A Few Hints to the Study of Naval Tactics.
(SEE No. 125.)
Comdr. H.S. KNAPP, U.S. Navy. It is a healthy sign to find naval tactics the subject of the prize essay. Up to a recent time ours has been a single-ship navy, and it is necessarily an evolution to rise from thinking in terms of a single ship to thinking in terms of fleets. That evolution is well started, however, and papers like the prize essay will help it along. It is particularly gratifying to find that the essayist is an officer of a junior grade, for the hope of the navy rests in the coming generation.
If the following remarks in discussion seem generally to be in disagreement with positions taken by the essayist, I am sure he will welcome them just the same as an honest effort to reach proper conclusions on so important a subject.
The essayist's definition of "exact column" (page 2) is, to my mind, too inflexible, and the following expresses my conception better (the word "exact" should be eliminated as unnecessary). Column is that formation in which ships follow after the leader, each in the wake of its next ahead. By this definition the line of bearing may be a broken line, or a curved line if the leader makes continuous slight changes of course. In this latter case there is a very general failure to realize how slight the curvature is. With a 6000-yard battle range, two fleets of sixteen ships at 400 yards distance engaged in a parallel column fight, the speed of one fleet 20 per cent greater than the speed of the other, the slower steadily but very slowly changing course to keep the faster from capping, the faster doing the same thing to hold the range under these conditions the slower fleet occupies about 11.5 of arc on a circle of 30,000 yards radius, in other words the rear ship has the leader about one point on the bow. With such a slight curvature and that number of ships, any evolution can be performed that can be done from the so-called "exact column" having a straight line of bearing. As a matter of fact the essayist seems to have the same idea of column as myself (in the last line of page 3 and the two first lines of page 4), but it does not agree with his definition, nor with the definition to be found in authoritative publications, and this is why the matter is noted.
With the essayist's general conclusions about the merits of column, line and line of bearing there will probably be little dissent. In column the leader is responsible for the course and the maintenance of uniform speed. The rest have only to follow on and keep distance; they need no compass. Slight irregularities in steering become apparent at once, and correct themselves. Distance is easily kept without instruments by reason of the depth along the line of vision occupied by the ship ahead, and the many vertical objects in range along that line masts, ventilators, bridges and smokestacks. In line every ship must keep the course, preserve the distance, and preserve the line of bearing. Slight irregularities in steering are not at once apparent, and ships can get considerably out of position before the fact is noticed. Distances are hard to judge without instruments when looking broadside on to the guide. A compass in use on every ship is a necessity to keep any line of bearing whatever except column. It is even more difficult to keep a good formation in "line of bearing" (echelon it is a pity to drop the use of a word so fixed in our nomenclature) than in line. To change course in line or line of bearing, or to get from them into any other formation, requires either a simultaneous movement, involving signals, or else a change of speed. Change of speed is never necessary in column except to open or close distances; and changes of course need no signal, not even the whistle if the fleet is well trained. The advantages of column that have just been mentioned refer solely to station keeping; when to them is added the yet more important advantage of greater volume of fleet fire, the case in favor of the column seems to be proved.
The essayist commends line and line of bearing, and condemns column, for the approach. In general I agree, but with some reservations. First the period of approach should be defined as the period from the time hostile fleets know of one another's whereabouts until they reach effective range. When once within effective range, the period of action begins. Retreat and pursuit are phases of action; approach is antecedent to, but is not properly speaking a phase of, action. Using the term "approach" in this sense, and it seems the proper one, there is no apparent reason why any formation should not be used fleet column, column of squadrons or divisions, line, line of squadrons or divisions, or line of bearing. The only limitation is that the fleet should be in column, heading approximately at right angles to the bearing of the enemy, when it comes into effective range. If two fleets were to head directly for one another, or nearly so, as soon as they knew of one another's proximity, line or possibly line of bearing would be the natural way of approach. But there will probably be a deal of maneuvering for position, miles out of range, and it may be that one fleet will never go out of column, leaving to the other the maneuvering during approach. The weather vantage and sun gauge are worth trying for, although this is not always done in battle maneuvers; and while there may be exaggeration in the statement made in these pages some years ago that fleets may maneuver for days before getting into action, yet I believe that it is nearer the truth than the idea so often implied, if not expressed, that fleets are going to rush madly straight upon one another as soon as they get within sight. My reservations are made more to bring this out than for any other reason. Toward the end of the approach, if a fleet is itself trying to close with the enemy, I agree with the essayist that it should be in line; but I do not follow him in considering line of bearing a good formation then. Line is hard enough to keep; line of bearing is much worse, and the end of the approach is no time for disorder. I have personally seen in battle exercises one or two illustrations of the lamentable disorder that may result from line of bearing approach, and they have removed any prepossessions I may once have had for it.
On pages 10-13 the essayist draws comparisons between three methods of doing certain evolutions, in which he introduces a consideration of gun fire. The reason for this is somewhat difficult to see, as none of the evolutions, possibly excepting the last, would be excusable if done within gunfire. And I confess to a certain amount of impatience at seeing the "special method" for the first two evolutions brought into the comparison. Such tactical gymnastics are possible on paper, but in my opinion they are impracticable on the sea with real ships, and would be foolhardy if attempted under fire. The "special method" for the third evolution has value, though in reality it is only a modification of the "direct method." It would be valuable in taking up the pursuit under some circumstances, and it is the common-sense method as opposed to the "direct method," which slows the leader.
This seems to be an appropriate place to express an opinion of many years' growth about the direct, really oblique, method, which is open to two grave objections; it is generally slower than the rectangular method, which entails being longer in a broken formation; and it requires changes of speed. To these must be added a third objection when evolutions from line to column are considered their danger though this does not hold in evolutions from column to line. The first two objections are sufficient in themselves to condemn the method generally. In evolutions from line to column the third objection should clinch the argument. I hope yet to see the method expunged from our fleet drills. If that is expecting too much, I yet venture to hope that the direct method of going from line into column may be discontinued. There is quite enough to do in getting a fleet so that it can follow the leader and perform rectangular movements perfectly without burning coal and using valuable time in doing evolutions of a kind that are obviously inferior.
