Motto: "Keep up with the Times."
SECOND HONORABLE MENTION.
Everybody is born into a world in which he must have considerable unhappiness, but in which he may get a great deal of happiness. The principal factors that go to assure happiness may, in the order of their importance, be stated as follows:
1. Good air to breathe.
2. Good water to drink.
3. Good food to eat.
4. Good clothing to wear.
5. Good employment.
6. Good companionship.
7. Good chance for self development.
These seem to be, not only the natural desires, but the natural rights of every man. But what can he claim as a right besides? He brought nothing into this world, and it is sure that he can take nothing out. At first sight, it would seem that these things ought not to be hard to get; but it is a matter of common knowledge that few people get all of them.
CONTENTS
THE NAVAL PROFESSION. By Commander Bradley A. Fiske, U.S.N 475
A GENERAL SALES COMMISSARY SYSTEM FOR THE NAVY: THE JUSTICE
OF ITS ESTABLISHMENT, AND A PLAN FOR ACCOMPLISHING IT WITH EXISTING MEANS. By Paymaster George P. Dyer. 579
NAVAL ADMINISTRATION UNDER THE NAVY COMMISSIONERS, 1815-1842. By Charles Oscar Paullin 597
SYSTEMATIC PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE. By Commander John G Quimby, U.S.N 643
A.B.G.B.S. By "Black Joke." 669
NEW LIGHT UP ON THE CAREER OF JOHN PAUL JONES 683
DESCRIPTION OF JOHN PAUL JONES' SWORD. By Cornelius Stevenson, Esq. 711
THE SWORD PRESENTED BY LOUIS XVI TO JOHN PAUL JONES. By Charles Henry Hart 712
ARMOR AND SPEED (VITESSE, C'EST FAIBLESSE). By E. Beaufailhy 717
CHANGING THE PROPELLERS OF THE U.S.S. HOPKINS AT THE NAVAL STATION, KEY WEST, FLA. By Captain W. H. Beehler, U.S.N 721
EFFECT OF MOVEMENT OF THE GUN-PLATFORM ON THE TRAJECTORY. By Lieut.-Commander H. O. Stickney, U.S.N 729
ELECTRICAL INSTALLATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. By Comdr Burns T. Walling, U.S.N., and Julius Martin, E. E. 739
DISCUSSION 813
PROFESSIONAL NOTES. Prepared by Prof. Philip R. Alger, U.S.N Ships of War, Budgets, and Personnel.—Ordnance and Gunnery Torpedoes.—Marine Turbines and Gas Engines.—Radio-Telegraphy.—Miscellaneous. 847
LIST OF PRIZE ESSAYS 897
INDEX TO ADVERTISERS 901
OFFICERS OF THE INSTITUTE 903
SPECIAL NOTICE.—Naval Institute Prize Essay, 1908 904
ADVERTISEMENTS.
U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD.
SECOND HONORABLE MENTION.
THE NAVAL PROFESSION.
Motto: "Keep up with the Times."
By COMMANDER BRADLEY A. FISKE, U.S. Navy.
Everybody is born into a world in which he must have considerable unhappiness, but in which he may get a great deal of happiness. The principal factors that go to assure happiness may, in the order of their importance, be stated as follows:
1. Good air to breathe.
2. Good water to drink.
3. Good food to eat.
4. Good clothing to wear.
5. Good employment.
6. Good companionship.
7. Good chance for self development.
These seem to be, not only the natural desires, but the natural rights of every man. But what can he claim as a right besides? He brought nothing into this world, and it is sure that he can take nothing out. At first sight, it would seem that these things ought not to be hard to get; but it is a matter of common knowledge that few people get all of them.
The great governments of the world assure all of them to every man in the naval profession, provided he is sober and obedient. In the matter of self development, it is doubtful if any other vocation gives a man such excellent opportunities. The demands made on every man for courage, intelligence, unselfishness, and endurance are not excessive, but are greater than like demands made by any other profession; and are sufficient to develop these qualities to a high degree in any man who wills it. And the travel, and the intimate mingling with many kinds of men, and the almost infinite variety of experience ashore and afloat, in storm and in calm, in peace and in war, under the glow of tropical sun, and in the ice of the Arctic Sea, give a man an experience and a wealth of memories, in comparison with which the experience and the memories of a man in any other profession are commonplace and tame.
But the men of the naval profession are not given these advantages for no reason. They are given them by every government in order that that government may have at its call the most powerful weapon in the world—a modern navy. Now that navy must fulfill certain requirements.
Since the naval profession, during the last fifty years, has endured a succession of changes so great as to bewilder the under- standing, greater than any other profession has endured, it may be well to try, even feebly, to see what its requirements are; and because the requirements of one period may not be the same as those of other periods, and yet may be supposed to be so, it may be profitable to begin at the beginning, and, recognizing the naval profession as one branch of the military profession, the profession of waging warfare, try to see what conditions it must meet, and what its member sought to know and do. And as the naval profession exists only to wage naval warfare, and as naval warfare is only a branch of warfare in general, it may be well to think a little about warfare in general.
WARFARE.
It has been said by the wise that love and war are the normal occupations of man kind. During the earlier ages, when the conditions of living were crude, man fought with man, and man fought with beast, in the struggle for existence. Every man's hand was against every man, and war in its crudest form was his principal employment. Later, the advantage of organization was seen, by which two men acting with mutual support could overcome one man, three men could overcome two men, etc. Family and tribal organizations resulted. By this means, war, instead of being continual, became intermittent; and intervals of peace resulted, in which time was found to practice other arts. That time was found to practice the art of love there is reason to suspect; that the art of trade was invented, and that it found many devotees, we have good reason for believing.
Ever since, the arts of love and trade and war have been the controlling factors in guiding the destinies of men. Love has been the agent by which the perpetuity of the race has been assured; trade has made possible the wealth which has enhanced so much the comfort and refinement of the nations which have followed it; while war, and the danger of war, have been the principal agents where by men have learned to join in concentrated action. And the strong governments, made possible in every case by the results of some war, have been the practical means whereby the vicious have been kept down, life and property protected, and large communities enabled to live together.
It is not necessary in this paper to consider which of these three factors has been the most potent; neither is it necessary to consider what their relative potencies might have been, if the actual nature of man had been different, interesting as such investigations would doubtless prove; for a mere statement of the parts they have played is enough to arouse the attention of the dullest mind. The part played by love has doubtless been the most alluring, if one judges by the number of people who have been engaged in it, and by the number of books there are concerning it. There have been a number of persons concerned in trade also; and we may reasonably suppose that it has interested them to a great degree. But the grand crises of the world; the extremes of triumph and disaster; the acme of the picturesque, the exciting, and dramatic; the pinnacles of human glory, have been reached only in war.
The Evil of War.—Yet that war is, next to disease and sin, the greatest evil in the world, can hardly be denied. War has been the immediate cause of an amount of suffering, and an acuteness of suffering, so frightful as to appall the imagination and wring the heart. From even the earliest times, and even in barbarous countries, the evils of war have been deplored, and ways sought to prevent it. Yet at the present day, in spite of the almost unanimous feeling of all the people in the world, in spite of the prevalence of Christianity in all the powerful countries, in spite of war's terrific expense, nations seem shoved into war by some irresistible force. War seems as unpreventable as death. The United States and Spain, Great Britain and the Boers, Japan and Russia seemed carried into war by forces outside of themselves. Not one of those six countries could possibly have abstained from war. Why?
War is an Effect, as well as a Cause.—Because war, while a cause of many effects, is itself an effect of many causes. It is an effect of those causes, just as inevitably as any disease is an effect of the causes which produced it.
Noting this, we can see how foolish are the railers against war, and how much more foolish are the railers against the men who fight in war. War does not come about through its own act, or through the acts of the soldiers and sailors who fight in it. Sometimes the underlying causes of a war are hard to find; and very rarely is the apparent cause any more than the upsetting, and often by a trivial incident, of an equilibrium that long had been unstable. Clearly, the real cause of any war is not the final trivial incident; the real cause is whatever cause, or causes, made the equilibrium unstable.
Causes of War.—Now, what causes make the equilibrium of good feeling between two countries unstable? Is the presence of a standing army or navy on each side a cause? Do these armies and navies insult each other; and then does each army and navy tell their country of the insults which some other army and navy have been heaping on them, so that each country gets very angry with the other country? Are the officers and men who will have to fight in a war, and get killed, and wounded, and sick, and leave their families in destitution—are they the ones who bring on war?
Leaving out as not pertinent to the present paper, the causes of wars between ancient countries, and between barbarous peoples, what is the thing most apt now to disturb the equilibrium of good feeling between two countries? Is it not the same thing that is most apt to disturb the equilibrium of good feeling between two men? Is it not the competition for money, or its equivalent?
Under any stable government, the competition for money can be regulated within that country, and the money gained by any man can be protected for his use; in fact, the government of any country exists primarily for the protection of the lives and property of its people. It accomplishes this by means of legislatures, courts and police. No matter how excellent were the legislatures and courts, no man could keep five dollars five minutes, unless the legislatures and courts were supported by a competent police.
Non-Preventability of War.—It is doubtful if many people would deny this; and yet, if they do not deny it, they admit that there are so many bad people, or so many people of conflicting views, in the world, that force must be exerted to protect a man in his rights, or what he thinks his rights. Now, if the exertion of force is needed to protect a man in his rights, how can the exertion of force be avoided to protect a country in her rights? And what is war but the exertion of force on a large scale?
Vocation of Warrior is Honorable.—Furthermore, if we recognize war as an evil which we have not yet learned to prevent, and if we recognize the exertion of force as the only means of making war, we seem forced to the conclusion that there is no virtue in exerting the force in effectively. In fact, it seems sure that, if we must exert force, we ought to do it as effectively as possible, in order to lessen the period of time during which we must exert it; that, if we are to police a city, or wage war, the police force in one case, and the army and navy in the other case, should be as effective as possible; and that their usefulness will be proportional to their effectiveness. Therefore, it is useful to have a police force and an army and navy as highly trained as possible. If this be true, it follows that the vocation of a member of a regular police force, or of a regular army, or a regular navy, is useful, and therefore honorable.
Mr. Carnegie's Rectorial Address.—Unless the above reasoning is entirely illogical, Mr. Carnegie's rectorial address before St. Andrews college was entirely illogical. This address, while an able plea for arbitration, not only assumed (entirely unnecessarily for his argument) that regular armies and navies are foes to arbitration, which they are not, but directly charged their members with devoting their lives to evil for the sake of money. He commended fighting to protect one's country, provided the fighting were done by volunteers; but he did not seem to realize that fighting by volunteers is war, just as actually as fighting by regulars is; much more apt to be horrible, and almost sure to be useless, if regulars be on the other side.
Mr. Carnegie's address was an insult to every officer and every man in every regular army and navy. It came from a very influential man, and represents the view of an extreme section of a powerful faction; therefore it justifies one in pointing out that, if a man disgraces himself by devoting his life to an army or navy for a small salary, while incidentally exposing himself to the dangers of war, he disgraces himself equally by selling war material for armies and navies to use, at large profit to himself, and without exposing himself to the dangers of war.
Preparation for War.—Supposing that war, at the present time, is unpreventable, we can see that it is our duty, as officers, to try to learn to wage it. The writer would like to be able to say some interesting and instructive things about it; but the trouble is that war has occupied the attention of the world so long and so vividly, that it is almost impossible even to think new thoughts about it; and so much has been written about it by all kinds of writers, that it is also probably absolutely impossible to say new things about it. Nevertheless, there are one or two facts concerning it which do not seem to have attracted the attention they deserve.
One fact is the comparatively recent date at which warfare took on what may be called the preparation phase. This does not mean that wars have not always been prepared for, in a way; but it does mean that the importance of careful preparation has only recently been appreciated at its proper value. In the Franco-German war, warfare took on a phase entirely new; and the incident is clearly marked as the invention of gunpowder or the sextant. As in all great movements, that succeeded in effecting permanent changes, one man initiated the idea, carried out the long process by which the idea was developed, and finally presided at the culmination; when the thoughts of genius, and the long years of painful labor against ultra conservatism bore fruit in a triumph which for completeness and importance has few parallels in the history of men. Previous to Von Moltke, no such complete preparation for war had ever been made. Not only is this true in the sense that no such amount of preparation had been made; but also is it true in the sense that no such kind of preparation had ever been made. Never before had twenty years of peace been spent in fighting theoretical battles. Never before had officers and men been trained in the practical solving of strategical problems by exercises, continued for many years, in sham battles, as distinguished from parades. Never before had subordinate officers been trained to such comprehension of the principles of warfare that they could be trusted to carry out general instructions, and adapt them to conditions suddenly encountered, instead of requiring positive orders, which could not possibly be given with adequate knowledge. Never before had an army of comparatively little experience in war gone into war absolutely trained for war. The change which had been made is illustrated exactly by a comparison between the French and German armies in 1870: for the French army, ill-prepared for the war, as it seems when compared with the German army, represented the amount of preparedness which, up to that time, had been the fashion; and which, compared with that of any army except the German, was extremely good.
Work must be Skillfully Directed.—Another fact to which attention may profitably be directed is the fact that, while Von Moltke initiated and developed the idea of doing hard work in peace as a preparation for war, this hard work was definitely directed. We do not see in any of Von Moltke's plans any intention to do mere work, but rather an intention to direct work along profitable lines. In this way Von Moltke performed the highest work that man can do, the directing of the work of many other men by the force of pure mind; not only achieving thereby the object which he tried to achieve, but by that achievement, and by the performance of that useful work, giving employment to the natural activities of the men themselves; for all men find their most enduring happiness in exercising their natural activities in work whose usefulness they see.
Difficulties Confronting Von Moltke.—When one reminds himself of the difficulty with which men are persuaded to adopt new ideas, one becomes convinced that Von Moltke must have gone through years of the most exhausting work, in perfecting his system; the principal work being, not so much the obvious work of preparing the actual plans, as the infinitely more difficult work of persuading other people to believe in those plans, and inciting them to that interest without which their mere work would have been useless. It may be objected that Von Moltke's road was made easy for him by the fact that Prussia was a kingdom; but this had nothing to do with it, or very little. The government might have been republican, and the same military proficiency have resulted, if the president had supported Von Moltke in his efforts in the way King William did. The authority of a president, while not so autocratic over an entire country as is the authority of a king, is just as autocratic over the army and navy. The condition necessary to Von Moltke's success, in having his ideas adopted and developed, therefore, was not that the sovereign should be a king, but that the sovereign should support him. Knowing, in a measure, the characters of these two extraordinary men, and recognizing the fact that the king had many things to attend to besides the army, we shall probably be right in concluding that a great part of Von Moltke's work,—outside of his obvious work of perfecting his plans,—was in persuading the king to believe in his plans, and then influencing him to give, and always continue, his support.
Influence of the Military Character of a People.—Of course, it is true that the hereditary military character of the German people, and the constant danger of war, made it easier for Von Moltke to secure the interest of the army and the people than it would have been if the conditions had been such as always have prevailed in the United States. And this explains why the United States was so unprepared for war with Spain; and why, to a less degree, Great Britain was so unprepared for the war with the Boers. No other reason can be found to explain why the two wealthiest, if not the greatest, countries in the world should have so disgracefully neglected to take advantage of information as to how to prosecute successful war, which Germany had paid so much time and money to acquire, and which she had given to the world for nothing. A condition like that of Germany, and unlike that of the United States and Great Britain, is to be seen in the preparedness of Japan for war with Russia. Not only do we see the same preparedness, but we see the same causes of that preparedness;—the essentially military spirit of the people, the expected war, the controlling brain of one man—Von Moltke (for it was his ideas that Japan adopted) and the all-powerful support of the sovereign. And not only do we see the same conditions, and the same cause for those conditions, but we also see the same result;-an almost perfect conduct of the war from start to finish; and an almost uninterrupted series of successes, culminating in such an overwhelming triumph as to astound the world.
Victory Due to Greater Preparedness.—It will be noted that, in these four wars, the two in which one side gained a brilliant victory, were the Franco-German, and the Japanese-Russian; and in both the victor gained victory over an enemy which was sup- posed by most military people to be at least as powerful; also, that the only assignable reason for the completeness of the victory was the completeness of the preparations of the victor. In the war between Spain and the United States, it cannot be said that victory was won by reason of the preparedness of the United States, for the United States was, disgracefully unprepared; but it can be said that it was nevertheless won by the greater approach to preparedness of the United States; for the degree of unpreparedness of Spain is almost incredible. In the war be- tween Great Britain and the Boers, Great Britain was unprepared, though not in the same degree as were the United States and Spain; and she whipped simply because of her excess of power. She would have prevailed very much more quickly and cheaply, if she had been better prepared—and she probably could have prevailed without actually going to war at all.
Use of the Mind in War.—Another interesting fact is the increasing use in warfare of the powers of the human mind. In early days, brute force was the only factor, and rude clubs and missiles the only weapons. As time went on, and organization was invented, the truth was seen that some ways of handling bodies of men were better than other ways; and systems of tactics were devised. Later, it was seen that, not only was it necessary to handle bodies of men when in actual battle with the enemy, but that it was advantageous to lay plans before the battle, whereby the greatest number of men could be gotten to the battlefield, with the greatest speed and certainty; and the elementary principles of strategy were evolved. Later, it was seen that much advantage lay with the side which had the better weapons; but it was not until the invention of gunpowder that this factor became important.
The invention of gunpowder opened a new epoch. This epoch was marked primarily by the longer distances separating the contestants, and by the advantage given to the side possessing gun powder over the side not possessing it; but it was marked secondarily by a very much more important matter—the advantage of superior intelligence and education, which began then simply with the differentiation between people intelligent enough to use gunpowder and people not intelligent enough to use it. This differentiation has been increasing ever since; and it has taken on an acceleration during the past fifty years, by reason of the growth of the engineering arts. This applies to both warfare on the land and warfare on the sea; for in both, the improvements in weapons and instruments have been so great that a high grade of intelligence and education is needed, to understand and use them. But it applies to warfare on the sea very much more than to warfare on the land; because the number and complexity of the weapons coming into use is very much greater on the sea than on the land. And it is not merely in the actual handling of the various weapons and instruments themselves that greater intelligence is needed, but in the providing of them; for their number and complexity have increased to such a point that, in the great navies, the most difficult single problem confronting those in high authority is the designing, purchasing, and repairing of the various ships, engines, munitions, guns, and instruments; to which must be added the problem of adopting and adapting new inventions, and taking continual advantage of improvements in the mechanic arts.
Importance of Wealth.—And it is most interesting to note how the invention of gunpowder, and the increasing adaptation to warfare ever since of mechanism of all kinds, has brought about a condition requiring not only more intelligence, but more wealth. In the days before gunpowder, and in the savage nations now, the crude weapons of the warriors are very inexpensive, and the requirements very few. But what shall be said of the enormous cost of the armament of a first-rate power, especially of the navy, a cost increasing year by year, with no sign of abatement, in the mad race that we call progress? And how utterly impossible it is for even the bravest nation, even the nation possessing naturally the most war-like ability,to contend successfully with a nation more wealthy and intelligent! Japan saw this fifty years ago; and set about acquiring modern civilization, in order to resist successfully that aggression from some civilized nation which she foresaw would come.
Principles and Conditions of Warfare.—The truth that it is the use of mechanism which differentiates modern warfare from ancient warfare, has a curious bearing on our accepted creed, which is that the principles of warfare remain the same, and only the conditions change. For the entrance in to warfare of mechanism created simply a condition; and yet this condition has given wealthy and civilized nations a greater advantage over others than any skillful adherence to military principles could have given them. This shows that the theoretical study of the principles of warfare must be supplemented by the practical study of the conditions of warfare. As between the two, the study of the principles of warfare is much the easier, and for several good reasons.
One reason is that the principles have been known for so long a time, and are so clearly set forth in books, that the student can learn them as easily as he can learn geometry; while the conditions of warfare are, so manifold that it is impossible to set them forth in books; and they change so rapidly that, even if they could be set forth in books, books could not be written fast enough, to keep pace with their changes.
But even if this could be done, the end would not be reached; because the really necessary study of one who wishes to know how to carry on warfare, is, not so much the principles or the conditions as the way in which to apply the principles to the conditions.
As the study of the application of principles to conditions necessarily includes the study of the principles and the conditions, one might presume that practical success would be more dependent on the factor of practical application than on the other two; and such seems to have been the case. As in very few wars we find that any difference in courage and physical strength turned the scale (because men do not differ much in these respects), neither do we find that any difference in understanding the principles of war turned the scale—because these principles have usually been as well understood by one side as by the other; nor do we find that a clearer understanding of the conditions of warfare, or the conditions of a specific war gave victory to one side or the other; because conditions are always of an objective, practical, tangible nature, that are pretty clear to most intelligent men; much clearer to most men than such intellectual abstractions as principles. The real thing that has turned the scale, seems to have been a skillful application of principles to conditions; a feat which requires a mental capacity which can both grasp abstractions, and apprehend actualities, combined with a skill entirely distinct, that of applying one to the other.
Difficulty of Applying Principles to Changing Conditions.—As between land warfare and naval warfare, there can be little doubt that the difficulty of applying general principles to actual conditions is greater in naval warfare; for the reason that the conditions change more rapidly. Every effect lags behind its cause: no cause produces an instantaneous effect. Therefore, it is impossible that principles can ever be applied to conditions by an unchanging method, unless the conditions are also unchanging. Naturally, if the conditions are few, simple, and slow, to change, the effort to keep pace with them is not great, and neither is the lag. But if the conditions are those that now obtain with naval warfare, the lag must be tremendous.
It may be pointed out in illustration that it was only three years ago that any navy began to take proper advantage of the possibilities of modern ordnance; and that we have not yet learned to take advantage of the possibilities of modern mechanism in the handling of fleets. We have not yet learned how to manage modern fleets as well, considering the advantages given by modern appliances, as they handled fleets in Nelson's day. Our ships go faster,and squadrons can be separated and gotten together with greater precision; but this is due, not to greater skill in the admirals, but to better motive power in the ships. The conditions which confronted the admirals and captains of Nelson's day were the same conditions as had confronted their fathers;—the same kinds of ships, guns, masts, sails, and ropes. The result was a skill in handling those loose-jointed fleets, composed of ships that were always leaky, often rotten, nearly always foul-bottomed, whose only propeller was the uncertain wind—a skill that is amazing to the sailor of the present day.
The acquirement of skill was easier then, because the kind of skill required, and the way to attain it, were the same as they had always been, and were perfectly well-known. The conditions were thoroughly understood, and the manner of dealing with them. The reverse is the case to-day.
Waging War Consists of Practical Acts of Applying Principles to Conditions.—Thoughts like these suggest that, while the principles of war, and of all arts and sciences, are the same as they have always been, yet nevertheless, the real difficulty is not in understanding the principles, but to a greater degree in apprehending all the manifold conditions which, in warfare, are changing with a kaleidoscopic perplexingness; and, to a greater degree still, in applying the never changing principles to the ever changing conditions. This statement has probably been true always; but the importance of its being apprehended is becoming greater. Without a clear apprehension of the truth it declares, one is apt to become an extremist; devoting himself too much to a mere theoretical study of the principles of warfare, or to a mere practical observation of the actual conditions. By the mere theoretical study of the principles of war, one can never acquire the ability to deal with its practical conditions, any more than by the mere study of the theory of architecture, he could acquire the ability to build a temple. And by the mere practical observation of conditions, one never can be able to grapple with unexpected changes in conditions, or to meet any situation which he has not met before; any more than by mere practice at carpentry, he could acquire the ability to build a temple.
