Discussion: Absence Over Leave in the Fleet.
Captain John G. Quinby, U.S. Navy.—The undersigned has read over with great interest the paper of Captain Fullam on the subject "Absence Over Leave in the Fleet," and during his seven years in the command grade has made a careful study of the subject discussed. He thoroughly agrees with the essayist in the statement that naval officers are to blame for not punishing with sufficient severity this offense. The lack of uniformity in the punishment for this offense awarded by different commanding officers is one strong reason for the continuance and prevalence of the offense. Men readily see and put their own interpretation on the lack of system shown in meeting this trouble. He also agrees with the essayist in his statement that if men are given to understand they must meet this condition fairly and squarely they will rise to the occasion and meet it.
In the earlier days of the careers of all the commanding officers now on the active list of the navy, the present standing for petty officers and others of inferior rating could never have been met. It was only after a petty officer was made a petty officer and given to understand his responsibility that the supply was met. Formerly the most inveterate drunkard in the ship, and probably the most prone to break his liberty, and who had the least sense of military discipline, was made a petty officer, only depending upon his dependability under the eyes of a commissioned or warrant officer, and his seamanlike qualities.
When the proposition was put to the seamen that American born men of good moral standing, correct habits, and a finer sense of military discipline were the desiderata for fulfilling the requirements of a petty officer, they rose to the occasion at once, with the result that now our chief petty officers particularly are men whose equals it would be hard to find in any walk of life.
The undersigned is fully justified in stating that we need have no fear of producing the necessary spirit in the enlisted personnel to effect such a condition of affairs that absence over leave will be a rarity, rather than, without a doubt, the most common offense every commanding officer in the navy faces.
As is usual in all reformations of a general far-reaching character, legislation is required to make "The punishment fit the crime." It is suggested that the following would be necessary:
To so extend the authority of Summary Courts-Martial that they could with the approval of the convening authority, sentence a habitual liberty breaker to three (3) months imprisonment at hard labor in a disciplinary camp, similar to that recently established at Port Royal, S. C, the confinement to take effect at once without reference to Washington after having been approved by the senior officer present; the man's pay to be stopped, except the customary three dollars ($3.00) per month for necessary prison expenses; and the three (3) months to be automatically added to his term of enlistment.
By habitual liberty breaking referred to, it is meant such as offend in this manner three (3) times in any one calendar year. This of course would include men that we are sure exist, who break liberty repeatedly in order to get their discharge by a "Bad Conduct Discharge," and who are willing to have their character blackened by such a discharge in order to obtain their release from their voluntary entrance in the service.
Except for the above addition to the remedy suggested by the essayist, the writer has with singular consistency followed almost intuitively the method pursued by him, not, however, with the success he claims.
Many of the petty annoyances, such as delays at mustering in and out liberty parties, are no doubt responsible for much of the prevalence of this offense, and were steps taken by the Navy Department through general orders to avoid the delay in mustering in and out, and making the punishment for the first and second offense uniform throughout the service, save for the difference in the humanity of the several commanding officers who judge each case individually at the mast, the occurrence of these annoyances would become less prevalent, the effect would be instantly felt, and we could wait for the slower channels of Congressional action which would give us the rest of the remedy needed, that is, the necessary increase in the jurisdiction and authority of the Summary Courts-Martial.
The writer, while in command of the U. S. S. Montana, even with the authority vested in the commanding officer, met this delay by establishing a Special Fourth conduct class, which automatically gave a man the limit of punishment the commanding officer could inflict (deprivation of liberty for three months). This class was awarded to liberty breakers for the third offense in any one calendar year, and for one other offense, that of failing to take prophylactic treatment. It did not meet the required conditions, for as stated above, the writer does not claim the same success with the method as the essayist claims for the Mississippi. Could this have been made to fill the conditions prescribed in the necessary additions to the authority of the Summary Courts-Martial, the writer feels confident an equal or greater degree of success would have obtained. In all of this he supposes that the commanding officer in the daily police court at the mast listens with care and an insight bred from long experience to each case, inquiring into the merits of each offense; weighing the testimony of all witnesses the offender may bring, and then awarding suitable punishment.
