The Norfolk Navy Yard was begun by the British before the War of the Revolution. During the war it passed into the hands of the State of Virginia and was continued as a ship yard. Finally, in 1800, it was purchased by the Federal Government from the State of Virginia for use as a Government navy yard. In its early days it was known as the Gosport Yard, from the name of the adjacent town. Gosport was absorbed by the city of Portsmouth, and the yard finally became known as the Norfolk Navy Yard to distinguish it from the Portsmouth Navy Yard in New Hampshire.
DEVELOPMENT IN AREA.
The original yard is shown on Plate I, defined by a heavy line. The area of the original yard was about 16 acres. About 1827 additional territory was added to the yard by purchase from private parties. This territory is shown on Plate i and comprises about 66 acres; in connection with the original purchase, it still constitutes the working area of the yard, as will be seen by reference to Plate 3. Shortly after this addition was made to the yard, the first dry dock was commenced, it being one of the first three built by the navy, the others being located at Boston and New York.
The next addition to the yard was made about 1848 by the purchase from private parties of the St. Helena tract on the eastern side of the southern branch of the Elizabeth River. This addition is shown on Plate 2 and also on Plate 3, north of the heavy line, and comprises about 46 acres. This was followed by the purchase from private parties, about 1899, of approximately 43 acres known as the Cedar Grove property to the south of St. Helena, shown on Plate 3 to the south of the heavy line. The name of Cedar Grove was not retained, but the name of St. Helena was extended over the new tract.
The last addition to the yard is known as the Schmoele tract, and is shown on Plate 3 to the south and west of the heavy line. This was purchased from private parties about 1904 and comprises about 272 acres.
EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF RESOURCES.
A comparison of Plates i and 2 shows the development of the yard in resources between 1800 and 1869. At the latter date it contained, principally, a small granite dry dock, a timber basin, and a few buildings, the resources of the original yard having disappeared. This comparatively small development does not indicate that the yard was inactive, but is due to the fact that the ships of that period were of wood with hemp and manila rigging, and much of the work of construction and repair did not require extensive shop facilities. During the Civil War period, 1860-1865, this yard being either in Confederate possession or territory, no improvements were undertaken by the Federal side, or were possible on the Confederate side. The political situation and the reaction from war conditions following the Civil War further retarded much development of the yard for many years.
RECOMMENDED DEVELOPMENT.
In 1869 a board was appointed to investigate the condition of navy yards and make recommendations concerning them. The scope of the board's duties is shown by the following order which was given it as a precept:
NAVY DEPARTMENT, March 11, 1869.
Sir: You are hereby appointed senior officer of a board to examine into the condition of our navy yards, after the completion of your present duty.
The following named officers have been directed to report to you at the New York Navy Yard, where you will commence your labors: Rear-Admiral Stribling and Commodore S. P. Lee.
It is desirable first to ascertain the condition and wants of our navy yards, so that they may be rendered efficient in time of war. It is also desirable to have the permanent peace establishment and the expenses of the yards reduced to the lowest scale consistent with efficiency and economy.
Not a single person should be retained in the yards whose services can be dispensed with. You will report to the Department on the preservation and care of public property at the yards.
Chief Engineer Henderson has been directed to report to you and assist the board in the examination of engines that are stowed away in the different yards, but not as a member of the board. You will state what these engines are, their capacity, and what sized vessels they were built for, also by what authority they were constructed, at what time, whether they are suitable for vessels of war, taking into consideration power, economy, and efficiency; and if not, if any portions of them can be used in constructing other engines, or if anything in the engineer department can be disposed of with advantage to the Government. You will examine closely into the present organization of the yards, and recommend if anything more simple and efficient can be devised.
It is desirable to bring every department of the yards under the immediate authority of the commandant.
You will furnish lists to include every person now employed in the yards, and a list of reductions you propose. You will report if there is any public property which it is desirable to sell. You will examine the condition of the dry docks, and state whether they are capable of repairing our naval vessels in war time; you will also make such recommendations as you may deem proper in regard to providing additional dry docks for the use of the navy. You will draw up a uniform set of regulations for the government of the different yards and transmit them to the Department.
Besides the matters above enumerated, your duties will require you to examine into everything coming under your notice, in order to bring about a better system of economy than now exists.
To enable the board to obtain full information on all subjects, the commandants of the several yards will be associated with you and will furnish you with such a number of draughtsmen and writers as you may require.
