Should a nation having a strong navy wish to undertake operations of war on land, it must confine its aspirations to attempts upon the coast of the adversary if its army is numerically weak. Not having at disposal means sufficient for an invasion of the enemy's territory, it is only by accident that it can take possession of an island or of a position on the coast, the occupation of which will always remain precarious.
On the other hand, a nation having a strong military organization, but whose navy has been sacrificed to the army, will always be tempted to seek upon land a field of battle that it does not find on the sea. It will disdain those desultory operations that attack only the material interests of populations on the littoral, and will be possessed by the idea of throwing great masses of men into the enemy's territory in order to make use of its army.
For this reason it is the English who have given examples of operations against the coast; while it is France that holds the stage as soon as the question is one of attempting an invasion.
The history of the Franco-English duel affords the most remarkable example of the efforts made by a country to compensate for its maritime inferiority by a land struggle. We purpose reviewing the different phases of this long drama.
THE LANDING IN IRELAND (1689).—The accession of William III to the English throne marks the beginning of the series of maritime wars that was not to end until 1815, 126 years after.
James II, dethroned by his son-in-law, had taken refuge at the court of Louis XIV and had sought his support. The new king of England himself furnished the pretext for an intervention by entering the League of Augsburg.
Attention was first directed to Ireland. Tyrconnel had succeeded in maintaining that island under the authority of the Stuarts, with the exception of Ulster. It was therefore decided that James II should betake himself to Ireland, and that he should be followed by a small army, about which to organize the poorly disciplined Irish troops.
The king left Saint Germain February 28, 1689, "I wish," said Louis XIV on leaving him, "never to see you again." A division composed of some 10 ships under the orders of Cabaret, Squadron Commander, had been fitted out at Brest with the utmost secrecy. James II embarked with 400 French officers and 1200 Anglo-Irishmen; he took with him a good quantity of arms and munitions. Cabaret arrived at Kinsale March 22. After having disembarked the troops and material he left Captain Duquesne-Monnier on the spot with three frigates, and returned to Brest without having encountered a single enemy vessel. Such happy luck need occasion no surprise. War had only just been declared; nothing about the projects of Louis XIV had leaked out; finally it was the custom in those days not to commission ships until spring. By sailing at the beginning of March one was almost certain to find the sea entirely free, which happened in this case.
In the meantime the fleet was put in commission at Brest under the command of Chateau-Renault. It was composed of 24 ships, 2 frigates, and 6 fire ships. On May 6 it sailed, escorting a convoy that carried 7000 men.
The attention of the English government had been attracted by the landing of James II in Ireland and the fitting out of the ships at Brest. It hastily fitted out a squadron commanded by Admiral Herbert, the same who had taken over William of Orange from Holland to England. Herbert took station on lookout off Ushant, where he learned of the departure of the French and laid his course for the Irish coast.
Chateau-Renault had orders to disembark his troops at Kinsale or Galway; but, on March 9, near Cape Clear, he had information of the English squadron. The nearness of the enemy and the direction of the wind forced him to abandon his plan; he immediately resolved to take his convoy into Bantry Bay, where he anchored March 10 at 11 o'clock in the morning.
The light vessels began embarking the troops in order to transport them to the head of the bay close to the land. About four in the afternoon the scouts signaled 27 sails which were tacking in to approach the land.
Chateau-Renault judging that the enemy would not arrive at the entrance of the bay before 24 hours, kept up the operations of disembarkation throughout the night. The next day he got under way at dawn and left the bay; but in order to cover his transports, he did not stand far off shore. The action began about 11 o'clock; it was rather confused, but finally the advantage rested with the French. Chateau-Renault gave, up the pursuit of the enemy in order not to separate himself from his convoy, and took his squadron back to Bantry. After having picked up his frigates and fire ships he endeavored to overtake the English; but as they had taken refuge at Spithead to repair their damages he steered for Brest, where he arrived March 18, after an absence of 11 days.
Without drawing premature conclusions from this single expedition, we shall note that it was favored by special conditions. Ireland was an allied country; the disembarkation could thus be effected within an enclosed anchorage and upon any part of the coast; the population, instead of forcibly resisting the descent of the troops, favored it to the extent of its power. Had it been necessary for Chateau-Renault to undertake the disembarkation in a hostile country he would have been forced to do it on an uninhabited beach, which would have required a much longer time; nor would he have been able to modify his plans at the last moment by selecting Bantry in place of Kinsale, because it is not a matter of indifference to arrive at one point rather than another when gaining a foothold on territory occupied by the enemy. Despite this array of favorable circumstances, despite the great extent of coast of which the expedition could make use, our squadron narrowly escaped meeting the English at sea; and it is easy to imagine what would have happened.
What became of the little army landed in March?
Upon the arrival of James II Ireland arose, and the principal towns of Ulster quickly fell into the power of the Jacobites. The Protestants shut themselves up in Londonderry and Enniskillen until the situation in England should permit William to succor them. James II laid siege to Londonderry, but the place was well defended, and after three months the siege had to be raised (July 28). A month later Schomberg landed with several thousand men, relieved Enniskillen, and pushed James II back to the borders of Ulster and Leinster. Thus the war dragged on, the ex-king fearing to give battle, Schomberg afraid to venture into the insurgent region.
THE SECOND LANDING IN IRELAND (1690). In November the English Parliament voted appropriations in order to push the war with vigor, and William manifested his intention of going to Ireland at the beginning of the campaign. Upon the urgent request of James II, Louis XIV had decided to send fresh reinforcements on condition that he should receive an equal number of Irishmen in exchange for his regular troops. In March, 1690, Lieutenant-General d'Amfreville left Brest with 27 vessels, escorting a convoy carrying 6000 to 7000 troops under the orders of the Duke de Lauzun, and also a great quantity of arms and munitions.
In consequence of circumstances that would take too long in telling, not only had the Dutch fleet not yet arrived in England, but the English ships themselves were not in commission. D'Amfreville, therefore, encountered no opposition; he landed his troops at Cork on March 23, embarked the Irishmen in exchange, and returned to Brest.
After the arrival of Chateau-Renault, who brought the Eastern Squadron from Toulon, Tourville sailed from Brest with 70 ships to dispute the command of the channel with the English and the Dutch. At Beveziers he encountered the enemy's fleet commanded by Herbert, and defeated it; but the very next day James II was crushed at the Boyne.
William III had reached Ireland the day of Tourville's sailing for Brest. He at once put himself at the head of his troops and, with 40,000 men, attacked James II, who had less than 30,000 men. Abandoning his army, James II fled precipitately to Kinsdale, where he found 10 French frigates. He embarked at once and had himself taken to Brest, and from there he went to Versailles to ask for a new army. But Louis XIV, indignant at his conduct, refused him any aid and ordered Tourville to send ships to Ireland to repatriate the troops.
After the defeat at the Boyne, the Duke de Lauzun had retreated to Galway while a simple French captain, Boisselot, shut himself up in Limerick with a handful of resolute men and arrested the victorious march of William. Lauzun was thus able to await the French ships without anxiety; these arrived at the end of August and took the troops back to Brest. Scarcely had the French troops left when Kinsale was taken.
At this time the allied fleet had taken refuge in the Thames, where Herbert has caused the removal of the buoys marking the entrance to the Thames in order to stop the pursuit by the French squadron. The victory of Beveziers thus had a direct influence upon the security of sea communications; and it is beyond question that the small French army would have been forced to capitulate if Tourville had been beaten.
ATTEMPT TO INVADE ENGLAND (1692). During the campaign of 1691 the fleet remained on the defensive. Tourville made his three months' sortie in the Channel, which has remained celebrated under the name of the "deep-sea cruise," during which time he held a superior enemy in check without permitting the least damage to himself. But in 1692 there came a reversion to the idea of invasion. This time it was desired to land in England itself in order to finish the war at a single blow. James II repaired to Havre and la Hogue, where 30,000 men and 500 transports were assembled. The army was commanded by Marshal de Bellefonds, and Tourville had the duty of covering the passage with the fleet.
The disadvantages of the geographical situation of France, which have been pointed out in a preceding chapter, then made themselves felt. The Toulon detachment, being hindered by the weather, was not able to arrive at the date fixed. Tourville, whose departure had already been delayed nearly a month by reason of strained finances, sailed on May 27 with only 44 ships. Mishaps always have disastrous consequences. Troops are assembled, transports are ready to sail, there is nothing to delay departure except awaiting the arrival of the escort; but every day that passes represents an added expenditure and increases the enervation caused by delay. It results, then, that patience is lost; and, in order that all these preparations shall not have been made in vain, some hazardous venture is attempted. This is what happened.
The delay in commissioning the fleet had left to the Dutch time to effect their junction with the English; and when the French fleet had doubled Cape la Hogue it found itself in the presence of
99 enemy ships. Tourville was defeated despite a magnificent
resistance. The expedition was abandoned.
We shall not recall here the melancholy incidents that followed the battle of la Hogue and brought about the loss of 15 ships. Suffice to say that the result of this battle illustrates well that a fleet that has been defeated, but not destroyed, is completely negligible for a long time, and that the demoralization that attends lost battles permits the victor to undertake with impunity the most hardy enterprises without running any risk.
The war with England lasted until 1712, with a short interval of peace from 1698 to 1702; but the miscarriage of this attempt at invasion took away from Louis XIV all idea of undertaking an operation of this sort again. It required 30 years of peace to weaken the bad impression that it had left, and to bring minds back toward a disembarkation.
SECOND ATTEMPT TO INVADE ENGLAND (1744). England had been at war with Spain since 1739. The vexations of every kind to which the English had subjected our maritime commerce made it plain that France, in spite of her efforts, would not long be able to avoid taking a part in the struggle. A final affront made the government emerge from its attitude of reserve which, if prolonged, would have wrought injury to the national prestige. The Spanish fleet, pursued by the English, had sought refuge at Toulon; and the English ships treated our coast as enemy country under pretext of watching the Spanish squadron.
Fitting out was immediately begun at Brest and Toulon, and it was resolved to throw an army corps into England, taking advantage of the fact that the war with Spain had withdrawn a great part of the English ships from their own coast.
While transports were being quietly dispatched to Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne, 15,000 old soldiers were concentrated at Lille and Valenciennes. The Pretender, Charles Edward, was to accompany the troops, which were put under the command of Marshal de Saxe.