Captain W.R. Rush, U. S. Navy.—The essayist has written a timely and excellent paper. We must all agree with his findings and conclusions, and must all believe any captain indeed very fortunate who can attentively read this essay without mental groanings of mea culpa.
The Mississippi, however, stands not alone in the effort to combat the evil influence of no method at all; or of the many arbitrary methods of stopping liberty breaking which now prevail throughout the fleet; this cm be demonstrated by referring to the records of the flagship Connecticut.
The punishment regulations adopted in the Mississippi for liberty breaking might have been copied from the ship's regulations of the Connecticut, so alike are they; and comparison with the good results obtained in the Connecticut shows them as good, and in some instances better than those obtained in the Mississippi. Of course, comparisons are odious, but when instanced for good and not for evil, and in the common cause of fleet efficiency, they may be pardoned.
The complement of the Connecticut includes 963 men, a considerably larger complement than other ships of the fleet; and during the past year 583 new men have joined the ship, so the Connecticut has not been spared in that particular.
As to the results accomplished: During a stay of three weeks at Weymouth, England, only 11 men overstayed liberty and 7 of these for a few hours only.
At Cherbourg from December 8th to 30th last, only 20 men overstayed liberty, and but 5 of these for more than 24 hours.
During the last visit of Connecticut to the navy yard, New York, the average daily absentee report was 6 men—nearly all repeaters.
The question of liberty breaking, and of the efficient checking of it on this ship, has received here more earnest consideration than any other matter affecting discipline, and the results in hand, as in the Mississippi have fully justified the means adopted.
In the case of Connecticut I would paraphrase the essayist on the last page of his article by saying, "It is proper to state in this connection that it has only been by the constant and unremitting personal attention of the executive officer that the plan has been a success."
This last page too is the meatiest page of any essay on fleet discipline that has ever appeared in print.
Il faut cultiver notre jardin.
Captain Spencer S. Wood, U. S. Navy.—I am heartily in accord with the views of Captain Fullam as expressed in his paper on "Absence Over I-eave in the Fleet." The idea of uniformity in the matter of punishment is not a new one to me, as I suggested to the department in January, 1909, that a board be appointed to draw up a recognized schedule of punishments for offenses so that all ships may work along the same lines. It was also suggested then that this schedule should be elastic enough to admit of a commanding officer using his judgment. If a regular schedule is decided upon for the service, with highest and lowest limits clearly stated, it could be published in the ship's bulletin board and every one would then know just what is awaiting him for every infringement of the regulations.
It is believed that similarity of punishment for the same offense in different ships would do much to lessen the dissatisfaction which frequently exists in some ships with their officers.
The Department disapproved the suggestion, so the matter was dropped, but I have always believed that an upper and lower limit of punishment for the ordinary list of offenses is most desirable. With a well recognized punishment for absence over leave, which would be practically the same on all ships (and I do not think the one suggested by Captain Fullam is too severe), it seems likely that much of the liberty breaking could be stopped and the men brought to appreciate the gravity of the bad habit which the; are forming by this dereliction of duty.
Captain H.P. Huse, U. S. Navy.—I am cordially in sympathy with Captain Fullam in the question of liberty breaking discussed in his paper entitled "Absence Over Leave in the Fleet." Restriction to the ship has never yet operated to bring men back on time. Of late years I have acted on this principle, and it is only fair to say that my action was due to a conversation with Captain Fullam about five years ago.
The general plan followed by him as set forth in the nine enumerated paragraphs on page [7] are, in my opinion, about right. I have general! made the limit for trial by deck or summary court five hours instead of three; but on the other hand, the repetition of an offense within three months doubled or trebled it according as it was a second or a third offense Thus a man three hours late from liberty having been previously punished once for liberty breaking during the preceding three months would be dealt with as having been six hours overtime. Possibly this period of three months should be increased to one year.