To decide which is the most important is like deciding which is the most important link in a chain. But it may nevertheless be, pointed out that the final act, the application of principles to conditions, is distinctly a practical act. President Cleveland's declaration, "We are confronted with a condition, not a theory," was an admirable statement, by the man having the responsibility, of the necessity for action, not discussion, at that particular juncture; that, granting all the knowledge of principles and of conditions possessed by the Chief Executive, and granting the necessity for that knowledge, yet, nevertheless, the most important thing was the purely practical act of meeting the purely practical conditions.
Strategy and Tactics.—Writers divide warfare into strategy and tactics; and while it would not be true to state that strategy concerns itself with the theory of war, and tactics with its practice, yet the interesting statement may be hazarded that the atmosphere enveloping strategy is that of deliberate and quiet thought; while tactics breathes action and the shock of arms.
STRATEGY.
An attempt to make a complete exposition of strategy within the limits of this paper would be ridiculous. A few interesting points connected with it may be mentioned, however, as bearing on the subject.
One point is the curious idea regarding its meaning, which is evident even in some dictionaries, that strategy is a science or art concerned principally in deceiving; whereas it is a word derived directly from the Greek word strategos which means general, and nothing else. Strategy deals with war, with everything pertaining to it. It may even be said, by a not very great stretching of the meaning of words, to include the subject of tactics; because, although strategy and tactics are very different, yet no strategical plans would be complete which did not include a consideration of the tactical conditions which would probably arise, and the tactics which would and could be employed. The domain of strategy is tremendous, and embraces not only all the means of preparation for war, and the handling of armies and fleets out of actual battle, their equipping and provisioning,—but also the causes of war, and even the political relations of nations who may possibly go to war. In fact, in the higher regions of strategy, the military and the political considerations sometimes become so closely interwoven, that it is hard to distinguish between them. In such cases, and when the civil and military authorities act in harmony, each understanding the principles and conditions perfectly, as was the case in Germany and Japan before their great wars, strategy rises to its highest point, and a nation goes to war, with the war almost already won.
Relation of Strategy to Affairs of Civil Life.—An interesting characteristic of strategy, as compared with tactics, is its closer relation to the affairs of civil life. There is a wide and deep gulf fixed between tactics and any doings whatsoever in civil life; but no such gulf removes the strategist from the rest of human kind. Strategy deals with the movements of large bodies of men and with the preparations of plans to execute definite projects; but so does politics in its larger sense, and so does statesmanship. Strategy deals with the providing in time of the proper appliances for doing mechanical work; but so does the management of every railroad and engineering company, and large industrial corporation. Strategy takes into account the time required to come and go; the providing of food at proper intervals; the state of the weather and the general question of ways and means; but so does the plan of every ball, parade and Sunday-school excursion.
Thus, it will be seen that, in spite of its high sounding name, and in spite of the widespread ignorance concerning it, strategy is nothing more than the exercise towards military ends of the same kinds of activity as are found in the larger affairs of civil life. In fact, if the word "military" or "naval" be used in the narrow sense in which it is usually employed, strategy need not be considered a strictly military art or science, nor need a good strategist be necessarily a good "military" or "naval" man. A man might be an excellent strategist, and yet be physically an arrant coward. He might be able to devise excellent strategical plans, and yet be unfit to command a company, or be entrusted with a pulling boat. He might be able to dominate a council of war, and yet, of his own initiative, be unable to make a decisive move. Not only is it possible for an excellent strategist to be ineffective in command, but excellent strategists have often been ineffective in command. This statement is not to be taken as meaning that the excellent strategists here considered may fail because they are “theoretical men" and not "practical men," because no man can be an excellent strategist unless he be a practical man, in his vocation, strategy. It simply means to point out that both reason and experience show that, while strategy is the highest branch of the military science and the military art, yet it lives rather in the study and the office than the field; and is not brought directly into contact with those distinctly picturesque, stirring and dangerous scenes, which are associated in our minds with the words "military" and "naval," as used in their customary but narrow sense.
Strategy is Preparation for Battle.—Strategy being a subject which many books have been written to expound, a subject containing many sub-divisions, a subject of vast extent, and characterized by extreme precision, it would be foolish to attempt to define it in a few words. Yet to the writer, a phrase of three words seems to express its aim— "preparation for battle." Of course, the word "preparation" must be here used in its broadest sense, and include all the things that are done—even for a long time before. This preparation includes not only what is done in war, but what is done in peace, before war. It includes the collecting and compiling of the data that are needed; the preparation of general plans, indicated by the data; the subsequent preparation of detailed plans; the raising of the proper forces, in personnel and material; their disciplining and equipping; the correct exercise and instruction of the enlisted men; and more important still, the correct exercise and instruction of the officers; the mobilization of the forces, when war comes, in accordance with plans already made in peace; the most advantageous handling of the forces before battle comes, in order that the force put into battle may be larger and more effective than the enemy's; then, leaving to tactics the conduct of the battle, the re-arrangement of the forces after battle, and the task of preparing them for another battle on the most advantageous lines.
Strategy More Important than Tactics.—When it is noted that strategy operates over a very much longer time than tactics does, that tactics merely employs during a few critical hours the weapons which strategy has handed it, and when one notes that any effect is merely the result of some cause or causes, and that strategy supplies most, if not all, of the causes by which victory or defeat results, he can safely declare that, not only is strategy more important than tactics, but that tactics is merely a child of strategy; that whatever tactics may be used in battle, those tactics are the result of the strategy preceding the battle, preceding it perhaps by many years. There were causes more deep-seated than the skill of the commanders at the front which brought about the soul-stirring triumphs of the Germans and the Japanese; it was not, at bottom, the lack of individual merit in commanders that caused the disasters of the French and Russians. It was not wholly the lack of tactical skill in the field at the beginning of the Civil War that caused the hopeless confusion and the resulting waste of life; but the absence of proper strategical preparation before the wars began.
The utter lack of foresight before the Civil War caused it to begin under conditions which Cesar or Napoleon, or any man who ever lived, could not possibly have met successfully at first. Now this lack of foresight,—or at least of preparation—was due more to the fault of the civil authorities, especially Congress, than of the naval and military authorities; yet it was not Congress that received the abuse. The war ended in the way that any sensible person would have expected; in that side whipping which was the superior in numbers and in wealth. No other result could possibly have occurred; and yet the commanders who happened to be in high positions on the victorious side at the end, received applause just as excessive as had been the abuse in the beginning.
Both the excessive abuse and the excessive applause arose from the same cause; the non-recognition of the fact that the result of any battle is due to many causes, besides the actual conduct of the battle itself. So clearly is this true that one might declare, using a figure of speech sometimes called an "Irishism," that some wars and some battles have been decided before they were fought. Wilson, in his "Ironclads in Action" in speaking of the utter unpreparedness of the Chinese fleet at the Battle of the Yalu, says "the Chinese were clearly doomed to defeat, when they saw the Japanese smoke rise above the horizon."
Victory Results Mostly from Causes Preceding a Battle.—The writer does not wish to be understood as advancing the idea that a battle is like a machine which, after being set going, will keep going in the way it was designed to go, until it is run down; nor as advancing the idea that the personal skill of the chief during the actual battle, has little influence on the result. But he does wish to be understood as advancing the idea that this factor, the factor of the personal skill of the chief during actual battle has been over estimated, at least in naval battles. This idea can best be illustrated by the following table, which shows the number of fighting ships which were engaged in the principal fleet actions of modern times; and indicates the curious fact that, up to the battle of St. Vincent, nearly every victory went to the side that had the most ships; while, since then, it has gone to the side which, from causes preceding the battle, had the best trained personnel.
In the battle of Saint Vincent, while appreciating to the highest degree the personal skill of Jervis and Nelson, as shown in actual battle, we must admit that the Spaniards were utterly untrained. The same may truly be said of the French and Spaniards at Trafalgar, the Chinese at the Yalu, the Spaniards at Manila and Santiago, and the Russians at Port Arthur, Pusan, and the Sea of Japan. Regarding the French at the Nile and the Italians at Lissa, it seems enough to say that the result in each case, was due to conditions preceding the battle, by which the French and the Italians were caught entirely unprepared.
Again the writer wishes to insist that his intention is not to belittle the work of the commander on the spot, even while point-
Battle. | Ships. | Victor. |
Four Days, June 11-14, 1666 | British…44 – Dutch…80 | Dutch. |
Solebay, June 7, 1672 | British, French…101 – Dutch…91 | Indecisive. |
The Texel, August 21, 1673 | British, French…90 – Dutch…70 | Indecisive. |
Stromboli, January 8, 1676 | French…20 – Dutch…19 | Indecisive. |
Beachy Head, July 10, 1690 | British, Dutch…60 – French…70 | French. |
La Hogue, May 21, 1692 | French, Spanish…27 – British…29 | British. Dutch. |
Toulon, February 22, 1744 | British…12 – French…12 | Indecisive. |
Minorca, May 20, 1756 | British…23 – French…21 | Indecisive. |
Quiberon, November 20, 1769. | British…7 – French…8 | British. |
Fort Saint David, April 29, 1758 | British…30 – French…30 | French. |
Ushant, July 27, 1778 | British…21 – French…25 | Indecisive. |
Grenada, July 6, 1779 | British…21 – French…23 | French. |
Guadeloupe, April 17, 1780 | British…8 – French…8 | Indecisive. |
Cape Henry, March 16, 1781 | British…7 – French…8 | Indecisive. |
Porto Prays, April 16, 1781 | British…9 – French…12 | Indecisive. |
Madras, February 17, 1782 | British…11 – French…12 | Indecisive. |
Trincomalee, April 12, 1782 | British…11 – French…11 | Indecisive. |
Cuddalore, July 6, 1782 | British…12 – French…14 | Indecisive. |
Trincomalee, September 3, 1782 | British…36 – French…33 | French. |
Les Satiates, April 9, 1782 | British…36 – French…30 | Indecisive. |
Les Saintes, April 12, 1782 | British…25 – French…26 | British. |
First of June, 1794 | British…13 – French…13 | British. |
Saint Vincent, February 14, 1797 | British…15 – Spanish…27 | British. |
The Nile, August 1, 1798 | British…13 – French…13 | British. |
Trafalgar, October 21, 1805 | British…27 – French., Spanish…33 | British. |
Lake Erie, September 10, 1813 | American…9 – British…6 | American. |
Lissa, July 20, 1866 | Austrian…7 – Italian…9 | Austrian. |
Yalu, September 17, 1894 | Chinese…12 – Japanese…12 | Japanese. |
Manila, May 1, 1898 | American…6 – Spanish…6 | American. |
Santiago, July 8, 1898 | American…5 – Spanish…4 | American. |
Port Arthur, August 10, 1904 | Russian…9 – Japanese…12 | Japanese. |
Fusan, August 14, 1904 | Russian…3 – Japanese…6 | Japanese. |
Sea of Japan, May 27, 1905 | Russian…12 – Japanese…12 | Japanese. |
ing out that most of the naval battles of history have been decided by conditions prevailing before the battles. And he believes it most important that this matter be considered thoughtfully; because it is within our own power to get a fleet well built, equipped and trained, but not within our power to produce an admiral absolutely sure to do well when the crisis comes. No one can tell how any one man will act at any one time. The most alert men are sometimes absent-minded; the most intelligent men sometimes do stupid things; an attack of indigestion will shake the steadiest nerve, and personal like or dislike has often clouded the judgment of the clearest mind.
Now it means a good deal to realize that the outcome of every war has been due absolutely to causes existing before the war began; that whether the strategy and tactics were good or bad, after the war began; whether officers and men were well- or ill-instructed, disciplined or fed; whether they were brave or cowardly; devoted, indifferent, or traitorous; the conditions did not create themselves, nor did they come into being suddenly, but were the result of causes running back in to times of peace. It means that "now is the time of salvation"; and it puts a new significance into the proverb "peace hath her victories, no less renowned than war."
Civil Authorities are the Principal Causers of Defeat in War.— And does it not mean a little more? Since the result of every war has been due, at the bottom, to causes existing long before the war, though perhaps not recognized; and since officers who have had to stake their all on the result of a war have naturally been more desirous of making preparation than the civil authorities, does it not follow that the men who have really been the causers of the disaster of any war, have been, not the military, but the civil authorities? Who really caused the slaughter on both sides during our own Civil War? Was it the Army and Navy? Or was it the civil authorities, who would not permit the Army and Navy to be large enough to get experience as even one corps or one fleet? If the United States had had an adequate army and navy, in which the higher officers had had experience in handling corps and fleets, and if a small minority had seceded, and tried to organize and train another and smaller fleet and army, how long would it have taken the larger and well-trained force to whip the smaller force, before it was gotten ready, and thus stamp out the war? Would not one battle have been enough? Would four years have been needed, and the slaughter of countless men, and the aimless, though gallant fights of hordes of soldiers, under commanders imperfectly trained until too late—and the untold expenditure of money?
Necessity for Adequate Army and Navy to Repress Disorder.— Surely, these questions are easy to answer. Surely, any one can see that the United States in 1860 was like any other community with a police force too weak to enforce the law. In any city, on election day, a little civil war is liable to happen, if the police force be too weak to preserve order. The Civil War would not have occurred if the government had had an army and navy strong enough to keep it down. The passions of the people of the north and south would have been kept under control, and the questions at issue would have been decided as questions even more burning are being decided in Russia now; by peaceful means. The army would have been used, just as it is being used in Russia now, just as it has often been used in the States and cities of our own country, to prevent the settling of disputes by fighting, and to compel their settling by peaceful means. It seems strange to refer to Russia as an example of anything good in government; but if the Russian army during the past two years had not been strong enough to preserve order, order would not have been preserved; and a result would have occurred somewhat like our Civil War.
But even if our army and navy in 1861 had not been strong enough to prevent the solution of the pending problems by Civil War, an army, say twice as large as it really was could have ended the war much more quickly than it was ended; not only because of its greater size, but because the officers would have known more about the handling of large bodies of men. But how could Captain McClellan, or any other officer in the army, know anything practically about such things? How could they possibly know anything about strategy or tactics? The little army had always been divided into little parties all over our vast country, and neither officers nor men had ever had a chance to drill together in large bodies. This was not the fault of the army, but the fault of the civil authorities. Therefore, the people responsible for the waste of life in our Civil War were the civil authorities. The civil authorities let the police force of the country get so weak that it could not keep down violence; and then, when violence broke out, they tried to repress it by means of a mass of volunteers so ignorant and so numerous, that they would have been unwieldy in the hands of Napoleon himself. The little regular army was almost as ignorant of real war as the volunteers. What possible good did their elementary training do, when not a hundred, but a hundred thousand men had to be fed, organized, drilled, marched and fought? Now the civil authorities did not cause the bloodshed, and the sickness and heartaches of our Civil War by intention; but they did cause them by ignorance. They caused them by their ignorance of a very old subject—the correct relations between the civil and military authority. Not only this, but they themselves caused their own ignorance by their exaggerated fear of militarism, and their refusal to listen to military men, and learn anything about military matters.
Need for the Intelligent Sympathy of the People.—Noting these things, and remembering that the underlying cause of the success of the Japanese army and navy was the intelligent sympathy of the Japanese people; while the underlying cause of the unpreparedness of the Russian army and navy was the unintelligent apathy of the Russian people, remembering that a "stream cannot rise higher than its source," and that the source of all our military strength is in the people themselves, it is easy to see that a most important thing for us to do is to develop an intelligent sympathy for the American navy in the American people.
Happily, this work has already been begun by the Navy League. Its value to the navy and the country, if it succeeds as Navy Leagues have succeeded abroad, will be so great that . . . . officers cannot over estimate it, or do too much on parallel lines. The people must be educated, and made to see that it is their duty to insist on an adequate navy, and very much to their interest. If this can be accomplished, if the people can be made to see that (this sounds like a paradox, but is not) they are at the bottom just as responsible for the outcome of a war as we are, we shall have no more trouble in getting sufficient money from Congress, proper support from the daily press, and freedom to develop the navy along correct strategical lines.
Necessity for Practical Work.—Of course, nothing that has been written here is intended to mean that officers should neglect their regular duties, to become either book worms, or "boomers" of naval things. Neither is it intended to suggest a less attention to the ordinary details of drill and discipline, and the proper con duct of daily life. All of these things need more attention, not less; but it is a delightful fact that intellectual interest in the principles of any profession, if guided by a desire to grasp their real meaning, and not to dream about them as abstractions, gives greater interest in the practice of the profession and not less. For this reason, one need not fear that more study of the principles of war, and more zeal in spreading information concerning them, will cause any lessening of interest or ability in the practical details of life. The details will become more interesting, not less; they will cease to be lifeless things, and stand out as examples of living truth; they will change like the vague shapes we hardly see at night, when the sun and the blue sky bring out their beauty of form and color.
TACTICS.
For the officers of armies and navies, tactics has always had more interest than strategy, because it seems more "military." Certainly tactics touches more intimately our daily lives, and seems less an intellectual abstraction. And while strategy smells of books, and papers, and maps, and figures, and intelligence reports, and everything else that can be dull; tactics stirs the blood with cavalry charges, and the picturesque maneuvers of . . . . ships, and the clash of fleets and armies. Strategy suggests study: tactics suggests action. And yet tactics requires study.
Theory and Practice.—Tactics, like nearly every art and science, may be divided into theory and practice; theory ascertaining the best way in which to do a thing, and practice doing it. A professor of mechanical engineering may be able to deduce, and describe, the best way in which to drive a given nail into a given kind of wood, and yet be less able to drive it than an ignorant carpenter. In this case, the division between the theorist and the practical man is very great; but if the work needed more education than driving a nail, the difference would be less; as for instance, the difference between the professor of mechanical engineering and the driver of a locomotive; and not only because the practical man had moved towards the theoretical man, but because the theoretical man had moved towards the practical man.
This leads to the suggestion that perhaps the theory and the practice of tactics are not very far apart; because nearly all the men in tactics are officers of similar education, and because one cannot even imagine a good practical tactician who did not have a good knowledge of the theory, or a man with a clear theoretical comprehension of tactics, who had not attained it after considerable practical experience. Exceptions must be admitted, of course; perhaps the most striking one is Clerk of Elden, whose scheme of naval tactics Nelson and Rodney followed; but who, it is said, was never on board a warship in his life.
The suggestion here made that the theory and the practice of tactics are not very far apart, does not mean that the man who is the best at either, will necessarily be the best at the other. For it is obvious that the kind of man who would be a good strategist might be a good theoretical tactician; and yet, from various reasons, such as excitability, or weak nerves, be unable to handle men, even in time of peace; and that, on the other hand, a very good practical tactician, in a limited sense, a man who could handle extremely well, small bodies of men or ships, under conditions with which he was familiar, might have so little grasp of the theory, as to be wholly at loss, if put in charge of large affairs, or confronted with a novel situation.
Broad Subject of Tactics not Important to Naval Officers.—But it is far from clear that the broad subject of tactics has much practical interest for naval officers. There can be no doubt that a science and an art of tactics, might be developed, applicable to both the land and the sea; but it seems sure that no such art or science exists to-day; and it also seems sure that, if it ever be developed, it will be found that the underlying principles, common to both land and naval tactics, will be few and simple; because the conditions to which they must be applicable, are so exceeding different. The writer will go so far as to declare that he has never seen a definition of tactics, or a description of its aim, which seemed to him even to include naval tactics. Many books have been written on the subject of tactics; but the most casual inspection of them shows that" tactics" meant to the writers the tactics of soldiers. Not only have the writers made no endeavor to include naval tactics, but their failure is so marked, and evidently so innocent, as to betray the fact that they never even thought of naval tactics.
Danger of Applying Principles of Land Tactics to Naval Tactics.—If this statement be correct, it follows that naval officers should be very careful how they attempt to apply the principles of land tactics, even if they are called "principles of tactics," to naval conditions. The temptation to discover similarities is very great to a certain class of active minds; but when great ingenuity is required to make an analogy, and one finds himself pleased with its brilliancy, then it is the time to scrutinize it carefully and determine whether the analogy be true or false: and when the matter is so important as naval tactics, he is justified in throwing the burden of proof entirely on the affirmer of the analogy.
And let not this declaration be considered academic:—for it is practical in the highest degree, and concerns the very ground work of Naval Science. Much has been written and said by naval men of influence, in behalf of or against certain schemes of—say naval organization, naval ships, and naval tactics—quoting, as arguments, some principles of purely land tactics, and adding that "principles are always true."—Yes, principles are always true, but the way in which some people understand some principles may be utterly untrue; and principles which state a truth about one thing cannot necessarily be held to state it about a different thing. Captain Bunsby's celebrated aphorism, "The bearings of this observation lays in the application on it," came not so far from being a wise remark, ridiculous as it really was; for we are very apt to take some general truth, and make with it an application that is utterly erroneous.
An instance of an attempt to apply to naval tactics a principle found good in land tactics, is the contention advanced by some that, in a fleet fight, each fleet should have a reserve. The only argument the writer has ever heard advanced is that "It is a principle of tactics" —meaning land tactics. It is a principle that a land force should have a reserve;—yes—but why? Simply because it has been found to be a good plan to have one. But it has never yet been found good for a naval force to have one; and therefore it is not a principle of tactics, but only a principle of land tactics; and no one has a right to insist on applying it to naval tactics.
Armored Cruisers not Comparable to Cavalry.—A somewhat similar fallacy is the oft-repeated justification of the armored cruiser—that it is comparable to the cavalry of an army.
In the first place, it is not comparable to the cavalry; and in the second place, no one has proved that a navy needs anything comparable to the cavalry. It is not comparable to the cavalry, for the reason that it has not nearly the same speed, relatively to the other vessels of a fleet, that the cavalry has to the other branches of an army; and because it has not nearly the same power, either offensive or defensive, relatively to the other ships, that the cavalry has to the other branches. And a person would have to labor hard to prove that a navy needs something com- parable to cavalry:—for how can one find on the open sea, and within the restricted space which even the largest enemy's fleet can cover, any opportunity for those quick surprises, or those sudden attacks on exposed lines of communication, stretching away for miles, which is one of the principal employments of cavalry; and can one even imagine a squadron of armored cruisers making a charge in battle against battleships, at all comparable to those charges of cavalry, which again and again in history, have been hurled with irresistible violence against a vulnerable point?
The writer does not wish to be misunderstood as questioning the usefulness of armored cruisers; for he is merely questioning the logicalness of an oft-repeated argument. At the same time it may be well to point out here, that, though we can find a use for our armored cruisers, now that we have them, yet nevertheless, if we had ten battleships, instead of our ten armored cruisers, our fleet would be much stronger.
If it be true, as the writer believes, that tactics as practiced on the land must be very different from tactics, as practiced on the sea, it follows that not only will it do little good, from a naval standpoint, to devote much time to it, but also that it may do harm; not only by taking our attention from the subject of strictly naval tactics, but also by misleading us.
Battleships More Powerful than Armies.—In fact, it may safely be stated, that, while the main principles of strategy apply to military operations on both the land and the sea, the conditions which govern tactics on both the land and the sea are more apparent by their absence than by their presence. On land, an army of 100,000 infantry carries 100,000 rifles. If those 100,000 rifles were all fired simultaneously the combined energy of the bullets, at the muzzle, would be equal to only 7 per cent more than the energy of two 12" guns in one battleship; and if the total energy of those 100,000 men could be concentrated, it would not be more than 25,000 horsepower, about 50 per cent more than the horsepower of the Maine. The 100,000 men would weigh about 7200 tons, about half the weight of one large battleship.