It was a small number for the conquest of England 15,000 men; but at this time George II was waging war in Germany, whither he had sent his best troops, and there were remaining in England not more than 10,000 men. The discontent that was readily taken for a desire for the restoration was also counted upon, and it was believed that the landing of the Pretender would be sufficient to make the country rise. It was a constant mistake of the Versailles cabinet to speculate upon a revolution in England. The exiled princes, living in retirement, were surrounded by a court of refugees who passed their time in commenting upon and in exaggerating events; and, in their haste to return to a state of affairs that should restore them to place and dignity, they took their wishes for realities. On the other hand, the emissaries kept in England by the court to keep it informed of opinion exaggerated the slightest incidents in order to justify the subsidies they received; and these different causes brought it about that the situation was viewed in a false light in France. As a result it was ever believed that the landing of a number of regiments on British soil would be sufficient to replace the Stuarts upon the throne of their fathers.
The squadron that had been fitted out at Brest comprised then 25 ships under de Roquefeuil as commander-in-chief; its duty was to cover the passage.
Count de Roquefeuil got under way on February 14, 1744. His object was to make a reconnaissance of the English coast, and, after assuring himself that no English fleet was in the Channel, to regain the Straits of Dover and escort the convoy.
Bad weather kept the French squadron off shore and it was not until the end of the month that it appeared off the Isle of Wight. Count de Roquefeuil ascertained that there was no naval force in the roadstead of Saint Helens; from this he concluded, a little prematurely, that the English had not yet fitted their ships out. He detached several ships under command of Baraith to inform Charles Edward and Marshal de Saxe that the passage was clear and that they could cross the strait under the protection of the escort that he had sent them. He himself anchored on the evening of the 22d at Dungeness to cover the passage. The next days his astonishment was extreme to see 34 enemy ships tacking in to reach him.
This is what had happened. Upon his sailing from Brest, Roquefeuil had been sighted first by the Phoenix, which was cruising in the vicinity of Ushant; and then, on February 3, by the escort of a convoy coming from Jamaica. The Admiralty, thus warned, had hastened the fitting out of the fleet ; and Admiral Norris quickly found himself at the Downs at the head of 49 sail, of which 21 were of more than 60 guns, and 11 of more than 44.
Thwarted by the tide, the English squadron had to anchor six miles away from our ships. Roquefeuil took advantage of the circumstances to get under way. Favored by the fog, he had already succeeded in escaping from the pursuit of the enemy, when a storm dispersed his squadron and sent it back in disorder to Brest. The same storm prevented the convoy from setting out; the Pretender, Maurice de Saxe and 11 battalions had already embarked.
When the bad weather was over the English forces were guarding the passage; the expedition was abandoned.
The French government had evidently reckoned upon being able to surprise the English because of the war with Spain; but the situation was too tense to permit of the vigilance of our enemies not being fully aroused.
LANDING OF PRINCE CHARLES EDWARD IN SCOTLAND (1745), FOLLOWED BY A THIRD ATTEMPT TO LAND IN ENGLAND. Charles Edward had not given up the hope of reconquering the crown of his ancestors, and he displayed an energy at this time that would, no doubt, have assured the success of his grandfather 60 years earlier. Left to his own resources he repaired to Nantes, and sailed from there with one ship and one frigate lent him by an Irish privateer. He landed in Scotland June 4, 1745, with a number of followers, some arms and 4000 louis, entered Edinburgh, beat the English at Prestonpans, and penetrated to within 30 leagues of London. The situation became critical for the English; the king was still in Germany and the Council of Regents was at its wit's end. The French government deemed the occasion a favorable one to intervene; 10,000 men were assembled in the vicinity of the Straits of Dover, and the Duke of Richelieu was selected to command. But action had been too slow; when the troops were ready to embark, at the end of December, two English squadrons were watching the Strait. After vainly waiting some time for bad weather to sweep away the English ships, the troops went back to their respective garrisons. The expedition was abandoned.
For a second time (and it will not be the last) we note the impossibility of making an expedition wait that has required lengthy preparations. When all is ready it is necessary to set out or give up the operation. But, as the coast is generally watched and as a storm alone can clear it, the departure depends upon a combination of circumstances that rarely comes to pass.
FIRST CONQUEST OF MINORCA (1756). As always happens after a fruitless attempt, the war ended without further thought of invading English territory; but the idea was to be taken up on a grander scale during the Seven Years' War.
The war was declared May 15, 1756; as a matter of fact it had been going on for several years. In Canada there had been fighting ever since the death of a French officer, Jumonville, assassinated by the English in contempt of the law of nations. Pitt had caused to be seized in the ports 300 French merchant ships; and, while Parliament had declared the captures irregular, the English government none the less refused to give them up. To all these annoyances it was desired to make an energetic reply, and while Lieutenant-General Macnemara sailed from Brest for Canada with a squadron, an expedition was fitted out at Toulon with the object of seizing the island of Minorca, which had been left in the hands of the British by the Treaty of Utrecht. That power was only keeping at the time two ships and three frigates in the Mediterranean, stationed usually at Mahon.
Lieutenant-General de la Galissonniere sailed from Toulon April 9, 1756, with 12 ships, 4 frigates and 6 gunboats. He first went to Hyeres Roads where he joined the convoy of 14,000 men under the command of Duke de Richelieu. On the 18th the fleet anchored before the little town of Ciudadella, where the landing took place with no attempt at opposition on the part of the enemy; by the 24th the artillery and all the material was on shore. The ships of war then went to sea to establish the blockade of the island, the French already being masters of the whole territory except Fort St. Philip, which commands the city of Mahon and in which the English garrison of 3000 men had taken refuge.
In the meantime England had taken alarm at the preparations going on at Toulon, and though their object was concealed it seemed probable that the expedition was aimed at Minorca. The admiralty immediately prepared a squadron for the Mediterranean.
Admiral Bing left Spithead April 6 (three days before the departure of the French fleet from Toulon) with 11 ships and 4000 troops. Upon arriving at Gibraltar May 2, he learned of the landing of the French from the English ships that had fled from Mahon at our approach. He left May 8, having then 13 ships, and arrived in sight of Minorca and of the French squadron on the 19th. Defeated by la Galissonniere the following day, Admiral Bing abandoned the relief of Minorca and sailed away for Gibraltar. Nevertheless he had not lost a single ship; for there, as at Bantry, the anxiety of the French not to abandon the expeditionary corps forbade them to fight to a finish. This timidity might have cost us dearly if contentions had not arisen in the English squadron to paralyze its movements; as a matter of fact, Bing found at Gibraltar on June 19 five ships that had just arrived from England to reinforce him, and with which he might have taken the offensive again.
Fort St. Philip capitulated June 30. The troops then began to embark, and, on July 8, the fleet set out for Toulon where it arrived the 16th, only a garrison remaining at Minorca.
As is known, Bing was relieved of his command, brought to trial before a court-martial, and was shot on the poop of his own ship.
War had been declared three days before the battle of Mahon.
It is curious to note that the English, who were constantly masters of the sea, made no attempt to retake Minorca throughout the entire course of the war. To our mind, the English government held, in this particular, the just estimate of the situation. The means were certainly not lacking to our enemy of landing in security at the Balearics a body of troops capable of wresting the island from the garrison in occupation; but, during the whole of the operation, which might have lasted several months if the French had sustained the siege in Fort St. Philip, the Balearics would have become the center of attraction for the navies of the two countries. The English ships, however, would not have found a favorable field of operations on those coasts; at that time, as we have already said, Gibraltar did not yet constitute a solid point of support, and England was more concerned then to keep the Rock than to utilize it. As a result an expedition against Minorca could have no other bases than the home ports, which were far away, while France had in the neighborhood one of her principal arsenals. A position so advantageous offered to the remnants of our navy that had taken refuge at Toulon such opportunities of thwarting all attempts against Mahon that England preferred not to risk them. Her government doubtless thought that being victorious in the end would suffice to constrain the vanquished to give up what he had taken, and that is the very thing that happened; at the conclusion of peace Minorca was exchanged for Belle-Isle.
FOURTH ATTEMPT TO LAND IN ENGLAND (1759). The battle of Mahon marked the end of our successes during this calamitous war. The navy had fallen into unworthy hands which set themselves to destroy it with as much ardor as, and more hatred than, the enemy. The ships remaining to us were laid up, their crews disbanded. Finding no enemy to fight, the English squadrons ravaged our coasts and took possession of our colonies; and it seemed as if the navy of Colbert was about to perish, suffocated by shame, when affairs fell into the hands of the Duke de Choisetil. His patriotism could not put up with such humiliations; but, in his desire to raise the prestige of France by a bold stroke, he only cast her into the depths, for there were no longer at disposal means sufficient for his purpose. As ever, our inability to wage war on the sea led us to shift the war to the land, and it was thus that attention was centered on a scheme of invasion. Choiseul, at the instigation of Marshal Belle-Isle, proposed at first to throw 50,000 men on to English soil by sending them over from Boulogne and Ambleteuse in flatboats. A beginning was even made on this plan; the construction of a flotilla was begun and the coast was armed with some hundred heavy guns designed to protect the points of assemblage. But this project was soon abandoned and a new one was adopted, due, it is said, to Captain Bigot de Morogues.
The descent was to be made at two different places; to this end two armies of 20,000 men each were assembled, the first in Brittany under the Duke d'Aiguillon, the second in Flanders under Chevert. At the same time a general concentration of all squadrons at Brest was to unite 35 or 40 ships. This fleet was first to join the convoy from Morbihan (Brittany), and, passing to the westward of Ireland, was to detach several frigates with the transports before the Gulf of the Clyde; then it was to turn the northern end of Scotland and pick up Chevert's army at Ostend and escort it to the English coast, where it was to land at Breathwater, some leagues from London. This very complicated plan had the peculiarity of taking no more account of the enemy than if it had concerned a simple ocean promenade. The participation of the English squadron was, however, acknowledged by providing that, in case it should show signs of interfering, the war fleet would remain in the Channel to paralyze its movements, while the two convoys should cross the sea under escort of a few frigates. To complete these dispositions a small division was to be sent out from Havre to throw a landing force into Ireland with the object of creating a diversion.
If the division of the expedition into three parts, composed of the two landing corps on the wings and of the escort in the center, had only for its object to force the enemy to divide his forces in such a way that the Brest squadron would find before it a number of ships small enough to be fought successfully—if such was the object of this peculiar distribution of force—it might be justified as a preliminary operation. But if it was expected that the passage could be made without fighting, the question arises: What object was there in concentrating the troops in a port at a distance from that in which the ships were to concentrate? This added one difficulty more to those already presented by such a hazardous operation.