On page 16 of the essay two laws are formulated that are said to govern the maneuvers of two squadrons within fighting range. The statement of the first is open to objection; it fits perfectly the most disadvantageous position when one's own fleet is in line and is capped by the enemy in column. I should prefer a statement of the law, if law be the proper word to use, something as follows: The advantageous position is that in which one's own line of bearing produced does not pass through the enemy's formation and his line of bearing produced does pass through one's own formation. The nearer the lines of bearing are at right angles the better, and the nearer to the center of one's formation the place where the enemy's line of bearing pierces the better. This statement is true irrespective of the character of the fire, broadside or end on. It is, of course, only an ideal, for if the enemy knows his business he will never be caught in such a predicament; and in maneuvering to avoid it the second law given by the essayist, which is really only a corollary of the first as here stated, will come into play, and there will be a parallel fight, which will almost certainly be a column fight. There is a rule of conduct resulting from reasoning and reinforced by game-board practice, that applies to the maneuvers of two squadrons within fighting range, and that may be expressed as follows: Maneuver as little as possible when once within range. Changes of speed, of heading and of formation, all tend to derange fire control. The game-board axiom is slangily expressed by saying that the player who "does stunts" under fire gets whipped.
I cannot in the least agree with the following sentence, to be found on page 20: "The foregoing examples have been those that will be most frequently met with during the engagement at medium ranges" (italics mine). With skilful adversaries such examples will rarely, if ever, be met within effective range, let alone medium range.
Within a day or so it has come to my knowledge that an officer of excellent judgment, who has had unusual opportunities for observation, has stated in effect that he regards as a very serious handicap a breeze of about 15 knots velocity from the bow opposite to the firing battery. He states that smoke from the guns hangs in front of the target, that hot gases in line cause erratic shooting, and that the smoke from the boilers often almost obscures the target. If this observation is confirmed by general experience it will have a great bearing on the value of the weather vantage, which I have hitherto estimated much as the essayist does, and have regarded as distinctly an advantage. Similarly the use of colored shades may obviate the disadvantage of having to face the sun glare. At the same time, if I were going into action to-day I should prefer a position to windward and to seaward of my enemy, as the essayist does.
On page 33 the essayist considers "the automobile torpedo as having a maximum range of 3000 yards." This is so wide of the range obtained by recent designs that the figures must be a misprint.
The distinguished Vice-Admiral Colomb has given one such excellent reason why there should be a well founded body of opinion upon tactical matters that I will close these remarks by a short quotation from a lecture that he wrote as long ago as 1871 on the subject of The Attack and Defence of Fleets. He says: "I believe that we are not sufficiently alive to the fact that the current view of the attack and defence of fleets is the foundation of all design in naval materiel." Again: "He (the naval officer) first forms views of the attack and defence, and these find expression afterwards (author's italics) in material products. If his original idea is crude, unthought out, above all, if there are diversities of ideal, the results in a material form will give rise to vague uncertainties, and useless discussions, such as those by which we find ourselves now surrounded."
Captain E.B. BARRY, U.S. Navy. Academically this essay is excellent, but some things in it do not appeal to me as convincing.
I am glad to notice the introduction of the time element. This does not often appear in print though we made much use of it in the Atlantic fleet at times when our muck rake critics would have the guileless American public believe we were idling away our winters doing nothing.
The writer tells us groups shorten the formation by increasing the depth and he adds that the group ships nearest the enemy are at a shorter mean range than the mean range of any ship in the column formation. This is a strong argument for the column to concentrate on the salient ships of the groups, but no mention seems to be made of it.
I do not like the use of the term "line of bearing" in defining exact column. It is evident that the author wishes to separate his formations into two clearly defined and, so to speak, primary formations defining themselves; exact column and line; also a third formation that is to embrace everything else; hence column should be defined without the use of the term "line of bearing." Exact column: two or more ships following one another at a given distance apart on a straight line passing fore and aft through their keels.
The area of full broadside fire is limited practically by the extreme train aft of the forward gun of the head of the column and the extreme train forward of the after gun of the rear ship of the column.
The half angle LGA in Plate II should have been drawn from the bow of No. 2 and should be parallel to BH.
Line should be defined similarly to exact column. Line: Two or more ships steering the same course at a given distance apart on a line passing athwart their middles at right angles to the course.
In Plate III, the line BIA is correctly the practical half angle if measured from the forward gun of the second ship clear of K's bow.
The rectangular method is opposed to the oblique. The definition of special methods should read "The aim is to reach the new formation by some method not laid down in tactics." This is the favorite ground for the academic specialist. Any series of turns and twists dangerous or not, by which some standard change of formation can be done away with is truly and indeed a special method. These methods are perfect when executed with gigantic battleships two or three inches in length on a game board where the mighty ocean is varnish and the speed is regulated by the same agility that governs the king's movement in chess! It is vastly different when these academicians are put to doing the real things in a ten to twenty thousand ton battleship; then special methods are forgotten and we return to our mutton.
In Plate VI I notice the oblique to form column is executed correctly and not as given in a former treatise. The only so-called special method that is safe by which column could be formed more quickly on any designated vessel, would be by increased speed to her left or right as the signal might call for. For example, to form column to the front on No. 6, when the signal of execution is hauled down No. 6 holds course and speed, vessels to the right slow and oblique, but Nos. 7 and 8 take full speed and sheer in ahead of No. 6 in succession. The ships will not be thrown out of formation, there will be no danger and the head of the column will be steadied before the rear ship has entered the formation.
It is difficult to understand what is to be gained by the special method of Plate VII. What is "slightly reduced speed?" It may be half, or slow, or it may be a decrease of one or two revolutions, no such term is possible in fleet tactics. If a special method must be required to form column from the center, let the first division execute ships right (Plate VII) and oblique to the right at reserve speed taking standard in succession at the proper time, while the second division executes column right. The first division will not interfere with gun fire and will be in station before the eighth ship is steadied on the new course; there is less swinging around, less interference with the steadiness of guns' crews, and the ships remain in natural order.
In the special method of forming a line of bearing from column and also in the direct method, there is no reason for slowing the head of the column; if the rear ships take reserve speed the formation will be attained with much greater facility.
I cannot accept as stated the first law governing maneuvers of two squadrons within fighting range.
The most advantageous position is column, broadside fire bearing, and perpendicular to the enemy's line of bearing. There are other advantageous positions, by which is meant that one squadron is better situated than the other, but there is only one most advantageous position.