But the fire of 100,000men cannot be concentrated, and neither can their energy in horsepower, nor their weight. Furthermore, the energy of the bullets falls to zero about 4000 yards away. So the statement would be correct that a battleship has more effective power, by far, than 100,000infantry. As to defensive power, an army has almost none; whereas, a battleship has armor which gives it a defensive power on a par with its offensive power. Therefore, we are warranted in saying that, by reason of its
inherent design, a battleship is a much more powerful thing than an army of 1000,000 infantry. This does not mean that a battleship could do on land what 100,000 infantry can; but it does mean that, on its element, the sea, it is a more powerful thing than an army of 100,000 infantry is on its element, the land. Furthermore, 100,000 men cannot march 240 miles a day; but a battleship can go 240 miles a day with ease.
In this comparison, no inclusion has been made, thus far, of the artillery and cavalry of an army; and it is evident that a fair comparison between the powers of an army and a ship would not be possible without considering the army's artillery and cavalry. Let it be supposed then, that the infantry of 100,000 men is accompanied by artillery in the ratio of 5 guns to every moo men, that is 500 guns; and say 17,000 cavalry, a not unusual proportion. The power of the 500 guns, each throwing say a 14-pound shell, would aggregate, if fired simultaneously, and concentrated on an ear target, the fire of eight 12" guns; and the cavalry of 17,000 could fire, if dismounted, 17000 rifles, less in energy than five 5" guns; and the energy of the 17,000 horses, if concentrated, would be equal to 17,000 horsepower.
Now, the 500 guns would need at least 6000 men besides horses. So the army would number 100,000 infantry, at least 6000 artillery with 500 guns, and 17,000 cavalry; at least 123,000 men; and their fire at the muzzle would equal only about ten 12" guns, and five 5" guns;—not very different from the armament of our projected ship, but without her speed and armor. Such an army is commanded by a general; the ship will be commanded by a captain.
No mention is here made of coast artillery, and for two reasons. One reason is that the coast artillery does not accompany an army; and the other is that, while in some countries, the coast artillery is part of the army, in others, it is part of the navy; and in other countries, like France, part is under the army, and part under the navy. Therefore, coast artillery cannot be considered as belonging to an army rather than to a navy.
Doubtless, it will be objected that it is not reasonable to compare armies and fleets by the standard of the muzzle energy of the projectiles and the horsepower of the men and ships. This, of course, is true; but the purpose of the last paragraphs was not to make a comparison, but on the contrary, to point out a difference. At the same time, it is well to note that the sole reason for having an organized army instead of an undisciplined horde of men, is that an army, organized, drilled, and equipped, is, because it is organized, drilled and equipped, a machine, possessing a vast amount of energy, which can be directed to a definite object, better than an undisciplined horde of men can; and it may be further pointed out that the reasoning above proves that our projected battleship will be a machine of a higher order, possessing in her gun-fire a greater amount of concentratable energy than an army of 123,000 men; possessing in her engines an energy more than half as great as that of all the men and horses in that army, if the energy of those men and horses could be concentrated, which it cannot; possessing also the ability to go farther in any length of time, and be self-supporting for a much greater length of time; and possessing in her armor a protection, which being practically on a par with her offensive strength, may truly be said to double her offensive strength.
In effectiveness of Armies Makes Their Operations Protracted.
—Again the great weakness of an army is its utter dependence on its communications; "the secret of war," said Napoleon, "lies in the communications." But a battle ship has no such weakness. Almost the whole effort of tactics on the land concerns directly or indirectly, the threatening, or protecting, of the communications; but a naval force is concerned with this only in so far as may be necessary to protect its auxiliaries, which are, or ought to be, in plain sight.
The managing of an army consists in a constant arranging and rearranging of thousands of little units, spread out over many miles, in the endeavor to concentrate power, at one place or another, where it may be needed. But in a battleship, concentration has already been effected. The greatest example of concentrated power in all the world is a battleship.
It is because of the comparative ineffectiveness of armies that the operations of armies last so much longer than the operations of fleets. If the energy of two armies could be concentrated in two units, each unit the size of a fleet, a war could be decided by one battle, lasting one hour. The proof of this is at hand in the war between Russia and Japan; the armies fought for many bloody months, without decisive issue; and the issue was decided by the naval battle of the Sea of Japan in less than one hour.
NAVAL STRATEGY.
Many books have been written on strategy; but few on naval strategy. And while it is true that the main principles of strategy apply to warfare on the sea as well as to warfare on the land; yet, nevertheless, most of the books on strategy deal so specifically with the application of those principles to warfare on the land, that a great deal of thought and study is needed, to work out their application to warfare on the sea; an amount of thought and study that few naval officers have time to give. It is true that Coulomb's "Naval Warfare" and Mahan's books on "The Influence of Sea Power" deal with naval strategy. Yet they deal with it secondarily, not primarily. Their books were not written to expound naval strategy, but to prove theories that the writers held. Coulomb proves that "command of the sea" has always been essential to success in wars between two countries that bordered on the sea; and Mahan's books prove that the possession of the dominating power upon the sea has always been essential to every nation that has ever achieved greatness. Their books, excellent as they are, deal with things that happened many years ago; they are mainly historical.
Of course, books like these are essential to the study of naval strategy; and historical examples must be cited, in order that we may see what was done, to make naval strategy successful in the past, in order that we may be helped (not guided rigidly) to see what should be done, to make naval strategy successful in the future.
So, it would seem that, even if such books underlie modern naval strategy, they do it in the same way that books written twenty years ago on steam engineering underlie modern steam engineering; and that a student of modern naval strategy has as much difficulty in learning modern naval strategy, by reading books twenty years old, as a student of modern steam engineering would have, in learning modern steam engineering, by reading books twenty years old.
In fact, does he not have more difficulty? Books written on steam engineering twenty years ago, were clear and precise; and they were written by so many men, and were subjected to such rigid criticism by experts, and were based on such trustworthy data, and their conclusions were tested by so many practical trials, that they give the student of to-day a foundation that he can depend on absolutely. But no books written twenty years ago can be called clear and precise in their dealings with naval strategy; none have ever been subjected to very rigid criticism by experts, because there have been no experts; their data can hardly be called trustworthy, because much of it had to be guessed at; and their conclusions have not been tested by many practical trials. So the student of to-day has not even a foundation that he can depend on.
What we need is a book, in English, which shall point out clearly the application of the principles of strategy to naval conditions:—not to general naval conditions, not to naval conditions in the galley period, or the sailing days, but to naval conditions now.
A few such books have appeared in German within the past few years. But, while some of us a reacquainted with the thrilling novels of France, and can converse with senoritas in the eloquent language of Spain, the professional books of Germany are as the hieroglyphics of Assyria.
When one remembers that our Naval War College was the first institution ever formed to study naval strategy; that this War College received for many years the whole-hearted condemnation of most naval officers, who would have put it to death, but for Luce, Mahan, Sampson, Taylor, Goodrich, and a few others; that it was started as late as 1885; that not until the advent of the General Board did the recommendations of the college get an influential hearing before the Department; and that all other Powers, except one, have seemed to be as lax as we, one can see why naval strategy is so little understood.
Probably there is not a subject in the world more dimly comprehended. Not only are its principles uncomprehended, but the conditions as well. Discussions are held on the most fundamental points. As to the comparative value of speed in battle, the greatest diversity of opinion exists. The same may be said as to the size of warships; among officers of the highest rank and the greatest intelligence, an incredible contrariety of views can be found. A great difference exists as to the relative value of coaling stations and colliers. Is there among the members of the naval profession any agreement as to the way in which the armor should be distributed? What kind of a bow is the best—ram, straight, or clipper? What is the best method of securing the best officers in the various grades? Is a naval officer primarily a warrior who wields certain weapons, or is he primarily an engineer, who utilizes his engineering powers for the purpose of making war? Why have all the navies built certain armored cruisers; although battleships would have been very much more useful, while just as cheap to build, and cheaper to maintain? Should a navy do nothing but train its officers and men to handle their ships and guns with the skill which only specialization can accomplish, letting the marines do the work of landing; or shall it continue to devote a lot of time to soldier work? Shall the navy be built so that it can "prey on commerce," or shall it let the commerce go? What is the best clothing for the enlisted man? etc., etc.
These are all common place matters, and can hardly be said to be included in naval strategy, except as conditions. Yet they concern the constituents of naval force; and as such, they underly naval strategy, and must be understood before naval strategy can be applied successfully to naval war.
It may be objected that a like diversity of opinion exists in all professions; and that we do not know about them, but do know about our own. But a little reflection will show us that some sciences, such as engineering, rest on very sure foundations; and that even in medicine, which is, next to naval strategy, the most confused science in the world, we do not find physicians disagreeing about fundamentals, say the efficiency of vaccination. In other words, the ratio of admitted theories and practices, to disputed theories and practices, seems very much greater even in medicine than in naval strategy. In regard to naval strategy, it may truly be said that "the navy is at sea."
The writer does not pretend to have any knowledge of naval strategy. It is his ignorance of naval strategy, and his inability to get any definite knowledge about it, that calls his attention to its undeveloped state; for if it be a fact, as it seems to be, that wars on land have been decided more by strategy than by anything else, it is high time that naval officers found out at least the underlying principles of naval strategy. It seems fairly sure that no nation except one, has studied it. If this one nation has studied it, and we do not, and if we fight her, we shall probably be whipped,—and deserve it.
Of course, the study of naval strategy of itself, can do little practical good, until we determine the proper constituents of naval force to which the strategy is to be applied. We must study the conditions and then the application of the principles to the conditions. Taking up some of the various points of difference of opinion just mentioned, concerning the proper constituents of naval force, the cases may be stated some what as follows:
Colliers vs. Coaling Stations.—The advocates of colliers insist that a fleet should be an integral thing, so composed as to be the utmost its country can do; that, to this end, it should be able to strike a blow that will crush the naval resistance of the enemy. They point out that our war with Spain was decided by the naval battles of Manila and Santiago. They point out that, in the war between Russia and Japan, even after the Japanese army had had its great victories in Manchuria, even after the Russian reverse of August 10, a decisive victory by Rojesvensky over Togo, would have given Russia control of the sea, between Japan and her army, so that the Japanese army would have been unable thereafter ever to ever get any supplies from Japan. They point out that, even if Rojesvensky had been very much later than he was in getting to Japan, this same result would have occurred. They point out
that a fleet of sufficient power, provided with means of going to battle, will surely win any naval war; that the only thing needed in a naval war is, first to have an adequate fleet, and second an adequate means of getting it where it ought to go. They point out that, no matter how fully adequate a fleet may otherwise be, no number of coaling stations now possible to any country, except Great Britain, will suffice to help her much to go to any distant point; and that, if she cannot go where she is needed, she will be of no use. They point out that, even in the case of Great Britain, who has had the foresight to get nearly all the places possible for coaling stations, the risk, difficulty, and delay would be very great of getting coal at just those stations, with a vigilant enemy hovering about, who knew where the coaling stations were;—whereas, a fleet, accompanied by colliers, could coal at convenient places without the knowledge of the enemy.
The advocates of coaling stations declare the collier plan to be utterly impracticable, except on a scale so small as to be useless; by reason of the enormous expense involved, and the handicap on the movements of the fleet, imposed by the colliers. They say that the cost of colliers as fast as modern battleships, and capable of carrying enough coal, both for the other ships and themselves, would be utterly beyond possibility; and that, if the colliers be slower than the battleships, they nullify the value of the speed of the battleships, which so much fighting power is sacrificed to get. To this, the apt reply is made, that colliers and auxiliaries do not have to be very fast, because they do not accompany battleships into battle; that battleships do not have to be fast, except in battle; that, in going to battle, the whole fleet, from a combination of reasons, should go at the most economical speed.
Speed.—Both the advocates and the opponents of high speed in battleships are agreed that speed is a desirable quality for purposes of both strategy and tactics, but disagree as to its value relative to other qualities which must be sacrificed to obtain it. This question has been discussed so much lately, that nearly all that can be said on either side has been already said.
The differences of opinion concern principally two points, one strategical and the other tactical.
The strategical point is whether or not it is very important for a battle fleet to be able to get to a distant point quickly. The advocates of high speed point out that ability to make junction between the separated parts of a fleet may be the deciding point of an entire war; and they show that this was the controlling idea in the British maneuvers of 1904, which were intended to simulate the most modern conditions of naval war. The dissenters argue that no such condition as a divided fleet ought to be considered for a moment. They insist that we must have our fleet together long before war breaks out; in fact, keep it together always. They contend that it will not make any difference whether or not the fleet goes quickly to the scene of action, provided the whole fleet goes together, and that it arrives in condition to do the best that is in it. They declare, furthermore, that, no matter how fast the battleships may be, they will never be able to go very fast very far:—first, because of the necessity of economizing coal, and second, because the probabilities are almost certainties that some of the fighting or auxiliary vessels will make the fleet slow down.
The tactical question, though very complex, may be stated briefly, as follows:
The high speed advocates hold that the faster fleet cannot only go into and withdraw from battle at will, but that it can secure a position of advantage—such as a position to sunward or windward—and can maintain it as long as it wishes; also that it can draw ahead of the slower fleet, to a position where it can cap or T, and where it can use its torpedoes more effectively than the slower fleet. The dissenters admit all the advantages except the capping; but they deny their great importance; and they deny flatly the ability of the faster fleet to cap (except in restricted waters), pointing out that all the slower fleet has to do is to head away from the faster fleet, compelling it to move in an arc of longer radius than that on which the slower fleet will move.
The subject is evidently one that it is difficult to submit to quantitative analysis. This is apparent from the following considerations:
1. In as much as battles, at the present time, can be decided by gun-fire only, and as we must presuppose equal gunnery skill on both sides, the question is, with a given weight of hull, what weight shall go into motive power, and what weight into guns, armor and ammunition, in order to attain the most effective gun-fire—not in a fight between two ships—but in a fight between two fleets?
2. It is not necessary to begin at the beginning, and suppose that ships must be designed de novo; because the fact that all great navies use 12" guns and corresponding armor, and are building ships of at least 16,000 tons, makes such conditions a starting point. It would be foolish, for instance, to build 8" guns to attack armor intended to keep out 12" shell; and it would be equally foolish to install armor that could withstand only 8" shell, when 12" shell were to be fired at it.
3. Sixteen knots and two turrets with 12" guns do not need 16,000 tons. We find ourselves, therefore, with a considerable weight, which we can put into motive power, and into guns, armor and ammunition. How shall we divide it?
4. It is easy to calculate how much a given weight will increase the guns, armor and ammunition of a ship, because we know how much they weigh. It is also easy to calculate how much a given weight will increase the speed of a ship. If we could only calculate how much a given increase of speed above 16 knots would increase the fighting power of a—not ship but fleet—the problem could be solved by arithmetic.
5. Let us imagine two fleets of 16 ships each. If they are abreast in parallel columns at 6000 yards, which now seems to be considered the standard fighting distance, it is plain that both fleets can use their maximum broadside fire, and that neither has a tactical advantage so far as gunnery is concerned. It is also plain that, so long as they remain in parallel columns, neither side has any great tactical advantage; though ability to concentrate on the leader of the slower fleet would be a tremendous advantage, if the admiral of the slower fleet were so foolish as to put his flagship at the head, where the faster fleet could concentrate on it, and where it could get support from ships astern only.
6. It is possible that the fleet of the greater speed might be able to T the slower fleet. But no case is known where this actually happened; and there seems no good reason why it ever should happen, except under extremely improbable circumstances.
7. The faster fleet may be able, not only to get a position in advance of the slower fleet, but to form on a line of bearing at an angle to it, refusing its own rear; thus getting the advantage of ability to concentrate on the leading ships of the slower fleet at a less average range than that of the slower fleet. If the average range of the faster fleet were 6000 yards, and that of the slower fleet 7000 yards, the advantage would be about in the ratio of 7 to 6. If, in addition, the four slow rear ships could not use more than their bow fire, which would be say half their beam fire, the slower fleet would, for the moment, be reduced practically from 16 ships to 14. But this ratio would not exist, except during the existence of these conditions; because the very fact of the comparative isolation of the four rear ships, while decreasing their gunnery efficiency, would also decrease the damage they would receive. In as much, as the 16 ships of the slower fleet would undoubtedly be reduced in practical efficiency below 16 but not so far as to 14, perhaps we shall not be far wrong, if we estimate that their efficiency would be reduced from 16 to 15.
8. As the gunnery advantage, by the ratio of ranges, would be reduced as 7 to 6, and by the tactical position from 16 to 15, we may conclude that the resulting ratio would be as 7x16 to 6x15, that is as 112 to 90, or about 100 to 80.
9. If no greater advantage were given by superiority in speed than this, we should have to take this as the basis on which to calculate the ratio between the weight given to speed and the weight given to guns, etc. In fact, in discussions on naval tactics, hitherto, this advantage has received ten times more attention than any other.
10. Now, can superior speed do anything else?
Yes; under some conditions.
It will be noted that all of the considerations just mentioned
refer to the range in one case, and the number of guns that can be brought to bear in the other case; but it is easy to see that the difference between the average ranges of two contesting fleets cannot be made very great if these average ranges be great, and neither can the difference in the number of guns brought to bear; except in the highly improbable case of capping.
Now, everyone knows that the difficulties of accurate shooting are so great, that an extremely small disturbing cause can reduce the number of hits on a distant target by a large proportion; a seemingly trivial difficulty, for instance, could reduce it from 2 to 1. A ship even thirty feet high, 6000 yards away, subtends an angle of less than six minutes; so that to hit it, a gun pointer must not make a mistake greater than three minutes, on either side, even if his sight be set at the exact sight-bar range; or, if he fires exactly at the right instant, his sight-bar range must be correct within half the danger space:—which, for a target thirty feet high and 6000 yards away is less than 100 yards.
Let us remember that a ship is rolling slowly when only rolling 1/2° per second, that an error of 3' of arc will be caused during such rolling by firing, with a turret gun, at the wrong instant by only 1/10 second of time; that, in order to spot near a target 600 0yards away, with an error not greater than 100 yards, a spotter even if 100 feet high, must instantly estimate the angle between the water-line of the target ship and the splash, with an error not greater than 20 seconds of arc; even if the water-line be unchanging, and the sea flat:—while, in fact, the water-line of a ship moving fast in the high waves of deep water, is not only rising and falling all the time, but is rising and falling varyingly at different points of her length; and a splash 6000 yards away, even when waves are only ten feet high, between crest and trough, is continually rising and falling, with an extremely irregular motion, from a position apparently about six feet below, to a position apparently about four feet above, the normal water-line of a target ship 100 yards beyond; while carrying on much more irregular antics, with relation to her actual water-line.1
Now, if it be so very difficult to hit a target, and so very difficult to tell how much to correct a miss, what is the best thing to do, in order to make both more difficult still—for the enemy?
Two things suggest themselves:
(a) Place him so that his ships will roll more than ours.
(b) Make it more difficult for him to estimate or measure distances, and to tell when to fire:—in other words, make it more difficult for him to see.
The first thing is very difficult to accomplish, for the reason that fleets are almost sure to head in the same direction; but the second is easy to accomplish, under certain conditions, if one has superior speed, by—
(a) If there be considerable wind and rain, keeping to wind-ward. Who could do good shooting to wind ward in a high wind and rain?
(b) If there be a bright sun, keeping to sun ward of the slower fleet, until near say an hour before sundown or a few minutes after sunrise and then attacking. Who can fire accurately, or spot accurately, with the sun in his eyes, the target ship in shadow, and its water-line invisible?
Could a gun pointer make twice as many hits per minute at a
1 This was written when the navy had faith in "vertical spotting," and was intended to show, incidentally, the folly of that faith. The fact that "vertical spotting" has since been practically abandoned does not affect the desirability of making it difficult for the enemy to see.
brightly illuminated target6000 yards away as he could at a target which had a bright sun directly behind it? The answer may seem a curious one:—that he probably could, if his skill were very great; and that the greater his skill, the greater the difference would be. But the answer really is not curious; because great skill in any art is dependent on good conditions for exercising it: and bad conditions injure the performance of good artists more than the performance of bad artists; whether those artists be gun-pointers, billiard players or pianists.
As all navies are now developing good gun pointers, we see that the question is of the effect of strong sunlight in the eyes, on the shooting of good gun pointers.
In order to test the effect of sun-glare, let any man mark a rectangle 3" long and 1/5-inch high on a card, and hold the card one foot from his eye. The rectangle will represent the horizontal and vertical angle of a ship having 30 feet freeboard and 450 feet length, 6000 yards distant, when viewed through a telescope—sight having a magnification often. Let him hold this card, first away from the sun, and then towards the sun, shielding his eyes as best he can; and then answer this question; bearing in mind that the cross wires sweep across that rectangle in 75 second, and supposing the firing to be done from a turret gun, and the ship rolling 1/2° per second.
Probably nearly every man, after trying this, would declare that a skillful gun pointer could make more than twice as many hits per minute with a low bright sun behind him as with it behind the enemy; and some might give a greater ratio; bearing in mind that the blinding effect of sun-glare becomes unbearable, after a few minutes.
Now, the fleet with the greater speed can, with plenty of-sea room, get in any direction it pleases from the slower fleet, and make her take any line of bearing, by threatening to cap; it can also defer action—within limits—until it gets conditions the way it likes them, and then attack at once; so that superior speed under some conditions, could be made to more than double the value of the gun-fire of one fleet, as compared with that of the other.
II. When we come to deciding how much superiority in speed is needed to do this, we find it a little difficult; but it seems as if two knots would be needed. Two knots per hour is 200 feet per minute, and 24 knots in a day of twelve hours. The sun is to the east in the morning, and to the west in the evening; and a fleet that was on the wrong side would have to pass entirely around the slower fleet, and form four miles off on the other side.
So, it seems as if a fleet which could go two knots per hour faster than an enemy's fleet, would—after meeting on the open sea—be able to abstain from battle until the weather conditions, either because of wind or rain, or because of bright sunlight, enabled it to take a position such that it could make more than twice as many hits per gun per minute as the enemy.
12. It may be objected that no admiral would dare to abstain from battle so long as might be necessary, in order to obtain the conditions he desired. To this, the answer may be made, that the delay would, as a rule, be more disadvantageous to the slower fleet than to the faster; for the reason that, as the two fleets would be running at about the same speed during the waiting interval, the slower fleet would be burning up the greater proportion of its coal.
In fact, if the fleets found each other when equally full of coal, it might be possible for the faster fleet simply to abstain from fighting until the slower fleet's coal were all consumed. Of what use would the superior gun power of the slower fleet be then? If the opposing admiral happened to be of an unamiable disposition, he might then simply steam away, taking all the colliers and supply ships, and leave the other fleet immobile on the ocean, admiring its powerful guns.
13. This reasoning seems to lead us to the conclusion that a fleet of 20 knots, having four 12" guns per broadside of each ship, could whip an equal number ships of equal size, having a speed of 18 knots and eight 12" guns per broadside.
14. But this reasoning is based on an important assumption: the assumption that the fleets meet so far from land, and under such conditions, that no strategical requirements may compel the faster fleet to fight when it does not wish to do so; on a calm day and with an overcast sky, for instance, thus surrendering the tactical advantages of a sunward or windward position.
