Honorable Mention
Motto: There are certain teachings in the school of history which remain constant.
The literature bearing upon the Russo-Japanese War began to appear almost with the outbreak of hostilities early in February, 1904, since when much has been written of interest to naval officers on various questions pertaining to the war. Notwithstanding the amount that has been written, it cannot be said that the subject has been exhausted. To those of the profession of arms in the service of neutral nations a war is as a complicated surgical operation to the medical student, something to be viewed from all points, studied with painstaking care, and thought over again and again until each step becomes as familiar as the most commonplace subject. A war, however, is of much rarer occurrence than a surgical operation, and, instead of one life, involves the lives of many, and possibly the very life of a nation itself. Hence, that one may become qualified to conduct war, it becomes all the more important that each and every preceding war be studied to the utmost, raking over many times the embers, as it were, that no possible particles of valuable knowledge be left undiscovered. The result of a war is always widely disseminated, but the reason for such a result is often not so apparent. To one wishing to learn the science of war, results without reasons are of little utility, and the all important question is "What caused such results?"
It seems strange that a subject of such importance in its bearing upon results as the strategy used by the two combatants in the Russo-Japanese War should have been so consistently neglected by naval writers, but such is the case. The tactics, international law, logistics, gunnery, materiel and personnel, each has been extensively studied, and discussed in many languages, but nowhere does one find anything upon the naval strategy of the war, viewed from the standpoint of strategy per se, though, of course, strategy is intermixed often with other subjects. Hence this modest attempt to analyze briefly the chief features of the war, to see what, if any, strategical lessons may be learned from the application of new principles or the adaptation of old ones, and particularly whether these lessons have a special application to our own country.
In attempting to make a study of this subject, one is immediately impressed with the paucity of reliable data. Both the Japanese and Russian archives remain closed, with their secret reports and documents inaccessible to outsiders. Usually writers on strategy wait for such secret papers and documents before attempting to draw deductions, but by doing so, much that is gained in accurate knowledge is lost in vital interest through the lapse of time. This study, acknowledged to be incomplete, is based upon the generally known incidents of the war, published reports and other sources of information, and makes no claim to greater authenticity than is shown on its face. Motives and reasons are deduced from known actions, which, after all, is a very logical method. Whether or not the motive inferred in any particular case was in fact the real motive, it may still serve to point its moral quite as effectively, provided that reasonableness is always maintained.
Of all the elements that enter into maritime warfare, strategy is probably the least apparent to the casual observer. It covers the whole possible field of operations, taking hostilities into one area and removing them from another; it works in silence and without ostentation, and prior to the actual clash of the opposing forces. One sees the results of strategy, perhaps in a brilliant victory, or possibly in the very absence of an engagement, but the unobtrusive strategy itself is often overshadowed by the more spectacular features that appeal with greater force to the popular fancy. It is well for naval officers that wish to reach the highest degree of proficiency in the science of maritime war, to read naval history with a discerning mind, in order that all the elements of success may be discovered if possible, and surely strategy is not the least of these.
Naval strategy may be divided, more or less imperfectly, into two classes, peace strategy (or political strategy, if one prefers that designation) and war strategy. Peace strategy concerns itself with preparing the way for war strategy. It has to do more with naval bases, and the protecting or improving of lines of communication, than with the fleet itself, and is most intimately related to international relations, as well of one's own nation as of the other great nations of the world. Thus, from a naval standpoint, the building of the Panama Canal is a gigantic stroke of peace strategy, as it so materially shortens the route from one of our coasts to the other, thus facilitating the concentration of the fleet on either coast, and the transferring of the fleet from one ocean to the other. So also the building of a naval base at Pearl Harbor is peace strategy, since it advances our base to be used in a possible war in the Pacific. War strategy, on the other hand, concerns itself with the disposition, security and coordination of the various parts of the fleet during and in anticipation of hostilities.
We will take up in turn the peace strategy of Russia and of Japan, and then the war strategy of each, dividing the war strategy into its two logical phases, viz., (1) from the beginning of hostilities until the fall of Port Arthur, and (2) from the sailing of the Baltic fleet to the battle of Tsushima.
After the peace of Shimonoseki between Japan and China in 1895, events showed clearly that henceforth it would not be China, but Russia, with whom Japan would have to contend for the supremacy of the Far East. Japan, stung with mortification and bitter disappointment by the coalition of Russia, France and Germany, of which Russia was the leader, bided her time, and began systematically to prepare for war with Russia, which she saw the conflict of national interests would precipitate.
Let us trace from this time the more important steps of Japan and Russia that had an influence on the maritime war when it came, taking up first the Russian side.
