SHIPS OF WAR, BUDGETS, AND PERSONNEL.
AUSTRIA.
VESSELS BUILDING.
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FRANCE.
VESSELS BUILDING.
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Trials of the Republique axd Patrie.—The new first-class battleships République and Patrie have successfully completed their trials. The Minister of Marine, M. Thompson, came from Paris specially to attend the final full-speed trial of the former, which took place off Brest, in which dockyard the shin has been built. The trial results of the République were as follows: With the central engine alone working and making 39 revolutions and developing 1500 I. H. P., and three boilers in use, a speed of 7.5 knots was maintained. On the 24 hours’ run, with the engines developing 10,332 I. H. P., and the two side ones making a mean of 102.5 revolutions and the center one 93, a speed of 16.8 knots was maintained, with a coal consumption per square meter of heating surface of 64 kg. (141 lbs.), and per I. H. P. per hour of 746 gr. (1 5/8 lbs.) the contract allowing for 800 gr. (1 3/4 lbs.). With the engines developing 18,000 I. H. P., 500 H. P. over the contract, a speed of 18.8 knots was maintained for four hours, with a coal consumption of 123 kg. (271 lbs.) per square meter of grate surface per hour. At the final full-speed four hours’ trial the engines developed 19,626 I. H. P., being 2126 H. P. over the contract, a speed of 19.IS knots was maintained, being more than a knot over the contract, with a coal consumption of 117 kg. (258 lbs.) per square meter of grate surface.
The trials of the Paine, which was built by the La Seyne firm at their yard near Toulon, were also completely successful. The results were as follows: With the central engine alone working and developing 1233 I. H. P., a speed of 7.9 knots was maintained, with a coal consumption of 590 gr. 1 1/4 lbs.) per I. H. P. per hour; with the engines developing 11,660 I. H. P., during a 24 hours’ run, a mean speed of 17.8 knots was maintained, with a coal consumption of 715 gr. (1 1/2 lbs.) per I. H. P. per hour; at the preliminary four hours’ full-speed trial, with the engines developing 17,350 I. H. P. and making 114 revolutions, a speed of 19 knots was maintained, with a coal consumption of 835 gr. lbs.) per I. H. P. per hour; at the final official four hours’ full-speed trial, with the engines developing 17,859 I. H. P., 359 H. P. over the contract, a speed of 19.125 knots was maintained, being rather more than a knot over the contract, with a coal consumption of 115 kg. (253 1/2 lbs.) per square meter of grate surface, the contract allowing for a consumption of 120 kg. (264 1/2 lbs.)
The gun trials of both ships were equally satisfactory, twelve rounds being fired from the four 12-inch guns in each ship, thus effectually disposing of the rumor which has been circulated that owing to a miscalculation the turrets were too small, and the guns could not be worked, which would delay the completion of the two ships for months, as it would be necessary to remove the old turrets and build new ones.—United Sendee Institution.
The Ernest Rénan.—The following description of the French armored cruiser, Ernest Rénan, the largest yet laid down in France, has been abridged from the Engineer.
Her general dimensions are as follows: Length at load water-line, 515 feet; breadth, extreme, at load water-line, 70 feet 1 inch; draft on a displacement of 13,644 tons, 26 feet 10 inches; total coal capacity, 2300 tons; estimated speed, 23 knots.
Protection is afforded by a complete water-line belt 12 feet 3 inches in width, having a maximum thickness of 6 inches for about 296 feet amidships, the thickness is gradually decreased to 4 inches and 3.2 inches at the stem and stern. The two strakes of the belt side armor extend from 4.5 feet below the water-line to 7 feet 7 inches above the same, from the lower to the upper protective decks. The heavy side armor strake has a maximum thickness amidships and at the water-line of 6 inches, tapering gradually to the lower edge, where it is only 5.2 inches, and from amidships to the ends where the thickness is 4 inches and 3.2 inches; the second strake is 5.2 inches thick amidships, and only 3.2 inches at the stem and stern. Abaft the belt side armor extends only to a few feet aft of the rudder, and there an athwartship armored bulkhead extends to both sides and from the lower to the upper protective decks. An armor strake extends from the stem to the fore casemates, and reaches from the top of the water-line belt to the lower edge of the gun deck, and is 2.2 inches in thickness.
There are two armored athwartship bulkheads extending from the shell plating at the ends of the casemates to the 7.7 inches barbettes, and 6 inches thick throughout. There are two protective decks extending from the stem to the stem, the lower deck being flat amidships, but sloped at the sides throughout and at each end. It will be built of 1 1/2 inch plating throughout, with nickel steel of 1.84 inches on the flat, and of 2 1/2 inches on the slopes. The upper protective deck is flat, and will be built of 1 1/2 inch double plating. The side protection is completed by a coffer-dam extending from the upper protective deck level to the lower protective deck level, and worked from end to end of the vessel. Behind this coffer-dam there is a water-tight bulkhead worked from stem to stern; the space between the coffer-dam and the water-tight bulkhead is used in its upper part as a passage for repairing breaches in the coffer-dam, and in its lower part as a waterway for the water coming through the breaches. Teak backing is fitted behind all the side armor. The space between the belt side armor, the water-tight bulkhead and cofferdam. and the two protective decks, is called “la tranche cellulaire de protection”; its numerous compartments are either empty, or packed with cellulose or other approved water-excluding material, or filled with coal, fresh water, etc. The ammunition passages, funnels, air pipes, etc., going through the “tranche cellulaire,” are protected by an annular cofferdam extending from the lower to the upper protective decks. Above the upper protective deck is the “gaillard deck,” or gun deck, extending from stem to stern; above this deck is the spar deck, extending from the stem to the astern turret. On the spar deck is a large bridge.
The conning-tower is on the bridge deck, between the fore turret and the fore mast. The conning-tower and shield will have a thickness of 8 inches. An armored tube 35.6 inches in diameter will extend from the base of the conning tower to the protective deck, and will be 5 inches thick throughout.
The engines will be three in number, 4-cylinder, triple-expansion type, developing combined 36,000 I. H. P., steam being provided by 42 boilers of the Niclausse type, placed in water-tight compartments.
The coal bunkers are to have a maximum capacity of about 2300 tons. With the ordinary stowage of 1354 tons the steaming radius will be at 10 knots 7500 miles, and with 2300 tons 12,000 miles. At full speed the steaming radius is to be 1026 and 1630 miles respectively with ordinary and maximum supply. A certain quantity of liquid fuel will be shipped in special tanks and in the double bottom.
The armament will consist of four 194-mm. (7-inch), twelve 164.7-mm. (6.5-inch) guns, twenty-four 47-mm. (3-pounder), and three 37-mm. (1-pounder) guns. The battery will be mounted as follows: The 194- mm. guns in pairs in two electrically-controlled, balanced, elliptical turrets on the center line, one forward on the spar deck, the other aft on the gun deck. The 164-mm. guns, of which eight are in electrically-controlled. balanced, elliptical turrets on the spar deck side, four on the port, and four on the starboard side, two at each end of the superstructure. The 194-mm. barbettes extend from the protective deck to the spar deck for the fore barbette, and to the gun deck for the aft barbette, and consist of 6.4-inch armor in front, and 4 3/4-inch in the rear; the barbettes will not have any special framing, the connection of the armor with the decks being sufficient. The turrets will have a front plate 6.4 inches thick, rear plate, 4 3/4 inches thick, and top plate 1.6 inches thick, with the upper tube 3.2 incites thick, and lower tube of 1.2 inches in thickness.
The 164 mm. barbettes will be 5 1/2 inches thick in front, and 4 inches in the rear, with the upper tube 2)4 inches thick, and the lower tube .8 inch thick; the turrets will have front plate 5 1/2 inches thick, and rear plate of 4 inches, and top plate 1.6 inches thick.
The armor casemates extend from the top of the water-line belt to the lower edge of the gun deck for the forward casemates, and is 514 inches in thickness; the athwartship bulkheads at the ends of these casemates extend from the shell plating to the 194-mm. barbettes, and are 6.6 inches thick throughout. The casemate armor around the 164 mm. guns on the gun deck is of nickel steel, the front plate is 5.6 inches in thickness; the splinter and inner plates are 2.4 inches thick, the floor and top plates are 1.2 inches thick.
The casemate guns are arranged to fire right ahead and right astern respectively. Two 7.7-inch guns and six 6.5-inch guns will fire right ahead or right astern, and four 7.7-inch guns and six 6.5-inch guns will fire on the broadside. There will be six 3-pounder guns on the gun-deck, ten of the same size on the spar-deck, and eight on the bridges. There will be two submerged torpedo tubes of 18 inches diameter.
Magazine bulkheads adjacent to heated compartments, such as fire- rooms, engine-rooms, dynamo-rooms, etc., are provided with air spaces. The shell rooms for the 7.7-inch guns are at the foot of the barbettes; the magazines and shell rooms for the 6.5-inch guns and small guns are between the main engine and fire-rooms compartments, and are so arranged that about one-half of the ammunition will be carried at each end of the ship. The ammunition will be conveyed directly by hoist from the ammunition rooms, or ammunition passages, to the deck where they are required, or as near that as possible. The hoists will be driven by electric motors; for transporting the ammunition, trolleys on rails will be provided in the handling rooms, passages, and shell rooms.
The keel of the cruiser was laid down on the 21st of October, 1903; she was launched on the 9th of April, and she will, it is said, be delivered to the navy on the 5th of August, 1908.—United Service Institution.
The French Naval Program.—The difficulty experienced by our French neighbors in settling unon a program of naval construction and carrying it through is emphasized once more by the discussions now taking place upon the proposals that will shortly be presented to the Chamber of Deputies by the government. The program of 1900, which was to have given to the French Navy its old relative strength, is not even yet terminated, nor is it ever likely to be in its entirety. The tampering with the program so far destroyed the aims of those who are responsible for it, that when M. Thomson succeeded to M. Camille Pelletan as Minister of the Marine, and took counsel with the Conseil Supérieur, he saw that the only way of getting out of the muddle was to make a clean sweep, as far as possible, and start upon an entirely new policy of naval construction. For the new proposals represent nothing less than an entire change in the French policy, a change so drastic that it could not fail to provoke a great deal of criticism. At the moment when M. Thomson proposed to put on the stocks six battleships of 18.000 tons, in anticipation of the program he was bringing forward, he seemed to have the almost united support of the Chamber. This was due mainly to the impression caused by the able report of M. Charles Bos, who showed, in view of the-lessons of the Russo-Japanese naval battles, that France was imperilling her security in neglecting the construction of heavy and powerfully-equipped units. The Minister had no difficulty in obtaining the sanction of the Chamber to start upon the new battleships during the present year. For the moment the party who had always been dazzled with the possibility of annihilating big and powerful fleets with torpedoes and submarines was silenced. Before venturing to attack the Minister's program, in view of the purely subsidiary part played by torpedoes in the naval battles on the high seas in the Far East, the advocates of a flotilla of small boats waited to see the results of the maneuvers carried out in the Mediterranean. These were organized princinally in order to test the efficiency of the submersibles and submarines. Attacks made upon Toulon were repulsed by these little craft, and at the termination of the maneuvers Admiral Fournier expressed himself as a strong believer in the submersible boat. This revived the hopes of the party who regard the expenditure of money upon a battleship as a deplorable waste, when such a vessel can be sent to the bottom by a boat costing less than a tenth of the sum. They endeavored to make out that Admiral Fournier himself recognized the superiority of the submarine over the battleship. The old controversy accordingly broke out afresh, and the new program seemed to be jeopardized by the opposition of the submersible enthusiast.
The persistency with which a large section of the French public are pinning their faith in the submersible as a weapon of attack against the battleship may be explained in two ways. In the first place, France regards herself as practically the inventor of the submarine and submersible boats—at least, in their practical form—and in view of their early promises it was firmly believed that they would prove an infallible weapon against the attack of the strongest fleet that could be brought against them. Secondly, France is finding it more and more difficult to equalize her budget on account of the steadily increasing expenditure in all departments, while the revenue remains almost at a standstill. At such a moment, any method of increasing the fighting power of the navy without entailing any further considerable sacrifice would be hailed with satisfaction. This is what the advocates of the submersible claim to be capable of doing. When the British Government decided upon reducing the expenditure upon naval constructions, and held out the hope that a general limitation of armaments would result, the French decided that they were unable to follow this example unless Germany was disposed to follow the lead of Great Britain. Moreover, this proposed reduction of armaments was taken as a text by French submersible engineers upon which to base arguments showing that France had no particular need to join in any movement for the limiting of naval constructions, since the advance she had obtained with the submersible gave her an advantage which she could not afford to lose. We repeat these arguments to show that the submersible mania is not yet dead, and that the government may be expected to meet with a considerable amount of opposition in their attempt to carry through the new program. Further evidence of the gathering strength of the opposition of the submersible party is seen in the report of M. Henri Michel upon the proposed naval credits. In his verbal report before the Commission of the Marine, M. Henri Michel has distinctly sided with the submersibles. In a word, M. Michel proposes to undo all the work that has been mapped out by M. Thomson with the assistance of the Conseil Supérieur de la Marine, as he asks the Commission to reduce the number of battleships to be put upon the stocks from six to three, by which means there will be an economv of 16,391,000 f., and a return to the old order of things which was so ruthlessly condemned in the report of M. Charles Bos.
The suggestion of M. Michel to reduce the number of battleships is all the more extraordinary seeing that a bill has already been passed authorizing the Minister to put the six battleships on the stocks. If this work is to be suspended it can only be done by the passing of another bill. M. Thomson, however, is firmly determined not to allow any tampering with his program if it can possibly be avoided. He should by now have already started upon the construction of the six battleship[s, but they have been delayed pending an inquiry into the efficiency of the turbine as a means of propulsion for such vessels. The renort of the results obtained with the Dreadnought have removed any hesitation upon this point. It has therefore been decided to equip the new battleships with steam turbines, for which orders have already been given out, and work will doubtless be pushed forward as rapidly as possible, so that by the time the estimates come up for discussion in the Chamber of Deputies, the program will be so far advanced as to admit of no further modification so far as the battleships are concerned.—Engineer.
Admiral Fournier’s Report on the 1906 Maneuvers.—Contrary to precedent, the report of last spring’s naval maneuvers has just been made public, doubtless because partial citations had led to the belief that Admiral Fournier condemned armored squadrons.
The praises which the admiral showers upon his officers and crews were well merited. The maneuvers took place at a time of great heat; the ships were overworked; the officers had to give proof of great endurance; and the men, especially the engineers and firemen, had to support excessive fatigues. Yet there was not a single accident and all showed remarkable zeal.
Admiral Fournier’s report can be divided into two parts, of which the first treats of the tactical exercises and the second of the torpedo-boats and submarines.
The tactical evolutions of the fleet enabled a trial to be made of the new signal codes which are soon to replace the old ones. Not less than five years have been required to reach this end, the work having been begun under the direction of Admiral Gervais and of the lamented Admiral Merleaux-Ponty, but having been retarded, or even wholly stopped, during the Pelletan administration. The new signals caused no misunderstandings, a subject for congratulation, since, as the admiral says, the experiment was a bold one. But the main interest of the maneuvers was the test of battle exercises “in line of battle of divisional groups.”—methods of formation aptly called “Fournier tactics.” Opinions are much divided as to the eventual efficiency of this system of tactics, the characteristic feature of which is that the three ships of each division form an irregular group which, while following the movements of the commander-in-chief, aims to keep its guns bearing upon the enemy. Thus it is hoped to render signals and compass bearings unnecessary. As may be supposed, the admiral attributes to this system all desirable qualities— simplicity, certainty, possibility of concentration of fire upon an adversary, while avoiding such concentration on his part, etc., etc.
Admiral Fournier has been reproached for not having tested the efficiency of his tactics against an opposing squadron; it is claimed that no important conclusions can be drawn from a combat in which the movements of an imaginary enemy have been arranged beforehand. The admiral devotes a chapter of his report to justifying his procedure in this respect—time was lacking to do more than was done. “It would have been unreasonable to have proceeded otherwise . . . next year the commander- in-chief will be able to allow more of an initiative to the supposed enemy."
The second part of the report consists of a warm plea in favor of the development of flotillas of torpedo boats and submarines, both offensive and defensive. The successes of the defensive flotillas of Bizerta and Marseilles during the three days, July 17, July 31, and Aug. 2, are there confirmed. The submarines succeeded on the average twice apiece on the first two days, and three times apiece on the third day, in approaching without being discovered, in position to launch their torpedoes, to within a few hundred meters of the objective. We must not conclude, however, as a certain school would have us, that in case of a real war all the battleships would have been sent to the bottom. It is not sufficient for a torpedo-boat by night, or a submarine by day, to get within torpedo range,—it is also necessary for the torpedo not to miss, and, moreover, to strike the enemy so as to inflict a mortal injury. Consequently, the admiral does not condemn armored squadrons, but concludes that these two types—the battleship and the submersible—under the conditions of modern naval warfare, precisely because of their extreme dissimilarity, lend themselves to an efficient joint action, particularly of value as far as France is concerned. A fighting fleet can only attain its highest efficiency by combining in its composition battleships and submarines.—Translated and abridged from Le Yacht.
Submarines and Submersibles.—France has actually in service 30 submarines and seven submersibles of different models.
- —The Lutin, of unhappy memory, belongs to the series of four submarines of the type Farfadet (Farfadet, Lutin, Konigan, Gnôme), begun at Rochefort in June, 1899, and completed in 1903 on the plans of Chief Engineer Maugas. These four, as well as three of the type Morse (Morse, Francais, Algérien) constructed at Cherbourg in 1898-1902 upon the plans of Chief Engineer Romayzotti, are developments from the Gustave-Zédé, built at Toulon in 1889 on the plans of M. Gustave Zédé. The four Farfadets were all at Bizerta,—they are pure submarines, cigarshaped, and of circular section, 41.35 meters long, 2.90 meters in diameter, 185 tons’ surface displacement, and about 8 per cent buoyancy. They have four torpedo tubes. Designed for 12 knots surface and 8 knots submerged speed, they have never been able to reach 9 knots surface and 6 knots submerged speed. The type Farfadet, the type Morse, and the Gustave-Zédé have but one motive power, an electric motor worked from accumulators.
- —The Anguille belongs to the series of 20 small submarines of the type Naiade, whose construction was ordered begun on April 3, 1901. Four have been built at Cherbourg, six at Rochefort, and ten at Toulon, on the plans of M. Romayzotti. They were not all finished till the spring of 1906, a period of five years, which is absurdly long for such small boats. They are 23.50 meters long, 2.30 meters in diameter, 68 tons’ surface displacement, and about 5 per cent buoyancy. They also are pure submarines, though an attempt was made to increase their radius of action by giving them gasoline motors in addition to the electric motors and accumulators. The results have been pretty poor—their gasoline motors have frequently broken down and a recent ministerial order (July, 1906) forbids their further use and the further putting of gasoline on board of them. Consequently they used electric motors only in their recent successful participation in the defence of Toulon and Marseilles during the last naval maneuvers. Their small size and lack of habitability condemn them to a defensive role, within short distances from their base. These 20 boats have about 8 knots surface and 6 knots submerged speed. They are now stationed 3 at Dunkerque, 5 at La Pallice, 8 at Toulon, and 4 at Saigon, but it has been proposed to send some of those at Toulon and La Pallice to other stations.
- —The Cigogne belongs to the series of 13 submersibles of the type Aigrette, begun at Cherbourg and Toulon in May, 1902, and the construction of 11 of which was countermanded by M. Pelletan in September of the same year. The remaining two, the Aigrette and Cigogne, were finished in 1906—they are upon the plans of Chief Engineer Laubeuf. They are submersibles of the type Sirène, enlarged, having 36 meters length, 4 meters beam, 175 tons surface displacement, and the great buoyancy (30 per cent) which characterizes the submersible type. They have a Diesel heavy-oil motor for surface use, an electric motor with accumulators for under-water use. Their speed is about 9 knots surface and 6 1/3 knots submerged, and they have 4 torpedo tubes.
The competitive tests of February, March, April, 1905, between the Aigrette and the submarine Z, a development from the Lutin, clearly showed the great superiority of the submersible over the submarine type in the matter of speed and sea-keeping qualities. These qualities make the submersible an offensive boat, while the submarine will always be useful in coast defence.
The boats designed for under-water use which are now actually under construction or trial number 28—the submarine Y. 6 submarines of the type Emeraude, the submersible Omega, and 20 submersibles of the type Cicé.—Translation from Le Yacht.