The first act of this whole scheme was to get the Toulon squadron out of the Mediterranean and into the ocean. De la Clue, its chief, was watched by Boswcawen off Toulon. The latter, having occasion to repair three of his ships that had been badly damaged in a hot skirmish in the outer roadstead of Toulon, returned to Gibraltar leaving some frigates before the port. The French admiral profited by his absence to sail, on August 5, 1759, with 12 ships and three frigates; on the evening of August 17 he was at the entrance of the Strait. The same date the English squadron, consisting of 16 ships and nine frigates, got under way at 10 o'clock at night, and on the morning of the 18th Bowscawen sighted the enemy, who had passed through the Strait, and immediately started in pursuit. De la Clue, finding himself discovered, decided to go on past Cadiz, which port he had intended to enter; but, sailing without lights in order not to betray his whereabouts, he became separated from five ships and three frigates, which pursued their course to Cadiz and anchored there in ignorance of his new dispositions. The remainder of the squadron was overtaken by the English squadron the next day, and had to abandon the Centaure. The following night two ships steered a false course and thereby succeeded in reaching Rochefort; the others were destroyed in the roadstead of Lagos.
There is a temptation to throw all the responsibility upon the actors of the drama when passing these painful events in review. Why did not the admiral signal a new rendezvous to his squadron when he decided not to put into Cadiz ? Why did the rear guard lose track of the ships in the van? Upon reflection it must be recognized that the cause of all the evil lay in the very conditions under which this unfortunate squadron labored. For a naval force there is no more ungrateful situation than the one that puts it under the necessity of avoiding, at all hazards, coming into contact with the enemy. The least incident destroys all calculations, forces sudden and unexpected modifications of orders, and puts the ships under sailing conditions that are abnormal. Why, then, be astonished that mistakes result that do not occur at ordinary times? The disaster resulting from this separation is not to be imputed to de la Clue but to the false position in which circumstances had placed him. On the other hand it is difficult to explain what he was going to do at Cadiz, in the immediate vicinity of a superior force. If the French had had the good fortune to pass through the Strait without being discovered, which was not impossible since they went through the Strait at night, the stop at Cadiz would have revealed their passage and have made them lose the benefit of their lead.
The number of ships at our disposition in European waters was reduced to 21 by the disaster at Lagos, and the plan of the campaign was modified. Five ships, detached from the Brest squadron, were to escort the convoy from Brittany, while the 16 others should occupy the attention of the English forces. But, at the last moment, Marshal de Conflans, who commanded the squadron, insisted that his force should not be divided, and it was decided that he himself should go to Morbihan for the convoy.
The English, who were attentively following all the preparations for the expedition, had 25 ships before Ushant under Admiral Hawke, while Commodore Duff cruised in the vicinity of Belle-Isle with four ships and three frigates in order to watch the movements of the transports. The season became well advanced with the squadron still at Brest. Finally, at the end of October, a storm forced the English squadron to retire upon Torbay and left the approaches to Brest free. Marshal de Conflans sailed at 11 o'clock on the morning of November 14 and set his course for Belle-Isle. Why had he waited so long ? It is impossible that the storm could have lasted 15 days. At all events, Admiral Hawke left Torbay the same day, and learning from his scouts of the sortie of the French, he sought them at Morbihan without hesitation. On the 20th he made junction with Commodore Duff, and he came upon the French squadron at the moment when it was entering the passes of Quiberon Bay. The result of that unfortunate battle is well known. The expedition was abandoned.
EXPEDITION OF THUROT TO IRELAND (1760). Meanwhile Captain Thurot, who was charged with the diversion in Ireland, had set out from Dunkirk on October 6 with a flotilla of six privateers carrying 1400 troops. Happily escaping the English cruisers that were watching the northern expeditionary corps, he appeared off Aberdeen and threw Scotland into a state of alarm. Overtaken by tempestuous weather he lost two ships and laid by for several months in Norway and the Fairoe Islands. Finally it was not until February 21, 1760, that he landed at Carrickfergus. He had no trouble in seizing the castle, which had a garrison of only 200 men. But having learned that the expedition had been given up in consequence of the battle of Quiberon, he judged that he would not be able to do anything solely on his own resources; and, three days after his arrival, he set out again for France. Moreover, discord reigned in the little squadron between the land and the sea officers, and between Thurot and his captains. Shortly after sailing two ships separated; the other three were pursued and attacked by English frigates, and were captured near the Isle of Man.
After the failure of this attempt at invasion, France had to confess herself beaten.
FIFTH ATTEMPT TO LAND IN ENGLAND (1779). When France ranged herself on the side of the English colonies in America that had revolted against their mother country, the circumstances were particularly favorable for attempting a descent upon England. The war, which had been going on several years on land in America, absorbed all the regular troops of the United Kingdom, while on the sea our alliance with Spain gave us a considerable superiority. Preparations were therefore made for an invasion on the following bases:
The two allied navies, after effecting junction, were to crush the English forces in the Channel and then conduct across a convoy of 40,000 men.
We shall see how an operation appearing to present the greatest chances of success may come to naught by the one fact of faulty preparation.
Lieutenant-General d'Orvilliers left Brest on June 3, 1779, with 30 ships and 10 frigates, and sailed for the Spanish coast. But the Spanish ships were not ready; for a month d'Orvilliers cruised in the vicinity of Cizarga waiting for them. On July 2 eight ships and two frigates came out from Corunna under command of Lieutenant-General Don Antonio Darce and joined the French fleet. It was not until 20 days later that Lieutenant-General Don Luis de Cordova arrived from Cadiz with the rest of the Spanish Fleet—28 ships, 2 frigates, 2 corvettes and 8 fire-ships.
Some days passed, during which the two admirals were occupied with the organization of the fleet. One important question, that of signals, had been entirely neglected during the negotiations concerning the assembling of the two squadrons. "I was greatly surprised, my Lord," wrote Lieutenant-General d'Orvilliers to the Minister, "to find that the signals for the fleet had not been printed in Spain, and that M. Mazzaredo (chief of staff of the Spanish fleet) had been obliged to copy them by hand after his departure from Cadiz. T can assure you that it has never before happened that two fleets, making junction at sea, have been reduced to the improvisation of an entire code of signals…" On the 28th and 29th the ships that had been detached to Ferrol and Corunna rejoined the flag of the commander-in-chief. On July 30 the combined fleet, in strength 66 ships of the line, of which 36 were Spanish, and 14 frigates of the two nations, stood away to the North.
More than two months had passed and the ships had already consumed a large part of their stores; but d'Orvilliers counted upon transports loaded with provisions being sent to him by the Minister, who knew the situation of the fleet. The fleet was encumbered with sick, many ships had sailed without doctors, and medicines were wanting.
On August 7 the combined fleet sighted Ushant. D'Orvilliers found there neither provisions nor the pilots for whom he had asked, but in spite of this he entered the Channel. On August 16 he received orders that modified the plans of the government; the landing, instead of taking place in the neighborhood of Portsmouth, was to be made at Falmouth. The moment was poorly chosen to change all the plans. The Minister took no account of the objections that his instructions gave rise to: Falmouth had an anchorage insufficient to hold the fleet and it did not offer secure shelter. D'Orvilliers attempted to point this out, but it was too late to discuss the matter. An easterly gale blew the fleet out of the Channel and solved the question. As soon as the weather moderated the provisions were equally divided between the ships, and the subsistence of the fleet was thus assured until September 20.
On August 25 the English fleet was signaled. It comprised 35 ships and was sighted near the Scilly Isles, having also been driven to leeward by the easterly winds. A real admiral (veritable homme de guerre) would have lost no time in undertaking its pursuit at once; d'Orvilliers preferred to call a council of war, and it is easy to imagine how long a time was needed to gather on board the admiral's ship the flag officers from a fleet of 80 sail. The council decided that the fleet should abandon its cruise on September 8 at the latest, in view of the sanitary conditions and of the shortness of provisions; and that, in the meantime, it should go to meet the enemy. But the enemy had not delayed for the end of the deliberations to make his escape; on September 2 he entered Portsmouth. The combined fleet continued to cruise for several days, then steered for Ushant, and anchored at Brest on September 14.
The expedition was abandoned.
This unfortunate cruise brought no honor to the allied governments, when consideration is given to the want of co-ordination shown in fitting out the squadrons, the failure to establish any understanding for sailing in company, the deficiencies in water and provisions, the lack of surgeons and medicines, the defective hygiene, and the unconcern manifested about victualling the fleet when it had put to sea. Not by showing such incapacity as this can it be hoped to give a fatal blow to an enemy who is determined to defend himself. The expedition was thus doomed to failure at the outset. D'Orvilliers fell under the ban of disfavor; but the Minister of Marine, M. de Sartines, deserved to have followed him into retirement, for he was the true culprit.
Though the war was to go on for several years, during which our superiority in the Channel became only the more marked, yet the idea of conquering England was completely given up.
It is a curious fact that, up to the time of the Empire, our schemes for descent were prepared with the least energy when our navy was the strongest. From this it may be concluded that the passage of an army offered such hazards that it was preferable to keep to measures exclusively maritime so long as the hope remained of being victorious on the sea; and that the army was only permitted to take a part when there were no other means to employ. But if there is hesitation about entrusting the destinies of troops to the hazard of a crossing when it is possible to conquer the command of the sea beforehand, then it must be admitted that disaster is inevitably courted if the same operation is ventured across a sea occupied by the enemy.
SECOND CONQUEST OF MINORCA (1781-1782). The manifold necessities that pressed upon the English navy had forced the Admiralty to strip the Mediterranean almost completely, and the allies found the occasion a propitious one for retaking Minorca. On June 23, 1781, Guichen took to Cadiz from Brest 18 ships which were placed under the orders of Don Luis de Cordova. They were joined there by a ship and a frigate from Toulon, and the combined fleet, 50 ships strong and carrying a landing force of 14,000 men, weighed from Cadiz on July 22. The fleet landed the troops at Minorca and then left the Mediterranean for the North. The Due de Crillon, who commanded the expeditionary corps, easily took possession of the island, but the citadel did not surrender until February 4, 1782.
THE EXPEDITION OF HOCHE TO IRELAND (1796-1797). We now come to the wars of the Revolution, during which the spirit of enterprise characterizing this epoch led inevitably to ideas of invasion. There was no preoccupation then about the means; it was willingly believed that hardihood of conception and enthusiasm in execution would make up for everything.
The leaven was ever at work in Ireland. A widespread association had been formed in the island to shake off the yoke of the English, and upon the outbreak of war a delegation of the principal leaders had come to Paris to implore the aid of France. The difficulties of every kind in the midst of which our country was then struggling had prevented the Convention from acceding to this request; but in 1796, new emissaries having come to give assurances that the appearance of the French would occasion a general uprising in Ireland, the Directory believed the moment favorable for action.
Hoche was appointed to the command of the expedition; Villaret-Joyeuse, who was at the head of the Brest squadron, was to command the naval forces and remain under the orders of the General.
The troops that had been engaged in the pacification of the Vendee were sent to Brest, and orders were given at that port to fit out all ships that were sea-worthy. Our naval material was at that time in a deplorable state; storehouses were empty, and for many years the ships had not been kept in condition. The personnel left quite as much to be desired; the attempt to get together the number of seamen necessary to form the crews of the ships had not succeeded, and those who were present had no professional instruction.
