Permanence of Enlisted Force of the Navy

NECESSITY OF PERMANENCE.

The desirability of having as nearly as possible a permanent body of men for our ships of war has probably been recognized since the formation of the navy, but before the advent of steam and modern ordnance the similarity of many of the duties performed by merchant seamen and men-of-war's-men rendered this matter of less importance than it is at the present time.

In the days of sailing ships, when recruits were drawn chiefly from our large sea-going population, the training necessary to render the merchant seaman an expert man-of-war's-man was comparatively insignificant. But conditions have changed and the duties of enlisted men have become complex, and even a thorough seaman must now undergo much training before he becomes an efficient man-of-war's-man; and, moreover, recruits are no longer drawn chiefly from our sea-faring population. The recruit of the present day must therefore be trained not only in his more complicated military duties, in infantry, artillery, gunnery, mines, torpedoes, and engineering, but must even be trained in the very elements of seamanship itself, in boating, knotting, splicing, steering, etc.

The time necessary to train a landsman to efficiency in his ordinary duties would alone require that recruit-enlistments be reduced to a minimum, but the necessities of modern gunnery training render the retention of well trained men of ever increasing importance. No ship can profitably engage in battle-practices until the individual gun-crews have been trained to a high degree of efficiency, and this elementary training requires time, labor and expense. Until this is completed the ship is not ready for battle, and she would therefore be an element of weakness in case of war. In fact, her effective training for battle can scarcely begin until her gun-crews are expert; this applies particularly to gun-pointers, and gun- and turret-captains, but it also applies with much force to every member of the gun-crew.

The efficiency of the fleet therefore requires (1) the reduction to a minimum of the time necessary for this preliminary training; and (2) the development of the skill of the ship in battle firing, which latter cannot be continuous and rapid unless the pointers and gun-crews remain practically intact during the remainder of the cruise.

These two requirements can be attained only by maintaining a reasonably permanent enlisted force. In fact, regulations insuring this permanence would influence advanced gunnery-training as beneficially as the present regulations influence the training of gun-crews; and it is this that renders the subject one of great military importance.

We should therefore not conclude that conditions are satisfactory simply because we are able to keep the personnel up to the allowed complement by the use of recruiting parties, or because large numbers of applicants for enlistment are turned away daily, nor yet because permanence is somewhat improving. Instead of congratulating ourselves that the 7800 vacancies which occurred during the last fiscal year were made good by recruit enlistments, we should rather deplore the net loss of 25 per cent of the enlisted force of the navy in one year, and the consequent necessity of replacing such a number of trained men by raw recruits.

EXISTING CONDITIONS.

Before proceeding further, it is desirable to present a statement in regard to the condition of the enlisted personnel during the last fiscal year. The report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, 1905, shows:

ENLISTMENTS.

Total enlisted force June 30, 1905: 30,804
Total enlisted force June 3o, 1904 (from 1904 report): 29,321

Increase in enlisted force during year: 1,483
Total number of recruits enlisted: 9,305

Net loss during year, which was filled by recruits: 7,823

LOSSES.

This net loss is due to the following principal causes:

Number honorably discharged, failing to re-enlist in four months: 1,513
Number ordinary discharges, failing to re-enlist in four months: 317

Total number of desirable men failing to re-enlist: 1,830

Discharges for inaptitude: 116
Discharges for undesirability: 678
Discharges for bad conduct: 492
Discharges, dishonorable: 498
Discharges, physical disability: 844
Deserters: 3,227
Retirements after thirty years' service: 5
Deaths 135

DESERTIONS.

Number of men absenting themselves without authority: 4,427
Number of men voluntarily returning to service: 881
Number who remained absent either permanently or until apprehended, i. e., practically deserters: 3,546

MISCELLANEOUS.

Number honorable discharges, expiration of enlistment 3,484
Number ordinary discharges, expiration of enlistment 445

Number discharges entitled to re-enlist: 3,929
Number of these failing to re-enlist: 1,830
Number of petty officers in the service: 9,400
Number C. S. C. men in service, 4,897 = 16.3%
Percentage of C. S. C. men to petty officers = 52%
Percentage C. S. C. men June 30, 1905: 13.4%
Percentage C. S. C. men, 1895, 1896, 1897: 31%
Number men re-enlisting more than four months after discharge, 314 = about: 1%

The above figures show:

(1) That it required 7823 recruit enlistments (9306 recruit enlistments minus 1483 increase of force) to maintain the force at 30,804; that is, there was a net loss during the year of 25.4 per cent over and above re-enlistments, which had to be filled by recruits.

(2) That, not counting losses due to deaths (135) and physical disability (844), which will probably remain about constant, there were 6844 vacancies, or 22.2 per cent loss of able-bodied men, many of whom had received from one to three years' training and were just becoming of value. Nearly half of this number were deserters, about 25 per cent were undesirable or bad characters, while about 25 per cent were prima facie good, well-trained men whose retention in the service would have been desirable.

(3) That, though only 3227 men were marked deserters, 4427 men absented themselves from their ship or station without authority, and only 881 of them returned voluntarily, leaving 3546 who were to all intents and purposes deserters, though some of these were apprehended and brought back. The report states that about one-third of the desertions were from the rating of coal passer, and though the desertion of a coal passer is less serious than if he were a highly trained man, even these are to be regretted, and it still leaves about 2400 deserters from other ratings.

(4) That, despite the improved conditions of enlisted men and the bonus for re-enlistment and continuous service, only 16.3 per cent of the present enlisted force hold C. S. certificates; that there were only about half as many continuous service men as there were petty officers; that there was only about half as large a percentage of C. S. C. men as in '95, '96 and '97; that nearly half of the discharged men who were eligible to and desirable for reenlistment, failed to return, and that but i per cent of the total strength returned after the allowed four months.

Gun-pointers.—Leaving aside the question of general permanence, let us consider the permanence of gun-pointers alone. The following table shows changes in the pointers of main-battery guns on all battleships from which the data could be obtained.

In the above table the first column under each caliber shows the number of pointers on board who fired with that caliber of gun on any ship at record practice, 1905. The second shows the number of these same pointers who fired at record practice 1906. The third number of those who fired at record practice 1905, who have been removed from their positions for other reasons than discharge or desertion. The fourth is therefore the loss in one year due to a lack of permanence, and does not include losses due to transfer from a ship, provided the man remains in the service. The very great difference between the different ships is of course due to the fact that, as a general rule, the term of enlistment of the majority of the crew of a ship expires the same year. The percentage of loss is also larger than a canvas of the entire service would show, since some of the discharged pointers will re-enlist, but, nevertheless, after making all allowances, the data is very instructive.

	12 or 13-inch				8-inch				4, 5 or 6-inch
Ship.	Number pointers firing record practice 1905.	Number of these who fired record practice 1905.	Number firing 1905 dropped for other reasons than being out of the service	Loss in one year due to being out of the service.	Number pointers firing record practice 1905.	Number of these who fired record practice 1905.	Number firing 1905 dropped for other reasons than being out of the service	Loss in one year due to being out of the service.	Number pointers firing record practice 1905.	Number of these who fired record practice 1905.	Number firing 1905 dropped for other reasons than being out of the service	Loss in one year due to being out of the service.
Iowa	8	0	0	8	16	6	0	10	8	1	0	7
Kentucky	12	10	1	1	8	7	0	1	28	25	1	2
Maine	8	7	0	1	. .	. .	. .	. .	32	16	1	15
Missouri	12	11	0	1	. .	. .	. .	. .	32	26	6(a)	0
Wisconsin	12	6	0	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	28	17	0	11
Alabama	12	4	0	8					28	8	1	19
Texas	8	3	. .	5					9(b)	2(b)	. .	7
Indiana	12	3	1	8	2	9	0	11	8	0	1	7
Illinois	12	4	0	8	. .	. .	. .	. .	28	12	2	14
Total	96	48	2	46	44	27	0	22	201	107	12	82
(a) 3 transferred.
(b) Qualified. No data in re those who failed to qualify.