In Plate IX, if the squadrons are in fighting range "A" does not want to cross ahead of "B." Before the leading ship reaches the prolongation of "B's" line of bearing, "A" should take half speed and destroy the head of "B's" column. It seems well to add that a fleet or squadron getting into "B's" fix deserves to be destroyed.
The rest of these cases are admirably stated.
I do not quite agree with the imaginary battle. I should have stood off to the northward to draw "A" in that direction, and when just out of range form column heading about west. If "A" engaged it must be on equal terms in parallel column, but "A" first would have to come about and "B" might force the passage.
In the engagement as depicted, when "A" swings into line to close the range, if there is any fight or hitting power left in "B" he should be able to defeat "A" during the time "A" is "swinging" and in line, while his volume of fire is reduced about two thirds. This maneuver would correspond exactly with the Chinese tactics at the battle of the Yalu. "A's" proper move is head of column right clear of the shore.
The remarks on the weather and wind are admirable, except that the fourth point, relating to gun fire efficiency, requires but one answer stop the firing. The advantage of steadying the gun's crews will more than compensate for the loss of fire during a period that must of necessity be very short.
Under concentration of fire I cannot agree exactly with the essayist. In the first place concentration of fire should be defined as fire from ships in fleet or squadron when the fire of more than one ship is directed simultaneously at one or more enemy ships.
Napoleon's victories were gained by concentration of forces and that brought about concentration of fire, and that is all that numbers ever bring about at the point of superiority. Presumably two soldiers each armed with a musket attacking one soldier armed with one musket will defeat him, so also fifty thousand men attacking twenty or thirty thousand men should defeat them. Napoleon's genius usually brought this about.
I think the conclusions follow from the premises in every case cited, but are the premises correct? I doubt if any admiral would concentrate the fire, let us say of eight ships, on one ship of the enemy leaving seven unattacked to work their will. I think my reply would be to concentrate two and two on his four leaders and knock them out just about the time my one ship got used up. Probably my uninjured seven would defeat his uninjured three.
When we get to the selection of a target we come to an ancient idea, modernized. The only man aboard ship capable of handling her in battle is the ordnance officer. "He must be thoroughly familiar with the tactics of the commander-in-chief and must duly consider the chances of a change of course or formation." What is the captain doing all this time? Poor useless animal, responsible for the failure and praised for success, this pale ghost of command will be better employed tending the wounded.
When we compare the essayist's ideas of concentration with his account of the battle of Tsushima I fail to see one idea of concentration as given by him as applying to the battle. In fact, I draw the inference that the Japanese won because they made use of concentration. Napoleon once more.
The torpedo part of the essay is most interesting and Plates XIII and XIV are diagrams well worth study. I cannot reconcile myself to any such situation arising as is depicted in Plate XV except for purposes of illustration.
Eight ships on a 45 line of bearing to eight ships in a column could not blame the column if it changed course. There is no use in going to a lot of trouble to get into a nasty fix and then taking more trouble to stay in it. The same remarks apply to Plate XVI, Fig. 2.
In the fleet evolutions the importance of the time element is well shown. Sufficient weight has not been given this in most discussions, but its importance was recognized years ago by the practical workers under Admiral Evans and to some extent even before his time.
The general scope of the essay and the topic chosen are admirable, and had the application of geometry been limited to the torpedo work, I think the essay would have been vastly improved.
The author, Lieutenant W.S. Pye, U.S.N., is to be congratulated on his essay.
Commander W.R. RUSH, U.S. Navy. Once again, in this article, are we confronted with a clear and able presentation of the virgin truths of the Fleet Drill Book and the Game Board; nailed to the mast tight enough this time by appeal to Commander Niblack and Lieutenant Dewar, as authorities regarding these truths; and, in the humble opinion of the writer, there are no greater authorities living.
Referring to page 34 of the essay, it is submitted that: the course of firing ships needs not to be considered, owing to ability to train torpedo in azimuth, and to ability to swing ships to the course necessary for firing torpedoes. The curved fire torpedo has not yet been developed to that degree which will result in its adoption by any navy, although it is in course of rapid development.
And again, page 37, Plate XV: The ships in column are more exposed to torpedo fire than those of the line of bearing in the lead.
By drawing to scale, and allowing a speed of 15 knots for both fleets, and with torpedo ranges given, no ship of the line of bearing in the lead is in torpedo range of the fleet in column; whereas all of the ships in column are in torpedo range of the left two of the line of bearing in the lead, and three of the ships in column are within torpedo range of five of the ships in line of bearing in the lead.
Yet we may ask, what matters it to the busy student, to be told that on the game board, you can actually get two divisions, in column at distance, into a two point echelon in so many minutes and so many seconds?
You couldn't do it at all in battle, and you wouldn't want it then, according to the writer's lights, especially if you were confronted by a live enemy in column. It is admitted without question that the whirls and twirls of the fleets on paper, or on the game board, are most interesting to watch, and this elementary study is most absorbing; but, as in the case with other like indoor games and puzzles, while they interest us and fascinate our attention for a season, we tire of them; of their limitations, their unproductiveness.
How much, I pray you, of equestrianism for example, or rowing can you learn from pictures in a book written on these subjects; and moreover, suppose if you please, you do learn the book, do you find that it has taught you that which pleases you most, or that which you find you want when once astride your mount, or finally settled in your boat?
I submit that all is different then; your eye and hand have different guidance; all the externals of reality exert an influence upon you and upon your every action, and, thus, unconsciously perhaps, is skill implanted in you and your mature judgment formed aright.
And so it is in the study of squadron battle tactics, the surroundings of reality, as in war, or the simulation of this reality, in peace preparation for war must ever be sought, and found too, if it is possible so to do; and therein, it is submitted, lies the true means of education in tactics.
Let us struggle no more with the fluttering candle of theory, to light the subject of naval battle tactics; switch on the search-lights the big fellows all of them. The fleet, squadron and division commanders are those to whom we rightly look for light on battle tactics; with their experience, skill, and the material at hand, what satisfying results can be obtained, what splendid battle tactics made possible.
No, you say, we must creep before we can walk! Eh bien, if so be, that we are really not yet "walking" in tactics, then hurrah, for a good creep, but first of all let us creep off the game board and overboard.
We must not stay on the game board unless we are going to fight our enemies there; we must do our creeping on the water now, in order that, later we may walk upon it with faith and confidence. Aye, with more faith than the apostle of old ever had in his Lord and Master; for we are destined to, and must, finally walk and run, and even fight on the water.