The danger of undertaking an expedition under such faulty conditions did not escape the attention of the officers; Villaret-Joyeuse particularly did not cease to represent to Minister Truguet the rashness of such an expedition. At the same time the lack of funds impeded the fitting out of the ships. Hoche went to Brest to hasten the preparations; he found that nothing was going on in a way to accord with his own impatience, and he openly accused the admiral of being ill-affected. The Directory ended by displacing Villaret, and Morard de Galle was named in his stead.
Surely Villaret should not be reproached for having lifted the voice of reason and for having advised against an enterprise in which his own honor was engaged as well as that of France; but, granted that the government had decided upon the crossing, it was good policy not to leave Villaret to have a part in an operation of which he disapproved. Unfortunately, Morard de Galle was no more confident. He did not accept the command given him without a protest; but this done he lent to Hoche the most devoted assistance.
Thanks to the efforts of Hoche, and to the activity of Bruix, who was chief of staff of the squadron, the expedition was ready to set out in the early days of December.
The original plan of Truguet consisted in concentrating at Brest all the French and Spanish naval forces; but, as the necessity existed of dispatching reinforcements to India, he thought of having the squadron leave Brest with only a part of the expeditionary corps, and of dispatching eight ships to India after the landing of the troops. As it was difficult to foresee at what time it would be possible to send reinforcements, this advance guard would be exposed to the danger of succumbing before aid could arrive. Therefore a more simple idea was reverted to, which, as the season was advancing, was satisfied by sending to Brest the division of Rear-Admiral Richery, 10 which had come from Newfoundland and anchored in Aix roadstead November 5.
On December 15 the squadron weighed from Brest; it was composed of 17 ships, 14 frigates, 6 corvettes, 6 storeships and 20 transports. It carried 17,210 infantry, 1100 cavalry and 1200 artillerymen. Hoche and Morard de Galle were on board the frigate Fraternite. The squadron of Admiral Colpoys had been driven off by a violent easterly wind.
On the evening of the 15th the fleet anchored in Bertheaume Bay to await two ships that were behindhand; it finally sailed on the afternoon of the 16th, steering for Sein Race. At 5 o'clock, owing to the wind, the admiral made signal to go through the Iroise Channel; but the signal was poorly understood because the ships were unaccustomed to sailing in squadron and the crews were improvised. To add to the confusion, an English ship cruising in the Iroise, the Indefatigable, ran near the French ships, firing rockets and guns and burning signals. In short, the greater part of the fleet passed through Sein Race, while the other ships kept on with the admiral, and the Seduisant was lost on Grand- Trevennec.
On the morning of the I7th eight ships, seven frigates, and one transport were together; they placed themselves under the orders of Rear-Admiral Bouvet, whose flag flew on the Immortalite. The Admiral then opened his instructions which directed him in case of separation to proceed to Cape Mizzen Head and cruise there for five days. On the 19th the division was joined by rear-admirals Richery and Nielly with seven ships, two frigates, and a number of transports. Only one ship, three frigates, two corvettes and one transport were missing; unfortunately the two chiefs of the expedition were on board one of the missing frigates.
On the 21st the fleet was at the entrance to Bantry Bay in bad weather with snow falling. Rear-Admiral Bouvet, mistrusting the inexperience of his crews, feared to remain underway; he anchored near Bear Island, allowing each ship to act at discretion. In his vicinity seven ships, six frigates, and one transport anchored; the rest lay to, and the fleet was once more divided.
On the 24th the wind fell. A council of war was called on board the Immortalite under the presidency of General Grouchy, in which it was decided to land the 6000 troops available. The ships got underway to get nearer the land; but the weather became so bad on the 25th that many ships had to go to sea to avoid being cast ashore, and among them the Immortalite.
During the afternoon of the 26th the wind began to go down. On the morning of the 27th, Division-Commander Bedout, to whom the command descended by reason of the absence of Admiral Bouvet, called a council of war on board the Indomptable. The matter of landing was debated, but it was decided to be impossible, the 4000 men remaining having neither artillery, munitions, provisions, nor money. The division sailed on its return to France and anchored at Brest on January 12 without having seen the enemy. Several ships that had been separated from the others on the 21st and 25th were already there. They were the Pinion, the Pegase, the Resolue, and the Immortalite, the last named carrying the flag of Admiral Bouvet.
The Tourville and the Fougueux, which had been unable to anchor under Great Bear Island, had remained at sea laid to; the former arrived at Bantry Bay, December 30, and the latter December 31. The Redoubtable, which had left the anchorage on the night of December 22, also arrived on the 3Oth. On January 1 the Nestor arrived; she had been in company with the Fraternite until December 20, but had lost her on the night of December 20-21 during a squall. Again the question of a landing came up. About 4000 men could be put ashore; but there was a rumor that the English had got 13,000 men together in camp since the appearance of the French; it was known further that a part of the expeditionary corps had sailed for Brest; finally the ships began to feel the need of provisions, and they could not delay their return much longer. It appeared imprudent to abandon a handful of men to their own resources under the circumstances, and the idea of landing was abandoned. The ships sailed for Brest on the 5th of January and arrived on the 13th, with the exception of the Surveillante which was in such bad condition that it had been necessary to sink her in Bantry Bay.
The Trajan and the Charente, after having gone to the mouth of the Shannon (one of the assigned rendezvous), anchored on December 28 in Kilkadia Bay, where the Trajan furnished some provisions to the Charante, which was short; after which both ships returned to Brest.
What, then, had become of the Fraternitc, which carried the two chiefs of the expedition? On December 21, this frigate found herself alone after having had in company for some time the Cocarde, the Romaine, and the Nestor. On the 24th she was chased by an enemy's ship and only escaped by jettisoning a part of her artillery. Going on then toward the Irish coast she met at sea the Revolution and the Scevola. The latter was in a sinking state and the Revolution took off her crew and passengers. From these ships the Admiral had news of the expeditionary corps up to December 22. He then decided, the General agreeing, to return to France with the Revolution, whose condition might become critical at any moment. The two ships anchored at Aix Island on January 13; already for several days the men had been on reduced rations.
Such was the end of this unfortunate expedition. Of the forty-five vessels comprising it, twelve were lost. The Seduisant had gone ashore on Grand-Trevennec upon leaving Brest; the Scevola had foundered at sea; the Surveillante had sunk in Bantry Bay; the Impatiente had gone upon the rocks near Cape Clear; the Tortue, the Atalante and four transports had been captured by the enemy; finally the Les-Droits-de-l'Homnie, chased by two vessels of the enemy, had been lost in Audierne Bay, carrying with her to destruction the English frigate Amazone.
At first sight it seems as if the enemy had had only a secondary part in the defeat of this attempt. The striking thing about it is the deplorable state of the ships, which were unable to stand the slightest wind; and the insufficiency of provisions, which weighed upon every decision. But, though hasty and insufficient preparation inevitably tended to failure, it is no less true that the necessity under which our ships labored of being unable to face the presence of the enemy had consequences even more serious. That it was that caused the modification of orders and provoked the initial separation of the expeditionary corps; that prevented the vessels arriving successively at Bantry from awaiting the laggards; that forced a multiplication of rendezvous and that misled ships in a false direction.
None the less the English squadrons were unequal to their task. How was it that the French could successively present themselves on the Irish coast without drawing the English squadrons thither? Here is something that appears beyond belief, and is so in fact. The expedition had to fear the squadron of Colpoys, which was cruising off Ushant, and that of Bridport, called the Channel Squadron, which was anchored at Spithead. Colpoys, as soon as he knew that the French had come out, went at once in search, and ran across the division of Rear-Admiral Villeneuve, which was on its way from Toulon to Brest. This diversion led him off as far as Groix Island, where he abandoned the chase, returning afterwards to Plymouth. As for the Channel Squadron, though advised on the 20th of December it did not sail until the 8th of January, and one is quite at loss to find the reasons that condemned it to inactivity. Nothing less than these two unlooked for circumstances could have served to keep the expedition from total destruction.
PREPARATION FOR A LANDING IN ENGLAND (1797). Hoche had returned furious, but with unabated enthusiasm. Attributing to the elements and to disaffection what was only the consequence of an error in principle and of the disorganization of the navy, he pressed the Directory to make ready a new expedition. After the signature of the Leoben preliminaries, the government apparently entered into his views, but with a desire this time to get together a force ample to try conclusions with the English. To this end the order was given to fit out all the available ships at Lorient and Rochefort and send them to join the Brest squadron, which was ready. At the same time the cooperation of Spain and Holland was obtained. The former was to send its squadron from Cadiz to Brest as soon as it found a chance to get out, and the latter was to attempt a diversion by throwing into England a corps of 13,000 men. This project was not followed up in France; it was the time of the Lille conferences that ended in nothing. Holland alone made a beginning in its execution. From the beginning of July, 1797, 13,500 men were embarked in her fleet, which consisted of fifteen ships, ten frigates, and twenty seven transports. For more than two months this expeditionary corps waited for a favorable opportunity to set out ; at the end of that time the ships had run out of provisions and the troops had to be landed.
The treaty of Campo-Formio, by establishing peace on the continent, left to France the free use of her army, and she wished to profit thereby by turning it against England, which alone refused to make peace. General Bonaparte took the place of Hoche (who died in September) at the head of the Army of England, and under his impulse the first preparations went rapidly forward.
"Vice-Admiral Pleville Le Peley recalled to the service the sailors who had been discharged with so little reflection some months before. The government took back the frigates, corvettes, and other vessels that it had loaned to commercial uses, paying heavy indemnities therefore. It was necessary to get together new crews, and it was then that the extent of the error committed in disbanding them was realized. The sailors of the maritime inscription hid themselves and only a small number of them were found. The government had no money, and the expedition to England required a great deal. The Conseils voted a loan to meet this expenditure on the proposal of the Directory. The court of Madrid was besought from Paris to assemble at Cadiz as many ships, frigates, and light vessels as possible. This squadron, provided with three months' stores and carrying a landing corps of 15,000 men, was to be ready to go to sea at the end of April. If not blockaded by superior force it was to sail at that time for a destination to be arranged by the two governments in concert. The Directory also asked that the vessels stationed at Ferrol, ships, frigates, and corvettes, might be sent to Brest with provisions and stores for three months, and with full crews. The Dutch Republic had pledged itself to take a part in the expedition to England. It gave the Texel fleet, some troops and the transports necessary to embark them. General Andreossi and Engineer Forfait were commissioned to ask from the Dutch government 200 flat boats of good sailing qualities and 200 fishing or other boats able each to carry from 80 to 100 men. They were charged to see, besides, that the gunboats and the launches and other armed boats were fitted out and sent to Dunkirk. It was the intention at Paris to have at Boulogne 50 launches, 400 or 500 fishing boats, 100 horse boats, and 25 vessels of 100 tons. Calais was to shelter 400 vessels, and the small ports Etaples and Ambleteuse 50 fishing boats each. General Caffarelli was ordered to put the coast batteries in good condition, and to augment their number should that prove necessary, in order to ensure the security of the ports designated to receive the vessels of the expedition. Engineer officers inspected the coast of England between Folkstone and Rye from the decks of privateers."