At this time the only naval port in eastern Asia held by Russia was Vladivostok, as yet unconnected by rail with Russia proper. The first step taken by Russia of interest to us came soon after the signing of the treaty of Shimonoseki. Taking advantage of her predominant influence over the Tsung-li-yamen, Russia obtained permission to continue her Siberian railway from Transbaikal straight to Vladivostok across Chinese territory (Manchuria). By this concession her only east-Asian naval port was brought about 330 miles nearer Russia, and incidentally the cost of the railway was much reduced and Russia gained a foothold in Manchuria that she has held to this day. However, Russia had ambitions beyond Vladivostok, for there were two serious naval objections to this port. It was not ice free, and Japan completely covered its approaches by sea, and, in any case, an alternative base was desired. So Russia turned her attention towards the Yellow Sea. In 1898 she acquired, by what was termed a lease, the southern portion of Liao-tung Peninsula, covering Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan Bay, the very concession that she had kept from Japan in 1895. By connecting Port Arthur with her railway line in the north, she had a naval port practically iee free, clear of the Sea of Japan, and in railway communication with Russia.
Observe the locations of the two Russian naval bases in relation to Corea, the objective, one on each flank. (See chart.) Unfortunately for Russia, however, Japan had the central location, and Russia's next move was an attempt to nullify this, and for boldness and effrontery exceeded anything she had yet attempted. It was nothing less than the obtaining from Corea of permission to establish a naval base at Masampo, located, one might say, in Japan's front yard. A glance at the chart is all that one needs to realize the vast importance to Russia of this move, had not Japan been able to prevent its successful termination through her influence at the Corean court. After this failure Russia contented herself with fortifying, strengthening and developing Vladivostok and Port Arthur, and generally in making more secure her position in the Far East. Where she most signally failed was in her lack of actual preparation for the inevitable conflict itself, and in her failure to recognize the paramount importance of naval power when the actual clash came.
During these years Japan had not been idle. After the peace of Shimonoseki, she turned her attention to improving her financial condition, and to assimilating that which she had learned in the China-Japan War by reorganizing and increasing her naval and military forces. It was realized that in preparing for war no element of possible national weakness should be left unstrengthened. Particular attention was paid to developing and extending her naval bases on and near the Corean Strait, and a new base was established at Takeshiki on the Island of Tsushima.
In 1902 Japan executed through diplomacy a stroke of .peace strategy of far-reaching importance. By concluding an alliance with England, the possibility of interference by other nations while Japan was at war With Russia was virtually eliminated. Japan had learned well the lesson of the coalition after the treaty of Shimonoseki, and did not propose to be deprived again of the most substantial fruits of victory. After the conclusion of this alliance, Japan's diplomacy with Russia underwent a radical change. Where she had acquiesced and ignored before, she now formulated demands. All the world, with the possible exception of Russia herself, realized that the result must be war, unless Russia made a decided change of front.
Of greater importance than all other peace strategy was the careful and systematic preparation by Japan of complete, elaborate and detailed plans for the execution of the war, and it behooves the belligerent of the future to learn this lesson well.
It may occur to some, in a body of readers composed largely of naval officers, that what is here included under the head of peace strategy, while possibly of interest to the student of history, is of only academic interest to those of the naval profession. However, naval officers must not overlook their duty in influencing, as may be in their power, both politics and diplomacy where they affect the preparedness for war of the navy. At times the way may seem long, and their influence nil, but their duty remains the same. For years the influence of the navy was thrown towards the establishment of the imperatively needed naval base at Pearl Harbor, and for years Congress refused to sanction it. The navy, figuratively speaking, sat upon the doorstep of Congress and yelled until Congress had to listen, and the desired legislation was at last forthcoming. The influence of the navy upon public opinion touching naval matters is much greater than many naval officers suppose, and professional service opinion must ever be ready to point the way, or sound the cry of warning as may be necessary, to the unprofessional opinion on naval affairs. One does not become less of a citizen by virtue of a commission in the navy, but rather his obligations as a citizen are increased.
Let us now take up the consideration of the war strategy of the two belligerents from the outbreak of hostilities to the elimination of the Russian Port Arthur fleet.
It is impossible to explain satisfactorily Russia's lack of realization that war was imminent early in 1904. It must be true that she did fail to realize this, however, for in no other way can one account for her poor naval strategy. The outbreak of hostilities found the Russian naval forces in Asia located as follows:
At Port Arthur, 7 battleships, 1 armored cruiser, 7 cruisers, 4 gunboats and 14 destroyers.
At Vladivostok, 3 armored cruisers and 1 protected cruiser.
At Chemulpo, 2 cruisers.
And several gunboats at different Chinese ports.
