When Captain Mahan was detached from the War College, May to, 1893, the command devolved upon Commander C. H. Stockton, as related in our previous article. That officer reported to the Navy Department that arrangements had been made at the College for the summer's course—the course of 1893—but no class was ordered. Though not realized at the time, this was the most critical period in the life of the College. It appeared, subsequently, that the Navy Department had already decided to abolish the College. The assigning of one-half of the quarters in the College building to the use of officers of the Training Station, was only a preliminary step towards its total extinction; and the turning over of the entire building to the Training Station. It was to carry out this settled purpose that the Secretary of the Navy visited the Station in August of that year, 1893. Two causes, however, led to a change of opinion on the part of Mr. Herbert. A copy of Captain Mahan's "The Influence of Sea Power upon History," then recently published, had been placed in his hands. This he read while on board the Dolphin, and on being told that the book was made up mainly of lectures delivered at the College, he exclaimed, in effect, that that work, alone, was worth more than all the War College had cost. That book, in short, gave him the first clear insight into the objects and ends of the new institution and led him to revise his estimate of it, as related in the previous number. Another cause which prevented the College from passing out of existence at this time was the active and friendly interest of Captain Taylor. A warm and steadfast adherent from its earliest inception, of the basic idea of an advanced course of professional study, the late, and greatly lamented Rear-Admiral Harry C. Taylor, was ever the ready friend and earnest advocate of the proposed plan. To a tenacity of purpose he added the art of diplomacy, always presenting the question at issue calmly, logically and in a clear light. This together with an engaging manner enabled him to win friends to the cause and when, in the autumn of 1893, he was ordered as President of the College he had gained for it, through his own personal efforts, a number of influential supporters. It is due to this lamented officer that his services to the College should receive full recognition. On his accession to the chair the tension which had so long kept affairs in an unsettled state was at its height but gradually became relaxed. He administered the affairs of the College with marked ability and his services generally were of inestimable value.
Another officer to whom the College owes a deep debt of gratitude is Captain William McCarty Little, U. S. N., who vigorously fought its battles when the great body of the service was either actively opposed to it, or wholly indifferent. The Naval War Game is his special contribution to the work. It was he who demonstrated all the possibilities of that method of investigation—now known as the laboratory method.
In the Preface to "The American Kriegsspiel, A Game for Practicing the Art of War," by Major W. R. Livermore, corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, 1898, we find the following: "The Navy has not been behind the Army in taking up the idea, as suggested at first by Lieutenant Wm. McC. Little, U. S. N., and the Naval Kriegsspiel [the War Game] has been so developed by the officers of the Naval War College that it forms an essential feature of its work." We are told further that "the American Kriegsspiel has been developed from that of the Germans, its purpose being to represent military operations upon a geographical, or topographical, map by small colored blocks, and auxiliary apparatus to which conventional meaning is assigned." Lieutenant Little was quick to perceive the possibilities of this method when applied to naval operations.
It was through the ingenuity of devising and working out details, and the indefatigable labors of Lieutenant Little that the Naval War Game became a recognized part of the College curriculum. His work has contributed very largely to whatever success the College has achieved. His first lectures (six in number) on the War Game were delivered at the College in the summer of 1887.
That the Naval Game Board has its limitations goes without saying. It does not cultivate what is called "nerve," nor does it improve the coup d'oeil; and it presupposes favorable conditions for the manceuvering of fleets. But by its means can be demonstrated what should be done with a fleet, if possible, when battle is imminent, and particularly what should not be done. This lifts the question of battle tactics out of the hazy field of conjecture. Some very plausible methods of carrying a fleet into action have been shown on the blackboard to ensure success; but which have been proved on the game board to be wholly impracticable. By working out, by means of the game board, a number of Don'ts, all visionary schemes of battle tactics may be eliminated, leaving any one of a few safe and thoroughly practical methods to be adopted by the Commander-in-Chief as in his judgment the circumstances may warrant.
War is no time for experimentation.