"At the beginning of February, 1798, General Bonaparate visited the coasts of the Ocean, the Channel and the North Sea…"
It was in consequence of this inspection that the commander of the Army of England was convinced that the expedition could not take place during the course of that year, and that he submitted to the Directory the plan for the expedition to Egypt, which was accepted.
THE EXPEDITION TO EGYPT (1798). The preparations were at once pushed with feverish activity. At Toulon fifteen ships and thirteen frigates were fitted out, and transports were assembled at Marseilles, Ajaccio, Genoa, and Civita Vecchia. Brueys, who had known General Bonaparte in Italy, was made a vice-admiral and put at the head of the fleet.
The Commander-in-Chief arrived at Toulon May 9, 1798; on the 19th the fleet set sail after a delay of several days due to contrary winds. Joined by the transports from Marseilles it steered with the wind aft for Ajaccio, then for Genoa, to pick up the convoys assembled in those ports.
As contrary winds prevented it from going to Civita Vecchia, the convoy from that place did not join until later. On June 10, Bonaparte captured Malta. On July 1 the fleet appeared before Alexandria. Brueys anchored to the westward of the city, facing the Marabout Tower, and the landing began that same evening. The next day the city was captured. The convoy and light vessels profited by entering the port immediately, while the squadron proceeded to Aboukir.
Thus did Bonaparte, guided by his star, succeed in transporting 33,000 men and 800 horses across a sea occupied by the enemy. Was that the end of it all? The outcome will teach us the answer. But first it is interesting to know the train of circumstances by which this fleet of four hundred sails had been able to cross undiscovered.
"When the first news reached England of the preparations that we were making at Toulon, the government saw in these measures only a stratagem to draw Lord Jervis into the Mediterranean. Should he withdraw, Admiral Mazzaredo 14 would get to sea. Consequently there was no desire in London to deviate from the line of conduct being followed at the moment. The British navy was closely blockading the Spaniards in Cadiz and the Dutch in the Texel. Considerable forces were watching Brest and the Channel coast. The danger of an invasion, the thing regarded with most fear by the English nation, seemed to be provided against by these measures. Nevertheless the reports of English agents in Italy gave such a formidable aspect to the preparations of the French that the British government deemed it necessary to have information of what was going on at Toulon. By direction of the Admiralty Lord Jervis sent a detachment of three ships and four frigates into the Mediterranean. This division, commanded by Admiral Nelson, was about 25 leagues south of Hyeres Islands on May 19, 1798, when it was struck by a violent gale from the northwest. The Vanguard, seventy-four, flagship of the Admiral, lost all her masts. The enemy's ships, flying before the wind, steered for the coast of Sardinia. On nearing land the Vanguard narrowly escaped being lost, but Admiral Nelson finally reached the anchorage of St. Pierre Island on May 22. On the 27th the Vanguard had rigged jury masts and repaired her worst injuries, and Admiral Nelson again went to sea. Arriving May 31 off Toulon, he was informed of the departure of the French squadron, but could obtain no information of the route it had taken. On June 5 he was joined by the brig Mutine carrying urgent dispatches. The English government, which had not paid any great attention to our preparations up to then, was beginning to get alarmed. They were asking in London if the concentration of troops and ships made at different points of the Mediterranean did not have England as their objective. The Admiralty with considerable effort fitted out new ships and sent them to Lord Jervis, who received at the same time an order to raise to fourteen ships the squadron detached into the Mediterranean…Lord Jervis, in the instructions that he sent to Nelson by the Mutine, seemed to think that we might wish to attack Naples or Sicily. Perhaps, he added, we might have in mind directing upon some point of the Spanish coast an army with which we could march against Portugal. Finally, examining a last hypothesis that was of especial interest to England, Lord St. Vincent asked himself if our real object were not to pass the Strait of Gibraltar and throw troops into Ireland…
"On June 7 Admiral Nelson effected his junction with the eleven ships that Admiral Jervis had sent him, ten seventy-fours and one fifty."
It was then that the exasperating pursuit began whose end was at Aboukir. The English squadron doubled Cape Corso June 12; it was at Naples June 19, where Nelson learned that the French fleet had been sighted on the Sardinian coast, the rumor being that it was on its way to Malta. On the 20th the English squadron passed through the Strait of Messina; on the 22d Nelson learned from a merchantman who had passed through the midst of our fleet that it was then to the eastward of Malta steering southeast.
Convinced that Egypt was our objective, Nelson hastened in that direction. On the 28th of June he was off Alexandria, communicated with the shore and learned that the French had not appeared. Uncertain what to think, he decided to return to Sicily, little suspecting that the next day he would pass within a short distance of our fleet as he worked to windward. The English squadron anchored at Syracuse July 19, for water and provisions. Nelson could no longer doubt the destination of the French expedition and he again set his course for Egypt. On the 1st of August the Zealous, which was scouting ahead of the fleet, signaled that ships were at anchor to the eastward of Alexandria. That night our squadron was annihilated.
Two questions now arise:
Why is it that the Egyptian expedition, alone of all those made with important bodies of troops, was able without hindrance to cross a sea occupied by the enemy?
Should we consider that the object of the expedition was attained by the fact that the troops took possession of Egypt?
When Brueys left Toulon the Mediterranean had been, since December, 1796, abandoned by the English ships, which were drawn into the Ocean by the preparations for a descent upon England; neither the Admiral nor the General suspected the arrival of Nelson in the vicinity of Toulon at the very moment of their setting out. The several movements necessary to pick up the convoys were thus made by the fleet in perfect ease of mind, without the haste that breeds disorder. The convoy sailed by easy stages and was able to remain concentrated, thanks to this lack of haste. To be sure this was not the determining cause of the success of the passage, but paradoxical as it may appear it was one of its elements, because with the conviction that the sea was free, there was no necessity of making the sort of decision so often attended by grievous results.
The thing that did favor the French, even more than the damage to the Vanguard, was the place chosen for the landing. So improbable was it that neither the English Admiralty, nor Jervis, nor Nelson suspected it at first. We were not at war with Turkey and it was not apparent that the occupation of Egypt would have great weight upon the issue of the war. Attention had not been called in this direction; consequently, the fleet having had the good luck to get away without being followed up, the search made in quest of it was bound to go amiss, and the fleet had against it only the chance of an accidental meeting at sea.
None of the expeditions of which we have spoken hitherto found themselves under like conditions. Some were able, thanks to a gale of wind, to leave port without being observed; but the enemy always knew on what coasts to find them again. And of this expedition it is likewise to be noted that the very reason that contributed to the success of the passage took away its efficacy from the enterprise, since the possession of Egypt by France did not imperil the fate of England.
As for the second question that has been raised, it may be said that, if it had been possible to sign a treaty of peace with England at Cairo, the success would have been complete, and the destruction of Bruey's squadron would have been only of secondary importance. But, since the expedition to Egypt was only a diversion, the importance of which, moreover, is not evident, since the naval war went on, we must put on the balance sheet of this undertaking the influence of the loss of our squadron upon maritime operations, the capture of vessels that attempted afterwards to establish communications with Egypt, and the fruitless attempts to revictual the expeditionary corps, like that of Ganteaitme. The army, cut off from the sea and abandoned to its own resources, grew weaker and weaker and finally was forced to capitulate. The genius of Napoleon was able to put off the inevitable day of reckoning: but that day was bound to come sooner or later, and come it did. From every point of view the expedition to Egypt had consequences that were calamitous; and if this is not apparent at first sight, it is because our attention is diverted by the brilliancy of Bonaparte's victories that have left behind them so luminous a wake. As for the passage itself, its success can not make us forget the dangers to which the army commanded by our greatest captain was exposed, nor reconcile us to such a hazardous operation.
EXPEDITION OF GENERAL HUMBERT TO IRELAND (1798). The great invasion of England had been postponed; events on the continent were soon to cause the Directory to abandon it. The Directory then reverted to the idea of stirring up Ireland to revolt by grouping the inhabitants about some thousands of French soldiers.
The advance guard of this small expedition left Aix August 6, 1798; it comprised 1200 men under the command of General Humbert. The division formed of the three frigates Concorde, Franchise, and Medee, was under the orders of Division-Commander Savary. He arrived on the coast of Ireland without having encountered any vessels of the enemy, and on the 21st he landed his troops at Killala, immediately returning to France. He entered the Gironde September 5 with the same good fortune.
At first General Humbert had some successes; then later, when the English had assembled troops, he was overwhelmed by weight of numbers and was forced to surrender on September 8.
On the 7th the brig Anacreon left Dunkirk carrying two Irish officers and forty-five men. Delayed by contrary winds, the vessel anchored near Great Aran Island, where news of General Humbert's surrender was received. The Irishmen deemed it useless to land and the brig brought the detachment back to France.
While General Humbert was sailing toward Ireland the Brest Division, carrying the major part of the contingent (3000 men), vainly tried to get away. It was composed of one ship, the Hoche, and eight frigates under Division-Commander Bompard. As early as July 21 it entered the Iroise but the appearance of the enemy forced it to go back to port. A second attempt, made August 19, was still less fortunate; the ships came back into the Goulet pursued by the enemy's shot. Finally, on September 16, it was able to get to sea; but from the moment of leaving it was followed by enemy frigates which never left it until October 4. On the 10th it was in contact with Commodore Warren's division composed of three eighty-gun ships and five frigates, and on the nth it was obliged to accept battle. The Hoche and three frigates were captured. The Immortalite and Resolue succeeded in escaping and anchored on the 18th in the Bay of Donegal, where they learned the fate of Humbert's column. General Menage gave up the landing and the frigates sailed the same evening. During the passage homeward the Resolue was taken by the Melampus, and the Immortalite by the Fishguard.
The Loire and the Semillante steered for Galway; on the 15th they were chased, and they separated. The Loire after several brilliant engagements, surrendered to the ships Anson and Kangaroo; the Semillante, more lucky, succeeded in escaping and arrived at Lorient October 26.
The Romaine anchored on the 13th on the Irish coast several miles away from the Immortalite and the Resolue; not succeeding in getting information she returned to Brest on the 21st.