To creep with success we must have some small squadrons of some small ships to devote to, and to expend, if necessary, in the practice of fleet battle tactics. They must be small—but not too small—in order that our falls and tumbles may not be too hazardous of life, or too expensive to afford.
Can this be done?
It can, and in this way; in Manila Bay we have the finest body of water in the whole world, in which to exercise our squadrons, with the accompaniment of an equable and healthful climate, and perfect weather conditions for by far the greater part of the year.
At Manila and Cavite we have divisions and squadrons of vessels, more or less in and out of commission, with some of their kind, at more or less peaceful rest on the bosom of Chinese waters. By name, a few of these are Elcano, Quiros, Mindoro, Pampanga, Panay, Mariveles, Samar, and Villalobos; and there are others of the coast guard service, swelling the total into two homogeneous squadrons. Here at last is homogeneity!
Homogeneous in point of small size, great age and general worthlessness in war, but, indeed, very worthy and of great use in the golden hours of preparation for war.
How?
In this way; organize all these boats into two squadrons composing a battle tactics fleet of evolution, attached to, and under the command of the senior naval officer in command on the station. The personnel of this fleet to consist of a commander, an officer or petty officer in command of each boat, and a small Filipino crew; lay down moorings for every one of them, and establish a system of coal and repair supply, to have the right-of-way, and woe to him who should, innocently or guiltily tie up the fleet of evolution with red tape! It should be always ready for use; ready to slip and do a day's steaming at its own standard speed; and, if not ready, the commander of the laggard must tell why in open court.
This evolutionary fleet would then be the Tactical School of the Fleet!
The detail for any day should consist of squadron, division and ship commanders, their staffs and assistants; they should board their commands in the morning, and moor them at night before returning to their ships.
Tactical exercises, battle tactical exercises not "Cipher A" drill, should be set by the senior naval officer in command on the station to be worked over, and a succinct report of the day's work, after the manner of reporting an engagement, should be submitted to him by the squadron commanders at close of day.
Here are the boats and the bay; the officers and the men and the pressing need; we lack the spirit, the organizers and the money.
Can we have these?
Courage and Prudence.
(SEE No. 125.)
Rear-Admiral C.M. CHESTER, U.S. Navy. I have read with much interest, the article in the March number of the PROCEEDINGS, entitled, "Courage and Prudence," and am glad that an officer of Captain Fiske's ability, has had the moral courage to set forth the war side of the gun-fire practice of our fleet with so much force. I have often heard it said, that in the next great naval battle a few strenuous moments may make or ruin a nation, that the commander-in-chief of the fleet, will have more need for moral than for physical courage, which latter quality most men possess naturally. He must battle against an ever present fear of being seen inside a conning-tower, where should be the paraphernalia for handling the force, much more than that of being struck down by an enemy's shell, particularly as under the present arrangements of our ships, he is not expected to be located therein.
On the other hand, the man in the fire-control party stationed in the fighting top of a ship in battle, with duties that preclude his taking advantage of that best antidote for cowardice work for mind and body need have no fear of his courage being questioned if he so controls his nerves as to be able to carry on uninterruptedly, the important duties of observing the fall of shots. To show that this may be no easy matter, I will relate a story of the Civil War, that seems to cover the case. A prominent officer of our navy, whose courage has been tested in more battles than are likely to fall to the share of any officer of the present generation, was at the time the young executive officer of a ship, engaged, in the Mississippi river, in that strategic game that Farragut originated of running by batteries on the land. He and his captain, also a man of much experience, were on the bridge of the ship while the enemy's shot and shell went screeching over them. The captain, entirely unconscious of his own movements when the shot came near, noticing a slight tendency to stoop before the oncoming missiles, on the part of his executive officer, jokingly said to him "What are you stooping for?" The junior's reply was made with some feeling to the effect that his statue had not altered so much as a hair's breadth; and after the next shot which passed but a short distance above their heads, he recovered somewhat quicker than did his captain, who was found still in a yielding position, and immediately retaliated by saying "Captain, have you lost anything?" The ludicrousness of the situation then struck them both simultaneously, and they broke out into a hearty laugh. It is said that Admiral Farragut himself, once hearing a young officer chide a subordinate for dodging, said to him, "Do not rebuke a man for that as long as he comes into action in plenty of time. I dodge myself." He could, soon after, however, upon receiving a report that a shell had become jammed in the muzzle of one of the guns, go to the division of this same officer, and after directing him to send all his men to a safe distance, pull the lock string himself which fired the gun in this precarious condition.
I am inclined, therefore, to agree with Captain Fiske that we may expect the fire-control party, in battle, if stationed as at present, to show a disposition to make themselves small when shell are bursting around them, even if they escape being burned to a crisp by the flame from the shells, and so unconsciously, perhaps, the reliability of their work may be affected.
I have watched with great interest and admiration, the wonderful improvement of our men in shooting at a target, but nevertheless have been somewhat concerned regarding the record they will make in actual conflict with an enemy, and am quite in accord with practically all that Captain Fiske has said on the subject. I maintain, as I did when this work was first begun, that the system now in vogue, does not fully meet the conditions of war service, and that some additional practice should be introduced to prepare for this eventuality. A number of officers, to whom I have expressed my fears, have invariably said, that the present drills were only preliminary, and that when the men were well founded in the details, battle practice would be taken up. As, however, the crews of our ships are constantly shifting, and new material is brought behind the gun, it is doubtful if they will ever reach the graduating class, under our present system of drills.
It seems to me, therefore, an absolute necessity that drills should be carried on at sea as well as in port, and as far as gun practice is concerned the latter should predominate, if we are to thoroughly prepare for fleet actions of the future. It may be admitted, as stated by Captain Fiske, that our gun pointers will shoot better in rough water, by practicing in smooth water, than if they do not practice at all; but it must also be admitted that, as a rule, they cannot reach a high degree of perfection in war service, unless some supplemental practice to that now in vogue is undertaken, that shall be in line with the probable conditions of battle.