All the work on board required to keep the ship in a sanitary and efficient condition is honorable and it should not be degraded by assignment punishment. Men soon get to look upon certain necessary and disagreeable work as suitable for "extra duty" only, and it becomes a hardship for men in good standing to be required to do it. For this reason, all extra dun should be done on the quarterdeck under arms during the recreation or rest periods except Sunday.
Paying the crew monthly instead of doling out "monthly money" in accordance with conduct classes was a great step. It is surprising that it was not done years before. But our enlisted men are only boys after all, and it is to be expected that they will spend most of their money on the first liberty or two after pay-day. This is objectionable for two distinct reasons: First, the possession of so much money soon after pay-day is a bait to every harpy and rum-seller on the beach and the cause of much sore temptation to the youngster. Captain Fullam does not mention it, but most of the liberty breaking is done just after pay-day. The second reason is that our youngster having spent all his money soon after getting it, is left penniless until next pay-day. It is a feast or a famine. At the beginning of the month, he rides in a taxi; towards the end, he prefers to walk— or to stay on board and feel bored and blue.
I have tried a plan of "weekly money" with success. Once a week, every petty officer receives five dollars of his pay; every other man in the ship receives three dollars. To simplify matters, the exact amount must be taken, or none. As a result, the men generally had cash in their pockets, the temptation to "blow in" a month's pay at once was very much diminished, with a consequent reduction in the list of liberty breakers. Indirect results are that there is less money "lost" on board and, that the liberty is more evenly distributed over the month. I have never had the opportunity yet to apply this scheme to the large crew of a battleship; but in the Nevada and in the Celtic it presented no difficulties and the co-operation of the paymasters was most cordial. The additional work involved cannot for one moment be weighed against the great material and moral gain.
I have never given any thought to the annoyance of delay in inspecting and sending off the liberty-party. I thank the writer and shall bear it in mind.
It has been my experience that a man returning from liberty a few minutes late is very often marked "on time." This encourages ideas the very opposite of what we wish to instill. The punishment for returning overtime should consist of two parts: First, a fixed punishment for being late; second, a variable punishment depending on the amount overtime. Thus, if a man is five minutes (or one minute) overtime, he would get three hours' extra duty; if four hours overtime, he would get three hours plus twelve hours, or sixteen hours' extra duty, if for a first offense. This would take four days to work off, during which time he would necessarily have no liberty. Saturday and sometimes Wednesday afternoons being recreation periods, eight hours' extra duty can be worked off on those days. The extra duty finished, there are no further restrictions as to liberty, so the men are always very zealous in putting it through.
Deck courts and courts-martial should always inflict the entire maximum punishment for this offense, leaving it to the revising authority to consider mitigating circumstances.
It should be made very difficult to prove a valid excuse for returning overtime. Late trains, delayed trolleys, blocks on the road, fog on the river constitute a wonderful chapter of accidents at the mast if the captain is thought to be easy. A "first offense" may also be pleaded several times, provided the offenses are not too near together, with bad results as to discipline.
I have tried a method of suspended punishments. It depends for its success upon never letting up—every breach of discipline involves the assignment of its corresponding punishment; but the execution of this punishment, in the case of minor offenses, may be suspended, and if the offender has a clear record for three months thereafter, the report is wiped off his record. To put this system into practice, each man must have a conduct card made out when he is sentenced to his first punishment. On this card a complete record of all offenses and punishments is entered, and it is scanned by the captain when the man's case is being investigated at the mast. Should a suspended sentence be hanging over him, its execution is ordered in addition to the new punishment. Forgiving or overlooking minor offenses encourages them; this plan has exactly the opposite effect and works well.
Captain Fullam is right. The lightness with which liberty breaking is treated in the service is a serious matter. It is one of the several disciplinary questions now to be considered. Others are the lack of smartness and energy with which so many of our young officers perform their duties when in charge of the deck, especially in port; the lack of neatness and the careless appearance of our officers in uniform; the failure on the part of men to salute officers, etc The time has come to brace up. Is it possible that our work afloat has been a little too strenuous and our people, more especially the officers from lieutenant-commander down, have been worked a little too hard?