The French government, uneasy about the situation of the division of Bompard, decided to send back Division-Commander Savary with fresh troops. He left the Isle of Aix on October 12, with four frigates, and by good fortune reached Killala, where he learned of the disaster that had overtaken Bompard. He sailed at once on his return to France without landing his troops. Chased by two English ships, his vessels scattered. The Venus entered the Charente November 6, and the Concorde on the 9th; the Franchise anchored off Saint-Martin-de-Re on the 6th, after throwing her guns overboard; finally the Medee reached Basque Roads on the 7th under similar conditions. It is hard to find an operation more badly conceived. Making the doubtful admission that 4000 or 5000 men were sufficient to maintain themselves in Ireland, the best way to drive them to surrender was certainly to send them out in small parties. It was actually too presumptuous by far to suppose that General Humbert would be able to maintain himself in that country with a thousand men; and, as the landing place of reinforcements could not be indicated in advance because of the presence of enemy forces along the coasts, the reinforcements risked being separated from the advance guard. Further the greatest difficulty was to land them; and circumstances so favorable as those encountered by the Savary division are not met more than once.
PREPARATIONS FOR AN INVASION OF ENGLAND: THE BOULOGNE CAMP. To end this history there remains only the mention of Napoleon's preparations to invade England.
From the rupture of the peace of Amiens the First Consul had dwelt upon this idea, and he gave to his plan proportions as vast as his genius. At Boulogne he formed a camp of 150,000 men, 10,000 horses, and 400 guns. Here is something far removed from the timidity of the Monarchy; this time it is to be a duel to the death, and if this great army succeeds in setting foot on English soil, England's day has come. But in order to carry over such a mass of troops means of transport were required, and the First Consul busied himself without loss of time to create them.
Three kinds of vessels were built:
1st. Armed launches carrying four pieces of large caliber. They were brig-rigged, had a crew of 24 men, and could carry a company of infantry of 100 men with their munitions.
2d. Armed boats especially intended to carry artillery. Forward they had a 24-pounder, and aft a field piece; amidships there were stalls for two horses. These boats had crews of only six men and could carry a company of infantry and several artillerymen.
3d. Pinnaces of about 20 meters length, provided with sixty oars to be manned by soldiers; they carried only a small howitzer and a 4-pounder.
Thus fitted out the army could land in spite of opposition, thanks to the guns of the launches, and immediately afterwards give battle; but in order to carry on the campaign there would be need of its cavalry and its trains. To this end a commission bought all the coasters and fishing boats along the coast from St. Male to the Texel.
When, after three years' efforts, the Emperor had succeeded in realizing the prodigious task of assembling two thousand three hundred vessels, the only thing remaining was to ensure the liberty of the sea to his immense flotilla. In a later chapter we shall see the different combinations that the Emperor had designed to sweep the strait, and the causes that made them come to naught.
This attempt at invasion, the grandest of all in its conception, was also the last.
If we desire to draw conclusions from this array of facts, whose results are often contradictory, it is necessary at the outset to distinguish between important expeditions, requiring the assemblage of a great number of vessels, and those which only involve the transportation of a few thousand men.
CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OVER SEA OF AN ARMY CORPS. In the former case recourse is necessary to packets and merchant ships, and consequently an encounter with the enemy, however feeble he may be, becomes fatal to the expedition. All these auxiliary ships are unprovided with the necessary means for sailing in squadron. They are officered by men who are strangers to maneuvers and to signals. In the old days, also, the convoy was nothing but a mob following pell-mell after its escort. Now the transports are placed in one or two columns, with ships of war introduced among them charged with the duty of guiding them. Naturally the speed is low because, when great numbers of troops are to be transported, it is necessary to utilize the last reserves of commercial ports.
If the enemy runs across this procession, which covers a great extent of sea, the situation at once becomes critical. At the first shells that fall about them the transports, destitute of every means of protection, have no resource save flight. Threatened by the danger of sinking and without succor, crews and passengers become demoralized; disorder ensues and soon the convoy is dispersed in every direction. What can the escort do? It seeks to concentrate and interpose between the enemy and the convoy; but in can neither keep the shells from reaching the convoy nor keep the light vessels from rushing in pursuit of it. Moreover the ships of war are themselves encumbered with troops in order to keep down the number of auxiliaries, and they find themselves in the most unfavorable condition for battle. In every way the expedition becomes broken up. So true is this that the instructions given to our squadron commanders under circumstances of this kind prescribed that they should always carefully avoid the enemy; and when they have had the bad fortune to be met at sea the result has always been lamentable. The Spaniards are perhaps the only ones who have essayed (in the sixteenth century) to form an assemblage of ships formidable enough to force the passage of a convoy in the face of the enemy, and the world knows what happened to the Invincible Armada.
Thus, in order to cross the sea with great bodies of troops, there is only a choice between the three following solutions:
1st. To take advantage of the fact that the sea is free, whether temporarily or absolutely.
2d. To destroy or paralyze the enemy at the outset, and then to cross.
3d. To seek to make the crossing by surprise.
First Case. The sea is free. The success of the crossing can then only be thwarted by bad weather. As for the landing, it can always be effected if the region has a large extent of coast; as for the rest, everything will depend upon the relation of the means put in operation to the elements of the enemy's resistance. The two expeditions to Minorca were carried on under these conditions, and both were crowned with success.
Nevertheless, when the freedom of the sea is only temporary an offensive return of the enemy must be foreseen, and sufficient forces must be disposed to save what has been acquired. In fact it is plain that, if la Galissoniere had been defeated off Mahon, the English garrison of Fort St. Philip would have been reinforced and revictualed, while the troops of Richelieu would have been seriously compromised.
It is necessary also to look to the future. Unless the landed army obtains overwhelming results—a desirable but improbable thing—it will need to have its ranks filled constantly with fresh troops, and above all to be resupplied; for in our day munitions cannot be manufactured on the spot as was done by Napoleon in Egypt. It is necessary, then, to remain in control of the communications after the landing, without which surrender will be the consequence at the end of a longer or shorter time. If it is foreseen that the communications cannot be assured it is best to refrain from the operation.
Second Case. The sea is not free, but the naval forces at disposal permit risking the hazards of battle. In this case the landing should always be subordinated to a contest which will decide the command of the sea.
One is confronted then with the following alternatives: either he will be victorious, in which case he can cross in security, profiting by the demoralization (of the loser) that always follows a lost battle; or else he will be beaten, and then, instead of losing a fleet and an army, the army at least will be saved.
When one has a marked superiority over the enemy afloat there may arise the temptation to adopt a mixed solution by dividing the forces into two parts: one, the more numerous, designed to mask the enemy squadron in order to permit the other to conduct the convoy and preserve it from the hardy incursions of single ships. This was the solution that was thought of in 1755. It can have only calamitous results. At the very beginning there will never be too much force to clear the passage, and it would be imprudent to jeopardize the game by withholding a detachment. Finally, whatever care be taken to interpose between the convoy and the enemy, one can never be sure of succeeding in it if the enemy maneuvers rapidly and skillfully, profiting by the night hours to steer false courses, or if he masks his movements behind a screen of his light vessels. On the sea the movements of forces are not subject to the same rules as on land, where the troops can only advance by known routes. It is preferable, then, instead of dividing the forces to divide the operation into two parts: first fight, then cross over.
But still it is necessary to be able to fight. It happens most often, however, that the enemy, when he is in inferior numbers, prefers not to face the battle and shuts himself up inside a port. In this event operations cannot be held up until he shall deign to come out; for every delay in the transportation of troops may modify the situation on land and be favorable to the enemy, who often seeks nothing else than to gain time. One is then content to blockade, or at least to watch closely the enemy forces, in order to prevent them from coming out; and, behind this covering fleet, to send the convoy across under the escort of several ships of war. The Americans did this at Santiago.
If the enemy has retired into port after a battle in which he has been defeated or has suffered severe losses, he does not constitute a serious menace because he is then demoralized and has no other object than his security. Such was the case with the Chinese at Wei-hai-wei and it is this that justified the manner in which the Japanese maneuvered when they landed in the vicinity.
Third Case. The sea is not free, and there is insufficient force to clear the passage. It is necessary then to pass over by evasion (surprise).
This was ever the hope of the French government; but we have seen that this hope was always betrayed excepting in the case of the Egyptian expedition, and there the meeting took place after the passage of the convoy instead of before or during the passage.
Is it not logical to conclude that it is always a mistake to risk an entire army under conditions of this sort? Such persistent adversity can not be imputed alone to mischance or to faulty execution; it is rooted solely in an error of principle easy of discovery. To assemble in certain ports a great number of transport vessels, to direct to those same ports columns of troops, these things cannot be done without attracting attention; thereafter there is no further chance of a surprise and the secret of the operation, which alone can assure success, is divulged. This is why Tourville, Roquefeuil, and Conflans were beaten or dispersed in the immediate vicinity of their convoys, the English knowing perfectly that they would find them there, and nowhere else. It was even a happy circumstance for us that the contact did not take place after the departure of the transports, for the disaster would then have been greater still.
In our opinion an operation presenting itself under such unfavorable conditions should be absolutely forbidden.
Nothing is easier than to build plans upon paper for the invasion of England. One takes a chart, notes that the ocean is vast and that ships get lost in its solitude, and therefore concludes that the chances of crossing without being seen are indefinitely more numerous than the chances of being met. But when the hour of execution arrives the dangers that were not discernible at long range come to mind in a flood, together with the consequences in their train. One then hesitates to stake the fortunes of the country upon a throw of the die. The expedition is not given up but one comes to think that everything can be reconciled by having it escorted by a naval force for its protection, and thereby one courts disaster; because, if the escort were sufficient, the issue of battle would be sought beforehand.
Think of the state of mind of the admiral charged with the duty of facing all the unknown possibilities of such an operation! The situation flowing from it is not one that can be laid upon the shoulders of a leader. To convoy an inert mass that is certain to succumb to the least attack without being able to defend itself; to have charge of thousands of human lives without means of safeguarding them; to be unable to anticipate the possibility of flight, even, in case of encountering the enemy; such responsibilities are beyond human strength.
Ask of our admirals to sacrifice their squadrons to assure freedom of passage; none will refuse. Demand of them that they fight against odds of two to one; it has been done, it will be done again. But do not ask of a man that he be an impotent witness to the annihilation of an army upon which the destinies of the fatherland depend.
By causing the expedition to set out from two or three different points there is the advantage of dividing the attention of the enemy. But unless this is done with the sole object of seeking an occasion to fall in force upon one of the detachments of the enemy, the benefits to be expected do not compensate for the attendant disadvantages; for, the several corps never being sure of being able to leave at the desired moment or to land at the chosen place, the result is compromised from the beginning. The first comer will share the fate of General Humbert.
We conclude, then, if France wishes in the future to take up once more her ideas of invasion, she must from now on undertake the sacrifices necessary to clear the passage instead of beginning again the fantastic operations that have made of the Channel and the Atlantic the graveyard of our navy.