For the present your investigations will be confined to the navy yards at Portsmouth, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Washington, and Norfolk.
You will furnish your report with the least possible delay, in succinct form, and tabulated so that it can be referred to without difficulty.
Very respectfully,
A. E. BORIE,
Secretary of the Navy.
REAR-ADMIRAL S. H. STRINGHAM,
United States Navy.
This was in the period immediately following the Civil War, and the order indicates that a thorough "house-cleaning" was contemplated, as well as an extensive preparation for the future.
With regard to the Norfolk Navy Yard the board reported, in part, as follows:
NAVY YARD, NORFOLK, VIRGINIA.
This is considered the best site on the Atlantic sea-board for a large navy yard. The judgment of Commodore Decatur occasioned its selection. It is the only navy yard on the southern sea-coast. It is situated near the capes of Chesapeake Bay on the Elizabeth River, and its nearest part is about five miles above the locality convenient for obstructions and their defense against surprise and assault by sea. Though near the sea, it is as inaccessible to attack as if it were far inland, possessing every advantage required for defense by sea and by land, and by exterior and interior lines and works. The situation is healthy, in a temperate climate, in the sea air, and on a firm, sandy soil, abounding in pines.
The harbor is accessible at all seasons of the year, and is one of the best on the Atlantic Coast of the United States. It is free from all obstruction and damage from ice.
An extent of land and water-front, with deep water desirable for a great modern navy yard, can now be had on the improved banks of the Elizabeth River.
The Dismal Swamp will afford, at small cost, fresh water for a great extent of basins, in which scores of iron-clads may be kept without rusting, floating in fresh water (free from all impurity), or blocked up dry and ventilated, ready for sudden service, especially for the defense of our great sea-board cities, the national capital, and the State and commercial capitals of Virginia and Maryland.
The Chesapeake Bay, with its fine navigable rivers, and the railroads, made and making, connect it with the great West and with the timber, iron, and coal regions of both Virginias, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. Its central and favorable position on the coast connects it by safe and easy water communication with the live-oak, pine, and other ship timber of Florida, Georgia, and the Carolinas, and with the naval resources of the northern cities. Good mechanics are attracted here by the mild climate, cheap homes, and the steady employment which experience has shown that the necessity of the Government requires and supplies.
Here may be large and useful arsenals for the construction, repair, equipment, and safe-keeping of armed and armored vessels of wood and iron; for the fabrication and delivery of cannon and munitions of war; rope of hemp and wire, and for the storage of the great quantity of material needed for the number and kinds of vessels which war and peace now require.
We earnestly recommend the immediate purchase for naval purposes of both banks of the Elizabeth River, from the navy yard to the locks of the Dismal Swamp Canal for the breadth of one mile from the middle of the river. This important site, worthy of defense, and on good lines by sea and land, may now be got for the low price of farm land in that region.
Its Favorable Qualities for a Great National Navy Yard.—Its natural features, proximity to the sea, central position on the coast, mild climate, secure defense. by sea and land, large accessible harbor, safe from wind. sea, and ice; grand extent of fit and inexpensive land, supplying the most abundant and convenient water-front, and almost natural basins like Paradise Creek, are extremely favorable for the construction of a great and national navy yard for all the purposes which modern naval warfare requires. The Government has declared the importance of this navy yard by the large fortifications erected at Fortress Monroe and the Rip-Raps. Earthworks and obstructions at Craney Island will supply a strong interior defense against naval approach.
List of improvements and numbers for the United States navy yard at Norfolk, Virginia, as sketched on the accompanying plan:
Quay walls, where there are none now, or where they have not sufficient strength and depth, to be built on the water-front. Erect two derricks of the best kind and largest capacity; also, five cranes of ample capacity to meet the wants of the yard. Additional quarters for officers to be built near the present quarters. To make the United States property at St. Helena, opposite the Norfolk Navy Yard, useful for naval purposes, and supply a part of the want of area at that navy yard, it is proposed to extend the limits at St. Helena, as shown on the plan. This would require the purchase of about thirty (30) acres of adjoining land, which, it is believed, may be got at the moderate rate of farming land there. This extension will, in connection with the property owned by the Government there, afford a water-front of about 1300 feet, and allow a ship channel of 1200 feet wide between the navy yard and St. Helena. The part of the St. Helena property and proposed purchase extending beyond the proposed water-front of St. Helena should be deepened to the depth of the channel, and the material may be conveniently used for filling up the low land at St. Helena, and in the navy yard. Front the St. Helena and proposed extension, when purchased, with a substantial quay wall, of proper depth for the largest vessels, and surround it with a good boundary wall. A steam derrick, of capacity to lift the heaviest ordnance, and two cranes, of ample capacity, to be erected on the water-front.