This table shows that of ninety-six 12- or 13-inch pointers who fired in 1905, forty-eight fired in 1905; two were dropped from the gun-pointer class for various reasons, leaving a loss of forty-six, or 47 per cent, due to lack of permanence. Of forty-four 8-inch pointers who fired in 1905, there was a loss of twenty-two, or 50 per cent; and of two hundred and one 4-, 5-, or 6-inch pointers, a loss of eighty-two, or 41 per cent, due to the same reason.

ARE THESE CONDITIONS SATISFACTORY?

Argument is unnecessary to show that a net annual loss of 25 per cent of our enlisted force is detrimental to efficiency. If this loss were confined principally to new and untrained men, it would be less serious, but when the lack of permanence among gunpointers is considered, the matter assumes not only an unsatisfactory, but an actually grave aspect. These are highly trained men, and as already shown, men whose individual skill must be developed before the training of the ship herself in battle firing can progress satisfactorily. To say nothing of the time, labor and ammunition expended in training the above mentioned pointers (and which must be expended on those who replace them) if the ships in the table had been fully prepared for action immediately after the Spring practice of 1905, what loss of battle efficiency would they have sustained, due to this cause alone, by the Spring of 1906?

Though doubtless some of the pointers which are in the "loss" column will re-enlist, the fact that the crews of new ships contain only the merest sprinkling of qualified pointers shows that, as a general rule, these men are probably gone for good, and that the training expended on them during the last few years was lost just as the ships were ready to utilize their skill in battle-practices.

IS IMPROVEMENT POSSIBLE?

To answer this question we must analyze our losses. They are, roughly:

Class 1. Death and physical disability, 3 per cent.
Class 2. Desertion (or practically such), 11 per cent.
Class 3. Bad conduct, inaptitude and undesirable, 5.5 per cent.
Class 4. Failure to re-enlist, 5.5 per cent.

The loss from Class I will probably remain approximately constant, and is not susceptible of marked improvement.

For the purposes of this discussion, Class 2 and Class 3 should be considered together, since it may fairly be assumed as probable that a large number of those discharged as undesirable, inapt, etc., are simply men who have become dissatisfied and lost interest and have either deliberately adopted this method of leaving the service, instead of deserting, or have so failed in the performance of their duty as to cause their officers to request their discharge.

These two classes, composing about 16.5 per cent of the enlisted force, probably consists of two distinct types of men.

(1) Those who are innately vicious, undesirable, or inapt.
(2) Those who are by nature really desirable men, but who have grown so actively discontented as to make them desire to leave the service.

It is of course to be expected that in any body of 30,000 enlisted men there will be a certain percentage of the first type— those naturally undesirable—but with the care taken in enlisting recruits it would seem that 1500 or 5 per cent would be more than an ample allowance to cover this loss. This would leave 11.5 per cent of the enlisted personnel as belonging to the second type—men who are naturally desirable, but who have grown actively discontented with life in the service.

This discontent must be due either to causes which are necessarily incident to life in the navy, and hence cannot be removed, or to conditions which are not necessary to efficiency, and which therefore can be improved. If the latter, then here is one cause of loss which can be largely eliminated.

Class 4, composing about 5.5 per cent of the enlisted force, are men who have completed an enlistment and are valuable, well-trained men. Their reasons for not re-enlisting are numerous, but in general it is probable that the same reasons that cause Classes 2 and 3 to grow discontented and to desert, prevent Class 4 from re-enlisting. If these causes are not necessary to our efficiency, their removal would increase re-enlistments and hence decrease this source of loss. If in addition to this, certain active incentives to re-enlistment could be adopted, the loss from this cause would be still further reduced.

The question then becomes: Are there any existing causes of desertion not inherent in the conditions necessary to efficiency, and are there any practicable incentives to re-enlistment which could be adopted? If there are, then improvement is possible.

After several years' study of this subject, including conversations with many enlisted men concerning desertion and re-enlistment, I am convinced that many of the regulations and customs which are the most active cause of discontent are not necessary to the results we wish to accomplish, and that there are certain other practicable regulations which might be adopted, and which would directly or indirectly incite re-enlistments.

WHAT Do WE REALLY REQUIRE?

The ultimate object of all naval training is that our ships may be properly maintained and fully manned by efficiently trained crews. If these two requirements are fulfilled the ship is ready for action. Anything which aids in the attainment of these requirements, lends itself to efficiency; and, conversely, anything which interferes is inimical thereto. These two requirements demand both work and skill on the part of the personnel.

The highest degree of efficiency in any large organization will be attained only when each individual unit of the organization has been trained to a high degree of skill. What we therefore require would seem to be regulations which will facilitate the early discharge of undesirable men, before much time had been wasted on their training, and insure permanence in service on the part of desirable men. A crew can never be efficiently trained, permanence in service can never be secured, nor can the best work ever be obtained, if a considerable proportion of the men are normally discontented.

CONTENTMENT.

The keynote of the question would therefore appear to be the contentment of the men. Why should we expect efficient work or permanent service from discontented enlisted men when it would never occur to us to expect it from discontented men in civil life? I doubt if we have given the question of the men's contentment the serious consideration which it merits. Every precaution is taken to preserve the material of the navy in a high state of efficiency; great care is exercised to maintain the physical condition of the men, and yet their mental attitude seems to have received scant consideration, though it has a greater bearing both on efficiency and on permanence than their physical condition itself. Do the conditions of naval life which are necessary to entire efficiency preclude contentment? I cannot think that they do, but we can best decide this point by ascertaining what are the chief causes of discontent among enlisted men.

Is it the life itself?—To a certain extent the conditions of life in the navy are distasteful. It is an abnormal life, which does not lend itself to the establishment of a home; there are certain unpleasant features inseparable from the necessary requirements of daily life on board ship, but to counter-balance these it offers many advantages which are attractive and which appeal particularly to younger men. With its constant opportunity for travel, it affords gratification to the curious and overcomes the monotony of a circumscribed existence which is so irksome to the restless; the close associations incident to the life engender good comradeship; the sports and contests create healthy enthusiasm; and, on the whole, if we but utilize the advantages it offers, and limit the unpleasant features to those which are absolutely necessary to the ends we desire to accomplish, I do not think the nature of the life itself would account for any great amount of discontent. In fact, I see no reason why the unpleasant features which are necessary to the life should cause more discontent among enlisted men than among officers, and I believe that the very features which cause the greatest discontent among the men would, if applied to officers, quickly create an untenable state of affairs. In other words, I believe that the features of the life which cause the greatest discontent are not necessary ones.

Is it the amount of necessary physical labor?—I think not. Naval efficiency requires work of each unit of the organization, hard, exacting work, both for the training of the crew and for the maintenance of the ship, but experience would appear to indicate clearly that men do not object to intelligent work in itself, or to interesting and useful drills. What they do object to in the ordinary routine is perfunctory drills and unnecessary annoyances which accomplish no beneficial result—and they are quick to recognize this. Even the lazy, welcome surveying duty with its accompanying hard work. Enthusiasm is manifested in the loading drills; coaling ship is no bug-bear. Though I am aware that a certain amount of purely routine work is necessary, in any military organization, if this be reduced to a minimum, I believe the work necessary to the preparation of a ship for war and her maintenance in that condition to be in themselves negligible factors in causing desertion. I believe we can get even more work than is now required of men on board ship, without it causing one desirable man to desert, provided the work is directed to an intelligent end; and work intelligently directed will give us an efficient ship if the men are interested and satisfied.

Is it inadequate pay?—Many officers have suggested an increase of pay as a means of creating greater permanence, but I doubt both the expediency and efficacy of such a remedy. I make this statement in full knowledge of the able and convincing article by Captain E. Anderson, 7th U. S. Cavalry, published in the March "Review of Reviews," which demonstrated the necessity for increasing the pay of enlisted men of the army. The pay of the enlisted personnel of the navy is far in excess, both in the lower and the higher grades, of that which he advocates for the army. Inadequate pay is not the kernel of our difficulty. Undoubtedly, if it were practicable to make a general increase of pay of three or four-fold, permanence would greatly increase. Men could not afford to leave the service; but even then I do not believe the remedy would reach the real root of our trouble. It would not remove the grievances which in my opinion largely contribute to disaffection and desertion, and would therefore not really produce contentment; it would simply result in holding men who were really unhappy and uninterested in their work. But of course such an increase of pay, even if it were desirable, would be entirely impracticable. That any reasonably large increase of pay would probably fail materially to increase permanence is indicated by the fact that the liberal extra pay of gun-pointers, though originally designed for this purpose, has failed to accomplish that result, though it has been most beneficial in stimulating enthusiasm. In fact, I think that, as a general rule, the present pay is adequate for the purpose, especially in view of the opportunities offered for advancement, and that no reasonable or practicable increase of pay would materially assist in attaining our end. The reasons for the trouble must therefore be sought elsewhere.