That the game board has an interesting history in no way detracts from the credit due to Lieutenant Little for reviving it, and bringing it into almost daily use. The idea of the game board for the practice of fleet evolutions originated, singular to relate, with a Scotch country gentleman of the name of John Clerk (1728-1812), otherwise known as the Laird of Eldin. Thwarted in his early ambition to be sent to sea he became an earnest student of naval affairs. Struck by the barren results of a number of the great fleet fights of the French wars he devised certain manceuvres which would, he believed, lead to breaking through the enemy's line, doubling on, and overwhelming, part of it and compelling the rest either to close action or flight.
Nelson is said to have been a careful student of Clerk's book. His celebrated Memorandum of October 9, 1805, in directing the attack from a position to windward, piercing the allied center and cutting off the rear, adhered closely to Clerk's method. Though the details were modified the principle remained intact. "This must be considered," says Laughton, "as Clerk's grand achievement."
Clerk's own account of his method relates that "having convinced myself of the effects that would follow a change of system (of battle tactics) it was my practice to criticise the methods of carrying a fleet into battle by fighting them over again by means of small models of ships which I constantly carried in my pocket, every table furnishing sea-room."
Fine seamen as they were and hard fighters the English naval officers of the times referred to appear to have given no attention whatever to the art of naval tactics. Clerk's work called that fact to their notice and materially influenced the battle tactics of the English navy. To-day the case is somewhat similar. Our officers have given their attention almost exclusively to the development of materiel. It is to the credit of Lieutenant, now Captain Little, that he has kept alive at the War College the interest in the naval Kriegsspiel, which is only an elaboration of the device of the Laird of Eldin.
The U. S. Army War College.—A college for an advanced course of professional study for army officers to be known as the Army War College was established by General Orders No. 155. Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, D. C., November 27, 1901.
The proposition for the study of the higher branches of the naval profession was readily accepted abroad and the success and rapid development of the several Naval War Colleges of Europe have been somewhat remarkable. The great powers take their naval establishments seriously.
England's Naval War College.—Mr. Julian S. Corbett, Professor of History at the Royal Naval War College, Portsmouth, England, is so well and so favorably known in this country through his many valuable contributions to the literature of the naval profession that everything coming from his pen must be received with the respect which is its due. In the London Times of June 5 and 9, 1906, he made a very stirring appeal for what was called in England the "War Course." He writes:
About half a century ago the service (naval) found itself face to face with a revolution in materiel. It was not merely a question of a new method of propulsion, but of new ships, new means of defense and new weapons of attack. For the time question of materiel inevitably dwarfed all others.
So complete was the preoccupation that in spite of such warnings as the battle of Lissa, in 1866, there was a tacit assumption that superiority at sea meant little else than superiority of materiel. In perfecting its weapon the navy had forgotten the art of war. It was not, however, till 1900 that a real start was made to put things right and then only in the most tentative way. It was simply decided to establish experimentally at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, a "War Course" for Captains and Commanders, designed broadly on the lines of the American War College. . . . . The "War Course" has shown itself capable of performing for the service one of the three great functions which, on the continent, are performed by a General Staff. It has shown itself capable of assisting officers to fit themselves for high command; it quickly made itself indispensable to the machinery of the admiralty. It was not intended that it should supply war plans in the authoritative manner of a General Staff. This function cannot be separated from the person of the first Sea Lord. But it was intended to prepare, "when directed," and in a purely advisory spirit, plans of campaign for the consideration of the Admiralty…The fact has to be faced that after all these years of strong endeavor, there is to-day no machinery at the Admiralty for the preparation of plans of campaign. When anything of the kind is required it has to be done by the first sea lord himself, either alone or with the assistance of such a committee as he can scrape together. Everyone is now agreed that this machinery must be found and found quickly…No attempt must be made to turn the War Course into anything like another General Staff.
After some further remarks of great interest, but too full for quotation, the writer continues:
Starting in this way, the expanded War Course will assist everyone and interfere with none. It will be doing no more than providing a laboratory where the lost art of war can be recovered and where officers destined for high command can learn it. There, too, all that is best in naval thought will be gathered in fresh from the sea and spun into threads which the Admiralty and the Committee of Defense can handle with confidence and weave into the fabric of our policy.
