual cost of maintenance was 5,500,000 yen. The nucleus of the navy comprised:
1 Armored coast defence ship, Fuso, of 3800 tons.
2 Old armored gunboats, Kongo and Hi- Yei, each 2300 tons. 1 Newer armored gunboat, Chiyoda, of 2400 tons.
4 Protected cruisers, Itsukushima, Matsushima, Hashidate and
Josino, each of 4200 tons. 4 Small cruisers, Xaniwa, Takashio, Akitsushima and Suma, of from 2700 to 3700 tons. Suma still building.
The Second Development Period, 1895 to 1902
In the war with China the Japanese captured 14 vessels of total displacement of about 15,600 tons, including one armored ship of 7300 tons, one armored gunboat of 2100 tons, and one protected cruiser of 2400 tons. China lost all interest in the navy, paid a large war indemnity, and China's naval progress was set back 15 years. During this war Japan ordered two battleships, Fuji and Yashima, to be built in England, and after peace began building two small cruisers in Japan; the Akashi and Miyako. The Sutna was launched in 1895. The cruiser Izwni, ex-EsmaraJda, was purchased from Chile and arrived in Japan in 1895.
In the spring of 1896, the naval forces in Asiatic waters of Western Powers aggregated 188,000 tons, and Japan felt compelled to increase her navy.
When the prompt payment of the Chinese war indemnity was assured, this fund, amounting to 362,900,000 yen, enabled the government to submit a second ship-building program, which was designated:
The Post-Bellum Program of 1897.
This program provided as follows:
1. The increase of the navy to 233,000 tons by expenditure of 213.000,000 yen in annual installments for 10 years, or until 1906. The program was practically completed in 1903, as the final installments for 1904, 1905 and 1906 were small. The last ship authorized by this program was laid down in 1902.
2. The program authorized building the following ships:
4 Battleships, each of 15,200 tons.
6 Armored cruisers, each of 9200 tons.
3 Small cruisers, each of 4800 tons.
2 Small cruisers, each of 3400 tons.
3 Torpedo gunboats, each of 1200 tons.
1 Torpedo depot ship, of 800 tons.
11 Destroyers.
89 Torpedo boats.
The ships were built as proposed, except that instead of the three torpedo gunboats they built one despatch boat and one small cruiser, while the number of destroyers was increased to 23 and that of torpedo-boats decreased to 64, besides which they procured two river gunboats. The status of domestic shipyards made it necessary to have most of these ships built abroad by contract, but even at this time they were anxious to build in Japanese yards.
Discussion of the Post-Bellum Program of 1897
A. Its Military Political Aspect.
The combined strength of foreign squadrons in East-Asiatic waters was doubtless the direct incentive of this program, though a coalition of all these navies could not have been expected. The program was systematic in providing for six battleships and armored cruisers, as that number was considered advantageous tactically, though they were more influenced by the probable time of completion.
The political weather-vane pointed steadily to Russia. The construction of the great Siberian railroad was being pushed with extraordinary vigor, which roused Japanese suspicions. This road was projected in 1888. In 1889, the stretch to Irkutsk was in operation. In 1900 the trans-Balkan and East-China stretches were operated, and in November, 1901, they completed the South Manchurian branch. In 1894 Russia began to increase her naval forces in the Pacific. In 1895 and 1896 she reinforced her troops in Vladivostok and continued to send additional troops. The Cassini treaty with China was negotiated, by which Russia obtained, viz.:
- Permit to extend the Siberian railroad through Manchuria to Vladivostok.
- To build a branch road via Mukden to Newchwang, and extension to the Liao-tung peninsula.
- To station troops to guard the roads there.
- To have control of Kiao-Chou Bay for 15 years.
Russia hesitated to take possession of Kiao-Chou Bay for fear of the jealousy of other European powers. In 1898 Russia took possession of Port Arthur.
The Japanese realized the urgent necessity of completing their program for new armaments before the Siberian railroad should be opened for traffic.
The reorganization of the Japanese army was planned to be completed by 1904, and for this in 1897 they had appropriated 81,200,000 yen, which was expended in the period to 1904. The naval ship-building program was completed in 1904, and in the meantime Japanese diplomacy postponed the inevitable collision with Russia until these preparations for war had been completed.