If it is true that lack of permanence is not due to the unpleasant features inseparable from naval life, to 'inadequate pay or to the work necessary to attain efficiency, to what may it be ascribed? It must be due to certain other regulations and customs; and as hard work by a contented crew will produce efficiency, these regulations and customs which cause the trouble would seem to be unnecessary, and should therefore be changed. The changes hereinafter suggested are based on the primary motives of human nature. No change is advocated which would in any degree militate against the good condition of a ship or limit the amount of intelligent drill or requisite work. The changes have for their object the increased contentment of the men. They pre-suppose that men are willing to work for the present pay if unnecessary annoyances are removed; that if the feeling can be overcome that an enlistment is a term of servitude and the ship a sort of prison; that if cruises are so far as possible systematically arranged with the idea of permitting ships to visit good "liberty ports" with sufficient frequency; that if on arrival in port men are encouraged rather than grudgingly permitted to go ashore; that if during recreation hours active pleasures can be substituted for passive inertness; in short, if "we work while we work, and play while we play," I feel confident that contentment would be engendered, efficiency promoted, and permanence of service so greatly increased, that our net annual loss would not exceed 10 per cent, and that 6o per cent of flip enlisted force would have continuous service certificates.

DETERRENTS TO PERMANENCE.

From investigation of the subject I believe the questions of food, and restriction of "liberty" and money to be the chief causes of active dissatisfaction with the naval service; causes which prevent re enlistment of desirable men, and which frequently result in otherwise valuable men losing interest, neglecting their duty, growing dissatisfied and insubordinate in spirit, and finally deserting or being discharged as undesirable.

FOOD.

While recent regulations have undoubtedly greatly improved the fare of the enlisted man, and while it is believed that the present ration is ample for the comfort and contentment of the crew, if properly cooked and served, there is at times so little official supervision over the actual feeding of the crew that, despite the ample ration, great dissatisfaction sometimes exists. In many cases this important department is left practically in the hands of the commissary steward, and this vital feature in the contentment and efficiency of the crew depends upon his honesty, zeal, ability as a caterer and organizer of food service. Though honesty is usual, a combination of these necessary qualities is rare, and even in cases where the commissary steward possesses all of these essentials, causes of complaint are certain to occur. Complaints are frequently unjustifiable and unreasonable but it is the man's mental condition with which we are principally concerned, and as an unjustifiable grievance is as injurious to contentment as a justifiable one, I believe the men should be encouraged to submit complaints.¹

It is believed that the dissatisfaction which is sometimes caused by the fare could be almost entirely avoided by a method which facilitates the investigation of complaints, and by adequate direct official supervision, not of the accounts, but of the details of the actual messing and subsistence of the crew. The justice of this criticism is shown by the fact that while some ships live well on the allowed ration and have their food well served, others live poorly and have their food badly served, thus causing serious discontent.

That this cause of dissatisfaction does exist on some ships, despite what I believe to be an adequate ration, only accentuates the importance of not dismissing it with the statement that the men are universally well fed. Conversation with many enthusiastic commissary officers only demonstrates how well the men may be fed, but they unite in saying that without the closest official supervision, and the most efficient organization, the best results will not be forthcoming. If the food on one ship is better than that on another in the same squadron, discontent is certain to arise; or if on any ship the food is unsatisfactory in quality or quantity, the cooking poor, or the bill of fare unnecessarily monotonous, it is certain to arouse discontent, and it is the hardest form of discontent to eradicate. On different occasions last summer I conversed, incognito, with two enlisted men of the fleet, men who expected to make the service their profession, and who stated that if a man didn't get along in the navy it was his own fault; in short, men who looked on the service in its best light. I made notes of their conversation at the time, and as they expressed it, "Kickers will kick on food quicker than anything else; our food can be made all right, because it is all right on lots of ships, while other ships live rotten. If a man gets good grub he can stand a lot of inconveniences, but as soon as he thinks he is not getting as good food as his ration ought to give him, he gets dissatisfied, loses interest in his job, and the first thing he knows he is in trouble. If a ship is having wholesale desertions it may be due to other causes, a mean Captain, or First Lieutenant, or no liberty; but if you examine very closely you'll be pretty sure to find a good hard kick on the grub."

This then is an important question, requiring constant watchfulness. We cannot afford to have the contentment of the ship's company, and hence the real efficiency of the ship, depend on the zeal, ability and honesty of the commissary steward. His work requires the closest supervision. Existing regulations will insure that his accounts are duly supervised, but the well-being of the ship does not depend on his accounts, it depends on the results of his work; it depends on his judgment, zeal and executive ability.  It may safely be said that the commissary steward has more to do with content or discontent than any other person on board with the possible exception of the captain and executive. Is it reasonable to trust a feature of such military importance to the ability of any enlisted man? Should the messing not always receive direct supervision of a competent officer?

RESTRICTION.

The question of restriction deserves the most careful and logical consideration. When work is not creative, where it is simply service rendered, and particularly where it involves considerable physical exertion, it must necessarily be distasteful to some extent. For men performing such service, life is necessarily made up of considerable distasteful work combined with such pleasures and recreations as are attainable—the former being the price paid for the latter. This is universally true, though on shore the employee's recreation looks out for itself, and the question resolves itself to one of hours and pay; while on a ship it is a question of pay and opportunities for recreation—which means active recreation and pleasure; not simply release from drill and ship's work. If in any vocation the distasteful features are not counterbalanced by the attractive ones, a man will naturally seek other employment. Naval life necessarily has many distasteful features; and in order to get men to adopt it as a life vocation we must reduce the distasteful features to such as are actually necessary, and utilize to the fullest extent the attractive features which the life offers. Probably the most distasteful features of naval life fall under the heading of what appear to me to be unnecessary restrictions; that is:

(1) Compelling a man, once enlisted, to complete his enlistment, regardless of what may happen.
(2) Compelling a man to remain on board ship when his services are not required, either for drill work or for the safety of the ship.
(3) Compelling a man to remain on board ship for several months as a punishment for some offense.

These restrictions are distasteful in themselves, and besides, being obviously an unnecessary denial of personal freedom, they must inevitably arouse resentment, since they curtail one of the greatest sources of pleasure, recreation and attractiveness offered by naval life, namely, shore leave. A modification of existing customs in this regard would therefore be doubly beneficial since; while removing a cause of discontent, it would add materially to the pleasures afforded by the life. At the present time a man knows that having once enlisted, he must serve out his enlistment or make a felon of himself; men of but short experience know that their shore liberty is largely dependent on their superior officers and on the ship to which they happen to be transferred; "poor liberty ships" are well known on every station, and are avoided even by the best men, sometimes to the point of desertion. itself. I believe that this cause is responsible for at least fifty per cent of the net losses we experience, and moreover, that it reacts on efficiency by producing discontent among those who remain in the service. It is therefore of such importance as to warrant a careful discussion of each of its features.

In view of the above cited statistics of desertions, it may seem illogical to advocate a change which would permit men to leave the service, though it is believed that the attempt to force them to remain in the service is really false economy.

In the first place, the mere knowledge that it is impossible to get out of the service honorably within four years, of itself tends to make men chafe in much the same manner as would the certainty that under no condition could they leave their native city for four years. It is an ever present reminder that they are not free agents, which in the case of many men incites a constant desire to leave. If this fact does not drive a man to desertion, it looms up prominently before him when, having once completed his enlistment, he considers the advisability of again irrevocably binding himself for four years more.