We have quoted this eminent authority somewhat at length for the reason that he shows such an intelligent appreciation of the true relations between the functions of a War College and those of a Naval General Staff.
A Board of Admiralty, English or American, must have in close touch with its principal—(First Lord or Secretary of the Navy)—an office devoted exclusively to the preparation of naval campaigns and cognate duties. The province of the War College is to enable officers to prepare themselves for that particular kind of duty as assistants to the Chief of the Division of Naval Operations. For that reason the War College must be a place where officers may devote themselves to study—the study of the higher branches of their profession.
Since the appearance in the London Times of Mr. Corbett's admirable articles, great progress has been made in the English War Course; it has grown to be the Naval War College. At the Royal Naval War College, Portsmouth, England, the course now consists of Playing the Tactical War Game, Playing the Strategical War Game, studying and writing reports on the various problems arising out of the strategical conditions of the present day, and lectures on Naval History, Naval Architecture, Steam, International Law, the Law of Evidence, Wireless Telegraphy, Coast Defense, etc. By the latest information at hand there were attending the College five rear-admirals, eleven post-captains and sixteen commanders.
German Naval War College.—From the high military character of the Germans and the thorough manner in which they conduct all their educational departments we may well believe that their Naval War College is worth a careful study. They give much more time to the study of war and its various branches than we are able to allow; and more officers attend than we can spare. All reports from there agree in saying that they are obtaining excellent results.
One thing may be affirmed of the Germans in relation to the development of their Navy. They are thoroughly in earnest.
In the Revue Maritime, Vol. 178, of 1908, July, August and September, will be found quite a full and a very interesting account of the War Colleges of England, Germany, France, and Italy. This renders any special notice of them here unnecessary.
The Naval War College of Japan is modeled somewhat after the U. S. Naval War College. The number of students depends upon the exigencies of the service. The course is two years long and consists mostly of laboratory work. The class is sent out with the fleet to witness tactical exercises, a feature regarded as very important. On graduating, which is made an occasion of ceremony the students receive diplomas, and even prizes for those who excel.
The Japanese "mean business," if one may be permitted the use of such an expression. French Naval War College.—"The end and aim of the Naval War College is to build up a military system upon solid and enduring foundations," writes Captain Darrieus. "It was in obedience to this precise thought," he says, "that the founder of the College, M. E. Lockroy, the Minister of Marine of 1895-6, gave it the name of the Naval War College. He wished thus to indicate the primary importance which he attached to making toe great and fruitful concept of war the ever guiding star of his labors."
In another place the author quotes Moltke as saying: "Our campaigns and our victories have instructed the French, who like us have numbers, armaments, and courage. Our strength will be in management, in leadership, in one word in the General Staff. This strength France may envy us; she does not possess it."
"The creation of the Naval War College," the author tells us, "was the first step towards a General Staff, as necessary in the preparation for naval war as in that for a war on land, and which must be realized some day, when minds are better prepared for it after generations of officers have passed through the College." "Of the various problems growing out of the complex character of the naval organization it may be confidently affirmed that Strategy and Tactics are its master key and best express its essence; all other problems will lend themselves to the solution of this fundamental problem of the military art. It is that which will form the strong roots by which the general growth will be nourished."
Of strategy in particular he says: "It is the fruit of long and patient meditations, of far-sighted measures taken long in advance and requiring slow but unbroken effort through many years. In fact, strategy touches upon all problems of war; it is their very soul; its field of action is unlimited and many volumes could be devoted to it without coming near to exhausting the subject." He then quotes Von der Goltz, Clausewitz, Jomini, Napoleon and Others to sustain his position.
Marine International Law.—Rear-Admiral C. H. Stockton, U. S. Navy, prepared the Naval War Code of i9oo as mentioned in our previous article.
In 1901 a method of discussing international law questions was introduced by Rear-Admiral Chadwick. It is best explained by the following preface to the "International Law Situations with Solutions," issued by the President of the College:
The studies in international law at the Naval War College during the summer of 1901 were under the immediate direction of Mr. John Bassett Moore, late Assistant Secretary of State, now of Columbia University. The mention to the service of his name gives assurance of the value of the present work. To his able and careful labors in the present instance the college is deeply indebted.