In 1897 the Russian Baltic fleet, which was the practical base for East Asia, consisted of the following modern ships:
5 Battleships, Poltava, Petropaulowski, Sevastopol, Peresvjet and Osliaba.
3 Armored cruisers, Rossija, Rurik and Gromoboi.
3 Large protected cruisers, Warjag, Diana and Pallada.
Japan had six battleships and six armored cruisers, built or building.
B. The Financial Political Aspect.
The estimated increase in the expenses for Japan after the Chinese war amounted 515,000,000 yen. 325,000,000 yen were allotted for the army and navy and 190,000,000 yen for public works, railroads, subventions, etc. The natural resources of Japan could not provide such sums even with the large Chinese war indemnity, since over 100,000,000 yen of this indemnity had to meet unpaid war expenses. Japan was therefore compelled to borrow vast sums of money. This paper cannot go into all details of financial operations, but only a general review.
- In 1894 Japan negotiated loans of 125,000,000 yen. The cost of the war with China was about 230,000,000 yen exclusive of the cost of suppressing the Formosan insurrection. After paying outstanding claims, the balance of the Chinese indemnity was used for the army and navy, but the navy was also strengthened with additional sums.
- Additional revenue was obtained by increasing the land tax, sake tax, licenses and duties on imports.
- Loans payable March 31, 1903, were negotiated:
- A foreign loan of 87,600,000 yen for public works and railroads; but as coast defences were included in the public works, this was largely used for army and navy.
- An inland loan of 101,300,000 yen was likewise for the public works and railroads, besides which there was an additional loan of 16,700,000 yen for Formosa.
C. Some Peculiar Features of Accounting.
The budgets were usually followed by deficiency bills varying from 9,500,000 to 17,400,000 yen.
In the budget of 1897-98 the accounts for expenses of Formosa were cleverly used for expenses in all departments.
Among the receipts there appeared during the period from 1893 to 1902 the total of 19,000,000 yen from a 10 per cent tax on the salaries of officials.
There is considerable confusion, and even with full details it is impossible to ascertain the amounts expended on individual ships for construction, engineering or armaments.
The Third Development Period, 1903 to 1911
A. The Period from 1903 to 1907.
The Boxer insurrection in China in 1900 diverted attention from the strained relations between Russia and Japan to Japan's advantage, whose armaments were not completed. The Russian ship-building program of 1898, their occupation of Manchuria and the commercial port of Newchwang, for which they used the Siberian railroad, the increasing concentration of naval and military forces in East Asia with other measures of similar import, and the occupation of Port Arthur especially, determined Japan to increase her armaments, no matter what the cost.
The Russian ship-building program of 1898 was a reply to the Japanese program of 1897, and provided for strengthening the Asiatic fleet by 1905 with the addition of eight battleships and six large protected cruisers.
Russia then built the following: eight battleships, the Pobjada, Rctivisan, Czarewitch, Knjas-Ssuworow, Imperator-Alexander III, Borodino, Arjol and Slawa, and four large cruisers: Askold, Bogatyr, Aurora and Oleg, besides the armored cruiser Bajan. Small cruisers not included. Japan could therefore expect her antagonist to appear off her coasts in 1905 with a superior force of 15 battleships, three armored cruisers and nine protected cruisers, to which Japan could only oppose six battleships and six armored cruisers. More were urgently needed, but whence the necessary money? But inasmuch as Russia built all except three of the above ships in her own slow-building shipyards, she could not overtake the Japanese ships being built in Europe. The prompt delivery of the Fuji and Yashima in 1897 should have been a warning to Russia. In 1903 all the new Japanese ships excepting two small cruisers had assembled in Japanese waters.