In the second place, circumstances arise when a man is practically compelled to leave the service. To buy his discharge is at best a sacrifice; a sacrifice sufficient to exert all the beneficial restraint necessary, for if he wants his discharge enough to buy it, it will generally be found that he wants it enough to take it, if it is not for sale.

Argue as we may, service in the navy in time of peace is not dissimilar, in the minds of enlisted men, from work on shore. The men sign an agreement to serve four years; this is the same to them as any other contract. The law assists us to enforce this, as it does other contracts, but when a man desires to be relieved from fulfilling it, our own customs place it in a different category from all other legal contracts, in that we refuse to accept a cash forfeit, but hold his person instead. It would never occur to us to require a baseball player or an actor to be imprisoned for not completing his season; he can always purchase his release. Can a man be reasonably expected voluntarily to place himself a second time in such a dilemma, and will his experience (which he will fully describe to his shipmates) not serve to prevent many other re-enlistments? Will the service performed by him during this latter period of his enlistment be really efficient?

Few thinking men would voluntarily enter an ordinarily alluring position if they knew that they could get out before four years only by making criminals of themselves. Why should we expect enlisted men to do it? Is it not reasonable to assume that this alone causes some desertions and prevents many re-enlistments? Is the refusal to permit discharge by purchase necessary to naval efficiency?

I suppose the policy of not allowing men to purchase their discharge has been adopted to prevent the loss which would be experienced from this cause. Is this not a mistaken policy? Weighing advantages and disadvantages, the only advantage is that refusal to grant discharge by purchase retains a small number of discontented men until their enlistments expire—and in their frame of mind it is doubtful whether their retention is desirable. The disadvantages are in preventing re-enlistments, creating restiveness, discontent, and dissatisfaction; in short, in creating the feeling among the entire enlisted personnel that they are "serving time." The loss by purchase will never be material, but the principle of invariably approving such requests except in time of war or threatened war, if definitely adopted, would, I believe, promote content, reduce desertions, and remove one of the greatest deterrents to re-enlistment.

Regulations and customs regarding shore leave.—While I believe that the adoption of a consistent policy of granting discharge by purchase would remove one of the most active deterrents to reenlistment, I believe the feeling that the ship is in a sense a prison is the most active cause of discontent, disaffection and desertion, and I believe many of the regulations and customs restricting shore leave are unnecessary to the results we are striving to accomplish, namely, developing an efficient, well-trained naval force.

This restriction of shore leave takes two forms:

(1) Insufficient liberty, due simply to not granting frequent permission to a large number of men to go ashore.
(2) Restriction of liberty as a punishment.

These may be considered together since the general effect is the same in kind though different in degree.

Efficiency requires that at all times we have a certain proportion (say about half) of the crew on board, and that, as a general rule, every member of the crew be on board during working hours; again, circumstances on shore may sometimes render it inadvisable to permit any men to leave the ship at all; these are some of the unpleasant features necessary to naval life and efficiency, and they are requirements which must be observed. I cannot, however, believe that efficiency demands that after working hours in port, a large body of men who have absolutely no duties to perform until the following morning, be kept on board ship against their will. On the contrary, it seems to me that the very knowledge that they have nothing to do and are nevertheless kept aboard either as a punishment or frequently because it simply isn't their day for liberty, is an ever active cause of discontent which could be avoided. Officers do not regard the ship as a prison. They know that when they have duty to perform they must remain on board; they realize that a certain number must remain on board for emergencies, duty or no duty; they realize that ships must frequently cruise in waters where shore-leave is inadvisable; still they know that under ordinary circumstances when they are in port and duty does not require their presence on board, they are free to go ashore if they desire, and it is this very knowledge which accounts for an officer sometimes remaining contentedly on board for several consecutive months.

If the question of getting ashore were an ever-present thorn in the flesh of an officer, if shore leave with him were in practice an occasional privilege rather than practically a right, would not the annoyance, the uncertainty and particularly the feeling of having subjected himself to a life in which innocent pleasures were unnecessarily withheld, a life in which his freedom was unnecessarily curtailed, would not this cause a large number of officers to seek outside employment? In other words, has not the necessity of retaining a trained corps of officers forced us into the adoption of logical regulations concerning them, while the less apparent (though ever-present) necessity of retaining enlisted men has permitted us to overlook the fact that the latter are governed by the same impulses, not to mention the obvious fact that the men, having fewer intellectual enjoyments, are all the more in need of recreation on shore.

It is a most natural feeling for men who visit foreign ports to desire to see the town. Many officers never fail to go ashore in every port, however uninteresting, if only for a few hours. These same impulses govern men, and a feeling of resentment will inevitably result if the ship visits port after port without their being permitted to go ashore. The saying "seeing Europe through a port-hole" is proverbial, and its meaning is far reaching. In the days when the present custom had its birth, I do not doubt that it was necessary, but with the class of enlisted men we now have I am convinced that it is pernicious.

The effect of forcing men to stay on board unnecessarily—and I speak absolutely only of unnecessary restriction—is twofold. As above stated, it is believed to be directly or indirectly the most active cause of desertion, of the disaffection which swells the list of "undesirable," " inapt," "bad conduct" and " dishonorable discharges," and of failure to re-enlist; but aside from this, the effect on the men who remain in the service is to be considered.

In order that men may be amenable to proper discipline and training, they must be habitually in a normal condition both mentally and physically—and of the two the mental is probably the more important. Unnecessary restriction of liberty will produce a resentful mental condition which diminishes the worth of a man as a unit in the ship's organization and lessens his capacity for submitting to discipline. On men of long service who have become resigned to this condition, the effect is possibly not great, but on young men in their first enlistment, on those from which our C. S. C. ranks must be filled, I believe this depreciating value to be sufficient in many cases to cause such a loss of interest and zeal as materially to reduce the efficiency and the value of the men.

The restriction of shore leave, to which I refer above as appearing to me not to be requisite to the efficiency of the naval service, takes form in various ways. Probably the most frequent is the deprivation of liberty as a punishment or as incidental to the punishment of declassification; sometimes because the crew has all been on liberty, and time in port does not permit another complete liberty; sometimes because under existent conditions it is not considered expedient to grant any liberty until certain general work is completed. From whatever point of view this question is regarded, it appears evident that any restriction of liberty not required by efficiency is a detriment not only to permanence, but also to the efficiency of those who remain; that deprivation of liberty as an habitual form of punishment should be abolished; and that enlisted men should be practically under the same liberty regulations as officers.

There is one point in regard to restriction to which attention is particularly invited. It is not the amount of necessary restriction which is galling so much as it is any restriction whatever, which is manifestly unnecessary. At the very best, the proportion of time spent on board ship is necessarily great for both officers and men, but except when very long periods of restriction are necessary, this does not produce serious discontent; it is accepted as incidental to the life. But the mental condition born of the knowledge that one cannot go ashore, though his presence is not required on board, is the cause of the really pernicious discontent, because it incites a resentful spirit.

Considering existing customs, it is well known that on different ships of the same fleet, lying in the same port, one crew will get a minimum of liberty while another will get a surfeit. This is due largely to the personal ideas of commanding and executive officers, and as these ideas vary widely between facilitating "liberty" and grudgingly permitting it, the inevitable result is wide differences in liberty regulations on different ships. On some ships liberty is dependent upon classification, which in turn depends upon the characteristics of commanding officers, as exhibited in widely varying punishments for the same offense on different ships. The effect is shown by the fact that in some ships the "first-class" men will include a large proportion of the crew, while in others it will embrace only a chosen few. Aside from a different declassification on different ships, and sometimes on the same ship, meted out for the same offense, in some ships the "first-class" men go ashore once in four days and the "fourth-class" once in three months, while in others the first-class go ashore every other day and the fourth-class once a month. In some ships a man remains "fourth-class" for three months, while in others he advances one class per month. Some ships grant no "liberty" to a man who has extra duty to perform, while others disregard this feature. Some ships have a large number of "special first-class" men who go ashore practically as officers, while other ships either do not recognize such a class at all, or maintain it at a minimum. These facts (and they are better known to men than they are to officers) do not lend themselves to contentment; on the contrary, the very non-uniformity itself, aside from the restriction per se, must inevitably produce dissatisfaction, because in the minds of the men this is an ever-present demonstration of unfairness and injustice. The men, on the good and the bad ships alike, reflect before re-enlisting, because they realize that this condition exists throughout the service, and that, even though fortunate on one cruise, they may be unfortunate on the next. It would therefore seem that the effects are too far-reaching to permit liberty to be entirely subject to the necessarily widely varying ideas of commanding officers.