At Suez, on their way to the Far East, there were 1 battleship, 2 armored cruisers and 2 cruisers. These turned back and took no part in the first phase of the war. The woeful inadequacy of these reinforcements for the Far Eastern fleet, even had they been despatched in proper season, is but one of many indications of the poor strategy of Russia.
At this day, when we so fully realize the military importance of concentration, it would seem almost idle to call attention to the glaring error of the Russians in failing to concentrate all their available naval forces, but, less we be tempted to point the finger of scorn, it must not be forgotten that at the outbreak of hostilities in 1898 we were caught with 25 per cent of our first-class battleships (the Oregon) in the Straits of Magellan, and that very recently our Senate has recommended to the President that our battleships be divided between the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans.
In marked contrast to their enemy, the Japanese naval forces were all concentrated at, or near, Sasebo, the two cruisers bought in Italy not yet having arrived. In October, 1903, five months before hostilities began, a foreign naval attache in Tokio, in a conversation with the Vice-Chief of the Navy General Staff, remarked, "You must be very busy," to which he replied, "Quite the contrary. We have nothing to do. We are all ready and only await orders." Comments or comparisons in regard to such a condition would be superfluous.
Before we take up any of the operations of the war it may be well to point out that the Japanese understood perfectly the value of the command of the sea, while the Russians apparently had no conception of its influence, certainly not until late in the war. This attitude on the part of the Russians explains many things that otherwise would be incapable of explanation. A few citations are all that are needed to illustrate the Russian point of view. Captain Klado, in his "The Battle of the Sea of Japan," says that he heard General Kuropatkin say on several occasions that not only the Russian Navy but also navies in general were of very little utility. Kuropatkin was at that time Minister of War, and later, as Commander-in-Chief in Asia, he had command of all the Russian forces, naval as well as military.
Klado also says that the command of the sea was still held in derision by both the Ministry of Marine and of War even after the disasters on land. It would be interesting to know what the opinion of General Kuropatkin was then, when in the field he saw the armies of his enemy being supplied and reinforced by the over-sea route with security, promptness and dispatch.
What, in general terms, were the problems of Japan and of Russia? Japan went to war because she considered Russia's attitude and position in Manchuria and northern Corea to be a menace to Japanese vital interests. Therefore, the Japanese problem was to effect by force of arms a change in the Russian status; the Russian problem was simply to maintain herself in statu quo. Japan, to succeed, must first get her military forces to the continent and then defeat the Russian land forces. Conversely, Russia must keep the Japanese forces from the mainland, or, failing in that, defeat them after they got there.
Let us now look at the chart of Japan and Eastern Asia. If, from the southern point of Liao-tung Peninsula, a line be drawn tangent to the western end of Quelpart Island, and a line parallel to this de drawn through Shimonoseki Strait, in the area included between these lines we have the area of paramount strategical importance in this war. Here took place all of the naval operations of moment. These operations did not give to the area in question its importance, but its importance caused the operations to take place within its limits. This distinction must be understood, for the importance of the area was inherent from the very problem that the war undertook to settle.
This area, in its relation to the war we are considering, may be compared to a bridge spanning a broad and deep river in the area of military operations of some land war. The general that controls such a bridge can move his troops over the river at will, and at the same time deny its use to the opposing general, forcing him, in case he wishes to cross, to make a wide detour, and probably subjecting his force to much delay, inconvenience and danger. Now, when this bridge is in the most direct and secure route from one of the generals to his main objective, its value to each of the combatants is all the more enhanced. Such was the case of the maritime bridge under consideration. One of the combatants in this case (Japan), by the very nature of her problem, had to enter the country at the far end of this maritime bridge. To do so with any hope of success, she must control, at least to a large extent, the route over which supplies and reinforcements must come, even though she might actually land her army without such control, or with very temporary control. Thus we see that if Japan could control this direct route her line of communications with her army that must be sent to the mainland was assured, and she could undertake land operations that if successful would terminate the war. If, on the other hand, Russia could control it, Japan must find another line, or else fail in her object of bringing Russia to terms in Manchuria. No line was practicable for Japan north of Gensan, owing to the difficult nature of the country bordering the Sea of Japan on the west and the absence of ports, and the line via Gensan would have been much more difficult than one along the west coast of Corea. It follows that the control of the area in question was almost a necessity to Japan's success, as enabling her to undertake an offensive campaign, while it was of equal importance to Russia in defense. Japan realized this, and prior to hostilities subjected the area to the closest study through her naval and military general staff and prepared comprehensive and complete plans for its control that were now to be put to the test.