The Utility of Submarine Boats.—The report which has just been made to the War Minister of France by Admiral Fournier, the vice- president of the Superior Naval Council and commander-in-chief of the naval forces, on the subject of the recent maneuvers of the French Navy, strongly advocates submarine boats. The maneuvers, it may be said, were directed, firstly, to illustrate problems connected with naval operations on the high seas; and. secondly, to enable a study to be made of coast defence. The admiral expresses his satisfaction with the new tactics employed, and compliments those responsible for them. That part of the report dealing with the operations for coast defence is, perhaps, the most suggestive, and in it Admiral Fournier, according to the Moniteur de la Flotte, refers to the almost unquestionable efficiency of submarine boats. The maneuvers prove that ordinary vessels would be forced to take all possible precautions when within range of powerful coast-defence artillery, and would also be subjected to severe treatment by submarine boats. But submarine boats might operate with impunity so far as the land guns are concerned. In his opinion, it will be necessary in future to construct as many submersible, or submarine boats as possible—boats for offensive oneration, with large radius of action, and other craft, purely for coast defence. The submarine boat is, in his opinion, the best auxiliary imaginable to large ships of the line, and consequently he supports the view that what is wanted are large battleships with many small craft, either surface or submarine but preferably the latter, delivering torpedo attack. It is pointed out that France two years ago had 34 submarine boats for defence, and 16 for attack; now there are 80 in use, or in course of construction. This year 18 boats are being laid down for attack, having a displacement of 398 tons. Among them there will be, for experimental test, one or two of a tonnage of from 800 tons to 900 tons. The 390-ton boats will be laid down as soon as the prototype of the class has passed through her diving trials. It is important, therefore, to note that France has in use, in course of construction, or projected, 80 submarine or submersible boats, while we in this country have only 40; our boats, according to the recent Admiralty return, range in displacement up to 313 tons, with a submerged speed of 10 knots and a surface speed of 13 knots. The United States have nine submarines in service, with several more building, and Russia has 23, including several bought during the war. Japan has seven, Italy has thirteen, and Germany is building one, but the budget for the current year decides that £250.000 per annum shall be spent for some years on submarines. It is obvious that the opinion in favor of the submarine is developing quickly and extensively.—Engineering.
New Submersibles and Destroyers.—The French Minister of Marine has ordered 16 submersibles to be put in hand, of which, it is said, three will be constructed at Cherbourg, seven at Rochefort, and six at Toulon. Eighteen boats were begun last year, and the Budget of 1906 made provision for 20 in all, so that four more have to be put in hand. Those now ordered will displace 398 tons, and be 160 feet long, with 16 feet 4 inches beam, and will have a maximum surface speed of 12 knots with 700 I. H. P. They will have seven torpedo discharges, and a complement of 24 men. It is intended that the remaining four boats of the program shall be of a much larger class, and it is said that they may even reach a displacement of 800 tons. Six destroyers are also to be begun in private yards—the Hussard, Voltigeur, Spalii, Tirailleur, Chasseur, and Cara- binier.—Army and Navy Gazette.
Le Yacht states that the 16 submersibles recently ordered are similar to 18 begun in 1905, and have the following dimensions—length 51.12 meters, beam 9.97 meters, draft 3.12 meters, displacement 308 tons, I. H. P. 700. The four boats remaining to be ordered will be of 800 tons displacement; two will be built at Cherbourg and one each at Rochefort and Toulon.
Types op French Torpedo-Boats.—Seventy-two torpedo-boats have recently been constructed for the French Navy. Fifteen of these were built at Havre, twelve at Rouen, eighteen at Nantes, ten at Bordeaux, nine at the Creusot Works at Chalons-on-Saône, and the remainder in the dockyards. As is customary with the majority of vessels of this class, their lines are such that when in motion they glide upon the surface of the water rather than cut through it. It is claimed for them they are remarkable, considering their displacement, for speed, resistance, evolutionary properties, offensive power, and habitability.
The hull, which is of high-resistance steel throughout, is divided into six compartments by means of five water-tight bulkheads. The bow compartment is apportioned to the crew. The second and third compartments are taken up by the boilers, of which some are of the Normand and some of the du Temple-Guyot type. Each boiler has a capacity of 1000 horsepower. The fourth compartment contains the engines, which have three cylinders and are triple-expansion, and the auxiliary machinery, dynamo, pumps, etc. The officers’ quarters are aft of the engines, and the stern compartment contains stores. The conning tower is on the deck forward. It is protected with i-inch plates of nickel steel.
The following table gives the leading particulars of these boats, which vary slightly, according to the yard in which they have been built. In the case of all of them, however, their length is the same, i. e., 39 meters, say, 124 feet 8 inches, and their contract speed is the same, i. e., 26 knots. Apparently their speed on trial varied between 25.65 knots in bad weather to 27.4 knots in smooth water.
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The bunker capacity is about 11.2 tons, and the steaming radius at 10 knots is said to be 1800 miles, while at full speed it is 200 miles. With a horsepower of 900—i. e., with one boiler not being pressed quite to its full capacity—a speed of 14 knots is attained with the engines running at 179 revolutions per minute.
It will be noticed that these boats only have one propeller. Formerly twin screws were preferred by the French naval authorities, and a speed of 30 knots aimed at. In the present craft, however, it would appear that speed has been sacrificed to better sea-going qualities.
The armament consists of three 1744-inch torpedo tubes. One of these tubes is placed in the bows. The other two are amidships, and can fire on either broadside. Six torpedoes will be carried.
This year two armored destroyers are to be built. They are to be of 450 tons displacement, and will be protected as were the armored torpedo boats constructed on what is known as the 1903 system. It may be of interest if we give a few details of these latter boats. The displacement is 185 tons. The boilers and engine rooms are protected with i-inch nickel steel plates on the sides and extreme bulkheads. The deck armor is 44 inch thick, and so is that of the conning-tower. There are three 19-inch torpedo tubes and two 144-inch quick-firing guns. These boats have “du Temple” boilers and two sets of four-cylinder triple-expansion engines each driving a propeller. An example may be given of the strength with which these boats are constructed. Recently one was on her trials when something went wrong with the steering gear. She ran at full speed on to a rock. The whole of the fore part was crushed and folded up like a concertina. She remained fast on the rock, but was eventually towed off. On examination in dry dock it was found that without the strength due to her armor the boat must have been totally lost. The fore part to the first bulkhead was taken out and a new bow fitted. She subsequently passed through her trials and is now in full service. The principal dimensions of these boats are as follows:
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Since the first of the series of 72 torpedo-boats mentioned at the commencement of this article were on their trials some improvements have been made in their steering apparatus. A balanced rudder is placed forward just below the keel. This is of considerable dimensions for a boat of such size, and has, we understand, been found very efficient.
A new type of balanced rudder, the invention of M. Normand, is to be supplied with every new' torpedo boat. It is stated that when steaming straight ahead a boat with a rudder of this type keeps her course without continual small corrections being made with the rudder.—Engineer.
GERMANY.
VESSELS BUILDING.
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The attention which has for some time past been focussed on the German Navy, will be largely increased early next year by the further reorganization of the fleet under Prince Henry of Prussia, and the organization of active battle squadrons cruising in the North Sea and the Baltic. The striking force of the German Navy will comprise 16 battleships and 3 armored cruisers, to be increased within 12 months or so to 23 armored ships. The Daily Telegraph’s naval correspondent points out that “no other navy—except that of Great Britain—has shown such a vast increase in its fighting strength immediately ready for war. The displacement of the home battle fleet continuously at sea has quadrupled since the beginning of the century, while the personnel always under war training in the battle fleet will be also four times as great as it was. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that at present the Germans keep in commission a number of battleships which cannot be regarded as first- class, side by side with the vessels of the British fleet, such as the Dreadnought, of 17,900 tons, the Lord Nelson and Agamemnon, of 16,500 tons each, the eight ships of the King Edward VII class, each of 16,350 tons, men-of-war of tremendous fighting power.
The constitution of the fleet according to this authority will be as follows: 16 battleships and 3 armored cruisers, organized in homogeneous classes, thus:
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In addition, the fleet will include seven small cruisers, two torped craft, as despatch boats; two torpedo flotillas for instruction; two torpedo flotillas for maneuvers; and one torpedo flotilla in reserve. The battle fleet in reserve will include two obsolescent battleships—Worth and Wcissenberg—and two coast defence ships.—Page’s Weekly.
The armored cruiser to be built under the 1905 program will be of 16,000 tons’ displacement and carry 10 28-cm. guns, or six less than the 19.000-ton battleships.
The following ships will enter into active service during 1907: The second and third of the Deutschland class of battleships, the Pommern and the Hannover; the two n,6oo-ton armored cruisers of 22.5 knots’ speed, Gneisenau and Schamhorst; the two last small cruisers of the Bremen class, Danzic and Koenigsberg; the three first of the following class of small cruisers, Nilrnbcrg, Stuttgart and Ersatz Wacht; 12 torpedo-boats, and 3 submarines.
These additions will make the German naval force consist of 22 battleships (later than the Brandenburg), 8 armored cruisers, 22 small cruisers (later than the Gazelle), and 68 torpedo-boats of 300 tons or more.— Le Yacht.
Admiral von Koester, who now retires practically from active service, is in his 61st year, has had a long and distinguished career, which has been recognized by the Kaiser’s bestowal upon him of the Order of the Black Eagle, the highest decoration which he has in his power to confer. Since Admiral von Koester first assumed command of the Maneuver Fleet in the spring of 1894, the German Navy has made enormous strides. When he took over the command from Admiral Schroder, the fleet consisted of eight ships forming two divisions, with two cruisers: the 1st Division, composed of the four battle-ships of the Sachsen class, which were even at that time nearly obsolete, and the 2d Division, of the Koenig Wilhelm and Deutschland—both older ships still—with the Brandenburg and Friedrich der Grosse, the two first ships of a new type. The total displacement of the fleet amounted to 66,367 tons, manned by 5000 officers and men. The active battle-fleet of to-day, the command of which he is vacating, consists of two squadrons of eight battle-ships each, with a total displacement of 191,200 tons and manned by 10,500 officers and men. In place of two small cruisers, the Cruiser Division now consists of 3 armored cruisers, and 6 smaller ones, with a total displacement of 46,000 tons, and manned by 3200 officers and men. In place of only one second-in-command, as formerly, the new commander-in-chief of the Battle Fleet has five flag officers under him.—United Service Institution.
In relation to the launch of the German small cruiser Nürnberg, which was built under the name of Ersatz Blitz, Ueberall draws the attention of its readers to the persistence with which Germany has continued to build small protected cruisers of this class, beginning with the Gazelle. In no other navy is such a policy pursued, except that Japan is now laying down some small vessels of an analogous class. The improved Gazelles are undoubtedly a remarkable class, and the later vessels displacing 3400 tons, and having a speed of from 23.5 to 24 knots, are a great advance upon the original type. But Ueberall evidently feels some doubt as to the wisdom of constructing so many vessels of the class, for there are now 22 built or in hand, and remarks that if more money had been available, trials might have been made with other classes. These small cruisers are to be used for scouting and torpedo-destroying purposes, as also for despatch duties.
Another of the German small cruisers was launched in September, namely, the O, built at Danzig, which has received the name of Stuttgart. She is of the improved Gazelle class, and a sister of the Niirnberg. These vessels displace from 3400 to 3500 tons. They are 354 feet 3 inches long, with 54 feet 6 inches beam, and carry ten 4.4-inch, eight 2.2-inch and four machine guns, besides having two submerged tornado tubes. The speed is to be 23V2 knots. The Niirnberg has Thornycroft-Schultz boilers. The Stuttgart will be furnished with turbines supplied by a German company, and not of the Parsons type. It is intended to test this new cruiser with the Ersatz Wacht, which, we understand, is to have Parsons turbines. The mining transport Nautilus has also been launched at the Weser Yard, Bremen. She is not protected against gun fire, but is strengthened at the waterline to resist the pressure of ice. She is of a special type, and it is hoped that she will begin her trials in November. A sister vessel is in hand.—Army and Navy Gazette.
The German naval authorities, in view of the fact that the Russian ships at the battle of Tsushima were so heavily laden with coal that the armor belt in many instances was below the water line, and consequently shot received on the water-line produced bad leaks and irreparable damage, have instructed the admirals and officers commanding battleships and armored cruisers to report what measures can be taken to lighten vessels so as to bring the armor belt higher above the water, thus affording more broadside protection.—N. Y. Herald.
The first submarine boat of the German Navy was recently launched from the Germania Shipyard at Kiel. Its displacement is 180 tons, its speed 9 knots, and it is meant to carry a crew of twelve hands.—Engineering.
Le Yacht states that the first of the series S138-S149 of torpedo-boats has just been launched from the Schichau works at Elbing. These boats are of 530 tons’ displacement and with 10,000 H. P. are expected to have a speed of 30 knots.
GREAT BRITAIN.
VESSELS BUILDING.
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H. M. S. Dreadnought.—The new battleship Dreadnought, which has awakened world-wide interest, is now running her official steam trials in the English Channel. With the results of the trials we hope to deal next week, and will confine ourselves for the present to a review of some features of the ship as a fighting unit of the fleet.
We are freer to deal with these elements than was the case when we first described the vessel in February last, because she has now passed from the closely-guarded secrecy of the dockyard to the open sea, where she meets the attack of the photographic camera—as fatal to official secrecy almost as the guns of the Dreadnought will be to foreign naval aggressors. There are ten 12-inch guns—the most formidable armament yet fitted to any ship. Each of the guns is of 45 calibers in length, firing an 850-pound shot, with a velocity to give a muzzle energy of something like 48,000 foot-tons. We have time and again referred to the courage displayed by Sir John Fisher in thus entirely eliminating the intermediatesized gun, and confining the primary armament to weapons effective at long range. This has increased the size and cost of the battleship, but the gain in fighting efficiency more than compensates for the higher cost, especially as experience at the Battle of the Sea of Japan demonstrated that future actions were certain to be fought at long range, and that the smashing effect of the projectile must be considered as well as its power of penetration. Many writers have, however, raised doubts as to the propriety of dispensing with the quick-firing intermediate-caliber gun, and Captain Mahan has recently returned to the attack. He lays stress upon the disadvantage resulting from damage to the upper works, ant} especially the funnels, whereby the steaming power of any ship may be materially reduced, influencing, as a consequence, the speed of the whole fleet. He seems, however, to have forhotten that, where artificial draft is fitted for the steam boilers, the whole of the funnel might be shot away without the steaming capability of the boilers being materially affected, and this point has been duly considered in the Dreadnought and the later ships for the British fleet.
The aim in the placement of the guns on the Dreadnought was to utilize the greatest possible proportion of gun-power for broadside and end-on fire, while ensuring that the blast from one gun would not affect the guncrew in any adjacent gun-house. These desiderata, which have not always been realized in foreign ships, have too often been omitted in paper comparisons of gun-power. It is idle to multiply guns if their arc of training is deficient, or if the fire of any one gun may at any time mask that of another, or if the blast renders dangerous the occupancy of any adjacent turret. Another difficulty is the arrangement of magazines to suit an ideal disposition of guns, especially in a modern ship where high speed involves the use of an extensive area for machinery. In the arrangement of magazines in the Dreadnought, Sir Philip Watts has shown great ingenuity and experience; but on this we are not free to give details.
The forward pair of 12-inch guns is on a high forecastle, the weapons being about 35 feet above the load-water line. What may be termed the wing bow-chasing guns—two 12-inch guns in a barbette on each side— are on the upper-deck level, nearly 100 feet abaft the bow guns, and in order that these may fire in line with the keel the forecastle is cut away, forming an embrasure. This arrangement of bow guns corresponds to that adopted in all of the recent British cruisers, but is here adopted for the first time in battleships. The forecastle guns have an angle of fire of about 270 degrees, while the two wing guns have an angle of quite 185 degrees. Their location so far aft, and the fact that the sides of the upper deck have been kept clear of all obstructions on each side aft from these gun-houses, have justified this wide arc, and will enable the guns to be used, if found desirable, as additional stem-chasing weapons. This, however, will be an exceptional condition.
Between the aft funnel and the main-mast, there is a pair of 12-inch guns in barbette mountings on the upper-deck level. These guns have an arc of training of quite 90 degrees on either broadside. We have heard the contention made that the firing of these guns 45 degrees forward of the beam might result in their fire being masked by the wing guns; but it may safely be assumed that the two guns in the center line between the funnel and the main-mast will only be trained and fired on the same bearing as the forward broadside guns, so that the objection raised is negligible. Abaft the main-mast there are the usual stern barbette guns on the upper-deck level.
There are thus three pairs of guns in the center line of the ship, with two pairs of wing guns placed rather forward of amidships, and eight of the ten guns can be utilized for broadside fire. This latter is the important measure of the gun-power of the Dreadnought, because broadside fire is the dominant factor in fighting efficiency. It is possible to conceive of a vessel having 12 or 16 guns so placed that her gun-power would not be as effective as the weapons in the Dreadnought.
The disposition and arc of training of the various guns has suggested a new arrangement of carrying the boats. These are compactly grouped around the funnels, a condition which is quite satisfactory for peace times. In war the boats will be cast overboard, so that they may not involve fire dangers. The masts have been built as tripods, an arrangement first introduced in the Lord Nelson and Agamemnon. This entirely dispenses with the shrouds, which would have obstructed the training of some of the guns. Moreover, the tripod form reduces the possibility of complete destruction of the mast by quick-firing guns; it reduces the target, and even were one leg to go, the others would stand with guys suitably placed. This is important, because the masts carry the gunsighting stations and the receiving wires in connection with the etheric telegraphic system. These are now very important items in a fighting ship, and make masts indispensable. When certain temporary fittings are removed, the only obstruction on the deck in the after part of the ship will be the base of the tripod of the mainmast, with the bridge surrounding it; the capstans, etc., are all removed when the vessel is cleared for action.
The Dreadnought is well equipped with machine-guns for repelling torpedo and submarine-boat attack; there are twenty-seven small quick-firing guns, most of them 12-pounder weapons of new design and greater power than those of this type hitherto carried on battleships. These are mounted on the upper platforms located between the two funnels. The navigating bridge, it will be seen, has four platforms above the upper deck, the two uppermost levels being carried, as in all the later ships, on forged steel columns. The top bridge over the chart-house is about 60 feet above the water-line. Under it is the main bridge, and below it is located the forward conning-tower, built of n-inch armor. Thfs is reached through a trap-door from above, so that there is no opening through which splinters of shells may find their way into the tower. Owing to the location of the wing 12-inch guns, this bridge does not extend the full width of the ship, and the position from which the “lead” is cast is on the upper deck.
The officers’ quarters are arranged on the main deck in the vicinity of the bridge, and a convenient promenade may be provided for the admiral on the one side, and the officers on the other, on the ledge on the main- deck level formed by the embrasure, in addition to the forecastle, which here takes the place of a quarter-deck. Abaft there is a small bridge, close to the mainmast for carrying a searchlight, etc. Here there is also a conning-tower formed of 8-inch armor, but ordinarily the ship will be navigated and fought from the forward bridge.
As to the armor, it is 11 inches in thickness in the central part of the ship from considerably below the water-line to the upper deck. The thickness, however, is reduced at the ends to 6 inches at the bow and 4 inches at the stern. The redoubt armor varies in thickness from 11 inches to 8 inches, the guns being protected by 11-inch armor. The thickness of the protective deck varies from 1 3/4 to 2 3/4 inches. There are many novel features in the design of the ship, associated with the arrangement of magazines, the supply of ammunition, and the training machinery for the guns, the work for which was carried out by Messrs. Vickers Sons and Maxim, Limited, and Sir W. G. Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., Limited. There are obvious reasons, however, why we should not disclose any details regarding these.
The contract for the machinery of the Dreadnought was placed with Messrs. Vickers Sons & Maxim, and on their behalf a considerable part of the work has been done by the Parsons Company. The propelling engines are steam-turbines driving four shafts, their collective horsepower being estimated at 23,000 indicated horsepower, with the turbines making 320 revolutions per minute, with steam at an initial pressure of 185 pounds. The fitting of four shafts enabled the power to be divided into two separate units. In each engine-room there is one high-pressure and one low-pressure main ahead turbine, a cruising turbine, and one high- pressure and one low-pressure astern turbine—five in all. The high- pressure main and the high-pressure astern turbines drive the wing shafts, while the cruising and the low-pressure ahead and astern turbines are on the inner shaft in each engine-room. The low-pressure ahead and low-pressure astern turbines are within the same casing. All the shafts and propellers turn outwards when going ahead. There are eighteen boilers of the Babcock and Wilcox type, designed to work at a pressure of 250 pounds to the square inch.
It may be interesting, in concluding this article, to refer briefly to the vessels which have borne the name of Dreadnought in past naval epochs, and a review of the work of these ships suggests that the Admiralty have very properly named this new and highest conception of destructive science the Dreadnought. We give a list of the nine successive ships of the name, showing the gradual increase in the length and tonnage, as well as in the number of officers required to man the vessels in warfare. Eight of these ships have seen active service. The first took part in the destruction of the Spanish Armada; the second gained renown in the Duke of York’s victory over the Dutch fleet off Lowestoft; the third was present at the victory off Cape La Hogue; the fourth was among the fleet which gained the day off Cape Passaro in 1718; the fifth was engaged in the French wars of 1744, and had some prizes to her credit; the sixth was present at the Battle of Trafalgar, and captured a Spanish 74-gunner. The others, of later date, have experienced more peaceful times. The guns carried in each ship suggest the enormous advance made with ordnance, and this is more strikingly evidenced by the fact that although the Dreadnought of 30 years ago had four guns firing an 809-pound projectile, these had only a muzzle energy of 13,930 foot-tons—little more than a fourth of the striking power of the 56-ton gun of to-day, firing an 850-pound projectile. On the other side of the ledger we have, unfortunately an enormous increase in the cost of ships. The Dreadnought of 1742 was built for £21,350, the 1875 ship cost £620,000, whereas the battleship of to-day is costing £1,797,497, according to the latest official estimate.—Engineering.