The improvements and resources recommended for the existing yard by the board are shown on Plate 2. A comparison of Plates 2 and 3 will show that the board's most important and leading recommendations were never followed. It was unusually well qualified to advise in these matters on account of the Civil War experience, and its recommendations undoubtedly carried great weight at the time. Had the board's recommendations been at once carried out, it is apparent that it would have been a misfortune at the present time, no matter how appropriate they may have seemed when made. The water-front of the yard would have been filled with dry docks and building slips that long before the . present time would have been practically useless and obstructions, and the navy would have acquired a large territory of no use to it which would have been an impediment to private and commercial development. The proposed development of resources at St. Helena was an error that might have been seen at the time; it divided the yard into two parts separated by a considerable body of water, the inconvenience of crossing which would have been prohibitive of any efficient operations.
The recommendations of this board are as striking an example as can be found of how impossible it is to accurately predict and provide for the future of a navy yard in great detail.
LATER DEVELOPMENT.
The actual development in resources of the Norfolk Navy Yard from 1869 to the present time is shown on Plate 3. It is a mixture of old and new buildings, and has been a matter of expediency and available resource, without following any definite or gradually maturing plan. Each bureau of the Navy Department has sought to secure all the funds that it could from Congress for its own particular needs, and to occupy the most favorable locations it could secure in the yard without regard to the needs of other bureaus.
CONCERNING APPROPRIATIONS.
A favorite method of obtaining appropriations for a navy yard from Congress has been to submit an annual estimate for millions of dollars in the hope of obtaining a few hundred thousand. These estimates are first pared down by the bureaus concerned, then by the Navy Department, and finally by Congress, and it may well happen that estimates first used for "padding" and not urgently needed may sometimes be appropriated for to the exclusion of more needed improvements. In this game it is well known that small items are more easily obtained than large ones, and a very necessary improvement may sometimes be secured in detail that could not be had in a lump.
A reform in the manner of securing annual appropriations for navy yards is needed. At present the annual estimates originate with the officers attached to the yard at the time. These officers are frequently changed, their ideas vary considerably, and as a rule their interests favor the bureau they naturally represent. Each bureau favors its own interests, and the Department itself has not the experience or information to always make a correct discrimination. When the matter finally reaches Congress the total amount that can be appropriated for that year is the governing factor.
NAVY YARD DEVELOPMENT BOARD.
The needs of a navy yard can be foreseen for five, and probably ten, years at least, as existing ships must be taken care of during that period. With this in view, the development of a yard should be determined upon by a suitable board, and estimates made accordingly. The work should be largely done at the yard itself and the board should give the officers at the yard every opportunity to advance their ideas and claims for its benefit and consideration. A definite basis can then be established for annual appropriations, and whether much or little can be secured in any one year, it can be distributed and applied to a logical and progressive development. Such a board would also be able to recommend a proper balance of appropriations between different yards. No officer newly attached to a navy yard can make a wise or discriminating estimate of its needs from his own immediate knowledge, and it does not follow that all can do so even after some experience and familiarity. This navy yard development board should be a permanent one and its personnel should change with discretion, and should further represent all interests of the service. It is evident that no legislation is necessary to create such a board, and it would remedy the present illogical and ill-defined conditions. The proper start for such a board would be to take the present annual estimates that are submitted from the yards, and from a personal inspection, and with consultations with the bureaus and officers concerned, reduce them to some permanence and order for the use of the Department.
FUTURE DEVELOPMENT.
The future development of the Norfolk Navy Yard starts from the plan shown on Plate 3, and has already had some study and consideration since the acquirement of the Schmoele tract.
CHANNEL.