Deprivation of liberty as a punishment.—Let us now consider the merits of deprivation of liberty as a regular form of punishment. Theoretically, punishment is the infliction upon offending individuals of sufficient pain or inconvenience to prevent the repetition of an offense and to act as a warning to others who are liable to commit similar infractions of discipline. There can be no doubt that restriction of liberty accomplishes this object to a certain extent (and the same would be true of the whipping post) but the vital question is whether the ultimate effect on discipline (and consequently efficiency) is good or bad. In other words, is it a desirable form of punishment? It is generally conceded that the most effective punishments are those which are certain and prompt. Are the men who are undergoing punishment in an efficient or desirable mental condition? A man who is suffering from a lack of sufficient food is not in a proper condition for rendering cheerful and efficient service. The same results in a modified degree may be expected if, owing to long restriction on board ship, a man is suffering from a lack of opportunity to satisfy his natural desires. To be in their most efficient condition, men must have recreation as well as food. If either of these is restricted by necessary conditions of service, men will regard it as a simple hardship, a misfortune; but if they are restricted when there is no manifest necessity, or if they are restricted as a punishment, a rebellious frame of mind is the 'result, for it deprives them of what they regard as their natural personal rights. This mental condition diminishes the man's capacity for submitting to discipline, and this diminishes his worth. Therefore restriction of "liberty," which in effect is restriction of bodily or mental necessities, reacts against the discipline and efficiency of the organization while the men remain in the service, and must inevitably tend to drive them out of it at the first opportunity, either by desertion or by failure to re-enlist.

The deprivation of liberty, sometimes as high as three months, which is administered either as a direct punishment or in connection with declassification for comparatively minor offenses, is not prompt; it causes a man to undergo punishment for an offense committed long before, it creates an abnormal mental condition not conducive to efficiency, and deprives him of the pleasures which the life must offer before he will adopt it as a permanent vocation. Though it may be argued that it is nevertheless a punishment which men fear, it may be said that the object of punishment is to exert a corrective, not a punitive effect, and to inflict punishment months after the offense was committed only produces discontent. For the above reasons it would seem apparent that deprivation of "liberty " is not beneficial as a regular form of punishment, and I suggest that a uniform scale of fines would be an ideal substitute. In civil employment fines for tardiness and absence are accepted without friction, but no employer could hold his men for a day if he attempted to punish them by restricting their food or limiting their recreation after working hours. A fine is a direct summary punishment, and being prompt and complete in itself, there would be no mental resentment, and the necessary balance between the pleasures and the distasteful features of the life would be maintained. In short, it is a punishment which, while affording a restraining effect, would not arouse a sense of violation of personal rights; and in order to avoid all suspicion that fines might be inflicted for other than disciplinary purposes, I would suggest that all proceeds from fines be turned into the general mess, or preferably that they be utilized for the benefit of the crew in such manner as the commanding officer might direct.

Therefore, as a remedy for the above enumerated evils in their various forms, it would seem that the following modification of existing regulations and customs would produce the desired result, viz:

Abolish deprivation of liberty as a punishment, except by sentence of a court martial; permit men to go ashore under much the same regulations as govern for officers, namely, when their services can be spared; and substitute as a regular form of punishment a uniform scale of fines based on percentage of pay; and to further prevent dissatisfaction let the money thus forfeited by fine be turned in to the general mess and used in subsisting the crew, or expended for the benefit of the crew in such manner as the commanding officer may direct.

When (as would probably sometimes occur) certain individual fines exceeded the man's pay, then as a last resort he could be deprived of liberty or punished in other ways, but this would be too rare to be of consequence.

PETTY ANNOYANCES.

It is believed that our regulations impose, in the ordinary daily life of the enlisted man, certain unnecessary annoyances so petty in themselves as to be generally overlooked, which have a material weight in causing men to leave the service. Though these annoyances may at first thought seem too trivial to mention, their daily occurrence, the fact that they affect so large a proportion of the enlisted men, and the fact that one's habitual frame of mind, on which contentment depends, is due rather to the minor occurrences in daily life than to those of more importance, but of less frequency, leads me to mention a few of them in detail.

(a) One of the most fruitful minor causes of discontent, for example, I believe to be that of afternoon muster. This muster is required by regulations, and even commanding officers are allowed no discretion. It does not increase efficiency, and it serves daily to annoy the 30,000 enlisted men in the service. I doubt if after officers have attained the high grades and have ceased to come into intimate contact with the men, they are able fully to realize the extent of the annoyance actually created by this muster; to appreciate it fully, one must daily see the men reluctantly breaking away from their games, their nap, their reading, or frequently from their legitimate ship's work, and forming ranks in a manner which clearly shows that they realize that the muster serves no useful purpose, and in a manner which one can clearly see does not lend itself to efficiency or increased contentment. The question arises: "Does the muster serve any useful purpose?" By its means we do ascertain the names of unauthorized absentees, but it is submitted that the unauthorized absence of men is usually discovered, reported, and the ship searched before this muster occurs, and even were this muster the only means of discovering absentees, it must be remembered that it in no way prevents absence; the man is simply found to be out of the ship and the muster only advances by a few hours the time he is missed and reported. True, the setting up drill and double time are carried out, but is this itself necessary? When we consider that from five in the morning until three-thirty or four in the afternoon the men are usually fully occupied in active work and drills, have they not had all of the exercise that is necessary both for their muscles and for their wind?

If this extra exercise is considered necessary would it not be better to double the amount of the morning exercise, and after the day's work is done, say at three-thirty or four-thirty, let the men have the remaining hours up to supper to themselves? What this muster really does is to prolong the working day from nine or ten hours to twelve hours, for it is the interruption, the knowledge that the day is not yet done, rather than the actual work involved, which is annoying. Even were it a sacrifice of the physical wellbeing of the men, the pernicious effect of this muster on their mental attitude should alone justify its omission from the daily routine.

(b) In some respect the uniform regulations are sources of extreme annoyance to the men. The regulation shoes, for example, make the entire enlistment of some men unpleasant, so much so that this constant source of petty annoyance is sufficient in itself to cause some men to leave the service. Where a certain style shoe "as per pattern" is prescribed, the only way to have the ship's crew in regulation shoes is to have them outfitted by the Paymaster. As everyone knows, feet vary considerably in shape as well as in size. It has been found by shoe factories that in order to conform to ordinary variations in the shape of men's feet, they have to manufacture shoes of any particular style in both full and half sizes and in six different widths. Further variety in shape is offered by the slight variations in the numerous styles of shoes; and in the event of a customer having feet of slightly abnormal characteristics, such as a high or a low instep, the manufacturers cater to their customers' trade to the extent of gladly making shoes to order at but a slight increase in price, rather than risk the danger of not giving satisfaction with one of the many ready-made varieties. Such is the variety in the shape of footwear from which a civilian may select. Compare the above attention to this matter, which is forced by business competition upon manufacturers, to that which is devoted to this same point in supplying enlisted men, and remember that the large amount of time during which they go barefooted tends to make their feet harder to fit than those of the average civilian. When we fit out men on board ship we find that the paymaster carries but one style (the regulation pattern) and this in full sizes only, and in two widths,—and this only when he is provided with a full stock; while frequently, I am informed, he is unable to obtain even the above variety of shapes and sizes and consequently, through no fault of his, is not fully fitted out; furthermore, even if fully fitted out on leaving a navy yard, owing to his necessarily limited stock the most common sizes are soon disposed of and his supply shortly consists chiefly of odd sizes. In other words, under the best conditions, the paymaster carries (in the regulation shoe) only one-sixth the variety carried, in any particular style, by a large shoe firm, and frequently he is short of the most common sizes and men must, from this incomplete assortment, buy ill-fitting shoes with their own money and wear them on their own feet, simply for the sake of having every man in the crew shod alike.