The Steam Trials of the Dreadnought.—The telegram of congratulation from His Majesty, in connection with the splendid results attained on the trials of the new battleship Dreadnought, was at once an evidence of the King’s interest in science generally and in the navy in particular, and it may be accepted also as a fitting public acknowledgment of what is undoubtedly a great achievement in constructional engineering. We have already referred to the great credit due to the Admiralty technical staff and to Portsmouth dockyard for the building of the Dreadnought in 16 months from the date of the first issue of drawings; we therefore confine ourselves here to the significance of the work associated with the propelling machinery. In the first place there will be increased satisfaction at the enterprise of the Admiralty in adopting the steam-turbine, now that a searching test has justified this step. The Admiralty were quite conscious of the fact that the steam-turbine system of propulsion has disadvantages ; but were convinced that the advantages to be gained altogether outweighed them, and acted accordingly. Easy of working, facility of regulation, freedom from vibration, and economy at high powers were all demonstrated. As to constructional advantages, the area occupied by the turbines, and their weight, are practically the same as for reciprocating engines. A reduction of 15 per cent is made in the boilers, and the total installation is less in weight and space occupied by this amount of boiler reduction. As the engines can be placed lower than in the case of reciprocating machinery, the protection is more effective, and the lower center of gravity facilitates the placing of the great array of heavy guns on the upper deck without reducing the stability of the vessel. As regards stopping and starting and maneuvering, the turbines have proved themselves most satisfactory; while in respect to working up to full speed, a great tactical advantage was established: the vessel was on her official full-speed trial an hour and a quarter after leaving the anchorage.
The trials prescribed were those which long experience has proved adequate to test the steaming capability of warship machinery. There was the usual 30 hours’ trial at 20 per cent of full power, the 30 hours’ run at about 75 per cent, and the 8 hours’ run at full power, with the addition of four trials, each of three hours’ duration, in order to arrive at the economy of the installation when steaming with the cruising turbines at various rates of power from the maximum obtained by the use of the by-pass valves, and at the lower powers obtained when not using them. But instead of dealing with the trials in chronological order, it may, perhaps, be better to review the salient points in the results achieved.
First, as regards the generation of steam, the results achieved were undoubtedly satisfactory. The boilers, 18 in number, of the Babcock and Wilcox type, were constructed by the contractors for the machinery— Messrs. Vickers Sons & Maxim, Limited. The evaporation at all trials worked out to between 10 pounds to 10.2 pounds per pound of coal per hour, which, under the service conditions prevailing during the trials, must be regarded as an excellent result. Again, the good workmanship was attested by the low’ loss of water. Even when running at full power the loss was only equal to one ton per hour per 8000 horsepower developed, while at 75 per cent of the maximum power the result was still more favorable. The boilers are of the standard Babcock and Wilcox type, with “wheel” baffling. The ratio of heating surface to grate area is 34.75 to 1, and on the trials nearly 17 horsepower were developed per square foot of grate for a lengthened period. The air-pressure in the stokehold was 1.2 inches.
As regards the turbine installation, the extreme variation in the speed of worships in commission introduces conditions inimical to economy. It has time and again been proved that the turbine at full or over-load is more economical than the reciprocating engine when design and manufacture are completely satisfactory; and this was again proved in the Dreadnought, where the coal consumption on the full-power trial of eight hours’ duration was 1.51 pounds per shaft horsepower per hour. During the course of the week’s steaming it was decided to ascertain the maximum power which could be realized, and 28,000 horsepower was developed, according to the torsion-meter; this gives an overload—a power above the maximum provided for in design—of 5000 horsepower; and the important point is that the coal consumption when thus overloaded equalled about 1.4 pound per shaft horsepower per hour. In comparing the coal-consumption results with the rate for similar ships having reciprocating engines, allowance must be made for the difference in the method of determining the power. In turbine machinery this is arrived at with the assistance of the Denny & Johnson torsion-meters, which measure the torque on the respective shafts. In the reciprocating engine power is “indicated” from within the cylinder, so that the total includes in such case such power as may be lost in friction in the engines and thrust-blocks; with turbines the power taken is that passing through the shafts. It is difficult to put a value on this loss by friction—it varies so much—but probably it is 8 per cent or 10 per cent of the total, so that the coal consumption of the Dreadnought on her full-power official trial should be reckoned at 1.4 pound, and at overload at 1.3 pound for comparison with the consumption for piston engines in preceding ships. In the seven ships of the King Edward VII class already tried, the coal consumption averaged 1.92 pound per indicated horsepower per hour, and in no case was the consumption less than 1.8 pound. A further proof of the efficiency of the Dreadnought’s turbine system is afforded by an examination of their steam consumption. This on the full-power trial was just over 14 pounds per shaft horsepower, and including the consumption in the auxiliary engines, the total was 15 1/2 pounds per horsepower per hour. In the battleships of the King Edward VII class the corresponding figure was 18.14 pounds; the power in this latter case, too, includes the 8 or 10 per cent lost in friction. Here, therefore, there is again a very striking evidence of the economy of the turbine at full power. This condition would naturally be that continuously obtaining in merchant practice.
This full power is in warships only supposed to be used in case of emergency—such as a sudden spurt to overtake the enemy or to engage in a running fight. But in the Dreadnought everything worked so splendidly that there need be no such limit in the period of maintenance of full power, especially with oil fuel, for burning which this vessel is fitted. The “continuous steaming power” of the ship, however, is officially regarded as 75 per cent of the full power, and in the 30 hours’ trial at this power there was, as was to be expected, a slight falling off in economy, as compared with the full-power result, because, as we have already pointed out, the turbine is most efficient when at full or at over-load. On this trial, however, when the power developed was nearly 17,000 horsepower, the coal consumption was 1.7 pound per shaft horsepower per hour, or, allowing for the difference between shaft and indicated horsepower, 1.53 pound per indicated horsepower. On the corresponding trial of the seven battleships of the King Edward VII class the average was 1.74 pounds. It will, therefore, be seen that here the economy of the turbine system is quite 10 per cent. The steam consumption was also 10 per cent less; and there is no doubt that experience with the turbine machinery will enable these results to be improved upon in commission.
Unfortunately, in the life of a warship the proportion of time during which the vessel is making full speed is small relatively to her total steaming time, and, as we have said, the variation in speed complicates the problem very materially. When a steam-turbine is run at light load, but at the same speed as at full load, its efficiency is but little affected. In the case of a marine turbine this is impossible; moreover, such turbines are, as a rule, underspeeded even at full load, owing to propeller considerations, so that further reduction of speed for low power has an unfavorable effect on the economy. To meet this condition there are introduced small turbines, designated cruising turbines, which are brought into action for low speeds. These constitute practically a lengthening of the turbine; but the length, or, more strictly speaking, the number of rings of blades, should increase in inverse proportion to the square of the reduction in speed if the efficiency is to be the same at low as at high power. Thus, to get down to half speed and still maintain the efficiency, the cruising turbine should multiply the number of rings of blades, in action by nearly four. This, however, is practically impossible, especially on board warships, where the space, particularly below the load water-line, is so valuable in connection with the carrying of a sufficiency of ammunition and projectiles. In some of the turbine-driven warships, notably in the Amethyst, high and low-pressure turbines were fitted for cruising, as well as for full-power steaming, and all four were worked in series at low powers. In the Dreadnought it was decided to make two separate engine-rooms, each with an independent steaming unit, the inner shaft having a cruising as well as a low-pressure ahead and a low-pressure astern turbine; while the outer shaft has a high- pressure ahead and a high-pressure astern turbine. Inspection of the turbines at the works of the makers suggested that the cruising turbines were about eight feet in external diameter, the high-pressure ahead turbines rather more, the low-pressure ahead turbines about 11 feet and the high-pressure astern turbine the smallest.
At low power the steam is passed into the cruising turbine, thence into the high-pressure ahead turbine, and finally into the low-pressure ahead turbine, from which it exhausts through the low-pressure astern turbine to the condenser, the low-pressure ahead and astern turbines being within one casing. For anything near half power this arrangement is favorable, and gives a result generally more economical than with reciprocating engines, but not so good as at full power. At the lower powers the necessarily low rate of evolution of the propeller results in the steam being throttled to such an extent that the wire-drawing involves considerable loss in power, unless a very small cruising turbine is used, so that the higher initial pressure would be maintained. It is probable that on the Dreadnought the loss from this cause at very low powers might be 20 per cent, and although this is partly counterbalanced by slight superheating, the loss is still considerable. The steam consumption, and consequently the coal consumption, at low power was greater than on the high-power trials already referred to, having been 2.56 pounds of coal per shaft horsepower per hour; even so, this has often been exceeded in battleships with reciprocating machinery, notably in the case of the King Edward VII. It is possible, however, that the arrangement in the Amethyst might be more satisfactory—namely, the working of the two cruising turbines in series. This, however, would forfeit the advantage of two entirely independent units of propelling machinery at low powers, and might be considered objectionable from the deck officers’ point of view. The other alternative is to increase the number of cruising turbines to four, having two in each engine-room working in series; but it is probable that limitations of space might prove a difficulty. All of this establishes what we have time and again pointed out. that in warship design there are conflicting considerations, so that the uniform success attained in merchant-ship practice cannot always be realized. Throughout the trials of the Dreadnought a vacuum of between 27 inches and 28 inches was maintained. The system producing this satisfactory result was that introduced by Messrs. Weir in connection with their dry-air pump, and fully illustrated in our article on the Cunard liner Carmania (Engineering, vol. lxxx., page 724).
As regards the power developed and the speed realized, the results exceeded anticipation. At one-fifth power the speed was over 13 knots. At 16.900 horsepower the rate was 19.3 knots—a very satisfactory result for this power, equalling the full-power performance of the vessels of the King Edward VII class. On their trial the indicator showed 18,000 to 18.500 horsepower, which is probably comparable with the 16,900 shaft horsepower of the Dreadnought; but while the speed and power are therefore equal, the Dreadnought has a considerably greater displacement—17,900 tons, as compared with the 16,350 tons in the preceding battleships. At the full designed power of 23,000 horsepower it was anticipated that the vessel would steam 21 knots, and it is another remarkable evidence of the accuracy of calculation that this was easily realized. The mean power on the eight hours’ trial was 24,700—an excess over the designed power of 1700—while the horsepower realized when on the measured mile west of Plymouth gave a mean speed over four runs of 21.6 knots. It is well known that the proportioning of an efficient propeller for turbine-fitted ships is one of the unsolved problems, and although the Admiralty have in the Dreadnought realized the anticipated result, we hope that in the interests of science, if not also of the navy, a series of practical tests will be undertaken when the vessel goes into commission in order to test various forms and proportions of screw propellers. The results in the County and Drake classes of cruisers justify any expenditure that may be incurred, as in both these instances higher speeds were realized as a consequence of propeller experiments.
An important point in connection with the adoption of the turbine has reference to the maneuvering power of the ship. The adoption of ten 12-inch guns in each ship of such a class gives an enormous offensive power for a short battle-line, and, the steering of the ships being satisfactory, confers a great advantage on the Admiral of the Fleet in the changing of the battle-line, apart altogether from the benefit which must accrue from concentration of fire. This question of the manipulation of the vessel had very serious consideration in connection with the design, and Sir Philip Watts introduced for the first time two rudders placed at about 12 feet apart, the stern framing corresponding, so that the inner propellers work in free water immediately forward of each propeller; the dead-wood was cut away to facilitate this. The wing propellers are located eight feet forward of the inner screws, with stern-brackets corresponding to the arrangement usually adopted in naval ships for twin- screws.
Each rudder has its independent steering-gear, consisting of the usual right- and left-handed threaded shaft, carrying two nuts with connecting- rods to a crosshead on the rudder-head. This right and left-handed screw-shaft is operated (as with ordinary single-rudder ships) from engines mounted on the after bulkhead of the engine-rooms. In each engine-room there are two vertical engines, each with n-inch cylinders and n-inch stroke, with a coupling, so that either of the two mav be used for working the shaft. This gear and also the capstan and anchor engines and gear have been constructed by Messrs. Napier Brothers, Limited, of Glasgow, who have supplied such machinery for so many of our large warships and merchantmen. Special interest was taken in the working of this double-rudder system, and it was found throughout the trials that the gear worked with remarkable precision, the ship answering the helm more rapidly than has even been the case with recent ships. The steering, etc., trials were most favorable.—Engineering.
Trials of H. M. S. Dreadnought.—The following notes on the performances of boilers, propellers, and turbines of the Dreadnought will be found interesting:
Boilers.—Her boilers are, as is well known, of the Babcock and Wilcox type, and have given very remarkable results. Indeed, it is doubtful if there are any records of trials of the same duration and rate of steam production per square foot of heating surface in any similar group of boilers with the same economy. Comparing earlier and later boilers of the same type, the Dreadnought shows that, as found in nearly all other water-tube boilers, the large unit always gives greater economy than the small unit. The following table, based on official trials, shows this clearly:
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These results are obtained by measuring the condensed steam, but as the “make up” is water pumped into the boiler and lost between the feed pump and measuring tank, after being turned into steam, this might also be added, and in the case of the Dreadnought would give 7.07 pounds of steam, produced per square foot of heating surface per hour, for the same coal bill.
The propellers.—A correspondent has pointed out that it was to be expected that the inner, which are the after, propellers would have always revolved faster than the outer ones. All the propellers appear to be of about the same dimensions, viz., diameter 8 feet 10 inches, pitch 8 feet 4y2 inches, and it will be noted that the slip of the win propellers seems to be less at low speeds, about the same at 19.4 knots, and less at 21.6 knots, than the inner propellers. And though apparently each propeller was intended to transmit the same power, yet a glance at the figures we gave in our issue of October 12 will show that this was only approximated to at 19.4 knots, and that at 21 knots the high-pressure turbines operating the wing shafts gave only about 40 per cent of the total power. Evidently there is much to be said for those who advocate that the wing turbines and propellers should exchange places.
The engines.—The engine results leave no doubt of the advantage of the “closed exhaust.”
The tables of initial pressures in the various turbines offer problems to students to find the efficiency of the steam. The cruising turbines are designed to have four expansions, the high-pressure ahead turbines six ex pansions, Jhe low-pressure ahead turbines seven expansions, and the low- pressure astern turbines five expansions. But a more momentous nrob- lem is that of propeller thrust. It will be observed that the port inner shaft is credited with transmitting an average of 7447 horsepower at 333.3 revolutions during the eight hours’ full power trial, and at 351.4 revolutions per minute there might be danger of the internal clearances of the rotors disappearing.
All four tunnel shafts have a minimum external diameter of 10 1/2 inches, and internal diameter of 6 1/4 inches.
Mean speed.—As to the mean speed obtained during the eight hours’ trial, a correspondent points out that from the figures we published the mean speed seems to be 20.993 knots for 24,712 horsepower, obtained by equating the revolutions of each shaft, which gives a mean speed due to inner shafts 20.811 and 20.042, and to outer shafts 21.814 and 21.304. A more correct mean seems to be obtained by allowing for the “mean slip” of all shafts between 19.4 and 21.6 knots, and this gives a mean for the eight hours of 21.129 knots, which would accord with the designed speed of 21 knots for 23,000 horsepower. The slip per cent of the various shafts at the speeds mentioned are: Starboard inner 21.041 and 25.324, port inner 20.369 and 24.738, starboard wing 21.690 and 20.815, port wing 21.716 and 19.871. Evidently new propellers should be tried, sanguine prophets giving the ship 23 knots when so perfected.—Engineer.
Trial of H. M. S. Dreadnought.—The performances of the Dreadnought are being watched with manifest interest by all who wish for the well-being of our navy. She' is the outcome of long experience, and includes various experiments, the success of which has yet to be fully demonstrated. We might cite many things apparently new in her, yet old. But, confining our attention to the machinery, there is no doubt of the magnitude of the step, from reciprocating to turbine engines. Technical men may be divided into Moderates and Progressives, or into the “James Watt cult,” and “Turbinists,” and only a few regard warship machinery in the correct light, which is the speed given by a certain weight of machinery burning a certain weight of coal. The cost of the machinery need only be considered when it has to earn dividends.
She has eighteen Babcock and Wilcox boilers, each of twenty elements, arranged in three stokeholds, and fitted for burning oil fuel in conjunction with coal. The grate surface is 1560 square feet, the heating surface 55,400 square feet, and the tops of her funnels are about 85 feet above the fire-bars. Each stokehold has a tube, about 30 inches diameter, which can be used for raising ashes or wounded, by electric lifts. See’s ash ejectors are also fitted. Each stokehold is self-contained.
The main condensers have 26,000 square feet of cooling surface, the auxiliary condensers 6000. There are four propeller shafts, all the four capable of going ahead or astern in pairs. The wing shafts have each two turbines on them, one high-pressure ahead turbine and one high- pressure astern turbine; the inner shafts have each three turbines on them, cruising, low pressure ahead, and low-pressure astern. The wing propellers are ahead of the inner propellers. The construction of the rotors is generally known; these have been carefully balanced under steam, and can run up to a speed of 400 revolutions per minute, and each shaft has a governor fitted.
It may be of interest to mention that each of the cruising turbines has 39,600 blades in it, and the total number in all the turbines is in proportion. One feature in turbine machinery is the immensity of the exhaust pipes, each of the Dreadnought’s exhaust pipes being a rectangle 12 feet by 4 feet—this for 11,500 horsepower. The system of dry and wet air pumps is well known.
The turbines are of the following sizes:
[TABLE]
The low-pressure astern rotor is. as usual, in the same casing as the low-pressure ahead one. The necessity for accurate balance is apparent when it is mentioned that the actual weights of the revolving rotors on one shaft amount to 32 tons. The boilers were designed to burn 34,500 pounds of coal per hour at full speed. The results show how this has been approximated to, and though the designed power was exceeded— as at 23,000 horsepower she only just neared the designed speed—yet there was little danger if the intended 320 revolutions per minute were passed so far as damage to rotors was concerned.
One very important feature about the Dreadnought is that her complement of men is much smaller than that of the Terrible or Magnificent, her crew all told numbering but about 655 as against 900 and 8eo of the former.
The horsepower of the engines was measured directly by means of Denny and Johnson’s torsion meters. This depends for its action upon the measurement of the angular distortion of the shaft itself. The shaft is thus converted into a transmission dynamometer, and the power passing through it is easily found. The apparatus consists of two discs or wheels of gun-metal keyed to the shaft at a suitable distance apart. Each disc carries one or more—generally one—permanent magnet, with the pole sharpened to a knife edge projecting from its periphery. Immediately underneath each disc is a stand containing a number of independent coils of insulated wire. Wires from the coils are led to a telephone which has differential winding. It is so arranged that if the shaft rotates without any distortion the permanent magnets pass simultaneously two coils, one in each stand, which are paired. The result is that absolutely simultaneous currents pass through the differential windings of the telephone, and the receiver does not speak. Suppose now that the shaft twists, then one magnet will pass one of a pair of coils before the other, and the telephone will tick for each one. But, by means of a suitable switch and contact studs, various coils out of the numbers on the stands can be paired together, and there is little difficulty in finding two which are the correct angular distance apart. As soon as this happens the telephone ceases to speak. The angular distortion of the length of shaft taken is then read off the instrument, and, being multiplied by a constant, gives the power that is being transmitted. This instrument, which has proved itself to give accurate results in many trials, is made by Kelvin and James White, Limited, of Glasgow.—Engineer.
A Squadron of Dreadnoughts.—The prospects are that in 1909 no continental nation will have in fighting condition one single ship of the Dreadnought type; whereas, says Engineering, if the British Admiralty continue the rate of construction attained with the ship to be tried this week, they will then have one squadron made up of six Dreadnoughts, and, in addition, a squadron composed of eight ships of the King Edward VII class, and two Lord Nelsons.
The first squadron will have 60 12-inch guns, with the enormous advantage of a short and easily manipulated fighting line, while the second squadron will have 40 12-inch guns and 52 9.2-inch guns. Both will be enormously superior to any squadron of an equal number of ships of any other navy. By 1908, too, the British nation will know whether foreign nations accept the olive branch which it has held out in this year’s naval policy, by a relaxation of naval expenditure, without any diminution of determination to ultimately maintain mastery of the sea. If this desire for limiting armaments is not reciprocated, then there will be equal unanimity in continuing building operations to maintaining our supremacy at all costs. There should be no mistake about this view.