Commander W.W. Phelps, U. S. Navy.—Captain Fullam's observation on absence over leave in the fleet represent the tried experience of the one officer in the navy, who by constant study of the problem and fearless application of his own matured convictions is probably the best authority on the handling of men we have.
The handling and development of the men is the most neglected element of our navy. And it is inexcusable that it is so neglected, the personnel being the most important element of the navy.
I don't hesitate to say that our discipline is not good. The state of discipline is such that some men largely do as they like, not as they are told. We cannot say that discipline is good until we can say that all men like to do as they are told. Our imperfect discipline is reflected in many little things observed in the day's work. With an improvement in discipline will come a reduction of liberty breaking. To improve discipline, organization is the first step. There should be no detail of a ship's activity that is not made dignified and important by being regulated. The ship's regulation should be sane, everyone of them standardized to be applicable as near as may be to all conditions of winter and summer cruising. Then every one of them should be patiently and persistently enforced or else revoked. The same applies with even greater force to the navy regulations and the uniform regulations.
Thus the end will be that, throughout the day, every day, every activity of the men will he regulated by routine, and the men will be bred, unconsciously to themselves, into subordination, an understanding that they must obey, and a state of rest. These bring contentment. A regulator contentment brings a better morale. With a better morale there comes less liberty-breaking.
Where there is a regulation not enforced, no matter how trivial the particular, it works great harm, in that it is an example to the men (and to the officers) that you don't exactly mean what you say in such and such a case, and if you don't mean what you say in such and such a particular why perhaps you don't mean what you say in a lot of other regulations. Thus the man will unconsciously reason, and thus comes about a wide disregard of law, regulations and orders in general, and the commission of offenses purely because of lack of discipline.
With a thorough organization and sane ship's regulations covering if details, most minor reports and casual liberty breaking disappear from the mast, and there is left only malignant liberty breaking to be dealt with, and occasionally a case where the man "just took a chance" of violating some regulation of interior discipline.
Liquor on board ship has about disappeared. So has ship jumping where the liberty is frequent and well regulated.
I heartily agree with Captain Fullam that the Summary Court Martial punishment schedule is inadequate and does harm. An excellent principle of discipline is to Jo all you can for the man who never requires punishment and come down hard on the man who demonstrates that he does.
With heavier penalties applied with discretion, there would be less summaries. We never make enough distinction between the man who never commits an offense and the man with the record smeared throughout the four years with offenses and punishments. Most of them seem to get "honorable discharges," testimonials of "fidelity and obedience," and in this view there is but little material incentive for a man to keep his record clear.
Each type of liberty breaker should get its own kind of treatment. I am not in sympathy with any ship's punishment schedule that gives, automatically and mechanically the same punishment for breaking liberty, let us say, to take the extreme, to the petty officer first class and the mess attendant. I think that each class of petty officers should be distinguished from the other classes of petty officers, and that more also should be demanded of C. S. C. men than of first enlistment men. All of this takes pains and thought and care, but the matter in my opinion merits the most painstaking study.
Liberty breakers can be assorted into the following types:
Type I—Casual liberty breakers.
Type II—-Confirmed liberty breakers who are first enlistment men.
Type III—Confirmed liberty breakers who are C. S. C. clean sleevers.
Type IV—Confirmed liberty breakers who are C. S. C. petty officers.
Type V—Trained liberty breakers.
The Type I (casual liberty breakers) is generally to be found among the younger men. They may break liberty every few months, and usually are not absent over liberty many hours. They are not drinking men, so have not that excuse, but they break their liberty in cold blood from disregard of law. regulations and order in general, and because they learn to break liberty from older men. This type is intermixed with Type V, is a class of Type V. The records of this type show usually a string of minor delinquencies, for many of which the youngsters themselves are not to blame, but rather the slackness of the service discipline; and all the delinquencies of this type including liberty breaking will materially diminish if their morale is improved by attention to matters of ordinary ship's discipline. They are so young that they easily go wrong if not held strictly to an observance of all regulations, and they easily can be kept right under strict ship's breeding.