The first matter that attracts attention is the narrowness of the channel in front of the yard, it being only about 600 feet wide and uncomfortably narrow for turning the present ships of the navy. This is already being partially remedied by the removal of the receiving ships Franklin and Richmond into a dredged pocket, and by increasing the channel width by dredging in the St. Helena tract, all as indicated on Plate 3. As the torpedo-boat slips on the St. Helena side are of wood, and the improvements on the peninsula are of a cheap and temporary nature, it is evident that the development of the necessary width of channel on the St. Helena water-front in the future is entirely in the Government's control. The important matter for future conditions is that no permanent improvement shall be made at St. Helena that will restrict the desirable widening of the channel. An incidental improvement at St. Helena which accompanies the present widening of the channel is the filling of the creeks indicated with the spoils of dredging. With future dredging operations the remaining creek and part of the inlet may be filled and reclaimed as indicated, thus securing valuable land area.
From the end of the St. Helena tract to the southern end of the yard the Government has no control of the eastern bank of the river. About 900 feet of the eastern bank north of the Belt Line Railroad is already being developed for commercial purposes and its acquirement by the Government would now be a matter of considerable expense; this, however, does not seriously affect the yard channel, if the Schmoele tract is developed with a basin. Between these commercial developments and the St. Helena tract it is probably still possible for the Government to obtain possession of the eastern bank of the river for the protection and widening of the channel at a reasonable cost, as no important improvements have yet been made. Any marked delay, however, will probably result in increased cost, as commercial developments are likely to begin soon. This water-front cannot be obtained alone, but some territory in the rear will accompany it which will be of no great value to the yard proper, but which can be utilized by the navy in various ways. The restriction of the channel by not acquiring this water-front is not the only thing to be considered, as commercial development means increased shipping traffic in front of the yard, which will also prove an inconvenience in the movement of naval vessels and in the use of the dry .docks. The failure to acquire this unimproved water-front will not be fatal to the future usefulness of the yard, if, as previously stated, the Schmoele tract is developed with a basin.
PURCHASE OF LAND.
In this connection, it may be said that land in many cases is not purchased by the Government, but is sold to it. The distinction is as follows: It may become recognized by officers that certain territory is very desirable for the Government and its acquirement recommended. Lapses of interest and changing administrations may prevent continued and sustained action, and nothing be accomplished beyond a growing recognition of the need. Local civilian interest and enterprise may then take the matter in hand and by concerted and sustained action secure an appropriation for the purchase of the desirable tract which the recommendation of officers alone would never accomplish. It is fortunate that this can be done, and as it cannot be accomplished without the approval of officers in a position of trust, it is not likely that property will ever be forced on the Government that will not be immediately or ultimately valuable.
SCHMOELE TRACT.
After consideration of the channel, the question may well arise, what will be done with the Schmoele tract? Every board or individual that has considered the matter has recognized that it should be developed with a basin to bring out its full value and incidentally increase the water-front of the yard. The natural mistake has been made of going into too much detail and making a scheme that largely ignored existing conditions and amounted to perhaps a twenty-million-dollar improvement to be accomplished as soon as possible. It has been repeatedly demonstrated that there is no better way to discourage Congress than by going to it with a minutely developed twenty-million-dollar scheme. Whatever general merit such a scheme may have is very likely to be masked by its proposed cost. The demonstration in a comparatively short time that some of these schemes have not possessed enduring merit has further rendered Congress shy of them. A backward look at the recommendations of the board of 1869 should be a further warning against the development of too much remotely future detail as a fixed condition.
BASIN.
The desirability of water-front for a navy yard, and that as conveniently located as possible, will carry a basin for the Schmoele tract through any test that can be applied. This basin may be of quick or slow development, but its importance is apparent. A basin is indicated on Plate 3. This is not the basin that others have proposed, nor is it considered that it is the only basin that can be made. Whatever basin is decided on, however, should properly balance with the land area, permit of piers and slips, and have the working area mostly on one side. The other side of the basin should permit some development, and also provide for widening in the unknown future. The beginning of the basin and its progressive development should be of value as well as its completion. One of the serious needs of the Norfolk Yard is a place for mooring vessels in ordinary out of the river channel. Whatever reasonable portion of the proposed basin is excavated at any time can be utilized with inexpensive wooden constructions for mooring that need not interfere with the continued extension of the basin to completion or with its final use.
PROPOSED DRY DOCK.