The situations were set by Mr. Moore, and tentative solutions were sent in by the several committees into which the officers in attendance are divided for college work. The tentative solutions were then discussed orally, the discussions being presided over and directed by Mr. Moore, who prepared and read the accompanying notes, and who is also the author of the paper in the appendix, entitled "Maritime Law in the War with Spain." The printed solutions exhibit the consensus of opinion of all concerned.
It is believed that by proposing cases simulating those which have recently arisen, or which seem likely to arise under modern conditions, and bringing to bear in mutual discussion the thought and experience of the officers who make application of the law, and the trained mind of the international jurist who expounds it, a method has been adopted which must give to these solutions a practical value of great interest and weight.
The results are submitted to the service in the surety that they represent a valuable addition to work in a domain of thought which belongs peculiarly to navies.
F. E. CHADWICK,
Captain, U. S. N., President.
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, Newport, R. I., September 5, 19m.
The same method was followed in 1902 as will be seen by the preface to the second volume of the new series.
The International Law Situations at the Naval War College during the summer course of 5902 were under the immediate direction of Mr. George Grafton Wilson, Professor in Brown University, whose name is already known to the service through previous papers prepared by him for the College.
As last year by Mr. Moore, this year the situations were set by Mr. Wilson, and tentative solutions offered by the committees into which the officers in attendance are divided for the college work. Throughout the several law periods during the summer there were general, and frequently long-continued, discussions of the solutions by the officers, making the subject a lively one; and more so, that several of the situations were of late occurrence, which the officers concerned have sent to the college for consideration. It is hoped that so profitable a practice will be continued by the officers afloat.
F. E. CHADWICK,
Captain, U. S. N., President.
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, Newport, R. I., November 59, 1902.
Mr. Benjamin Baker has given a very clear account of the further progress made at the College in this branch of study. We are permitted to quote as follows:
Two or three specific instances will serve to show the way in which the Naval War College conclusions, apart from the items of the code of 1900 [referred to in our former article], have established sound principles for particular situations and have to a large degree formulated in advance the decisions later adopted by the Powers. One of these instances related to the arrival of the Russian transport Lena at San Francisco, during the Russo-Japanese War. The vessel was damaged, and necessary repairs promised to require six weeks or more. This disposed at once of any Possibility of observing the twenty-four hour rule. The ship could not be ejected from the port in an unseaworthy condition, in which state she had entered it; and if allowed to refit and then go out, the hospitality of the Port would result in aid to Russia against the interests of Japan—consequently a breach of neutrality. The situation was not covered by any accepted rule. The solution actually adopted by the State Department was the interment of the ship until the end of the war, and the same rule was applied to the Russian squadron under Admiral Enquist at Manila. This rule, it is interesting to note, was at that time in print as one of the conclusions of the then latest conference of the War College.
Another instance is the conclusions reached upon the subject of submarine mines by the War College conferences of 1905. The subject was then practically a new one, brought into acute prominence by the events of the War in the Far East. The Naval War College formulated these conclusions:
"1. Unanchored sub-marine mines are prohibited, except those that by their construction are rendered innocuous after a limited time, certainly before passing outside the area of immediate belligerent activities.
"2. Anchored contact mines that do not become innocuous on getting adrift are prohibited."
Compare with these articles Article I of the Hague Convention of 1907—two years later—on the same subject. The Hague text says:
It is forbidden:
1. To lay unanchored automatic contact mines, except when they are so constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after the person who laid them ceases to control them.
2. To lay anchored automatic contact mines which do not become harmless as soon as they have broken loose from their moorings.
The substantial identity of the two sets of articles is certainly striking.
Another item is the fact that of the topics proposed for consideration in England's invitation to the London Conference, all but two had been the subject of conclusions on the part of the War College conferences which were in nearly all points in harmony with the declaration finally adopted.