In this type will be found many youngsters of excellent stuff. These need only a strong hand over them and a manifestation of official interest in them and they can be moulded into man-o-warsmen of fine quality.
In this type also will be found the shiftless youngster who doesn't care whether school keeps or not, who lacks the element of self-respect essential in the process of breeding a well-disciplined man. These youngsters are the kind that works the navy for a soft thing, that kicks about the grub. Given an inch they go the limit, and are always to be found trying to do as they please, to wear any uniform they please, to smoke where they like, passing officers on shore without saluting and doing endless other insubordinate things. Some of these can be pointed straight by a short course of vigorous disciplining. A few are hopelessly incorrigible and should be discharged as such, for their retention in any ship works endless harm
This Type I, unless disciplined, eventually becomes Type III.
Type II, confirmed liberty breakers who are first enlistment men.
In this type are older men who enlist at the recruiting offices and thence go to a guardo before being drafted to sea. In the guardo these men get no training worth calling as such; and when they arrive in the man-o-war they are nothing else but merchant sailors in a man-o-warsman's uniform. These men have thrown themselves into the navy as in an inebriate asylum and they should be thrown back into civil life when their unreliability is demonstrated. Those of this type of liberty breakers who are artificer petty officers have a bad demoralizing influence. It is this type, wearing the chevrons of a petty officer first class, we will say, with no training, with no idea of the responsibilities that ought to carry with the chevrons of a petty officer first class, with no idea of commanding a squad of men, it is this type that makes one sometimes think that we cheapen our petty officer ratings by being too promiscuous with them. Perhaps we could do better, reserve the petty officer ratings for the men who can be petty officers, and not give them for ability as specialists merely. Let us try more to breed our specialists in the ship rather than seek them from civil life.
Type III. This type, the confirmed liberty breakers who are C. S. C clean sleevers, is bred from both the Type I men who re-enlist and the Type II men who never get to be petty officers. This type exists because ofgiving Type I and Type II liberty breakers "honorable discharges," "testimonials" with four months' pay. Some of this type are redeemable, but t redeem some it is necessary to treat them all with just severity, and to make an example to some by bad conduct discharging the worst. Those of this type who intend to stick to the service will respond to discipline. Those who don't intend to stick to the service are not amenable to any discipline, and the sooner we are rid of them the better, for while they are in the service they have a very bad influence over young men just from the training stations (or as these stations should more accurately be called the Recruit Depots).
Type IV. Confirmed liberty breakers who are C. S. C. petty officers this type is almost wholly derived from perpetuating by re-enlistment Type 11 liberty breakers. The tremendous demoralization and cheapening of the petty officers' chevrons wrought by this type is justified by the service because "they are good workers aboard ship." This antiquated service idea is found expressed n a very bad regulation, paragraph 8 of Article 16J.I frequently invoked by revising authorities, whereby Summary Courts a-'= admonished not to break a petty officer for "overstaying leave." Happily there is a tendency towards wiping out this wrong notion, for paragraph (page 4) of Bureau of Navigation Circular of October 1, 1910, admits that liberty breaking is a bar to promotion. We should go farther. We should wipe out paragraph 8 of Article 1693 and break the petty officer who is liberty breaker. And further, as fast as he keeps on breaking liberty If should keep on being broken even down to apprentice seaman, or coal passer or landsman. No rating must be allowed to be considered a vested right. To take away a man's stripes, to reduce him in the levels among his shipmates I regard as the severest and most convincing punishment, the one which will most surely bring about discipline. There are lots of fine youngsters ready and able and waiting to step up in the scale, and reduction in rating vigorously applied to the confirmed liberty breaker is the most potent of all punishments, of that I am convinced. I have no hesitation in saying that it should be applied to seamen and firemen first class where necessary to reach such men who are giving less than value received by reason of absences from duty on account of overstaying leave and the ensuing procedures. Reduce a few seamen to ordinary seamen and firemen first class to firemen second class and the Type I and Type III liberty breakers would sit up and take notice.