Harbor practice educates the eye only, while sea practice calls into operation the good qualities of the eye, as well as quick and efficient judgment, for which our men have been noted from, time immemorial, and which is more essential to-day than ever before. The one service calls for firing, practically from a steady platform at a stationary object as does the rifleman at the butts, and marksmen of this character may be formed in an incredibly short space of time, as experience will show; but men who are limited to the latter practice cannot become good wing shots, and no more can our smooth-water marksmen become qualified to fight battles at sea without other practice than that afforded by our present system. This difference in marksmanship is well understood by sportsmen, many of whom, though expert in rifle shooting, to which our smooth-water practice assimilates, regard it as a waste of time to try to shoot birds on the wing. They have no aptitude for it whatever.
It is always an easy matter, however, to criticize, and quite difficult to suggest a remedy, but while subject to the call of "chestnut," I venture to again bring up the subject of sub-caliber practice at sea, as a good supplemental drill for those now in use.
It has the merit of cheapness at all events, and will add one more lesson to the school of the gun, that will in no wise detract from present methods. Of course it is understood that this drill has not been entirely cancelled from the service, but it seems to be so little used to-day as to gain nothing from it.
From the time Admiral Luce, with his able assistant, Lieutenant Meigs, first introduced systematic target practice into the North Atlantic squadron and into the navy, I have seen so much benefit derived from the use of sub-caliber practice that I feel warranted in urging that more of it should take place from our ships. Whenever I have had the power I have required that a portion of each day, when ships were at sea, should be given up to target practice, leaving for the much longer time when at anchor, the drills that could be carried on better there.
Under this rule, the U.S.S. Kentucky, on a voyage from New York to Manila, missed only two days from the routine of sub-caliber target practice while at sea, and this was during a gale of wind of such force that a trans-Atlantic liner, near us, raced out one of her propellers. A number of targets were put overboard at such times and for about one hour the ship steamed around them firing all the guns fitted with sub-calibers. The exercise was frequently closed by a round of full service charges, to give the full effect of firing in battle, and there was expended during the trip something like 100,000 charges of 45-caliber and one-pounder ammunition besides all the quarterly allowance of full service ammunition. The crew thus had the benefit of continuous drills under all conditions of wind and sea, which, besides accustoming the men to the sea habit, trained their eyes, judgment, and nerve as well.
While upon this subject I will add that, as it was necessary for all gun ports to be kept open during the drills, not only the men, but the ship as well, were tried under sea conditions. The result was to settle to my satisfaction at least, and I think also to the others on board, the question of the adaptability of our low free-board class of ships for war purposes, a question that while it was in its infancy at the time (1900) was more discussed than at present. To be sure, in extreme cases water might enter the ship through exposed ports, but it was found that under average conditions, in which battles are likely to take place, the Kentucky, a vessel that represents a type of vessel of minimum free-board, was fully prepared for a contest with an enemy at sea, even though there might be a slight risk of some of the men getting wet at such times.
As experience is the best teacher I will mention one other event relating to sub-caliber work, which I found to be beneficial to the ships concerned and perhaps it may be interesting to the readers of the Proceedings of the society. This related to preparations for the Spanish War by the South Atlantic squadron then under my command. While the three vessels composing the squadron had been extensively engaged in target practice during their stay in port, they also kept the drills when proceeding at full speed across the Caribbean Sea to join the force of the North Atlantic squadron. During the run each vessel towed a small target astern at which the sub-calibers of the consorts kept up a continuous fire from early morning till late at night, the ships being formed in double column for the purpose. So much for sea practice.
Confirming the conclusions of Captain Fiske (from some experience with the stadimeter, that perhaps would antedate his) that "any plan whatever by which fire control in battle is attempted from exposed positions, must lead us to hopeless and complete disaster," I might refer to a plan for fire control which I know to be in existence that would perhaps meet the conditions of war better than the one he proposes. It has not been submitted to the service as a whole, through fear, I imagine, of a similar experience to that related by the captain, when an excellent suggestion relating to a conning-tower supporting a roof through which a periscope projected, was dismissed with the extraordinary statement that "the mirrors would distort the image." When it is remembered that experiences of this kind have been so common that a prominent cabinet officer, in a speech delivered to the graduating class of the Revenue Marine Service, in 1900, could say "In one of these departments, I will not say which (the which, however, was published), we court-martial subordinates for having ideas," may we not hope that Captain Fiske's efforts for the good of the service may result in a change in this system of condemning suggestions without investigation as well as in the target practice and fire control system.
Lieut.-Comdr. YATES STIRLING, JR., U.S. Navy. Captain Fiske's article in the March issue of the INSTITUTE should furnish much food for thought to not only officers of the service, but to those in the national congress of our country. In a republic such as ours it seems unlikely that we shall ever be in the strictest sense of the word "prepared" for war.
Protection of the Compass. The plan proposed is good, the service must by this time appreciate how handicapped it will be in battle without a compass to steer by, for those unprotected will not be of service.
Fire Control. The author clearly shows the faults in the present system, and claims his plan will eliminate them, yet to correct his range finder he resorts to spotting, the very thing he so forcibly condemns.
Range Finders. The short base range finders installed on our ships have been almost universally condemned by officers of the fleet. The principal objections seem to be:
- Short base compared to the great range of battle.
- Unreliability due to changes caused by temperature.
- Jarring out of adjustment by discharge of firing.
- Vibration caused by machinery at high speeds.
- The necessity of cool, calm observation for accuracy, a condition of observer rarely found in action.
Probably the first three objections can be overcome by careful workmanship and by making the range finder solid enough, but the fourth and fifth cannot be eradicated so easily.
Captain Fiske says his range finder has but an error of 1 per cent, this is from observations on shore or on board ship at anchor in smooth water. However, that it can be made so accurate rules out Objection 1. Objection 2, I believe, can be corrected by the use of metals with different expansions. Objection 3 can be cast away by making the instrument as strong and solid as we have the telescope sight. Objection 4 may be lessened by mounting the range finder on a heavy mass of metal like a turret, as the inventor suggests. Objection 5 can be controlled by laboriously training certain men to use the instrument. In time their acquired expertness may overrule the objection.
The plea of an inventor who has produced so many valuable implements for the navy should not be cast thoughtlessly aside. Remember the resistance against his telescope sight at its inception! If we regard critically Captain Fiske's inventions, where has he failed to succeed eventually? Some are now so much improved upon that we have lost sight of the fact he was the originator of the idea, and in every case the active support of the officers of the service was withheld. When the invention was crowned with success, our forgetful navy forgot even to give him his share of the praise.
Now with these lessons before us, would it not be wise to give his range finder a hearing? Not by a star chamber board of so-called experts but by building such a range finder on the turret of a modern battleship and allowing her to compete in moderately rough water with a similar battleship provided with but the instruments which we have already.