The Japanese press and people were greatly exited, and the possibility of providing still more was vehemently discussed in parliament. Programs were submitted and rejected, new elections were ordered and the new parliament passed the so-called Third Naval Law, which appropriated 99,860,000 yen, to be expended in annual installments for a period of 11 years, to build:
3 Battleships, of 16,000 tons each.
3 Armored cruisers, of 11,000 tons.
2 Small cruisers, of 5000 tons.
The ordinary revenue receipts indicated improvement in the finances; but foreign loan markets continued to be closed to the Japanese government, which was obliged to abandon the proposed reduction of the unpopular land tax. Moneys provided for railroads and public works were transferred to the navy, and all available funds from loans for railroads, telegraphs, etc., were likewise taken under various pleas for the army and navy.
The Financial Execution of The Third Naval Law.
Considerable difficulty was experienced in executing the program with the money appropriated. But they were remarkably successful in building up the navy. The two big battleships Katori and Kashima were ordered to be built in England at the outbreak of the Russian war. The Satsuma, Ikoina and Tsukuba were launched from Japanese yards at the close of 1906, and in the next year the Aki, Ibuki and Kurama. The installments were insufficient to provide for the cost of the ships proposed, including two "dreadnoughts" and four large armored cruisers. Other funds had to be used.
During the Russian war the navy was provided with an extraordinary appropriation of 222,500,000 yen, of which there was a balance unexpended, of 31.500,000 yen, which was given to the navy as receipts under this new law.
For war expenses and to cover this increase in the navy, a total of 1,700,000,000 yen was expended. The cost of the war, according to the "Financial and Economic Annual" of 1896, was 1,982,200,000 yen. The national debt increased from 561,600,000 yen in March, 1904, to 2,217,700,000 yen in March, 1907.
B. The Period from 1907 to 1911.
Japan's naval losses were fully compensated by the ships captured from the Russians, viz.: five battleships, three coast-defence ships, one armored cruiser, five destroyers, three protected cruisers and 14 auxiliary ships, though some had been sunk and raised and others had to undergo very extensive repairs. Japan lost two battleships, one coast-defence ship, three protected cruisers, one unprotected cruiser, three gunboats, two destroyers and seven torpedo-boats.
With the arrival of the Nishin and Kasuga shortly before the war, the Japanese navy was larger than proposed by the law. There were no just grounds to build ships to replace those lost: these were more than replaced by the captured ships. There was need of building substitutes, not because the Japanese ships.had become obsolete in that time but chiefly because they had all been launched about the same time.
A new program was discussed, however, and in the summer of 1907, a supplementing program was adopted, appropriating 333,500,000 yen, including the unexpended balance from the existing Third Naval Law amounting to 81,930,000 yen for new shipbuilding during the following seven years.
From a military point of view, this 1907 supplementing program provided a substantial increase of the navy over the Third Naval Law. The naval minister declared that there was no increase, and claimed that Japan had a number of obsolete ships that should be stricken from the list. The supplement of 1907 provided for the cost of building ships commenced during the war, repairing the captured Russian ships, and the cost of material ordered from England to build the 29 destroyers. There were strong motives to prepare for a possible war with some other nation.
The supplementing program appeared during a period of worldwide financial depression. After the war there was a great boom in commercial enterprises in Japan, but the financial panic in 1907-08 was a terrific shock on the Tokyo exchange.
National development was retarded. The burden of the war taxes was doubled and trebled by so-called tax reforms. War taxes that were expected to be removed in 1906 had to be continued. Commercial and social enterprises were postponed. All improvements and buildings of peaceful character had stopped during the war, and in the budget of 1906 only the most urgent requirements could be provided in order that all money and labor might be available for the navy. The government was anxious to nationalize the railroads; the debt had to be refunded by a thorough financial reform on a stable basis of normal conditions. The wounds of the war were still painfully felt, involving additional expenses for pensions and care of invalids. Many new problems arose, such as the expense of administering Korea and the maintenance of the large army and navy. A large part of the army was still stationed abroad. Four new divisions of the army were to be organized, and the naval program could not be carried out as proposed.
The conflict caused a change in the ministry. In 1905, Marquis Saiyoni had succeeded Katsura, the "Old Statesman," and in 1908 Katsura again resumed control as Premier and Minister of Finance. A change was made, and the budget of 1908-09 provided for a prolongation of the program period until 1915-16, or two years, and the budget of 1909-10 prolonged it another year, until 1916-17, with consequent reductions in the annual installments, to expend the money not before the end of the prolonged period.