An illustration of the authority of the War College conclusions in regard to points not covered by recent international agreements is afforded in a bulky book called "International Law Applied to the Russo-Japanese War," and written by Professor Sakuye Takahashi of the University of Tokio, who was the legal adviser of the Japanese Government during the war. Discussing Japan's treatment of the newspaper correspondents—a matter which gave rise to volumes of complaints from the newspaper men themselves—Professor Takahashi says:
The problem of the treatment of newspaper correspondents is well discussed in the International Law Situations published by the United States Naval College. The author takes the liberty to quote the larger part of the solution (as formulated by the War College) to prove that the Japanese treatment of the correspondents was very reasonable, judging from the American view.
Takahashi then proceeds to quote more than ten pages of the U. S. Naval War College "Situations" of 1904 in support of the policy actually followed by Japan.
This use of the Naval War College publications on international law may well enough serve to point out the great value they have as texts, as collections of authorities and principles, bearing on a great variety of problems, quite apart from their positions as statements of final conclusions. The American delegates to the Second Hague and the London Conferences had reason to be thankful that the whole range of debated and debatable points had been so fully examined in the War College annuals, and that all the documentary materials pertinent had been so adequately presented. The degree of this thoroughness was illustrated at the conference in London when one of the continental delegates presented a proposition (finally embodied in article 54 of the Declaration) as a wholly new matter. It was very interesting to the conference, as a whole, to discover—and it was a discovery for them—that the "new" point was set forth in full detail in one of the War College annuals, with a citation of provisions covering that very point from treaties between the United States and several European countries.
Professor Wilson has been for nine years the technical law adviser of the President and Staff of the War College. He has prepared "situations"; collected and presented the authorities, assisted in discussions, and formulated the conclusions of the conferences; and these have acquired a position of great authority throughout the civilized world. Necessarily, he has been in the most intimate contact with every detail of the country's foreign relations so far as these concern matters of war; and has a familiarity with current events hardly to be possessed by any other person except the naval officer who actually handles the concrete case. The naval officers who annually meet at the conferences at Newport are men of judgment and wide experience. Their legal adviser very nearly shares their experiences and he brings to the discussion of them a degree of learning which is naturally out of reach of the busy naval officer.
In a letter to the London Times by a "Naval Correspondent," April 5, 1901, the Naval War Code prepared by Captain Stockton, U. S. N., is very favorably noticed. The writer remarks that "this little code of laws deserves to be noted as another product of the United States Naval War College, to which we owe Captain Mahan's work on Sea Power." On April to, 1901, the eminent English authority on International Law, Professor T. E. Holland, wrote to the London Times:
It is worth considering whether something resembling the United States Code would not be found useful in the British Navy. Our code might be better arranged than its predecessor, and would differ from it on certain questions; but should resemble it in clearness of expression, in brevity, and above all things in frank acceptance of responsibility. What naval men most want is definite guidance in categorical language, upon those points of maritime international law upon which the government has made up its mind.
Since these letters appeared the English Naval War College has made great progress as we have shown.
All this is very gratifying as far as it goes, but it must not blind us to our defects. The College has not yet emerged from the adolescent stage. While its growth has been in one respect healthy, in others it has been far from satisfactory. In the department of Marine International Law, it has fulfilled the expectation of the friends of the College. In the department of the Science and Art of War it presents a case of retarded development. The time has arrived—is even now here—when the College must go ahead or go back. In the report of the Board of 1884 it said: "The Board is of the opinion that a cogent reason for such a school" (now known as the Naval War College) is that there may be a place where our officers will not only be encouraged, but required to study their profession proper—War—in a far more thorough manner than has ever heretofore been attempted, and to bring to the investigation of modern naval warfare the scientific methods adopted in other professions." . . . . "The School (College) will tend to hold the young officer to those lines of professional thought so eminently calculated to qualify him for the highest and most responsible duties."
It was assumed by the board that six months would be needed for the work of the proposed school. The course of study was divided under two heads:
A. The Science and Art of War.
B. Law and History.
The latter, as we have seen, has far outstripped the principal branch. It is now time to develop the more important course. All the great masters of the Art of War who have written upon the subject, dwell upon the importance of a knowledge of strategy, and the amount of study and reflection required to master it. We give four months to it and a vacant chair of Naval History. Fifteen years ago this was seen to be trifling with a subject admittedly of the highest importance. For that reason the following order was issued:
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, February 18, 1895.