The Sea Lords, who, after all, continues Engineering, have the confidence of the nation, will not waver as to the vital principle of supremacy. Foreign nations, and notably the German people, may realize that their continuance in the development of their naval program—involving as it does in their case not only an enormous sum for ships, but something like 10 millions sterling for the widening of the Kiel Canal—cannot win even the mastery of the German Ocean—the ambition of the Admiral of the Atlantic.—United Service Gazette.
Naval Construction.—The ships which have recently been nut into the water reduce the number of vessels on the stocks so considerably as to have attracted attention. And it appears to be worth while, therefore, to glance for a moment at the actual condition of construction. There is not at the present time any battleship on the stocks, although three new Dreadnoughts are to be begun before the end of this financial year. It may, we think, be assumed that, although these three vessels have not yet arrived at the stage when their keels are laid, orders have been placed for material and possibly for armor. It will be remembered that in the case of the Dreadnought herself similar orders were given out, and a very large expenditure incurred before the ship began to be put together at Portsmouth. Of the battleships which have been launched but are not yet completed, the Lord Nelson, recently put into the water at Messrs. Palmer’s yard at Jarrow, and the Agamemnon, which was put afloat earlier in the year by Messrs. Beardmore at Glasgow, are all we have in hand. Then there are the vessels which, in various stages of completion, are either about to make or have just finished running their trials. These are four in number, the Dreadnought, the Britannia, the Hibernia, and the Africa. Of these four vessels, the Britannia, which was launched in December, 1904, is practically complete. The Hibernia, launched at Davenport, in June, 1905, and the Africa, launched at Chatham, in May of the same year, should soon be in active service, while the Dreadnought, launched in February of this year, has begun her trials. It may be said, therefore, that we are turning out three battleships a year, and if the Dreadnoughts now to be put in hand are built in anything like the same time as the name ship of the class, we should continue to do so.
Turning to the subject of cruisers, very much the same condition of affairs is apparent. There are the three new ships, Invincible, Indomitable, and Indexible, all well advanced on the slips, decked in, and must soon be ready for launching. The only other cruiser not yet in the water is the Defence, laid down at Pembroke in February, 1905, and with regard to this vessel there appears to be no reason why she should not be launched at any time the authorities desire. Of her sister vessels the Shannon has just been launched, and the Minotaur was launched earlier in the year. These vessels are still in a completing stage. They will all three make and complete their trials early next year, which, remembering that they belong to the program of 1904-05, will not be otherwise than creditable. Of the ships of the previous program, there are the Achilles, at the Armstrong’s Works; the Cochrane completing by the Fairfield Company; the Natal, in a similar stage at Vickers; and the Warrior, completing at Pembroke. All four of these vessels are in a very forward state, and their trials will certainly be finished, and the ships probably in commission before the end of the financial year. It would certainly be an advantage if all vessels of the same class could invariably be brought forward for trial about the same time, for it would be more useful to have them all in active service together than to obtain such slight benefit as might arise from correcting in the sister vessels such mistakes as were discovered in the first ship tried. We have had recently, both during our own maneuvers and in the incidents of the war in the Far East, examples of the ill effects of nutting into the same squadron ships of different dates, and therefore of different speeds. Lord Selborne’s celebrated aphorism, “Gunnery, gunnery, and again gunnery,” has for its parallel a similar maxim about homogeneity; for it is quite certain that without something like homogeneity in his squadron no commander can expect to get the full value of his ships.
The small craft in hand, destroyers and submarines, although not nearly as numerous as in some past years, make a much better show than their larger and heavier companions. None of the vessels of the 1905-06 estimates are as yet in commission, although several of the coastal destroyers are in the water. They include the twelve boats, Cricket, Gadfly, Firefly, Glow-Worm and Dragonfly, all of which have been put afloat, with the Gnat, Grasshopper, Greenfly, Mayfly, Sandfly, Spider and Moth. Then there are the ocean-going torpedo-boat destroyers of the same program, Afridi, Cossack, Gurkha, Mohawk, and Tartar. The latter are, of course, much larger vessels, but they should be ready for commission with the fleet next year. At present they are all in various stages of construction, but it is quite likely that they will go afloat very quickly after one another. Of the same program there is the special ocean-going destroyer Swift, building by Messrs. Cammell, Laird & Co., at Birkenhead. With these may also be mentioned the Velox, a turbine fitted destroyer, and the Yarrow motor boat recently purchased. The above appear to be all the destroyers for which orders have actually been given, and so far no contracts are known to have been entered into for the construction of the destroyers of the 1906-07 program. In this program there are five oceangoing destroyers, of which two have since been struck out. There were also twelve coastal destroyers, all of which have been struck out. And it is reported that the three boats to be built will be of the class of the Swift, of 36 knots speed. The submarines have also been reduced in number, four out of the twelve which it was proposed to lay down having been postponed. Where the remaining ones will be built, or when they will be begun, is also uncertain.—Army and Navy Gazette.
The Shannon.—The first-class armored cruiser Shannon, built at Chatham, was successfully launched on September 20. One of a trio, of which the others are the Defence and Minotaur, the Shannon was laid down on January 3, 1905. Her principal dimensions are: Length over all, 519 feet; extreme breadth, 73 feet 6 inches; draft forward, 24 feet 6 inches; aft, 25 feet 6 inches; displacement, 14.600 tons; indicated horsepower of engines, 27,000; speed, 23 knots. The armament will consist of four 9.2- inch breech-loading guns, ten 7.5-inch guns, eighteen 12-pounder 18-cwt. guns, two 12-pounder 8-cwt. guns, and five .303 Maxims, while in addition she is fitted with five torpedo tubes. When commissioned she will carry a complement of 778 officers and men. The Shannon has cost nearly £1,230,000.—United Service Gazette.
The Lord Nelson.—The launching of the new British battleship Lord Nelson from the yard of Palmer’s Shipbuilding Co., at Jarrow, on Sept. 4, was remarkable for the fact that she is the last battleship for the British Navy remaining on the stocks, either in the Royal or private yards. Her sister ship, the Agamemnon, was launched from Messrs. Beardmore’s yard on the Clyde a couple of months ago, and these two vessels mark an intermediate stage between the Dreadnought and the King Edward. The Lord Nelson and the Agamemnon have four 12-inch guns and ten 9.2-inch guns, whereas the Dreadnought will carry ten 12-inch guns. In addition, they will be armed with thirteen 12-pounder quickfirers, twenty 3-pounders, two maxims, and five submerged torpedo-tubes. Their displacement will be 16.300 tons, and their engines will develop 16,750 I. H. P., which it is anticipated will give a speed of 18 knots, one knot slower than the Dreadnought. As to protection, they carry a water-line belt of 12 inches in thickness amidships, reduced towards the stern to 4 inches and 6 inches in the bows. In the central part of the ships, above the water-line, 8-inch armor protects the upper deck, and the protection athwartship against raking fire from ahead or astern is 12 inches in thickness, the conning-tower protection being the same. The principal dimensions of the vessels are: Length, 410 feet; beam, 79 feet 6 inches; mean draft, 27 feet. The first Nelson built for the navy (the name was without the prefix) was built at Woolwich, in 1814, and was the largest wooden line-of-battleship ever built in this country. Her overall length was 244 feet, and her length on the gun deck, 205 feet. Her extreme beam was 54 feet 6 inches, and she drew 24 feet forward and 23 feet aft, on a measurement of 2617 tons. Her depth to the upper part of the tattrail was 65 feet, and her armament consisted of 112 carriage guns and 18 carronades. The figure-head was a bust of Nelson, supported by Fame and Britannia, and bore as a motto the Trafalgar signal. There have been two other Nelsons. One was lent to Melbourne for the defence of that colony in the seventies. The other, which was built in 1880, is a vessel of 7000 tons, and she was the first flagship of the late Admiral Sir George Tryon on the Australian Station. She is now at Portsmouth, engaged in the training of stokers.—Nautical Gazette.
Coastal Destroyers.—The first of the five new coastal destroyers built by Messrs. J. I. Thornycroft & Co., Limited, at their works at Chiswick, has recently been tried. This vessel—H. M. S. Gaddy—is small for a destroyer, being even less than the Daring, although somewhat larger than the last torpedo-boats. She is 168 feet long over all by 17 feet 6 inches beam, and draws, when laden, about 6 feet 6 inches. The propelling machinery consists of Parsons steam turbines, steam being generated in Thornycroft boilers burning oil fuel. It is evident we have here a very interesting vessel, and one whose trials should be capable of throwing valuable light on the most modern problems of marine propulsion. Unfortunately for naval architects and marine engineers at large, the Admiralty have determined to keep the whole design and the performance of this class as secret as possible, and the builders being bound by a promise of secrecy, we are able to present our readers with no more than a few outline details of the Gadfly and her performance, pending the arrival of information from abroad.
The propelling effort is divided between three shafts, half the total power from the engines being transmitted through the center shaft, and one-quarter of the total through each one of the wing shafts. There are altogether four separate turbines, capable of working, however, in series. The machinery is arranged so as to give a good economy at cruising speeds, for which the arrangement is as follows: On the forward end of the central shaft there is what is known as the cruising turbine, into which steam is directly admitted from the boilers. From this turbine steam is exhausted into the turbine on the starboard shaft, which forms the first, or high-pressure, turbine, at full speed running, or, rather, at speeds over about 16 knots. From this second turbine in the series for cruising purposes the steam is carried right across to the turbine on the port shaft, which is the medium, or intermediate, pressure turbine of the higher speed working. From the latter turbine steam is carried to the low-pressure turbine, which is abaft the first-mentioned cruising turbine on the central shaft. From the low-pressure turbine the steam passes to the ordinary cylindrical condenser on the port side of the vessel. It will be seen, therefore, that each wing-shaft has its own turbine, and that there are two turbines placed tandemwise on the central shaft
For full-speed running the cruising turbine is cut-out altogether, and being then connected with the condenser, the blades revolve in vacuo, and therefore do not waste power to any appreciable extent. The port turbine then becomes the first, or high-pressure element, the intermediate and low-pressure turbines coming into the series as before. For going astern there are reversing blades in the exhaust casing of the low-pressure turbine.
The manipulation of the engines is, of course, entirely by valves. At full power running the steam valves between the engines and boilers are open, as well as the valve on the high-pressure turbine; but the valves admitting steam to the cruising turbine and for reversing purposes are shut. To reduce speed to below 16 knots the valve admitting steam directly from the boilers to the high-pressure turbine is closed, two valves admitting steam to the cruising turbine are opened, whilst a self-closing valve on the high-pressure cylinder has to be opened to pass steam from the cruising casing to the high-pressure turbine. For going astern from full speed ahead it is necessary to shut off steam from the high-pressure turbine by one valve and to open a valve admitting steam from the boilers to the exhaust-casing of the low-pressure turbine. There is also an auxiliary exhaust-valve to close; this can be done from the platform by means of gearing. For greatest speed there is a by-pass valve by which steam is admitted from the boilers direct to the high-pressure turbine some distance down the casing, so that there is then a double admission.
The striking characteristic of the engine-room of this vessel is its roominess and comfort. The machinery is no lighter probably than that which would have been installed if reciprocating engines had been used, but the gain in comfort, safety, and simplicity is enormous. The engine- room equipment does not contain other novel features, unless it is that wet and dry-air pumps, made by Weir, are placed in the after part of the engine-room. The engines for the Gadfly were made by Messrs. Parsons, at their Wallsend works, but the sets for the other four boats are being constructed by Messrs. Thornycroft, at their Woolston works.
The boilers, as stated, are of the Thornycroft water-tube type, and are fired by oil fuel. The system is that which has been developed by the Admiralty, and certainly appears to work with great success. As our readers are aware, experiments have been carried on for a long time past by engineers belonging to the Service, and those who have been engaged in them are to be congratulated at having arrived at what seems to be a fairly perfect result. We are, for reasons stated, unable to describe the process; but it may be said that the success reached has been due to careful improvement in detail rather than to any radical departure from precedent. The oil used is a thick treacly substance of the appearance of crude Texan oil. It is evidently thoroughly atomized as the boat runs—at any rate after the boilers are once warmed up—without smoke or smell, and the chimneys remain quite cool, or cool enough to preserve the paint. The furnaces of the boilers are only adapted for oil fuel, there being no provision for burning coal. Probably oil-burning adds somewhat to the weight of the boiler installation, though not much, as a certain amount of firebrick must be used, and this would outweigh the saving through absence of fire-bars.
There is, however, a very important saving in the adoption of oil fuel, as with turbine-engines—that is, in the personnel. It would, we believe, be quite possible, if necessary, to arrange the Gadfly so that she might be run single-handed. In place of having to shovel coal on to the furnace, to trim it on to the stokehold floor, and clean fires at intervals, the boiler attendant—“stoker” would be a misnomer—has nothing to do but manipulate his feed and burner-valves if required. The fire remains constant, and consequently the steam pressure varies through a very small range; so long, of course, as the demand for power is constant. Much the same kind of thing may be said of the turbine-engines. Those who can remember the early days of torpedo-boat trials, with a crowd of men with oil- feeders, squirts, mops, and even half-pint tins bombarding the engines with lubricant, can best appreciate the quiet orderliness of a turbine- driven boat. It may be safely said that had water-tube boilers, oil fuel, and turbines preceded coal and reciprocating engines, the old Admirals of the forties would not have raised such a pother about the introduction of steam into the navy.
The Gadfly made her full-speed official trial on September 27, off the mouth of the Thames, the vessel being complete, including armament; and having on board a weight of 24 tons, representing stores, ammunition, etc., besides oil fuel for the trial. The contract speed was 26 knots. The mean speed reached during the 8 hours’ run was 27,336 knots, while the six runs on the measured mile gave 27.505 knots. The mean revolutions were 1204 per minute, the steam pressure being 215 pounds to the square inch. The oil consumed during the trial was 22.8 tons. The exact power developed by the engines is, of course, unknown, but judging by the performance of other vessels of a corresponding class, the consumption of oil would be about I y2 pound per indicated horsepower per hour, or probably 1 pound less than the weight of coal that would be required. It is characteristic of turbine engines and oil fuel that the speed increased while the trial progressed, as fires did not get foul, and the “human factor” did not deteriorate through hard work and anxiety. It was considered that the only absolute limit to the duration of the trial was the amount of fuel carried. This would have given about 400 nautical miles at full speed.
On the following day (September 28) the maneuvering trials were gone through successfully. Going astern the boat was run for a quarter of an hour with the center propeller revolving at two-thirds the revolutions needed for 26 knots, the speed, as taken on the mile, being 12 knots. Afterwards the vessel was run astern at 699 revolutions per minute for a quarter of an hour, the speed being approximately 13 knots. Of course, only the center propeller was used on both these runs, the astern turbine, as stated, being only on the center shaft. Good results were also obtained in stopping and starting, these being pronounced equal to the performance of ordinary boats of the type.
The official 24 hours’ low-power consumption trial, with the cruising turbine in use, was carried out in the Thames estuary on Monday and Tuesday, October 1 and 2. The speed registered was 12.037 knots, with a mean of 459.5 revolutions per minute. The steam pressure averaged 150 pounds, and the vacuum 28 inches. The oil consumed was 2130 gallons, or about 8.88 tons. The maximum radius of action, with all oil-tanks full, would be about 1300 nautical miles.
It will be seen that with the Gadfly a most successful result has been obtained. Both the Admiralty officials, who have so successfully worked out the oil-fuel problem, and Messrs. Thomycroft, the contractors, are to be congratulated on the results. The only pity is that oil fuel is not as plentiful as coal.—Engineering.
The Glow-Worm, the second to be completed of five coastal destroyers ordered from Messrs. John I. Thomycroft & Co., Ltd., by the Admiralty, in connection with last year’s naval program, was successfully launched, with all machinery on board, from the company’s Chiswick works. The dimensions of the class to which the Glow-Worm belongs are: Length, 168 feet; beam, 17 feet 6 inches; draft, 5 feet, 11 inches, and the contract speed is 26 knots. The vessel is fitted with turbine machinery of Parsons type, built by Messrs. Thomycroft at Southampton, and Thomycroft water-tube boilers, while the armament will consist of two 12- pounder quick-firing guns and three torpedo tubes.
The new coastal destroyer, Cricket, built by Messrs. White, of Cowes, has just completed her contractors’ trials with satisfactory results, and she will shortly be handed over to the government. In a recent 24 hours’ continuous steam trial the vessel accomplished 1450 sea miles on her total oil stowage of 41 tons, and in an eight hours’ test she developed a speed of over 27 knots, steadily maintaining her contract speed of 26.2 knots.— United Service Gazette.
The coastal torpedo-boat destroyer Firefly, was successfully launched from the works of Messrs. J. Samuel White & Co., Ltd., East Cowes. She is a sister vessel to H. M. ships Cricket and Dragonfly, and is the third vessel of her class to take the water of the five coastal destroyers building by this firm for the government under the 1905-06 naval program. The vessel is 175 feet long and of 230 tons displacement, her I. H. P. being 3600, and her speed 26 knots. The machinery consists of water-tube boilers, White-Forster patent (fired with oil fuel), and turbines, and manufactured by Messrs. White under Parsons patent.—Page’s Weekly.
Dockyard and Contract Built Ships.—The Admiralty state that the figures of comparative cost of hulls in the case of similiar ships built in the Royal dockyards and private yards respectively, since the system of allowing contractors to complete vessels for service came into operation, are as follows:
[TABLE]
—Engineering.
Several innovations have been made in the machinery department and general fittings of the British battleship Hibernia. The most important of these is the application of forced lubrication in the engine room. Weir’s pumps have been fitted to the central bulkhead to force the lubricating oil by means of pipes to all parts of the bearings and cranks. For this purpose the crank pins have been perforated and grooves cut in the bearings. They are also all covered over to exclude all foreign matter. Another departure is in the method of heating the various compartments of the ship and the cabins by the substitution of hot air pipes for the steam pipes. The reservoirs are so designed that the hot air service may be disconnected from each such apartment at will. Another novelty consists in the application of motors for working the pumps. This practically completes the placing of all work which was formerly performed by manual labor under the domain of machinery and the engineer.—Iron Age.
Speed Trial.—The last speed trial—eight hours’ full power—of the Second Cruiser Squadron produced no record speeds, but was remarkable for the fine performance of the Cornwall, which has long been striving for the record, and has now pulled it off, beating the Drake. The results were:
[TABLE]
There was a heavy head sea.—Engineer.
New Submarines.—Considerable interest is centered on the new class of submarines, known officially as C, the first of which, Cl, will be delivered from the builders, Messrs. Vickers, Sons & Maxim, at the beginning of next month. A crew for this vessel has been told off and is now at Barrow being instructed in the working of the new type before it is taken over. The speed of the vessel is 14 knots on the surface, one knot faster than the B class, the immediate precursors of the C’s. The speed of the B class has enabled them to deliver successful attacks upon large craft from unexpected positions, and has been of especially good service to them in facilitating retreat after the attack, therefore the extra knot of speed given to the C class should tend to make them even more efficient. The C boats are larger than those of the B class, and have two propellers, while another innovation is the addition of a second periscope, which it is hoped will render impossible any repetition of the Ai disaster, when, it will be remembered, the submarine was run down by a liner, which the one periscope, with its range of vision of 60 degrees, was powerless to disclose.—United Sendee Gazette.
Increase of Marines.—At one time it was clearly the intention of the Admiralty to abolish the Royal Marines. But circumstances have led to a complete change of policy in this respect, and now, instead of disbandment, our amphibious army is to be augmented in strength. The causes which have brought about this change of front have been the handing over of coast defences to the Admiralty, including the manning of port defences, and the decision to establish a co-ordination of duties between the sea and the land forces. The initial step in manning coastal-forts is about to be taken at Milford Haven, where the garrisons at present supplied by the army are to be replaced by small detachments of the Royal Marine Artillery, and a more important development is in prospective in a scheme which is now under consideration of garrisoning Gibraltar exclusively with Marines. The intention is, of course, that all naval base defences and all important harbor fortresses shall, in time, be held by the Royal Marine Artillery, which body is to be brought up to a strength of 3620 officers and men, while the Royal Marine Light Infantry are to be increased to a total of 13,875 officers and men, exclusive of bandsmen in both cases. There will be a general feeling of relief that this grand old historic corps has been spared from the destruction marked out for it, for no finer or more useful body of men are to be found wearing the King’s uniform.—United Sendee Gazette.
Admiralty Announcements.—The Admiralty, in a circular letter issued to the fleet, state that they have had under consideration the question of providing for the cost of hospitality, which, from time to time, it may be necessary to offer to ships or squadrons of foreign naval powers, in circumstances where the entertainments are invested with an international character, and go beyond the casual entertainment of foreign naval officers by the officers of His Majesty’s ships. In the latter case hospitality is recognized as a reciprocal duty, but in the former their lordships desire that officers of His Majesty’s fleet should not be called upon to contribute to the entertainments from their private sources. Foreign ships and squadrons are to be received in a manner befitting the national prestige, and in cases where it is proposed to give such entertainments, the commander-in-chief or senior naval officer is to submit a detailed estimate for their Lordships’ approval.