The naval part of the war was fought for the control of this small area of the sea that formed the vital connecting link between Japan, Corea and Manchuria. The belligerent that succeeded in getting and maintaining control of this area would have in his grasp the key to ultimate victory.
When Japan decided that the time for war had arrived she at once began a comprehensive naval campaign for command of the sea within the strategic area above outlined, while Russia, taken unawares and apparently without plan or naval preparation, did nothing. As Admiral Togo began his first report, "The combined fleet left Sasebo on the 6th and proceeded as had been previously settled." The words "as has been previously settled" occur repeatedly in Admiral Togo's despatches throughout the war, and they throw a flood of light upon the forehandedness of the Japanese Navy General Staff. One would not think of venturing upon extensive business operations without first preparing comprehensive plans, and yet how often does one see war operations undertaken in complete violation of this fundamental principle. The Japanese fleet remained combined only in so far as its parts were all working on interior lines and towards one end—the command of the sea in the area covering Japan's main line of future communications. Vice-Admiral Kamimura, with one or two armored cruisers and several smaller cruisers, took station in the Corean Strait to keep the Vladivostok division from coming through; Rear-Admiral Uriu with one armored cruiser and several cruisers and destroyers went to Chemulpo to destroy the Russian ships there; Vice-Admiral Togo, with the main fighting force and destroyers, went for the chief objective, the Russian battle fleet at Port Arthur.
It is well to notice here that the division of the Japanese naval forces was more apparent than real, since all of the Japanese detachments were between the two main Russian detachments. All of the Japanese force could be brought against either of the Russian detachments before the other Russian detachment could join. In other words, strategically speaking, the Japanese forces were still concentrated and between the two Russian detachments. Every Japanese part was operating on interior lines to the Russian forces.
Advanced bases were promptly established at Gensan, at Masampho, off Mokpo in Najan Islands, in Hai-ju Bay, off Chin-nam-po, at the mouth of the Ta-tong River, and in the Elliott Islands.
Note the complete chain of bases from Japan to the seat of land War, extending up the middle of the strategic area previously mentioned. Gensan alone is outside of this area. This base was established, no doubt, for two reasons, to keep it out of the hands of Russia and to have it available for an alternative line of communication if needed.
Thus, from the very beginning of the war, Japan had command of the sea where most needed, i. e., from the Straits of Corea to Liao-tung Peninsula. Her transports and supply ships, without convoy, passed practically unmolested from her home ports to the seat of war, and her small gunboats operated with the army on the west coast of Corea unimpeded by the Russian naval forces.
Of the numerous gun and torpedo attacks made by the Japanese on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur, it is unnecessary to speak in detail in a strategical study. From the way Togo avoided endangering his battleships, and from his repeated attempts to block the entrance to Port Arthur, it is perfectly apparent that he hoped to eliminate the Russian fleet in Port Arthur by the capture of the place by the land forces, in conjunction with the naval blockade. The increasing importance of command of the sea as the war progressed was realized. Togo's battle fleet was the only force available for this purpose when Russian reinforcements arrived, and it was impossible to replace this fleet during the continuation of the war. Throughout the war the Japanese kept in view the whole war rather than any particular feature or phase of the war. They cared little for spectacular victories of small importance, but were concerned only with ultimate success.
When the Russian fleet made its sortie from Port Arthur on August 10, it must have been apparent to those in authority that its further usefulness at Port Arthur had absolutely ceased, even if it had ever had any usefulness there. Yet, after a very indecisive action, the major portion of the fleet returned to Port Arthur, to sink later at their moorings from Japanese fire from shore or at the hands of the Russians themselves. It was the imperative duty of this fleet, placed as it then was, to engage the Japanese fleet in a decisive action, even to their own complete annihilation, in the hope of so damaging the Japanese fleet as to make easier the regaining of the lost command of the sea by the Baltic fleet upon its arrival. They were as ignorant of major as of minor strategy, and seem to have been animated by no more lofty ideas than sauve qui peut. It has been stated that the Russian Admiral said that he was going to Vladivostok in case he could do so without fighting. In war, what is worth having is worth fighting for, and at sea or on land the leader that expects to accomplish great things without fighting is predoomed to defeat.
A fleet that will not fight to attain its objective has no further interest for us, so let us turn our attention to the cruiser division at Vladivostok and see if, perchance, it did anything of interest. The authority directing this division seems to have had the idea that it could accomplish something, but just what that something was must have been vague and ill defined. The division in question made a number of raids in the Sea of Japan, in one instance even getting well down in the Straits of Corea, and in another instance passing out of the Sea of Japan through Tsugaru Strait and cruising down the east coast of Japan as far as the entrance to Tokio Bay. The object of these raids, if they had a military Object, must have been to draw some of the Japanese ships out of the Yellow Sea. In this they were unsuccessful. The Japanese never for a moment lost sight of the correct objective, the battle fleet in being of their enemy. However unpleasant these raids might be to the Japanese, they could have no effect on the outcome of the war, so long as Togo's fleet contained the Russian fleet at Port Arthur. It may be well to consider here for comparison our conduct during the Spanish-American War every time an over-excited fisherman reported a school of porpoises as a Spanish fleet.