Brief Sketch of Internal Conditions
Katsura's ministry promulgated a plan during the latter part of 1908 for: (1) Rapid redemption of the national debt, (2) the conversion of outstanding loans to reduce the rate of interest, and (3) no new loans. The proposition included reduction of expenses, economy in administration, new sources of revenue, more equitable distribution of the burden of taxation, measures to promote the social status of the people and increase of the salaries of officials.
He began with the redemption of the first series of Treasury notes, amounting to 97,000,000 yen, which was accomplished by the end of 1908. The financial reforms were executed with remarkable celerity, so that by the end of 1910 outstanding loans were reduced 238,000,000 yen. At this time the unredeemed national debt amounted to 2,630,000,000 yen = $1,328,000,000.00.
Japanese Foreign Commerce Since 1903. | |||
Year | Exports | Imports | Excess of imports |
In million yen | |||
1903 | 290 | 317 | 27 |
1904 | 319 | 371 | 52 |
1905 | 322 | 489 | 167 |
1906 | 424 | 419 | -5 |
1907 | 432 | 436 | 62 |
1908 | 378 | 436 | 58 |
1909 | 413 | 394 | -19 |
1910 | 473 | 473 | … |
The financial condition has improved. In 1911 other measures, such as the income tax, employer's liability, etc., will be adopted.
Some claimed that the government had found means to provide for a new naval building program, for additional administration expenses in Korea, for building railroads in Japan and Korea, for harbor works, for regulating rivers, and for the national steel works, which would all appear in the estimates for 1911-12. This would indicate that Katsura's policy had been successful. The Japanese press was jubilant.
Trade had suffered from the scarcity of money, but revived somewhat when circulation improved through the conversion policy. There was still a lack of confidence in the stability of affairs, but confidence was eventually restored. Trade statistics demonstrated that the government was right in its predicted return of prosperity. The exports in 1910 were 59,800,000 yen more than in 1909, while the imports were 78,300,000 yen greater and balanced at 473,000,000 yen.
Complete details of trade statistics would be voluminous, but they indicate a healthy growth. The large increase of the imports of 1910 over 1909 is chiefly due to extraordinary importation of raw cotton, amounting to 51,000,000 yen more than in 1909. The most important feature is that the importation of raw materials and unfinished iron and steel products was much greater than previously. The exports in 1910 reached 473,000,000 yen (higher than ever before), and included all classes of exports, among which the exportation of cotton yarn was the largest.
Agricultural interests are still depressed, but the most urgent need for Japan is to strengthen her national credit, which has apparently been partially successful. January 21, 1911, the Minister-President announced that Japanese credit abroad had been firmly re-established.
To return to the consideration of the naval policy, the naval administration was hampered by the prolongation of the shipbuilding program and consequent reduction of the annual installments. The delay was felt still more from the fact that the installments were inadequate to meet the higher cost of "dreadnoughts" to be built to substitute the obsolete ships. The administration was seeking the first financial opportunity to obtain more money. In 1909 the Naval Minister declared that a new naval program would be proposed as soon as financial conditions would warrant. During the latter part of 1909 the press clamored for a Fourth Naval Law, but the failure to negotiate favorable conversion of two foreign loans of 30,000,000 yen each silenced the press until the cherry-blossom season in the spring of 1910, when the fortunate conversion of the great loans of 281,000,000 yen, that reduced interest from 5 per cent to 4 per cent, justified new hopes.
The measure was debated generally during the summer of 1910, and in September the press reported that the new naval law would be submitted. The cost of administration in Korea was only 1,360,000 yen instead of the estimated cost of 12,359,000 yen, and the prospects for the navy were improved.
The desire for more rapid development of the navy was universal. The manager of the Bank of Japan declared that the proper maintenance of a strong navy was not a financial problem for Japan but a necessity for national security. The anti-Japanese agitation in the United States, together with the American policy to neutralize the Manchurian railroads and the discussion of the policy of fortifying the Panama Canal, aided the Japanese naval propaganda considerably. The "Jigo Shimpo" and other naval organs claimed that without a very large navy Japan would not be able to maintain her national honor after 1917.