The Admiralty announce, in a circular letter, that the Royal Standard, being the personal flag of the Sovereign, is, by His Majesty’s command, not to be displayed in future on board His Majesty’s ships or on official buildings, as has been hitherto customary, on His Majesty’s birthday and other occasions, but is only to be hoisted on occasions when the Sovereign is actually present, or when any member of the Royal Family is representing the Sovereign for the time being. In such case members of the Royal Family may fly the Royal Standard for the time being, but on no other occasion. The Royal Standard is to be used for Her Majesty the Queen in the same manner as for the King. As the occasions for all Royal salutes are officially notified, it is considered that the use of the Royal Standard is unnecessary when Royal salutes are fired in the absence of the Sovereign.
We are informed by the Admiralty that the following communication has been made to the fleet:
The Board of Admiralty have decided on the following alterations in the distribution of naval strength:
- A distinct fleet will be constituted from the ships in commission in reserve to be called the “home fleet” under the supreme command of a flag officer with the status of commander-in-chief and headquarters at Sheerness, but his functions will not interfere with those of the existing commander-in-chief at the Nore. This fleet will be in every respect organized with a view to enhancing its value as a fighting force, and battle practice and other fleet exercises not at present carried out by the reserve divisions will be introduced. The primary object aimed at will be seagoing efficiency, and for this purpose the cruises of the Home fleet will be made as frequent as practicable.
- A sliding scale will be adopted in the strength of nucleus crews, so that the vessels first required in war will have the largest complements; while the vessels in special reserve, instead of having no crews as at present, will have adequate complements of officers and men to keep the propelling machinery and armament efficient. The vessels now in “special reserve” will be gradually replaced by other ships as they cease to be effective units of the home fleet. The Board of Admiralty will determine the nature of this sliding scale of nucleus crews from time to time.
- The distribution of ships between the present Channel, Mediterranean, Atlantic, and Reserve fleets will be altered, in order to permit of the strengthening of nucleus crews and the organization of a home fleet as above described. No ships will be paid off, no men will be sent to the barracks or to the instructional schools, and no alteration will be made in the proportion of officers and men serving afloat.
- The Board of Admiralty have also decided that, where it will conduce' to the fighting efficiency and convenience of the service, there will be an interchange of vessels between the home fleet on the one hand and the Channel, Atlantic, and Mediterranean fleets on the other. For instance, any vessel in the three last-named fleets requiring an extensive refit will be placed temporarily by a ship of the home fleet.
- The cruisers of the home fleet will from time to time be combined for instructional and tactical exercises with the cruiser squadrons of the other fleets, and the Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets will be combined as usual for the same purpose.
The Board of Admiralty are satisfied that the constitution of a home fleet will increase the immediate striking strength of the navy, and that the more active training which the nucleus crews will receive under the new system will add to the sea experience of the fleet as a whole.
These changes will be gradually carried out in such a way as to obviate any dislocation of the various fleets and squadrons.—United Service Gazette.
Table of punishments inflicted in the British Navy during 1905:
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Flogging and birching, though still in the list of punishments authorized by the Naval Discipline Act, have been suspended by Admiralty order, the former since August, 1881, and the latter since January 30 last. The King’s Regulations authorize caning on the breech with the clothes on in the case of boys and buglers under 18, but by Admiralty orders dated March 2, 1906, this punishment is only to be inflicted under the actual order of the captain, and is not to be carried out in public.
ITALY.
VESSELS BUILDING.
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The Moniteur de la Flotte gives the following as the characteristics of the four armored cruisers, San Giorgio, San Marco, Pisa and Amalfi; Length between perpendiculars, 131 meters; total length, 138 meters; beam, 21 meters; mean draft, 7.15 meters; displacement, 9800 tons. Armament: 4 10-inch of 40 calibers; 8 7.5-inch of 45 calibers; 16 3-inch; 8 47- mm., and 3 torpedo tubes, of which 2 are under water. Armor: A complete water-line belt of thickness from 180 mm. to 50 mm.; redoubts and traverses of 180 mm. thickness; 10-inch turrets of 180 mm.; and 7.5-inch turrets of 160 mm. Horsepower, 18,000. Speed, 22.5 knots. Normal coal supply, 700 tons.
Fiat Motor Boats.—We are informed that the Fiat Muggiano Company, of Spezia are constructing motor launches for the Italian Navy, for the use of admirals and captains of the fleet. These boats are 27 feet 10V2 inches in length and of 7 feet 6V2 inches breadth, and when fully loaded with ten people and 150 kilograms of fuel on board have a draft of 19 inches. The motor provided is a standard 16-24 horsepower Fiat motor, and is so arranged that the control of the motor and the steering of the boat can all be managed by one man. The hull is of light galvanized steel. The firm are also constructing submersible boats of the Glauco type, work on one of 200 tons displacement now being in hand.— Engineering.
The Midvale Steel Co. of Pennsylvania has obtained from the Italian Government an order for 2100 tons of armor plate, valued at $1,000,000, for an Italian man-of-war. The American company was in competition for the contract with five European firms, including the Krupps. Its tender was $180,000 less than that of the Italian Temi factory.
The successful Italian bid of the Midvale Co. is about $131 in excess of its bid of $345 a ton for Class A armor, under which it obtained half the contract for supplying the armor for the new United States battleships South Carolina and Michigan.
In the contest for supplying the armor for the American battleships the Midvale concern underbid the Carnegie and Bethlehem companies, from $70 to $95 a ton, but the latter companies made a successful fight against the entire contract going to the Midvale Co., and one-fourth of the contract was awarded to each on the condition that they meet the Midvale bid of $345 a ton.—Nautical Gazette.
JAPAN.
VESSELS BUILDING.
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The Japanese Naval Program.—In the program of the Naval Department of Japan for the current year, special importance is attached to naval education, thus proving again that the Japanese are always careful in laying the foundations of a policy before attempting to carry out its details. This accounts for the great success which has attended all their efforts. The Naval Staff College in Tokio and other institutions for naval education will be greatly extended. The Staff College formerly could only admit forty students; henceforth it will be made to take in 115 students. At the Gunnery School, Naval College and Marine Corps, 10-inch or 8-inch guns will be installed for training purposes. The educational expenses of the Navy Office are expected to amount to between two and three million yen. At the same time, the naval strength of Japan will be greatly increased during the course of the year. Two battleships— the Aki and Satsuma—and several other vessels of various sizes will be launched during the year, and their equipment will be completed during the course of next year. In addition, the following list of ships captured from the Russians, and all now under repair, will show the magnitude of the new strength to be added to the Japanese Navy.
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The battleship Iki (Imperator Nicolai I, 9594 tons) and the armored coast-defence ship Okinoshima (General-Admiral Appraxine, 4126 tons) have already been repaired and are on duty in the navy. In order to meet the increased demands upon them, considerable additions and developments will be made in the dockyards and arsenals at Yokosuka, Takeshiki, and other naval stations.—Engineering.
The Japanese Naval Budget for the present year showed an increase of about four million yen upon that of 1905. and reached a total of 39,523,127 yen. There were some increases for shipbuilding on the extraordinary estimates, but the previous year had already borne some charges for the new program, of which we have given full particulars. The arsenal at Kure is to be enlarged, and a good deal is to be done to improve the port.—Army and Navy Gazette.
The battleship Mikasa has been raised, after many difficulties and doubt, to the great satisfaction of the nation. The Russian cruiser Novik has been raised in the neighborhood of Sakholm, and the mining vessel Amour at Port Arthur, the latter having received the name of Amakusa.
Nothing seems even now to be known as to the cause of the fire that led to the sinking of the Mikasa. She sank on September 11, 1905, and the first attempt to raise her was made on December 25 of the same year. It failed. Then followed a second attempt on January 16. This, too, was unsuccessful. The third essay was on June 23, but it was of the nature of an experiment, which enabled the authorities to stop some large rents in the side of the ship, which made the final effort, on August 7, successful. Engineering says the principal damage in the ship consists of a rip 81 feet long in the stern, and there were in all ten large holes in her sides. All the ammunition in her magazine and a torpedo seem to have exploded on the occasion of the fire, and of course this caused great damage. Four powerful 27-inch pumps, each capable of discharging 3000 tons per hour, were used in the operations. Congratulations were sent to Vice-Admiral Saito, Minister of the Navy, from many important personages, among others by Vice-Admiral Sir Arthur Moore, in command of the British squadron in the eastern seas.—Army and Navy Gazette.
The Mikasa and her adventures should make the Vickers-Maxim firm feel proud. She sank in mud, and remained there eleven months. Unlike the Russian ships at Port Arthur, she was not nicely greased below, but went down quite unexpectedly. When she was raised steam was got up in the forward group of boilers, and at 150 pounds supplied to the engines. Under her own steam she then moved away from the scene of her loss. There must be some uncommonly excellent work inside the Mikasa, and some very considerable smartness on the part of the Japanese salvers for them to be able to attempt to get up steam in a ship that had been so long below. That it was carried out without difficulty is, if possible, more wonderful still. There cannot be anything in connection with salvage that the West can teach Japan.—Engineer.
It is officially announced by the Japanese Admiralty that inquiry into the causes of the sinking of the Mikasa at Sasebo have shown that the disaster was owing to spontaneous explosion due to chemical decomposition. Thus the personnel of the Japanese navy are exculpated from all blame.
The Moniteur de la Flotte states that the Aki and Satsuma are to be armed with 4 12-inch and 12 IO-inch guns, all in double turrets; 12 4.7-inch in a central battery; and 4 under-water torpedo tubes. They are to have turbine machinery of 27,000 horsepower, giving an estimated soeed of 20 knots. The boilers are of Migabara type, with small tubes. Both ships are to carry torpedo defence nets.
It is reported upon good authority that one of the new Japanese battle- shins (Aki) and one of the armored cruisers are to be fitted with Curtis turbines, which are now being built in the United States by the Fore River Shipbuilding Co.
Oil Fuel for Japanese Steamers.—Consul C. B. Harris, of Nagasaki, referring to his previous report that Nagasaki shipyards had contracted to build for the Toyo Kisen Kaisha (Eastern Steamship Co.), of Tokio, for use on their Hongkong-San Francisco line two sister ships, each of 13,000 tons gross, now adds that the vessels are to be fitted to use oil for fuel. He is also informed that the steamship company’s three vessels, the America Maru, Nippon Maru, and Hongkong Marti, each of 6000 gross tonnage, now plying between the ports named, will be refitted to burn the same fuel.—Nautical Gazette.
PERU.
One of the Peruvian cruisers building or completing at Barrow was launched there on September 24, and received the name of Coronal Bolognesi. She is a sister ship of the Almirante Grau, which has just had a very successful trial. Both vessels are of the scout class, displacing 3200 tons, and the contract for a full-power speed was 24 knots. The Grau attained 24.64 knots on the measured mile in the Clyde, and the performance of the machinery gave entire satisfaction to Admiral Carvajal, chief of the Peruvian Naval Committee on board. A trial of 24 hours was run to determine the speed and coal consumption at lower powers, all being satisfactory, and it was found that the vessel could steam at 22 knots as long as the coal lasted, with only eight of the ten water-tube boilers in use. The turning trials were also successful, and an opportunity was given for testing the system of wireless telegraphy with which the cruiser is fitted, the messages being received over a distance of 150 miles. The machinery on board was intended to develop 14,000 I. H. P., and is of the four-cylinder triple-expansion type. These cruisers have two 6-inch quick- firers protected by armored shields, firing severally fore and aft, with a wide arc of training, while the secondary armament includes eight 14- pound and eight ij^-pound. There are also two submerged torpedo tubes. The Peruvian Navy is being partly resuscitated, a floating dock is being constructed, the coast is to be better lighted, and hydrographic work is in progress. Admiral Carvajal expresses great indebtedness to the Vickers Company for agreeing to all his requirements, and for making the greatest efforts to attain the best results.—Army and Navy Gazette.
RUSSIA.
VESSELS BUILDING.
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No surprise can be felt that information concerning the Russian Navy is scanty. It has been stated that a new program of naval construction would shortly be put forward, but there is as yet no sign of it, although a new committee under the presidency of Lieut.-General Ratnik, who is an inspector of naval construction, has been appointed to consider the matter. The Marine Rundschau says that the proposed battleship type of 19,800 tons has not been approved. Vice-Adimral Skrydloff succeeded the late Vice-Admiral Tschuknine in command of the Black Sea fleet, the ships of which—Rostislav, Tri Sviatitelia, and Dvenadzat Apostoloff—engaged in maneuvers or exercises in June. In the Baltic the torpedo flotillas have been watching the Finnish harbors and inlets in order to prevent the landing of arms and ammunition. For the same purpose a considerable number of torpedo-boats have been placed on Lake Ladoga. By a recent imperial order the ships were to make an evolution of coaling with the purpose of accomplishing this much more rapidly. The whole of the ship’s company was to be employed, the time being taken, and the end of the coaling was to be signalled. On the following day the ships were to be washed down, and on the result of the evolution a report was to be sent to the Minister of Marine. All this is new in the Russian Navy.—Army and Navy Gazette.
The Russian battleship Andrei Pervozvannui was launched without ceremony at St. Petersburg on October 20. She was laid down in 1903, and is not expected to be completed until 1909, the length of time occupied in the work of construction having been extended by the recent troubles. An attempt is being made to embody in the ship some essentials proved to be required by the war, but she cannot be equal to the latest types, and will be much out-distanced by the time she is ready for sea. Her armament will comprise four 12-inch and eight 8-inch guns, all in turrets. There will be a complete armor belt, and an armored deck reinforcing the sides. The displacement is said to be 17400 tons. Engines of 17,600 H. P., supplied by 25 Belleville boilers are to give a speed of 18 knots. Rumors are current as to the announcement of a new scheme of naval construction being forthcoming, and according to some versions the total outlay will this year be raised from £5.000,000 to £11,000,000, the additional money, it is surmised, coming from the Privy purse.—Army and Navy Gazette.
The new cruiser Pallada of 7900 tons and designed to have a speed of 23 knots was launched at the new Admiralty works at St. Petersburg on November 10. She is of the type of the armored cruiser Bayan, now in course of construction here.
The Pallada and the Bayan are to have 16,500 indicated horsepower, 6-inch armor belts of from 4 to 6 3/4 inches of Krupp steel, and will mount two 8-inch guns, eight 6-inch guns, twenty 12-pounders and four 6- pounders.
The new Pallada and Bayan take the place of the Russian protected cruisers of the same names sunk at Port Arthur, and refloated by the Japanese.—New York Sun.
The Russian cruiser Rurik was launched November 17 at the yards of Vickers, Sons & Maxim, Barrow-in-Furness. Her displacement is 15,000 tons. She is to make 21 knots with 75 per cent of her boilers working. Her armament is to be more powerful than that of any existing cruiser. It will consist of four 10-inch breechloaders, eight 8-inch guns, twenty 4.7-inch, twelve small quick-firers, and two submerged torpedo tubes.
The latest Rurik in the Russian Navy, before the one launched November 17, was one of the Vladivostok squadron which gave the Japanese considerable uneasiness during the late war, until Admiral Kamimura encountered it off Tsu Island on the morning of August 14, 1904. The fight lasted five hours, but at the end of it the Rurik had been sunk and the other two ships of the squadron, the Gromoboi and Rossia, were making their way to Vladivostok, badly damaged.—New York Sun.
Le Yacht states that two armored cruisers of 20,000 tons displacement are soon to be laid down in Russian shipyards.
SPAIN.
The Spanish naval authorities, actively supported by King Alfonso, are proceeding vigorously with the re-building of Spain’s Navy. A considerable part of the construction program, involving an expenditure of ii5,- 840.000, is already under way. There are to be eight battleships of 14,000 tons, and nine cruisers. Of the cruisers, four are already in being, the Emperador Carlos V, Cardinal Cisneros, Cataluna, and Princessa de Asturias, and other vessels are well advanced. The utmost efforts are being made to make Spain’s new ships up to date in every way. The system of electrical power doors adopted by the Spanish Navy is the same as that in use on nearly all the new vessels of the United States Navy. It enables closure of the main bulkhead doors to be effected from an electrical central station located on the bridge.—Page’s Weekly.
UNITED STATES.
VESSELS BUILDING.
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Launch of the North Carolina.—The armored cruiser North Carolina was launched at the yards of the Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. on October 6. She is a sister ship to the Montana now building at the same yard. A contract for the construction of these vessels was entered into with the Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. on January 3, 1905, both to be completed in 36 months from date of contract.
The plans called for vessels of the following dimensions and characteristics:
Length on water-line, 502 feet; length over all, 504 feet 5 1/2 inches, breadth (extreme), 72 feet 10 1/2 inches, depth amidships (moulded), 42 feet 2 3/8 inches; draft, full load (mean), 27 feet 1/2 inch; displacement (fully loaded), 15,980.86 tons; displacement on trial, 14,500 tons; draft on trial, 25 feet; total coal capacity, 2000 tons; coal on trial, 900 tons; maximum speed (average of four hours’ run), 22 knots; maximum indicated horsepower, main engines (estimated), 23,000.
Armament—Main battery: Four 10-inch breech loading rifles, sixteen 6-inch breechloading rifles and four 21-inch submerged torpedo tubes. Secondary battery: Twenty-two 3-inch rapid-fire guns; twelve 3-pounder semi-automatic rapid-fire guns; two 30-caliber automatic guns and two 3-inch field guns.
The hull is of steel throughout. It is protected by a water-line belt of armor about 17 feet 3 inches in height amidships, extending from the protective deck to the gun deck port sills, being stepped down at the ends; of a uniform thickness of 5 inches throughout the machinery and magazine space and 3 inches forward and abaft this. The upper side armor is disposed in the wake of the 6-inch battery and is 5 inches thick throughout Nickel steel, 2 inches thick is disposed in wake of the 3-inch battery. Athwartship armor of 6-inch uniform thickness is fitted from the protective to the main deck.
The 10-inch barbettes extend from the protective deck to about 5 feet above the main deck and consist of 8-inch armor in front and 4-inch at the rear below and 6-inch armor above the gun deck. The 10-inch turrets have front plates 9 inches thick, rear plates 5 inches thick, side plates 7 inches thick and top plates 2 1/2 inches thick. The conning-tower is 9 inches thick and has a door 6 inches thick; signal-tower, 5 inches thick. An armored tube, 30 inches in diameter extends from the base of the conning-tower to the protective deck.
Magazines and shell rooms are so arranged that about one-half the total supply of ammunition is carried at each end of the ship. The ammunition for 6-inch and smaller guns is conveyed by electric hoists directly from the ammunition rooms or ammunition passages to the decks on which it is required. The turret guns have separate turret ammunition hoists, operated by electric power.—Nautical Gazette.
Le Yacht, after discussing at some length the steam trials of the Virginia and Rhode Island, concludes that the results as regards coal consumption were very bad. This is attributed partly to the excessive combustion of the multi-tubular boilers, as much as 229 kilos per square meter of grate surface having been burned when 175 kilos should be the maximum for this type of boiler. In part it is said to be due to the fact that more power had to be developed to give the required speed of 19 knots than was anticipated—instead of 19,000 H. P. 20.524 was required for the Rhode Island and 23,105 for the Virginia. The fact that the Virginia took 2580 H. P. more than the Rhode Island for the same speed is attributed to the insufficient propulsive surface of the Virginia’s screws, which with less diameter than those of the Rhode Island, have the same pitch.
ORDNANCE AND GUNNERY. TORPEDOES.
Abstract of Annual Report of Naval Bureau of Ordnance (1905- 1906).—The rapid erosion of high-powered, large caliber guns has been only partially remedied, and they must soon be relined. A reserve of at least one-fourth of all calibers is to be provided. Improved gas-checks, gas-ejectors, and gas-ejector attachments for rammers are being experimented with. The maximum strain on mounts is to be reduced by a new recoil check. Designs have been completed for nearly all types of broadside mounts, and it is hoped to equip all the important vessels with these during the current fiscal year. The new model telescope for sights is a great improvement. All vessels are to be equipped with improved bore sights. The results of these improvements thus far is shown in improved target practice.
Money has been saved by the satisfactory employment of civilian inspectors. Progress has been made in securing smokeless powder of greater stability and ballistic efficiency, and an attempt is being made to get rid of the 3,500,000 pounds of brown prismatic powder so as to provide storage room for the new powder. No satisfactory shell of large caliber has yet been obtained. Base percussion fuses of marked superiority have been obtained.
There has been a material increase in the delivery of armor, though, owing to the sharp competition between shipbuilders, the complaints of delay in the receipt of armor continues. The output has reached its maximum, and all outstanding contracts should be completed within 14 months. Then the armor manufacturers will turn their energies in other directions.
The work of installing a well standardized system of battery control on all vessels will soon be completed. An attempt is being made to substitute telephones for voice tubes on board ship, but thus far without success.
The Bureau is about ready to proceed to manufacture satisfactory and efficient torpedoes on a large scale. Estimates are submitted for putting the new torpedo, which is equal in efficiency to any, on the Maine, Missouri, Ohio, and the sixteen torpedo-boat destroyers. War exercise tests of submarines are under way.