15. Very few fleet battles and no fleet battles under steam, have been fought far away from land. And it can hardly be said to be probable that future fleet battles will be so fought; because battles are not fought for the mere sake of fighting, and are not arranged like prize fights to take place at some point far away from any where. The meeting points of fleets are determined by strategical conditions. Usually, one fleet wants to fight then and there, because the conditions are favorable; and the other fleet does not want to fight, but is compelled to do so. It is only rarely that both sides think the conditions advantageous.
The battles of the Yalu, Manila, Santiago, Port Arthur and Tsushima illustrate this point; and though the admirals could have delayed battle a little while, the strategical conditions were such in every case, that no admiral could have delayed it very long.
16. This shows us that an important claim of the high speed advocates is absolutely unwarranted; the claim that the faster fleet can abstain from action, and go into action, exactly when it pleases. The claim is good tactically, but not good strategically:— except perhaps for a few hours, or under peculiar conditions, or when both fleets wish to fight. Did Togo try to defer action and wait for more favorable conditions? Would he have been justified in doing so—even though his fleet was much faster than the Russian fleet?
17. Another contention of the speed advocates—that the faster fleet can withdraw from action when it pleases—cannot be admitted, except when the faster fleet is getting the advantage; and then it will probably not wish to withdraw. If it is getting the worst of the fight, it will be because the heavier battery of the enemy is damaging the ships; and then they may not be able to go anywhere--except down. So, we can see that the conditions under which a ship may fight are so uncertain, that, even though we can see that speed, may under some conditions, more than double the fighting power, and though we can calculate how much a given weight will increase the guns and armor of a ship, and how much it will increase her speed, we cannot tell how much speed will affect her fighting power, in general.
It may be suggested, however, that the weight to be put into a ship's motive power, guns, armor and ammunition may be considered a "constant"; that any increase in speed, even if the guns, armor, and ammunition remain unchanged, increases her fighting power; and also that any increase in the guns, armor and ammunition, even if the speed remains the same, increases her fighting power. Therefore, the fighting power of a ship may be considered as the product of some function of the weight of her motive power, and some function of the weight of her guns, armor and ammunition. Now, if a+b is a constant, the product of a and b is the greatest when a and bare equal. Bearing this in mind, we probably shall not be far wrong, in dealing with this much vexed question, if we conclude that, in order to get the maximum product of the useful effect of speed and the useful effect of guns, etc., these two factors should be considered equal in importance. The writer sees no way of stating this mathematically, or even quantitatively; but it does not seem as if it would be impossible to a mathematician.
Meanwhile, it would seem true that, if any ship is much faster than ships she would naturally fight, but with much weaker battery and armor protection, the proper equality of speed and guns, etc., has not been secured; and that the same is the case, if a ship is much slower than ships she would naturally fight, but with much heavier battery and armor.
Probably some officers will challenge the assumption that sun-glare can reduce the number of hits per gun per minute in a ratio greater than 2 to 1. Such a challenge would be most sensible; and it would be well to make it, if a test of the correctness of the assumption could thereby be brought about. It seems strange that no such test has been made under modern conditions, if, in fact, it has ever been made; for no test of more practical usefulness can be imagined, or one much easier to make. It is merely necessary for a gun pointer to fire for half an hour—say with a six-inch gun—in the early morning, at a distant target, when the sun is behind him; and then to fire half an hour in the afternoon, over the same range, when the sun has gotten behind the target. If a comparison be made of the hits made during the two periods, a quantitative decision can at once be made. It would be well to make the same test on succeeding clays, with other gun pointers, in order to eliminate the effects of chance.
While it is true, however, that it is practically only by gun-fire that battles can be decided now, yet it is evident that we shall have to consider the torpedo very soon; and it is not impossible that the speed and range of the torpedo may soon be increased so much that the torpedo will become more important than the gun. The torpedo is much younger than the gun, and possesses in a higher degree the potentiality of the future.
It seems pretty sure even now that we can depend on 4000 yards range at 25 knots; and greater ranges at less speed. This will increase greatly the advantage of superior speed in ships. For instance, imagine two fleets of sixteen ships each, at a distance between ships of 400 yards. Suppose the faster fleet has gotten on the sea side, and crowded the slower fleet so close to the land that it cannot get any closer. Let the faster fleet draw in to such a position that the slower fleet are on the quarter with 6000 interval between the columns, and calculate the speed of the slower fleet, which it can then do easily. Suppose it to be 16 knots. Now let each ship of the faster fleet fire two torpedoes exactly a beam and at a torpedo speed of sixteen knots. If the torpedoes go straight, each slower ship will be hit by two torpedoes; if the torpedoes do not go straight, each of the thirty- two torpedoes has about one chance in three of hitting one of the sixteen target ships; so that the probabilities would be that the sixteen ships would be hit by at least ten torpedoes. And it is doubtful if any of the faster ships could be reached.
The suggestion may here be made that the regulator of the torpedo should be marked for speed as well as range.
Distribution of Armor.—Perhaps in the whole realm of Naval Science, there is no matter on which there have been more various ideas expressed or larger sums of money dispensed. It would take a book to describe the almost infinite ways in which armor has been applied to ships. Considering the expense of armor, and its tremendous usefulness, and the fact that the subject has occupied the calculations of the highest engineering talent the world possesses, an ordinary man would suppose that some general plan would be agreed on, in its main features, as the best. But the most casual reference to Brassey or Jane shows that the fashions in armor are almost as numerous as the fashions in ladies' hats.
Possibly, one principle has been gradually advancing towards general acceptance; and that is, that the main office of armor is to preserve from destruction by gun-fire the ship itself; and that the part of the ship whose preservation is more important to the safety of the ship than any other part is the water-line; the word "water-line" here meaning a belt so far above and below the normal water-line, that a projectile penetrating it, or a torpedo striking it would not let the water in, either below the protective deck, or just above it. The safety of the ship itself being thus provided for, another principle now advancing towards recognition is that the guns should be so large, that there will be few of them; and that the armor should be concentrated around them, and around the bottoms of the smokestacks, leaving the other parts of the ship, above the water-line, to make as little resistance to shells as possible.
In the opinion of the writer, there is still another principle, which is that the idea so often expressed, that we must expect to lose men, and that the armor is not intended primarily for them, is as foolish as any idea possibly could be. Of all the things in a ship, which things are the most easily injured, and repaired with the most difficulty? Which are the only things that are rendered utterly useless for their purpose by a projectile going near them? Which are the things on which the control of the ship and firing of the guns directly and indirectly depend? Which are the greatest and most capable mechanisms in the ship? The men. Therefore, after the safety of the ship which carries the men has been assured as far as practicable, is not the next-thing to protect the men? In the opinion of the humble writer, the protection of the personnel has not received enough attention. This applies to all the men, but especially to those directing the ship itself, its gun-fire, and its signals.
Kind of Bow.—until recently the ram-bow has been the fashion. Now it is going out of fashion. Why? So far as the writer is informed, there are no good reasons existing for and against the ram that have not existed for thirty years, except increased rapidity and accuracy of gun-fire. Without apparently any other new evidence, some officers have suddenly concluded that the occasions for the use of the ram will be very few; and that the ram will always be a menace to friendly ships, and a foe to tactical drills. But suppose a thing that easily may happen: suppose that two hostile fleets, one with rams and the other without rams, fight without victory coming decisively to either side, until the ammunition is gone. This is not an impossible case at all; in fact, a very probable case, if the fleets be well-matched. Would not the ram-bow fleet have the other fleet entirely at its mercy, unless the other could run away? The ram is a very clumsy weapon; but like a great many clumsy things, it has the element of rugged strength, and may remain useful after more delicately organized things have ceased to be of use. And in the melee which may happen—and often has happened—in battle, when ships would be close together, a vessel with a ram would be more effective than a vessel without one, especially if about to be raked by a ship ahead.
Personally, the writer rather inclines to retaining the ram, but his reasons are not many. The ram may be likened to the bayonet; and we all know that there was a movement for many years to abolish the bayonet, and that the bayonet was about to be abolished, when its extensive and decisive employment in the Russo-Japanese war reinstated it in military favor, and with a vigor and promptness that left nothing to be desired. Now, the bayonet is a ram, and the ram is a bayonet. They are the weapons of last resort. When the decisive moment really comes; when armies or navies meet in the intimate death grapple, the bayonet, or the ram, does its horrid work; and nothing remains to be done thereafter.
Best Method of Promotion.—It is a truism that the purpose of organization is to unify the efforts of many men; to enable one man to direct the efforts of, say a hundred men, in such a way that the result will be the same as if he himself did the work of those hundred men.
If a great number of men, taken haphazard in any community, be examined, and then compared with an equal number of men similarly examined haphazard in a similar community, it will be found that the average of ability, intelligence, and character is about the same in each lot; it will also be found that most of the men in both communities do not differ, very much from the average. So clearly is this fact known, that the ungrammatical expression "the average man" is well recognized and understood. In comparing men, the various qualities which go to make them up are usually lumped under the heading "ability." The average man, therefore, may be considered as a man who has the ability to do an average amount of work of average quality in a given time. Let us call him the "unit man," and define him as the man who can do a unit of work per day. Let us admit, without argument, that there are a great many " unit" men everywhere, and that they are very easy to get.
Now, almost every man will work to the best of his ability at work which amuses him, or which is to bring him immediate reward. The purpose of most organizations, however, is not to amuse or reward their employees, but to make them work for some definite end which the organization wishes attained, and which may be of no interest to the employees. The problem of the organization is how best to bring this about. Evidently the problem is one of administration, and may be divided into three parts.
1. How to make each man do his allotted work. This may be called "driving."
2. How to manage so that the work done shall be directed along a definite line. This may be called "managing."
3. How to direct that definite line so that it shall be the best one. This may be called "directing."
1. Driving.—The first thing to do, in order to drive well is to divide and sub-divide the organization in such a way that small parties of men shall be in the charge of men of a rank just above the rank of the "unit" man, these parties combined in larger ones under men of higher rank, and soon. This is the general scheme in nearly every large organization, and may be seen perhaps in its simplest form in the organization of a regiment. It is clear that most of the work of driving each man directly must be done by the men in charge of the small parties; and yet, that a great amount of driving must be done indirectly by the men in charge of combined parties, and that the amount of driving done by one man increases with the rank of that man. For instance, the corporal of a squad drives eight privates; but the colonel drives his subordinate officers and every private in his regiment, just as much as a corporal dries eight privates, though less directly. Now, no matter how nearly perfect the system may be, by means of which the colonel is enabled to drive the officers and men, it will be more difficult for him to drive them, with any given degree of efficiency, than for the corporal to drive eight privates with that same degree of efficiency, unless the machinery be perfect; and this it can never be. No matter, therefore, how much power the colonel have placed in his hands, no matter how highly educated he may be in using that power, he will never be able to drive the large number of officers and men in his regiment so well as the corporal drives his privates, unless he be a man of more personal ability than the corporal; because he must make up by his personal ability for the inefficiency of the mechanism, which increases with the amount of the mechanism.
2. Managing.—This work is so different from that of "driving" that a man who can do one well may not be able to do the other well. To manage well, the principal quality would seem to be what is usually called "good judgment," a quality which is entirely independent of force or tact, and which may exist either with or without it. To illustrate the ability which enables a man to manage well may be done by supposing a man to lack it entirely, who when in charge of the work of a thousand men is able to make all of them work exceedingly hard, and yet who manages so that the work of 500 men is exactly opposed to the work of the other 500 men. This would be an extreme case; but all of us have seen the work of many men brought almost to naught by bad management. Now, no matter how nearly perfect the mechanism of any organization may be, no matter how much power those in high positions may have, no matter how much knowledge and education they may command for managing the work of the men below them, it is plain that only an absolutely perfect mechanism could enable those having many men under them to manage their work as efficiently as those men who have fewer men; unless the officials controlling many men have more personal ability than the officials controlling fewer men.
In comparing the qualities necessary to success in managing with the qualities necessary to success in driving, it may be stated, that, in the lower grades of authority, the qualities that fit a man for driving are the most important; but that in the higher grades, the qualities that fit a man for managing are the more important; and that they increase in importance as the loftiness of the position, the "rank" increases. In the highest rank, while the personality of the chief finds abundant exercise in "driving," this driving must be done more by what is called “magnetism" than by any other thing; by inspiring all with, not only willingness to work, but clearness of understanding as what to do. And it may be interpolated here that this power is one of the greatest that a chief can have; and that, unless the chief have it, the most willing subordinates become inefficient, because they do not know what to do.
Nevertheless, though the chief finds abundant exercise for his ability in "driving," yet the "managing" must be more especially his employment. This idea is illustrated by a battleship, in which the greatest amount of work done, is the work done by the engines; but in which the special employment of the officer of the deck, is not in seeing that this work is done, but in seeing that it is so managed as to move the ship straight on the course prescribed.
3. Directing.—Above the task of driving and of managing so that the driving is done along a given line, is the work of directing the direction of this line. No one, probably, will doubt for a moment that this is the most important matter connected with any organization, or will gainsay the declaration that the highest possible exercise of the mind and the spirit of man, is in directing along the right path the actions of many men. So great is the faculty of doing this, that, when it exists in its highest form, organization itself is not needed; and men like Confucius, Shakespeare, Franklin, Raphael, Wagner, and Praxiteles direct the minds and souls of men by the unaided power of genius. Lowering our eyes to the things of daily life, we see the exercise of this power, at the present day, principally in the creating and developing of great commercial organizations. In former days, it was displayed principally in the directing of armies. But warfare has become only the occasional employment of men, instead of the principal one; and commercial organizations have assumed an importance undreamed of even fifty years ago; an importance that is rapidly increasing.
A few moments' thought will show that the work of directing is entirely different from that of driving or managing. The same man may do all these, as does a general of any army or the admiral of a fleet; but the faculties employed in doing them are so diverse, that there must be very few men capable of doing all three well. A. T. Stewart is said to have been such a man; a man equally able in getting out of every man whatever ability was in him; in managing the business in its largest features and in its smallest details; and in directing also the entire external policy of the concern. So able was he in each way, that, starting comparatively poor, and by perfectly legitimate business methods, as distinguished from speculating, he became the greatest merchant in the country, and initiated certain reforms in business methods that have continued ever since.
But though it was the combination of abilities in these three ways that made Stewart great, yet it can hardly be denied that the principal factor was the large grasp of mind, which made the wise directing of so large a concern a possibility. The finding of unit men to do unit work was easy; the finding of men to manage the various departments was more difficult; not only because those men had to exert to a degree far beyond the ordinary, certain faculties of the mind, in keeping clear a great many skeins that tended to tangle up, but because they had to drive as well. There are thousands of organizations in this country, that give every evidence that they are well managed. But when we look for organizations, which like Stewart's, have been so directed as to attain to great success, do we find many? Far from it. When we search for examples of what is great in anything, we naturally find few examples; simply because greatness is unusual, or it would not be great. In stature, in physical strength, in any human attribute, in even the trees of the forest, departures from the normal are rare, and are rare in proportion to the greatness of the departure.
This being the case, what is the particular reason that a certain few organizations have advanced to unprecedented success? Why among the manifold organizations of our country, do a very few organizations stand out in such bold relief? The country is open to all; all have the advantages of its climate, its government, and its resources. There are thousands of organizations; but the country knows only a few like the Standard Oil Company, the Westinghouse Company, the Pennsylvania Railroad, the Vanderbilt system, etc. Why have these organizations achieved such wonderful success? What ever the cause was, it must have been a wonderful cause; something as wonderful as the men Rockefeller, Westinghouse, Scott, and Commodore Vanderbilt, who gave them definite direction. Perhaps the cause was the genius residing in those men. This seems possible, when we reflect that, in some cases like the Bell Telephone Company, not only the directing of the company, but its starting, its creation, were due wholly to one brilliant idea in the brain of one man. What other cause then can be accepted as sufficient?
In the opinion of the writer, no other cause can be accepted as sufficient. History shows that, back of every movement, political, religious, or commercial, there can always be found, if the search be continued far enough, one inspiring mind. We find behind all great movements, men like Peter the Hermit, Bismarck, Washington, Luther, Rothschild, Edison or Ito; and similarly in smaller matters, and in our own country, certain names are connected inseparably with all our greatest institutions and corporations.
Now, if it be true that it has been the brain of some great leader that has been the vivifying spark of all great improvements, then the amount of ability of the leader of any organization must be the principal single factor of its success. And this conclusion is not very unreasonable to expect; because the individuals doing the actual working and driving and managing must be practically of the same kind in one organization as in others. Therefore, the real difference between two organizations, measured by the ability with which they are directed, is in the ability of the two men directing.
If this be granted, even in part, it must also be granted that the most important thing for any organization is to get the best possible man at the top; and the next most important thing is to get the best available men in charge of the divisions and sub-divisions.
Such a conclusion, though here arrived at by a circuitous route, can be reached at once by the simple process of recognizing that all organizations are composed of human beings only; that the iron and brass, and steam, and coal employed are merely inert matter; that the work of the organizations must be done by human beings only, and that each human being will do his best work, in proportion as his ability is adapted to the work given him. For, in designing a human organization, as in designing a machine, the soft materials, and the hard materials, and the stiff materials, and the highly organized materials, need to be put to the work which each is best adapted to do.
Application to the Navy.—If we try to apply to the navy some of the ideas just advanced, it may occur to us that the duties of driving fall naturally to the petty officers and divisional officers of ships; driving and managing to the executive officers and captains; and driving, managing, and directing to the commander-in-chief. It may also seem that, in any well-disciplined fleet, the principal duties of the petty officers and divisional officers should be in driving; of the executive officers and captains in managing, they being relieved of the necessity of driving to an extent depending on the efficiency of the petty officers and divisional officers; and that the principal duty of the commander-in-chief should be in directing; he being relieved of the duties of driving and managing to an extent depending on the efficiency of the officers of his staff, and of the officers in the various ships.
We of the navy are so familiar with the work of driving and managing that no statement about it is required. But how many of us have any conception of what directing means? How many men in any vocation are ever called on to direct? And how many men who have been called on to direct have been able to do it well? While a man is driving, he is employed mainly in exerting force, even if he is assisting it with tact. We all know that men of very great education and mental ability are not required in order to do this well; a master-at-arms for instance does not have to be highly intellectual.
While a man is engaged in managing, he is exercising certain ordinary objective faculties of the mind, the principal ones, besides those used in driving, being sound judgment, patience, and that peculiar faculty for arrangement which the executive officer of a ship is continually employing, in keeping up his station bill.
But directing calls in top lay faculties beyond all these. Perhaps the most common one is far-sightedness, which is an extension of what is usually called "foresight." By foresight is usually meant a quality by the use of which a man takes note of what is likely to happen, and makes his plans accordingly. Foresight is constantly used in managing; but as the word is ordinarily employed, foresight takes note of things which an ordinary mind can easily anticipate. An admiral who reckons the probable expenditure of coal and provisions in his fleet, and takes measures to offset the expenditures by timely and adequate supply, is exercising foresight. So is a shopkeeper, who buys in time the things likely to sell well during the coming season.
Of course, foresight is constantly used in directing. In fact, directing could not be done without it, because directing consists almost wholly in laying plans for the future and then executing them.
Two Kinds of Directing.—But there are two kinds of directing—directing along a known course, and directing along an unknown course. Directing along a known course requires an ability not much higher than that used in managing, and not very different from it. Every general manager of a company, every bishop of a diocese, every captain of a ship, every admiral of a fleet, so long as the questions presented can be solved by rule, or decided by precedent, does this kind of directing.
But did Stewart become the greatest merchant of his time by doing this kind of directing? Was it this kind of directing that made the greatness of Alexander? Was it by this kind of directing that Columbus moved his little fleet across the vastness of an unknown sea? Has this kind of directing ever accomplished anything unusual?
Every one will answer "No"; that, though this kind of directing is essential if any large enterprise is to succeed, yet, it of itself, is not the vitals park. It seems necessary in the same way that bodily and mental health were necessary to Shakespeare; necessary, though not of themselves forming elements of his genius.
What kind of directing is it then, which imparts to some enterprises, and some organizations, a success beyond that which others reach? If it be a quality in the mind of the director, what is that quality?
Qualities of a Great Director.—Evidently, it must be some quality which gives a man a clearer idea of what is going to happen, or of what can be made to happen, than the ordinary man possesses. This does not mean that he has the gift of prophecy: but it does mean that, since no man can make anything happen in the past, or even in the present; since no man can make anything happen except in the future, the fact that a great director can make things happen more advantageously than other men, shows that he has a clearer idea of the future than other men.
It must be clear to any one that, since large enterprises take a long while for their development, and since the only time at the disposal of the director is future time, the director most capable of directing must be the man, who (other qualities being equal) has the clearest insight into the future.
But since the mind of man is incapable of prophecy, by what process can a great director get insight into the future?
The writer, not being a great director, cannot answer this question; and he feels that even the men who seem to have the greatest insight cannot answer it; but neither can an artist tell how he paints things that are beautiful.
One thing seems pretty sure, however, and that is that all great directors have great powers of imagination; of seeing things with the eye of the mind; of mentally combining, arranging and rearranging men, things, and events, so as to create effects unknown before. These powers are the powers of genius, because they are creative; but why is not a man who arranges men, things, and events, to create a campaign as much a genius as a composer who arranges sounds, to create a sonata; or a painter who arranges colors, to create a picture? " Sans le don d’imagination, point de grand general."
Two Men of Genius as Directors.—Perhaps the writer's meaning may be made plain by pointing to two men who stand before the world so clearly, that they need not be named. Each man is gifted highly with great powers of driving; each manages the complicated mechanism of a large country with the adroitness of a Japanese juggler; and each is gifted with a supreme genius for directing, by means of which their countries have been literally jumped along the line of progress. No one can read of what they say, and write, and do, without perceiving the creative faculty; which, before it can create, must first see what can be created, and second how to create it. Now this seeing can be done by the imagination only. Of course, the imagination must be clear and well controlled; for an imagination that is vague and uncontrolled is very near insanity. This suggests the true difference between genius and insanity.
A Standard by which to Compare Them.—Perhaps a slight digression may be pardoned, while one difference between these two men is pointed out; the difference that, in the case of the Emperor, we are told continually of the hard work he does, and the hard work he makes others do; while in the case of the other man, we are told of the enormous things he accomplishes. This may not be a bad standard, by which to compare the greatness of the men.
The writer has not mentioned the cases of great geniuses, with the idea that we should try to fill our grades with geniuses, but merely to suggest what may be called a "First Law of Organization," as herein deduced from the experience of organizations in general.
Men of Great Ability in the Navy.—It may be objected that men of great ability have not appeared in our navy, except in war. With the exception of Admiral Luce, and a few others, this statement perhaps is true. But how do we know; how, under our system, can a man of great ability make himself known? Frank J. Sprague, who if not a genius, has proved himself to be the greatest mechanical genius the Naval Academy has produced, and who is to be credited more than any other one man in the world, with the creation of the trolley car, got no recognition in the navy, beyond being called a crank. At the time he resigned, he had made a reputation in the scientific and engineering circles of every civilized country by his original and brilliant method of testing dynamos and motors at the Crystal Palace Exhibition in London; a method selected in competition with other methods proposed by European scientific men of international fame. And yet, Sprague was only an American midshipman on a month's leave from the Lancaster! Our navy was then just beginning the reconstruction period, and Sprague was a man the navy could not afford to lose. If he had been kept in the navy, and given the opportunity to expend in the navy's service half the energy, and inventive and constructive ability that he expended in the engineering world, it is inconceivable that we should not have a better navy than we have now, and developed at less expense. It is inconceivable that the navy would have made so many mistakes, trying to find out the best kind and size of ships, and the best types of apparatus of different kind. The Sprague Company never showed any such weakness; yet its problem, while on a smaller scale, involved more unknown qualities, and its solution required ability of a higher order.