Marquis Katsura compromised, and in the naval budget, 191112, provided an additional sum of 82,200,000 yen to be expended in a period of six years until 1916-17.
The Advisability of Renovating the Captured Russian Ships
This work was finished in 1908 by the expenditure of 60,000,000 yen, and has been unjustly criticized. The fighting value of these ships had depreciated by damages sustained in battle and by having been sunk, but they have been thoroughly repaired and have received new armaments, so that they are properly regarded as very serviceable war-ships. In the same time and with that amount of money Japan could have had two and a half "dreadnoughts" built in England, but it was Japanese policy to be independent of foreign shipyards. The domestic yards were at that time fully occupied in building new ships which required such long building periods (4 or 5 years) that they could not build substitutes for the lost ships rapidly. The repairs to the captured Russian ships served to train the dockyard personnel (the work being of a copy character, in which the Japanese excel). The renovation of the Russian ships likewise afforded the navy a convenient lever for new appropriations. These renovated Russian ships served as standards to demonstrate the superiority of new ships built in England. The moral effect in stimulating the esprit de corps was much greater by having these captured ships in commission than if they were kept in some naval museum or allowed to decay as wrecks.
The Naval Budget for 1911-1912 | |||
| 1910 | 1911 | Increase |
Million yen | |||
Ordinary expenses | 38.5 | 40.7 | 2.2 |
Extraordinary expenses | 37.2 | 45.5 | 8.3 |
Total | 75.7 | 86.2 | 10.5 |
The growth of the naval budgets is shown in the following table:
Japanese Naval Budgets Since 1881-82 | |||
Fiscal years | Ordinary budget | Extraordinary budget | Total |
Million yen | |||
1881-82 | 3.0 | 0.3 | ? |
1882-83 | 3.2 | 1.6 | ? |
1883-84 | 3.1 | 5.4 | ? |
1884-85 | 3.2 | 3.4 | ? |
1885-86 | 2.6 | 2.9 | ? |
1886-87 | 4.7 | 4.3 | ? |
1887-88 | 4.9 | 5.2 | ? |
1888-89 | 5.4 | 6.0 | ? |
1889-90 | 5.3 | 5.6 | ? |
1890-91 | 5.8 | 7.1 | ? |
1891-92 | 5.4 | 5.6 | ? |
1892-93 | 5.3 | 5.9 | ? |
| Navy only | ||
1893-94 | 5.1 | 3.0 | 8.1 |
1894-95 | 4.6 | 5.7 | 10.3 |
1895-96 | 4.9 | 8.6 | 13.5 |
1896-97 | 7.4 | 12.7 | 20.1 |
1897-98 | 9.5 | 40.9 | 50.4 |
1898-99 | 11.2 | 47.3 | 58.3 |
1899-00 | 14.6 | 47.1 | 61.7 |
1900-01 | 16.9 | 41.4 | 58.3 |
1901-02 | 19.5 | 24.5 | 44.0 |
1902-03 | 21.1 | 15.3 | 36.4 |
1903-04 | 21.5 | 14.6 | 36.1 |
1904-05 | 8.1 | 12.5 | 20.6 |
1905-06 | 12.3 | 11.1 | 23.4 |
1906-07 | 28.0 | 33.9 | 61.9 |
1907-08 | 31.3 | 41.0 | 72.3 |
1908-09 | 34.3 | 37.2 | 71.5 |
1909-10 | 35.3 | 36.9 | 72.2 |
1910-11 | 38.5 | 37.2 | 75.7 |
1911-12 | 40.7 | 45.5 | 86.2 |
Japanese Funds for New Ship-Building, Authorized 1911 | |||||||
Chapter VI | Total for the period 1911 to 1916 | Annual installments, in million yen | |||||
1911 | 1912 | 1913 | 1914 | 1915 | 1916 | ||
Title 1. Ship-Building |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(a) Construction | 89.8 | 11.6 | 15.3 | 17.0 | 26.4 | 18.5 | 1.0 |
(b) Armament | 68.5 | 17.8 | 15.3 | 11.8 | 12.4 | 10.2 | 1.0 |
Total, Title 1 | 158.3 | 29.4 | 30.6 | 28.8 | 38.8 | 28.7 | 2.0 |
Title 2. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Public Works | 35.9 | 5.2 | 4.9 | 5.6 | 3.8 | 8.2 | 8.2 |
Title 3. Repairs and Commissions |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(a) Construction | 19.8 | 2.9 | 7.6 | 5.9 | 1.5 | 1.8 | 0.1 |
(b) Armaments | 34.7 | 6.3 | 5.1 | 6.4 | 7.6 | 8.2 | 1.1 |
Total, Title 3 | 54.5 | 9.2 | 12.7 | 12.3 | 9.1 | 10.0 | 1.2 |
Discussion of the Ship-Building Fund