Type V. The trained liberty breakers. For this type the slackness of discipline in the service is altogether to blame. To this type belong those youngsters who, having come into the fleet from the training stations well disciplined and with clear records and line promise, actually are trained to break liberty by association with and example of all the before-mentioned types of liberty breakers who are rather tolerated and accepted than corrected and eradicated. Go to one's office and take down any number of records and one will see that this statement is correct. It is startling to realize that there is at the training stations a discipline that keeps men's records clear, and in the fleet a lack of discipline that manifests itself by bad records.
While I have affirmed that the discipline is not good, I wish to be understood to mean simply that more attention to elementary discipline would reduce liberty breaking. I have the greatest faith in the possibility of making our discipline superb, and I am a firm believer with Captain Fullam that we can make our men what we will. We have so many splendid men in the service that it is a shame and a pity that we hang on to a few sots and unreliables only to degrade the great majority. Therefore I think that each of these types of liberty breakers should have its own peculiar treatment, that the punishment a man merits should be based, not on a schedule thought to fit all, but on a study of the type of liberty breaker one has to deal with. Undoubtedly the Summary Court punishment schedule is ridiculously lenient, and its very leniency breeds more summaries. The lazes, that is, the statutes, are splendid. They provide ample and adequate punishment. But the regulations have gone too far in tying the hands of the captains in inflicting the lawful penalties. Under the statutes captains have full swing in penalties if they are permitted to inflict them. I say captains, because 1 take the ground that as the captain is responsible for the discipline, it is the duty of the Summary Court officers to adjudge a punishment deemed appropriate by the captain, and as a Summary Court senior member I have always laid this view before the captain—that while the court would be guided by its conscience in the finding, it would be guided by the captain in its sentence. And so, under the law, the state of a ship's discipline reflects the character of the captain as a seaman and as a disciplinarian, and depends on his habits, temperament, personality, example and knowledge of men. While one scheme anJ schedule might be best for one ship under one captain, the same might not be so well applied in another ship under another captain. I agree, that x standards go, it were better could all ships standardize punishments, but that can not come about until we standardize captains; and I agree emphatically that we need more disciplinarians in the service, and a mort vigorous application of the law. But on the other hand, the very limitations imposed by the regulations in applying the lawful penalties have probably operated to stifle some captains in attaining good discipline; for if these regulation limitations are good, why did not the splendid seamen who wrote the laws into the statute books a couple of generations ago put them in the laws? Probably because they knew that as the captain should be the "priest, prophet and king" to his men, so on the captain ultimate!' depends the discipline of his command, and the amount of liberty breaking
Lieut.-Commander W.T. Cluverius, U. S. Navy.—I am glad to set Captain Fullam's opportune article. It is high time that this in-growing evil be eradicated, for absence over leave in the battleship fleet is malignant. Its influence is far-reaching, for it not only attacks discipline and create' disregard for authority, but imposes restrictions upon the scope of endeavor of the ship, the division, and the fleet. Captain Fullam has brought this point out and not one whit too forcibly. The conditions are recognizable to all of us. Nothing exasperates one more than having to get work done with a chronic set of liberty breakers to do it. What is there t. prevent other factors of unreliability from entering into the make-up of the ship's crew if this one so generally obtains, and who can foresee the effect of an unreliable personnel in action?
Captain Fullam says the offense prevails through lack of determined effort to stop it. Concerted determined effort, I would say. His paper is timely, because this is the day of standardization, and the handling of liberty breaking is bound to be standardized, and I am convinced that this will result in its sensible reduction. If determined effort will stamp it out in one ship, concerted determined effort will remove it from the fleet.