An immediately important improvement that is needed at the yard is an additional dry dock of the first class. The yard has only one dry dock (No. 3) that will take the present ships of the navy, and the 20,000-ton battleships will not be gotten into it with convenience. It is generally considered that the new dock should be located somewhere in the general position shown on Plate 3. This position gives excellent direction for vessels entering and leaving the dock, and is as convenient as may be to the present working part of the yard. As the Schmoele tract develops, the dock will become more and more central, and all the docks will be kept in the same general group, which is a desirable consideration. The channel of the river has been recently dredged to a depth of 30 feet at mean low water to the dotted line shown at the entrance of this proposed dock. It will then be seen that a very small amount of additional dredging, as indicated by the dotted line to the south, will give access to this dock and begin the basin as well.
BUILDING AND LAUNCIIING WAYS.
In previous considerations of the Schmoele tract it has been proposed to locate a building and launching ways just west of the Site shown for the proposed dry dock. This is for the obvious reason of securing an unobstructed launch up stream. A test should be applied to this proposition. A building and launching ways will occupy about 600 feet of water-front and extend back moo feet, thus taking up a large and valuable territory. It will limit the development of dry docks in this ultimately central portion of the yard, and prevent their concentration in one group. It might be years before an appropriation could be secured for constructing the launching ways, and years before their use after being built. If used at all, there may be long periods between when the launching ways lie idle and deteriorating. As every first-class navy yard should be prepared to build a ship, this test, though severe, does not do away with the building and launching ways, for which there is no better location than that proposed under present methods of ship-building.
DRY DOCK FOR REPAIRS AND CONSTRUCTION.
By using a method not yet practiced in this country, the building and launching ways may be eliminated. This method is to build the ship in a dry dock, and this dock may be the new one proposed, a succeeding one, or there may be more than one.
Such a dock should be somewhat different from the present standard structures in concrete and stone. In general, it should have well-sloping sides with continuous small altars similar to those in the old wooden dry docks, for convenience of shoring and staging, and for light, air, and easy access. The entrance should have two caissons, first for extra protection against flooding, and second for preservation. The inner caisson being generally dry admits of continuous preservation; it also permits turning around the outer caisson for periodical painting and preservation. This makes a structure that is always useful for docking ships when not used for building them. It would be somewhat more expensive than the ordinary type of dock, but the difference would be less than the cost of the building ways, and the structure would be continually giving a return on the investment. A few incidental advantages would be as follows: The regular dry dock traveling cranes could be used in building operations for handling materials of construction. The ship would be built on an even keel. All launching strains would be avoided. The ship could be more nearly, if not entirely, completed before being floated.
The policy of the Government has been so far, and probably always will be, not to build any great number of ships in navy yards, but to be prepared to do so, if necessary. Such preparedness at the Norfolk Yard to the extent of reserving space for ordinary building and launching ways is evidently a hindrance to development for repair purposes. It would remove new resources on the Schmoele tract a greater distance from the existing resources in the old yard, and would ordinarily increase inconvenience and expense. A ship-building dry dock would fit any policy or change of policy that the Government might adopt.
That the general idea for a dry dock for building purposes is practical and a success is shown by the fact that the Maryland Steel Company built the New Orleans Government floating dry dock in an unlined earthen basin closed by a dam. When the floating dock was completed the basin was flooded and the dam removed by dredging. Some of the reasons for the procedure were those enumerated above, and it was so successful that the same company repeated it in building the Government floating dry dock Dewey for the Philippines.
It is neither wise nor desirable to go further with a proposed development of the Schmoele tract in this treatment, though the temptation is great. No harm, however, can result from continuous study, but the results should first be used as a target for general criticism and discussion, and if the basic principles are correctly developed, the future details will not be likely to go far wrong. The older portion of the yard should and must be utilized as long as possible, and a careful study by a permanent navy yard development board will reveal many improvements that can be made in old buildings and constructions, and in their disposition.
TIMBER DRY DOCK.
A matter in the old yard that will claim attention in a very few years is the timber dry dock, No. 2. The dock will either require rebuilding or abandonment. If rebuilt in its present length, it will not even accommodate present ships. To lengthen it materially will destroy a building recently repaired and made available for many more years. As the rebuilding of a dry dock has so far proved of questionable value, consideration will probably be given to converting this dry dock into a slip. This would be a comparatively simple and certain proceeding, and any slip is available for the craft it will accommodate and increases water-front. Should a slip be made, a much freer communication can also be had between the old yard and the Schmoele tract by making the slip somewhat shorter than the dock.
BERTHING SLIPS.