The total of 158,300,000 yen for new ship-building appears to be scant. The new big ships cost about 25,000,000 yen each, and for the proposed five such ships there will remain but 33,000,000 yen. Of this, 6,000,000 yen will be required for the three small cruisers, one-half the cost of which is assumed to have been paid. To this the cost of a fourth proposed cruiser of the same size, 5000 tons, at 4,000,000 yen must be added, leaving but 23,000,000 yen. Several installments remain to be paid for the Kawachi and Settsu which have been building for several years and which cost about 20,000,000 yen each. These two ships were laid down in 1909, in January and April, and 10,000,000 yen are still to be paid for each in two installments of 5,000,000 yen each.
There are thus but 3,000,000 yen remaining for the four destroyers, which are building, with four submarines and one river gunboat. It is not clear how the final installments have been paid for the Aki, Ibuki and Kurama, nor those for the Katori and Kashima, which were delivered by Vickers in the summer of 1906.
During the war Japan decided to build 32 destroyers and ordered the necessary material from England. Three of these were provided for in the budget of 1907, and 29 were built out of the war funds, viz.: Hatsushimo, Minazuki, Nagazuki, Kikusuki, Yunagi, Matsukasc, Asakase, Asatsuyn, Hatsuyuki, Harukasc, Hayakase, Hatsuharu, Hibiki, Yayoi, Yagure, Yudachi, Kamikase, Kisaragi, Mikasuki, Nenohi, Nowake, Oite or Oitase, Shiratsuyu, Shirayuki, Shirataye, Shigure, Ushio, Uzuki, Wataha.
The Japanese naval administration has been held back in its earnest effort to rapidly build up the navy. In comparing Japanese naval strength with that of other nations the following table of comparative budgets is apparently more unfavorable to Japan than it really is.
Naval Budgets, 1910-1911 | ||||
| Total budget | For ship-building exclusive of repairs | ||
1910-11 | 1911-12 | 1910-11 | 1911-12 | |
In millions of yen | In millions of yen | |||
England | 381.0 | 430.0 | 130.0 | 147.1 |
Germany | 207.0 | 215.9 | 106.7 | 115.0 |
United States | 266.0 | 253.0 | 67.0 | 69.0 |
France | 180.0 | 196.7 | 56.0 | 68.7 |
Russia | 94.7 | 118.1 | 13.5 | 31.0 |
Japan | 75.7 | 86.2 | 27.1 | 29.3 |
Japan's probable naval strength in 1917 will be 14 battleships, including four renovated Russian ships; 17 armored cruisers, including one renovated Russian ship. The oldest ships will be Sagami, ex-Peresvjet ('98) and Tokiwa ('98). Ships launched over 20 years are obsolete and not counted.
In 1917 Japan will have nine ships of the Dreadnought type, of which five will be battleships and four armored cruisers.
It is therefore evident that considering the inadequacy of Japan's shipyards and steel-works she cannot overtake the preponderance of the United States, nor that of any of the other first-class naval powers, by 1917, without reference to the completion of the Panama Canal in 1914.
A repetition of the plan of purchasing large quantities of armaments abroad, as was done before the Russian war, is forbidden by internal political, as well as diplomatic, relations. Besides, the lack of big ships, to meet any opponent in the immediate future, is not necessarily a political set-back for Japan. Her geographical position, the strategic advantage of which has not been overestimated, outweighs any opponent's advantage, though her shipyards are inadequate. One glance at the map will demonstrate this clearly. In any war, no matter with whom, except China and Russia, the result will be decided at sea. Supported by Kure and the Inland sea, whose approaches and islands are strongly fortified, Japan will operate on interior lines and wear out any superior naval forces, except England's and soon overcome her enemy.