Captain Fullam presents a method. It is based on his analysis of the cause and spread of the offense. His method works. I have seen it operating under all varieties of conditions, and with all sorts of men. 1 have never seen a ship's company return to duty in better trim of mind and body than the Mississippi's, or tackle the day's work more cheerful!) or stick to it better, with liberty neither present nor prospective. Records can show a good deal of this, and it is my belief that this ship has been "happy" one, which means much. I saw the method applied to a battleship in reserve, with a crew of 400, and acting also as a receiving ship. A large number were new men being broken in for battleships and destroyer about to be commissioned. There were many general detail men, drifting in and out, and her own skeleton crew made up the complement. The heterogeneous assortment had no initial interest in this particular ship. That the liberal liberty given was appreciated and was recognized as privilege was plainly indicated, for the daily reports rarely showed more than one absentee. The plan was taken up later by a gunboat cruising under the uncertain conditions of duty in the West Indies and marked success resulted.
The proposition is a square one. It is not necessarily new, and it is met more than half way. That a definite punishment attends abuse of its liberal features is well understood. It is productive of a good return of labor, for the enlisted man soon grasps the fact that "he must be on his job to hold it."
Lieut.-Commander D.W. Knox, U. S. Navy.—Referring to the advance copy of an article entitled "Absence Over Leave in the Fleet," by Captain W. F. Fullam, U. S. Navy, received by me with the request for a discussion, the following is submitted:
It aims only at making the best of a bad condition, whereas the correction of the condition itself is preferable. "Free gangways" and "severe punishments" are but incidentals in a more comprehensive reform which will be suggested by a closer examination into the causes of our troubles than is made in the article under discussion.
- The author's analysis of the bad effects of liberty breaking, striking as it does at the fundamental principles of duty, is extremely clever and carries conviction.
- The article will undoubtedly do a great deal of good towards making the service at large appreciate the seriousness of the offense, which, it is believed, has not heretofore been thoroughly recognized.
- The principle of the "free gangway" is undoubtedly sound, as well as that of severe punishment for transgression against liberal privilege.
- But it should be remembered that the true origin of liberty breaking is debauchery. This latter is fostered by the "feast and famine ' methods of work and play, which, though not as acute as formerly, still obtain to an undue degree.
- Our first enlistment men are fine raw material and rigid effort should be directed towards making decency a habit easily to be acquired by them. Unfortunately we are well stocked with debauchees. Those who find great gratification in the large number of re-enlistments do not take into account the fact that a large proportion of these men could not hold a job in the Pennsylvania railroad because of their habits. We refrain from drastic weeding out of habitual liberty breakers (who are debauchees whether or not it shows on their record), because of the tremendous demand it would make on a recruiting service already strained to the limit
- While the remedy for liberty breaking practiced by Captain Fullam tends to reduce debauchery, it does not, in my opinion, strike sufficiently deeply into the root of the evil to promise permanently satisfactory results.
- At present we are chiefly deficient in morale, which has been defined as "cheerful willingness to do the utmost." It is probably three times as essential to war efficiency as proficiency in the manipulation of material, to which of late years we have been giving such paramount attention.
- Morale is based on contentment. Other factors, such as interest, enthusiasm, subordination and loyalty must be included in its definition; but these cannot reach a high development unless thoroughly fertilized by contentment, which does not now exist to the proper degree among officers or men.
- In order to secure reasonable contentment, it is vital that the administration of the service be such as to permit the personnel afloat to lead more normal and regular lives; comparable to that led by the average good citizen on shore. While it is unnecessary and perhaps undesirable to unduly encourage matrimony for the enlisted personnel, at the same time it must be recognized that of those who are the most worthy and the most valuable to the service, the major portion will sometime in the natural order of events desire to marry. They are then forced to choose between leaving the service or leading a very abnormal life. But whether or not a man marries, his contentment and his moral inclinations are fostered by regularity of life and by frequent substitutions of play for work and vice versa
- The remedy may be found in establishing a permanent "operating base" for each fleet within reasonable distance of one or more large cities, at which eight or nine months of every year will be spent. It may be observed incidentally that the British and Germans have followed this practice for a number of years.