Before the test can be made the observers must be given at least a month's training. Use a moving target at 7000 yards, have all the officers of the fleet observe the test and make reports. Allow the navy to select the instrument which it believes is better.
Even if the plan of Captain Fiske's is condemned by the officers of the fleet, if the range finder is found even half as accurate as he claims, it will be a valuable adjunct to the projector, for by tracking the enemy the two unknown quantities needed by the projector (course and speed of the enemy) will be known with greater accuracy than by means of the "vernier eye."
Conning-towers. The periscope idea for use with a conning-tower, even if it may have many disadvantages such as becoming befogged by spray from short shots of the enemy, is well worth a trial. At present in every ship we have the conning-tower is no more than so much extra metal. With a periscope it would immediately become serviceable, and at an expense ridiculously small.
Professor PHILIP R. ALGER, U.S. Navy. Captain Fiske has set forth very clearly the difficulties and disadvantages of the system of fire control at present used in our own and the British Navy. It can hardly be gainsaid that the results obtained with this system under target practice conditions are no criterion of what can be accomplished with the same system in action and with the ordinary weather conditions of the high seas.
Would it not be well, without further delay, to determine by actual trial to what extent gun-fire can be accurately regulated at 5000 to 7000 yards range in a moderate sea? There need not be competition between ships, but a selected ship could compete against her own previous record in smooth water. A single test might demonstrate the impracticability of the method of vertical spotting; without such a test we may continue indefinitely possessed of a false belief in our gunnery efficiency.
A Japanese naval officer who went through both the battle of August 10 and that of the Sea of Japan said to me, in a discussion of this subject, "the best system of fire control is a good range finder," and I must confess that that has always been, and is now, my own opinion. The principal objection to dependence upon a range finder is the alleged inaccuracy and want of reliability of such instruments. But has a really serious attempt been made to construct an accurate and reliable range finder? The problem of range finding is merely the problem of measuring a small angle; there is no mystery about it; it is a question of good mechanical design and of extremely careful workmanship. If the government will pay the money it can get range finders which are many times more accurate and many times more reliable than the human eye. No amount of training will get around the inherent deficiency of the eye as a distance-measuring instrument, and the various methods which apparently increase its accuracy are but tricks that fool the unreflecting.
I am aware that at present it is thought necessary to calibrate guns before target practice in order to determine the difference between the true range and the sight-bar range, and that the existence of this difference is thought to be a bar to the sole use of a range-finder, however accurate, in regulating gun-fire. But let me point out that the variation in range at the same elevation on different occasions is due to removable causes, while the errors of the eye in spotting are unavoidable.
Variations in weight of shell, and in weight of charge, and above all insufficient rotating bands, have caused excessive variations in the range from round to round, but these defects have been largely eliminated, with the result that the hits of an accurately pointed gun can now be counted upon to bunch close together. Similarly, increased uniformity in manufacture, increased care to secure uniform conditions of moisture and temperature in storage, and more accurate sight graduations will result in greater uniformity of range for the same sight-bar setting on different occasions and with different guns. If as great pains are taken to eliminate these differences as have been taken to correct for them, I predict that the time will very soon come when an accurate range finder and means of transmitting its results to the guns will constitute not only the best but a truly efficient fire-control system.
Aids to Contentment in the Navy.
(SEE No. 123.)
Ensign R.R. RIGGS, U.S. Navy. The last line of the following paragraph, quoted from "Aids to Contentment in the Navy" in No. 123 of the PROCEEDINGS, is my excuse for relating a personal experience.
"It has been suggested, as an expedient that has worked well in practice on board a certain torpedo destroyer, that an excellent form of punishment is in withholding some of a man's pay by 'classing him.' This is of the nature of a fine, while not taking actually from him that which" is his. The gangway, in this case, is still free. I would like to hear from my brother officers on this point."
During the greater part of the year 1906 and part of 1907 I had command of the gunboat Arayat, cruising in Philippine waters. I had no master-at-arms, (and of course no marines), no brig, and I was very seldom where there were enough commissioned officers to hold a summary court-martial. I had a small compartment opening off the engine-room that could be used for a brig in case of necessity, but I did not like to do so as the absence of electric fans made the ventilation very bad at the best, and when under way the heat was intolerable. On some of the gunboats of the same type, the captains used the lazaret under the quarterdeck as a brig, but I never did so as the place was so small that a man could not stand upright. Our sources of amusement in the southern islands were very limited and the duty often got very monotonous, so I felt that deprivation of liberty was a real hardship, and I also felt that with so small a ship and crew, restriction would cause undue discontent, which would be easily caught by the men not being punished. Therefore I made it a rule that men would be deprived of liberty only for two offences overstaying leave and drinking on board ship. In this way I found myself, with very little experience to guide me, confronted with the problem of keeping up discipline and of finding some legal and practicable means of punishing offenders.
In the first place, I went on the assumption that liberty was a right and not a privilege, and that if there were no reason for a man to be on board ship, there was every reason for his being ashore. The petty officers were given a free gangway, and those who were required aboard for duty knew it as well as an officer would, and stayed. The crew were divided into two liberty sections and all of one of these sections were put on the liberty list every day, one taking the odd and the other the even days. If any man desired to go ashore on any day but his own, he had simply to give in his name before one o'clock each day. The only reason that they were not all put down each day, or given a free gangway, was that in case there was any work to be done requiring a certain number of men to be on board, there could be no question as to who they should be. Every pay day, the men were given 48 hours' liberty without asking for it, so that in case they decided not to come back in the morning, they did not have to do so. In this way they spent their money in a day or two, and I could hardly drive them off the ship for the rest of the month. Sometimes I had almost to order them on hunting or swimming parties, to get them off the ship, to keep them from hating themselves, and me, and the ship, and all concerned. This worked so well that, with one exception that I will speak of later, I never had a man as much as 20 minutes over time. The one exception was a man that came to me from the Ohio when she went home. His record was one list of "over leave," "absent without leave," "drunk on board ship," "Striking master-at-arms," etc. ad infinitum. Why he was ever sent to such a ship I cannot imagine. I had a rule which I explained to all newcomers, that if a man came to the ship classed, he would be advanced one class each month, but so long as he behaved he would receive first class privileges in the meantime. This man came to the ship third class, and the first thing he did was to overstay his liberty four and one-half hours. I gave him the regular punishment, reduction of one class, which made him fourth class, and he, thinking that he had been much abused, by not being second class, proceeded to get full on board. I telegraphed for his detachment, and received an affirmative answer the next day. As he was the only one who ever broke his liberty, and as he was the only one of the crew I ever saw drunk either ashore or on board, I never had to restrict a single man. I hit upon the expedient of the torpedo-boat officer that you quoted—that of simply holding up the pay of classed men, and nothing more. In all the time that I was in command, I assigned but 18 punishments, and practically all of these were little errors of omission, not commission, which could not be overlooked and had to go on the man's record, but did not require much punishment. And this was with a crew that had a very bad name when I joined the ship.