There remains but one other incident to consider in this phase of the war, and that is the action of August 14 between Vice-Admiral Kamimura's division and the Vladivostok division. Kamimura has been severely criticized in some foreign countries for abandoning the chase after sinking the Rurik. If this action be viewed as an isolated naval battle, the criticism is assuredly justified, but we must look at it as only one small incident in the whole war, and then Kamimura's conduct seems both strategically correct and highly commendable, for he sacrificed the completeness of an unimportant action in which he personally took part to the possible good of the Japanese position as a whole. Let us briefly inspect the whole scene of naval operations at this time. On August 10 the Port Arthur fleet made its sortie, and one battleship, the Czarevitch, eluded the Japanese, and Kamimura did not know how many others had done the same. A Russian destroyer escaped to Chefoo and undoubtedly got a message through to Vladivostok, for 12 hours later the Vladivostok division headed for the Straits of Corea to join the Port Arthur fleet.
Now the duty of Kamimura was perfectly clear. He must keep the Vladivostok cruisers from passing through the Straits of Corea to the southward, and he must, above all things, keep any Russian battleships from passing to the northward. At daylight on August 14 he located the enemy's cruiser division about 30 miles north of Tsushima. The Russian cruisers turned north and the Japanese gave chase for five hours. Just how far this took them from the Straits of Corea, we do not know. Anyway, at this point, having sunk the Rurik, Kamimura abandoned the chase and headed for his station, and by the time he reached it his ships must have been away as much as eight hours. He had accomplished the first part of his duty and he took no great chances of failing in the second. The fact that the Czarevitch disarmed at Kao-chow rather than attempt to go on to Vladivostock does not make Kamimura's judgment less correct.
One of the famous expressions of Nelson was, "Had ten ships been taken and the eleventh escaped, we being able to get at her, I should never consider it well done." At first sight Admiral Kamimura's conduct might seem a violation of the principle contained in this phrase, but Nelson used it specifically in relation to the battle fleet of the enemy. Kamimura turned back to prevent the possible escape of the one battleship, and it must be acknowledged that to prevent one battleship from getting through the straits was of far greater ultimate importance than to destroy the two remaining cruisers. Certain it is that the two cruisers that escaped had no subsequent influence on the war, and the information was given out in Tokio that Kamimura acted according to his orders. He sacrificed sentiment to good strategy, which was consistently done by the Japanese during the whole war.
Having seen what was done by the two combatants during the first phase of the war, let us briefly see what might have been done had Russia realized two things: the iminence of war and the paramount importance of command of the sea. What was the problem confronting the Russian Naval General Staff? It was, first, to determine the objectives of Japan, and, second, to determine where to concentrate their fleet and how to use it so as best to prevent Japan from attaining her objectives.
Japan had no hope of bringing Russia to terms without defeating the Russian land forces in East Asia. In order to have a secure line of communications for her army Japan must get and maintain command of the sea within the necessary area. Therefore, her first objective must be the Russian fleet, but only as a means to an end, the end being the occupation of Corea, and the defeat of the Russian army in the Liao-tung Peninsula and in Manchuria. Before Russia decided upon the port for naval concentration she should have decided whether her force available was strong enough to conduct an aggressive, offensive campaign, or whether a defensive campaign was necessary until her naval forces could be reinforced. She apparently decided the latter, and subsequent events seem to have borne out the correctness of the decision. At which end of the line then should she have placed her fleet, at Port Arthur or Vladivostok? Japan, in any case, must make her advance into Manchuria from the south, owing to the distribution of the Russian forces in and around northern Corea, the nature of the country, and the protection that would be afforded her over-sea line of communications by a chain of temporary bases; whereas she -was prevented from making her advance from the east by the mountainous country practically devoid of roads and without ports of consequence from Gensan to Vladivostok for landing or for temporary bases. The Russian army in the Liao-tung Peninsula must at least be contained, if not seriously engaged, soon after the Japanese army crossed the Yalu in their advance. Of what advantage then to Russia to conduct a defensive naval campaign from Port Arthur? The presence there of the fleet but made it a double objective, since the fall of the port would eliminate both army and fleet.