- The establishment of such a base would permit men and officers to settle their families or relatives permanently with a prospect of seeing them each week-end during most of the year. The three or four months each year away from the base may be employed in a foreign cruise or in such other work as may be desirable, with beneficial effect on the morale of "roving spirits," and without impairing that of men whose families are settled near the "base."
- It is desirable though not essential that there be at such an "operating base" recreation grounds for all kinds of sport and athletics, billiard halls, reading rooms, etc., similar to those found at many British and German naval bases.
- It is believed that the adoption of such a plan would strike at the very root of liberty breaking, debauchery, immorality, desertion of good men, failure of good men to re-enlist, the necessity for excessive recruiting inadvisability of a more thorough weeding out of drunkards, lack of permanence of personnel, and many other difficulties which are encountered at present.
Commander C.B. Brittain, U. S. Navy.—Referring to the paper by Captain Fullam on the subject of liberty breaking and remedies for it. I consider the paper a most timely one, and the matter one that should receive the harmonious effort, not only of commanding officers, who, working together, could do a great deal to remedy the evil, but this working together or united effort on their part should be brought about by well considered action of the Navy Department itself. This is perhaps the only way that united and consistent effort among captains could be brought about. Action by the Department regulating the monthly payment of men was an effort most successful and cured that evil which only a few years ago, was perhaps the greatest of evils in causing discontent among the enlisted men and giving rise to breaches of discipline born of this discontent. In May, 1910, when placed in command of the U. S. S. Massachusetts, I put into effect, as regards liberty breaking, a system practically identical with Captain Fullam's. It worked splendidly. In October of that year I further revised my system to make it more nearly identical with Captain Fullam's, which I had then learned about in some detail; the Massachusetts was then in reserve and the results were still excellent. When I took command of the Wheeling in January, 1911, I continued this same system, and in the eleven months that I have had command of the ship, liberty breaking has been an exception rather than the rule. The system not only adds to the efficiency of the ship and to the moral tone and self-respect of the personnel—commissioned as well as enlisted, for it hurts the pride and self-respect of everybody to see wholesale and uncondoned liberty breaking—but also adds to the contentment and real happiness of the men, for they, as well as the officers, like to belong to an efficient and well disciplined ship.
A New Method of Teaching Swimming, with a Few Hints on Rescuing the Drowning. (See No. 139)
Mr. Willard C. Tyler.—This officer's amusing method of learning to swim in one lesson might well be tried by all who arc unable to learn this easy accomplishment. His directions for breathing in rough water ought to be instinctive with everyone not a fool, but unhappily it is not. The advice is valuable to all inexperienced persons who find themselves in rough water.
In saving the drowning, an experience of the writer's should be of value to all who are called upon to assist these helpless people and may be the means of saving two lives, viz., the helper and the helped.
I have always been a strong swimmer, having learned as a boy in a Massachusetts fresh water river. Many years ago the duty fell to me to go to the assistance of a person drowning in about 20 feet of salt water. Through carelessness or the ignorant method of my approach this person got her arm tight around my neck, absolutely shutting off my wind, and our case was desperate. Everything went black and I felt that we both were lost. Just then an inspiration came to me, that a drowning person will not cling to a sinking object until the last death grip comes. It's contrary to all natural law. So I ceased all effort and we both went to the bottom. Just as my feet touched, to my unspeakable relief the grip around my neck was relaxed and we parted company. The rest was easy; I struck for the surface at sufficient angle to go clear, got some breath and, having more sense that time, got hold of one of the feet of the other person and towed her ashore, spread-eagled on her back, in safety. I was quite used up at the finish, but soon recovered my breath and was all right.
The point of the above is, that, if a drowning person gets too strong a grip on you, and has not been down twice before, take them down, or to the bottom and they will let go.
This is my belief from that experience and I would be glad to know if it is confirmed by others?
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