SPECIAL CIRCULAR No. 20.
1. The Session of the Naval War College and Torpedo School for 1895 will commence on the first day of June next, and will terminate on the 15th day of October.
2. It is the intention of the Department to detail a class of about twenty-five officers (fifteen of and above the grade of lieutenant and ten below that grade) for attendance during the session. From this class it is proposed to select five officers to remain after the Session to continue the general work through the winter and prepare for the next Session. These five officers will be chosen for their aptitude in the work, and their attainment in International Law, Strategy and Tactics.
H. A. HERBERT,
Secretary.
It will be seen from this order that it was the intention of the Department that comparatively young officers who had shown an aptitude for the cultivation of the higher professional branches should remain at the College for Study; not to hear lectures, which are very well in their way—but to study. And of all the junior officers in the service it was certainly a very modest assumption that five such officers might be found. That was before the Spanish War when the officers could have been found, had there been anyone in the Navy Department of that day to see that the orders of the Secretary of the Navy were carried out. To-day all the conditions are different. The scarcity of officers is everywhere felt. The College cannot expect to be favored at .the expense of ships in active service. But in the fulness of time when the supply of officers shall be equal to the demand, we indulge the hope that not only five officers may be found but many more.
The value of lectures on professional subjects must not be underrated. They are indispensable. But it is one of the principles of the Science of Education that throughout youth and in maturity the process in the acquisition of knowledge shall be one of self-instruction. Knowledge which the student has himself acquired, a problem which he has himself solved, becomes by virtue of the conquest much more thoroughly his own than it could otherwise be. This is making education a process of self evolution. "Humanity has progressed solely by self-instruction," says Herbert Spencer, "and that to achieve the best results, each mind must progress somewhat after the same fashion, is continually proved by the marked success of self-made men." What the learner discovers by mental exertion is better known than what is told to him.
When it was proposed in 1884 that Rear-Admiral—then Captain—Mahan should take the Chair of Naval History at the War College, he replied that he did not have the accurate knowledge necessary; that he had not given the subject special attention. If his knowledge of naval history was in that day superficial, no one can say that now it is not profound. On accepting the office he began a course of self-instruction in order that he might instruct others. He was obliged first to possess himself of knowledge. He then organized his knowledge, and in his treatment of naval strategy he resorted to the "comparative method," to which science owes so much. He studied the principles underlying military strategy and then applied those principles, as far as they were applicable, to naval strategy. In a word his method, consciously or unconsciously, was scientific. The works on Sea Power were a great boon to the naval profession, but not greater than the example he set by the practical illustration of what self instruction can accomplish: an example all should heed.
Naval history has been for the most part a collection of isolated and independent facts. The ships of one nation encounter, at sea, the ships of another nation with which it is at war. A battle ensues and the results are given by the historian with more or less detail. This is an isolated fact. The historian then proceeds to give an account of another sea fight, and of still another, and so on to the index of the chapter. Thus we have a series of independent facts, each one interesting in itself to the naval student, and worthy of critical examination in all its various aspects. But not satisfied with the historian's bare relation of facts, the student asks himself whether it was through accident or design that those opposing fleets met and fought at sea. On further examination he finds that there is a relation between these facts. He then uncovers, or discovers, what had been hidden from him that these several facts are all related to each other. What then had appeared to him as a series of independent, unrelated facts, he finds out to be phenomena which fall within the province of law. In short he has, by self effort, gained knowledge; he has organized that knowledge, and has worked out for himself the science of Naval Strategy. "Science is organized knowledge."
There is a still higher field of inquiry. Why were those two nations at war? The causes which led to our War of 1812 have been traced back for nearly one hundred and fifty years.
Let us continue our lectures by all means. But let us also find a few officers who are not only willing but anxious to specialize on the lines laid down by the author of Sea Power. To such the War College extends a cordial welcome.