The report contains an account of the accidents to the 8-inch gun on the IozL’a, and the 12-inch at the Proving Ground, and of the reorganization of the professional staff of the Bureau. The Bureau cannot too strongly record its appreciation of the loyal and capable support of the professional assistants. Their zeal and efficiency has made possible the successful administration of the affairs of the Bureau.
Annual Report of Army Ordnance Bureau.—In the last annual report mention was made of an effort to improve the system of accounting in the Ordnance Department so as to determine more accurately the cost of the different articles manufactured by it. and it was stated that this cost would thereafter include, besides the indirect shop expenses, a proper percentage to cover the pay of the officers and enlisted men of the establishment, the general repairs and improvements to buildings, the clerical expenses, deterioration, and in general all those expenses which a private manufacturer must take into account, except profit. This percentage has been determined to be for the Frankford Arsenal 9, for the Springfield Armory 14, and for the Rock Island Arsenal 11.4. In comparing government manufacture with that at private establishments certain advantages characterize each method. The private manufacturer is not restricted to eight hours of labor per day; this may or may not be an advantage, but there is no doubt of the advantage resulting from his relief from the necessity of paying for 15 days of vacation per year, for seven national holidays and for Saturday half-holidays during the summer months. The time for which the Government in this manner pays, without return in labor, amounts to 10 per cent of the working time of the year.
On the other hand, the Government has a right to charge a less interest rate on the value of its plant, because its better credit enables it to borrow money at a less rate. Its losses by fire are also limited to those actually incurred, instead of being obliged to carry the “load” involved in the machinery of conducting insurance companies and the dividends to stockholders. Its high-class superintendence is also less liberally paid, and the deterioration of plant, like the insurance, is only that actually incurred, instead of being an amount which the manufacturer must often make large to cover himself against a lack of future orders, but which he rarely diminishes when the real cost of his plant has been actually covered. Added to all else is the profit, which the manufacturer will of course make as great as the conditions of industry allow. It is sometimes claimed that the private manufacturer has a stimulus spurring him to effort to reduce cost by improved methods and close supervision, which is lacking in a Government establishment. There is no necessity for the lack in Government establishments, if the career of the officers is made to be affected by their conduct of them, and there is the same possibility as in private establishments, of reward to employes for valuable suggestions. Success in diminishing private cost does not by any means signify lower prices to the Government, but rather greater profit to the manufacturer.
Below is compiled a statement showing the contract prices and the arsenal cost of various manufactures of recent years. In some cases the contractors claim that their price was so low as to cause them a loss. The arsenal costs include all of the general percentages mentioned above. The evidence is in favor of Government manufacture, as will be seen from the following items:
3-inch field guns, model of 1902, contract price, $2499; arsenal cost, $2242.
3-inch field guns, model of 1905, contract price, $1990; arsenal cost, $1491.
3-inch field gun carriages, contract price, $3010; arsenal cost, $2292.
3-inch field caissons, contract price, $1522; arsenal cost, $1183.
15-pounder barbette carriages, contract price, $4042; arsenal cost, $3642.
15-pounder shrapnel, contract price, $3.96 each; arsenal cost, $2.83.
Ball cartridges for rifle, model of 1903, contract price, $42.50 per 1000; arsenal cost, $34.99 per 1000.
Last year’s report referred to the effect of erosion in limiting the life of heavy guns, and to the possible necessity of finding some method of securing the necessary power less expensive than that involved in using the very high velocities of projectiles now employed, with the accompanying rapid wearing away of the rifling in such manner as to destroy the accuracy of the gun after a few rounds. Going into the subject in more detail and considering the 12-inch gun of the model of 1900 as an example, we have for the life of this gun. firing a projectile of 1000 pounds weight, with a velocity of about 2500 feet per second, only about 60 rounds. As the gun is capable of firing for a considerable interval at the rate of 45 rounds per hour, it is seen that the limit of its life could be reached in less than an hour and a half. It has been considered that in attempting to run by fortifications guarding the entrance of a harbor the period that would elapse from the time that the leading vessel of the fleet would come within range until the last vessel would pass beyond the range of the coast guns would be about two hours; it is therefore evident that a new 12-inch gun would not last through such an engagement. Similar statements can be made with regard to guns of smaller calibers, although as the caliber diminishes the admissible velocity increases. The 6-inch gun of the model of 1900, firing a projectile of 100 pounds weight with a velocity of 3000 feet per second, would have a life of 150 rounds, corresponding to about an hour and a quarter at the rate at which the gun can be fired. It needs only a statement of the situation to show the necessity for doing something to meet it, notwithstanding that the accuracy of the guns could be restored by relining them at much less than their original cost.
By lowering the velocity of the 12-inch projectile to 2250 feet per second the life of the gun is increased to 200 rounds, and by similarly lowering that of the 6-inch projectile to 2600 feet per second the life of the gun goes up to 450 rounds. The penetration of armor plate is, of course, reduced by this process, that of the 12-inch gun at 10,000 yards coming down from about ioV£ inches to about 9 inches, and the range at which its projectile would uenetrate 12 inches of armor plate being reduced from about 8000 yards to about 6000 yards, Krupp hard-faced armor being referred to in both cases.
To restore the offensive power the most obvious course is an increase of the caliber of the gun, and all considerations indicate that there is nothing against such a course and a great deal in its favor. A 16-inch gun has been successfully built and tested and there is no reason why this caliber should not be adopted for our guns of the highest power if it should be considered necessary. But let us examine an intermediate caliber. The design of a 14-inch gun has been laid down in this office, of which the weight is 49V2 tons (111,000 pounds), the weight of the projectile is 1660 pounds, and such construction has been adopted as will involve a muzzle velocity of 2150 feet per second. The charge of powder required to produce this velocity is about 280 pounds, as against 366 pounds for the 12- inch gun of the model of 1900.
Summarizing the results of tests and manufacturing data, it appears that by using in the situations requiring the greatest power a 14-inch gun with 2150 feet per second muzzle velocity of projectile instead of the 12-inch gun with 2500 feet per second initial velocity we would secure a lighter gun, a cheaper gun, a heavier projectile, greater muzzle energy, a still greater proportion of energy at each distance beyond the muzzle, and a life four times as long.
The Taft Board for the revision of the report of the Endicott Board on coast defence has recommended the use of the 14-inch gun in place of the 12-inch in situations where the highest power is required, and this department will hereafter construct guns of that caliber, abandoning as a maximum caliber the 12-inch, which had been tacitly adopted.
Congress at its last session made an appropriation of $165,000 for the establishment of an army smokeless powder factory. Steps are being taken for the selection of a proper site for the establishment of this factory, and when this site has been selected the work of erection of the factory will be pushed vigorously to completion. In the meantime plans and specifications for buildings and machinery are in preparation.—Iron Age.
Naval Prize-firing Competitions.—The shooting competitions in our Naval Service are becoming so popular among the officers and men of the fleet, and are so much responsible for creating the present burning zeal and boundless energy which permeates both the quarter-deck officer and the lower-deck man, that anything which tends to damp down this enthusiasm deserves to be met with the strongest possible opposition. On these grounds we wish to enter a strong and earnest protest against the advocacy of those who are striving so hard to abolish the gunlayers’ test, now carried out in every ship in our fleet having a full complement of officers and men on board.
This year’s competitions between the gunlayers and the guns’ crews throughout the fleet were recently brought to a conclusion, and a portion of the ships have since carried out their battle practice. The competitions, so far as the results are at present known in what is essentially the men’s competition, as no officers are allowed to have hand or part in it except to see the rules obeyed by the guns’ crews, have been extraordinarily prolific of high individual scoring. This has especially been the case with the largest guns, such as the 9.2-inch and 12-inch weapons. The score of Petty Officer Sullivan, of the Duke of Edinburgh, mentioned in our columns last week, when ten hits were made with ten rounds in ninety seconds, from a 9.2-inch gun, on board that armored cruiser, while carrying out the gunlayers’ test in Tetuan Bay, was a marvellous performance when measured by the old standards of the pre-Scylla and pre-Terrible days.
Yet in face of this high-class shooting, unquestionably brought about by the keenness created by a man-and-man competition, there are those who would deliberately remove this strong incentive to the straining of every nerve; those, who would, perhaps inadvertently, but nevertheless assuredly, damp down the tense and helpful spirit of rivalry now kept alive by a struggling for individual reward. It may be argued by those who would abolish the gunlayers’ test, and thus quash the competition between the men, that this would enlarge the field by creating other competitions in which the officers and men might share alike in the honors and rewards.
If it was possible to establish so keen a competition at a longer range, and be, at the same time, able to pick out and adequately reward the best men—the central idea of all prize competitions, where individuals compete—then something might be said for the abolition side of the question. But we venture to think it is impossible to do so in any heavy-gun shooting in the navy, where the officers and men are engaged together, the former in “spotting” the fall of the shot and prompting, and the latter in rapidly loading and laying the gun for the object, and keeping the sights of the piece continually bearing on the object.
If praiseworthy shooting be made under these conditions of mutual help and mutual confidence, then the credit must be shared equally between those responsible for the performance. It would be impossible to select any single man of the crowd engaged and say this man did better than his neighbor in such a test of general skill and organization. Long-range firing usuaily means “salvo” or “broadside” discharges of groups or whole broadsides of guns, fired at the given signal of one man. The responsibility of giving the order, or doing the act at the right moment, rests in this case with one individual; but the laying of the separate guns belonging to the group belongs to the several men behind the telescope- sights of the different pieces of ordnance that go to make up the group.
If the guns are fired together with various degrees of accuracy, their shot pitch at various distances from the object aimed at. But who is to say whether the shot of this or that man is the nearest or farthest away? Or who shall say, if there be fault at all—or contrawise if there be credit—that it does not all lie with the man who gave the order to discharge the guns either too early or too late on the roll of the ship at the correct moment? Under such circumstances it should be perfectly obvious to the merest tyro in such matters, that it is next to impossible to reward individual merit or censure individual fault. And if there is to be no individualism, and no cutting and pruning among gunlayers, who like other mortals suffer physical decay and decline in professional skill, what means are we to adopt to replace the unfit by the fit?
Whenever bad scores were made there would be mutual charges and recriminations, often, perhaps, between officers and men, detrimental in the highest degree to discipline; whereas in the gunlayers’ test, at present, each gunlayer fights for his own hand and reward, and a guns’ crew have no one but themselves to blame if they fail to win a prize, taking their run of luck with the rest like good sportsmen. It is this personal touch and test that give the present zest to the competitions, and as the prizes are already far too small, it would be little less than suicidal to abolish them altogether, and trust to the honor of the bluejacket and Marine to make those personal sacrifices of individual training, and a period of tense effort necessary in strenuous competitions, which all other classes of the community are encouraged to undertake by the bait of either handsome money prizes, promotion, or high honor and decoration.
If good shooting is made at the gunlayers’ test and bad shooting at battle practice, under normal conditions, then the fault is probably that of the “spotter” who directs the raising or lowering of the sights by which the guns should be well and truly laid. This probability arises from the fact that the same men, unaided by a “spotter” and shooting at a distance where they could see the holes their shot made in the target, or watch their shot falling short or over, by the telescope-sights, and thus do their own “spotting,” have a few weeks previously shown themselves expert marksmen. In such a case the fault would generally rest with the officer “spotter.” If on the contrary the men fire badly when working unaided, and do the same when prompted by a “spotter” at long distances, then the officer can scarcely be blamed if a bad gunlayers’ test is followed by a bad battle practice performance. Whereas a good battle practice score, following on a bad gunlayers' test record, might fairly be credited very largely to the way the gunlayers had been guided to the target by the “spotting” officer aloft, and he would deserve, and probably obtain, their lordships’ commendation.
The system at present in vogue meets these conditions, and has, so far as experience has gone, proved to be eminently satisfactory in developing our naval shooting, which is making rapid progress among guns of all calibers. To abolish the gunlayers’ test, then, without the clearest ideas as to what is to be substituted to maintain the present gunnery keenness, and without being morally confident of a good result, would, in our opinion, be akin to midnight madness. And on the grounds mentioned above, we strenuously oppose any such action being taken. Let the critics of the present system show us a better plan before the current one is tampered with. So far this has not been done.—United Service Gazette.
Elevating Gear Tests.—A number of qualified gunlayers of the United States Atlantic fleet have been at the proving grounds of the Bethlehem Steel Company, to try, in sub-caliber practice, some elevating gears for a 6-inch 45-caliber gun. Three speeds were supplied, which could be quickly changed, so that the men had an opportunity of seeing which suited them best for firing at the target, which had a motion similar to the apparent motion of a vessel’s broadside from a rolling ship. These speeds gave 30, 50, and 75 minutes of angular motion to the gun’s axis for one turn of the elevating wheel. There was also an arrangement whereby the man could use, as is customary, his left hand for elevating while firing with an ordinary electric trigger with his right hand on a stationary pistol grip, or could use both hands in elevating, in which case he fired by pressing with the forefinger of his right hand an electric trigger which was attached to the handle of the right hand elevating wheel and which, of course, was in continual motion. The target was 0.34 inches wide, which represents a free-board of 26 feet at a range of 6000 yards. Each man fired for five minutes at the target, which was caused to move vertically in an irregular and intermittent manner, simulating the rolling motion of a ship from one degree to eight degrees. The motion of the target was controlled and made correct by means of a series of curves, which caused its motion to be rapid at the middle of the roll and to slow off and stop at the top and bottom of the roll, as would be the case in a ship, and all rolls were described in fourteen seconds. That is, this was taken as the period of the firing ship for a complete double oscillation of whatever magnitude. This was arranged by means of a sound given every two seconds, which enable the man following the curves referred to to describe them at the correct speed and thus move the target at a correct speed. Owing to the fatigue caused by following with the gun this considerable rolling motion for five minutes, and to the better power to start and stop, and to the absence of a dead point, the double hand wheel gave better satisfaction than the single hand wheel. Also the speedier gears gave better results, especially on the high rolls. The system is analogous to that used in the British service.—Army and Navy Gazette.
The Duke of Edinburgh and Black Prince, of the Second Cruiser Squadron, have completed their gunlayers’ tests at Gibraltar. With her 9.2- inch guns the Duke of Edinburgh fired ten rounds in 90 seconds, and secured 10 hits, her total record with this gun being 51 rounds and 44 hits, the number of hits per gun per minute averaging 3.67. With the 6-inch guns the record was 81 rounds and 71 hits; best gun, 9 rounds, 9 hits. The Black Prince with her 9.2-inch guns fired 32 rounds, making 21 hits, while with her 6-inch guns she scored 60 hits out of 71 rounds.
The Exmoutli, flagship of Admiral Sir A. K. Wilson, V. C., commander- in-chief of the Channel fleet, has just completed her heavy gunlayers’ test off Portland, with the following results: 12-inch guns: 19 rounds, 16 hits; 6-inch guns: 119 rounds, 86 hits. The Exmoutli headed the returns in 1905, but this year the circumstances attending her firing have been far from conducive to good results. She commenced her test some months ago, but unfavorable weather, the salvage operations at Lundy, the grand maneuvers, and other circumstances intervened, and she has only just been able to complete her firing.—United Service Gazette.
Progressive Naval Gunnery.—The magnificent shooting performance by Petty Officer Sullivan, on board the armored cruiser Duke of Edinburgh, is an example of the wonderful progress that is being made all along the line in naval gunnery. It is probably the best piece of shooting from heavy guns that the world has ever seen. To hit a target 21 feet by 17 feet 6 inches, at a range of 1600 yards, from a 9.2-inch gun, 10 times with 10 successive rounds, in the short period of 90 seconds, is a feat fully deserving the high praise that was bestowed upon it by that expert naval gunnery man, Prince Louis of Battenberg, who commands the Second Cruiser Squadron, to which the Duke of Edinburgh belongs. It must be remembered that this was an unaided effort on the part of the gunlayer and his crew, as the “spotter officer is not allowed to prompt the men from aloft by indicating the fall of the shot to them, as is the case when battle practice is being carried out. In the gunlayers’ test the man behind the telescope has to do his own spotting, and with the glasses now used he can at that distance see the holes in the target if the shots are hitting. This feat represents something more than just a specimen of accurate shooting from a large gun, beautifully mounted and splendidly poised; it is likewise a physical feat of the highest order, for the 9.2-inch gun is a hand-loading weapon, and has no hydraulic rammer to push home its charge and projectile. The breech arrangements are also worked by hand in a similar manner to the 7.5-inch, 6-inch, and smaller guns. The gun’s crew, therefore, to have loaded a gun of this size 10 times in 90 seconds, must have been splendidly trained, and this is the part of the performance that has most struck the imagination of naval gunnery experts. With guns mounted and poised as our naval guns now are, good shooting is made easy to men with an aptitude for it, as the weapon can be made to follow the target horizontally and vertically, by elevation and training, with about the same facility as a fowler can make his piece, when raised to his shoulder, follow a bird. It is the loading of a gun and the supply of ammunition which form the chief difficulties. That these are being overcome the Duke of Edinburgh, the Diana, and Prince George have recently shown. The two latter ships have just obtained more than 50 per cent of hits at their long-distance practice. This is going ahead by leaps and bounds.—United Service Gazette.
Firing Experiments with the Montagu.—The Ordnance Committee, acting in co-operation with the Director of Naval Ordnance and the Director of Artillery, have arranged to carry out some important experiments in firing at the battleship Montagu, stranded on Lundy Island, with the object of testing the effect of high explosives on modern armor.
The projectiles to be used are 12-inch and 9.2-inch armor-piercing shells with caps, having a bursting power of nominally 6 per cent in the case of the 12-inch shell, and of proportionate capacity in that of the 9.2-inch. The firing ship will be one of the King Edward VII class, which mount guns of these calibers, the vessel selected probably being the battleship Africa. Special charges will be used, and the firing ship will be moored. This will be the first opportunity that has presented itself of obtaining trustworthy information as to the effect of armor-piercing capped shell against modern armor in position, en masse, on a ship’s side, and the results will be far more valuable than those gained by firing at single plates in proof cells at the various testing grounds. The experiments are also expected to have an important effect in demonstrating the damage caused by high explosives striking at an angle, this being rendered possible as the Montagu is partly heeled over. In this respect the conditions will therefore closely resemble those of a sea fight, and contribute to the meager information which the authorities possess of the effect of shell not striking with direct impact, but in a glancing position.
Another important feature of the experiments will be to show the efficiency of the fire control installation, as the positions where it is thought the control fittings would mostly be damaged by concussion, etc., are mostly available to be fired at in the Montagu.—United Service Gazette.
It is stated, and apparently on authority, that the factory at Chatham for the Brennan torpedo is to be converted to some other use. We regard the story as true because it seems to be only a logical sequence of the decision to place the defence of the harbors in naval hands. The Brennan torpedo has been a very expensive toy since the time when it was acquired by the War Office at a cost of £110,000, with a salary to Mr. Brennan. the superintendent of its manufacture. It has been the subject of much costly experiment, and installations of the machinery required for its manipulation are to be found at a few places at home and in our colonies and dependencies. But we have never yet heard that it was likely to give a satisfactory return for the outlay, or to exercise a deterrent effect, moral or otherwise, upon the action of an alert and enterprising enemy. It was purchased at a time when local and fixed defences were much more in favor than they are at present and it has never been regarded with a partial eye by the navy. Yet curiously enough it was a committee mainly of naval officers that first advised its being sent to this country for examination by the military authorities. It was then thought, however, that it might be utilized as a naval weapon, and it is because it labors under the disadvantage that it cannot be taken to the enemy that it has been held in such small esteem by seamen. Doubtless the factory can be used for other purposes than the manufacture of the torpedo, but we are assured that nobody will regret the disappearance of the Brennan from our national armory.—Army and Navy Gazette.
The Moniteur de la Flotte states that the Whitehead Co. has introduced a very important improvement in the depth regulator of the automobile torpedo. Nearly 100 pieces of the old mechanism are done away with, and the result is an increase of facility of regulation, a decrease of cost, and an increase of explosive charge. The 1906 model, now under trial at Fiume, is to give a range of from 1000 to 1500 meters at from 40 to 42 knots’ speed.
In torpedo practice at Berehaven by the Channel fleet last week, the hits were 90 per cent, the only drawback to the operations being that four of the torpedoes were lost. The fleet was divided into two sub-divisions, one headed by the battleship Exmouth (flagship) and the other by the battleship Albemarle. They steamed in opposite directions at 2000 yards range, and the speed of each was unknown to the other. When abreast, torpedoes were discharged at the battleship occupying the corresponding position in the opposite line. The torpedoes, which were fitted with collision heads, were discharged with almost unerring precision, only two failing to find the mark.—United Service Gazette.