Sprague's ability was not utilized, because it was not recognized. And even if it had been recognized theoretically, it would not have been possible to recognize it practically; because our system did not permit him to be promoted to a position where he would have had adequate field for the exercise of his extraordinary talents, until he had become an old man.
And Sprague was not the only good man lost to the navy by our present system. Many names can be mentioned: Westinghouse, Benjamin. Thompson, Miller, Stayton, Dana Greene, Nixon, Breed, Weeks, and many others; men of initiative and enterprise; who saw the "golden years" of early manhood go sterilely by; with no opportunity for doing anything, except what they were told to do, no outlet for their energies, and no hope of betterment.
Not to utilize able men until they are old, is to violate the fundamental principle on which every great organization has built its greatness.
Since we have always violated this principle ("the right man in the right place") can we wonder that we have on our hands so many ships that have eaten up our appropriations, and our allowance of officers and men, without adequate return? Can we wonder that our navy got down where it was in 1882; that we left torpedoes out of our ships; that we have installed in turning screws in thirty-seven vessels; that we have put sighting hoods on turrets, when parallel mirrors were used on fortifications by Leonardo da Vinci 400 years ago; that we have no naval-range finder, no battle signals, no general staff; that we have put the steam whistle where it deafens the officers of the deck and the lookouts, while they are listening for fog signals; that our conning towers are not adapted to their purpose; that we have no means of steering a compass course in battle; that we have no means of handling a fleet in a fog; that we have acres of armor just thick enough to insure the maximum effect of hostile shell; that we have smokestacks unnecessarily high, which interfere with fire control and signalling; that most of our flag officers have never learned to be flag officers; that the War College, and nearly all improvements, have been opposed; that Admiral Luce was not appreciated till he was seventy years old; that we take narrow views of the naval profession; that we have no clear ideas of naval strategy or tactics; and are only beginning to have a definite naval policy?
We are told that it would be "impracticable" to have any other system of promotion in this country, and under our government. If this be true, we must recognize the fact that we must work under a handicap, and cannot accomplish much. We must continue to get our ideas of everything naval from abroad, and to know that our profession is the only one in the United States that follows behind its corresponding profession in Europe.
Conclusions.—Perhaps, we may now conclude that,
1. The naval profession is not different fundamentally from others, except that, like the army, it is an organization, as well as a profession.
2. In any organization the most important matter is to get in the various positions the men best fitted for them.
3. This work is important (and therefore difficult) in proportion as the positions are important.
4. In the positions which direct the lines along which the efforts of the organization should be made, the highest possible ability should be secured.
5. In the naval profession, no attempt seems ever to have been made to do this. Whether or not it is possible to do it is an other matter; but the curious lack of individuality among naval officers, except where they have been pushed to the front by being in command in some battle, must be accepted as a fact. It is an old naval saying that "we are all tarred with the same brush"; and this expresses the writer's meaning fully.
6. In any organization, the endeavor to get certain kinds of men in certain kinds of positions, develops individuality instead of crushing it. A broader statement even may be made—that evolution itself consists very largely in developing individuality— in going from the simple to the complex.
7. Therefore, there must be something in naval organizations that is very wrong; something which is not only opposed to progress in general terms, but which specially prevents the development among its members of the highest qualities that are needed. Of course, organization must necessarily tend to homogeneity among men of the same grade; but it is carried too far if it represses the ability of those fit to rise. The homogeneity of the privates of the French army did not prevent the rise of Napoleon and his marshals.
8. Clearly the naval profession, especially in this country, is confronted with a very serious problem; but fortunately its members have finally wakened to the fact, and are doing their best to solve it. It is at least appreciated that the question of how to get men in the places they belong in, especially the high places, is the most important matter that the navy has before it; that, if that problem be solved, all others will solve themselves; also that the fact that it is a hard problem is not a reason for neglecting it, but the reverse.
What Is the Best Clothing for the Enlisted Man?—No one will deny that the matter of clothing is important. In all grades of society, in all countries, and at all times, clothes have occupied a great deal of the attention of the people, and caused the expenditure of much money and time. Unfortunately, and unwisely, much of the money and time have been spent, not in attempting to produce the best clothing, but in attempting to produce the most beautiful clothing. The result, in many cases, is clothing which is neither good nor beautiful; often it is not adapted to its purpose in a useful way, and does not please the eye in an artistic way.
Doubtless this statement will not be denied by any observant person; but the writer holds that, while its truth is apparent everywhere, it is more apparent on board a man-of-war than any where else. It is admitted that a handsome young seaman, going ashore in a new suit of dress-blue, looks very well indeed; but he would look very well indeed in any new and well-fitting suit of clothes: just as well as in a seaman's suit. If not, if a se a man's suit makes a man look handsomer than any other kind of suit, why do not other men than sailors wear it, or something like it? As a fact, no man wears a sailor's suit, unless he is compelled to do so. So much for the seaman's garb, as a thing of beauty.
Now, is it adapted to its purpose? If so, in what way? The usual answer is that a sailor must be active, and that a sailor's garb permits activity. If this be the reason, why are all the engineer's force dressed in it? Why all the artificers, and the mess man branch, and the rest? In the ship in which the writer is now serving, there are three hundred and twenty-nine men who wear "sailor clothes." Are they all "sailors"? One hundred forty-four are, and one hundred and eighty-five are not. Why are these one hundred and eighty-five men dressed in such extraordinary garments, which may have been appropriate once for a fore-top-man, but which have never been appropriate for a fireman? Imagine a fireman or an oiler, or a coal-passer trying to do his work in his uniform. He could not do it well. Why dress a man in a uniform which he cannot wear, and which we know he never does wear, when doing his regular work? If there be no definite reason, we seem forced to the conclusion that, for more than half the men in this ship,(and in most ships) who wear sailor's clothes, no reason can be given, on the score of either beauty or utility; also, that the fundamental principle in designing uniform is violated, and the fundamental reason for having uniform, forgotten.
Furthermore, besides these three hundred and twenty-nine men, there are thirty-six who wear caps and sack coats. These men are, by reason of their character, intelligence, and conduct, the kind of men that we should like to have known on shore as belonging to the navy; but their uniform does not indicate this to the average person who sees them.
Now, as to the men of the seaman branch; is their uniform adapted to their work? Can a man do his work well at his gun, or in his turret, with his knife lanyard hanging down and his neckerchief? Can he do his ordinary work about decks conveniently with these impediments? Does not his flappy collar get in his way, when the wind blows? Does not his flat cap blow off when the wind blows, unless he takes the grommet out; and does he not look very slouchy if he does take it out? Does his flat cap, or his white hat, or his watch cap keep the sun out of his eyes; and is not an important use of a hat, or cap, to keep the sun out of one's eyes? If not, why does every civilized man wear a hat or cap, that does keep the sun out of his eyes, except those who are deprived of this privilege? Does the white hat look well after it has been washed two or three times?
Why do our men have to wear such extraordinary inexpressibles? Why do those in expressibles open across the abdomen, a fashion discarded by other men more than a generation ago? Why is the only survival of this ridiculous custom to be found in navies? Is any useful purpose served?
Why not have a simple uniform, loose enough for free movement, but not slouchy? Why not have a simple cap and visor, such as men wear in so many kinds of out-door employment? Why not have a shirt with a sensible collar? Why have such enormous neckerchiefs? Why have a knife lanyard? Why not let the men wear trousers like other men? Certainly the present garb has not even the merit of being cheap. The uniform of the soldier, or marine, is just as cheap, if not a little cheaper.
And there must be something about the present garb that tempts the men to get out of uniform. In a certain ship, in a certain length of time, twenty-five bluejackets were reported as out of uniform, but not one marine. The ratio of blue jackets to marines is about seven to one; so one might expect seven times as many blue jackets to be out of uniform as marines, but no more. And it is a matter of common knowledge that, in every ship, blue-jackets are constantly reported for being out of uniform, but very rarely a marine. May one not conclude that the marines' uniform is better adapted to his work than the bluejacket's is to his work? So may not the fault be a little ours, and not entirely the bluejacket's?
Certainly it is worth thinking about. Perhaps a uniform more adapted to modern man-of-war conditions would remove many causes of discomfort on board ship, and enable officers to devote to other purposes the time they now spend in measuring collars. In regard to shore-going, it is well known that the uniform of the seaman does him no good when he goes a shore, but a lot of harm. It is a hard fact that the most exemplary man in sailor clothes is suspected on shore, and is not welcomed except by saloonkeepers. He would be happier if he went ashore in a uniform less identified in the mind of the people with great bravery at sea and great drunkenness on shore.
The writer proposes a plain blue or white cap, with an anchor in front; a loose blue or white shirt, with a turn-down collar, buttoned to the throat with small navy buttons; a plain black necktie, no knife lanyard, and plain blue or white trousers of ordinary cut, except that there would be a lacing behind, to permit the trousers to be worn without suspenders, and yet to fit well around the body. The present rating badges and other designations would afford sufficient decoration for good taste. He also proposes that the mess man branch wear a distinctive uniform, because they form a distinctive class. The present uniform of stewards and cooks seems excellently adapted to their work, and, with small modifications, would be good for mess attendants too.
If the marines are taken from our ships, a uniform for the bluejackets that is less slouchy will become even more desirable than now. For, though marines are less useful on ship board than an equal number of bluejackets, their uniforms give an air of neatness and trimness, which offsets, in a measure, the slouchiness of the bluejackets about the decks.
NAVAL TACTICS.
Naval tactics has been defined as the art of handling fleets in battle. But if this definition be accepted, it is apparent that "battle" must not be considered as limited to the time during which actual gun-fire is going on; but as embracing, in addition, all the time during which the fleets are maneuvering in each other's presence. In fact, during much of the time when gun-fire is going on, two things conspire to limit the employment of any tactics whatever; one thing being the injury done to gun-fire by every change in the direction or speed of the ships; and the other thing being the prevalence of gun smoke, which, added to coal smoke, hinders the interchange of signals, and even an accurate idea on board any ship of what the other ships of both fleets are doing. So clearly is this true, that it is hard to imagine a condition in which a very effective gun-fire and tactical evolutions could be carried on at the same time.
The main effort of naval tactics, as employed by a commander- in-chief, may be said to be to place his fleet so, as regards the enemy's fleet, that his ships can use their guns and torpedoes more effectively than the enemy's ships can use their guns and torpedoes. This can be done in three ways:
(1) By so putting his fleet as regards the enemy that the sunlight will be in the eyes of the enemy's gun-pointers and put his own ships in shadow, while the sunlight is behind his own gun-pointers and illuminating the enemy. If a commander-in-chief can accomplish this near sunset or sunrise, with bright sunlight, he will have achieved a tactical advantage of the highest practical value.
(2) By so placing his fleet as regards the enemy and the direction of the sea, that his ships roll less than the enemy's ships.
(3) By so placing his fleet as regards the enemy that a greater proportion of his guns and torpedoes than of the enemy's guns and torpedoes can fire effectively.
Of these three ways, the third is the one that has received the most attention; and justly so, from the fact that the first way is not of much importance unless the sun be low and bright; and the second is not of much importance, unless the sea be such as to cause much more rolling when ships are heading in one direction than when they are heading in another—an infrequent case in ordinary weather, at least with battleships. Nevertheless, the first point has an importance which the writer believes underestimated, especially when viewed from the standpoint of speed; because it shows how the faster fleet, on the open sea, may maintain a position out of range until near sunset, and then attack with almost certainty of success. Let any one who doubts, turn a telescope sight in the direction of the sun when it is bright and an hour above the horizon, or even more, and see how utterly impossible it would be to do good shooting.
The third way, that of placing the fleet so that its gun-fire will be denser than the enemy's, has received so much attention that it would be impossible in the short space available in this paper, to say anything new about it. It amounts, in some cases to flanking, to getting the line of bearing of the enemy's fleet on the beam of one's own fleet, or to approaching this condition; but in other cases, it amounts to attacking one part of the enemy's fleet with a superior force, while the rest of the enemy's fleet is so far away, or so placed, as to be unable to support the part attacked.
Concentration plus Isolation.—It may be pointed out here that, as demonstrated in the prize essay of 1905, this is not exactly the same thing as concentration, because it is concentration plus isolation; in fact that concentration is of no value, unless accompanied by isolation; because without isolation, the concentration cannot be directed against an unsupported part. An exception to this statement exists when the value of some special vessel of the enemy, (such as a flagship), or her closeness to a ship astern, renders concentration on her desirable; and the writer has been unable to find a single instance in the naval battles of the past, when concentration without isolation was effective, except when directed against a flagship.
This does not lessen the importance of ability to concentrate; because, although concentration can be employed without isolation, isolation cannot be employed without concentration.
The distinction between concentration and concentration plus isolation has not been recognized (unless recently) even by our War College, as Professor Alger showed in his comment on Lieutenant-Commander Niblack's essay, "The Elements of Fleet Tactics." And it is extremely important that it be recognized; because, unless it be recognized, an admiral may risk a good deal to attain concentration on part of the enemy's fleet, when its attainment would do no good. Not only would he risk something for nothing, but he would impair his gun-fire by attacking inferior targets. Besides, he would complicate his fleet management by additional signals, which is admitted to be disadvantageous; and after the concentration had once begun, he might not be able to stop it exactly when he wished. In this case, the concentration would be kept up too long, and he would violate a "Principle of Warfare" recognized the world over, that "there is nouse killing a man after he's dead."
The writer is aware that there is a widespread sentiment in favor of concentration, even without isolation; but he can find no written reason for it, except on page 439 of Mahan's" Influence of Sea Power upon History"; where, after describing the second battle between Hughes and Suffren, the distinguished author writes: "The practical advantage gained by the French must also be tested by comparing the lists of casualties, and the injuries secured by their individual ships; for it is evident that, if both squadrons received the same total amount of injury, but that, with the English, it fell on two ships, so that they could not be ready for action for a month or more, while with the French, the damage was divided among twelve, allowing them to be ready in a few days, the victory, tactically and strategically, would rest with the latter." And in a foot note he adds, "This remark seems too self-evident to need emphasis; yet it may be questioned whether naval men generally carry it in their stock of axioms."
The writer respectfully admits that the truth of this remark does not seem self-evident to him, and that he does not see why naval officers should carry it in their stock of axioms. Why are twelve ships, each one of which is injured, say by one-sixth of her original strength, necessarily better than twelve similar ships two of which are disabled utterly, and ten of which are entirely uninjured? They seem to be exactly equal, in fact, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we should have to consider them so. It is probable that, under some conditions, the twelve partially injured ships would be better than the ten uninjured ships; but it seems equally probable that, under other conditions, the ten uninjured ships would be better than the twelve partially injured ships. For the reason that it is best to put a given amount of fighting power in as few ships as possible, the advantage would seem to rest, under most conditions with the ten uninjured ships.
Besides, although the wooden sailing ships of Suffren's days could be repaired after battle by their own crews, as was done, things are different now. If two fleets now receive injuries in any fight, at all comparable to the fight described, they would not get into shape again, without going to some sort of navy yard. And it would take fully as long there to repair twelve partially injured ships as two utterly disabled ships—supposing the total damage in the two cases to be equal, as stated. Meanwhile the ten uninjured ships would be carrying on the war!
Gun-Fire and Torpedo Fire.—One important effort of the commander-in-chief, which must be carried on under gun-fire, is to keep his ships so arranged relatively to each other, that no ship will mask the fire of another; and heading in such directions relatively to the enemy, that they will be able to fire their entire broadsides. A similar effort will be to compel, or induce, the enemy to huddle his ships, so as to mask the fire of some ships, and to head them in such directions, that they will not be able to fire their entire broadsides.
How to accomplish this must depend on the circumstances of each situation. But it is clear that, if either fleet has the advantage of bow or stern fire over the other, it will be its game to get well forward or abaft the beam of the enemy.
The recent improvement in the range and speed of the auto-torpedo forecasts its entrance into practical tactics; and that navy is wise which foresees its influence, and arranges its plans accordingly. At present, all we seem to be able to declare safely is that the auto-torpedo will soon make us do our gun fighting beyond 4000 yards; and that it will give the fleet of the greater speed the advantage that, by drawing ahead, it can reach the slower fleet with its torpedoes, when the slower fleet cannot reach it. Attacking Colliers.—In the case of two fleets meeting, one of which is far from its base, and accompanied by auxiliaries, it might be the game of the other fleet to destroy his colliers; or, failing in this, abstain from battle, and prevent him from coaling. The enormous advantage of fighting near one's own base is suggested here; and the enormous difficulties of "carrying the war into Africa," if Africa is near the enemy's base.
Speed.—As the very idea of tactics includes the idea of movement, and, as the contest between two fleets for tactical advantage partakes largely of the character of a race, or a number of races, for a position of advantage, it follows that speed, from its very nature, is the most important single factor in naval tactics. Speed, as used in this sense, means speed of movement, not only in a straight line, but in turning.
Were it not for one fact, it would be hard to decide whether speed in a straight line, or speed of turning is the more important: but because of the fact that ships must spend more time in battle in following a straight course than in turning, we see that speed in a straight line is the more important. Speed of turning, how ever, is more important than may seem at first thought; for quickness in turning not only hastens the instant when a desired formation or position is attained, and permits the admiral to utilize that formation or position, but it lessens the injury to gun-fire while turning, by lessening the time consumed in turning.
Restricting our meaning of the word "speed" to the meaning ordinarily given to it, the writer wishes to make it clear that his declaration that speed is the most important factor in tactics is not intended to mean that it is the most important factor in battle. Other factors than tactics enter into a naval battle, the most important being gun-fire and armor.
Naval tactics may be regarded from two standpoints:
1. The broad professional standpoint, from which one considers all the factors which concern the tactical handling of fleets, and decides on the best designs of ships, and the best scheme of fleet handling. This may be called the strategical view of tactics. This view has already been considered in this paper—briefly, but as fully as the space seemed to permit.
2. The standpoint of the commander-in-chief, when actually handling his fleet in the presence of the enemy.
This is the strictly tactical standpoint of the subject of tactics. To consider it correctly, one must imagine himself the commander-in-chief of a fleet. He must see in his mind's eye abroad expanse of water, limited by the wide circle of the horizon, and perhaps land and perhaps no land. He must see his own ships—battleships, armored cruisers, protected cruisers, scouts, destroyers, and auxiliaries. He must see the like ships of the enemy. He must realize the responsibility. He must realize the struggle for position—the silent heart-breaking struggle; the enormous tension unrelieved by any opportunity for action, or vent for feeling. He must feel the situation, and say "what should I do then"? He must take account of his chance of seeing clearly the panorama of the battle, before and after the gun-fire has begun, when coal smoke and gun-smoke are obscuring things. He must remember that conning towers are so made, that all the captains must either surrender what little chance they have of seeing, or else stand a very good chance of being disabled shortly after gun-fire has begun. He must not forget that, in all the ships of both sides, the numerous signalmen, quartermasters, and junior officers, whom the captains are accustomed to employ are in absolutely unprotected positions, suggesting a generous use of shrapnel by the enemy, and a resulting demoralization in the handling of both fleets shortly there after. He must not shut his eyes to the fact that the people on whom he and all his captains have to rely for controlling the gun-fire, are about to be called upon to exercise an extreme nicety of judgment, while under fire, in estimating, not measuring, the sizes of angles less than half a minute, between the irregular water-line of the target ship and the irregular surface of the sea, where the splashes are seen; he must remember that they expose considerable targets, and may be directly attacked by shrapnel, and that shrapnel fire is very effective at 6000 yards; so that he cannot count on maintaining fire control very long after the enemy has be gun to fire at him. He must remember that, in both fleets, the smaller guns are in positions imperfectly protected, thus making it obligatory for him to decide whether, in as much as he has those guns and men, he shall, or shall not, expose their crews to slaughter, for the sake of attacking by salvos the exposed officers, quartermasters, signalmen, fire-control party, and gun screws of the enemy. He must bear in mind that the ships will be obscured by coal smoke in addition to the gun smoke; and that it will be difficult, not only to read signals, but to measure distances, and sometimes even to tell one ship from another. He must remember that the only place from which an admiral can get an unobstructed view is the main truck, which is somewhat inconvenient; and that in any position, such as the bridge, where custom asks an admiral to die for his country, he will have an excellent chance for dying, but a very bad one for seeing. He must bear in mind that a great change will occur when the fleets get drawn up in with in gun range, and gun-fire begins. Before that time, all will be order and quiet and precision. Nothing but a denser coal smoke, and a greater speed will make the occasion look very different from any tactical drill; but just before the clash, during the struggle for tactical advantage, the nerve tension will be more painful than anything short of actual wounds in the subsequent battle. Yet, so long as this period lasts, there will always remain the chance of achieving some great advantage, or averting threatened disaster, by some happy tactical maneuver; or of having the enemy make some mistake.
The naval battles of the Spanish-American and Russo-Japanese wars seem to show that, with battleships, after the battle is once joined, tactics will step into the background, and make way for guns and armor. In the days before the gun became so destructive, when ships could not be injured by one shot so much as ships can be injured now; when the torpedo did not exist, and when men were just the same as now, fleets would fight together for hours, if well-matched, and sometimes for a whole day. The Battle of the Four Days was, strictly speaking, a battle that was fought, and fought hard, for four whole days.
But, despite the fact that armor has kept pace with ordnance, ships have not kept pace with ordnance; because they are not entirely covered with armor, and have no protection at all against torpedoes; while the directing personnel of a ship are as much exposed as in the days of Ruyter. The net result is that the proudest battleship which floats cannot fight nearly so long as the ships of Ruyter; and that the disablement of one or both fleets as directible, coherent forces, will probably occur much sooner after gun-fire has begun than in the days of Ruyter.
Maneuvering before Closing.—The idea that modern fleets may maneuver a considerable time in each other's presence, before taking the irrevocable step of closing, may not be accepted by some; and so it may be well to mention some battles that were preceded by considerable maneuvering, even informer days, when the consequences of an error were not so hard to overcome as they would be to-day, and when there was, therefore, less demand for caution.
Ruyter maneuvered from one day until the next, in order to get the weather gage at the Battle of the Texel. The entire day before the Battle of Stromboli was spent in maneuvering. Before the actual Battle of Beach' Head, the hostile fleets maneuvered in each other's presence for ten days. De Guichen and Rodney maneuvered for an entire day before the battle of August 17, 1780. The first battle between Hughes and Suffren was preceded by two days' maneuvering. Their fleets maneuvered in each other's presence twenty-four hours before their third battle. Hood and De Grasse maneuvered during the entire days of June 24 and 25, of 1782, ending with a short and inconclusive exchange of shots. The battle between Rodney and De Grasse of April 12, 1782, was preceded by an artillery duel on April 9, and by maneuvering by both fleets in each other's presence on April 10 and 11; and the Battle of the First of June was preceded by maneuvers during May 28, 29, 30, and 31.