Let us look at the port at the other end of the fine, Vladivostok. Not unlike Port Arthur, it is located on a small peninsula, on a land-locked harbor, but a harbor of greater extent and facility of ingress and egress for large ships. Its approaches, both from seaward and from the interior, are much more favorable for defense. On one side of the peninsular lies Usuri Bay, on the other Amur Bay, and extending about 25 miles in a southwest direction from Vladivostok and separating the two bays is a chain of islands with numerous passages between them. The land in the immediate and more remote vicinity is very hilly and rugged, and numbers of batteries cover all approaches by land as Well as by water. In the opinion of military experts the reduction of Vladivostok would have presented quite as many difficulties as did the reduction of Port Arthur, while from seaward it is not nearly so easy to blockade. The Japanese never attempted to blockade Vladivostok during the war, considering it easier to keep the cruisers out of the Corean Straits than to keep them in Vladivostok Harbor. The Japanese Navy Department stated during the war that it was thought that naval operations off Vladivostok were practically impossible, owing to the prevalence of dense fog. It would be hard to overestimate the vast difficulty for Japan had she been forced to send an army to operate against Vladivostok with its bleak and rugged country, and with the Russian fleet ineffectively blockaded, and this in addition to her other enterprises, for they would still have been necessary.
The question of ice at Vladivostok had to be considered, but Russia had ice breakers there for the very purpose of keeping the port open to the navy, and, as a matter of fact, we know that the cruisers started on their first raid from Vladivostok on February 9th. The danger from ice would have been far greater for the blockaders than for the blockaded, particularly in a defensive campaign.
Had Russia based her fleet on Vladivostok and hastened reinforcements to them, the question of the ultimate command of the sea might have resulted far differently from what it did, though, of course, other elements might have nullified the best strategy.
It would seem then that Vladivostok was the better port from which to conduct a defensive campaign, as offering the greater facilities for retarding the Japanese operations until naval reinforcements could arrive from Russia. Had Russia been able to conduct an offensive naval campaign from the beginning, it seems that Port Arthur would have been the proper base from which to operate, being so favorably located on the flank of the Japanese main line of communication. Thus we see that in choosing a strategic point we have to consider not only the situation, strength and resources of the point, but also the nature of the campaign to be undertaken.
The importance of the strategic area mentioned previously is not overlooked, but is emphasized. There is a place, a time and a method for obtaining control and it is the function of strategy to co-ordinate these for ultimate success. After the defensive campaign had been conducted from Vladivostok and reinforcements had arrived, then an offensive campaign must have been undertaken for command of the sea within the area, when it could have been undertaken with much greater prospect of success.
As indicative of the. Japanese opinion in regard to the location of the Russian fleet is a statement in a publication on the Russo- Japanese War by the British Army General Staff, and we know that the British had unexcelled opportunities for acquiring information. In discussing the commencement of hostilities, this statement occurs: "On the 3d of February, . . . . a report reached Tokio that the Russian squadron at Port Arthur had put to sea. For a brief space something akin to consternation filled the breasts of the Japanese, . . . . but the alarm . . . . quickly subsided when it was known that the Russian admiral had anchored his command in the outer roadstead of Port Arthur." It would seem as though the Japanese wanted the Russians to remain at Port Arthur, and we know that the Japanese were not influenced by sentimental reasons.
It may be well to digress here for a moment to point out the reasons for dwelling upon the difference in strategy necessary if a continuous offensive campaign be undertaken, or if at first the defensive be assumed in order that later an offensive campaign may be entered into with greater chances of ultimate success.
The position of the United States in relation to the Pacific is somewhat analogous to that of Russia at the beginning of 1904. Each fronts on two seas far remote from one another. On account of many practical considerations, our naval force is divided between the Atlantic and the Pacific, as Russia's fleet was divided between the Pacific and the Baltic. As Russia habitually kept the greater part of her naval forces in the Baltic, we keep ours in the Atlantic, and it is improbable that during peace the general distribution of our forces will materially change. Russia and the United States are both nations of great power and resources, but the United States particularly is strong in latent military force, while in a chronic state of unpreparedness for war. If, unfortunately, at some future time we should become engaged in war with a nation in the Pacific, and, as is probable, our naval force is divided between the Atlantic and Pacific, sound military policy would dictate that at first we adopt a defensive attitude, until complete concentration has been effected. However humiliating it may be to a first-class power, and however insistent public clamor may be, we cannot afford to fritter away our power, but ,must wait until our whole available force is concentrated with respect to the campaign to be undertaken, and then assume the aggressive-offensive by hurling our missed military power against the enemy in an effort to deal a paralyzing blow from which it will take him years to recover.