In the opinion of many experts, the hand-grenade or bomb will in future tend more and more to supplant the use of the bayonet for close- quarter fighting, and it will be remembered that grenades were most effectively used by the Japanese in the late war. A grenade for such purposes is made by the Cotton Powder Company, of 32 Queen Victoria street, E. C., and is 7 inches long by 1 5/8 inch in diameter. This “Hale” hand-grenade can be thrown 30 or 40 yards by means of a tail rope 18 inches in length. The detonator is carried separately in a pouch, and only screwed into the grenade just before it is to be thrown. The weight is about 1 pound 4 ounces, and they may be carried on a belt with perfect safety to the soldier. The charge is of tonite, but any other high explosive may be employed with good effect.—Engineering.
MISCELLANEOUS.
Rules for Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War.—At the closing session of the Institute of International Law, held recently in Ghent, Belgium, the following articles relative to wireless telegraphy were voted:
The regulations governing wireless telegraphy in time of peace are applicable in principle in time of war. Belligerents may prevent the transmission of Hertzian waves by a neutral state over the high seas within the sphere of their military operations.
All persons taken prisoners while receiving or transmitting wireless messages from belligerent territory or between different sections of a belligerent army are not to be considered spies, but are to be treated as prisoners of war, unless their operations were carried on under false pretenses.
Carriers of dispatches received by wireless who make use of concealment or ruse in their work will be regarded as spies.
Neutral ships and balloons proved to have been used to furnish an adversary with information helpful in the conduct of hostilities may be removed from the zone of hostilities and the wireless apparatus on board seized and sequestrated.
A neutral state is not obliged to prevent the passage across its territory of Hertzian waves destined to a country at war. A neutral state has the right to close or take over the wireless telegraphy station of a belligerent operated in its territory. Every prohibition in the matter of wireless communication made by belligerents must at once be communicated to neutral governments.—Electrical Review.
Motor Torpedo Boats.—A line of investigation being pursued by the naval authorities which opens up a new avenue of construction, is in connection with the torpedo motor boat. The first boat of this class, that built by Messrs. Yarrow & Co., was described in this journal on its first appearance some months ago, and there is no doubt, as Sir William White has said, that the introduction of the internal combustion engine has given naval designers a new field in which to work. The tests made with this boat are understood to have been so satisfactory that it is now regarded as the first of a numerous flotilla designed for coast service, and its advantage on the score of efficiencv and low cost are such as to undoubtedly recommend it to a government which has embarked on a policy of economy in regard to naval construction. The development of the petrol marine motor has made it possible to build 6o-foot boats, capable of carrying two torpedoes and the necessary equipment and crew at a speed of 24 knots for a distance of 250 miles, a performance well ahead of what could be achieved with a steam engined boat of the same length. The new departure will be watched with interest.—Page’s Weekly.
In an address at the Engineering and Machinery Exhibition at London on October 4, on “Large Gas Engines,” H. A. Humphrey, M. Inst. C. E., said that under favorable working conditions a large gas engine develops a horsepower hour for 0.8 lb. of coal, while a steam engine takes about 2 lb. In Germany, with 24 makers in the field, competition has led to improvements in design. While German and Belgian firms have met heavy losses in their gas engine experiments, the possibilities of these engines have had better appreciation on the Continent, where coal is dearer. The speaker had information to the effect that the use of gas engines and electrical equipment of the rolling mills has reduced the price of finished products 13s. to 18s. a ton. While the list was not complete he had obtained particulars of 531 large gas engines, having a total of 544,240 hp. —Iron Age.
Panama Canal Plans.—The Isthmian Canal Commission has issued a statement describing the general plan for the construction of the Panama Canal. It is explained that the type of canal proposed by the minority of the Consulting Board is to form a summit level about 85 feet above the level of the sea, which is to be reached by a flight of locks built at Gatun, on the Atlantic side, by one lock at Pedro Miguel and two others at La Boca, on the Pacific side. The locks are all to be in duplicate.
The summit level will be formed by the construction of a large dam at Gatun and a small one at Pedro Miguel. A second lake, with a surface elevation of 55 feet, will be formed on the Pacific side between Pedro Miguel and Panama Bay by the construction of a dam at La Boca, across the mouth of the Rio Grande, and another dam between Sosa Hill and high ground near Corozal.
From the Caribbean Sea to the mouth of the Mindi river a channel is to be excavated, having a bottom width of 500 feet and a depth of 45 feet below mean tide. From the mouth of the Mindi to the Gatun locks the width and depth are to be the same as from the sea to the mouth of the river.
The Gatun locks are to be built in duplicate. The lift will be overcome by a flight of three locks of 28 1/3 feet or by two locks of 42 1/2 feet each. The Gatun dam will reach from a point near the Gatun Hills, on which the locks are to be located, to the hill 3500 feet westward, in which the spillway will be built. The object of this dam is to form a reservoir in which the floods of the Chagres will be received. Its area will be approximately no square miles. Works for regulating the level of the lake will be situated in the hills that lie midway between two extremes of the dam. They will consist of a system of gates constructed on foundations of concrete. The gates will be almost counterparts of those used on the Chicago drainage canal.
From the Gatun locks to San Pablo, a distance of about 15 miles, only a small amount of excavation will be required. The width of the canal will be about 1000 feet and the depth 45 feet. The growth for 50 feet along the shores is to be removed. Further up the lake, as the amount of excavation necessary to obtain a depth of 45 feet increases, the width of the channel will be decreased, first to 800 feet, then to 500, then to 300 from Obispo to Las Cascades, a distance of about 1 1/2 miles, where the Culebra cut begins.
The channel from Matachin to Bas Obispo may be narrowed to 100 feet. From Las Cascades to Paraiso, a distance of 4.7 miles, the width of the channel will be 200 feet. This is the most difficult work of the whole canal construction. From Paraiso, the end of Culebra cut, to the Pedro Miguel lock, a distance less than two miles, the channel will be 300 feet wide. The Pedro Miguel lock will have a lift of 30 feet and will be in duplicate, with approach walls at each end. From the lock for a distance of 1.87 miles the channel will be 500 feet wide, and will then be increased to 1000 feet for a distance of 3.61 miles to Sosa Hill, on the shore of Panama Bay, where the Sosa locks will be built. These locks will be in two flights with lifts of 27 1/2 feet each, and will be in duplicate.
A dam will be constructed across the Rio Grande from San Juan Hill to Sosa Hill, another from Sosa Hill to Corozal Hill and a small dam from Corozal Hill to the high ground eastward. These dams will form a lake known as Soso Lake. It will have an area of eight square miles and will be provided with regulation works for discharging the surplus water.
From the Sosa locks to deep water in Panama Bay. a distance of four miles, the channel is to have a bottom width of 500 feet and a depth of 50 feet below mean tide. The mean rise and fall of the tide is about 15 feet.
The Panama Railroad will be relocated throughout almost the entire distance from the mouth of the Mindi river to Panama, and some heavy embankments will be required to cross certain parts of Gatun Lake.— Iron Age.
Comparison of a Turbine and a Reciprocating Engine for the United States Navy.—Although we have been rather late in taking up the question of the marine turbine in this country, it is gratifying to know that the two most successful forms of the turbine, the Parsons and the Curtis, the former a British, and the latter an American development, are now under construction for use in American-built vessels. Of the various marine turbine installations proposed or in course of construction, perhaps the most interesting is that which is being built by the Fore River Shipbuilding Company for the United States scout Salem. The Salem is one of three 24-knot ships which were authorized in 1904, and whose contract was signed in May of 1905. In designing these vessels, the government wisely determined to use the opportunity here afforded to test the relative efficiency of the turbine and the reciprocating engine in the propulsion of fast ships. The contract for the construction of two of the vessels, the Birmingham and the Salem, was awarded to the Fore River Shipbuilding Company, and the third vessel was given to the Bath Iron Works, Bath, Me. The two ships which are being built by the Fore River Company, the Birmingham and the Salem, will be equipped respectively with reciprocating engines and Curtis turbines, while the Chester will be driven by Parsons turbines. The engines of the Birmingham will be of the twin- screw vertical expansion type; those of the Chester will consist of four turbines, driving four propellers, while the Salem will be driven by twin- screw turbines.
These navy scouts will be 420 feet long, 47 feet I inch in beam, and the mean draft will be 16 feet 9 inches, on which draft they will displace 3750 tons, the full-load draft being 4687 tons. Each ship will be armed with twelve 3-inch rapid-fire guns and two of the new 21-inch turbine torpedo tubes. The contract calls for a speed of 24 knots with a development of 16,000 horsepower.
The following table is a comparison of one of the Curtis turbines built for the Salem and one of the triple-expansion engines built in the same shops for the battleship Vermont. The turbine is of 8000 brake horsepower and the reciprocating engine of 8230 horsepower. A comparison of the dimensions and weights of the two engines is greatly in favor of the rotary type.
[TABLE]
The above shows that on practically every point of comparison recorded, the turbine has an advantage and particularly in the matter of length, height, and weight, being only half as long, not much over half as high, and only two-thirds as heavy. The tests on an experimental turbine, built expressly for testing this type of turbine, show that in steam consumption there is a proportionately fine economy.—Scientific American.
The Minor Navies of the World.—There is, perhaps, no subject more discussed in the present day than that which has been denominated by the great American seaman-author, Captain Mahan, as sea-power. As steam-power has increased, and as year by year the steamship has grown in both size and swiftness, the nations have discovered that where in the old sailing days they were self-contained entities, producing for their own consumption those articles necessary for their existence, to-day a much wider application of the term “necessaries” has sprung into existence. Articles which but a couple of decades ago were the luxuries of the rich are now the common objects of the coster’s barrow in the great capitals and wealthy cities of our complex civilization, and all this has meant an enormous increase in sea carriage among the nations, the erstwhile self- containedness of which has been exchanged for that inter-dependence and commercial cosmopolitanism which is the principal feature of the age in which we live. This world-wide commerce, and the different class of vessel which is now engaged in it, has altered many features in the sea routes of the world, of which one instance may suffice; ten or, at the most, fifteen years ago Gibraltar was a great port of call for all steamers bound outward “up the Straits,” or homeward from the Mediterranean, for the purpose of re-bunkering, and where, in those not very far distant days, fifteen or twenty steamers would enter or leave the port daily, at present one or two have taken the place of the larger number, and those which now make regular calls are nearly all of the big liner class, who never coal in the bay. Nowadays the humblest tramp carries coal sufficient to take her from London or Liverpool to Port Said, and the once-flourishing coal trade is a thing of the past in Gibraltar. The day of the giant merchant-ship is also the day of the leviathan man-of-war; the tonnage and horsepower of the Great Eastern, so long the standard of all bigness, have now long since been surpassed, and concomitantly the size of warships has increased until, in the present, we are confronted with the accomplished fact of the Dreadnought, and the plans of France, Germany, Japan, and the United States to follow where England has led. Competition in trade in the twentieth century seems to be followed by further competition in armament as surely as the night follows the day; and the taxpayer, who gasped at the idea of a warship costing a million pounds sterling, has now to steady his nerves sufficiently to accept the fact that the powers that be now consider an expenditure of double that sum necessary on the vessel which is destined to guard his hearth and home. Building programs for navies have increased beyond the wildest dreams of even ten years ago, and we may note, without any intention of entering into any controversy on the subject, that it is Great Britain which has shown the first signs of weakening in that competition in which, whether she likes it or not, she is bound for the sake of her very national existence to remain at the head. The fact of this strenuous striving after an equality with our own country on the part of other Powers renders an examination into the force at the disposal of the minor navies of the world all the more interesting, as, in the event of some Titanic sea struggle happening, the possible exhaustion of the combatants might render the aid of those whom we regard at present with a certain measure of contempt an asset by no means to be despised. It is not really very difficult to separate the great from the small in the matter of sea-power, as the former category is really a small one, which comprises Great Britain, the United States of America, France, Japan, and Germany; Italy and Austria can be placed intermediately, and we then come to those nations which are not regarded as serious rivals by any of those just mentioned. Of Russia it is, of course, unnecessary to speak at present.
Those fine seamen, the Scandinavians, rightly come first in consideration of minor navies, and their requirements in the shape of men-of-war are rightly and sensibly limited to ships destined to defence. They have at present no ship in commission larger than the Äran class, of which there are four; their displacement is 3650 tons; length, 287 feet; beam, 49 1/4 feet; maximum draft, 16 feet; these vessels carry two 8.2-inch 45- caliber and six 6-inch guns, ten 3-pounders, two 1-pounders, and two submerged torpedo-tubes. The Distrigheten, of 3500 tons, has a similar armament, except that she carries 6-pounders instead of 3-pounders; the Svea class, of three ships, are of 3300 tons, with an armament different from the others, in that they carry one 8.2-inch gun less, one more 6-inch gun, and one more 6-pounder. The Odin, Thor, and Niord, of 3400 tons, and which dates from 1879, 1898, and 1899, respectively, concludes the list of Swedish warships other than torpedo craft; their armament consists of two 10-inch and six 4.7-inch guns, ten 3-pounders and two i-pounders, and one submerged torpedo-tube. A cruiser—the Fylgia, laid down in 1905, of 4060 tons—is building, as also a coast service battleship—Oscar II—of 4275 tons. The torpedo craft comprises five torpedo-gunboats, two destroyers, and some torpedo-boats.
The sister kingdom of Norway possesses two cruisers—the Norge and Eidswold—of 38a) tons; two—the Harald Haarfagre, and Tordenskjold— of 3400 tons; and three torpedo-gunboats. Norway and Sweden have need for navies owing to the propinquity of Russia and Germany; and although their force is small, it is said to be, as might be expected, extremely efficient; and in the stormy and foggy waters in which they are called upon to operate there is no doubt that these few Scandinavian vessels would prove a hard nut to crack.
Denmark possesses three coast-service battleships of the Herluf Trolle type, of 3470 tons, carrying three 9.4-inch and four 6-inch guns, ten 6- pounders, four i-pounders, five machine-guns, and five torpedo-tubes: The Skjold, dating 1896, is 2160 tons; but the remaining craft, the Valkyrien, of 3020 tons, built in 1880; Tordenskjold, 2580 tons, 1880; Iver Hitfeldt, 3200 tons, 1886; and Helgoland, 5370 tons, 1878, may be dismissed as being absolutely without fighting value in the present day. There are no seamen in the world for whom the British have had a greater respect than for those of the Low Countries as Van Tromp, de Ruyter, and many a stout Dutchman besides caused us much trouble in the days of old; for was it not the Dutch who burnt British vessels in the Medway, and can we not to-day sec the captured English flags hanging in the cathedral at Amsterdam? But the days when Holland could measure herself with England are gone, never to return; and the old amphibious breed, sheltering behind the dykes which keep out the German Ocean, are to-day possessed with a lively fear of a foe which may come from the south, and not from the north, a foe which desires, above all things, ships, colonies, and commerce. and which casts covetous eyes on the ports of Belgium and Holland. Maritime expansion on the large scale is not possible for either a mercantile or an imperial navy, and Rotterdam and Antwerp in German hands would make a nice commencement of that new state of affairs when Germany is to reign supreme from the North Sea to the Adriatic. But meanwhile Belgium is neutralized by European agreement, and the Dutch, as all the world knows, have before now preferred that the North Sea should swallow their territory sooner than that it should remain in the possession of any save themselves.
Meanwhille the navy of Queen Wilhelmina is no very formidable affair, as the largest battleship, the Tromp, is but of 5300 tons, carrying two 9.4-inch and four 6-inch guns, twelve 12-pounders and four 1-pounders and three torpedo-tubes. There are also the Koningin Regentes, de Ruyter, and Hertog Hendrik, of 4950 tons, carrying two 9.4-inch and four 6-inch guns; the Evertzen, Piet Hein, and Kortenaar, of 3520 tons, carrying three 8.2-inch and two 6-inch guns; the Koningin Wilhelmina der Nederlanden, of 4600 tons, with one 11-inch, one 8.2-inch, and two 6.8- inch guns; and besides the six cruisers of the Holland class, of 3950 tons, carrying two 6-inch 40-caliber and six 4.7-inch guns. These, with some torpedo-boats, make up the naval strength of Holland.
Another old antagonist of the Dutchman—the Spaniard—comes next on the list; but since the war with the United States, in 1898, very little has been done in the Peninsula to remedy the state of weakness to which that conflict reduced her: the Pelayo, of 9950 tons, dates from 1887, and can accordingly be hardly considered seriously in the present day; the Princesa de Asturias and Cataluna, of 7000 tons, date respectively from 1896 and 1900, and carry two 9.4-inch and eight 5.5-inch guns; the Emperador Carlos V, of 9200 tons (1895), Lepanto, 4826 tons (1892), and four small cruisers complete the list of Spanish naval power.
Portugal possesses the Vasco da Gama (which dates from 1875. but was reconstructed at Leghorn in 1902), of 2500 tons; the Dom Carlos I, of 4100 tons, dating from 1898, carrying four 6-inch and eight 4.7-inch guns; the Rainha Dona Amelia, of 1665 tons; the Adamastor. of 1750 tons; and the Sao Gabriel and Sao Rafael, of 1800 tons. There are, in addition, a number of gunboats, of no value whatever.
The Turkish fleet may be mentioned en passant. But it is to be imagined that no one—least of all the Yildiz Kiosk—is likely to take this as a serious force; it can only be a matter for wonderment why persons so shrewd as the Sultan and his environment should ever have wasted money in the purchase of ships for the purpose of allowing them to slowly molder into decay at the Golden Horn.
The Greeks are the possessors of three battleships, of 5000 tons—the Psara, Spetsai, and Hydra. Roumania is credited with a cruiser—the Elizabeth, of 1320 tons; and Bulgaria with a torpedo gunboat, of 715 tons. Even an alliance comprising all these Powers would not materially alter the balance of power in Europe. This completes the tale of the ships belonging to the minor European Powers; but we have yet Asia and America with which to deal. In the former continent China possesses the Hai-Chi, of 4300 tons; the Haiyung, Hai-Shew, and Hai-Shen, each of 3000 tons; and some gunboats and torpedo craft. But China, although like Japan, she has had in her time the services of most able British naval officers to help to train her fleet, has not profited by the instruction given, and as soon as the Englishmen were withdrawn, the ships and crews were allowed to drift back into the state of hopeless incompetence which obtained before. Siam has one cruiser—the Malta Chakrkri—and a few gunboats.
And now in considering the minor navies of the world there remains America, in which continent there are a good many vessels of war apart from the fleet of the United States, which is projected to be, as all men know, only second in power and importance to that of Great Britain herself. If anything has been said concerning naval matters at the Pan- American Congress sitting at Buenos Ayres, nothing has transpired; but if there should have been an idea of adopting the proposition of Sefior Drago, the Argentine representative, which amounted to no less than resistance to any forcible attempt on the part of Europe to collect debts justly due, the navies of the Central and South American Republics would have been hardly adequate to the demands upon them; but Mr. Root, the United States representative, could hardly be persuaded to see eye to eye with Argentina, and in consequence the project dropped. The idea of America, North and South, as a self-contained continent, brooking no interference from the nations of Europe, is, of course, no new thing, being neither more nor less than the Monroe doctrine, to which the ingenuous and ingenious Senor Drago would wish to add that other doctrine propounded by him; but Europe, which has accepted the lex non scripta of the United States, would certainly jib at any extension of the principle which might easily eventuate in complications of a most undesirable character. Although, taken singly and compared with European navies, America presents nothing very formidable from the point of view of armed maritime force; still, if we collect together the warships of Argentina, Brazil, and Chili, we shall find that collectively they might prove a not unimportant addition to the strength of the United States in repelling any attempts to violate the hegemony which that Power has decreed shall exist on the western side of the Atlantic Ocean. Argentina possesses the Independencia and Libertad. of 2336 tons, carrying two 9.4-inch and four 4.7-inch guns; Almirante Brown, of 4627 tons, with ten 6-inch guns; Pusyredon and General Belgrano, of 7000 tons, with two 10-inch and ten 6-inch guns; the Garibaldi and San Martin, of similar armaments; the Buenos Aires, of 4500 tons, with two 8-inch and four 6-inch guns; Nueve de Julio, of 3500 tons, with four 6-inch and eight 4.7-inch guns; Vinte-Cinco-de-Maio, of 3200 tons, with two 8.2-inch and eight 4.7-inch guns, besides some old vessels and torpedo craft. The naval authorities of Argentina have under consideration designs and tenders from the leading shipbuilders for the construction of several large vessels, including battleships.
Brazil has the Riachuelo, of 5700 tons, but as her date is 1883, she can hardly be reckoned as an efficient warship; the Deodoro and Floriano, of 3162 tons, carrying two 9.2-inch and four 4.7-inch guns; Barroso, 3450 tons, with six 6-inch and four 4.7-inch guns; Tamandare, of 4537 tons, with ten 6-inch and two 4.7-inch guns; also old vessels and torpedo craft. There was recently ordered by the Brazilian Admiralty three battleships, two of which are to be built by Sir W. G. Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., Limited, and one by Messrs. Vickers Sons & Maxim, Limited, who, we understand, will construct the propelling machinery for all three.