Much of this success, however, was due to the petty officers. I gave them officers' privileges and expected an officer's sense of duty from them. I said that if anything went wrong on board ship I would hold them absolutely responsible. The mere fact of their knowing nothing about it would not be accepted as an excuse; the ship was so small that if they did their duty they would be sure to know about it. I told them that I had made them, and I could and would break them, and get men that I could trust. I never found a case where they failed me.
Ordinarily I do not like the idea of holding back a man's pay and even doubt the legality of it, but in the position in which I found myself, it was the lesser of the evils provided for in the regulations. It worked to perfection on this small ship, where we had paternal government, but for all ships, fines would be infinitely preferable to confinement. To put a man in irons in a cell for something that is not a crime is enough to make a criminal of many men, and petty officers in particular lose prestige by it. Fines would not only not injure a man's self-respect, but in most cases they would remove the source of the evil.
The Money for the Navy.
(SEE No. 125.)
Naval Constructor THOMAS F. RUHM, U.S. Navy. The various papers by Mr. Mudd, on this and kindred subjects, have been read by me with the greatest interest and appreciation of the masterly manner in which Mr. Mudd handles his subject; but there are certain features which viewed from a purely professional standpoint, I think are open to some criticism; and others which, to be accurately understood, require some additional information.
(1) The criticisms of the cumbersome wording of appropriation bills is well founded; a simplification thereof could be possibly brought about by legislation definitely and in detail fixing the division of the various features of ship work among the several technical bureaus. Such division is now dependent on more or less vague articles of the navy regulations which are subject to indefinite changes from time to time by the powers that be. It is natural that each bureau should be desirous of having its part of the appropriation bill worded so as to avoid, as far as possible, later discussion as to which bureau has cognizance over any particular article or auxiliary.
(2) The criticisms of the Bureau C. & R. control of the "kinds, quantities and style of so many articles of ships' equipage, and supplies" are misleading. The complement of the ship is fixed by the proper authority, and the outfit is based thereon the basis being so many of each article to so many men—this basis being the result of information gathered from those using the articles. The type is also based on experience, but there are more differences of opinion regarding type than quantity. In any group of officers will be found differences of opinion on most simple articles: the chair that suits the doctor might not suit the paymaster the selection of either might not suit the admiral.
The statement "'Ship Construction' has no more right from the viewpoint of economical efficiency, to have complete control of an important portion of the sea allowance than it has to determine the size of the paymaster's safe, or the quantity of paregoric to be carried in the sick bay chest" is true, but its use is misleading. There are, first, certain articles of ship equipage which depend on the design of the parts with which such equipage is used; second, articles of equipage for use of the personnel; third, spares; and fourth, supplies for use in connection with various sorts of ship's work or repairs performed on board. The articles of the first sort are fixed by the nature of the part with which used, for instance, chain-chocks, anchor bars, wrenches, etc.; those of the second sort are based on the number of the personnel ; those of the third and fourth sorts on the quantities shown by experience to have been necessary. Granting to the "trade" ordinary common sense, who better than that "trade" could, from experience with ships coming to the yards for repairs and with requisitions submitted from time to time by ships in commission, and from criticisms of those using the appliances on ships, prepare an allowance for a ship. It is easy to criticize, and well-based criticism should always be heeded, but it is more difficult to originate. Should the ordnance officer draw up the construction allowance? the equipment officer the ordnance? or should each draw up that which his "trade" brings him in touch with? or should the pay officer draw up all? Each allowance is just as much an expression of service experience and necessity as is the quantity of clothing and small stores, and the nature of the provisions carried by the pay department.
(3) Was not the Bureau of Yards and Docks right in objecting to the purchase of the motor truck for the general store-keeper? If each department of the yard had its own motor trucks, its own cranes, its own railroads, and kindred appliances, what would become of the economy which Mr. Mudd so appropriately and ably advocates? Why should the G.S.K. require a locomotive and flat car to carry a "hatful of supplies to a ship?" Does the G.S.K. actually haul a monkey wrench or anything else for any other department? Is it not rather the case that a large part of the G.S.K. work is done by other yard departments?
(4) The suggestions as to inspection of navy yard accounts in the manufacturing and constructing departments, and as to enforced competition between the yards doing similar work, are worthy of considerable consideration.
There is, however, considerable room for argument as to the best way in which this inspection could be accomplished. Each bureau is responsible for the expenditures under its cognizance—why would not the creation of the office of a navy yard inspector for each bureau, as suggested by Mr. Hoff be a better beginning than the inauguration of the system by first utilizing the "night watchman?" That such inspection could be handled by a pay officer with no technical experience, in such manner as to produce any satisfactory results whatever, is in my opinion questionable. The proposed inspection would be along very different lines from the present money and property inspection of pay officers' accounts. There might also be included in the new inspection, an inspection of the general storekeeper's stock and accounts.
The comments of Admiral Goodrich relative to navy yard competition, and relative to reducing the number of navy yards, I consider most appropriate. Why not have a fixed number of navy yards on each coast, properly located, completely equipped, an ample number of dry docks in each yard; and have no other yards for repair or building purposes, except of course such yards as may be necessary in our outlying possessions. We are practically dependent now on comparatively few of our navy yards why not devote to their extension and to additional dry docks the amount we are expending on smaller and less fortunately located yards? Why not form some idea of the ultimate size of our fleet, and add to the best located yards accordingly? In case of war on the Pacific where would our fleet be docked and repaired? We have now at this late day one government dock on the Pacific coast that can take a modern battleship. I believe that the tendency should be towards obtaining more properly located dry docks at once, even if we have to forego for a time one or more battleships to obtain the necessary appropriations.