It may not be amiss at this point to invite attention to the fact that additional slips are possible in the future in the northern part of the old yard, as indicated. The consideration of these slips is ventured, as they do not displace a single new or valuable building, or one that will not require or merit removal in a reasonable time. The consideration is also suggested, as present lack of berthing space is one of the defects of the yard. The present fitting-out basin, which is comparatively new and occupies the site of the old timber basin, is the most valuable improvement of recent years, next to dry dock No. 3, which has just been completed. It is apparent that these slips could be commenced at once and about one-third completed with little disturbance of present conditions. They would become at once available and could be completed in the future, as conditions permitted. The indiscriminate renewal of old buildings in this locality without broad consideration of the subject will forestall these slips. It is to be noted that they would take ships out of the main channel and are opposite the point where the widening of the channel is under Government control.
ST. HELENA.
A matter requiring general consideration in the development of the Norfolk Navy Yard is the disposal of the St. Helena tract. It is seen that the recommendations of the board of 1869 in regard to this tract have not been realized in any way, and the reasons are apparent why none of the resources of the yard proper will ever develop on that side of the river on account of the difficulty and inconvenience of communication.
Within the past few years there has grown up at St. Helena one of the most successful and efficient training stations for apprentice seamen that the navy possesses. This development has been without recognition by Congress, and is largely due to the energy and efficiency of the officers in command of the receiving ships and the able personnel under their command, who have had direct charge of this training station. The bureaus of the Department have given what little aid they could in this matter, and the results are worthy of study and consideration. The apprentice seamen are accommodated in temporary buildings and tent houses, with the result that they become strong and hardy and are not spoiled by undue luxury for the life they must soon take up on board ship. The climate permits of continuous drill and instruction the year round, both on land and water. The proximity of the navy yard and the frequent visits of ships of war all go to familiarize and educate the apprentice seamen with the life before him. The adjacent yard permits of the practical instruction in its shops of those of a mechanical aptitude.
An attempt was made in recent years to develop a torpedo-craft station on the southern end of St. Helena, but its greatest inconvenience was its separation from the main yard on which it was dependent for all matters of greater importance, and it was recently removed to the navy yard at Charleston, S. C. The training station was prompt to occupy this vacated territory and convert the only building of permanence on that side, a storehouse for torpedo-boat outfits, building No. 81, into a mess hall and offices.
The constantly increasing success of this self-made training station seems to point to a successful development of St. Helena in this line, and a slight recognition from Congress will put it on a permanent footing and make it the best and most attractive in the navy. At present it is constantly demanding help from the main yard, from which it receives assistance with reluctance, as the two interests are conflicting. With special appropriations for its maintenance and development, and separation from the yard as a distinct command, its future is one of assured success.
The development of St. Helena as a recognized training station points to one use of the land south of it, if acquired by the Government, as it may be added to such a station. Other uses for this property would be for coal and fuel oil storage, and the storage of unloaded projectiles, all of which matters are better out of a working yard than in.
In any event, St. Helena has afforded a protection to the waterfront of the navy yard that is worth greatly more than was paid for the property. The necessity for widening the channel has already been reached, and to have been compelled to cut back into the yard proper would have cost many times the original value of the tract opposite. It can be seen on Plate 3 that by cutting into St. Helena and making a basin in the Schmoele tract the necessity for the land south of St. Helena is not absolute; nevertheless, the time is ripe for the consideration of its purchase before it greatly increases in value.
ADVANTAGES.
Some of the points of advantage of the Norfolk Navy Yard and its vicinity were pointed out by the board of 1869, and many of them are as true now as they were then and will probably always be so. Some other practical points are worthy of mention and are as follows: There are no strong tidal or other currents at the yard, so that the handling of ships is not hampered thereby. The average range of tide is only about two and a half feet, so that there is no difficulty with moorings, and the cost of water-front constructions, foundations, and dry docks is reduced to the least amount. There is very little silting of the channel, so that the necessary depths are readily obtained by dredging and easily and economically maintained. The low range of tide also renders excessive dredging unnecessary for low-water conditions.
The Norfolk Navy Yard now ranks second in importance in the naval establishment. With its geographical and strategic advantages and its already acquired area, it is entirely possible that it may sometime rank first amongst the navy yards. The basic measure of value for a navy yard is its dry dock facilities and possibilities, and it is apparent that at Norfolk the possible number of dry docks is large.