This must not in any way be taken as an argument favoring the defensive method of war as against the offensive. It would be much better to be in a position at the beginning of a war to at once assume the offensive, but, if, through poor strategy, the fleet at the outbreak of hostilities is not concentrated, it would be inexcusable to commit the further strategical error of exposing it to the enemy in detail, when by assuming for a time the defensive the previous error might, at least in part, be atoned for by concentration. The offensive method is usually preferable as offering the greatest chances of success, but in order that it may have the greatest number of factors in its favor, it is quite necessary in some cases, as the one under consideration, to assume the defensive for a time. One must not be so obsessed with the idea of the offensive as to think that it means the exposing of one's forces to attack merely as they come to hand; nor must one conceive the correct defensive as simply a passive waiting in the hope that something favorable may develop. The defensive is properly assumed when by delaying the campaign the defender adds some specific and definite power that enables him to then assume the offensive with greater chances of success.
This brings us to the end of our brief review of the strategy of the first phase of the naval part of the war. The Russian naval force in the Far East had been destroyed and Japan had lost one battleship by a mine. Japan had complete command of the sea in the area of hostilities, though Russia still had in other parts of the world a navy numerically superior to that of Japan. In the second and last phase of the war, Russia attempted to wrest command of the sea from Japan, in which she signally failed. Russia had to undertake now with the remnant of her naval forces what she should have undertaken with her whole naval force earlier in the war.
A great amount of discussion was had in Russia as to whether this attempt should be made, but this is of interest only as indicating the woeful lack of realization in Russia of the importance of command of the sea in the area of hostilities. That Russia delayed so long in despatching the Baltic fleet to the Far East, and the whole fleet at that, must ever remain as great a disgrace to Russia in the eyes of naval officers as will the defeat of that fleet when it finally arrived.
As soon as the Japanese battle fleet was released by the fall of Port Arthur, active preparations to meet the Baltic fleet were begun. Her ships were cleaned and repaired, and then disappeared from public view. No vestige of information concerning them was allowed to become public. Japan's strategy of absolute secrecy at every stage of the war cannot be too highly commended, and may well be considered by us, belonging as we do to a press-ridden country, always clamoring for the publication of military information however valuable to an enemy it may be.
About this time Japan took a step that, so far as records show, has never been taken by any other belligerent. By public notice certain so-called "strategical sea areas" were set aside and placed under most stringent regulations as far as the entry of any except Japanese Government ships were concerned, and even fishermen might be excluded if thought necessary. The "areas" were the waters within 3 miles of the Hoko Group (Pescadores), Kelung, Okinawa Island, Amami 0 Shima Island and Tsugaru Strait. (See chart.) None of these "areas" are near the Straits of Corea, it must be observed. Other means were employed to keep military information concerning this region from becoming public, and, being more central in respect to the "rayon d'action," it had been since the beginning of hostilities a strategical sea area," as were several other centrally located places.
Thus the Japanese weaved their web, and Togo's fleet retired unobserved into his lair in the Corean Straits at Masampho and Shikeshima, and patiently awaited in secrecy and assurance the coming of its victim, Rozhestvensky.
Meanwhile the Russian fleet had been slowly working its way eastward, threatened by nothing more dangerous than imaginary hostile cruisers, destroyers, submarines and war balloons, which appear to have been sighted with alarming frequency throughout the voyage, beginning on the Dogger Bank. About 50 miles north of Saigon, Rozhestvensky's fleet was completed by the arrival of Nebogatoffs division on April 9, and soon thereafter the combined fleet headed to the northward.
How different would have been the undertaking of Rozhestvensky had the eastern fleet concentrated at Vladivostok before the beginning of war. In all probability this fleet would still have been in being instead of resting in the mud, interned, or in the hands of the Japanese. Had this fleet been in Vladivostok as Rozhestvensky drew near the region of hostilities, the problem would have been a grave one indeed for the Japanese. They would most likely not have captured Port Arthur before this, except for the alluring bait that the fleet there constituted. If they blockaded Vladivostok, their whole line of communications in the south were left exposed to Rozhestvensky, and Port Arthur was available as a much-needed base. On the other hand, if they attempted to cover the approaches to the Yellow Sea, the Vladivostok fleet was left free to proceed to a pre-determined rendezvous with the Baltic fleet, and Togo would then have had to meet the combined Russian fleet instead of meeting it in detail, as he did do. In any case the Japanese command of the sea would have been in jeopardy, if, indeed, it had not passed into the hands of the Russians. Picture the Japanese army cut off in Manchuria by the Russian fleet, as was the French army in Egypt by the British fleet commanded by Nelson. Alas, for Russia, only vain regrets! The foresight that is the sine qua non of strategy was lacking, and the fleets of Russia were largely defeated ere the war began by the poor strategy emanating in St. Petersburg.