In most of the battles which were not preceded by maneuvering, the reason was that one admiral found matters just as he wished, and was permitted to seize the occasion. This was clearly the case when Jervis sighted the straggling Spanish fleet, near Cape Vincent, trying to flee to Cadiz; when Nelson caught the French fleet helpless at anchor and in confusion in Aboukir Bay; when he saw the allied French and Spanish fleet, stretched out in irregular column to leeward at Trafalgar; when Tegetthoff caught the Italians utterly unprepared at Lissa; when Dewey found the Spaniards at anchor and unsupported at Manila; when Sampson discovered the Spanish fleet rushing into his arms at Santiago; when Togo saw the Russians advancing to destruction in Tsushima Straits. In some of these cases the fleet caught at a disadvantage was doomed before the battle began; in others, say at Trafalgar, skillful maneuvering might have saved the day. But in almost every case, where the fleets were fairly matched and both fought well, a great deal of maneuvering preceded the actual fighting.
If this were the case in the past, would it not be so now? The greater speed of modern ships might possibly shorten the time spent in maneuvering for position, but it might prolong it.
The Tactical Interval.—Our would-be tactician must therefore realize that the time during which tactics rules is only the interval elapsing between the instant when the hostile fleets come within each other's presence and the time when they come to blows. Nearly everything that tactics can do must be done within that time. Now, he must realize not only this, but also that the Opposing admiral will also realize it. This will carry with it the realization that the admiral who sees himself caught in the inferior position will try to prolong the tactical interval, while the other admiral will seek to shorten it; one will try to gain time by tactical maneuvers, which will get him out of an inferior position, and the other will try to close.
If this line of reasoning be correct, we may say that naval tactics may be divided into three parts:
1. The struggle for the better position.
2. The struggle to get out of an inferior position.
3. The struggle to prevent an enemy from getting out of an inferior position.
This presupposes, of course, fleets of nearly equal strength. If they are not, the more powerful fleet would naturally try to force the fighting, unless some peculiar conditions, such as the strength and direction of the sunshine, or the relative coal supply gave the weaker fleet some tactical advantage so great as to offset, in a measure, the inferiority of strength. It also presupposes that both admirals recognize the conditions.
1. The Struggle for the Better Position.—If the fleets meet on the open sea, the struggle can hardly be decided otherwise than by speed. And as there will probably not be very much difference in speed, the struggle may last a long while, especially if one admiral knows that his coal supply is better than the enemy's; because, if he can defer the action until the enemy's coal is burned up, the enemy will have to surrender, toute de suite. This suggests the ridiculous possibility of two fleets burning up all their coal before fighting, because the admiral of each fleet had been led to believe the other fleet short of coal.
Leaving out any such contingency, we may assume that each admiral will realize that the die will be cast irrevocably when the two fleets once get engaged; and for that reason will exert every possible effort to get the best position, and not try to close until he feels that he has gotten a position, relative to the enemy's, as good as he can expect to get. On the open sea, it is hard to suppose that either fleet will have an advantage when they first sight each other, that cannot readily be overcome by the other fleet, which will have so much space and time for maneuvering; except an advantage which concerns the direction of the sea and the sunlight. If, for instance, two fleets sight each other at early day light in clear weather, and the A fleet is just sun ward of the B fleet, it would be A's game to close as rapidly as possible, and come to blows, at the time when the bright and level rays of the sun would blind the enemy's gun pointers; and it would equally be B's game to avoid action until the sun was higher.
Colored Glasses on Telescope Sights?—This line of thought suggests the possible advisability of putting colored glasses on our telescope sights, like the colored glasses on sextants, for use when looking into a steady glare sunward.
The Windward Position.—The direction of the wind and sea regarding the relative directions of the two fleets when first sighting each other, seems less important; yet it cannot be denied that even a considerable inferiority in gun power might be overcome by a faster fleet, able to keep the slower fleet to leeward; especially in a high wind and rain, when accurate firing to windward would be impossible.
The Race.—If the strength of the sunlight, and the heaviness of these a were too slight to make them important, each fleet would naturally tend to draw itself up in the best formation for giving or receiving attack; that is column, head to sea. Naturally, they would gradually close in somewhat, on more or less converging courses. Then would begin the struggle for position—the awful race for advantage; unless one admiral, or the other, knew that his speed was the less, and his guns and armor the heavier; in which case, (Vide Togo and Rojesvensky), he would naturally desire to close at once to gun range, and decide the battle by a stand-up fight.
But if the admirals did not know at first the relative speeds of their fleets, the fact would soon be decided by the race. A race somewhat like that here supposed is the race between the Russian and Japanese ships on August 10, 1904, a race lasting from about half-past two until about half-past five. During the race, gun-fire seems to have been used a little, but so little, and at such great ranges as to have been a waste of ammunition, and irrelevant to the matter in hand or the result. About 5.30, however, the gun-fire began, when the fleets had gotten within about 7500 yards. There was no real maneuvering whatever for battle positions; but the reason was that the mission of the Japanese fleet was, not to whip the Russian fleet, but to prevent it from going to Vladivostock; and the mission of the Russian fleet was, not to whip the Japanese fleet, but to fore its way on the course then held, straight to Vladivostock.
It seems safe to assume, therefore, that after a race not very long, the fact that, say the A fleet has the superior speed, will be known to each admiral, and that each will form his plans accordingly. The A admiral will feel that he has the best of it, so far: and the B admiral will gird up his loins, and try by dint of skillful maneuvering to make up for this tactical handicap; hoping that some oiler in the A fleet will let a bearing get hot, and turn the handicap the other way.
2 and 3.—Recognizing the situation, the A admiral would probably head in a little, hoping to assume a line of bearing at an angle to B's, his ships somewhat in advance of B, which would enable him to concentrate on B's leader, refusing his own rear and isolating B's rear; besides using his long-range torpedoes more advantageously than B. B might not object to A's closing, but he would object strenuously to A's getting ahead, and at an angle to his column; and to offset it, would have to turn away from A slightly. If A were to follow, the two fleets would take up circular courses on parallel arcs.
Small Gunnery Advantage in Attacking Leader, unless it is a Flagship, or unless Enemy's Fleet is in Close Formation.—But, unless the faster fleet can get far enough ahead to cap or T, there seems little advantage, so far as gunnery is concerned, in getting ahead at all in column parallel to the enemy's, except in the improbable case of the leader of the slower fleet being a flagship; because, although the faster fleet can concentrate on the leader, there is little advantage in concentrating on the leader, simply because it is the leader. The rest of the enemy's column would undoubtedly be subjected to some danger of confusion, if its leader were disabled; but little more so than if any other ship were disabled, except the rear ship.
This presupposes; of course, that the enemy's fleet is not in close formation. If it were, the sudden disabling of the leader might, in the smoke, cause collisions along the entire column, and sink several ships.
Attacking the Morale of the Admiral.—In fact, unless the faster fleet can get far enough ahead to cap, or approximate it, it would seem best for it to take up such a position that its center ship would be opposite—not necessarily the leader, but the flagship of the enemy. And not only for the sake of the chance of disabling the flagship, and of killing the admiral and his staff, but for the certainty of impairing in some measure the morale of the admiral himself. In operations on land, the beneficial effect of surprising and bewildering the mind of the opposing general, upsetting, if possible, his mental equilibrium, is recognized in the clearest way. And what could tend more to impair that cool, clear judgment, that ability to balance nicely the many quantities that must be balanced nicely, in order to make a wise decision on a momentous matter,—than to be surrounded by smoke too thick to be seen through, the ears assailed with the tremendous and frequent discharge of guns, and then suddenly to find one's ship the center of a vicious assault from several battleships; to hear the explosion of shells against armor, and to see the flame, and hear the noise, and feel the shock of explosions; and to be suddenly confronted—not only with the probability of sudden death on an exposed bridge,—but, even if that does not occur, with the probability of having his flagship disabled, and seeing the rest of the fleet rush by, like a riderless horse?
The Unexpected must be Expected.—On the open sea, it seems somewhat improbable that either fleet would be able to T the other, unless some ship of one fleet slowed down, and the rest of that fleet slowed down a great deal, to keep her company. Of course, if one fleet can T the other, she will have such a gunnery advantage that only some unexpected happening can save the fleet that is T'd. Unexpected happenings, however, are part of the history of war and must be expected. See, for instance, the case of the Mikasa and the Czarevitch on August 10; both were hit in nearly the same place at the same time by 12-inch shells; but the shell that hit the Mikasa did little permanent harm, while the shell that hit the Czarevitch killed the admiral and jammed the helm hard over, causing the Czarevitch to sheer out of column; a maneuver which caused immediate confusion among the ships, and gave the Japanese an opportunity to close in, and use their guns to the best advantage.
So, even when gotten into a bad position, the out-maneuvered fleet must try to maneuver out of it and hope for good luck. The maneuvers will consist, of course, in some form of chasing by one fleet, and of running away by the other fleet. In the days before gunnery became so forceful, accurate, and rapid as it is now, columns of British ships used to stand down towards the Frenchman's line, with the intention of breaking through, and concentrating on the rear or center, and the Frenchmen would usually fire for a while, and the nuphelm, and re-form to leeward. The maneuver was sometimes successful for the attacker, though always attended with much damage received:—but the chasing and running away could hardly take that form to-day.
Battles Near Land.—It has been assumed thus far, in considering the tactics of two fleets, that they meet with plenty of sea room. This is very interesting, as presenting the tactical problem in its simplest form; and there are no reasons why naval battles should not be so fought in the future, as many have been so fought in the past.
But the proximity of the land may give such an advantage, especially if it be the native land of one of the fleets, that one fleet may be expected to court battle there, and the other to shun it. A better illustration of the way in which the native land may be to the advantage of one fleet, and of the way in which the full advantage may be taken by one side, without the other's being able to prevent it, cannot be found than the battle of the Sea of Japan. The Russian fleet was T'd before it began to fight; that is, its slower speed made it impossible for it to keep its course to Vladivostock, without being T'd by the faster fleet; and its destruction was as complete and as quick as could have been expected; but no more so. Even if the Russians had been as good gunners as the Japanese, and even if the personnel and material of both fleets had been equal, the tactical conditions under which the battle began made the success of the Russians a matter of improbability. The value of the land in this battle consisted in its forcing the Russians to go through a comparatively narrow body of water, flanked by hostile shores, so placed that the Russians, in order to effect their object, which was simply to go to Vladivostock, had to pass through it in a direction more or less axial: while the Japanese could await them in security, and then form straight across their path. A more formidable “lay in the land" can hardly be imagined.
Another illustration of how the lay of the land may be of advantage to one side is given by the battle of Santiago. The Spanish fleet had to come out of a narrow channel, in column, while the American fleet lay across the exit; so that the Spanish, like the Russians, were T'd before the battle began. As soon as they could, the Spanish headed away; but the American fleet had already gained the critical initial advantage; and the presence of the rocky coast of Cuba denied the Spanish ships any escape from the position in which they found themselves.
The Battle of Manila furnishes an astonishing illustration of how the land may give one side an enormous advantage, which that side may utterly ignore, to its own undoing. The Spanish fleet not only had all the advantage of a navy yard for all its repairs, and a battlefield known perfectly to itself, and unknown to the enemy, but it could have had the support of the batteries on the ramparts of Manila, which had of themselves, an artillery power greater by far than that of all the American ships. This advantage was thrown away; and the Spanish fleet, anchored seven miles away from Manila, and isolated from its support, was destroyed with the suddenness and completeness that the conditions of the fight exacted.
Naval Tactics, Considered as a Game.—The foregoing general reflections about naval tactics concern the relative acts of hostile fleets in each other's presence, but have not touched upon the ways in which those acts should be performed; they suggest the general purpose of the game, but do not tell how to make the moves.
In a fleet the commander-in-chief plays the game, and tells the captains to go "ships right," etc. Each captain is as much a "piece" in the hands of the player as a knight is on a chess board. That is, he would be, if the game of naval tactics were developed to the same degree as the game of chess. But it is not. So little has it been developed, that the expression "system of naval tactics" means nothing at all. How can there be such a thing as a "system" of naval tactics, when the last naval battle, that was fought with enough approach to equality, in personnel and material, to give any chance for tactical competition, was the battle of the First of June in 1794, which was fought between fleets of little sailing ships, whose armament, armor, and motive power were utterly different from those of battleships to-day?
There are a great many chess clubs and whist clubs in which certain men have acquired tremendous skill; and each man has his own general "system" of playing. But these men have each played thousands of games; and what admiral ever commanded in a thousand battles? Nelson had independent command at Trafalgar and the Nile, and acted independently, though second in command, at Copenhagen and St. Vincent. Hughes had independent command in four battles, and Suffren in five. Perhaps some admiral had independent command in six fleet battles, but the writer does not now recall it.
Now a "system" is worked by rules. How can a system of naval tactics be worked by rules, when the conditions change year by year, and no two naval wars have been fought under conditions even approximately similar, since the almost changeless centuries of the sailing days? If some success or to Mr. Stockton would get up a real Great War Syndicate, under whose management sea battles could be fought under conditions as well-defined as those of a baseball game, then we could formulate a "system" of naval tactics; but not till then.
Need for Great Caution in Drawing "Lessons" from Naval Battles.—It is true that we can make deductions from certain battles; but the trouble is that the data are so meagre, and the conditions so complicated, that the deductions are almost as likely to be wrong as right. The battle of Lissa led everybody to an exaggerated idea of the value of rams: our Civil War gave us an exaggerated idea of monitors; our war with Spain gave us too low an estimate of the value of turret guns; and perhaps the Russo-Japanese War led many to underestimate the torpedo and submarine. We are prone to jump at conclusions, from "practical experience, "without examining all the conditions; we are prone to conclude, for instance, that torpedoes are useless, simply because obsolete torpedoes failed at some special time; and yet, none of us would conclude from two throws of a die that—say 5,—was more apt to turn up than any other number.
A "system" of land tactics seems much more within the possibilities, because a great many well-contested (and well-edited) land battles have been fought within recent years; because the conditions of land battles can be more readily simulated than the conditions of sea battles; and because the changes in weapons have been comparatively so small and so gradual, that there is less danger of error in applying the "lessons" of 1806 to the conditions of 1906.
Necessity for Studying the Game.—But, because no way seems open of devising a "system" is no reason for not studying the game and trying to see what situations are likely to come up, and what move should be made when a given situation does come up.
This is what is done in other games, in fact, every game consists in meeting situations with moves, or acts, of some kind. But to do this, the player must learn first what moves to make, and second how to make them. In naval tactics, at least at the present time in this country, we seem to have reversed this procedure: we seem to have learned how to make the moves, but not to have learned what moves to make.
In a recent number of the INSTITUTE, Admiral Goodrich expressed an idea quite like the foregoing, by saying "the tactics of formation are like the alphabet in writing, indispensable"; but what is to determine a commander-in-chief to perform any particular maneuver, and how shall he carryout his intentions?
Necessity for Keeping Tactical Drills up to the Times.—Furthermore, we seem to have come to a standstill in the matter of the moves themselves. We have been working a good deal at tactical drills during the past twenty years; and although the deck officers have at times become very skillful in making the moves, the moves are the same as they were twenty years ago, though the ships and guns are very different. In other words, we have not adapted the moves to the changes in conditions which have occurred. It may be possible that the changes in conditions have been such as not to require any change in the moves. But this is a matter that we must be sure about; because, if the lessons of the past teach anything, they teach that failure to see that changes in tactics are needed, has always been a fruitful cause of disaster. Braddock's defeat was not due to lack of tactical drill, or courage, in his troops, but to the fact that Braddock did not adapt the tactics by which he managed his troops to the conditions which he met; though the tactics had been devised to-fight highly-trained soldiers on the closely settled lands of Europe, and he had to fight Indians in a forest.
It was largely a blind adherence to old methods that defeated the Austrians before Napoleon in Italy; the same thing caused the awful slaughter of the French, moving in masses under the fire of the German artillery; and the same thing caused a like result in the British ranks, when shot at by the Boers, dispersed on the hill tops of South Africa. And a curious and significant phase of this matter, as shown in those wars, is that, if the tactics be not adapted to the conditions, the highest skill in following those tactics is of no avail. In fact, the higher the skill, the greater the ill result. It was the very perfection of the regularity of Braddock's lines that made them such excellent targets for the Indians; even if they had been drilled under European tactics, but had been insufficiently disciplined, and had broken ranks and hidden behind the trees, they would have made a better fight. And in the later European wars, the more compact the masses, the more perfect the lines and columns, the greater the slaughter, under the rapid and accurate fire of modern arms.
In sea battles the instances are fewer; largely because the number of sea battles has been fewer than the number of land battles, and because the difficulty of getting accurate information about sea battles is greater than about land battles. But we know that the attacks in column made in so many battles, by the British against the French, usually met with a fair measure of success; and we also know that any attempt now to charge a column of battleships against a column of battleships drawn up perpendicular to the line of attack, would be disastrous to the attacker, despite his superior speed, protection, and gun power, as compared with those of Nelson's fleets, and despite the fact that the "principles of warfare ever lasting." The fact that the receiver of the attack has proportionately more gun power than the French had in Nelson's day, is the only reason why the principal method of attack of the galley period and a favorite method in Nelson's time, would be ridiculous to-day.
In other words, this change in tactics is due merely to a change in conditions. Similarly, the battle between ships and forts was once conducted on fairly equal terms. Even in our civil war, ships were not at a very great disadvantage. One fact came out so clearly that the writer has heard it enunciated as a "Principle of War" that "ships cannot silence forts, but can run by them." That this was nota principle, however, but a condition, will probably be admitted by every one who knows that the guns and armor of ships have improved no more than the guns and armor of forts: and that ships have no new devices by which they can overcome the advantage, in both gun-fire and protection, that has been given to forts by modern mortars, position finders, submarine mines, submarine boats and disappearing guns.
The answer may perhaps be made that our tactical drills are up to the times; that it is impossible to prepare beforehand to meet all situations; that the commander-in-chief, finding himself confronted with a hostile fleet, will simply use his common sense, and direct his fleet according to circumstances; that he will form his fleet in whatever formation the circumstances may dictate, and change the formation whenever it becomes desirable; also that our tactical drills are adequate to carry out whatever movements are required.
To this, one may answer, in rebuttal, that even if our tactical drills are up to the times, we must see that they are kept there. Even the absolute commander-in-chief of a fleet cannot tell whether his drills are really preparing his fleet for battle, under modern conditions, unless he tests them in some way, nor can he get any experience himself, except as drill master. We must not content ourselves with asserting that our tactics are up to the times, and making someone prove that they are not. We, ourselves, must assure ourselves that they are up to the times.
The reason that Braddock was defeated was not because he knew that the tactics he was using were bad under the conditions, but because he had not assured himself that they were good.
Our Tactical Drills are not Abreast the Times.—One fact seems to show affirmatively, however, that our tactical drills are not up to the times. That fact is that, while there are only two uses for tactical drills; one use being to teach the admirals and captain show to manage the fleet and the ships in, battle, and the other to develop weaknesses in the organization, drills, and material, in order that rectifications may be made,—our tactical drills are not directed to accomplish these results. The admiral tells the flag lieutenant to signal "ships right," when there is no advantage to be gained by their going to the right; and the various officers of the deck (who would not be there in battle), get excellent experience in ship handling, but of a kind that has little relation to a sea battle, because the conditions are not realistic. No attempt is made to simulate the enemy. No attempt is made to make allowance for the smoke of gun-fire or the shock of gun discharge, or to provide protection for the directing personnel, or to minimize the number necessarily exposed, or to simulate the disablement of certain ships, especially the flagship:—and yet these are things which would come startlingly to the front in any well-contested battle.
How to Learn the Game.—So it would seem that our tactical drills are not realistic enough to give the captains much valuable experience in making moves in battle, or the admiral any experience at all in ordering what moves shall be made. If this be so, we do not compare very well with the commonest football team; and it is time that we learn our game.
Now, how shall we learn it? Shall we do it by mathematical calculations, by drawing diagrams and writing essays? This must be done, of course; in fact, a great deal of it has been done, and use fully. But the trouble is the same as is with all theoretical work; it needs to be supplemented by data, and data can be obtained only by practical experiments. Not only must theoretical work be supplemented by data, it must also be preceded by data, before we can even determine the lines along which the theorizing should be directed.
Our poor human brains always seem to stumble along as follows:—first, experience suggests the advisability of meeting some contingency; then the brain gets to work and devises a theoretical means for meeting the contingency; then practice tries the theoretical means, and finally embodies it in some practical form. For instance, a man feels cold; theory suggests covering the body; the man makes clothes.
Following this idea, how shall we learn the game of tactics?
1. Practice squadrons in maneuvers against each other, under conditions as nearly like war as practicable, in order to see what contingencies must be met.
2. Devise theoretical schemes for meeting those contingencies.
3. Try those schemes practically.
Then will follow the same succession of events as has always followed in the history of human progress; a continual finding out in practice of difficulties, then a continual theoretical devising of means to overcome them, followed by a continual trial of those means, etc., etc. When that succession ceases, progress ceases.
This does not mean that two squadrons should be set against each other and left to their own devices. The mutual maneuvering would be a series of experiments; and nothing is more blind, expensive, and inconclusive than experiments which are carried on unscientifically. Experiments, to gain successful results, always have to be directed along a definite line of investigation. It is true that unexpected facts are often brought out by experiments, even facts not along the prescribed line of investigation; and some of the most valuable discoveries in science have been made by accident in this way. But these have always been accepted as free gifts; and they have been so few that it would be foolish to expect others, or to go in blind search after them.
The introduction of competition into our tactics will not increase the work of the subordinate officers or the men appreciably, for the same reason that a man does no more work in walking to a given place than if he walked the same distance aimlessly; but it will increase the work of the admirals tremendously. In fact, the position of flag officer, especially of commander-in-chief, in time of peace, cannot fail to take on a character entirely new; and become one of great strenuousness, difficulty, and responsibility. The Question of Risk.—The tactical drills of battleships are attended with risk, and it is probable that the introduction of competition will increase the risk, in the same way that the introduction of competition into our target practice has increased the risk of target practice. Eagerness to excel blunts the edge of prudence.
For this reason, the question of risk must be considered carefully, And the boundary line between a justifiable risk and unjustifiable risk, drawn as clearly as it possibly can be done.
But it will be very much easier to draw it clearly than to decide where it shall be drawn. And before this can be done, we shall have to decide what is a justifiable risk and what is an unjustifiable risk.
This subject would need a book for its proper exposition; so the writer will not attempt to do more than suggest a few phases of the subject, as it appears to him.
It appears to him that all risks are of themselves disadvantageous; that the only thing which makes a risk justifiable is something outside the risk; for instance, a practical advantage that will probably be gained if the risk be taken. If this be so, the burden of proof to establish the justifiability of a risk is always on the man who takes it.
If this be so, not only must there be a practical advantage to be gained by taking each risk, but the advantage must be commensurate with the risk. Not only this, but the advantage must be as definite as the risk.
Life insurance companies understand this. In fact, they understand the whole question of risk, and have even learned to deal mathematically with its phases as applied to their business. The enormous wealth attained by life insurance companies in recent Years is proof of this assertion.
Successful men in commercial life must treat risk skillfully, in order to attain permanent success; for in business a man takes risks continually. Every shop keeper takes a risk, when he lays in a stock of anything.