It would therefore seem that for the sake of a fetich we are making many men uncomfortable and dissatisfied, not to mention the fact that should the men thus shod land for marching they would be inefficient for the reason that in not a few instances their shoes would not fit. Would it not conduce to efficiency to frame our shoe regulations with greater elasticity, requiring, for example, that the men be neatly shod in black shoes, prescribing the Blucher pattern, calfskin leather, or making such other general qualifications as may be deemed essential? The present regulations in regard to men's shoes are a source of profound annoyance to some men at all times and to all men at some time during their enlistment, whereas were the regulations more liberal, the men would be more contented, better shod, and while perfect similarity would be sacrificed, general appearance would probably be improved.

(c) The undress blue uniform, which is the habitual costume on board ship in cool weather, is annoying in its wristband. As a proof of this all that is necessary is to inspect a working party in this uniform say at three o'clock any afternoon in moderately warm weather: it is probable that more than half of the party will have unbuttoned their wristbands and tucked up their sleeves while the other half will have rolled back the wristband. The tight-fitting wristband lends itself neither to work nor to drill. On the other hand the present blue working jumper, with somewhat shorter sleeves than at present prescribed, is a rational costume for both: the only mistake is that instead of its being the rarely prescribed "working dress," it should be the "undress blue" uniform the same as the white jumper is the "undress white" uniform. This would give the men a comfortable uniform both in blue and in white for ordinary use, thus increasing their daily comfort, while for dress we could retain the present less comfortable, but better appearing, overshirt with tape and wristband.

The above are but a few of the "minor annoyances" which, without increasing efficiency, actually lend themselves to the daily discomfort of enlisted men, and which therefore directly incite discontent in the navy.

INCENTIVES TO RE-ENLISTMENT.

If the above-explained causes that tend to diminish permanence in the enlisted personnel are changed as suggested, I am convinced that conditions in this respect would greatly improve; but there are other changes which might be made in existing customs and laws which would either actively incite re-enlistment of desirable men or facilitate the early discharge of the undesirable.

RETIREMENT OF ENLISTED MEN.

If we hope to retain permanently a large percentage of men, not only must we remove causes of discontent, but it is necessary to offer the men a career to which they can look forward—and this can be accomplished without undue expense.

The recent provision of law that enlisted men can be retired after 30 years' service, provided no man be retired who is less than 50 years old, is a step in the right direction, but its effect in the service was, so to speak, local rather than general. That is to say, it had to my personal knowledge the effect of retaining a number (probably a large number) of men with from 20 to 25 years' service, who saw the chance of retiring on three-fourths pay when they completed their 30 years. But the prospect of a reward at the end of a longer period than 10 years is not sufficient in many cases to accomplish the desired result. Thus, the promise of reward has acted definitely to retain men who had already served 20 years but has in itself probably had little effect in encouraging men with less than 20 years' service to re-enlist, though undoubtedly its general influence on such men has been beneficial.

That its effect has not been all that might be desired is indicated by the fact that only five retirements occurred during the last fiscal year, and that, though this law has been in force seven years, only 133 men are on the retired list, and continuous-service men form only 16.3 per cent of the enlisted personnel, which is almost exactly the same percentage as in 1891, and only about half of that in 1896. To reduce the age of retirement materially would be uneconomical and probably ineffective. What then is a practicable method of increasing the benefit of retirement laws? One of the objects we wish to accomplish in time of peace is not only to prepare the present naval establishment for war, but to provide a well-trained reserve personnel. In the establishment of this reserve, manifestly any man who had no physical disability and who had served several enlistments would be a valuable addition. It would seem possible, therefore, to establish a really efficient reserve in connection with the retired list, and thus by the same act accomplish the two results. This would be an economical method of attaining the desired ends, but it would of course involve some expense, but this expense could well be incurred when the advantage to be gained is considered. This would be more apparent if the value of a really efficient reserve were more constantly before us and received the consideration which its importance merits. I think the following changes in the retirement laws would increase permanence and establish a valuable trained reserve without unduly increasing the expense.

1. Allow enlisted men to retire after 12 years' service on one-eighth pay; after 20 years' service on one-third pay; after 24 years on one-half pay, and after 30 years' service (whether they be 50 years old or not) on three-quarters pay of the rating they may then be holding, all men so retired to be available for service in time of war until they reach the age of 50.

2. Allow men who have retired after 20 years' service or more, to re-enlist for non-sea-going service (except that, in time of war they would be available for service afloat) ; such, for example, as duty on vessels turned over to the naval reserve, on receiving ships and navy yard tugs, at training stations, as range keepers, or on ships in reserve.

3. Allow any man on the retired list who is physically qualified to return to active service in the rating in which he was retired, on his requalifying for such duties. As a retired man receives his recompense while he is retired, treat him in regard to continuous service as if retired service was neutral time. That is, the time from the date of his retirement until the date of his re-entry into active service would be treated as if it did not exist, and in regard to his continuous service he would be treated exactly as lie would have been treated had he re-enlisted on the date of his retirement.

With the idea of increasing the percentage of enlistments among men who fail to re-enlist in four months, I would suggest the following:

4. Allow men to re-enlist as at present within four months and receive pay for those months, but, should a man re-enlist within one year of his discharge, give him credit for his continuous service, but no bonus for re-enlistment, and if he enlists at any time subsequent to one year after discharge, allow the time he has already served to count as retirement service but not as continuous service.

The following advantages would, I believe, result from the suggested change:

First.—The proposed modification of the retirement laws extends to young men a direct active incentive to remain in the service a reasonable length of time, with the assurance that they will be retired on a certain definite pay while they are yet young. It changes retirement from the hope of a reward in the indefinite future (which, as has been shown, fails as an active inducement to retain young men) to a reward which they realize will come in a few years, and which will serve to hold them for three enlistments. Young men are naturally ambitious, and in many instances it would be distasteful to them to feel that they have deliberately chosen as a life work a profession in which the highest position they attain may be that of chief petty officer; but on the contrary if there are several stations along their course at each of which they may choose whether or not they will continue to the next, if the next station is not too distant, and if a reward is held out for them to continue, the result will be to retain many men whom we now lose. By this means it is believed men will be retained for three enlistments, with the intention of then retiring and entering civil life; but on retirement, finding themselves unaccustomed to shore life after twelve years at sea, and finding their retired pay small, many of them will return to service for the two additional enlistments necessary for either their retirement on one-third pay or for shore duty on full pay thereafter. After 20 years' service a man will hardly ever adopt permanent employment in civil life, but will either live on his third pay or, more probably, return to service, with the assurance that if he so desires the remainder of his duty will be on shore, and that after 30 years he will be able to retire on three-quarters pay. The proposed system therefore offers a series of constantly increasing inducements to lead them on in the course which we would have them follow. The present laws have been made rigid with a view of forcing men to stay continuously in the service until they are 50, and also with a view of making them re-enlist in four months; and the penalty for a failure to do either causes the man to lose practically all reward for his past service. Therefore the effect of these rigid laws and regulations in many cases is to prevent men from re-enlisting, rather than to encourage re-enlistment. Hope is an inherent human quality. When a man knows that he must remain in the service until he is an old man, to gain any reward from retirement laws, he will naturally try to better himself by going into civil life at the expiration of his first enlistment. Civil life is not the bell of roses which many sailors expect, but four months is frequently not a sufficient time for them to find this out, though within the first year they will frequently have encountered breakers and learned the practical meaning of hunger and want. If then the opportunity to re-enlist and receive credit for past service is still open to them, they will be more likely to avail themselves of it.

Second.—After men have retired, and gained some experience of civil life, they are still free to return. After a man has done twelve years' honorable service he is a valuable man. With his one-eighth pay as a regular income he may retire from active service to accept a position in civil life, but with disappointment ashore he will frequently return to active duty in order to gain the benefits of the 20-year retirement, provided he knows that he will receive full credit for his past service.