Without going into details, it is only necessary to note that the three exits of the Inland sea are flanked by the great military ports Yokosuka, Sasebo and Maizuru, and that an attacking fleet would be obliged to watch the second-class military ports of Takeshika, Gensan, Chinkaiwan and Makung, besides all other fortified harbors in Japan, Korea and Formosa, before the Japanese navy could be crippled.
Notwithstanding the Marine Minister is reported to have submitted a plan for new loans, with the idea of obtaining funds for a larger navy, nevertheless the negotiation of a new loan will not be followed by an increase of the navy. While better prospects appear for the country, the affairs are far from satisfactory. A saving has been made in cost .of interest, though not as much as expected; credit has been strengthened, and trade has improved, yet the people are still carrying the burden of the bulk of the war taxes, and agricultural interests are greatly hampered. A revision of the income tax is expected in 1912-13, a reduction of the land taxes is contemplated for 1913-14. and in 1914-15 the postponed military budget is expected, so that the navy will be obliged to wait until 1915-16.
Conversion of new loans will be used for carrying out the proposed new tax laws. It is doubtful if the revenue receipts will be increased by the new tariff, and Japan will have to make concessions which will enable reduction of taxes.
Japan must consider other obligations, such as the railroadand regulating the rivers. The budget for 1911-12 contains an item of 180,000,000 yen for river improvements, which amount will be expended in a period of 18 years in annual installments. 12.500,000 yen being that for 1912-13.
The financial status does not indicate any probability of any increase of the navy.
The financial status is completed by the following exhibit:
Financial Status. | |||
| 1902-03 | 1911-12 | Increase |
In million yen | |||
Ordinary receipts | 221.2 | 492.1 | 270.9 |
Extraordinary receipts | 76.1 | 48.8 | -27.3 |
Sum | 297.3 | 540.9 | 243.6 |
Ordinary expenses | 171.0 | 407.1 | 236.1 |
Extraordinary expenses | 118.2 | 133.8 | 15.6 |
Sum | 289.2 | 540.9 | 251.7 |
National debt | 552.2 | In Dec. 1910, 2360.0 | 2077.8 |
Japanese Domestic Shipyards and Steel-Works
Japan early recognized the necessity of adequate iron and steel works for national defense, but the results of efforts to establish such plants efficiently have not been satisfactory. Japan consumes about 750,000 tons of crude iron annually, of which about 140,000 tons are produced in Japan, and only 180,000 tons of steel. Her iron and steel products are also inferior to those of foreign countries. Japan lacks skilled engineers and labor to compete with foreigners. The works have suffered chiefly for want of sufficient quantities of suitable iron ore. The high cost of iron ore, most of which was imported from China, as well as the high cost of suitable coal, are reasons why the works have not paid.
Japanese Imports of Pig-Iron And Ores. | |||
From— | 1909 (Yen) | 1908 (Yen) | 1907 (Yen) |
China | 600,000 | 913,000 | 753,000 |
Korea | 565,000 | 416,000 | 149,000 |
Others | 9,000 | 2,000 | 7,000 |
The national steel-works at Wakamatsu should yield a maximum of 159,000 tons, and when the proposed enlargement is completed, for which 12,400,000 yen were appropriated, to be expended in installments for several years, it is expected to yield about 300,000 tons annually. The works are operated at a loss and are far from paying expenses, which amount to 56,000.000 yen, and thereby have an annual deficiency of 1,500,000 yen. The new Anglo-Japanese steel-works at Muroran will deliver guns and projectiles for the Japanese army and navy, together with railroad material. This establishment has not yet managed to exist. The effort to obtain 10,000,000 yen for building these domestic plants has not succeeded. The future development of these plants is uncertain, and the Japanese naval administration cannot depend upon them.
Recent development of excellent iron and coal areas in Korea indicate a possibility of improvement in the steel production, and the importation of iron from China has largely decreased.