The speculator differs from the ordinary business man, in taking greater risks, but he takes them for the sake of greater profits. As a necessary result of their methods, we see a greater measure of substantial prosperity among business men; but we find greater fortunes—and failures—made by speculators. We also see another thing; we see that some men are able to take risks more successfully than others. Perhaps the best example of the successful risk-taker was Jay Gould. So enormous were the risks he took, that nearly every one expected that his "luck" would fail someday, and Jay Goulddie poor. But he did not depend on luck. He understood the game thoroughly, and trained his judgment to tell him what risks were good, and what were bad.
But even this would not have availed, if he had not had the nerve to take the risks which his judgment told him were good. This, then, was the combination that made Jay Gould successful:
First, complete understanding of the game,
Second, a trained judgment as to the risks and gains involved, Third, nerve to follow the advice his judgment gave him.
If any one of these three factors had been wanting in Jay Gould, Jay Gould would have been like other men.
It is impossible to say which of these three factors was the most potent in Gould's success, and which is probably, therefore, the most potential cases of success. But it is very easy to see from daily life which of these three factors is the most potent in disaster. Probably any man who thinks about the matter for a minute will declare that the most potent cause of disaster is nerve, when unaccompanied by understanding and judgment.
Applying this line of thought to the matter of taking risks in tactical drills, and bearing in mind the fact that a disaster to a ship in peace is not only a definite practical loss at the time, but may mean the lessening of the fleet by one ship in a future war, we may conclude that—
1. No risk what ever should be taken, unless the justification for it can be clearly proved.
2. Inasmuch as all officers must get experience in tactical drills, and as all tactical drills contain some risk, the necessity for the experience constitutes the justification for all necessary risk involved, but not for any unnecessary risk.
3. In as much as the risk in performing tactical drills decreases with the skill attained, the endeavor must be made to train officers; but the training must be gradual, and the difficulty of the maneuvers attempted should always maintain a proper relation to the skill of the officers attempting them.
4. Maneuvers which are dangerous should not be attempted, unless it can be shown that they would be useful in war.
5. All maneuvers, and all ways of performing maneuvers, which are merely showy are unjustifiable.
6. If one commander-in-chief has a temperament like the speculator's, and another has a temperament like that of the successful man of business, we may expect the former to do more brilliant things than the latter, but with a greater probability of ultimate disaster. The former will get the more personal glory; the latter will do the more good to this country. Napoleon and Wellington illustrate the types.
Attention may here be asked to the fact that a great deal of danger in naval and military operations is due to ambiguous orders and instructions. This suggests that every officer should be careful to see not only that his orders express his meaning, but also that they cannot possibly be understood to express any other meaning.
The Question of Distance.—Closely associated with the question of risk is the question of distance. Some officers believe that 400 Yards between centers is too great and insist on 300 or even less.
The gain in concentratability is obvious, and there can be no doubt that the distance should be made as short as is consistent with reasonable safety. But it should be borne in mind that,—
1. There is no use in drilling at a less distance than we shall use in battle.
2. In battle, the danger in steaming at a short distance is greater than at drill; because the gun smoke and coal smoke make seeing more difficult, the helmsmen and the men at the throttle and reversing gear below are more apt to make mistakes in all the ships, the noise on deck and the intense strain cloud the minds of the captains to some degree, and injury to the captains or the helmsmen may occur. In other words, the conditions of safe steaming are more difficult.
3. No matter what distance may be prescribed, ships are as apt to be closer than this as farther away.
4. When a ship puts her helm over, she throws her stern across the bow of the ship astern.
5. There is some distance so small that, with two given ships -with a given speed, if the ship ahead puts her helm hard over, or if she becomes disabled, the ship astern cannot possibly avoid colliding with her.
6. The distance used in battle should be great enough to avoid-the probability of any two ships getting within this dangerous-distance.
7. If any two ships get within this dangerous distance, the game of the enemy should be to concentrate on the leading ship of the two, with the object of disabling her, and causing a collision.
8. Even if serious disasters did not then occur, buckling up could not be avoided. This would slacken the gun-fire, and bring about a state of confusion that would probably continue a long while. Unless the enemy's fleet got in to a like condition, defeat could hardly be averted.
It seems clear, therefore, that one of the first things to be decided is the minimum distance, not at which ships can steam in column, but at which they can maneuver from column; this distance being such that, if one ship puts her helm hard over, or if she suddenly becomes disabled, the ship astern will not collide -with her; After this has been determined, it will then be necessary to determine what distance shall be added to this as a factor, of safety, to get the minimum distance which it is reasonably safe to prescribe between ships in column in battle; in recognition of the fact that some ships will surely get closer than is ordered. If 400 yards be the prescribed distance between centers, we must allow at least 167 yards, the length of the Colorado, as the length of a unit ship; which gives the distance of about 233 yards as the distance from the stern of one ship to the stem of the next. It is well known that this distance is safe. The question is, can we wisely shorten it; and if so, how much?
Of course, we can shorten it 100 yards, and the ships can still maneuver in safety, so long as this distance is not actually decreased. But in the unavoidable smoke and confusion of battle, this distance will actually be decreased. Even when steaming under the easiest conditions, and at 400 yards, the ram of one ship sometimes gets a breast of the stern of the one ahead of her. If a maneuver became necessary at such a time, and the ship ahead put her helm hard over, either to port or starboard, or if she suddenly became disabled from some cause, such as a large wound near the water-line, a collision could not be averted; and such a collision in battle would probably entail defeat.
While realizing to the fullest the advantage of the concentratability given by short distance, the writer has been forced to the conclusion that, until we know exactly how a battleship will act when receiving a 12" shell at the water-line, the question of determining the best battle distance should be approached with the greatest circumspection. We must remember that if the prescribed distance be too small, it will be not only the ship astern of the disabled ship, but also all the ships astern of her that will be affected. For instance, the captain of one ship, seeing the ship ahead of him slow down, or sheer to starboard or port suddenly, and not being able to see clearly, may slow down more than he ought to do; especially if he is closer than he was ordered to be, and is not able to sheer to either side himself. This would force the captain astern to slow or back, and so on; causing imminent danger of collision down the entire column; whereas, if the ships were opened out more, no danger would be entailed, beyond the sheering out of one ship. It may be objected that ships in column are not exactly one behind the other. To this the reply may be made that they are, when about to make a maneuver; and that this is exactly the time when collisions are most apt to happen.
It may be suggested here that the time required to get into “exact column" is so considerable, that an admiral in battle may prefer to keep his ships in exact column all the time, especially as this will permit a disabled ship to sheer either way; which may, in case of disablement of steering gear, be a very advantageous privilege.
This line of thought suggests the advisability of having an automatic helm indicator, and two automatic shaft indicators, over the stern of each ship, to show the ship a stern where the helm is, and what each engine is doing. They could be secured just below the rail, and would not beat all liable to injury. The helm indicator might be a pointer, say three feet long, connected by sprocket chains to the helm, and move to starboard or port with the helm. The shaft indicators might be pointers, say two feet long, connected to the shaft by sprocket chains, so that they would revolve synchronously with the shafts.
It may be objected that a helm indicator is not needed, because the captain of the ship astern can see the ship ahead sheer, when the helm is put over. To this objection, one may reply that it takes a good many seconds after a battleship's helm is put over, for her to take a sheer that will be plainly apparent to the ship astern.
It may also be objected that shaft indicators are not needed, because the speed-cones show what the engines are doing. To this objection, one may answer that, even if speed-cones be used in battle, they will be extremely unreliable; first, because the speed-cone boys will be very apt to make mistakes and to forget to move the cones; and second, because the boys will be in the most dangerous place in the ship, and very apt to be hit by something and disabled.
The battleship torpedo has hardly yet entered into practical tactics, but we can see it coming; so it may be pointed out here that, although a small distance between ships gives the advantage of concentratability of gun-fire, it increases the chance of being hit by a torpedo. If ships are steaming at 400 yards distance, and their average length is 400 feet, the chance of some ship being hit by a given torpedo is 1 in 3, or 3 in 9; while if they are at 300 yards, the chance is 4 in 9. In other words, the chance of being hit varies inversely as the distance between the centers of the ships.
DUALITY OF THE NAVAL PROFESSION.
If one were called upon to say what is the distinguishing feature of modern civilization, as compared with ancient civilization, he might at first be puzzled to reply. Yet it is evident that modern civilization is different from ancient civilization. In what does the difference consist? It cannot be proved that we are any stronger, better, braver, or more beautiful than the people of Greece and Rome in their early days. Certainly we are no more patriotic. We have no greater writer than Plutarch; no greater philosopher than Plato; no greater orator than Demosthenes; no greater hero than St. Paul; no greater poet than Homer; no greater sculptor than Praxiteles; no greater statesman than Caesar; no greater general than Alexander; no greater admiral than Themistocles.
And we cannot prove that our governments are any better administered, or that our society is on any higher plane than were the governments and the society of Greece and Rome, in the times before they became degenerate.
Yet there is some difference, and a tremendous one, between modern civilization and ancient civilization. What is it?
The Use of Mechanism.—Clearly the difference lies almost wholly in the use of mechanism. Of all the mechanisms, that of printing is, of course, the most important. We cannot even imagine modern civilization without it. But although printing is the most important of the mechanisms there are many others of an importance such that we can truly say that modern civilization could not exist without them. Of these the steam engine, the telegraph, and the sewing machine come first to mind. After them, and almost as important, come the telephone, the elevator and the trolley car; and after these come countless mechanisms of countless kinds. Our whole life is surrounded with what may be called an atmosphere of mechanism. One may walk a whole day in the city, and, excepting the sky, clouds, trees, earth and people, see not a thing that is not mechanism, or was not made by mechanism of some kind. And the use of mechanism is increasing every year. New inventions are born continually. Thirty-one thousand patents were taken out last year, and every year the number is increasing.
Prevalence of Mechanism in Navies.—In common with everything else, the naval profession has taken on the use of mechanism. In fact, there are no other people in the world so closely associated with mechanism as the people of the navies. Even the mechanical engineer goes home at night, or ought to do so; and Sunday he spends with his family, we may trust; but that he Spends it in occupations as far removed as possible from those of his days of work, we may feel quite sure. On board a man-of-war, however, a man is not only surrounded day and night, Sundays as well as week days, by machinery, but he lives in a machine; for a warship is the greatest and most complex machine there is. And not only this, he is a part of the machine itself. No matter what station he occupies, he forms one moving part of the machine, with his place and use as fixed as those of any valve, and with a spare part on hand to be put in his place, if he becomes disabled.
Improvability of Mechanism Greater than that of Man.—Now, the greatest use of mechanism is in reinforcing and assisting human skill and strength. Human skill and strength have never been, and probably will never be, developed very high. The development of human skill and strength begins in childhood; and it cannot be said that, on the average, it continues more than thirty years. The limitations are obvious and rigid. The principal reason evidently is that every man's skill and strength die with him. No matter how strong and skillful a man may be, his son must begin just as his father began, just as weak, just as ignorant, just as clumsy. But a piece of mechanism, "lifeless" it is sometimes called, has an attribute denied to the human race—that of improvability. A mechanism, once invented and constructed, may live for ages, even though the parts composing it are broken and thrown away. Not only may it live for ages, but it can be improved upon; each improvement being a definite and enduring step up the hill that we call progress. History does not allow that man, as man, has improved very much, or that he has the capacity for doing so.
Best Illustration of Power of Mechanism is a Fleet of Battleships.—If we should search the world for an illustration of the way in which mechanism assists the skill and strength of man, the best illustration we should find would be a fleet of battleships. There is no man on earth who has his strength and skill reinforced and assisted so definitely and directly as does the admiral of a battle fleet. His own strength and skill, no matter what they may be, are subject to the limitations of poor human nature; but reinforced and assisted by the guns and the vis viva of sixteen battleships, he is a being, compared with whom the ancient conception of Jupiter with his thunderbolts was a pigmy.
If the strength of a fleet be doubled, the skill of the admiral remaining the same, it is clear that the power of the admiral will be doubled; also, if the skill of the admiral be doubled, the strength of the fleet remaining the same, it is clear that the power of the admiral will be doubled. We may, therefore, truly say that the power of an admiral commanding a fleet can be measured by the product of the strength of the fleet itself and his own skill.
It is clear, also, that what has just been said about the admiral is true of the captain of every ship; that the power of the captain of every ship is a product of the strength of that ship and his own skill. It is also clear that a like thing may be said about every officer in the fleet, and every enlisted man; that the work each officer and man can do is the product of the tools put into his hand and the skill with which he uses them.
Personnel and Material.—Of course, this is only an extension of the well-known idea that every navy is divided into personnel and material. And, of course, it is idle to talk about which is the more important, because the net result is the product of: the two. Fortunately, it is not necessary to decide which is the more important; because excellence in either is not gotten at the expense of excellence in the other. It may be contended by some—and it has been—that the personnel is the more important, for the reason that if the "personnel be excellent, it will see to it that the material is excellent. While giving weight to this argument, it may be answered that the personnel of a modern navy cannot be even good, until it has had sufficient practice with the proper material; and furthermore that the record of all navies shows that improvements in material have not originated with the personnel of the navies, unpleasant as it is to remind ourselves of this fact. We will be safe, however, in saying that it is essential to the efficiency of any navy to have as good material as possible and as good a personnel. It is clear that the personnel will be good, when the various individuals composing it handle skillfully the tools Placed in their hands under the conditions of service; and it is clear that the material will be good, when it is such as to yield good results, when skillfully used under the conditions of service.
Military and Technical Skill.—It is not necessary to think very deeply about the matter before seeing that the kind of skill required by the personnel naturally falls into the two classes, military and technical. It is also clear that no individual can do his work well, unless he does it well in both a military and a technical way. It is also clear that, although a sharp dividing line may be drawn between the military and the technical or engineering arts, yet, in the ordinary exercise of the naval profession under the conditions of service, this dividing line is blurred. In the ordinary exercise of the duties of a naval officer, his military and his technical work are so closely connected, that it is hard to tell where one begins and the other ends. Neither is it necessary to decide which of the two is more important; for any officer's efficiency is clearly the product of his military and his technical efficiency. It is true that there are occasions under which, for a short time, the military or the technical part of his profession may be more prominent. But if such conditions exist for long, it is usually due to accidental cause, and can hardly be considered a normal case.
It may seem at first sight that, in some of the lower grades of the service, including those of both officers and enlisted men, the technical, or engineering, part would be more important, while the reverse would be the case in the higher grades; that a chief engineer or ordnance officer, for instance, would have more need for engineering knowledge than an admiral. Doubtless, this is true in a measure; but perhaps not to so great a degree as might be first supposed; for although an admiral should not be called upon to descend to small details of mechanism, neither should he be called upon to descend to small details of organization, or even of strategy or tactics. All a man in a high position can do is to direct along the proper line the work of those below him; and how can any admiral or captain be the best, who does not have a very clear comprehension of all the factors which compose his fighting force, mechanical as well as human?
It may be objected that, even if this be true, technical knowledge would come more into play with an admiral, or captain, in the years of peace than in the critical moment of battle. To this it may be replied that the years of peace are just as important as the critical moment of battle; because it is the work done in the years of peace which decides how the critical moment of battle shall be met; and this work must be done, not only by developing proper skill in the personnel, in using the various mechanisms, but also by seeing that the most up-to-date mechanisms are provided for the personnel to use.
Necessity for Keeping Mechanism Up-to-Date.—Surely, no argument is needed to prove that it is just as important to have up-to-date mechanisms as to have the personnel drilled to proper skill in using them. The writer will not assert that it is more important to have proper mechanisms than proper skill, because this might be misunderstood as belittling the necessity of skill; but the position can easily be maintained that mechanism has done much more to increase the power of a fleet than has the development of skill, simply because mechanism is capable of being carried to a higher point of excellence. The proof of this is hardly necessary; for what could all the trained admirals and captains and fleets of Nelson's time do against one battleship, commanded by an ordinary man? What quartermaster of the utmost skill can compete in signalling with a second-class electrician, handling the wireless telegraph; and what gunner of twenty years ago could compete with an ordinary gun pointer of to-day, with a telescope sight and a balanced turret, electrically controlled? In 1891 a little girl eight years old, the daughter of a French officer, made a perfect shot at a target, from a turret, being simply told to press the button when she saw two lines come together.
"A Scientific Person and a Sailor."—Many years ago, Mr. W. L. Alden used to have a funny editorial in the New York Times every day. In one of these editorials occurred a sentence substantially as follows: "this story is inherently incredible, because it represents the hero as both a scientific person and a sailor: a combination almost unthinkable."
But, at the present day, the need for scientific training is so great, especially in certain branches of engineering, and an officer's duties are sometimes so purely of an engineering kind, that he must be "both a scientific person and a sailor"; and the line between the engineer and the naval officer is becoming very dim. The strictly naval profession has lost many of its distinguishing peculiarities, as have certain other professions. In fact, this gradual blurring of the outlines is common to many vocations, and is one of the most interesting facts of modern times, co-existing, as it curiously does, with the increase of specialization. The lawyer, not very long ago, stood out sharp and clear in his calling; but now there are so many kinds of lawyers, so many of them are in the employ of large business corporations, and so many businessmen have legal training, that it is hard to say just where the dividing line between the business man and the lawyer can be found. In some cases, the dividing line does not exist.
So with the naval officer. There was no difficulty fifty years ago in seeing a wide and deep dividing line between the naval officer and the engineer; but now, an officer's work may for a long time be so wholly connected with figures and metals, and blue prints, and machinery, that he may almost be pardoned if, unthinkingly, he may say in support of some contention, that primarily he is an engineer, and merely devoting his attainments to the navy.
For many years, a well-defined and recognized antagonism existed between the old-time naval officers and the engineers; but this is happily fading away. The reason for its existence is easy to find; it was simply the sudden forcing into a conservative profession of another profession, which was not only exceedingly progressive, but exceedingly aggressive. It is difficult for us to realize to-day the tremendous changes forced into the old-time profession, by the interjection of this turbulent element. And when we remember that it began only a little more than fifty years ago, when we contemplate the changes wrought, and the opposition encountered, we may wonder perhaps, that the changes came about with such comparative peacefulness. Certainly, no other profession has had an experience at all to be compared with it. It is true that the medical and electrical engineering professions have seen great changes; but these changes have been almost wholly in science and theory, and affect but little the daily lives of the practitioners; whereas in the navy, the changes have been, not only in science and theory, but to an amazing degree in the daily life of every man. The physician lives much as did the physician of fifty years ago; but what comparison can there be between the life of any man on board the Saratoga and the life of any man on board the Maine?
Resistance to Introduction of Mechanism.—For many years, not only was there a distinct antagonism between the individuals of the military branch, the line, and the engineers, but there was a distinct opposition on the part of the line to the adoption of engineering appliances, of mechanisms of all kinds. The history of the struggles and ultimate adoption of mechanical appliances, even of steam itself, is a history of which the navy need not feel proud. Many of the things on which we pride ourselves to-day, our engines, our turrets, our torpedoes, our gun mounts, our sail-less ships, were opposed, not only with passive resistance, but with a bitterness that now seems inconceivable. But they are inconceivable now, simply because these particular appliances have forced their way into the service, and rejoice in a general popularity; and this must not blind us to the fact that their adoption was kept back many years, that the service is now less far advanced than it would have been otherwise; and that, despite this fact, the navy has thus far failed, and still fails, to appreciate the importance of encouraging new conceptions. It is willing to have improvements in detail made in mechanisms whose value has been proved; but it cannot rise to the appreciation of an invention as distinguished from an improvement, or view improvements calmly, unless they are very gradual. A few exceptions. may be made, such as the wireless telegraph and the stadimeter but these were conveniences, which gave people less work and not more; and besides they were so simple, that no imagination or judgment was needed to decide about them.
Necessity for Stating Facts and Suggesting Remedy.—This may seem like a mere general complaint, unbased on actual facts; and even if based on actual facts, to be merely destructive criticism, which rails at an evil but suggests no remedy. It becomes necessary, therefore, either to withdraw the complaint, or else prove its justice; and then suggest a remedy.
A few facts will therefore be stated; numerous and important enough to show that, since they all, except the last one, came within the writer's own narrow experience, they could not have been exceptional cases, but must necessarily have been symptoms of a general condition. A remedy will be suggested later.
First Test of Telephones on Shipboard.—One instance was the treatment accorded the telephone. In 1890 the Bell Telephone Company, at the suggestion of a certain officer, asked permission to install two telephone circuits in the Philadelphia, then building at Cramp's yard. One circuit was to run from the executive officer's office to the master-at-arms', and to represent the easiest condition; the other circuit was to run from the bridge to the engine room, and to represent the most difficult condition. The company offered to do the work for nothing.
Permission was at length obtained, and the installation made. The circuit from the executive officer's office to the master-at-arm's worked well, and received a good report. The circuit from the bridge to the engine room did not work well, and received an unfavorable report, and was taken out of the ship. Why?
Because the insulation was chafed off between two short wires on the bridge. In order that the officer of the deck might be able to use the transmitter and receiver without stooping, or turning around, and in order to avoid a cumbrous pedestal, the support for the telephones consisted of a stand about three feet high, in- side of which was an inner tube, carrying the telephones, which tube could be pulled up telescopically, until the telephones were at the most convenient height. All wires of the circuit were permanently installed, except two flexible wires, perhaps two feet long, which connected the ends of the permanent wires inside the stand to the telephones which were raised or lowered, on the inner tube. The effect of the wind was, of course, to make these wires rub against each other and quickly destroy the insulation between them. It seems scarcely credible, but it is a fact that this trivial difficulty, so easily remedied, was sufficient to cause an inference and report exactly wrong as to the result of the test. This delayed the adaptation of the telephone to our use, and forfeited the assistance and interest of the only people in the country who then understood the telephone.
Telephone Installations in Our Ships.—The general telephone system in nearly all our ships is another case. Until within the last three years, when certain obvious causes combined to bring about a reform, the telephones in our ships were very much more inefficient than any the writer has ever used anywhere else. In fact, except on board ships in which the telephone installations have been made, or rectified, within the last three years, the telephones are so exasperatingly bad, that people seldom use them. Yet, the telephone is about the most perfect instrument in the world—the most valuable, the most easily kept in order.
It may be objected that the telephone is not adapted to ship use." This has been direct and easy accusation against it, and in general, against all new mechanisms: The lack of truth of this accusation, as applied to the telephone, is proved by the excellence of the telephones which have been put in our ships recently. There is no reason, scientific or practical, why a telephone should not work as well on board ship as anywhere else. In fact, there was a perfectly efficient telephone system, connecting the forward and after instruments of the electric range finder, on board the Baltimore as far back as 1890 and 1891; and yet the entire circuit was exposed on the spar deck.
The Naval Telescope Sight.—The naval telescope sight furnishes another illustration of the navy's blindness to the value of new ideas, unless the demonstration of their usefulness can be made so clearly as not to require thinking. In September, 1892, the three gun divisions of the Yorktown fired six shots each, 18 in all, at a regulation target distant 1320 yards; and they made a total score of 52 out of a possible 90, using the ordinary gun sights. A new invention, the present naval telescope sight, now used all over the world, was then fitted to the gun mount, and five shots were fired, the fourth breaking the target mast. The aggregates core was 22, out of a possible 25. The averages core made with the open sights was therefore 52/18=2.9; and the averages core made with the telescope sight was 22/5= 4.4. This was 50 per cent better than had been done with the open sights, and yet the telescope sight had never been tried before, except once, when a mistake had been made in bore-sighting it. Not only this; but had the present target been used, four shots out of eighteen would have hit it with the ordinary sights, and four shots out of five with the telescope sight. The marking for the telescope sight shots was done with great care by Ensign B. F. Hutchison.