THE FLEET IN BEING. Let us now examine the problem: What is the role of an inferior force confronted with the menace of an invasion? Should it offer battle at the risk of being defeated and of leaving the passage clear?
The role has been defined by Admiral Colomb in the theory of the "fleet in being." The arguments of the distinguished English historian may be summarized as follows: So long as a naval force exists and makes its existence manifest, an enemy, even superior, cannot undertake a landing; and if he persists in the attempt he places himself in a bad position, and goes to his defeat.
Admiral Colomb bases his doctrine upon the defense of Torrington before the court-martial that tried him for losing the battle of Beveziers. The example does not seem to us to have been judiciously chosen; the argument rests upon what Torrington might have been able to do and not upon what he did. Then too, the author credits the French with plans of invasion of which no trace can be found f finally the English fleet really left the sea free after its defeat by shutting itself up in the Thames. It cannot, therefore, be taken as a model of the fleet in being.
Nevertheless, the considerations that Torrington turned to account, after having planned his defense at leisure, have received the confirmation of facts. In the following year Tourville gave a luminous demonstration of the power of an inferior fleet in his famous deep-sea cruise, during which he prevented the English fleet from attacking our coasts without permitting himself to be run down. Other examples might be cited, such as that furnished by the Invincible Armada, by the fleet of d'Orvilliers in 1779, by the Italians at Lissa, and again very recently by Cervera's squadron, of which we shall speak again later on.
The fleet in being should then, by serving as a menace, paralyze the movements of the enemy. It acts in the manner of troops operating on the rear or flanks of an enemy. Its entire strength resides in its activity and in the doubt in which it leaves its movements shrouded. If chased it necessarily runs away; as soon as it is left in quiet it should seek contact again to keep the enemy under tension. But it is not as easy as may be thought to play at blindman's-burr, even with superiority of speed. Tourville contended that an encounter is inevitable when two fleets are within sight of one another; and the reasons that he gave are not weakened by the advent of steam. To avoid it the enemy must be at a considerable distance, which implies that contact is only made by the scouts. Navigation under sail permitted engaging in what may be called the "game of dead sectors" by utilizing the direction of the wind and its variations. Now only steering false courses can be counted upon; but that resource is uncertain enough, especially in narrow waters; and if the pursuit is active the fleet in being will soon be compelled to take refuge in port. Thereafter it is reduced to impotence; it dies.
Admiral Colomb contends that such is not the case; that even shut up it must be taken into account. Captain Mahan holds the contrary opinion, and without engaging in the discussion we may say that Mahan is justified by the facts.
In fact, as long as Cervera's ships were at sea the Americans put off the execution of their plans for landing; and the influence that a mobile force can exert at a distance is the more remarkable in this instance because no nation ever professed the same degree of disdain for its. adversary as did America. But as soon as Cervera had shut himself into Santiago his squadron had no weight in the flow of events."
The inferior force should, then, keep the sea as long as the enemy does, and should be as fast. If it succeeds in holding him in check until his bunkers are empty the situation is saved for the moment, and perhaps definitively, for all schemes of invasion have been abandoned after a first miscarriage. Why, then, is it contended that speed and radius of action are unnecessary in taking the defensive?
The theory of the fleet in being is attractive, but it is easier to define than to put in practice. It would be dangerous to build great hopes upon its employment; and if it is possible to avert the danger of invasion by the aid of a diversion, this means will always be preferable.
CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OVER SEAS OF A BODY OF TROOPS OF LIMITED NUMBERS. Do the conclusions that we have drawn from the great attempts at invasion apply to the transportation of a few thousand men?
Conditions are here very different. As the preparations no longer demand considerable movement of troops and of ships they can remain secret; it becomes possible to do without the aid of the merchant marine, the elements of which are a source of embarrassment, and to make up a homogeneous and fast division of several ships of war. Difficulties of navigation are thus greatly simplified, and in place of the expedition's setting out from the nearest point to the enemy's coast in order to diminish the difficulties due to a slow order of march, a point of departure less under observation may be chosen at a distance. In case of meeting the enemy the expedition will doubtless be dispersed; but it will not be fatally annihilated, thanks to its speed. Finally, and above all, the consequences of a failure will be less grave; they will not weigh so heavily upon the issue of the war.
It may then be admitted that it is possible to cross seas of which one has not the command when the operation has been surrounded with all these guaranties; but this principle is subject to one condition—the expeditionary corps once landed must be able to take possession of the territory, and to maintain itself there on its own resources if the communications remain cut.
Without speaking of Ireland, into which we have been able to throw detachments on several occasions, confirmation of this rule will be found in the operations that have had their scene in the Antilles at different times, and which we have not cited in order not to lengthen our narrative. In those islands, where the English and French possessions were so closely interspersed, it was always possible to choose a propitious moment to land upon the shores of a neighbor; but the conquest remained precarious, or even lacked the time for its accomplishment, if the troops landed did not rest upon the support of naval forces. A study of the facts discloses many occasions when men have allowed themselves to be tempted, thoughtlessly and with no heed of the morrow, by the ease with which a handful of men could be transported and landed; among them were very few where the operation procured any absolute benefits. We do not care to conclude from this that recourse to such operations should be forbidden; but they should be undertaken only with forces sufficient to overcome the resistance of the enemy at one blow, and there should not be the immediate necessity to send reinforcements.
After having studied the principles that should govern conquests of territory over seas, we are now about to see how some large landing operations have been carried through. From this point of view the expeditions to Algeria and to the Crimea were well conducted; that to Wei-hai-wei by the Japanese may be considered a model of its kind; as much cannot be said of those to Madagascar and to Cuba.
THE EXPEDITION TO ALGIERS. The fleet that carried the expeditionary corps to Algiers left Toulon, May 23, 1830. It was composed of 676 ships, men-of-war and merchant ships, and carried 36,000 men and 4000 horses. The army was commanded by General de Bourmont and the fleet by Admiral Duperre. In keeping with tradition the relations between the two chiefs were far from cordial; moreover, they did not even belong to the same political party.
The fleet set its course towards Africa; but, on approaching the coast, bad weather made it turn back and seek refuge at the Balearic Isles. The land officers, and particularly the commanding general, were made impatient by this delay. There were sharp exchanges between the two chiefs, and altercations arose between the land and sea officers that ended in duels. The army officers did not seem to comprehend that a landing is impossible with the wind blowing on shore, and that even vessels at anchor are often forced to put to sea at such times. What would have happened if the boats loaded with troops had capsized; or if, one part of the expeditionary corps having been landed, the rest had been carried off to sea with the ships? It would not have been admitted as an excuse that the Admiral had yielded to the solicitations of the General. Nevertheless, had the Admiral had to fear an attack by sea, he would doubtless have preferred to take the risk of landing rather than delay in the Balearic Isles; and for this reason the expedition might very well have ended before it began.
The fleet remained in Palma Roads an entire week. Finally on June 13, it anchored off the peninsula of Sidi-Ferruch, and the next day the landing of the troops began without any opposition from the army of the Bey. The first division was put ashore in half an hour, and the 36,000 men were landed in five hours. The same day the Bey's camp was taken.
Several days were necessary to land the material, owing to interruptions due to bad weather. As soon as the operation was completed the army took up the march. After this time the part played by the navy was only secondary.
THE EXPEDITION TO THE CRIMEA. In the Crimean expedition it was a question of landing 27,000 French, 28,000 English, and 7000 Turks. The fleet, numbering more than four hundred vessels, set sail September 7, 1854, and anchored at Eupatoria on the 13th. The landing of the French began at 7.40 a.m., September 14; at 9.20 a.m. 9000 men were ashore; at noon the three infantry divisions and eighteen guns with their material; before night the three divisions with their trains and horses, the engineer company and all its outfit, the horses of the Spahis, and the horses of the Marshall and of his staff.
The fourth division was embarked on board steamers that had been to the Bay of Katcha to make a diversion; it was not disembarked until the next day.
Such a rapid operation shows preparation to minute details: it was a contrast to the confusion that had attended the embarkation of the material at Marseilles. It was doubtless understood, after a first experience, that order is a primary condition of every combined operation.
THE EXPEDITION TO WEI-HAI-WEI. The qualities of organization shown by the Japanese in the Chino-Japanese war were never better thrown into relief than by the expedition to Wei-hai-wei, which was carried on in the dead of winter (—10°C, 14°F). This operation was peculiar in that the transportation was effected in four convoys, of which only the first was escorted by the fleet.
Some fifty transports, each carrying a large distinguishing number had been gathered at Talien-wan. The expeditionary corps was composed of 25,000 men, 6000 of whom were coolies, and 3000 horses.
The light Japanese squadron began by making a diversion to the westward of Wei-hai-wei, bombarding the city of Ting-chou-foo and landing there 2000 men; then it went to sea off Wei-hai-wei in order to cover the crossing. Meantime the first convoy of fifteen ships left Talien-wan, accompanied by the Japanese squadron and fifteen torpedo vessels.
Upon approaching land the torpedo vessels were detached to watch Wei-hai-wei, while the cruiser Yayeyama went to reconnoiter Yung-Ching Bay where the landing was to take place. This ship arrived at dawn January 20, cleared the beach with the fire of her guns, and dispersed a detachment of 300 Chinese; then it made ready for the anchorage of the convoy, which arrived at 6 o'clock in the morning. Landing stages were immediately constructed at the beach by the carpenters, and the disembarkation began. All the troops were ashore by night.
The second convoy arrived on the 21st, the third on the 23d, the fourth on the 25th, and on the 26th the army was put on the march.
During all this time the Japanese squadron kept the Chinese ships closely blockaded in Wei-hai-wei.
It would perhaps have been prudent to blockade them earlier if they had not already suffered the ordeal of the battle of the Yalu; but in view of their demoralized condition excessive prudence was not a demand of the occasion.
THE EXPEDITION TO MADAGASCAR. Although we have only concerned ourselves here with landings that have taken place in countries where the invader had no base (expeditions like those to Mexico, China, or the Transvaal having another character), it is well to say a few words about the expedition to Madagascar because of the teachings of a general character that it affords.
One wonders how France, which was not without experience in combined operations, was able to commit so many faults in this unfortunate affair.
The navy had made the preparations for the expedition; at the last moment it was turned over to the War Department. The navy, wounded in its dignity, took care not to propose its cooperation, which for that matter was not sought, and made ready to judge results; the spectacle was not common-place.
The transports were chartered and loaded with material, but no care was taken to put aboard first the articles that should be unloaded last. Then the transports were dispatched in succession at fixed intervals, but there was a neglect to enjoin any date of arrival, so that the ships, not having the same speed, arrived at irregular intervals. There being no arrangements ready on shore to receive the troops, those that arrived before the date anticipated had to remain on board ship at Majunga Road, where there was soon an extraordinary congestion.