Third.—The progressive system of retirement with increased pay for 12, 20, 24, and 30 years' service would encourage men to remain as at present until they have served 30 years, when they can retire on three-fourths pay. It may be noted that the general principle on which the proposed changes are based is that Americans are susceptible of being led but not driven. We know that certain traits of character exist in the average man, and the proposed changes simply enable us to utilize these traits in accomplishing our ends instead of running counter to them. Officers are held in the service in many cases because they are receiving more pay than they could immediately demand outside, but often that is not true of enlisted men, particularly of skilled mechanics, therefore in order to retain these men we must add an incentive. The hope of retirement in old age does not in itself entirely prevent young officers from resigning, therefore we cannot reasonably expect it to so affect uneducated men who do not look far into the future; hence we must put the retirement within their reach so that they can feel that this reward will come while they are still comparatively young.

Fourth.—The assurance that after 20 years' service they can either retire on one-third pay, or re-enlist on full pay for service on shore, extends to 12-year men a further incentive to re-enlist and serve two additional enlistments. The feature of guaranteeing 20-year men shore duty extends to older enlisted men an appropriate relief from the more active duties afloat, and permits us to utilize them for duty that is absolutely necessaly. Hence it is economical in that it relieves the retired list of the one-third pay which they would draw were they not employed.

Fifth.—The retired list of comparatively young men would be a positive asset in case of war, for, even if many of these men do not return to active service in time of peace, they would be available in time of war and would be a most valuable addition to the naval forces of the country at that critical moment, because they would be on the rolls and subject to immediate orders. In fact, one of the greatest advantages of the proposed change is that it would form a most excellent and highly trained reserve, always available for use the moment war is declared.

Sixth.—The extension of time between enlistments offers the same inducements for immediate re enlistment as at present, and at the same time those who leave the service with the intention of not returning, are encouraged to re-enlist and obtain a reward for the service they have performed.

The criticism that this retired list would be too great an expense appears to me to be unsound. The navy differs from a business organization in that the only return from the money expended is the war-efficiency which is attained. Increased efficiency has therefore a certain definite monetary value. The fact that each man on the retired list would have served three enlistments, many of them five and some seven, would of itself cause an increase of service efficiency which has a definite value. But the efficiency of the peace establishment is not enough. The only reason for all of our training and expenditure is to make the war-navy efficient. Therefore a trained reserve, immediately available for service in war, would be of even greater value in increasing our war-efficiency than in promoting efficiency in the peace establishment. This being true, we should never fear that this retired list would grow too large, but on the contrary we should look with complacency on its attaining the greatest possible size, with the assurance that when war is declared we can utilize a far greater number of such men than we will ever have on our list, and at that time their value will be too great to be measured in dollars and cents.

DESERTION.

Whether it be on account of present laws, or decisions, or regulations, the fact remains that, unless a man pleads guilty to desertion, it is very difficult for any court to find him guilty, provided he voluntarily surrenders himself. It is true that recent court-martial orders differ greatly from former ones in the large number of men against whom desertion is proved, but they nevertheless contain numerous instances of men being found guilty of "absence without leave" who had been absent from their duty for months. From an administrative point of view, desertion is defined as an unauthorized absence of ten days, while from a judicial point the intent to leave the service permanently must be established. It is rarely impossible for a man to surrender himself within the above time limit, therefore if he does remain so absent, it does not appear unreasonable to place the burden of proof on him. If a man remains absent without leave for more than ten days, it would therefore appear reasonable to consider him guilty of desertion (unless he proves conclusively that he made every effort to return) and to punish him accordingly. A man who has left his ship without permission, and remained absent for months or years, is none the less guilty of desertion because he voluntarily surrenders himself, say to escape hunger and privation. His plea that he did surrender himself does not prove that he did not intend at the time he left to abandon the service permanently. To accept such pleas places a premium on actions of this sort. Admiral Goodrich has aptly expressed this thought in saying, "Desertion is a crime, complete in itself, when the inculpating offense is committed." This is undoubtedly one of the most serious defects in our present naval discipline, and it should receive correction either by law or by regulation.

This could be done by giving the word "desertion" a broader interpretation and removing its present technical limitations, or by awarding very summary and severe punishment to men who are to all intents guilty of such an offense. The nature of proof which is required to establish desertion really prevents proving the offense which the law was designed to punish. Our regulations define desertion, and prescribe certain penalties therefor, but before these can be applied the law requires the practically impossible feat of proving the interior workings of a man's mind. Whatever desertion may be in the eyes of the law, if we can assign a uniform and adequate punishment to men who remain absent more than 10 days, and see it carried out, it will remove the somewhat farcical appearance which naval regulations on this subject present to the enlisted man, and in all such cases it is the worst enlisted men who benefit by those technicalities of law.

MONEY REGULATIONS.

The principle of withholding men's money, money which they have on the books, money which belongs to them by virtue of their having earned it, is subject to all of the objections that apply to the curtailment of liberty, because it is a restriction of what men justly regard as an inherent right. It is an undesirable form of punishment in that it creates a mental condition inimical to efficiency, is non-uniform on different ships and, moreover, it invites subterfuge and deceit on the part of the men more than any other form of punishment. These objections are only alluded to, not because they lack importance, but because of their similarity to those attending deprivation of liberty. There is ground for argument that a system of fines, by which men would forfeit their money permanently, would also arouse feelings of resentment, but it is not believed that it would have that effect, provided the scale of fines is uniform and reasonable, for though such money would be forfeited permanently, the transaction would be finished and the proceeds of the fines would revert to the crew. This is not the same constant source of irritation as that caused by withholding the men's own money.

I also specially desire to question the principle of assisting men to save money, which is exhibited in many forms in our regulations. Is this logical and desirable? What are we striving to attain? Efficiency. How can we get it? By contentment and continuous service. To allow men to draw their own money as it becomes due them would certainly promote contentment; conversely, not to do so quickly incites discontent and encourages subterfuge.

Will saving men's money, by punishment, by deposit, or by other methods, increase the amount of continuous service? I cannot think so. If two men are discharged, one with $500 and another with one month's pay, other things being equal, which is the most likely to re-enlist? The one has by our own action been assisted (possibly forced) to save enough money to permit him to enter some civil pursuit; the other will probably be without money in a few days, and will be presenting himself for reenlistment. I therefore believe the general principle is wrong; for, though it may be philanthropic, its effects directly oppose our own interests. The withholding of the man's money throughout his enlistment creates discontent and a consequent desire to leave the service, while the money thus saved enables him to gratify this desire. However beneficial this may be to the man, it is not beneficial to the navy.

Inasmuch as the deposit system is already established by law, and inasmuch as it is a privilege to the men to feel that they have this means of saving money if they so desire, I do not suggest its abolition. That would be undesirable and unnecessary, for we can entirely circumvent its bad effects by simply changing the law so as to permit men to draw the money which they have placed on deposit whenever they desire to do so—and human nature will do the rest. Similarly, it would seem to be to our interests to permit any man to draw every month all money due him in excess of one month's pay.

DISCHARGES.

In the beginning it was shown that efficiency would be promoted if our regulations resulted in permanence of service on the part of good men and facilitated the elimination of undesirables. The quicker men who are unfitted for naval life are removed the better it is for the service. We should not let our desire to establish a permanent body of men make us fail to differentiate between the good and the bad. A bad man's "room is better than his company." If we can get rid of a bad man early in his enlistment, before we have wasted a great amount of time on his training, we can replace him by a good recruit, but to retain him in service with the hope that he may turn over a new leaf is to risk both the contamination due to his example and the time required to train him. When men are lazy, worthless, dull, inapt and malicious they are generally so by nature, and such men, even after an entire cruise, are not of as much value as a good recruit, and the time that has been expended on their training, after their undesirability was shown, could have been used to train several good recruits—this, to say nothing of the pernicious example they have set in the meantime. There should be no temporizing with such men. Our interests would be subserved by discharging them in the beginning. If this is true, who are the most competent to decide as to the men's incompetence? Manifestly, the officers with whom they are serving. Not only is this logically true, but discipline would be strengthened if the officers who are directly responsible for this discipline were given the necessary authority to make it effective. When officers have not the authority to summarily punish an offense, however unruly a man may have been, he is always left the hope that through influence, through error, or through the leniency of those not fully acquainted with his real worthlessness, his penalty may be mitigated—a hope which, however poorly founded, has a pernicious effect on discipline. Is not the whole subject of thus safeguarding the discharge of men, sometimes even to the point of giving them another trial after they have been adjudged by a court of officers to be unfit or undesirable for the service, radically wrong? Is it not highly probable that an average recruit would be more efficient than such a man? Would it not subserve efficiency if the officers present could decide on a man's fitness for the service, at least during his first enlistment, and were authority vested in the commander-in-chief of a fleet or squadron to authorize his discharge, after having assured himself that the further retention of the man would be undesirable? Is it not pernicious for enlisted men to feel that however lazy or inefficient they may be, their bed, board, and pay are safe; that we want men too much to afford to discharge any of them? Is it not pernicious for them to feel in a general way that they cannot be discharged unless they seriously commit themselves? Are such men not of far greater damage than a vacancy? Do we differentiate sufficiently between valuable units and harmful ones?