Nearly two years afterwards, on board the San Francisco, in May, 1894, the same sight, placed on a six-pounder, was tested for two days by a Board, with the result that, using the regulation target of that day, moo yards distant, the ship at anchor, twelve officers and men made an average of 94; and only three of these had ever used the sight before. The next day, eight men, selected because of their poor marksmanship, not one of whom had ever used the sight before, except one man who had fired one shot the day before, made an average of 81.8. One was a coxswain, one a seaman, one an apprentice boy, two landsmen, one a machinist, one a boilermaker, and one a coal passer. The marking and observing were done in both cases with exceptional care: and it is doubtful if the accuracy obtained on the first day in the San Francisco, has ever been surpassed with a six-pounder.
Now, did the navy applaud the invention, and put the laurel on the inventor's brow? They called the invention impracticable, and the inventor a "crank."
Not only this, but after the sight had finally been adopted, the reports from officers of all ranks about it were, in the main, so condemnatory that the Bureau of Ordnance, as late as 1902, was on the point of retiring it from the service, and acknowledging the invention a failure. The only thing that saved it was the clear head of Sims, who proved that the trouble was, not in the sight, but with the people who constructed the actual instruments, and the people who used them; the people who constructed the actual instruments making them too flimsy, and the people who used them not securing them firmly in position. Sims accomplished this in 1904.
In other words, it took twelve years for the navy to apprehend the value of an extremely simple device, of extraordinary value, intimately connected with the very gist of the profession; though the most convincing demonstration possible had been made the second time that it was tried.
Omission of Submarine Torpedo Tubes.—Another surprising case was the striking out from the designs of the Colorado and certain other ships, of torpedo installations. Happily, the designs were subsequently rectified by the united efforts of a few officers; but the practical evil done has not even yet been rectified, because of the delay occasioned. Now, in this case, and in all others here mentioned, the cause was a blindness to the value of new ideas in mechanism which is almost incredible. In all these cases, the value of the mechanism stood as plain as the sun in a clear sky. In the matter of the torpedo, for instance, it was perfectly well known that our then new 5m torpedoes could run 1500 yards at 25 knots; that great lateral accuracy is not needed in firing at a fleet; that torpedoes were in favor in all European navies; that the invention of the Leavitt super-heater had been made which increased the speed and range enormously; and that experiments already made indicated that the turbine would much increase the simplicity and reliability of the weapon,—as has long since been proved.
Electric Turning System for Turrets.—A like blindness came almost infinitely close to losing for the navy the electric system by which our turrets are turned so well. Even after an absolutely complete demonstration of the superior control of electric power had been given at Schenectady in 1895, the apparatus used being identical in all respects, except minor details, with the apparatus since used in all our fighting ships, a Board of Officers, after testing it for two days, reported against it in toto. The suggestion was then made, by a certain officer, that two turrets of the Brooklyn be fitted with the electric system used in the demonstration at Schenectady, and two turrets fitted with whatever system the Department might present, so that the two systems might be tried under conditions identical in every way, and by the same officers. This suggestion was rejected; and steam turning apparatus for all four of the Brooklyn's turrets were ordered. The few advocates of the electric system did not lose heart, however. Neither did their enemies. The result was a conflict that lasted many months; the issue being,—not the adoption or non-adoption of the electric system, but merely permission to try it, after electric motors had been used for years under cars, in snow and mud, all over the United States, and after the Schenectady demonstration had been made. The Secretary finally granted permission for the test. The result was a triumph so overwhelming that further obstruction became useless, and yet to the mind of a man who understood the question, not one thing was demonstrated on board the Brooklyn that had not been demonstrated with absolute conclusiveness at Schenectady.
The Case of Sims.—The case of Sims was a still better illustration of our ultra-conservatism; because the reforms which Sims proposed were so simple, the need of them so obvious, the resistance to them so determined, and the benefit now accruing from them so tremendous. Sims was not an ignorant crank, but a lieutenant-commander in the navy of excellent reputation. He proposed—not a fantastic, highly expensive and extremely scientific experiment, but simply that our navy improve its gunnery in the way a certain British squadron had improved its gunnery, by firing at cheap little moving targets, by securing the sights and other gear firmly, and by practicing at loading. Did the navy see? Not at all. Did any naval officer of high rank help Sims? Not one. Who did? A civilian, President Roosevelt. The writer does not believe that he ought to write what he thinks about this episode: but he feels that every naval officer ought to regret that we failed to manage a matter so clearly our own business, and that a reform of purely naval character, so simple and so good, should have had to be forced on us by a civilian.
Fulton's Torpedo.—No mention has been made thus far of the early struggles of the navy against the light. Its resistance to the introduction of nearly all the appliances that have made ships formidable and comfortable are perfectly well known, and are recorded faithfully in books. Recent instances only have been noted, in order to show that the spirit of resistance does not belong wholly to the distant past. One early instance may be recalled, however, because it typifies, with singular fidelity, not only the whole series of battles fought between new ideas and the officers who happened to encounter them, but also the attitude of many other officers towards those officers.
The instance is the trial of Fulton's torpedo in 1810. Congress was much interested and appropriated $5000—a great sum in those days, for the test. The ship designated against which to make the test was the Argus, commanded by a captain whose name need not be given. Now the purpose of the test was perfectly plain to any fair-minded man. It was not to sink the Argus, or to glorify Fulton, or to humiliate the captain; it was simply to find out whether or not the torpedo was adaptable to the purposes of naval warfare. Did the captain give the invention a fair trial, such as would bring out its virtues, if it had any, and expose its defects, and show what defects were remediable, and what not remediable? Did the captain recognize the fact that, if this invention were good, it was his duty to bring out the fact, and report it, so that his government might profit? He did not. He acted as if his ship were threatened by a danger which it was his duty to avert; and he resorted to such extraordinary measures to avert it, that, while he succeeded in crushing the life out of the struggling little idea, for the time being, he drew from Fulton the wise, but unheeded, remark that "a system, then in its infancy, which compelled a hostile ship to guard herself by such extraordinary means, could not fail of becoming a most important mode of warfare."
This incident is clearly typical; and not only because of the action of the captain, but because the propriety of his action has ever since been debated seriously by naval officers! And yet, the recognized value of the torpedo to-day, was evident to many before 181o, after Fulton's many demonstrations; and it was almost evident even to a civilian Congress. How can it be doubted that the captain did the service an injury, which, though negative, was none the less actual and irreparable? An opportunity was then given to the young American navy to show a little enterprise, and to seize the practical advantages accruing from the sole possession of an important instrument of war. The only price was the exercise of an open mind. The opportunity was rejected; and opportunities once rejected, never come again.
Causes of Resistance to New Ideas.—Supposing that the facts just brought forward prove that, in many ways, the navy has been unduly slow in adopting new ideas, it is now in order to suggest a remedy; but, before doing this, it may be well to see if the causes can be ascertained, as this may assist in finding the remedy.
If we try to find the causes of this resistance to new ideas in mechanism, three will soon suggest themselves:—
1. Failure on the part of officers in high position to realize the duality of the naval profession; to realize that a navy consists of both the personnel and the material; the two of equal importance, and each useless without the other.
2. Failure on the part of officers in general to correlate the military and the engineering arts; due to lack of knowledge by some officers of engineering matters, and to a lack of knowledge by other officers of military matters, combined with a lack of perception by both classes of officers of the relations which ought to exist between the two arts.
3. Simple lack of open mindedness on the part of officers in high position. This does not mean that naval officers as a class, lack the open mind more than people in civil life do; but it does mean that we do not get an equal proportion of our able men in high positions; and that, when we do get one in high position, he is beyond his prime, physically and mentally, besides not being so "up-to-date" as a younger man. This lack applies especially to engineering matters, which change so rapidly, that it is almost impossible for an elderly man to keep pace with their progress. Imagine a successful commercial organization, in which the men in high positions, not only averaged sixty years of age, but occupied those positions because they averaged sixty years of age.
The cause of these causes is not apparent; but the suggestion may be hazarded that a partial cause may be the fact that, while the main factors in controlling men are the hope of reward and the fear of punishment, naval officers are controlled almost wholly by the fear of punishment. Yet of these two factors, the hope of reward is the more potent; because the mind dwells on it longer than on the distressing fear of punishment, from which it naturally recoils; and from which it healthfully seeks distraction in more Pleasant thoughts. An officer receives not even thanks for exerting initiative, unless under the direction of some superior, or forgoing any original work, even if that work prove of the highest possible value to the service. But he is punished, and sometimes severely, for an error that it required only 30 seconds to commit. This tends to make a man "play for safety," as a habit; and a man who "plays for safety" as a habit soon becomes an ultra-conservative. In fact, this is what an ultraconservative is.
But whatever the cause, the impression is broadcast that naval officers, as a class, are ultraconservative, and are extraordinarily slow in apprehending new ideas, even after some one else has conceived them, and demonstrated their correctness. This quality is amazing to civilians accustomed to the greatest nimbleness in keeping up with the times; and it subjects naval officers to criticisms which are often unduly harsh. We are sometimes declared to be a class of men very brave, but unable to do anything but routine work; unable to get out of the rut cut for us by our superiors, and incapable of understanding the value of any new appliance, unless it makes a perfect demonstration before our eyes. It has been declared that, while all the world is progressing, and while progress even in the naval engineering arts is very great, almost no step in the progress of any naval engineering art has ever been originated by a naval officer.
Proposed Remedy.—Supposing that the instances cited prove that the navy has been unduly slow in adopting new ideas, and that the causes are fairly clear, we may now see if a remedy can be found.
The remedy is easy to find, because it has been found already by the large industrial concerns. These are themselves large organizations; and competition between them is so keen, that a concern which falls behind the times, goes into the hands of a receiver very soon. Fortunately for our navy, foreign navies have been as lax as we, and will continue to be so until one navy wakes up. Then they will all have to bestir themselves, or get into a condition so obviously inferior, that fighting would be a useless sacrifice of life and limb. Now, there is one country whose people are so exceptionally enterprising, wealthy and ingenious, that she, more than any other, could profit by the remedy suggested. That country, of course, is the United States.
The remedy found by the great industrial concerns is simply that of recognizing affirmatively the necessity of having the most up-to-date contrivances, and of establishing an experimental department, whose business is, not only constantly to improve on old appliances and invent new ones, but to examine all schemes submitted by outside inventors, and test such as seem worth testing. This part of their work is like that of the "readers" in publishing houses, who read all MS submitted to the house, and report what is worth publishing. It is clear that, while the experimentalists and the readers must not recommend everything, neither must they condemn everything; they must steer the middle course of wisdom, lest the concern lose some invention or book, which it could make and put on the market to advantage. As to the experimentalists, they do another work fully as important, that of getting a promising invention into the best shape for manufacture and sale. Not one, invention in a hundred, even if valuable, is so constructed as to be practicable for manufacture and sale, when first presented, anymore than a MS is fit to be is sued as a book. The invention, as illustrated in the model or drawings, is too expensive, or too weak in one place, or too Clumsy in another, or too liable to rust in another; or the parts are so proportioned as not to make the article easy to make by machinery. So the experimentalists take hold of it; and sometimes they spend months of time and thousands of dollars, on drawings, and models and samples. At length, after every suggestion has been made and tried, and every objection met, then, and not until then, is a sample sent to the "shop," to be manufactured wholesale, and issued to the market.
But how could such a scheme be adapted to the navy? It could be by recognizing affirmatively the value of keeping up with the times, and by recognizing, further, hat this, like many other necessary things, is hard to do, and that something must be sacrificed, to do it. The experimental departments of the industrial concerns cost a great deal of money, and complicate the organization, and take away the services of the best workmen; but nevertheless, they are kept up, and they are rising in importance from year to year. So, with the navy; if we start what would correspond to an experimental department, we must prepare to spend a great deal of time, money and brain work on it, and expect to find it a bother in many ways. Secretary Whitney, a man whose practical ability was demonstrated by his success in everything, laid the foundation of such a work by appointing a Board of Officers, to investigate all inventions and new ideas submitted to the Department, and to report such as seemed worthy of test. The members of the Board were Captain A. P. Cooke, Commander C.F.Goodrich, Lieutenant-Commander R. B. Bradford, Lieutenant A.R. Couden, and Lieutenant S. P. Comly.
At the present time, when our battleships are so much more complex than the ships we had in Mr. Whitney's time, any adequate scheme of experimentation would have to be taken up on a much larger scale. And not only would it be necessary to see that every promising scheme should be given a trial, it would be equally necessary to see that it should not be condemned merely for a little defect that could be remedied. Not only this, it would be essential that every apparatus which proved good on test should not be fully approved then, but should be modified in detail in every way that the tests suggested, until the device were gotten into perfect form.
Then a perfect device could be sent to the "shop," be manufactured whole sale, and issued to the service. Not only would the device be sure to function well, when it appeared on board ship, but all devices for any given work would be alike; and the service would not only get a lot of good things it otherwise would lose, but the interval of time between the conception of a good idea and its appearance in our ships, in perfected form, would be reduced to a minimum.
It may seem that this plan would cause some confusion in our ships, by reason of many and frequent changes; but it may be pointed out that many causes of the frequent changes now constantly appearing in our ships would be obviated; because each device would go through its period of changing in the experimental department, and would not appear in a ship until it has its final form. Here we again find ourselves in the same category as the manufacturer; because he finds it much cheaper and quicker to do all the experimenting before his wares are issued. It is necessary for him to find out the best final form, before his wares go out, and not to depart from them thereafter. He does not want to issue things from time to time, corresponding to our various Mark I Mark II, etc., which are caused by improvements suggested by use after issue to the service.
In order to have an experimental department that should accomplish what is here suggested, a very considerable "plant" would be needed. What this plant should be cannot be determined, until it be first determined how seriously its work is to be viewed, but it seems sure that it should include a sea-going ship with a turret. In fact, when one considers that peace is the time, and the only time, in which to prepare for war, that ordnance is a constantly progressing art, and that there are a great many questions as yet unsettled, especially in ordnance, such as sights, mounts, powder, elevating gear, schemes of hoisting and loading, safety devices, etc., besides all sorts of drills, and that new questions are constantly coming up, the detail of a first-class battleship, from time to time, might be found advisable. Of course, this detail would diminish the fighting strength of our fleet, by just one unit; but it would diminish it only in time of peace, when fighting strength is not required.
The only loss would seem to be in fleet drill for the ship itself: for she could have as many other drills as the other ships, especially gunnery drills. Naturally, she would be kept in such shape that, on the probability of war, she could cast off her experimental character and join the battle fleet. The detail of a ship for experimental duty only, is here suggested, because experimental work of the completeness herein contemplated could not Possibly be carried on by any ship cruising in fleet.
The writer does not wish to be misunderstood as advocating a Pell-mell adoption into the service of useless gimcracks; or, as Proposing a plan whereby our fighting fleet would be turned into an experimental laboratory, devoted to trying the wild schemes of every would-be inventor. Neither does he fear that the service Will rush to any extremes in that direction;its whole tendency is the other way. To his mind, in the matter of mechanism,the service has never followed the middle course of wisdom, but has always kept on the side of ultraconservatism.
The injury resulting, it may be admitted, has been negative. But a negative injury, is just as important as a positive injury, and is much harder to prevent. An official may be prevented from stealing money and from doing deeds of violence, but who can prevent him from letting his department get behind the times?
A GENERAL STAFF.
The fact that the naval profession is a distinct profession, while the navy is a distinct organization under the government, combined with the fact that the military profession is the only other profession that lives under like conditions, combined with the further fact that our army has been given a general staff, has led some naval officers to believe that the navy should be given a general staff, which should embody the knowledge, wisdom and force of the navy, considered as both a profession and an organization. As this matter is important, it may be interesting to consider a few facts that present themselves.
If we examine the history of our navy and its condition to-day, we find two very important facts. One fact is that the actual duty done afloat has always been well done, both in peace and war. Mistakes have been made sometimes, duty has been neglected sometimes, officers and men have got drunk sometimes. But the mistakes and the neglect and the drunkenness have been so infrequent, and the skill, care, and sobriety have been so great, that our ships and fleets have always been well handled, and have always held the confidence of the American people.
The other fact is that the general direction of the navy has not always held the confidence of the American people. One often hears the highest praise from business and professional men of the wise direction of the Pennsylvania Railroad, the Standard Oil Company, Trinity Parish, Harvard University, the Bell Telephone Company, the New York Stock Exchange, the Astor Estate, the New York Herald, The Young Men's Christian Association, the Roman Catholic Church, and other organizations; but seldom of the direction of the Navy Department. Personally, the writer does not remember ever having heard it praised, though he may have done so. He has often, on the other hand, heard it compared unfavorably with other organizations by naval officers of all ranks, and he had often heard business and professional men speak of its methods as behind the times.
Now, need this surprise us? For the comparatively simple matter of handling ships and fleets, already constructed, we begin the education of officers at an early age, and continue it all their lives. But for the distinctive and peculiar work of shaping the policy of the navy, no one is educated, either in the navy or in civil life. It is true that since the War College and the Naval Institute have been in existence, a few officers have educated themselves to a considerable degree; and the General Board, drawn from officers of this kind, has been able to do a great deal towards influencing the policy of the Department to proceed along correct military lines. The Board has been in existence so short a time, however, and its influence is so small, by reason of its purely advisory character, that less has been accomplished than is needed.
The need for such a Board becomes clear, when one recalls the fact that the naval profession now covers a very wide field, in both its military and its engineering phases; and that this field is increasing so rapidly, that it is impossible too for any one officer to master it. And yet the Secretary is expected, not only to master it, but to make decisions on the most difficult questions immediately after he takes his seat. A civilian with the natural genius of Napoleon could not do this wisely, unless he had counsel which was complete and correct, and so authoritative as to be a warrant for acting on it. Such counsel it is not in the wisdom of any one man to give; first, because no man has sufficient knowledge; and second, because the human mind, like the human eye, sees everything from one point of view only; incompletely and therefore incorrectly.
In order, then, to give the secretary correct counsel on any difficult subject, a multitude of counselors (General Board) is needed, who study the subject, until, not only does each member get a clear view of the subject as it appears to him; but, by careful super positions of views, they get a composite picture, which all agree on as correct.
The General Board has had to make its way against great opposition; but it has now proved its value so conclusively, that open opposition has almost ceased.
Now that it has proved its value, however, the in security of its position, and the lack of proper dignity surrounding it, are coming to be apparent.
Certainly, it seems odd that no steps should be taken to insure that the Board shall be continued, or that its recommendations shall be given heed. Some officers even argue that the Board should have executive authority in the military direction of the navy; in short, that it should be expanded into a general staff.
If any one will note the career of successful men and organizations, he will see that they usually begin either as assistants, or advisers, and gradually acquire influence with their superiors, until at last they are given authority, under those superiors. That this will be the case with the General Board, there is much in precedent to indicate.
The objection to a general staff has been raised that it would lessen the power of the secretary and tend to militarism.
This objection is ingenious, in that it arouses the suspicions of the people in general, and Congress in particular, who rightly insist on the subordination of the military to the civil authority. Perhaps the objection is sincere in the minds of some; but if so, it must be because they suppose that it is necessary to make a general staff superior to the authority from which, alone, it derives its own authority. It seems hardly worthwhile to argue about that; but it may clear up the matter to ask if Von Moltke, the greatest chief-of-staff the world has ever seen, was superior to his superior, the king. If he was superior to his superior, the king, then it might be thought necessary to have a naval chief-of-staff, superior to his superior, The Secretary of the Navy. But Von Moltke was just as subordinate to his king as any person in the army—equally under his orders in every way. The king naturally followed his advice in certain prescribed matters:—but he followed the advice of his physician in certain prescribed matters; and yet the physician was not superior to the king. Also, he allowed Von Moltke to give orders directly to certain subordinates, but he allowed every officer in the army to give orders directly to certain subordinates. The German general staff was, and is, merely a part of the army, and if Congress should give the navy a general staff, that staff would be merely a part of the navy. It would be amendable to law; it would be under the orders of the Secretary; it would not be a wild and ruthless military despotism, trampling the rights of the people under foot, and stamping out the embers of Liberty with an iron heel.
On the contrary, it would be a body of mild and studious gentlemen, who would pore over maps and charts and plans continually, and try to arrange matters, in such a way that the country would get the best return for the dollars invested in the navy. Perhaps it might be found best to give it a little executive authority, not independent of the Secretary, but under him, like the executive authority of the chiefs of bureau.
CONSERVATISM AND ULTRA-CONSERVATISM.
It is often said that all navies are conservative, and it is often said reproachfully. Yet we all know that there is no motto better than "hold fast that which is good," or one that expresses better the spirit of conservatism.
As the world has gone along, many men of many minds have sought truth along many different paths. Nature seems to have helped but little in the search; so the seekers have sought with suffering, and the paths have been drenched with blood. Everything accomplished, every bit of knowledge gained, has been accomplished, or gained, by painful experience. Our human instincts have guided us little beyond preserving and perpetuating the race; yet there is that within us which makes us strive for something better and higher than the mere preserving and perpetuating of a brute existence. We have striven for it for centuries, blindly, but persistently. Much has been learned; many secrets of Nature have been wrested from her; many arts and sciences have been created; many rules of conduct have been established. To imagine that what has been accomplished by so much pain should not be treasured, is to imagine the human race a very foolish race; to suppose that any beliefs drawn from the past should be easily supplanted by mere plausible theories of the present, is to suppose something contrary to history and common sense. A very brief reflection is surely enough to convince us that, of all the virtues by the exercise of which the race has attained and maintained the excellence it holds to-day, the crowning virtue is conservatism.
The main trouble found in exercising the virtue of conservatism seems to be the same as that found in exercising some other virtues; the trouble of exercising it enough, and not too much. As we go on in life, gathering experience all the while, we naturally treasure our experience, and regard it as an asset. Clearly, it ought to be treasured, and is an asset. But the trouble is that our daily lives are apt to become so filled with our immediate duties, that we fail to take due note of changes, even of changes which affect the things in which we have had experience. Sometimes the changes make our experience useless, and sometimes worse than useless; because they make us base our ideas on something which was true, which is not true now, but which we think is true now.
This is one of the causes which make elderly men of so much less value, compared with young men, than they used to be; which, in commercial life, make it almost impossible for an elderly man to get a new position. It is ordinarily explained by saying that a young man is quicker to learn, and this is doubtless true; but one reason why he is quicker to learn is that he has less to unlearn.
The personal experience of individuals is often like the experience of organizations, large and small, even of nations. Certainly it is so in the matter of conservatism. In the attaining of what is called "practical success," we can see everywhere that those individuals, those organizations, and those nations, are the most successful, which practice the virtue of conservatism, without falling into ultra-conservatism; which keep up with the times, but do not run too far ahead.
The Chinese are so good an example of ultra-conservatism that no other is required. They held fast many things that were good; but they held them so very fast, that they failed to get hold of a great many other things that were good, that came within their reach. We see a like dullness in families, in business houses, in railroads, in manufacturing concerns, and everywhere. Everywhere we see the indolent, the careless, and the blind, who fail to join the triumphal procession of Progress, as it marches by. Those who do not fall in and catch step, impede the march, and vex the marchers:—so everywhere we seem to hear the adjuration, "Keep up with the procession, or get out of the way."