Of Rozhestvensky's reasons for his method of procedure we know nothing. We can only infer from what we know of the then existing conditions. He was in command of a fleet apparently superior to the fleet of his enemy. The only hope of Russia in the war was for him to accomplish that for which he had been sent to the Far East, i. e., to gain command of the sea. He could only do this by destroying the Japanese battle fleet. The day for delay had passed; the day for action had arrived, and delay could avail nothing. He must fight, and fight with the full knowledge that in his hands was Russia's last hope. Between him and his only port, Vladivostok, lay Japan, the country of his enemy. The Japanese fleet had disappeared, whether into one of the so-called "strategical sea areas" or not he had no way of knowing. He not only did not know what was in these areas; he did not know whether anything was in them. Between Kelung and Okinawa Island was a distance of about 350 miles apparently clear of danger, whether left open by Japan intentionally or not we do not know. Through this opening he entered the Eastern Sea. He was in the spider's web.
About this time a zealous foreign naval attache in Tokio asked at the Japanese Navy Department for the disposition of their fleet. He was informed that the direction of the Japanese fleet was wholly in the hands of Admiral Togo, and that only in the most extreme emergency would the department interfere. The plan of action had no doubt been decided upon by the Naval General Staff, but the execution of the plan was left in the hands of the commander-in-chief, where it belonged. Responsibility and authority went hand in hand.
In the Chusan Archipelago Rozhestvensky stopped long enough to coal for the last time. Why did he not separate his auxiliaries from his battle fleet after this? And why did he so overload his ships with coal? are the questions so frequently asked. The reason he did not do so was undoubtedly due to a particular attitude of mind induced by the special problem he had been so long engaged upon, i. e., the physical transferrence of a big fleet from the Baltic to the Far East during war. That this was a stupendous task, and that it was well done, none can deny. It was a question of ways and means, repairs, supplies, coal and anchorages. For months all of his energies had been directed towards the purely material side of the campaign, and the frame of mind that was induced caused him to see only the fact of getting his fleet to the Far East. The reason for doing this was lost sight of in the method of doing it. Thus, even at Chusan, though in the theater of hostilities, Rozhestvensky overloaded his ships with coal and continued his voyage accompanied by his auxiliaries, losing sight of the military handicap to which he was subjecting himself and possessed only with the idea of not getting caught without those cruising supplies that for so long had been his care. Thus lumbered and lumbering he laid his course for the Straits of Corea.
All the entrances to the Eastern Sea the Japanese had left unguarded, but the exit was covered by Japanese scouts to give timely warning, and was defended by the concentrated sea power of Japan. The result is too well known to need mentioning. Russia, by failing to learn from history the value of real sea power, and by failing to learn how to handle even such forces as were available, had to pay for her ignorance in bitter defeat. With the destruction of Russia's fleet, the last hope of victory for her in the war passed away. Once again had sea-power exerted its influence upon history.
In our brief survey of the main incidents of the war we find no new principles of naval strategy demonstrated. The value of a study of the strategy employed is that it affords an additional, and the most recent, illustration to be added to the many already to be found in naval history, tending to show the correctness of certain strategical principles and the fallacy of certain others. Throughout the war we see on the part of one belligerent, and the opposite on the part of the other:
1. Careful preparation for war in time of peace, including plans as well as forces.
2. A view of the war as a whole rather than as a series of independent parts.
3. Concentration with a view to the particular campaigns to be undertaken.
4. Secrecy regarding all military matters.
5. No sacrifice of military principle to sentiment or public clamor.
6. The least possible division of authority.
7. Well selected and protected lines of communication.
8. Bases selected with a view to interior lines.
9. Complete realization of the paramount importance of command of the sea, particularly in certain areas.
10. The careful husbanding of non-replacable forces.
11. Recognition of the threat to the command of the sea that always exists so long as the battle fleet of the enemy remains in being.
The reasons for the success of Japan and the failure of Russia are not secrets. The principles observed by one and disregarded by the other may be found set forth in naval history repeatedly since men first fought for the mastery of the sea. Their observance is associated with victory, and their non-observance with defeat. History with impartiality records the good and the bad, and it is quite as important for the student of warfare to reject the bad as it is to accept the good. It is only in time of peace that one's mind may be so trained by the study of correct principles that in time of war the proper solution of special cases will seem only the obvious solution, as dormant memories spring forth as inspirations. Reading, study and thought during peace have been cited again and again by the great captains of the world, both naval and military, as the source of their inspiration in war. Such a source is open to all.