Is it not true that most officers are inclined to leniency, and do we not allow the possibility of a personal injustice to the man to outweigh a consideration of what the best interests of the service require? When discharges must be authorized by an officer on duty at the Navy Department who can have no especial personal interest in individual men, but to whom the man must in most cases be but a name, is it not likely that a failure on the part of such officer personally to appreciate the worthlessness of the man will render him more lenient than if he had been the commander-in-chief of the squadron in which this man was serving? And if the man is so worthless as to cause the commander-in-chief to discharge him, is he not so worthless as to render his retention in the service undesirable? Moreover, though in theory it seems well that all discharges be ordered by a supreme authority, what is the result in practice? Do not the very necessities of the case prevent any person in high authority from deciding the merits of each case; must they not in almost all cases be decided by a Junior, subject to the general directions and rulings of such superior? Could not these general rulings be transmitted as easily to a commander-in-chief as to said juniors?

We all know of many instances where worthless characters are dragged along for an entire cruise, receiving food and pay, doing little work, causing much annoyance and spending (probably voluntarily) much time in the brig, because it is practically impossible to get them discharged, except for very serious offenses. These men may commit no overt act; or having been found guilty, recommended for discharge and pardoned, they may, while avoiding a repetition of an overt act, render reluctant obedience, and a minimum of efficient service. In either case, such men are a detriment to the navy. The fact that a man commits no overt act does not render him valuable, nor does it in itself justify the expenditure of the time necessary to train him; moreover, the knowledge of the "red tape" involved in discharge, tends to increase the worthlessness of such men.

If the immediate commander-in-chief or squadron commander of such men had full authority to discharge them, and if they had seen examples of men summarily discharged for no other reason than their worthlessness, would it not tend to remove an exalted idea of their value to the service, and either afford means of inciting their best efforts or of relieving the navy of their presence? Would they not soon begin to feel that the service was a business, a vocation in which persistently inefficient men would not be tolerated? Our present regulations offer various rewards to incite men's best efforts and to encourage continuous service, but some men, being naturally lazy and without ambition, are not reached by the stimulating effects of these rewards. Such men are of no help to the navy, but drag along and permit other men to do their quota of work. Is it not logical to get rid of them summarily, and in a manner that will have the best effect upon others?

I have observed at least one example of the beneficial effect of vesting the power of discharge in the commander-in-chief. On the Asiatic Station that officer could formerly authorize the discharge of Chinese messmen. For a while, about 1901, this authority was withdrawn, and the effect was soon noticeable, and after a few months the messmen became really troublesome; realizing that they could not be spared for confinement in the brig or for extra duty, they deteriorated, became lazy and inattentive, and, in some instances, impertinent. This authority was restored to the commander-in-chief after about a year, with the most noticeably beneficial result, though it was not accompanied by wholesale discharges. It simply became known that the authority existed, and that alone was sufficient to produce the effect.

For a commander-in-chief to have the power of discharge is simply in line with a similar custom in commercial life. Experienced men are probably not more important in the navy than in other large organizations, but so far as I know, in all business enterprises the recommendation of any man in even small authority is sufficient to insure the discharge of any man directly under his orders. This gives to the men who are responsible an actual and ever-present hold over the men under them, with the corresponding increase in the efficiency of their respective departments.

SUMMARY.

It will be observed that though I began by discussing means for increasing the permanence of the enlisted personnel, I have suggested many features which facilitate the removal of men from the service. This is not illogical. Believing that the present pay is sufficient for our purpose, that men do not seriously object to necessary work, and that such work, if performed by a body of contented men, would result in naval efficiency, I have endeavored to seek the principal causes of discontent. I have tried to be fair and logical, my principal assumption being that enlisted men were impelled by the same motives that govern other human beings. I have endeavored to show that in any attempt to insure permanence of our personnel, it is quite as important to consider the mental attitude of the men as their physical requirements; that discontent can be created as easily by an assumed grievance as by a well-founded one; that the honestly assumed (and unexplained) grievance is just as harmful to contentment (and discipline) as the well-founded one; and that many of the causes of discontent are not necessarily incident to our entire efficiency. I believe that if the advantages offered by naval life were utilized, and unnecessary annoyances removed, we would have a body of men whose ambition would be to retain their positions permanently, as is the case with our officers, or as is the case in business life, rather than a body of men who are impatiently awaiting the expiration of their enlistment.

I believe that our present regulations are illogical in their attempt to force men to stay in the service, in their failure to take into account the influence of contentment upon efficiency and continuity of service, in their failure to facilitate the early discharge of men who are probably undesirable, and in their failure to so utilize the conditions which exist that men will desire to re-enlist instead of seeking outside employment. I think that the very difference in attitude of the average enlisted man toward his term of enlistment, as compared with that of the average workman toward his vocation, must be corrected before we can expect a large percentage of men to make the navy their life work; and the fact that the average officer is satisfied to do this would seem to indicate that this could be accomplished without jeopardizing efficiency.

Among the points suggested, the following are mere matters of regulation and could be adopted without legislation.

1. Arrange cruises, in so far as possible, with special reference to suitable liberty ports, keeping the men informed of the probable movements as far ahead as practicable.
2. Recognize the military importance of furthering the contentment of the men by the employment of every proper means which does not interfere with efficiency.
3. Establish uniform and more liberal regulations concerning recreation on shore, and so far as possible avoid using deprivation of "liberty" as a punishment.
4. Establish throughout the service a more uniform official supervision over the regulation of messing.
5. Adopt a uniform policy of granting every application for discharge by purchase.
6. Adopt regulations facilitating the discharge of undesirable men, including a consistent policy of approving such recommendations from court-martial.
7. Prescribe for unauthorized absence over ten days a punishment as severe as that for desertion.
8. Change money regulations so that on any pay-day men can draw all they have on the books in excess of one month's pay.

The following changes would require legislation, but owing to their importance I do not believe difficulty would be experienced in getting it.

1. Substitute for deprivation of "liberty" as a regular form of punishment, a uniform, graduated scale of fines.
2. Amend retirement laws, as indicated, in order to combine incentives to continuous service with the establishment of an efficient reserve personnel.
3. Amend desertion laws so that the offense is complete after ten days' absence.
4. Amend deposit laws so that men can draw deposit money when they wish.

It is regrettable that the most important of these recommendations, the adoption of fines as a regular punishment, requires legislation. Some such regular form of punishment is necessary. Restriction of "liberty" is undoubtedly detrimental, extra duty is undesirable and impracticable as an habitual form of punishment, but fines are prompt, summary, final, and complete. They do not require the performance of duty by another person to see the punishment administered. They are therefore ideal, and their adoption would permit us to place service in the navy on much the same footing as service in any other vocation.

In conclusion, let us not forget that efficiency lies in our ability to maintain and handle the weapons under our charge; this means not only guns, but fleets, squadrons, ships, boats, as well as all weapons of offense or modes of defense with which we are provided. To attain this ability we require a body of well-trained men who are contented with their lot, and such a body of men can be acquired only by weeding out the bad as soon as possible, retaining the good permanently, concentrating attention on practical drills, and granting every privilege to the men not inconsistent with efficiency.