The lack of confidence in the quality of domestic steel products is demonstrated by the rejection of products of the Wakamatsu works on acceptance tests by the military inspectors, which caused great loss to that national plant. The naval minister declared that the naval steel-works at Kure cannot supply the wants of the navy, and that the Wakamatsu works could only supply limited quantities. The delay in completing the guns has repeatedly delayed the completion of ships. Last year the naval administration was obliged to give Armstrong, Vickers & Co. a large order for twelve 12-inch guns.
Duties have been laid on foreign iron and steel products to develop domestic works, and the Subvention Law of 1910 especially provides for importation of ship-building material. The effort to become independent of foreign ship-building has not been fully successful. Japanese ship-building industry cannot compare with foreign plants. The failure of the domestic steel-works and lack of skilled naval constructors and skilled labor contribute thereto. The Naval Minister declared that while it was greatly desired to build all Japanese war-ships in Japan, it must be confessed that such ships are built much better abroad. This statement in the fall of 1910 followed the order given to Vickers & Maxim for one 28,000-ton ship, which will apparently serve as a model for building sister ships.
Parliamentary Co-Operation with the Naval Policy
It has often been asserted that the Japanese Parliament is a complacent body, and instead of the despotism of the Shoguns there is an overstrained militarism and the control is divided by two families, the Satsuma and Chosu. These claims are misleading. The parliament cannot remain silent regarding the political policy nor refrain from giving the masses of the people, who have recently become civilized, a voice in the affairs. Nothing is more natural than that other capable travelled men will participate in the constitutional management of affairs. The present skilful leaders deserve the thanks of the people, and if they should withdraw at this time the country would be thrown into a chaotic condition. The people must first be qualified for a constitutional government. The transition can only be gradual. Any student of Japanese politics will have observed that there are evidences of a break in the healthy development of Japan. To-day new social laws are being discussed. Rome was not built in one day.
There has never been any well-defined opposition party in the Japanese Parliament. Marquis Katsura has had an agreement with his opponents, the liberal majority, who have 204 votes out of 367. The liberals have, however, co-operated with the Administration. This concord was recently disturbed by the rejection of the government's proposed railroad measures the necessity of which was not clear. The Administration is closely identified with financial banks, and most of the enterprises are decided in secret conferences with bankers and the Cabinet.
Conclusions
1. In considering a people's willingness to make sacrifices, it is necessary to know their efficiency in both military and industrial affairs.
2. The conduct of the naval policy before the Russian war was admirable; after the war this policy should have been more in keeping with the needs of the country. The unfavorable financial status limited the appropriations for the navy. The last estimates became necessary because of the higher cost of modern ships, especially due to increased displacement and larger-caliber guns.
3. The alliance with England and the treaties with China in 1909 and Russia in 1910, influenced Japan's naval policy, without which Japan would have had less money available for the navy. The treaties with Russia and China did not relieve Japan from the necessity of building strategic railroads in Korea.
4. The influence of the Panama Canal on Japanese naval policy may be ignored, as heretofore, Japan must endeavor to decide any war in Japanese waters.
5. The bulk of the Japanese navy has become obsolete in a few years. A new large increase must soon follow, but this cannot take place before 1914-15 without delaying the tax reforms and army requirements, etc. The increase of the figure of total tonnage displacement of the Japanese navy by 1917 can be accomplished only by purchasing large quantities of material to be ordered from abroad in 1914. This is hampered by the inefficiency of Japan's shipyards and steel-works, upon which gigantic sums have been expended without satisfactory results. The available and proposed war material, in conjunction with the geographical strategic position, insure Japan's national safety.
6. Japanese naval policy has been restricted by the inefficiency of her shipyards and steel-works and improvement in this respect is not evident. The costly effort to develop them is, however, justified.
7. The co-operation of parliament in the naval policy has not been questioned in Japan as in other countries. The budget committee does not submit any naval program which may be disputed. The Administration and the majority in the parliament have worked in harmony, which is a satisfactory substitute for a parliamentary ministry.
8. The peculiar hankering for secrecy which has characterized Japanese naval policy can no longer be maintained so strictly. Fleets cannot be built in secret.