(5) Any comparison of costs at various navy yards as now existing, to be convincing, must be accompanied by details as to locality, other work going on, whether or not the articles are actually of the same type, etc. The yard on Puget Sound, for instance, pays for labor and material much more than does the Norfolk yard. A certain portion of an establishment must be permanent such as the clerical and drafting force; if during a particular period the work on hand is small that work must carry a large charge for fixed expense. One boat built alone will cost much more than one boat of five. A rudder for one type of boat will cost more than a rudder for another type. Even in the same ship there may be two different styles of mahogany bureaus in the cabins.
All articles of outfit should be, and I believe are being, standardized. If one yard can make the identical article considerably and comparatively cheaper than another yard, something must be wrong; and outside inspection and enforced competition will tend to locate the trouble, provided practical methods of outside inspection and competition are developed.
A great step towards economy in navy yard work would be made if there were discovered some means of more widely separating the military and technical functions of the navy yards. In what private establishment exists the red tape of navy yards due to the combination of the military and the technical, and the additional clerical and office force necessitated thereby?
(6) It is stated by Mr. Mudd "The writer at times has been amused at the way the cost of building ships at our yards and that at private ship yards have been compared. The selling price of the commercially built ship is coolly put alongside the cost price of the navy yard ship without the flutter of an eyelid."
A navy yard has three distinct functions, it is a military station, it is a constructing or repairing station, and it is a supply station for the fleet. In each function the purely technical is subordinated to the military. To compare the cost of administration of such a yard with a private establishment, and to include it in the cost of turning out manufactured or repair work, would be most unreasonable.
There are certain military officers, marines, watchmen, etc., and there are large numbers of officers, clerks, etc., for handling supplies, a large proportion of which should in no way be considered in figuring costs of navy yard repair or manufacturing work. Supposed the Connecticut had not been built at the New York yard, what officers, clerks, watchmen, etc., would have been available for duty elsewhere? What actual increase in cost of administration was involved by building this ship at the navy yard? The facts to be gotten at are the extra expenses to the government if any, compared with building by contract: to get at such facts, what portion of the cost of administration should really be included? The yard and its administrative force are there whether the ship is built by private contract or by the government.
Moreover, what private yard pays nine and ten hours' wages for eight hours' work? pays all employees for seven holidays each year? gives all employees, in addition, fifteen days' leave with pay each year? and also closes every Saturday afternoon for three months of each year, but with full day's pay for such Saturdays? All this amounts to the fact the navy yard pays a certain amount for labor, of which about 20 per cent is absolutely without return; all in accordance with existing law.
What private yard is hampered in the employment of labor as are the navy yards?
(8) The foregoing questions, I think, should be considered in a discussion of navy expenditures ashore. The article of Pay Inspector Mudd is a most valuable contribution, and as he aptly says:
"This is the time to do great things in the way of bettering government methods of doing business." A most important step in the right direction would be to adopt a system ashore not based on the aggrandizement of any particular part or corps of the service, but on business lines and for the good of the country.
War on the Sea.
(SEE No. 125.)
Rear-Admiral F.J. HIGGINSON, U.S. Navy. I want to congratulate the Institute on the translation of Captain Darrieus' book on "War on the Sea." He is a most interesting and charming writer, and the Institute deserves great credit for introducing him to the service. His style is clear and distinct, and he has, evidently, a thorough knowledge of his subject. He uses such happy and concise expressions to convey great truths. They ought to be painted on the walls of class rooms and halls in large letters all through the Academy buildings, as religious sayings are displayed in churches, so that maxims of basic importance to the naval profession will sink unconsciously into the minds of our cadets during their four years. These subconscious ideas will float to the surface some day when badly needed. I shall look forward eagerly for the coming numbers of the translation. The book when published will be highly educational and a valuable contribution to the study of naval strategy.
I am sorry that Farragut does not show up more brilliantly among the naval leaders of history, for I am sure that his principles of action were as great as those of any of the leaders mentioned. His sphere of action was, of course, comparatively limited, but within it he showed all the qualities of a great commander. Nelson never took a more desperate chance than did Farragut at Mobile Bay when he dashed at the enemy's torpedo line. I have been alongside of Farragut under fire and he had the boyish elation of spirits and total absence of fear which characterized Nelson in action.
But, of course, fighting forts in a civil war does not measure up to the standard of great strategical and tactical operations with large fleets upon the ocean. Our man for that work may be, as yet, a "mute inglorious" midshipman.
I hope the Institute will continue its encouragement of the discussion of battle tactics and formations. We cannot have too much of it. The maxim that the "cruising formation should be the battle formation"—Is it possible? Perhaps it may be with wireless communication, but that is uncertain and liable to derangement. According to the correspondents our Atlantic fleet cruised either in divisions in column abreast, or line of divisions in column, neither of which are battle formations, and from which rapid deployments are not easy.
Two Pictures of Nelson's Time.
(SEE No. 119.)
GILBERT TOTTEN MCMASTER, M. D. The picture of Nelson published in the PROCEEDINGS some time since, from Southey's life, wherein the artist's name is obscured, I find is from the pencil of one De Kestre and was drawn from life in 1801, and the favorite of the admiral.
De Kestre was famous, in his time, for the "nicety of his work" in this line. Every line was as it should be, and exactness as to his model his aim. Fortunately for us, impressionism, that fad of art to obliterate faulty drawing, had not dawned, and we have the face as it looked to him one day in the year 1801.
The present Lord Nelson honored me with the following note conveying this information:
TRAFALGAR, SALISBURY, November 2, 1906.
Dear Sir.—I thank you much for the two pictures of Nelson's time. The first was originally drawn by De Kestre. He made two pencil drawings and submitted them to the admiral in 1801. One was taken by him at the time, the other one I bought of De Kestre's niece. I think it is a powerful and agreeable picture of the great admiral.
I have two pictures of the funeral car, one worked in needle work and the other an old print, but not so good or clearly printed a one as that which you have kindly sent me.
I am yours faithfully,
NELSON.
From the above it will be observed that the Institute has the best reproduction so far of the funeral car that conveyed the great admiral to his last anchorage.
Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, who cannot say too many nice things of our navy and nation, and who has done much to cement bonds of good feeling and friendship between the two great English-speaking peoples, writes me that he has placed the two little prints referred to above in the cabin of his flagship.