The unloading of the material presented insurmountable difficulties. The lighters had not arrived, and as there was need of articles of prime necessity, such as guns, that were stowed in the bottom of the hold, it was necessary to empty the holds upon the decks in order to find them. There resulted a tremendous loss of time involving demurrage.
Lighters were lacking; but to make up for them six thousand Lefevre carts had been sent, and were found to be in fact of no manner of use.
The navy had provided a small wharf to facilitate the operation of landing. The army, attempting to do things on a large scale, extended the wharf—on paper—in order to permit ships to lie alongside; but it had neglected to investigate the nature of the bottom, which did not lend itself to a work of this kind. Besides there was not enough time at disposal to permit undertaking so considerable a work, and the ironwork for the wharf went to the dump alongside the Lefevre carts.
We shall forbear to speak of the mistakes made by the expedition on its march.
Everybody knows that the sailor loves to play at being soldier, while the soldier adores to play at being sailor. Here it was the last case that arose; instead of turning over entirely to the navy the maritime part, as was done in the expeditions to Algiers and the Crimea, the army had the ambition to act all by itself. The result was just that to be expected. "Let us not overwork our talent…" says the fabulist.
THE EXPEDITION TO SANTIAGO. If the faults of others can console us for our own, we shall find satisfaction in the way the Americans organized the transport and landing of the expeditionary corps to Santiago.
Thirty-five transports had been gathered at Tampa to transport 15,000 men; but such was the confusion that it was not known exactly how many men had set out. Baggage and material were heaped pell-mell into the ships as fast as it could arrive at the wharf. The absolute want of organization may be judged from the two following facts. The several elements of three batteries of artillery were scattered among five transports, which divided up among them the guns, carriages, munitions, mules, and artillerymen; it is a question if these batteries were ever reassembled. The order having been given to put on shore the horses of two volunteer regiments whose sailing had been countermanded, the horses could not be found; they were finally discovered on board a transport that was already in the stream.
A single line of rails ended at Port Tampa, but it belonged to a private citizen who used it to organize excursions, which only served to make things worse.
Finally on June 8, 1898, several transports sailed off by themselves, and it was necessary to send a war vessel to bring them back. On June 14, the expeditionary corps at last got started. The transports were escorted by several men-of-war; but soon each was navigating without reference to the rest, and the fleet covered an extent of sea of more than ten miles.
If only one of the Spanish gunboats then scattered among the ports of Cuba had been commanded by a man of energy, that would have sounded the knell of the expedition. It would have sufficed to disperse all the rest of the transports if one or two tardy ones had been sunk.
The convoy proceeded slowly. The average speed was less than seven knots although the weather remained good. This indifferent result is nowise surprising, for there had been a lack of time necessary for selection among the merchant ships. Furthermore all express steamers had to be converted into auxiliary cruisers.
Finally on June 20, this extraordinary fleet arrived off Santiago, after passing along the coast to the end that nobody should be ignorant of its presence. On the 22d a diversion was made to the westward while the landing began east of the city, at Daiquiri. It was made under the same conditions as the embarkation. Thus only 6000 men were put ashore the first day; it is true that the surf greatly hindered operations and smashed several boats. It was not until the 26th that the material was landed; but already some detachments had been put on the march, without order, taking the first road that came in sight, so that the army, whose objective was the capture of the heights commanding the entrance to Santiago, came out under the walls of the city. To complete the confusion, the inevitable quarrel arose between the Admiral and the General.
Nothing is more curious than the fact that this expedition, so badly organized and so badly led, was crowned with full success. At the moment when General Shafter, fearing disaster, was debating about re-embarking, Santiago, defended by fatuous generals, laid down its arms.
In the midst of all these shortcomings the American Squadron did its duty. Closely blockading Admiral Cervera, it assured the freedom of the sea and guaranteed the safety of the landing.
From the preceding examples we can deduce the general rules that should govern the transportation and disembarkation of an expeditionary corps when the sea is free.
The preparations require the constant cooperation of the army and the navy. It consists in the determination of the apportionment of the different bodies and of the several arms on board the ships, in order to be able to land them in a way that is logical and at the same time rapid; in the distribution of material to each transport, and in its stowage in such an orderly way that the articles immediately needed will arrive first on the beach; finally, in assembling the greatest possible number of means for landing. Nothing of all this can be improvised. It is work that demands long and painstaking application, and it ought to be prepared in times of peace, at least in its broad outlines.
The embarkation will always be easy because a closed port provided with wharves will be available. It will suffice to proceed with method, and to embark the material first in order to obviate the long standing about so wearisome to the personnel.
Let us now follow the convoy to sea. It will be escorted by all the warships that can be assembled; although we are supposing the sea free, it is always a matter of concern to have a strong escort. At the outset, freedom of the sea does not imply that the enemy has no longer a single ship in a condition to go to sea; it means simply that he is unable to put a sufficient force in line to inspire serious fears. One cannot, therefore, put a convoy at the mercy of a single cruiser, nor can one take too many precautions. Ships of war are well provided with means to facilitate the landing, and this is an added reason for increasing the strength of the escort.
In order to reduce the number of transports and to accelerate the landing, troops will be embarked on board the warships, excepting those of the light squadron that may be called upon to fulfill special missions. The Admiral will make of these naval vessels three parts; the first, composed of out-of-date ships will act as guides for the convoy, each serving as file leader for a given number of transports; the second, divided in groups if the convoy is numerous, will form the escort; the third, composed of light vessels, will remain available for any duty.
If the enemy is anticipating invasion it will be well to make a demonstration in order to divert his attention. Even though the defense may have enough perspicacity to doubt that it is more than a feint, it will none the less be obliged to guard against all eventualities.
The place of landing will be preferably a beach of large extent, and one that is not too near any large center. It would be of advantage to make use of a closed harbor, but the safe havens are generally provided with means of defense in civilized countries, and it is evident that a landing by main strength is to be avoided at all hazards. It is almost always necessary to be content with an open roadstead, and then weather conditions become an important factor; the state of the sea may necessitate the postponement of the landing for several days.
The landing is preceded by a reconnaissance made by a light vessel to be assured that the beach is easy of approach and has not been put in a state of defense.
A division composed entirely of warships will be the first to anchor. It will immediately land the covering force, an affair of a few minutes, and will mark the anchorage of the convoy. It is not desirable to make up the covering force from the (naval ships') landing companies. Besides the fact that sailors make indifferent soldiers, the men-of-war will need all their own complements for the discharge of the ships, and the service of the beach and of the boats.
After the convoy has anchored, the first division, as soon as its troops are landed, will get underway to do the same covering duty on the ocean side that the force landed by it has done on land.
The beach will be commanded by a naval officer, who will have flags placed to indicate the points where the boats of each transport shall land, and the points of assembly for the several corps. A mixed personnel placed at his disposition will give permanent directions to the detachments for their guidance as soon as they arrive at the beach.
As soon as this preliminary work has been done the landing of the troops will begin, the landing of the material in the lighters going on at the same time.
The rapidity of this operation will depend only upon the means at hand and upon the orderliness governing the general movement.
According to the indications of former expeditions, it may be reckoned that not less than three days will be required to land all the impedimenta of an army of more than 30,000 men. Nevertheless much time may be gained by constructing especial material for the purpose, and by numerous exercises in time of peace. As for the troops, they can be landed in a few hours.
This length of time, three days, gives an idea of the chances of an attack developing from the side of the sea. It is reasonable to admit that the enemy will hold his most important reserves near his own coast if he has naval forces at disposal and is in fear of invasion; in which case he will need little time to reach the landing place.
In the transportation of an expeditionary corps the navy comes in only to conduct the troops from one point to another; it is an intermediary. Delicate though its function may be, it is none the less a secondary one, and the principal objective must be attained by the land forces. It is therefore entirely natural that the supreme command should be lodged in the general. But, none the less, the admiral retains his independence in the execution of the program devolving upon him, which is: to take the troops at some given point and to set them down at another point.
Once the troops are embarked the admiral is responsible for their safety. He may be assailed from one moment to another by a tempest, that permanent enemy of the sailor; it is he alone then, that should regulate the order of sailing, give the route to be followed, and decide whether or not the time is fit for the landing. The general, on the contrary, finds himself on an element with which he is not familiar, and regrettable consequences might result if he undertook to impose his will.
We have seen in the expedition to Algiers a remarkable example of the situation that may arise for an admiral, due to the elements, and we believe that the bad part fell to the general commanding in chief, at least in this instance.
After all we may rest assured that the admiral will not delay needlessly on the way. The burden of conducting large assemblages of merchant ships is too thankless, and it demands too many precautions and cares, not to make one seek to reduce its duration to a strict minimum; and no time will be lost except in obedience to imperious necessity. Let it not be forgotten that there is a constant risk of collision among all these transports, strangers to squadron sailing, and that the admiral will count his ships every morning to assure himself that none has gone wrong during the night.
But though the admiral in his responsibility is free to conduct the fleet according to his own judgment, that is no reason to relegate the general to a merchant steamer, as was done in the last combined maneuvers. He is properly only a passenger, but he is none the less the commander-in-chief; and if he refrains from weighing upon the decisions of the commander of the fleet, he has the right to know what is going on, and the reasons for it. It is even to be desired that he have this knowledge in order to calm his impatience or his uneasiness. Moreover, circumstances may arise to impose a modification of the original program; the intervention of the commander-in-chief then becomes necessary. For example, if persistent winds make the landing place fixed upon unapproachable, it will be necessary to choose another. The admiral will then propose a new solution; but it ought to be accepted by the general, because a landing on hostile soil at one place or at another is not a matter of indifference from the military viewpoint. Again it may happen that the convoy is partly dispersed by gales. The admiral will tell the general the time he estimates necessary to gather in the wanderers, and it will be the general's duty to decide whether to land with his forces reduced, or to seek the vessels that have strayed, or finally to give up the enterprise.
In a word, the relations between the two chiefs should be permanent; and this is not possible unless they are on board the same ship. Can the possibility be admitted of their being separated by the chances of a sea voyage?
When combined operations have only a secondary importance, and admit only of reduced numbers, the action on land will no longer have a preponderating influence upon the issue of the war. It seems reasonable then to exchange parts and give to the navy the supreme direction. In a naval war nothing can be done without ships; in order not to compromise his naval forces in an isolated attack the decisions ought to be made by the naval commander who is informed about what is going on on the sea, and what commands the line of retreat.
It is astonishing what lamentable results have arisen simply from dissentions between the land and the sea commanders; and in this particular other nations have no reason to envy France. All these quarrels seem to us very paltry affairs, and it is to be regretted that an article has not been introduced in our Regulations to remind officers that the susceptibilities of individuals must yield to the good of the service and the end to be attained.