Chili has the Captain Prat, 6900 tons, with four 9.4-inch and eight 4.7- inch guns; O’Higgins, 8500 tons, with four 8-inch and ten 6-inch guns; Esmeralda, 7000 tons, with two 8-inch and sixteen 6-inch guns; Blanco Encalada, 4420 tons, with two 8-inch and ten 6-inch guns; Chacabuco, 4300 tons, with two 8-inch and ten 4.7-inch guns; Ministro Zenteno, 3600 tons, with eight 6-inch guns; also old ships and torpedo craft. Chili, like her neighbors, aims at the strengthening of her fleet, and, as in the case of Argentina, has plans and prices of ships before a naval commission; but the great financial loss due to the earthquake must intensify a situation not very encouraging, so that the government may be disposed to pause in the matter of naval expansion. Such a decision might influence Chili’s great rivals of Argentina, inducing them also to defer, on new warships, the expenditure of capital which must be borrowed in any case.
Belgium, Cambodia, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, Hayti, Morocco, Mexico, Persia, Peru, San Domingo, San Salvador, Sarawak, Uruguay. Venezuela, and Zanzibar are possessed of vessels of a nominally warlike character, which fly the flags belonging to these states, but none of which are of the smallest value. There are also a certain number of merchant vessels subsidized for use in case of war; but as these belong to the great Powers, they do not come within the scope of the present article. Although these minor navies exist, it would seem somewhat problematical if they will continue to do so in the future; more and more, as time goes on, does the power of the purse assert itself in maritime affairs; at sea as well as on shore the wholesale man seems destined to oust or to gobble up the retail dealer; the small man in any walk of life at the present time seems in danger of absolute extinction, and, as with commerce, so it is with armaments. Powers like Spain, Holland, Brazil, or Chili may own men-of-war which are comparatively modern, and consequently useful; but as time goes on the life of warships seems to shorten more and more, and the constructive marvel of a decade ago is hopelessly declassé to-day. Estimates for new construction have to be faced by the great Powers in that struggle for existence which is leading them no man knows whither; but so great is the burden, so appallingly does expense mount up nowadays in the building of even moderate-sized cruisers, that it is very doubtful if the minor Powers will be able to face the taxation necessary for the upkeep of their fleets. It may be that national pride will nerve them for the making of the sacrifice; but even if made, it is hard to see of what value it will be when it is remembered that the struggle is unceasing and year by year more costly; the common sense of the matter would appear to be that, as that nation is said to be happy which has no history, it would be better to give up attempting to make it by futile expenditure upon naval armaments.—Engineering.
Superior Speed not Essential to Naval Supremacy.—If one side is determined to fight and the other is not willing, the latter must withdraw either into port or to some other area. Both cannot remain in the same waters without fighting. The larger the forces and the smaller the area the greater will be the difficulty to avoid battle. So often has this been found to be the case that it amounts to a truism, but to emphasize the point we may ask whether two large opposing fleets could remain long in the North Sea without coming into collision if one was bent on fighting? In the days of sail they came quickly into contact in such a narrow field, and under modern conditions will have as good a chance of doing so in larger areas, since steam and wireless telegraphy have enlarged the sphere of action on both sides. No designed superiority of speed in the ships of the weaker can do more than delay the meeting, because experience shows that sooner or later either failure of speed or some unforeseen circumstance brings it about. The larger the squadron the greater is the chance that speed may fail; its precarious nature when ships are pressed and the wide margin on service between ships nominally the same is well known. If the weaker cannot remain in the area when his ships are concentrated, still less can he do so if they are spread. Such a policy only facilitates the enemy’s work, as he can more easily pick up detached ships. In fact, to concentrate power in capital ships and then to disperse them is a contradictory policy impossible to justify.
A good position is more important than superior speed, and can be used to counterbalance the strategical advantages belonging to the latter. Thus, when Suffren captured Trincomalee in the year 1782, he placed himself at Batacoloa, less than one day’s sail from his objective, while Hughes was at Madras, fourteen days’ distant. No conceivable superiority - of speed could have saved the place. Again, as Captain Mahan has clearly shown in the important paper recently contributed to the Proceedings of the U. S. Naval Institute, Togo’s position at Masampho would have enabled him to intercept Rodjesvenski, irrespective of the route taken to Vladivostok, even if the Russian fleet had been faster than the Japanese.
When examined by the light of the preceding remarks, the naval maneuvers of the current year will be found to be instructive. It will be remembered that the forces were very unequal, the Red (English) being more than twice as strong as the Blue (the enemy). The former had 41 capital ships and 20 cruisers, or 61 in all, of which rather less than one- third were based on Gibraltar and the remainder on Falmouth or other English ports; the latter had 18 capital ships and 9 cruisers, or 27 in all, at Berehaven or other Irish ports. The nominal area of the operations was included between the parallels of 30 degrees N. and 60 degrees N., and between the meridians of 20 degrees W. and 10 degrees E. It measured about 1800 miles in length, and varied from 1000 to 500 miles in breadth. The real area was much smaller, as it was the trade-route from the Chops of the Channel to Gibraltar, and measured not more than 900 miles in length by, perhaps, 350 miles in width. Blue’s aim was to tempt Red to use his force improperly under the pressure of public opinion. With this end in view he was to attack the trade in a strictly limited area, completely commanded by a greatly superior force. Red knew this, and, as all ships were to put to sea at noon on June 24, he was not troubled with Nelson’s doubts during the Trafalgar campaign. Blue spread his ships in the limited area. As was to be expected, he was beaten in detail and compelled to fly for safety to his base in the North Sea with a mere remnant of his force. In time of peace it is difficult to conceive the triumphant and exultant feeling which the news of such a victory would raise in this country. What might have been expected to happen to Ganteaume’s fleet in 1805 if Napoleon had ordered him to put to sea from Brest and to attack the trade in the same waters, if the French admiral had done so and had spread his ships, if Nelson at Gibraltar and Cornwallis in Torbay had known his mission and the time of his sailing? Napoleon would never have had any doubt. He was too great a master of the art of war to spread an inferior force within striking distance of a greatly superior fleet. The maneuvers this year certainly show that in the future, as in the past, fleets will be composed of ships varying in speed, but they do not prove that superior speed has any particular strategical value, unless it is an advantage to have some ships able to run away. They appear rather to point to the disastrous influence of wrong strategical conceptions, and to the imperative necessity of a closer study of war conditions.
We are now in a position to judge whether superior speed is of such value in a capital ship that other qualities should be sacrificed in part to obtain it. We have shown that superior speed is only one of several factors which contribute to success in war. In tactics it is less important than tactical skill, and it gives a very limited control over the range. In strategy it is discounted by the demands of enduring mobility, by the conditions of war, and by the strategical ability of the admiral. In all cases its uncertainty is such that reliance cannot be placed upon it. Our conclusion is that in designing a capital ship an increase in speed is right if it results from a natural growth, as already explained, but that otherwise it is wrong.—From “The Speed of the Capital Ship,” in Blackwood’s Magazine for October.
The Gibraltar of the Channel.—One result of the recent naval maneuvers has been to draw attention to the gradual transformation which Dover harbor is undergoing in the progress it is making towards becoming a national harbor. The old Cinque port has been a center of military activity from time immemorial, and the barracks on the Western Heights still boasts of the carefully preserved foundations of what was once a chapel of the Knights Templar, wherein King John is believed to have done homage for his crown to the Papal Legate. Hitherto, however, Dover has been chiefly known to fame as the “stepping-off” place for the Continent, and also for the undying advertisement given to it in the pages of Shakespeare. But the “old order changeth,” and from a Shakes- perian asset Dover is on the eve of developing into a very important national one, and assuming the role, for which nature intended it, of the Gibraltar of the Channel.
For nine years Dover has been in the throes of an engineering activity. Armies of navvies, engineers, divers, and mechanics of all kinds, have been working night and day in constructing the immense arms which run out into the sea, embracing a world of waters which are destined not only as an area for the great national harbor, but also to provide room for our future naval base. For nine years has this great engineering feat been steadily progressing, and in something less than three years from now a harbor and naval base will be given to the British nation which will be the glory of the world. Already the Red Star liners and many of the Hamburg-American boats make Dover their port of call, but not until the magnificent harbor passes out of the contractors’ hands will its great importance to the nation as a naval base, and as a harbor for the great ocean traffic, be made manifest.
These have been obtained, in the first place, by building an eastern arm, which runs from the foot of the cliffs below the old convict prison, to a distance of over three thousand feet out into the sea, in an encircling direction towards the Admiralty Pier, from which another arm has been projected about two thousand feet in length, inclining in the direction of the eastern arm. Between these arms, and situated under a mile from the shore, is being erected a monster breakwater, some four thousand feet in length, and this, combined with the two arms, eastern and western, form an encircling protection which encloses a water area of about seven hundred acres, space sufficient to provide shelter for a fleet of battleships, with their attendant auxiliary crafts of gunboats, destroyers, torpedo-boats, etc. As this huge breakwater is still in the hands of the workmen, it is necessarily delaying the announcement to the nation that its unparalleled national harbor is open to the world.
There are points about the new harbor which will conduce towards making it the most important of all our naval bases. In the first place, besides being the largest created harbor in the universe, it will be absolutely torpedo-proof, and in this it would, in the event of hostilities with another great Power arising, give us advantages of an unrivalled nature, both from an offensive as well as a defensive point of view. The fortresses which command the harbor, from the Castle and the Western Heights, are thoroughly capable of repelling any attack, while the comparatively narrow stretch of water which separates us, at this point, from the French coast, would enable our torpedo-boats to frequently run across for offensive purposes, and get back to the protection of the harbor, in an incredible short space of time. Happily our friendship with France, strengthened as it has been by recent events, leaves no room for the formation of any such designs, but that such opportunities will be within our grasp may not be without its effect in determining the European policy of the future, and in any case it will undoubtedly strengthen our position and lend weight to our influence, in the great Council of Nations. In spite of all that has been alleged against us by those who have watched with secret jealousy our growth as a great naval and military Power, we are nevertheless a peace-loving people, and in aiming at thoroughness in the matter of our national defences, we are actuated rather by a desire to prevent that peace from being broken by less scrupulous nations, rather than with an intention of adding in any way to our national aggrandizement.
Dover’s national harbor will cost this country above five million pounds sterling, but it will bring increasing prosperity to it under cover of increased security. We shall, doubtless, hear less talk about the probabilities of invasion, and, in a way, it will therefore prove a contributing means towards curing the existing mania for conscription. But apart from all other considerations, our navy will benefit enormously in the unique facilities afforded to it of training in a sphere of the English Channel which, in all probability, will be the scene of the great naval engagements of the future, which, prophets tell us. must inevitably take place some day between the rival fleets of Great Britain and an aggressive great Power. Far be it from us to encourage the prospect of such a conflict, but if it ever takes place it will find us with a navy fully capable of giving a good account of itself, while the name of Dover will be found figuring among the factors which have combined to frustrate the invader, and aid our fleet in adding one more to the great and gorious naval victories of the past.
The day that Dover becomes the Gibraltar of the Channel will mark a new era in the history, not only of the ancient port itself, but of the nation at large. With perfect command over the watery streak which separates us from the Continent, it will add to our supremacy at sea, and virtually make the duties of our first line of defence less onerous than they are at present. The prospect is comforting, and its accomplishment will bring much gratification to the people of these islands. It was Sir Walter Raleigh who first pointed out the great strategical value of Dover as having no equal in its natural situation as a source of offence or defence, and it is the wisdom crystallized in his few pithy words on the subject which has now come to maturity, and resulted in benefiting the country by the addition of a magnificent harbor, a strong naval base, and a most powerful fortress. No better record of work could an Admiralty hand down to posterity.—United Service Gazette.
A Review of Jane’s Heresies of Sea Power.—Mr. Jane has saddled this sturdy blue quarto with a title of a curiously questionable shape. “Heresies of Sea Power.” What, exactly, does it mean? Heresy is one thing—and a very elusive thing, too, since it can only be seen as such from one point of view, and disappears entirely when that standpoint is changed—and Sea Power is another; but, grammatically speaking, you can no more have a heresy of sea power than heresies of a torpedo, 01 of gravitation, or of the use of the globes. Heresies as to the influence of sea power, then, does Mr. Jane mean, or heresies regarding its principles? But who in this case is the heretic? Mr. Jane himself, or some of his predecessors in the field of naval history? A glance at the preface to some extent loosens the tangle. “Though it seems to be all that its title can imply,” we read, the book “has not been produced with a view of casting doubt upon the labors of great men who have made a special study of naval history, but only in order to suggest the possibility of some great principle underlying all naval history, as capable of reinforcing theories of sea power as of destroying them.” Mr. Jane, then, is the self-styled heretic, but only, it seems, a very mild one. After reading his introduction, you gather that a fully expanded sub-title might read: “Reflections—not quite orthodox—as to the relative magnitude of the influence of sea power, together with doubts—seemingly somewhat heretical—as to the permanent applicability of any accepted theories whatsoever, deduced from history in regard to it.” Two general conceptions, submits Mr. Jane, are accepted by the majority of people as dogmas. The first, to put it broadly, is to the effect that who rules the sea rules the land; the second is that “the possession of a navy of tried skill, power, and general efficiency assures the certainty of victory.” That being so, the purpose of his book is to inquire whether there be not sufficient alloy in the metal of these propositions to make whole-hearted trust in them as eternal principles undesirable.
Having thus cleared the ground, it is allowable to ask whether the above “dogmas” have ever really been so authoritatively and uncompromisingly set forth as to raise Mr. Jane’s proposed modification to the rank of a heresy at all. According to the book before us, their initiation is attributable to Captain T. Mahan, and their exaggeration to “his imitators and disciples.” Since these latter are unnamed they may be dis
regarded here, but it may be well to re-examine the scope and intention of Captain Mahan’s now famous treatise upon “The Influence of Sea Power upon History,” since Mr. Jane tends, we think, to misrepresent it.
Is sea power, he says, a peculiar and predominant factor as, to a certain extent it is claimed to be by Captain Mahan?
We have carefully re-read Captain Mahan’s preface and introduction, and we cannot anywhere find him falling into the error of unduly magnifying the importance of his subject. His purpose was to raise to its proper dimensions a hitherto neglected side of military history, to reinforce the general proposition that the use and control of the sea has been
a great factor in the history of the world by a detailed survey of operations by sea, big and little, during the sailing-ship period lying between 1660-1783. He relied, in fact, upon a numerous collection of illustrative special incidents, and in so doing filled up a big gap hitherto bridged by the vaguest of general observations. In such a book the sea is inevitably ever in the foreground, but the perspective is always admirably preserved, and the relation and interdependence upon each other of sea and land op- rations is constantly emphasized without undue magnification of either of the two great branches of military history. But “as the study of the military history of the past is essential to correct ideas, so will the study of the sea history of the past be found instructive by its illustration of the great principles of maritime war.”
Now, if Mr. Jane is anywhere “heretical” it is with regard to these general principles. He finds general principles, set adrift upon the unstable medium of the sea, as independable as the color of a chameleon, as elusive as an active rabbit near his burrow. How are you to generalize, for instance, as to the immunity of a fleet anchored in a protected bay? Nelson at Aboukir shattered those theories, yet once, at Algeciras, four French ships lying in a bay handsomely beat Sir James Saumarez with six, while at Navarino the bay secured the Turks no safety. Again, at Actium, heavier and more numerous galleys were annihilated b- smaller and fewer ships; at Lepanto lighter vessels succumbed, in their turn, to the monster galleases of Venice. Does history then teach anything save that the impossible may occur? In asking that question Mr. Jane often loses sight, we think, of that distinction between principle and precedent upon which Captain Mahan has laid so just an emphasis.
“A precedent,” he says, “is different from, and less valuable than, a principle. The former may be originally faulty, or may cease to apply through change of circumstances; the latter has its root in the essential nature of things, and, however various its application as conditions change, remains a standard to which action must conform to attain success.”
And again in illustration:
“The particular tactical combination—at the Nile—depended upon a condition now passed away, which was the inability of the lee ships of a fleet at anchor to come to the help of the weather ones before the latter were destroyed; but the principles which underlay the combination, namely, to choose that part of that enemy’s order which can least easily be helped, and to attack it with superior forces, has not passed away.”
If that truth and that illustration be kept in view, how shall we impugn the broad veracity of the general proposition that “the battles of the past succeeded or failed according as they were fought in conformity with the principles of war.”
Let us turn, however, from the contemplation of sea power in action to the question of the determining influence of sea power itself. The two questions, of course, are closely intertwined; for if the principles governing the control of the sea are as unstable, as Mr. Jane fears, the possession of the strongest fleet in the world may well be the most anxious of military assets. A third of his book is accordingly devoted to a consideration of “Seven Great Naval Wars.” in which “accepted theories of sea power were either actually or apparently ignored by the victors.” In their order they are the Peloponnesian War, the First and Second Punic Wars, Actium, Lepanto, the Spanish Armada, and the Russo-Japanese War. We will, however, first take the Second Punic War, since Captain Mahan has definitely committed himself to the opinion that the Roman control of the water forced Hannibal to invade Italy by land, and remained throughout the struggle a powerful item in the list of determining factors—not, it should be noticed, an exclusively determining influence. With regard to Hannibal’s march, Mr. Jane offers the quite reasonable suggestion that it was deliberate, not necessitudinous. and that Carthage definitely staked her fortunes upon a struggle by land. But if this be so, does not the spectacle of a great sea-faring nation athirst for revenge against a foe who had decisively defeated it upon its own element in a former war seeking that revenge on land, afford strong oresumptive evidence that Rome still retained the control of the seas which she had wrested from Carthage? Mr. Jane will not have it so. He holds that, if anything, Carthage was the stronger on the seas in the second Punic War, and that Scipio's final invasion was successful in the teeth of sea strength which should have, according to accepted theories, finally overwhelmed him. But the truth is that the maritime history of the final stages of the war are shrouded in mystery, and he fails entirely to prove his pair of oaradoxes to the effect that: (1) In the first Punic War Rome, having sea power, invaded Africa and met disaster; (2) in the second she had probably not got the sea power. She invaded and succeeded completely.
The first of these “salient facts” seems to us, frankly, absurd. The disaster to Regulus had nothing to do with the sea—was even, indeed, to quote Mr. Jane, “a matter of the purest luck.” The influence of the sea appears in his previous defeat of the enemy’s fleet, which rendered that invasion possible, and the whole struggle teems with similar instances. The lesson of the war lies, of course, in the fact that ingenuity, energy, and grim determination finally prevailed against accomplished seamanship, but in that daring capture of sea predominance there was nothing running counter to the general bulk of received theory as to its influence. Mr. Jane’s treatment of the Peloponnesian War is indeed of more value to his thesis, as showing how unexpectedly a people’s control of the sea may pass from them without such overwhelming assets in the enemy’s hands as those which enabled Rome to crush Carthage. But even here no paradoxes emerge from a careful study of Athenian sea fights. The loss of the fine Athenian fleets in the fatal harbor of Syracuse was really the always possible climax to the Athenian desertion of a sound for an unsound policy, and even then the single victory at Cyzicus, three years later, gave Alcibiades a foolishly neglected opportunity to make peace upon honorable terms.
On the whole, by the time that the unbiassed reader has digested the last of Mr. Jane’s “paradoxes,” he is not unlikely to come to the conclusion that in keeping his eye upon the list of victors who have ignored accepted theories he has forgotten to notice that the vanquished have ignored them far more frequently. If you suffer a fine fleet to be hermetically sealed in a harbor—as the Athenians did at Syracuse—you are courting most unorthodox disaster. You should not again, be caught napping, as Russia was in the war with Japan, or as Carthage was at the beginning of her duel with Rome. If you are, and your enemy secures an advantage, it is sheer throwing of stones from glass houses to accuse him of breaking rules.
But it is high time to examine that potent underlying principle in which Mr. Jane finds the eternal verity, the sole secret of success in the struggle to control the seas. It is no less a thing than “Fitness to Win”—“Fitness to Win.” We have no desire whatever to linger over the platitude involved. This fitness is defined as “neither ships nor skill at handling them, neither great leaders nor willing obedience, but the sum of the sentiment of each individual combatant”—sentiment being here interpreted as a very keen desire to kill the enemy in the day of battle.” The definition, at least, contains a truth. It embraces all that is implied in Nelson’s working formula to “hate a Frenchman like the Devil”; or in Hannibal’s deadly oath to loathe and ruin Rome; all the intensity of the slaughterous Japanese attack, all the self-sacrifice and endurance which help a country, big or little, in the day of its need. No one will deny that time and again in sea history the potential energy of the victors has been such that they would probably have won had they accepted the ships and the tactical dispositions of their enemy. But to recognize this is by no means to admit that “waste paper is made thereby of all strategy and tactics that have led to victory in he past.” Fitness to win, or potential energy, or whatever one likes to call it, is a powerful coefficient of many factors that make for victory, but to disdain those factors as “merely embroidery” is to diminish the value of a really useful and interesting book. Stripped of its exaggeration, this so-called “heresy” is little more than a supplementary rider; or, perhaps, it might be re-labelled on the naval shelf as “Mr. Jane’s Amendment.”—The Engineer.